Critical Thought: Mapping the Terrain—the most comprehensive online and altogether open–access reference of its kind—was previously entitled Marxisms and Neo–Marxisms: Mapping the Terrain. Its production originated in a rather naïve attempt to constitute a rudimentary, and heavily annotated, classification system for a broad sweep of Marxian perspectives. Even so, the Marxist theoretical tradition—which was initiated by Karl Marx (1818–1883) along with his trusted comrade and collaborator Friedrich Engels (1820–1895)—would be accurately represented by a labyrinth of interconnections and trajectories, not by a two–dimensional Flatland.

The book’s purview was subsequently widened to include a conglomeration of other outlooks, such as: literary criticism, poststructuralism, sociological conflict theories, anarchism and post–anarchism, hermeneutics, existentialism, phenomenology, heterodox or alternative economics, political theology, and an assortment of third–way viewpoints. A new title or descriptor—one specifically highlighting the diversity of intellectual postures now covered—seemed apropos. Additionally, despite a considerable expansion in these ideal types, the author gradually came to appreciate that the construction of any similarly conceived disciplinary taxonomy is extraordinarily problematic or, perhaps, even futile. Such a linear format affords each of the heterogeneous creative inheritances, as presented here, insufficient justice. In this outline, the primary focus is upon radical philosophical and theoretical schemas.

As has frequently become apparent—during the ongoing investigatory process—the assignment of distinctive subject matter to one heading or another was, in a number of instances, somewhat arbitrary. Namely, many of the items selected for inclusion could have been legitimately organized under alternate rubrics. A decision was made, nevertheless, to persevere with the endeavor. Please take into account the limitations of the model, the literature review, and the sporadic personal extrapolation while exploring the text. Furthermore, the intent, throughout, was to be as painstakingly exhaustive and as substantively credible as reasonably possible. Every effort was made not to misrepresent—or much less to disrespect—the work of various scholars, scholar–practitioners, and left–wing activists. Indeed, no one position, theory, current, or tendency has been deliberately biased over all the others.

The writer holds no formal memberships in any political organizations or parties. However, his previous Marxian views approximated those of Tony Cliff’s International Socialist Tendency. Cliff was of the neo–Trotskyists who developed a theory of state capitalism. (C. L. R. James and Raya Dunayevskaya were two others.) Currently, in my work as a sociologist, I more strongly identify with the pioneering work of the Polish–German political activist and author Rosa Luxemburg. Her approach may, aptly, be referred to as Marxist–Luxemburgist democratic left–communist internationalism. I have grounded Luxemburg’s democratic communism in the metatheory of critical realism. It was originally formulated by the distinguished London–born philosopher Roy Bhaskar (1944–2014). In my Dialectical metaRealism™, Marxism–Luxemburgism and Bhaskarian critical realism have been interpreted, jointly, as an approach to both left–refoundation and left–regroupment.

Simultaneously, various elements of world–systems analysis, community organizing, and intersectional and feminist standpoint perspectives have been incorporated into the conceptual framework of Dialectical metaRealism, as well. The latter category refers to extensively utilized developments of, originally, African American feminist critical theory. It was pioneered by the legal scholar Kimberlé Williams Crenshaw, the sociologist Patricia Hill Collins, and others. Emancipation from the abomination of state monopoly capitalism—with the associated inequities of imperialism and cultural hegemony—would inevitably maximize the vast potentialities of humanity, facilitate a freedom from all forms of absolutism and, and protect the poor from all injustices.

The rotten fruits of the mechanisms of disunity or, better, demireality are personal estrangement, social alientation, and antipathy. Anticipating a deliverance from any of the dangerous forces of domination through capitalism, whether of the “Third–Way” or the more classical variety, is a mere idle fancy. The invisible hand of an alleged “free market”—a principal thesis of the Scottish economist Adam Smith (1723–1790)—would be the epitome of magical thinking. Smith’s disempowering subtext, or putative natural law, becomes a commentary on the demireality, the evil, which has been cultivated by a laissez–faire market:

Still, a reasonably dispassionate observer—following a clear–eyed assessment of the precariousness and instability which characterize the contemporary international arena—could justifiably conclude that many of the fundamental properties of any concrete utopia must, on the whole, await socialist liberation. By the same token, even a modest elevation in proletarian and lumpenproletarian (MP3 audio file) class consciousness will—one might contemplate—encourage and facilitate the struggle for a revolutionary, decentralized cosmopolitanism at a dialectical constellation of ensuing circumstances. Although the precise timings of these worldwide transformations to the masses are unknown, their basic contours can, nonetheless, be imagined.

At the outset, a reflection on the fundamental properties of existence may be constructive. Being is not hierarchical or vertical but, rather, laminated—layer within layer within layer. The substance or fabric of reality, in itself, can be visualized as a pure, virtuous, and nondual cosmic envelope. Accordingly, successfully negotiating this inner ground state of copresence vis–à–vis one’s personal activities requires that any explicitly relativist or—worse—nihilist approaches to ethics be firmly, decisively, and unreservedly rejected. For now, regrettably, a plane of dystopian dualism—disunity or, better, demireality—remains a consistently dominant mediator of events on the multinational field. In such a truly barren lifeworld, the mere absence of liberation stands out among the foremost instruments or coördinators of social behavior. Alas, even basic human decency has, by and large, been abandoned.

As such, an identity politics which culminates, tautologically, in the promotion of more identity politics is to no effect. If, however, identity politics leads to a recognition of intersectionality—the oppressions folded inside the contraditions of the capitalist system—such an identity politics could be productive and life–changing. Black identity politics can, because of its structural positioning, sometimes promote a larger struggle for liberation. By contrast, European American identity politics, as a simple assertion of white privilege, will never be an emancipatory project. Framing issues of personal status, dualistically, as being for or against identity politics—or being for or against intersectionality—misses the subtlety.

Moreover, social justice warriors (SJWs) are sometimes critiqued, or more commonly mocked, by commentators on both the left and the right. However, social justice warfare is a tactic, not a strategy. As a tactic, fighting for social justice is fine and commendable, but it needs to be keyed into an appropriate long–term revolutionary strategy. Likewise, decrying the countermovement of political incorrectness on the basis of its safeguarding of white privilege—and, hence, corporate capitalism—must be positively distinguished from oppositions to political correctness for quite different and unrelated reasons, such as: puritanically insulating one’s own personal sensitivities, self–segregrating in a safe space to avoid being “triggered,” or prioritizing politeness over honesty and frankness. Context matters. Words are pointers, not things.

To further illustrate, particular sectors of the culturally alienated proletariat and the underclass were broadly stigmatized as “the deplorables” during the deeply unsettling U.S. presidential campaign season of 2016. Certain individuals, as a result, immediately owned that disparaging label as a collective badge of pride. In the election which succeeded a brutal run for the White House—one characterized by racism, white identity politics, misogyny, ableism, xenophobia, Islamophobia, and social marginalization—the contradictions, the demirealty, or the intersectionality of capitalism intensified. As the economic failures of a post–American America have continued to multiply, the mistakes of the past, evidently forgotten, haunt the present with an astonishing frequency. Yet again, many oppressed male workers—comprising a demographic sometimes portrayed, collectively, as the angry white man—are seen turning against an oppressed, a subaltern other.

Be that as it may, the final contradiction of capitalism may, after years of expectation, be a reality. The ironic, illusory embodiment of a supposed panacea for neoliberalism—a charismatic, flamboyant capitalist or, facetiously, the last Trump—was elected to singlehandedly resolve the problems which, themselves, proceeded from the warriors of deceit in the corporatocracy. Emerging from beneath the skyline as a perfect storm, the enigmatic victor triumphed, narrowly, through the electoral college. Remarkably, during a televised campaign rally, he openly requested that the neo–Stalinist, autocratic government in Russia release hacked data on his nearest challenger. She was, in the end, the overwhelming winner of the popular vote. Advancing in a spiral configuration, the dialectic of modernity, an exemplar of the primary animating impetus of history, seems to have plainly disclosed its antithesis.

The following self–authored verse is a poetic, a meditative, and an impressionistic paraphrase of a poignant aphorism recorded in two of the New Testament’s synoptic Gospels (see Matthew 8:21–22 and Luke 9:59–60). So be it:

Aikido (Japanese, 合気道, aikidō as pronounced in this MP3 audio file), a Japanese martial art, was developed in the twentieth century. The name itself can be roughly translated as the system of harmonious spirit. Morihei Ueshiba (Japanese, 植芝 盛平, Ueshiba Moritaira as pronounced in this MP3 audio file), who lived from 1883 to 1969, was the school’s founder. The aesthetics of aikido are based upon a metaphysical orientation which might, here, be designated as an ontology of reciprocity. The rôle of a skilled practitioner of this powerful art is to tactically and cautiously redirect her or his combatant’s own efforts and chi (Chinese, 氣 as pronounced in this MP3 audio file, qì, “breath, air, spirit, or gas”). Expeditiously, the aikidoist (Japanese, 合気道家, aikidōka as pronounced in this MP3 audio file) brings about the person’s defeat. Aikido’s ultimate aim, however, is to cleanly and decisively beat one’s opponent while, at the same time, avoid bringing harm or injury to the individual.

As the global system becomes evermore complicated, tenuous, and unstable, an allied principle—loosely called the law of unintended consequences—is quite likely more relevant than ever. It was addressed, forthrightly, by the highly regarded American sociologist Robert K. Merton (1910–2003):

By way of analogy, in a hypothetical political philosophy of aikido, prime ministers, presidents, and monarchs find themselves increasingly paralyzed to deal adequately with the pressing demands of their constituents and, on the planetary stage, with the dire onslaught of rapidly changing affairs. Meanwhile, the absenting structures of the dialectic may be deflecting the plans and actions of those same domestic leaders—whether well–intentioned or malicious—down a truly hazardous avenue: The generalized destruction of the present–day order—established on the ruins of World War II—is seemingly around the corner. In that order’s wake, a substantial majority of its inhabitants might be obliterated.

In the meantime, as one ponders, phenomenologically, on those dialectical and causal interventions—throughout each and every sphere of life—one can do little more than to boldly conjecture. Here is a somewhat cursory synopsis:

• First—Fiscal unrest, disruptions to merchandising, breakdowns of service–oriented enterprises and the commons, catastrophic disintegrations of the infrastructures for transportation and communication, and turmoil within and between governments will, admittedly, be ubiquitous and unambiguous. Likewise, apocalyptic convulsions encompassing the substructure of global capitalism and, concurrently, the abrupt collapse of imperialist regimes are, for all intents and purposes, inevitable. Industrially advanced and economically prosperous areas will, one might expect, suffer the most grievous devastation. Taken together, everything—from top to bottom—is about to fall apart.
• Second—As a case in point, an American empire, well past its prime, has been running on the fumes of its long discredited exceptionalist ideology. That nation, now effectively expired, ill–advisedly cast aside the few hitherto undiscarded fragments of its moral compass or collective conscience. While hastening to fill the normative vacuum, many of that nation’s citizens fervently embraced a new reactionary populism. Bigoted politics and rhetoric have, in certain quarters, become socially acceptable or normative, once again. Correspondingly, any respite or reprieve from total, conceivably nuclear, annihilation—hitherto accorded to this racist republic after its 1960s–era civil rights legislation—appears, unfortunately, to have reached its deadline.
• Third—Currently, tremendous revolutionary aptitude lies latent in the workers of the world. For the time being, many would–be proletarian activists, searching for answers to their economic vexations, have been, grievously, placing their faith in right–wing demagogues and ultraconservatives. Dialectical contradictions need somehow to be, opportunistically, harnessed, captured, and canalized in a more constructive direction. So far, no organization or party has succeeded in this area. A scientific socialist method must be discovered for practicing Marx’s eleventh thesis: “Philosophers have sought to understand the world. The point, however, is to change it.”
• Fourth—Further down the road, sober, unvarnished, and levelheaded conversations, requiring extreme foresight and discernment, will be the legacy of our posterity. Their mindful and nuanced discussions must focus on significant issues and practical engagements. As an example, a broad–based inquiry into the best available prospects for eudaimonia (Greek/Hellēniká, εὐδαιμονία, eu̓daimonía as pronounced in this MP3 audio file) might be profitable. That Greek–language expression—later adopted by Aristotle (Ancient Greek/Archaía Hellēniká, Ἀριστοτέλης, A̓ristotélēs)—has conventionally been translated as human flourishing. However, a more literal and precise, albeit less colorful, rendering is good fortune.
• Fifth—After careful and thoughtful deliberation, the attentive reader might be assured or, conversely, dissuaded regarding the merit, or the plausibility, of the foregoing propositions. One’s judgments regarding these premises notwithstanding, human agency is essential for social renewal. Surely, the actual, the unmitigated liberation of countless downcast and dejected multitudes will require the due diligence, sacrificial efforts, and selfless dedication of committed radicals. Scores of class–conscious, democratically supported, and ethically accountable revolutionaries shall undoubtedly arise to serve their comrades. At that point, hopefully, a remnant—angry, disenchanted, and fighting for survival—will enthusiastically migrate from the authoritarian right to the emancipatory Left.

Although the Rubicon has been passed, few seem to have taken notice. Yet, as comedy turns to tragedy, the hour may have arrived to mourn for the imminent future. Humanity now enters the arduous transitional period to a far–off tomorrow. However, while proceeding through a perilous interlude, grave karmic (Sanskrit, कर्म, karma, “action”) repercussions are, ostensibly, unavoidable. Nature, in Her fury, shall shortly manifest the mighty wrath of the dialectic. Would not a logical implication of the accelerating diffusion of neofascism—in societies on both sides of the North Atlantic pond and elsewhere—be the prologue to an era of dewesternization or, in plain English, the curtain call of Western civilization? Therefore, hoping against hope for the revitalization of a profoundly effete establishment—riddled with oligarchy, plutocracy, or crony capitalism—can only be justified by the most callow fantasies of the bourgeoisie.

Tumult and confusion resound as watchwords for these opening decades of the twenty–first century. The welcome demise of the world’s capitalist nation–states would seem to be just over the horizon. In the aftermath of a great unraveling, Earth–shaking events could incur unimaginable adversities. These severe trials and tribulations might afflict the populace, without regard to customary civil boundaries, across a meandering passageway of multiple decades or even several centuries. Speculatively, such terrestrial cataclysms may foreshadow a longstanding, vigorous undertaking to inaugurate a borderless, transitional workers’ state. For generations unborn, the oppressive bourgeois market system—and, with it, poverty as well as wealth—shall be, once and for all, universally denounced and eradicated.

Eventually, the state, in the sense of a “repressive force,” will, according to Engels, have outlived its usefulness. At that point, state domination withers away. The “government of persons” will give way to an “administration of things”:

Dear Rosa Luxemburg was less definitive, but perhaps more circumspect, concerning the features of future communism. Wisely, she also critiqued the lawlike or formulaic revolutionary vision of Vladimir Lenin and Leon Trotsky:

All things considered, the end objective of the aforementioned violent upheavals is—however defined—some manner of glocalized democratic communism (MP3 audio file). The term glocalization (MP3 audio file)—as a portmanteau of globalization and localization—refers, here and now, to an equitable, a well–regulated federation of coöperatives. That neologism was initially an English–language interpretation of dochakuka (Japanese, 土着化, dochakuka as pronounced in this MP3 audio file, “indigenous”). In the present context, glocalization has been adapted by the author to the non–Leninist and, categorically, non–Stalinist stance of a Luxemburgist socialism from below. By virtue of such a markedly non–tyrannical union, localized globalism will be combined with globalized localism. Needless to say, any political democracy without an economic democracy is a faux democracy.

In other words, the material transactions and monetary exchanges—formal as well as informal—of each collectivized, commercial entity will be expertly synchronized as a tight–knit local network of independent labor–managed firms. Grassroots economies—including their sources of revenue and avenues of expenditure—could be administered through the enlightened democratic consultations of popularly elected boards of trustees. Businesses of every sort would, thus, be vigilantly monitored and regulated by assemblies of compassionate public servants. Those representative, custodial bodies shall, of course, be directly responsible and accountable only to their village, neighborhood, or other locality. External vested interests, of all stripes, can have no vote or influence. Moreover, a negative income tax, operating as a catalyzing mechanism of redistribution, must—pursuant to the guidance of the same financial councils—be singularly, consistently, and painstakingly enforced. High and low incomes alike will, by necessity, be thoroughly abolished.

Additional social institutions will also discharge their functions under the full democratic jurisdiction of each municipality. With regard to conducting an overall reform of law enforcement, the more compelling approach is not, as claimed by many pundits, community policing but, rather, the introduction of a new venture in community–run policing. Consequently, the police would always work for the community, not with the community. Individual officers and their supervisors should be subject to immediate and unconditional termination—by the residents themselves—in cases of brutality or any other wrongdoing. That is to say, the underlying framework of criminal justice must be completely revolutionized—taken apart and then re–assembled—not feared or venerated. A reactionary hate movement, like blue lives matter, provides confirmation of the need for a top–to–bottom reconstruction of police departments. That movement is not, by the way, universally supported by peace officers.

In summation, the pathway to hope is paved with crisis upon multiple crises. The answers to the dilemmas which confront the current age do not lie buried on an archaeological site. An excavation of the artifacts from a former, an outmoded, era may uncover ruins, never solutions. Rather, the complex intersections of oppression can single–handedly become disentangled at the crossroads of liberation. In the duality of theory and praxis, true revolutionaries should develop and apply various critical theories and metatheories to address the social problems of the common people. Certainly, emancipation, peace, and unity can be realized—whether by isolated individuals, small groups, complex organizations, cultures, or entire societies. In that sense, a qualified optimism is more than justifiable. Even now, the sands are moving through the hourglass. Only time will tell.

Return to the table of contents.

1. Classical and Orthodox Marxisms: The term “classical Marxism” refers to the broad scope of ideas, covering the world of nature and the human sciences, developed by Karl Marx (Kärl Märks as pronounced in this MP3 audio file) and Friedrich Engels (Frēd′rǐx Ěn′gěls as pronounced in this MP3 audio file) during Marx’s lifetime. The website, Marx Myths and Legends, is an excellent resource for refuting many of the common forms of anti-Marxism. The Dictionary of Revolutionary Marxism is also a helpful repository of information.
   As a aside, Engels speculated regarding the future obsolescence of the (capitalist) state. He, quite notably, did not anticipate the replacement of all forms of vertical authority with horizontal decision-making. That is to say, Engels was not an anarchist. Marxist communism—with the exception of certain of its left libertarian tendencies, currents, or variants—and anarchist communism have, in other words, been historical adversaries.
   “Orthodox Marxism,” on the other hand, began with Engels’ later works and continued through the early 1920s. It included the writings of other Marxist thinkers from this time period, such as Karl Kautsky, Rosa Luxemburg, Leon Trotsky, Daniel De Leon, and Vladimir Lenin. Orthodox Marxism fine-tuned Marxism and, with some writers, turned it into a social science.
   The two basic perspectives, which can be found in both classical and orthodox Marxism, are dialectical materialism and historical materialism. On the other hand, some authors have used dialectical materialism and historical materialism interchangeably.
   1. dialectical materialism (Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels): The unity of contradiction (the dialectic) determines the types of relationships which are found in nature or matter. Through the dialectic, according to Marx and Engels, nature, including human nature, becomes progressively more complex. Although the concept of “dialectical materialism” can be found in Marx’s own writing, the specific term was initially used by Joseph Dietzgen (German, Josef Dietzgen as pronounced in this MP3 audio file), an early Marxist, and, later, by Georgi Plekhanov (Russian Cyrillic, Георгий Плеханов, Georgij Plehanov as pronounced in this MP3 audio file), the father of Russian Marxism, and by Vladimir Lenin (Russian Cyrillic, Влади́мир Ле́нин, Vladímir Lénin as pronounced in this MP3 audio file). In the former Soviet Union, dialectical materialism was abbreviated as diamat (Russian Cyrillic, диамат as pronounced in this MP3 audio file).
      “My dialectic method is not only different from the Hegelian, but is its direct opposite. To [Georg Wilhelm Friedrich] Hegel, the life process of the human brain, i.e., the process of thinking, which, under the name of ‘the Idea,’ he even transforms into an independent subject, is the demiurgos [Latin, dēmiūrgōs, demiurge; the maintainer of the physical universe] of the real world, and the real world is only the external, phenomenal form of ‘the Idea.’ With me, on the contrary, the ideal is nothing else than the material world reflected by the human mind, and translated into forms of thought….
      “… In its [the dialectic’s] rational form it is a scandal and abomination to bourgeoisdom and its doctrinaire professors, because it includes in its comprehension and affirmative recognition of the existing state of things, at the same time also, the recognition of the negation of that state, of its inevitable breaking up; because it regards every historically developed social form as in fluid movement, and therefore takes into account its transient nature not less than its momentary existence; because it lets nothing impose upon it, and is in its essence critical and revolutionary.
      “The contradictions inherent in the movement of capitalist society impress themselves upon the practical bourgeois most strikingly in the changes of the periodic cycle, through which modern industry runs, and whose crowning point is the universal crisis. That crisis is once again approaching, although as yet but in its preliminary stage; and by the universality of its theatre and the intensity of its action it will drum dialectics even into the heads of the mushroom-upstarts of the new, holy Prusso-German empire.”
      [Karl Marx. Capital: A Critique of Political Economy. Volume 1. Samuel Moore and Edward Aveling, translators. Chicago, Illinois: Charles H. Kerr & Company. 1915. (German original, 1867). Pages 25-26.]
      “Since the so-called emancipation of the serfs, the Russian commune was placed by the state in abnormal economic conditions, and since that time the state has not ceased to heap on it all the social forces concentrated in its hands. Weakened by fiscal exactions, it became inert matter easily exploited by commerce, landed property, and usury. This external oppression let loose inside the commune itself the conflict of interests that was already present and rapidly developed the seeds of its decomposition. But that is not all. At the expense of the peasantry, the state has cultivated, in a hot-house, branches of the western capitalist system which, without in any way developing the productive bases of its agriculture, are precisely calculated to facilitate and precipitate the theft of its fruits by unproductive intermediaries. It has thus co-operated in the production of a new capitalist vermin sucking the blood of the ‘rural commune’ that was already so impoverished.
      “In a word, the state has given its assistance in precociously developing the technical and economic means most calculated to facilitate and precipitate the exploitation of the cultivator, that is, of the largest productive force in Russia, and to enrich the ‘new pillars of society.’”
      [Karl Marx, “From the Drafts.” Karl Marx: Selected Writings. Second edition. David McLellan, editor. Oxford, England, and New York: Oxford University Press. 2000. Pages 624-628.]
      “… [Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel accepted] ‘consciousness,’ ‘thought,’ quite naturalistically, as something given, something opposed from the outset to being, to nature. If that were so, it must seem extremely strange that consciousness and nature, thinking and being, the laws of thought and the laws of nature, should correspond so closely. But if the further question is raised what thought and consciousness really are and where they come from, it becomes apparent that they are products of the human brain and that man himself is a product of nature, which has developed in and along with its environment; hence it is self-evident that the products of the human brain, being in the last analysis also products of nature, do not contradict the rest of nature’s interconnections but are in correspondence with them.” [Friedrich Engels. Anti-Düring: Herr Eugen Dühring’s Revolution in Science. Emile Burns, translator. 1878 (German). 1907 (English). Page 13.]
      “According to the materialistic conception, the determining factor in history is, in the last resort, the production and reproduction of immediate life. But this itself is of a twofold character. On the one hand, the production of the means of subsistence, of food, clothing and shelter and the tools requisite therefore; on the other, the production of human beings themselves, the propagation of the species. The social institutions under which men of a definite historical epoch and of a definite country live are conditioned by both kinds of production: by the stage of development of labour, on the one hand, and of the family, on the other. The less the development of labour, and the more limited its volume of production and, therefore, the wealth of society, the more preponderatingly does the social order appear to be dominated by ties of sex. However, within this structure of society based on ties of sex, the productivity of labour develops more and more; with it, private property and exchange, differences in wealth, the possibility of utilising the labour power of others, and thereby the basis of class antagonisms: new social elements, which strive in the course of generations to adapt the old structure of society to the new conditions, until, finally, the incompatibility of the two leads to a complete revolution. The old society, built on groups based on ties of sex, bursts asunder in the collision. of the newly-developed social classes; in its place a new society appears, constituted in a state, the lower units of which are no longer groups based on ties of sex but territorial groups, a society in which the family system is entirely dominated by the property system, and in which the class antagonisms and class struggles, which make up the content of all hitherto written history, now freely develop.” [Friedrich Engels, “The Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State,” in Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels. Selected Works. Volume Three. Moscow: Progress Publishers. 1976. Pages 191-334.]
      “If—it takes a hatter one day to make a hat, and a shoemaker the same time to make a pair of shoes—supposing the material used by each to be of the same value—and they exchange these articles with each other, they are not only mutually but equally benefited: the advantage derived by either party cannot be a disadvantage to the other, as each has given the same amount of labor, and the materials made use of by each were of equal value. But if the hatter should obtain two pair of shoes for one hat—time and value of material being as before—the exchange would clearly be an unjust one. The hatter would defraud the shoemaker of one day’s labor; and were the former to act thus in all his exchanges he would receive for the labor of half a year, the product of some other person’s whole year; therefore the gain of the first would necessarily be a loss to the last. We have heretofore acted upon no other than this most unjust system of exchanges—the workmen have given the capitalist the labor of a whole year in exchange for the value of only half a year—and from this, and not from the assumed inequality of bodily and mental powers, in individuals, has arisen the in equality of wealth and power which at present exists around us. It is an inevitable condition of inequality of exchanges—of buying at one price and selling at another —that capitalists shall continue to be capitalists and working men be working men, the one a class of tyrants and the other a class of slaves.” [Karl Marx. The Poverty of Philosophy. H. Quelch, translator. Chicago, Illinois: Charles H. Kerr & Company. 1910. Page 77.]
      “The worker receives means of subsistence in exchange for his labour, but the capitalist receives in exchange for his means of subsistence labour, the productive activity of the worker, the creative power whereby the worker not only replaces what he consumes but gives to the accumulated labour a greater value than it previously possessed. The workers receives a part of the available means of subsistence from the capitalist. For what purpose do these means of subsistence serve him? For immediate consumption.” [Karl Marx, “Wage Labour and Capital [1847].” Classical Sociological Theory. Second edition. Craig Calhoun, Joseph Gerteis, James Moody, Steven Pfaff, and Indermohan Virk, editors. Malden, Massachusetts: Blackwell Publishing. 2007. Pages 122-129.]
      “Men make their history themselves, but not as yet with a collective will according to a collective plan or even in a definite, delimited given society. Their aspirations clash, and for that very reason all such societies are governed by necessity, the complement and form of appearance of which is accident. The necessity which here asserts itself athwart all accident is again ultimately economic necessity. This is where the so-called great men come in for treatment. That such and such a man and precisely that man arises at a particular time in a particular country is, of course, pure chance. But cut him out and there will be a demand for a substitute, and this substitute will be found, good or bad, but in the long run he will be found.” [Friedrich Engels, “To H. Starkenburg: London, January 25, 1894.” The Marx-Engels Reader. Second edition. New York and London: W. W. Norton & Company. 1978. Pages 767-768.]
      “Although [Karl] Marx never followed up his plan of expounding his dialectical methodology – and although he did not use the words ‘dialectical materialism’ to describe his doctrine – the elements of his thought are undeniably those conveyed by this term. One can understand why he should have stressed the dialectical form of his account of economics with a certain ‘coquetry’ as he himself puts it (in the preface to the second edition of Capital), having previously come down so hard on all ‘metaphysics of political economy.’” [Henri Lefebvre. Dialectical Materialism. John Sturrock, translator. Minneapolis, Minnesota: University of Minnesota Press. 2009. Page 74.]
      “Marxism, through its philosophy of ‘dialectical materialism,’ conjures away the contradiction between the high moral dynamism of our age and our stern critical passion which demands that we see human affairs objectively, i.e. as a mechanistic process in the Laplacean manner. These antinomies, which make the liberal mind stagger and fumble, are the joy and strength of Marxism: for the more inordinate our moral aspirations and the more completely amoral our objectivist outlook, the more powerful is a combination in which these contradictory principles mutually reinforce each other.” [Michael Polanyi. Personal Knowledge: Towards a Post-Critical Philosophy. London and New York: Routledge imprint of Taylor & Francis Group, an Informa PLC business. 1962. Page 243.]
      “Since I am here dealing only with the question of epistemology, it will be allowable, I think, to assume that there is a matter of intuition, distinct from thought, and not reducible to it, (though incapable of existing apart from it,) since this is the position taken up within [Georg Wilhelm Friedrich] Hegel’s Logic. Whether the dialectic process has any relation to it or not, its existence is, in the Logic, admitted, at least provisionally. If Hegel did make any attempt to reduce the whole universe to manifestation of pure thought, without any other element, he certainly did not do so till the transition to the world of Nature at the end of the Logic. Even there I believe no such attempt is to be found.” [John McTaggart Ellis McTaggart. Studies in the Hegelian Dialectic. Kitchener, Ontario: Batoche Books. 1999. Pages 226-227.]
      “… as [Karl] Marx was to put it later, ‘the only immutable thing is the abstraction of movement.’ Gradual change is going on all the time, some of it repetitive. But from time to time slow, cumulative secular changes lead to more fundamental changes in the nature of the entity, watersheds as it were. These changes were not just changes of quantity or degree, but qualitative changes of kind. The fundamental transitions of birth and death were biological instances of such qualitative macro-changes. So were the life and death, analogically, of societies.” [Peter Worsley. Marx and Marxism. Revised edition. London and New York: Routledge imprint of Taylor & Francis Group, an Informa PLC business. 2002. Pages 15-16.]
      “One of the principal sources of the difficulties of interpretation raised by [Karl] Marx’s work resides in the fact that it is at the same time the work of both a scholar and a militant. The militant wished to mobilize his potential troops against the adversary, in such a manner as to reduce the ‘historical birth pangs.’ The scientist was aware of the complexity of the social processes and of the fact that this complexity itself rendered the consequences of social action difficult to foresee. The militant wished that the proletariat would mobilize itself against the capitalists, perhaps because he was not entirely convinced that the internal contradictions of capitalism would be sufficient to render its destruction inevitable. He wanted the proletariat to eliminate the middle class in the same way as the middle class had eliminated the feudal class. But the scholar had clearly seen the importance of the downfall of private income from the land in the process of the degeneration of feudalism, and realized that it was due to an accumulation of exogenous factors.” [Raymond Boudon and François Bourricaud. A Critical Dictionary of Sociology. Peter Hamilton, translator. London and New York: Routledge imprint of Taylor & Francis Group, an Informa PLC business. 2003. Page 229.]
      “In terms of the basic class relationship of capital/labour, we have seen that it is fundamentally a relationship of work which has the commodity form. Capital appears as a means of social control through work under circumstances in which capitalists control the means of production and thus force the working class to work for them. This is not accomplished easily because the working class, too, has initiative and there is a continual power struggle — the class struggle over work. The character of that struggle has varied — whether, how much, what price — but it is always about work, about the commodity form.” [Harry Cleaver. Reading Capital Politically. Oakland, California: AK Press. 2000. Page 159.]
      “… dialectical materialism deduces … that ‘reality’ and ‘dialectical contradiction’ are the same thing—that is, interchangeable terms and concepts. In its view, everything is contradiction: mechanical motion, the cell, action and reaction in physics, as well as the relation between capital and wage-labour: there is no thing or reality devoid of inner contradiction.” [Lucio Colletti, “Marxism and the Dialectic.” New Left Review. Series I, number 93, September–October 1975. Pages 3-29.]
      “… I shall argue, they [Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels] associated themselves with the kind of democratic communism advocated during the Revolution by Gracchus Babeuf and other members of the 1796 Conspiracy of the Equals. The Equals’ first priority had been to reinstate the Constitution of 1793, which had established universal (male) suffrage, national and local elections, majority rule, a uniform civil and criminal legal code, unlimited freedom of the press, speech and assembly, and other key democratic rights; and there is no reason to think that Marx and Engels, in their turn, ever abandoned these goals.” [Daniela Cammack, “Marx, Engels and the Democratic Communist Tradition.” Privately published paper. December 21st, 2011. Retrieved on September 21st, 2016.]
   2. historical materialism (Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels): Dialectical materialism is applied to history and social science. The relations between dominators (or oppressors) and the dominated (or the oppressed) are characterized by contradictions (the dialectic). Throughout most of human history, dominant or oppressive groups have used their ownership and control of the economy to dominate or oppress others. Examples include: ancient slavery, medieval feudalism, and modern capitalism. This oppression began following the end of a global dominance of primitive communism (hunting-fishing-gathering or foraging societies).
      In Engels’ book, Socialism: Utopian and Scientific (1880), he referred to this social theory as “historical materialism” and, alternately, as “scientific socialism.” Engels distinguished between scientific (Marxian) socialism and the utopian socialism of Robert Owen and others. Later, in his letter to Conrad Schmidt (1890), he also designated the perspective as “[t]he materialist conception of history.” These terms are, approximately, three alternate designations for the same theory.
      “To accomplish … [the] act of universal emancipation is the historical mission of the modern proletariat. To thoroughly comprehend the historical conditions and this the very nature of this act, to impart to the now oppressed proletarian class a full knowledge of the conditions and of the meaning of the momentous act it is called upon to accomplish, this is the task of the theoretical expression of the proletarian movement, scientific Socialism.” [Friedrich Engels. Socialism: Utopian and Scientific. Edward Aveling, translator. Chicago, Illinois: Charles H. Kerr & Company. 1908. Page 139.]
      “I hope even British respectability will not be overshocked if I use, in English as well as in so many other languages, the term ‘historical materialism,’ to designate that view of the course of history which seeks the ultimate cause and the great moving power of all important historic events in the economic development of society, in the changes in the modes of production and exchange, in the consequent division of society into distinct classes, and in the struggles of these classes against one another.” [Friedrich Engels. Socialism: Utopian and Scientific. Engels’ introduction to the English-language edition. 1880 (German). 1892 (English).]
      “… one worker is married, another is not; one has more children than another, and so on and so forth. Thus, with an equal performance of labor, and hence an equal in the social consumption fund, one will in fact receive more than another, one will be richer than another, and so on. To avoid all these defects, right, instead of being equal, would have to be unequal.
      “But these defects are inevitable in the first phase of communist society as it is when it has just emerged after prolonged birth pangs from capitalist society. Right can never be higher than the economic structure of society and its cultural development conditioned thereby.
      “In a higher phase of communist society, after the enslaving subordination of the individual to the division of labor, and therewith also the antithesis between mental and physical labor, has vanished; after labor has become not only a means of life but life’s prime want; after the productive forces have also increased with the all-around development of the individual, and all the springs of co-operative wealth flow more abundantly – only then then can the narrow horizon of bourgeois right be crossed in its entirety and society inscribe on its banners: From each according to his ability, to each according to his needs!
      [Karl Marx. Marx’s Critique of the Gotha Programme. Moscow: Progress Publishers. 1970 (German original, 1875). Page 5.]
      “The materialistic doctrine that men are the products of conditions and education, different men therefore the products of other conditions and changed education, forgets that circumstances may be altered by men and that the educator has himself to be educated. It necessarily happens therefore that society is divided into two parts, of which one is elevated above society (Robert Owen for example).
      “The occurrence simultaneously of a change in conditions and human activity can only be comprehended and rationally understood as a revolutionary fact.”
      [Karl Marx, “Marx on Feuerbach (Jotted down in Brussels in the spring of 1845).” (Theses on Feuerbach.) In Friedrich Engels. Feuerbach: The Roots of the Socialist Philosophy. Austin Lewis, translator. Chicago, Illinois: Charles H. Kerr & Company. 1908. Pages 129-133.]
      “The dialectical method … came to be added to historical materialism and the analysis of the economic content, once this analysis had been sufficiently developed to allow and demand a rigorous scientific expression. The dialectical method, worked out first of all in an idealist form, as being the activity of the mind becoming conscious of the content and of the historical Becoming, and now worked out again, starting from economic determinations, loses its abstract, idealist form, but it does not pass away. On the contrary, it becomes more coherent by being united with a more elaborate materialism. [Henri Lefebvre. Dialectical Materialism. John Sturrock, translator. Minneapolis, Minnesota: University of Minnesota Press. 2009. Page 72.]
      “Having generalized the experiences of the proletariat’s revolutionary struggle and the data of science, [Karl] Marx and [Friedrich] Engels demonstrated the dialectical-materialist character of development of nature and of human society. They completed the edifice of materialism by applying it to social history, and in this way created historical materialism. This was of great revolutionary significance both for the science of society and for the entire social practice. An integral theory of the laws of the development of nature, society and thought—the philosophy of dialectical and historical materialism—was created.” [Alexander Spirkin. Fundamentals of Philosophy. Sergei Syrovatkin, translator. Moscow: Progress Publishers. 1990. Page 62.]
      “Marxism refers to those schools of social, economic, political and philosophical enquiry that derive their approach from the work of Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels. The interpretations and developments of Marx’s work are extremely diverse. They share an approach to the analysis of society that gives primacy to economic activity, although key debates within Marxism centre on the degree to which the economic base determines the nature and structure of the rest of society. Societies are understood as being structured according to the exploitation of subordinate classes by a dominant class. Historical change is therefore typically analysed in terms of developments within the economic base, that are manifest as class conflict and revolution.” [Andrew Edgar, “Marxism.” Cultural Theory: The Key Concepts. Second edition. Andrew Edgar and Peter Sedgwick, editors. London and New York: Routledge imprint of Taylor & Francis Group, an Informa PLC business. 2008. Pages 196-199.]
      “The real originality of [Karl] Marx and [Friedrich] Engels lies in the field of politics, not in economics or philosophy. They were the first to discover the historical potential of the new class that capitalism had brought into existence—the modern proletariat, a class that could encompass a universal liberation from all prevailing forms of oppression and exploitation.… But the decisive contribution made by the founders of historical materialism was the theory of proletarian revolution.” [Robin Blackburn, “Marxism: Theory of Proletarian Revolution.” New Left Review. Series I, number 97, May–June 1976. Pages 3-35.]

Return to the table of contents.

2. Spectrum of Left–Wing Tendencies: The current chapter includes several tendencies or perspectives related to communist, socialist, and anarchist theory and praxis (practice). For clarification, this writer’s personal definition of the word communism is “the demolition of the capitalist state and the proletarian state along with some agnosticism concerning future communism.” Marxism–Leninism, Marxism–Trotskyism, the communist left, Marxism–De Leonism, Marxism–Titoism, Marxism–Sorelianism (Georges Sorel’s revolutionary syndicalism), Eduard Bernstein’s evolutionary socialism (including both democratic socialism and social democracy), Left Refoundation and Regroupment, and left anarchism will be considered in sequence. Sections devoted to Marxism–Maoism and Marxism–Juche can be found in the chapter on Global Southernism and Third World. For a guide to various left tendencies, visit the website, Leftist Parties of the World.
   1. Marxism–Leninism: Historically, Marxism-Leninism (or the Marxist-Leninist tendency) has been the dominant political expression of Marxism. It was, arguably, a failed attempt to apply Marxism, as modified (or, rather, distorted) by Vladimir Lenin and others, to nation states. According to Marxism-Leninism, a revolutionary vanguard or vanguard party, consisting of class-conscious members of the working class (i.e., those who have rejected capitalism), establish a single-party state. This list is far from being comprehensive.
      “In deed – a complete renunciation of dialectical materialism, i.e., of Marxism; in word – endless subterfuges, attempts to evade the essence of the question, to cover their retreat, to put some materialist or other in place of materialism in general, and a determined refusal to make a direct analysis of the innumerable materialist declarations of Marx and Engels. This is truly ‘mutiny on one’s knees,’ as it was justly characterised by one Marxist.” [Vladimir I. Lenin. Materialism and Empirio-Criticism Critical Comments on a Reactionary Philosophy. 1908.]
      1. Soviet Marxist-Leninism (Vladimir Lenin and many others): The establishment, through national revolutions, of single-party governments around the world. Command economies, where governments have centralized control over the economy, were implemented. The Communist Party of the Russian Federation is the successor to the Communist Party of the (former) Soviet Union.
         “The internal social and economic conditions, the oppressive political system, the national tensions and the class conflicts within the Russian Empire which led to the revolution of 1917 have been described elsewhere in this series. However, it is worth recalling some of the salient features of the tsarist social and political order into which Joseph Stalin was born and in which he served his revolutionary apprenticeship.
         “At the end of the nineteenth century, the Russian Empire was the largest continuous land-empire in the world, covering approximately one-sixth of the earth’s land surface. In 1897 it contained a population of over 125 million people, of which only two-fifths were Russian. The other 60 per cent was made up of a multinational, multilingual and multireligious conglomeration of Slavs, Jews, Balts, Finns, Georgians, Armenians, Azeris, Turkic-speaking Muslim peoples of Central Asia, and a whole patchwork of aboriginal ethnic groups and tribes in Siberia and the Far East. Many of them suffered from various forms of racial discrimination and religious persecution and actively struggled to liberate themselves from Russian imperialism. Stalin, himself a non-Russian, made the nationalities problem of the Russian Empire one of his special areas of expertise, and it was in fact as People’s Commissar for Nationalities that he made his political debut in the very first Soviet government.”
         [Alan Wood. Stalin and Stalinism. Second edition. London and New York: Routledge imprint of Taylor & Francis Group, an Informa PLC business. 2005. Pages 5-6.]
      2. Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (Arabic/ʿArabiyyaẗ, الجَبْهَة الشَعْبِيَّة لِتَحْرِير فِلَسْطِين, ʾal-Ǧabhaẗ ʾal-Šaʿbiyyaẗ li-Taḥrīr Filasṭīn) or the PFLP: It is a secular, non-Islamic Marxist-Leninist organization in Palestine.
      3. Egyptian Communist Party (Arabic/ʿArabiyyaẗ, الحِزْب الشُيُوعِيّ المِصْرِيّ, ʾal-Ḥizb ʾal-Šuyūʿiyy ʾal-Miṣriyy): It is a Marxist-Leninist organization.
      4. The National Liberation Front – Bahrain (Arabic/ʿArabiyyaẗ, الجَبْهَة التَحْرِير الوَطَنِيّ ـ البَحْرَيْنِ, ʾal-Ǧabhaẗ ʾal-Taḥrīr ʾal-Waṭaniyy – ʾal-Baḥrayni): It is a Marxist-Leninist group.
      5. Jordanian Democratic People’s Party (Arabic/ʿArabiyyaẗ, الحِزْب الشَعْب الدِيمُقرَاطِيّ الأُرْدُنِّيّ, ʾal-Ḥizb ʾal-Šaʿb ʾal-Dīmūqrāṭiyy ʾal-ꞌUrdunniyy): It is a Marxist-Leninist organization.
      6. The Struggle (ʾUrdū, طَبَقَاتِی جِدُوجْہَد, Ṭabaqātī Ǧidūǧhad, literally, “class struggle”): It is a Marxist-Leninist organization in Pakistan.
      7. Communist Party of Pakistan (ʾUrdūized English, کُمْیُونِسْٹ پَارْٹِی آف پَاکِسْتَانَ‎, Kumyūnisṭ Pārṭī ʾâf Pākistāna): It is a Marxist-Leninist group.
      8. Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Party (Amharic, የኢትዮጵያ ሕዝባዊ አብዮታዊ ፓርቲ, Yaʾutéyop̣éyā Ḥézébāwi ʾAbéyetāwu Pārétu): It originally supported a Marxist-Leninist revolution in Ethiopia.
      9. Māq″y (Hebrew/ʿIḇəriyṯ, מָק״י): It is a Hebrew acronym for the Communist Party of Israel (Hebrew/ʿIḇəriyṯ, הָמִפְלָגָה הָקוֹמוּנִיסְטִית הָיִשְׂרְאֵלִית, hā-Mip̄əlāḡāh hā-Qōmūniysəṭiyṯ hā-Yiśərəʾēliyṯ; or Arabic/ʿArabiyyaẗ, الحِزْب الشُيُوعِيّ الإِسْرَائِيلِيّ‎, ʾal-Ḥizb ʾal-Šuyūʿiyy ʾal-ꞌIsrāꞌīliyy), a Marxist-Leninist organization.
      10. Israeli Communist Forum (Hebrew/ʿIḇəriyṯ, הָפוֹרוּם הָקוֹמוּנִיסְטִי הָיִשְׂרְאֵלִי, hā-P̄ōrūm hā-Qōmūniysəṭiy hā-Yiśərəʾēliy; or Arabic/ʿArabiyyaẗ, المُنْتَدَى الشُيُوعِيّ الإِسْرَائِيلِيّ, ʾal-Muntadaỳ ʾal-Šuyūʿiyy ʾal-ꞌIsrāꞌīliyy): It is a Marxist-Leninist activity.
      11. Communist Party of India (Marxist) (Hindī, भारत की कम्युनिस्ट पार्टी (मार्क्सवादी), Bhārata kī Kamyunisṭa Pārṭī (Mārksavādī)): It is a Marxist-Leninist organization.
      12. Communist Party of Greece (Greek/Hellēniká, Κομμουνιστικό Κόμμα Ελλάδας, Kommounistikó Kómma Elládas): It is a Marxist-Leninist organization in Greece.
      13. Jordanian Communist Party (Arabic/ʿArabiyyaẗ, الحِزْب الشُيُوعِيّ الأُرْدُنِّيّ, ʾal-Ḥizb ʾal-Šuyūʿiyy ʾal-ꞌUrdunniyy): It is a Marxist-Leninist group.
      14. Communist Party U.S.A.: It is a Marxist-Leninist party in the U.S.
          “Founded in 1919, the Communist Party USA has championed the struggles for democracy, labor rights, women’s equality, racial justice and peace for ninety years. The Communist Party has an unparalleled history in the progressive movement of the United States, from the struggle against Jim Crow segregation, the organizing of the industrial unions, from the canneries of California, to the sweatshops.” [“The Party.” Communist Party U.S.A. Undated. Retrieved on September 20th, 2015.]
      15. Marxist-Leninist Party of Canada: It is a Marxist-Leninist party in Canada.
          “A new direction for the economy that upholds public right, not monopoly right. Sovereign decision making over the economy has to be restored and manufacturing made a priority using natural resources to meet the people’s needs, not for sell-out. An end to the sell-off and privatization of public assets.” [“Vote Marxist-Leninist!” Marxist-Leninist Party of Canada. Undated. Retrieved on September 20th, 2015.]
      16. Communist Party of Great Britain (Marxist-Leninist): A Marxist-Leninist party in the United Kingdom.
          “We are constantly told that Trotsky was the true ‘inheritor’ of Lenin and one of the authors of the Russian revolution, but nothing could be further from the truth. In fact, Trotsky was an enemy of Lenin and Leninism until the eve of the revolution, and only joined the Bolsheviks in 1917 when it was obvious they were going to win.” [“Trotskyism is a tool of the capitalists … Leninism is a weapon for the workers!” Communist Party of Great Britain (Marxist-Leninist). October 27th, 2014. Retrieved on September 20th, 2015.]
      17. Communist Movement of the Punjab (Guramukhī Pajāba script, ਪਜਾਬ ਦੀ ਕਮਿਊਨਿਸਟ ਲਹਿਰ, Pajāba dī Kamiꞌūnisaṭa Lahira; or Šāh Mukhī Panǧāba script, پَنْجَابَ دِی کَمِیُونِسَٹَ لَہِرَ, Panǧāba dī Kamiyūnisaṭa Lahira): It is a Marxist-Leninist activity in the Punjab.
      18. Lao People’s Revolutionary Party (Laotian, ພັກປະຊາຊົນປະຕິວັດລາວ, Phak-Pasāson-Patiwat-Lāw): It is a Marxist-Leninist party in Laos (MP3 audio file).
      19. The Communist Party of Vietnam (Vietnamese, Đảng Cộng sản Việt Nam): This Marxist-Leninist party in Vietnam follows Ho Chi Minh Thought (Vietnamese, Tư tưởng Hồ Chí Minh).
      20. Fight Imperialism, Stand Together (FIST): A youth-oriented Marxist-Leninist organization.
          “… what is the answer? The answer is the abolition of the capitalist system and the expropriation of the capitalist class. In the place of the capitalist system a system based on actual human need, in solidarity with the oppressed and workers the world over, needs to be built. The system of socialism removes the profit motive; the means of production are held and developed by the entire society for the need of all in society, not for profit.” [Tyneisha Bowens, Ben Carroll, LeiLani Dowell, Elena Everett, Julie Fry, Larry Hales, David Hoskins, Caleb Maupin, and Dante Strobino. What Is Marxism All About? New York: World View Forum. 2013. Page 9.]
          “A worker is anyone who sells their labor power in order to survive. The overwhelming majority of humanity is made up of workers. There are workers in the United States, France, Australia, Bangladesh, Jamaica, China, Tunisia and every other country on earth. Every building in the New York City skyline is the product of the collective work of thousands of workers. Every product in every store was produced by workers, packaged by workers, stocked and transported by workers, and sold by workers.
          “The labor of workers makes the world move. The labor of workers is the source of all wealth and power.
          “You are not a capitalist. In addition to the overwhelming majority of humanity that are workers, there is a very small group of people called capitalists. They are sometimes called ‘the ruling class,’ the ‘bourgeoisie,’ or ‘the 1%.’ These are people who do not make their living by stocking shelves, sweeping floors, teaching students, painting pictures, or do any other useful work.
          “The small minority of people in the capitalist class make their living by owning, not by working. They own the majority of the world. They own the natural resources and land. They own the factories. They own huge stores. They own the oil wells. They own the banks.”
          [Editor. The Truth about Communism. Fight Imperialism, Stand Together (FIST). Undated pamphlet.]
          “The Marxist conception of the state has been the center of debate among activists for more than a century. By ‘the state,’ we mean the police, the military, the prison system, the courts, and other supporting institutions. These are the primary tools of class domination, through which the billionaire .01% ruling class control the rest of society. The state has consistently been the primary tool of oppression of the Black nation, Indigenous peoples, the Chicana/o nation, as well as other nationalities within the US. It is also the primary tool for reinforcing gender oppression, oppression of LGBTQ [Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgendered, and Queer] people, and other forms of social oppression.” [Andy Katz and Scott Williams, “How will we defeat the police state?” Red Flag: The Voice of Fight Imperialism, Stand Together. Volume 1, issue 2. Pages 4-7.]
      21. Hoxhaism (MP3 audio file): This Marxist-Leninist philosophy was established in Albania under the leadership of Enver Hoxha (MP3 audio file). He lived 1908–1985 A.D.
          “The revolution and socialism as a theory and practical activity cannot be imposed on the masses from outside by isolated individuals or groups of people. The revolution and socialism represent the only key which the proletariat and the masses need to solve the irreconcilable contradictions of capitalist society, to put an end to their exploitation and oppression and establish genuine freedom and equality. As long as there is oppression and exploitation, as long as capitalism exists, the thinking and struggle of the masses will always be directed towards the revolution and socialism.” [Enver Haxha. Eurocommunism is Anti-Communism. Undated.]
      22. Other Versions of Marxist–Leninism: In the 21st century, Cuba is the only remaining nation state where Marxist-Leninism, of a sort, continues to be dominant. However, it seems to be declining in importance under the presidency of Raúl Castro (MP3 audio file). Both Vietnam and Laos are, for their parts, gradually transitioning from Marxism–Leninism to market-based economies. Mainland China has pursued a similar course. Marxism–Maoism, a branch of Marxism–Leninism, is discussed in the chapter on Global Southernism and Third World.
   2. Marxism–Trotskyism as pronounced in this MP3 audio file (Russian Cyrillic, Марксизм Троцкизм, Marksizm Trockizm): Leon Trotsky (Russian Cyrillic, Лео́н Тро́цкий, León Tróckij as pronounced in this MP3 audio file), 1879-1940, was born Lev Davidovich Bronstein (Russian Cyrillic, Лев Давидович Бронштейн, Lev Davidovič Bronštejn as pronounced in this MP3 audio file). He was assassinated by the former Soviet Union’s secret police (the KGB) while in Mexico. Trotsky critiqued Soviet Marxism–Leninism as having devolved into a “degenerated workers’ state.” Trotsky himself accepted Bolshevism and regarded his approach as Marxism–Leninism—although some other Marxist–Leninists would disagree. One of Trotsky’s major perspectives is his theory of permanent revolution. Trotskyists began the Fourth International. An offshoot, or branch, of Trotskyism, known as third–camp socialism, also developed. (The other two camps are capitalism and Stalinism.)
      “We met with success in the October Revolution, but the October Revolution has met with little success in our press. Up to the present time we lack a single work which gives a comprehensive picture of the October upheaval and puts the proper stress upon its most important political and organizational aspects. Worse yet, even the available firsthand material—including the most important documents — directly pertaining to the various particulars of the preparation for the revolution, or the revolution itself remains unpublished as yet. Numerous documents and considerable material have been issued bearing on the pre-October history of the revolution and the pre-October history of the party; we have also issued much material and many documents relating to the post October period. But October itself has received far ]ess attention. Having achieved the revolution, we seem to have concluded that we should never have to repeat it. It is as if we thought that no immediate and direct benefit for the unpostponable tasks of future constructive work could be derived from the study of October; the actual conditions of the direct preparation for it; the actual accomplishment of it; and the work of consolidating it during the first few weeks.” [Leon Trotsky. The Lessons of October. Pacifica, California: Marxists Internet Archive (Marxists.org) ebook edition. 1924. Page 1.]
      “The world political situation as a whole is chiefly characterized by a historical crisis of the leadership of the proletariat.
      “The economic prerequisite for the proletarian revolution has already in general achieved the highest point of fruition that can be reached under capitalism. Mankind’s productive forces stagnate. Already new inventions and improvements fail to raise the level of material wealth. Conjunctural crises under the conditions of the social crisis of the whole capitalist system inflict ever heavier deprivations and sufferings upon the masses. Growing unemployment, in its turn, deepens the financial crisis of the state and undermines the unstable monetary systems. Democratic regimes, as well as fascist, stagger on from one bankruptcy to another.
      “The bourgeoisie itself sees no way out. In countries where it has already been forced to stake its last upon the card of fascism, it now toboggans with closed eyes toward an economic and military catastrophe. In the historically privileged countries, i.e., in those where the bourgeoisie can still for a certain period permit itself the luxury of democracy at the expense of national accumulations (Great Britain, France, United States, etc.), all of capital’s traditional parties are in a state of perplexity bordering on a paralysis of will. The ‘New Deal,’ despite its first period of pretentious resoluteness, represents but a special form of political perplexity, possible only in a country where the bourgeoisie succeeded in accumulating incalculable wealth. The present crisis, far from having run its full course, has already succeeded in showing that ‘New Deal’ politics, like Popular Front politics in France, opens no new exit from the economic blind alley.”
      [Leon Trotsky. The Death Agony of Capitalism and the Tasks of the Fourth International: The Transitional Program adopted by the Founding Conference of the Fourth International with the Statutes of the Fourth International. New York: Pioneer Publishers. 1946. Pages 5-6.]
      “Dialectic is neither fiction nor mysticism, but a science of the forms of our thinking insofar as it is not limited to the daily problems of life but attempts to arrive at an understanding of more complicated and drawn-out processes. The dialectic and formal logic bear a relationship similar to that between higher and lower mathematics.” [Leon Trotsky. The ABC of Materialist Dialectics. December 15th, 1939.]
      “Capitalist structures survived from country to country through an uneven pattern but it survived. The process of the reconstruction of capitalist structures in Eastern Europe just like the process of structural assimilation which was to follow must be viewed as a complex one in which political, social, structural and economic factors are intertwined. To separate out a single factor, such as nationalization, or for that matter, political rule, and attempt to understand the changes in the society as a whole simply by noting changes in this single factor is completely misleading and superficial.” [Tim Wohlfarth, “The Theory of Structural Assimilation.” “Communists” Against Revolution: Two Essays on Post-War Stalinism. John Lister, editor. London: Folrose Ltd. 1978. Pages 18-19.]
      “Most so-called Trotskyist groups are reformist – they are Trotskyists in name only. These reformist so-called ‘Trotskyist’ groups basically push illusions in the Democrats or some other reformist party. They seek an alliance with some ‘progressive’ wing of the bourgeoisie. There is no such thing as a quote unquote progressive wing of the bourgeoisie. Leon Trotsky was the co-leader of the Bolshevik Revolution with Lenin. Real Trotskyists want to repeat the October Revolution of 1917 all over the world. That is what Trotskyism is. Trotskyists do not push illusions in reformist leaders or reformist movements or reformist parties. Trotskyists might work with reformist organizations to stop fascist groups like the KKK [Ku Klux Klan] or the neo-Nazis from marching, Trotskyists might march alongside other reformist groups on a picket line, Trotskyists might defend reformists from government repression. But while doing all these things Trotskyists always maintain their political independence. Trotskyists never push illusions in a reformist leader or reformist movement or reformist party. Real Trotskyists understand that the bourgeoisie state must be smashed, and replaced with a workers state. A Trotskyist understands that there are two classes – the bourgeoisie and the working class – and you’re on one side or you’re on the other.” [Wolf Larsen. Capitalism Sucks! Bloomington, Indiana: AuthorHouse. 2011. Kindle edition.]
      “[Leon] Trotsky saw it as his task to curb intolerance and to expose the futility of the slogans about proletarian culture and art. This was not easy. The idea of proletarian culture appealed to some Bolshevik intellectuals, and to young workers in whom the revolution had awakened a craving for education but in whom it had also released iconoclastic instincts. In the background there was the peasants’ anarchic hostility towards all that had been associated with the gentry’s way of life, including its ‘cultural values.’ (When the muzhik [Russian Cyrillic, мужи́к, mužík, ‘peasant’] set fire to his landlord’s mansion he often let go up in flames the library and the paintings—he saw in them only part of the landlord’s possessions.) Theorizing Bolsheviks rationalized this iconoclastic mood into a pseudo-Marxist rejection of the old ‘class culture’ which was to be swept away.” [Isaac Deutscher. The Prophet Unarmed: Trotsky, 1921-1929. London and New York: Verso imprint of New Left Books. 2003. Page 140.]
      “Although [Leon] Trotsky condemned the atrocities of Stalinism, he supported the Soviet Union’s nationalization of property as an important step toward the creation of a truly socialist state. But as [Joseph] Stalin’s excesses multiplied, [Max] Shachtman came to believe that the Soviet government had merely replaced the bourgeoisie as the chief oppressor of the working class. The final break came in 1939, when the Soviet Union invaded Finland. Trotsky defended the move; Shachtman condemned it as Soviet imperialism. Already appalled by the Hitler-Stalin pact, Shachtman went on to develop a ‘third camp’ school of socialism, critical of both East and West. With the onset of the cold war, Shachtman’s views attracted a new generation of anti-Stalinist leftists, Michael Harrington among them.” [Michael Massing, “Trotsky’s Orphans: From Bolshevism to Reaganism.” The New Republic. Volume 196, number 025, June 1987. Pages 18-22.]
      “When Islamic fundamentalism first emerged, sections of the left defined it as analogous to fascism. The Arab Trotskyist Salah Jaber [Arabic/ʿArabiyyaẗ, صَلَاح جَابِر, Ṣalāḥ Ǧābir] wrote in 1981 that ‘Islamic fundamentalism is one of the most dangerous enemies of the revolutionary proletariat.’ He pointed out that ‘the fundamentalist movement shares many of the characteristics of fascism outlined by [Leon] Trotsky: its social base, the nature of its political ideology, its fierce anti-communism and its totalitarianism.’
      “But there were also differences between classical fascism and fundamentalism. In some respects ‘the fundamentalist movement is, in fact, more backward than was fascism.’ It drives the historical clock backward to a reactionary utopia with more faith and zeal than the classical fascists. But the fundamentalists, as part of this ‘more reactionary’ drive backwards, can also challenge big private capital. This contrasts to the role of classical fascism as the brutish guarantor of big capital in the face of a mass workers movement.”
      [Alan Johnson, “Iraq and the Third Camp.” New Politics. Volume 9, issue 3, summer 2003. Pages 33-57.]
      “… it is clear that there is no substantive link between neoconservatism and American Trotskyism. In order to argue for the existence (and indeed centrality!) of such a link, it is necessary to considerably misrepresent the histories and theories of both movements. A systematic examination of the paleoconservatives’ ‘Trotskyist neocon’ assertion shows that it cannot stand up to scrutiny in light of the easily accessible historical evidence.
      “… It may well be that with the paleoconservatives we are seeing the historical low point of debate inside intellectual conservatism. At the very least, it would be fair to say that the ‘Trotskyist neocon’ assertion—historically inaccurate and intellectually sloppy, yet widely popular—is one of the major oddities of recent American intellectual life.”
      [William F. King, “Neoconservatives and ‘Trotskyism.’” American Communist History. Volume 3, number 2, December 2004. Pages 247-266.]
      “[Leon] Trotsky recognised that state property could underpin a state-capitalist régime or some new bureaucratic exploiting class. And ‘the higher the Soviet state rises above the people … the more obviously does it testify against the socialist character of this state property.’” [Martin Thomas, “Three Traditions? Marxism and the USSR.” Historical Materialism. Volume 14, number 3, 2006. Pages 207-243.]
      “My attitude to [Leon] Trotsky is such that I am generally considered as a ‘Trotskyist’ in Italy, although I have never actually been one. If you go into the University here in Rome, you will see signs painted by students—Maoists and neo-Stalinists—which demand: ‘Hang Colletti.’ Anti-Trotskyism is an epidemic among Italian youth: and so I am commonly considered a Trotskyist. What is the fundamental truth expressed by Trotsky—the central idea for whose acceptance I am quite willing to be called a Trotskyist? You could condense it very laconically by saying that in any genuinely Marxist perspective, the United States of America should be the maturest society in the world for a socialist transformation, and that Trotsky is the theorist who most courageously and unremittingly reminds us of that. In other words, Trotsky always insisted that the determinant force in any real socialist revolution would be the industrial working class, and that no peasantry could perform this function for it, let alone a mere communist party leadership. The clearest and most unequivocal development of this fundamental thesis is to be found in the work of Trotsky. Without it, Marxism becomes purely honorific—once deprived of this element, anyone can call themselves a Marxist.” [Lucio Colletti, “A Political and Philosophical Interview.” New Left Review. Series I, number 86, July–August 1974. Pages 3-28.]
      “[Leon] Trotsky and his followers criticized the USSR’s [Union of Soviet Socialist Republics’] concentration of power in its bureaucracy (state and party), yet they hesitated to label it state capitalist because of the successful collectivization of industrial capital and establishment of state planning …. Debate turned on which of two tendencies was stronger: a tendency toward capitalism arising from concentrated power in the hands of state bureaucrats versus a tendency toward communism arising from collective power over capital and distribution. For Trotsky and some of his followers the Soviet resolution of the two tendencies produced at best a society ‘halfway between capitalism and socialism’ … – often designated by ambivalent labels such as ‘statism’ or ‘state socialism.’ For the few critics of the USSR who made use of the term ‘state capitalism,’ they clearly meant it to designate an undemocratic distribution of power and not any particular social organization of the surplus, a particular ‘class structure’ in our terms ….” [Richard D. Wolff, “State Capitalism versus Communism: What Happened in the USSR and the PRC?” Critical Sociology. Volume 34, number 4, July 2008. Pages 539-556.]
      “He [Leon Trotsky] … rose to his full height not merely as the chief manager and organizer of the army but as its inspirer, as the prophet of an idea. He boldly tapped the hidden moral resources of the revolution. The quality of his appeal may be gauged, for instance, from an address he gave at a congress of the Comsomol, the Communist Youth, which met just when Moscow and Petrograd had come within reach of the White Guards. He spoke to juveniles about the duties they had to perform ‘within the shrinking area left to the Red Army.’ They should assist in the mobilization; they should help to maintain liaison between units in combat; they should steal through the enemy’s lines to reconnoitre his dispositions; and so on. But before they went on their perilous assignments, they ought to know the place they occupied in the affairs of the world. Lucidly, simply, without a trace of condescension, he surveyed the international scene. They should also see their own role against the background of world history, in the long perspective of mankind’s slow, painfully slow, yet inspiring progress ‘from the dark animal realm’ to undreamt-of summits of civilization, towards which socialism was leading them.” [Isaac Deutscher. The Prophet: The Life of Leon Trotsky. One–volume version. London and New York: Verso imprint of New Left Books. 2015. Kindle edition.]
      1. theory of permanent revolution: This Trotskyist approach to internationalism, while intriguing, is, at least in Foster’s view, too law-like or deterministic. No one knows whether revolutionary struggles will be global, local, or perhaps in some combination of the two. The approach taken by Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels to “permanent revolution” was, in Foster’s view, less doctrinaire.
         “The theory of permanent revolution now demands the greatest attention from every Marxist, for the course of the class and ideological struggle has fully and finally raised this question from the realm of reminiscences over old differences of opinion among Russian Marxists, and converted it into a question of character, the inner connexions and methods of the international revolution in general.” [Leon Trotsky. The Permanent Revolution. 1931.]
         “Personally I fully agree that a discussion on the questions of the permanent revolution, the situation in the USSR [Union of Soviet Socialist Republics], etc., is necessary. It was precisely as a basis for such discussion that I first formulated my theses on permanent revolution, and wrote a pamphlet on the subject, and it was as such that I formulated my theses on the USSR some time ago, which I have proposed as a draft platform on that question. A discussion on these points is greatly needed, and Comrade Treint’s participation in it is greatly to be desired.” [Leon Trotsky, “On Comrade Treint’s declaration.” The Writings of Leon Trotsky [1930-31]. George Breitman and Sarah Lovell, editors. New York: Pathfinder Press. 1973. Pages 274-279.]
         “While the democratic petty bourgeois want to bring the revolution to an end as quickly as possible, achieving at most the aims already mentioned, it is our interest and our task to make the revolution permanent until all the more or less propertied classes have been driven from their ruling positions, until the proletariat has conquered state power and until the association of the proletarians has progressed sufficiently far – not only in one country but in all the leading countries of the world – that competition between the proletarians of these countries ceases and at least the decisive forces of production are concentrated in the hands of the workers. Our concern cannot simply be to modify private property, but to abolish it, not to hush up class antagonisms but to abolish classes, not to improve the existing society but to found a new one. There is no doubt that during the further course of the revolution in Germany, the petty-bourgeois democrats will for the moment acquire a predominant influence.…
         “Although the German workers cannot come to power and achieve the realization of their class interests without passing through a protracted revolutionary development, this time they can at least be certain that the first act of the approaching revolutionary drama will coincide with the direct victory of their own class in France and will thereby be accelerated. But they themselves must contribute most to their final victory, by informing themselves of their own class interests, by taking up their independent political position as soon as possible, by not allowing themselves to be misled by the hypocritical phrases of the democratic petty bourgeoisie into doubting for one minute the necessity of an independently organized party of the proletariat. Their battle-cry must be: The Permanent Revolution.”
         [Karl Marx and Frederick Engels. Address of the Central Committee to the Communist League: London, March 1850. Alek Blain, editor. Pacifica, California: Marxists Internet Archive (Marxists.org) ebook edition. 2006. Online publication. No pagination.]

         “The term permanent, as used by [Leon] Trotsky, meant that the revolution became permanent only in the continuous development of the world revolution. The world Trotskyist movement has used the term to mean that the revolution became permanent when the working class took power in any given country. The nature of the revolution in any country was therefore deduced from a fixed theory, not grasped through an understanding of the development of the living movement of the world revolution.” [Chris Bailey, “Theory of Permanent Revolution and Post-War Stalinism: A Critique of Tim Wohlforth’s ‘Theory of Structural Assimilation.’” Permanent Revolution and Post-War Stalinism: Two Counterposted Views on the “Russian Question” – a proletarian revolutionary pamphlet. Published by the League for the Revolutionary Party (USA). Undated. Page 34.]
      2. third–camp Trotskyism or Shachtmanism (Max Shachtman): Schachtman’s neo–Trotskyist position challenged the two camps of Stalinism and Capitalism.
         “The Third Camp is the camp of the workers in factory and field, in mine and on railroad. It is the camp of the slaves of all colors who yearn and fight for their independence from imperialism. It is the camp of labor, fighting against the profit-lusting employers. It is the camp of labor fighting against the governments of the employers. It is the camp of the peasants and sharecroppers and farmers fighting against the grasping trusts, the railroad magnates, the bank sharpers. It is the camp of the Irish people. the Indian people, the Indo-Chinese and Moroccan peoples, the Filipinos and the Puerto Ricans, the Chinese people, the Polish and Czech and Slovakian and Scandinavian people, the people of the Soviet Union, – the people who are at war today or will be at war tomorrow against the imperialist tyranny of the United States, England, France, Germany, Italy, Japan and the bureaucratic dictatorship of the Kremlin.” [Max Shachtman, “Against Both War Camps – For The Camp Of World Labor!: Third Camp Unites Workers, Colonial People Against War.” Labor Action. May, 1940. Pages 1-2.]
         “The role of the Soviet Union can be followed and understood only if one is clear about the predominant character of the war. It is not a war of imperialist attack upon the Soviet Union; it is not a ‘mixed war.’ It is a war between two big imperialist camps for the redivision of the world, with the Soviet Union as an integral part of one of the imperialist camps.
         “The strategy of the imperialist camp to which Stalin is subordinated, is fairly clear. It is to keep all sides of Germany protected by herself and her allies, to confine the front to the comparative safety of the Westwall-Maginot lines; to destroy the British Empire for the benefit of the Rome-Berlin-Moscow axis, primarily for the Berlin section of it. Stalin’s role in the war, from the very beginning, has been that of auxiliary executant of this strategy.”
         [Max Shachtman, “The Soviet Union and the World War.” New International. Volume 6, number 3, April 1940. Pages 68-72.]
         “I cannot leave unmentioned your [Leon Trotsky’s] references to the ‘revolutionary’ role of Stalinism in its recent invasions. ’In the first case (Spain), the bureaucracy through hangman’s methods strangled a socialist revolution. In the second case (Poland) it gave an impulse to the socialist revolution through bureaucratic methods.’ Here again, I find myself compelled to disagree with you. The bureaucratic bourgeois revolution – that I know of. I know of Napoleon’s ‘revolution from above’ in Poland over a hundred years ago. I know of Alexander’s [Emperor Alexander II of Russia’] emancipation of the serfs ‘from above’ – out of fear of peasant uprisings. I know of [Otto von] Bismarck’s ‘revolution from above.’ I know that [Adolf] Hitler and [Benito] Mussolini play with the idea of an Arab ‘national revolution’ in Palestine out of purely imperialist and military reasons – directed against their rival, England.” [Max Shachtman, “Bureaucratic-proletarian revolution is not desirable and not possible.” The two Trotskyisms confront Stalinism. Debates, essays and confrontations—Texts. Sean Matgamna, editor. London: Alliance for Workers’ Liberty. 2015. Kindle edition.]
         “… Third Camp socialism [was born] in the split with Trotsky over the question of Russia’s wars in Finland and Poland in 1939-40, and its development in the epoch of expanding Stalinism after World War II. I set out why the concept was indispensable to a politics of self-emancipation and revolutionary democratic internationalism in the period of the Cold War. The concept was not simply a rejection of the two imperialist war camps [capitalism and Stalinism] – although that was the beginning of all wisdom. The partisans of the Third Camp, in the most unpropitious of circumstances, also developed a positive alternative to both war-camps, and to war itself, through the concepts of a ‘democratic foreign policy’ and ‘political warfare.’” [Alan Johnson, “‘Neither Washington Nor Moscow’: The Third Camp as History And a Living Legacy.” New Politics. Summer, 1999. Pages 135-165.]
         “[Joseph] Stalin’s invasion of Poland triggered a dispute in the American Trotskyist movement between a majority led by James P Cannon and a minority led by Max Shachtman. It would end with a split down the middle of the party on 16 April 1940. The Heterodox Trotskyists launched themselves as the Workers Party ten days later, on 26 April 1940. They produced a single-sheet issue of Labor Action in time for May Day 1940, and by then they had already produced the April number of the New International magazine as their publication (as editors, Burnham and Shachtman had been the registered owners). The first weekly Labor Action appeared on 20 May 1940.” [Harry Braverman et al. The two Trotskyisms confront Stalinism. Debates, essays and confrontations—Introduction. Sean Matgamna, editor. London: Alliance for Workers’ Liberty. 2015. Kindle edition.]
      3. Johnson–Forest Tendency or “the Johnsonites” (Cyril Lionel Robert “C. L. R.” James and Raya Dunayevskaya [Russian Cyrillic, Ра́я Дунае́вска, Ráâ Dunaévska as pronounced in this MP3 audio file]): This Trotskyist tendency is named after the respective pseudonyms of James (“J. R. Johnson”) and Dunayevskaya (“Freddie Forest”). James (1901–1989) did work, for instance, on the “dialectic between sports, culture, and society.” Dunayevskaya (1910–1987) developed an approach to Marxist–Humanism, i.e., a humanistic type of production and a non-state form of governance. See the News and Letters Committee: A Marxist-Humanist Organization and The International Marxist-Humanist: Journal of the International Marxist-Humanist Organization.
         “All tendencies inside world Trotskyism, sharp as the differences may be, have been united in adherence to the fundamental theory of the permanent revolution; in maintaining the traditions of Bolshevism; in irreconcilable opposition to all other tendencies in the labor movement. The ideas put forward by ‘Johnson-Forest’ originate in that common heritage and have no other purpose than to bind us together in the achievement of our aims.
         “‘Johnson-Forest’ have abstained almost totally from the Yugoslav discussion and now enter it only to the degree that it is a part of the preparation for definitive decisions. We ask that our views, however far-reaching, be considered on their merits. We believe that we have earned the right to such a hearing, and more so because in the death-agony of capitalism, the chief spokesman of the Fourth International has called into question the validity of Marxism for our epoch.…
         “We are very conscious of the fact that for this system of ideas which we claim must be discarded, thousands have died , and that by it many now living have shaped their lives. But the class position of the proletariat is involved the moment you reach the question of defensism or defeatism. As long as this was confined to Russia, there was no urgent necessity to draw what was implicit to its conclusions. But today the question involves half of Europe and half of Asia, that is to say, the whole world.”
         [C. L. R. James written in collaboration with Raya Dunayevskaya and Grace Lee. State Capitalism and World Revolution. Chicago, Illinois: Charles H. Kerr Publishing Company, 1986. Pages 2-3.]
         “We [Johnon-Forest] base our analysis on the theory of state-capitalism. It is commonly believed that this has mainly to do with defeatism or defensism of Russia. That is the least of our concerns.…
         “… The theory [of state capitalism] is not primarily concerned with defensism or defeatism in Russia, about which we can do little. We are primarily concerned here with what the refusal to accept this theory does to the party, its solidarity, its capacity to fight its enemies, its capacity to preserve itself and to grow, in brief, to prepare the liquidation of Stalinism.”
         [C. L. R. James written in collaboration with Raya Dunayevskaya and Grace Lee. State Capitalism and World Revolution. Chicago, Illinois: Charles H. Kerr Publishing Company, 1986. Pages 6-8.]
         “Among the many important contributions of this work that has endured over these fifty years are those concerning the rise of the social and cultural significance of sports —cricket in particular—for societies, and how this significance can decline with the unleashing of new sociohistorical forces within the society under consideration. Written with great elegance and charm, James skillfully develops this dialectic between sports, culture, and society with subtlety and insight that to this day remain unsurpassed.” [Paget Henry, ”Foreward,” in C. L. R. James. Beyond a Boundary: 50ᵗʰ Anniversary Edition. Durham, North Carolina: Duke University Press. 2013. Pages xi-xv.]
         “A glance at the world showed that when the common people were not at work, one thing they wanted was organized sports and games. They wanted them greedily, passionately. So much so, that the politicians who devoted themselves to the improvement of the condition of the people, the disciples of culture, the aesthetes, all deplored the expenditure of so much time, energy, attention and money on sports and games instead of on the higher things. Well, presumably it could not be helped. It had always been so and was likely to continue for a long time. But that was quite untrue. Organized games had been part and parcel of the civilization of Ancient Greece. With the decline of that civilization they disappeared from Europe for some 1,500 years. People ran and jumped and kicked balls about and competed with one another; they went to see the knights jousting. But games and sports, organized as the Greeks had organized them, there were none.” [C. L. R. James. Beyond a Boundary: 50ᵗʰ Anniversary Edition. Durham, North Carolina: Duke University Press. 2013. Page 152.]
         “The totality of the opposition between the world of the ruled and that of the rulers is bound to explode.
         “The question is: what will allow the collision of the two worlds to result in a reconstruction of society on OTHER, on human beginnings? Can the future inherent in the present evolve without a theory? And, if not, where is the theory that will converge with the practice of the millions?
         “Naturally, we think it is Marxist-Humanism. But we must put its analysis of what is, as well as the organizational form of what is TO BE DONE, to the test….
         “The uniqueness of Marxist-Humanism lies also in this: that despite all theoretic contributions and singleness of purpose in achieving total freedom, it asks to be ‘taken over’ by the masses, to be subjected to the daily and long-range tests, so long only as the UNITY of theory and practice, worker and intellectual, technologically backward and technologically advanced economies, all merge in order never to stop short of ‘the ultimate’: the new society, the new human dimension, the incorporation within the individual of all of his mental and manual talents.”
         [Raya Dunayevskaya. The uniqueness of Marxist-Humanism. Speech. The upper-case words are included in the original text. August, 1963.]
         “Above all, we hold fast to the one-worldedness and the new Humanist thinking of all oppressed from the East German worker to the West Virginia miner; from the Hungarian revolutionary to the Montgomery Bus Boy cotter; as well as from the North Carolina Sit-inner to the African Freedom Fighter. The elements of the new society, submerged the world over by the might of capital, are emerging in all sorts of unexpected and unrelated places. What is missing is the unity of these movements from practice with the movement from theory into an overall philosophy that can form the foundation of a totally new social order.” [Raya Dunayevskaya. American Civilization On Trial: Black Masses as Vanguard. Fourth Expanded edition. Chicago, Illinois: News & Letters. 1983. Page 33.]
         “[Karl] Marx took over from classical political economy its exposition of the law of value in the sense that labor was the source of value, and socially-necessary labor. time the common denominator governing the exchange of commodities. Marx, however, drew from this labor theory of value his theory of surplus value. He criticized classical political economy for mistaking the apparent equality reigning in the commodity market for an inherent equality. The laws of exchange, Marx contended, could give this appearance of equality only because value, which regulates exchange, is materialized human labor. When the commodity, labor power, is bought, equal quantities of materialized labor are exchanged.” [Raya Dunayevskaya, “A New Revision of Marxian Economics.” The American Economic Review. Volume 34, number 3, September 1944. Pages 531-537.]
         “[Karl] Marx treated market phenomena only as manifestations of the production relationship between capitalist and worker. The organic composition of individual capital, as well as market competition, affects the division of profit among capitalists, but not the surplus value itself. Surplus value is a given magnitude arising only from the process of production. Marx insisted that the struggle among capitalists to effect what he called ‘capitalist communism’ was of no concern to the worker. He analyzed these market phenomena only in order to prove the oppressively dominant position of ‘self-expanding value,’ or the primacy of the production relationship.” [Raya Dunayevskaya, “Revision or Reaffirmation of Marxism? A Rejoinder.” The American Economic Review. Volume 35, number 4, September 1945. Pages 660-664.]
         “Marxist-Humanist Initiative (MHI) began in April 2009, following the collapse of previous Marxist-Humanist organizations. It aims to contribute to the transformation of this capitalist world by projecting, developing, and concretizing the philosophy of Karl Marx (1818-1883) and its further development in the Marxist-Humanism articulated by Raya Dunayevskaya (1910-1987).
         “We are not a political party. Nor are we trying to lead the masses, who will form their own organizations, and whose emancipation must be their own act. But we have seen that spontaneous actions alone are insufficient to usher in a new society. We seek a new unity of philosophy and organization in which mass movements striving for freedom lay hold of [Karl] Marx’s philosophy of revolution and recreate society on its basis.”
         [Marxist-Humanist Initiative. 2011. Retrieved on September 28th, 2015.]
         “The International Marxist-Humanist Organization (IMHO) aims to develop and project a viable vision of an alternative to capitalism—a new, human society—that can give direction to today’s freedom struggles. The IMHO is based on the unique philosophic contributions that have guided Marxist-Humanism since it was founded in the 1950s by Raya Dunayevskaya. We do so by working out a unity of theory and practice, worker and intellectual, and philosophy and organization.
         “An alternative to capitalism means ending production for value, creating a humanist mode of production, establishing a new non-state form of governance, and building freely associated human relations. Breaking with the law of value is the necessary condition for the possibility of the formation of a truly new society, as value production subordinates human beings to things and distorts human relations. We must theorize such an alternative now.”
         “Constitution of the International Marxist-Humanist Organization.” International Marxist-Humanist Organization. March 1st, 2013. Retrieved on September 28th, 2015.]
         “Like many other distinguished figures from the colonies, the Caribbean especially, [C. L. R.] James was a diasporic intellectual, in constant movement, from the margins to the centres of empires and back, travelling along the routes of the black Atlantic, from one pole to another: the West Indies, Europe, the United States and Africa.…
         “The main concern of James’s theoretical and political practice is the movement of the masses and the movement of history, which for him are one and the same.”
         [Matthieu Renault, “Decolonizing revolution with C.L.R. James: or, What is to be done with Eurocentrism?” Radical Philosophy: Philosophical Journal of the Independent Left. Number 199, September/October 2016. Pages 35-45.]
         “… the Johnson-Forest Tendency undoubtedly deserves credit for endeavouring to nuance its theory of state capitalism with a consideration of the empirically operative reality of the capitalist category of surplus value. It can only be regretted, therefore, that in considering the nature of Soviet capitalism in a subsequent book on ‘state capitalism’ James focuses merely on the tendency towards the personification of capital by bureaucrats, and on the intensified exploitation of the workers …; and fails even to reiterate, let alone make more profound, the points derived earlier from the application of a ‘categorial’ approach. The similarly disappointing work later published by Dunayevskaya as a ‘Marxist-Humanist’ philosopher …, in which she largely restricts her attention to a recounting of nuts-and-bolts data about purges, camps, and Stakhanovism [re: Aleksei Grigorievich Stakhanov], demonstrates that neither of the Tendency’s leaders was able to break the theoretical impasse any more than the other.” [Neil C. Fernandez. Capitalism and Class Struggle in the USSR: A Marxist Theory. Ashgate Publishing Company. 1997. Pages 59-60.]
         “The Johnsonites, led by the West Indian historian and theorist C. L. R. James, were an oppositional faction within the Workers Party—and [Irving] Howe, in particular, had crossed polemical swords with them in internal debates.” [Scott McLemee, “The Last Page.” Dissent. Volume 55, number 2, spring 2008. Page 128.]
         “In 1941, one year after an ice-pick-wielding assassin ended [Leon] Trotsky’s life in his Mexico study, [C. L. R.] James’s group broke with the Fourth International. The Soviet Union, claimed the Johnsonites, was not a ‘degraded worker’s state’ per the Trotskyist line, but rather a bastion of ‘state capitalism’ whose bureaucratic class necessarily repressed the rights and individuality of working people. Living in the United States—that land whose cult of the individual was a matter of near-religious faith—James concluded that any socialist Revolution worth its name would have to place the wants and needs of individuals at its core.” [Joshua Jelly-Schapiro, “C. L. R. James in America: or, the ballad of Nello and Connie.” Transition: An International Review. Number 104, 2011. Pages 30-57.]
      4. International Communist League (Fourth International): This Trotskyist tendency was previously known as the Spartacist Tendency. However, it has no direct historical relationship to Rosa Luxemburg’s Spartacist League.
         “We trace our continuity back to the revolutionary teachings and experiences of Marx and Engels and the First and Second Internationals, through [Vladimir] Lenin and [Leon] Trotsky’s Bolsheviks and the Third (Communist) International, as well as Trotsky and the Left Opposition’s fight against Stalinist betrayal culminating in the formation of the Fourth International. The political tendency embodied in the ICL [International Communist League] today originated as the Revolutionary Tendency within the U.S. Socialist Workers Party in 1961-63. The RT [Revolutionary Tendency] sought to continue and complete the struggle against Pabloite revisionism in the Fourth International, which was taken up, albeit too little and too late, under the leadership of founding American Trotskyist James P. Cannon in 1953. Pabloism represented the liquidation of the Trotskyist vanguard party into bourgeoisnationalist, Stalinist and social-democratic formations ….” [Editor, “Fighting for Programmatic Integrity in a Reactionary Period.” Sparatacist. Number 62, spring 2011. Pages 2-10.]
      5. International Socialist Tendency: Neo–Trotskyist Tony Cliff (born, Yigael Gluckstein [Hebrew/ʿIḇəriyṯ, יִגְאָל גְּלוּקְשְׁטָיְּן, Yiḡəʾāl Gəlūqəšəṭāyyən]), the originator of this tendency, explained the Soviet Union through his “theory of state capitalism” (the state as the capitalist or owner of production). Many people, this writer included, agree with Cliff on that point. He also develops a Trotskyist critique of the theory of bureaucratic collectivism. Affiliate and sympathizer parties of the International Socialist Tendency include the Socialist Workers Party (UK affiliate) and The International Socialist Organization (U.S. sympathizer). The latter organization publishes Socialist Worker (a monthly newspaper), the International Socialist Review (a journal), and a book publishing company through Haymarket Books. Foster’s own views largely conformed to this tendency before adopting Marxism–Luxemburgism.
         “The International Socialist Tendency (IST) is a current of revolutionary socialist organisations, based in different countries, which share a political outlook and seek to help each other by exchanging experience and practical support.
         “These organisations stand in the tradition of socialist from below, the idea that workers can only emancipate themselves through their own struggles. This tradition was initiated by Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, and subsequently developed by revolutionaries such as [Vladimir] Lenin, Leon Trotsky, Rosa Luxemburg and Antonio Gramsci. In the same spirit, groups linked to the IST have sought to further strengthen this tradition both through involvement in struggle and attempts to develop Marxist theory.”
         [Editor, “About.” International Socialist Tendency. 2016. Retrieved on December 7th, 2016.]
         “The Southern Africa Social Forum, held in Harare, Zimbabwe, in October, was a big step forward for the anti-capitalist movement in the region – and a triumph for the International Socialist Tendency.
         “Around 4,000 people took part in what was the largest event ever of its type in the region, bringing together people from South Africa, Botswana, Mozambique, Malawi, Lesotho, Swaziland and Zimbabwe. There were trade unionists, people with HIV, housing campaigners, campaigners for women’s rights, informal traders, disabled people, students, unemployed and many more.”
         [Charlie Kimber, “A Report from the Southern African Social Forum.” International Socialist Tendency: Discussion Bulletin. Number 7, January 2006. Page 25.]
         “A world free of exploitation—socialism—is not only possible but worth fighting for. The ISO [International Socialist Organization] stands in the tradition of revolutionary socialists Karl Marx, V. I. [Vladimir Ilyich] Lenin and Leon Trotsky in the belief that workers themselves–the vast majority of the population–are the only force that can lead the fight to win a socialist society. Socialism can’t be brought about from above, but has to be won by workers themselves.” [Editor, “What We Stand for.” The International Socialist Organization. Undated. Retrieved on September 20th, 2015.]
         “On the question of whether the workers in Russia are proletarians, the proponents of the theory of Bureaucratic Collectivism answer, and must answer, that they are not. They compare the Russian with the classical worker who was ‘free’ of the means of production and also free of any legal impediments to selling his labour power. It is true that there often were legal impediments to the movement of Russian workers from one enterprise to another. But is this a sufficient reason to say that the Russian worker was not a proletarian? If so, there is no doubt that the German worker under [Adolf] Hitler was also not a proletarian. Or, at the other extreme, workers in power are also not proletarians inasmuch as they are not ‘free’ as a collective from the means of production. No doubt an American worker is very different from an indentured girl in a Japanese factory who is under contract for a number of years and must live in the company’s barracks for that time. But basically they are members of one and the same class. They were born together with the most dynamic form of production history has every known, they are united by the process of social production, they are in actuality the antithesis of capital, and in potentiality socialism itself (because of the dynamics of a modern economy, no legal impediments in fact put an end altogether to the movement of workers from one enterprise to another under Stalin’s regime).” [Tony Cliff. The Theory of Bureaucratic Collectivism: A Critique. 1948.]
         “The few comrades who started the International Socialist tendency were not prepared to use Marxism as a substitute for reality, but on the contrary wished it to be a weapon helping to master reality. In the years 1946-48 we had to wrestle with very difficult questions. We had to be clear that we were continuing a tradition – that we were followers of [Karl] Marx, [Vladimir] Lenin and [Leon] Trotsky – but that we had to face new situations. It was both a continuation and a new beginning. Intellectual toughness does not mean dogmatism; grasping a changing reality does not mean vagueness. Our criticism of orthodox Trotskyism was conceived as a return to classical Marxism.…
         “… [An] analysis of Russia as bureaucratic state capitalist followed Trotsky’s theory of permanent revolution in taking the capitalist world system as its basic frame of reference. If it is a step forward from Trotsky’s analysis of the Stalinist regime as given in The Revolution Betrayed and elsewhere, it is that it tried to take account of the pressure of world capitalism in the mode of production and the relations of production prevailing in the USSR. Trotsky’s explanation did not reveal the dynamic of the system; it restricted itself to forms of property instead of dealing with the relations of production. It did not supply a political economy of the system. The theory of bureaucratic state capitalism tries to do both.”
         [Tony Cliff. Trotskyism after Trotsky: The origins of the International Socialists. London: Bookmarks. 1999. Ebook edition.]
         “In order to establish guidelines for the work of revolutionary socialists in the trade unions, we must answer these questions. Our first principle must be that of Marx, that the emancipation of the working class is the act of the working class itself. Socialists must therefore always take as their central focus the activity of rank-and-file trade unionists. But to apply this principle in times of retreat for the workers’ movement, when a general lack of confidence in the working class leads to a low level of activity, calls for an understanding of complex strategies. In this the experience of the early years of the British Communist Party and the General Strike can be invaluable.” [Tony Cliff and Donny Gluckstein. Marxism and Trade Union Struggle: The General Strike of 1926. London: Bookmarks. April, 1986. Page 4.]
         “… this fact – the isolation of a small working class in a sea of antagonistic, backward, petty capitalist peasants – proved to be in the rise of Stalin!
         “However, [Vladimir] Lenin and [Leon] Trotsky had no alternative. It is true that the Bolshevik Party programme provided for nationalisation of all landed estates. And for many years Lenin had argued heatedly against the Social Revolutionaries who were in favour of distributing the landlords’ land among the peasants. However, in 1917, when the land problem demanded an immediate solution, he straight away adopted the slogans of the much-condemned Social Revolutionaries, or rather of the spontaneous peasant movement. If the Bolsheviks had not done this, they, and the urban working class they led, would have been isolated from the countryside, and the revolution would have been stillborn, or at most short-lived (as was the Hungarian Revolution of 1919).”
         [Tony Cliff, “Rosa Luxemburg (1959/1969),” in Tony Cliff. International Struggle and the Marxist Tradition, Selected Works. Volume 1. London: Bookmarks. 2001. Pages 59-116.]
         “The mistakes of the first few years of the Comintern were the mistakes of revolutionaries searching for new tactics in an unfamiliar field. But around 1923 a qualitative change took place. The degeneration of the Communist International and the search for alliances with left union officials was the result of the isolation of the Russian revolution. This gave rise to a state bureaucracy in Russia which put its own self-interest above that of the international working class. This process did not fully take hold until after the Fourth Comintern Congress. Until then the Congresses had been a genuine forum for the debate and development of Marxism. After Lenin’s illness in 1923 the Stalinist bureaucracy put a stop to development. This meant that the opportunity to correct and improve on the Comintern’s trade union strategy, as had been done in so many other spheres, was lost.” [Tony Cliff and Donny Gluckstein, “Marxism and the Trade Union Struggle.” Publication and date of publication unknown. Pages 31-43.]
         “… although starting by damning the bureaucracy as new exploiters, bloodsuckers, deadly enemies of the working class and of human freedom, etc., etc. – and, undoubtedly, 99 percent of the real motivation for any self-proclaimed Marxist’s calling the bureaucracy a new ruling class stems from such understandable moral indignation rather than cool scientific analysis – one would paradoxically end up by historically justifying that very same bureaucracy, if not becoming a straightforward apologist for all its crimes.” [Ernest Mandel. Why The Soviet Bureaucracy is not a New Ruling Class. 1979. Retrieved on October 6th, 2015.]
         “[Tony] Cliff was born in 1917 in what was then commonly regarded as a southern region of Syria—Palestine. The son of a Jewish family who supported Zionism, his birth name was Ygael Gluckstein. In 1947, he moved to Britain, where he remained until his death in 2000. During the 1930s and 1940s, Cliff wrote a series of articles under the pseudonym L. Rock and later (1945) as Tony Cliff, calling for an anti-imperialist, independent Arab and Jewish labor movement. These early writings of Cliff are notably different from his later writings from 1967 onward: on the one hand, this discontinuity is glossed over by an amnesia or a distortion of Cliff’s own historical analyses and conclusions to fit into a neat picture of the contemporary; on the other hand, this deterioration is made possible by some early kernels that later grew into a more recognizable inane politics.” [Camila Bassi, “The Inane Politics of Tony Cliff.” Journal for the Study of Antisemitism. Volume 3, 2011. Pages 729-738.]
         “We live in a world system capable of producing enough to house, feed, and clothe all its inhabitants, but it does not. Worse yet, a precondition of the system’s continued existence is the misery of most for the enrichment of the few. The task of socialists is to build the struggles, the movements, and the organization needed to once and for all get rid of a system of exploitation and oppression—capitalism.” [Ahmed Shawki, “Between Things Ended and Things Begun: Perspectives for Socialists.” Internationalist Socialist Review. June–July 2001. Pages 1-18.]
         “Imperialism is the stage of capitalism in which a few economically advanced states dominate the rest of the world. Imperialism coalesces as a system during the latter half of the nineteenth century, but its cruel dynamic also drives the process known as ‘globalization’ today. This means that we continue to live in a world in which a handful of strong nations use their economic and military power to subjugate and exploit weaker nations. It also means that our world is still one in which the strong nations regularly face off against each other—threatening, preparing, or unleashing wars whose basic aim is to secure a competitive advantage for one nation over its rivals in imperialist plunder.” [Tom Lewis, “Marxism & Nationalism.” Internationalist Socialist Review. August–September 2000. Pages 1-8.]
         “We knew the NLF [National Liberation Front] would set up a state capitalist regime that would deny all democratic rights and powers to workers and peasants in order to better exploit them. The Vietnamese nation had the right to determine its fate, no matter the outcome, or the undemocratic nature of its leadership. To overthrow that leadership is the task of the Vietnamese working class, not a task outsourced to U.S. imperialism, whose democratic signature is the millions of civilians it has bombed to death.” [Joel Geier, “Marxism and War” Internationalist Socialist Review. Summer 1999. Pages 1-8.]
      6. Revolutionary Communist International Tendency: Members of this Austrian–based Trotskyist organization refer to themselves as Bolshevik–Communists.
         “The task of the dictatorship of the proletariat is to advance the revolution. In fact, the revolution can survive and win only if it has a permanent character. Otherwise it risks a fate like the bureaucratisation and finally the collapse in the USSR. The Bolshevik-Communists, therefore, advocate the strategy of permanent revolution. This means that the revolution must constantly strive for international expansion with the aim of establishing a world socialist society. Our slogan therefore is not the construction of socialism in one country, but the spread of the revolution from one to different countries towards federations of socialist states and ultimately the formation of the United Socialist States of the World. Simultaneously the permanent revolution also tries to advance the economic, social and cultural transformation. Such a socialist society in which decisions are democratically taken in councils from the bottom up, through delegates recallable at any time, will plan the entire social and economic resources to meet the needs of people and not of profit of a few.” [Michael Pröbsting and Shujat Liaqat. The Revolutionary Communist Manifesto. Vienna, Austria: Revolutionary Communist International Tendency. February, 2012. Page 67.]
         “It is because of the inherently contradictory dynamic of increased concentration of capital accumulation and the decreased rate of profit from capitalist production that, in lieu of non-existing major productive channels for investment, the bourgeoisie has for decades been forced to defend and augment its accumulated capital and future profits by two main means: (1) the increased financialization of the world economy (creating one investment bubble – ‘wealth on paper’ – after another) and (2) relentlessly attacking the working class with one austerity package after another. Naturally the two are inextricably linked, as we witness whenever the latest financial bubble bursts. This was in particular obvious when in 2008 the potential collapse of the great Western banks was only averted by the unprecedented criminal transfer of workers’ taxes by the bourgeois governments to the financial wizards of Wall Street. When the treasuries of the capitalist states are looted to save the criminal bankers, the working class faces huge cuts in government spending on health, education, housing, and social welfare.” [1st Congress of the Revolutionary Communist International Tendency. The Tasks of the Liberation Struggle against Decaying Capitalism: Manifesto for the Socialist Revolution of the Workers and Oppressed. Vienna, Austria: Revolutionary Communist International Tendency. October, 2016. Page 7.]
      7. The International Marxist Tendency: It is a Trotskyist group started by Ted Grant. Socialist Appeal is the American branch.
         “It is not enough to contemplate the problems of the world. It is necessary to change it. First, however, it is necessary to understand the reason why things are as they are. Only the body of ideas worked out by [Karl] Marx and [Friedrich] Engels, and subsequently developed by Lenin and Trotsky can provide us with the adequate means of achieving this understanding. We believe that the most conscious members of the scientific community, through their own work and experience, will come to realize the need for a consistently materialist world outlook. That is offered by dialectical materialism. The recent advances of the theories of chaos and complexity show that an increasing number of scientists are moving in the direction of dialectical thinking. This is an enormously significant development. There is no doubt that new discoveries will deepen and strengthen this trend. We are firmly convinced that dialectical materialism is the philosophy of the future.” [Ted Grant and Alan Woods. Reason in Revolt, Vol. I: Dialectical Philosophy and Modern Science. New York: Algora Publishing. 2002. Page 25.]
         “Our aims are modest. We stand for a new society – a socialist society – where all our resources, the factories, land and technology, are used for the needs of the majority and not the profits for a handful of billionaire parasites.” [“What We are Fighting for.” Socialist Appeal – The International Marxist Tendency. January 8th, 2008. Retrieved on September 20th, 2015.]
      8. Freedom Socialist Party: This Trotskyist party focuses on, among other subjects, socialist feminism or “the Trotskyist feminist program.”
         “Socialist feminism is the recognition that the oppression of women, the ‘original sin’ of the system of private property and private profit, is a revolutionary question, the oldest and most profound of all subjugations. Just as women’s inequality was a necessary precondition for capitalism’s rise, it remains a condition of capitalism’s survival. Women’s basic democratic rights, like the rights of people of color in the U.S., cannot be won short of the destruction of capitalism: this is a feature of the permanent revolution. And it is the reason why women are the target of every series of cutbacks by the employers, every reactionary crusade by the right wing, and every assault on rights by the state.
         “Especially in its exhaustion and decline, capitalism depends for its profits on the super-exploitation of women workers, workers of color, indigenous peoples, immigrants, and workers in the post-colonial and less developed countries. This super-exploitation is propped up by sexist and racist ideology, which divides and disorients the working class, unions, and social movements, and which becomes virulent and deadly in times of economic and social crisis. The class is further divided by heterosexism, a patriarchal offshoot of the subjugation of women.”
         [Andrea Bauer, “Socialist Feminism and the Revolutionary Party: A radiant program for new generations.” Freedom Socialist. Supplement 1, February–March 2011. Pages 5-12.]
         “As the impulse toward revolution gathers steam, [Leon] Trotsky’s ideas are finding a new audience, creating a precious opening to explain the value of the Trotskyist feminist program of the Freedom Socialist Party. It is a powerful moment in the Party’s 40-year history: a chance to spread the rich trove of Trotskyist ideas, to break out of the isolation forced on the Party within world Trotskyism by the male chauvinism and blinkered politics of much of the movement, and to forge ties with other socialists in our hemisphere. It is an opportunity to learn from these revolutionaries and to share the knowledge we have acquired about building an interracial party where women’s leadership is respected and appreciated, in an atmosphere of comradeship between men and women.” [Guerry Hoddersen. One Hemisphere Indivisible. Seattle, Washington: Red Letter Press. 2006. Page 23.]
      9. laws of combined and uneven development (Leon Trotsky, Jane Hardy, John M. Hobson, Nick Taylor, Kamran Matin [Persian/Fārsī, کَامْرَان مَتِین, Kāmrān Matīn], and others): This perspective—informed by the work of Leon Trotsky—focuses on development.
         “The laws of history have nothing in common with a pedantic schematism. Unevenness, the most general law of the historic process, reveals itself most sharply and complexly in the destiny of the backward countries. Under the whip of external necessity their backward culture is compelled to make leaps. From the universal law of unevenness thus derives another law which, for the lack of a better name, we may call the law of combined development – by which we mean a drawing together of the different stages of the journey, a combining of the separate steps, an amalgam of archaic with more contemporary forms. Without this law, to be taken of course, in its whole material content, it is impossible to understand the history of Russia, and indeed of any country of the second, third or tenth cultural class.” [Leon Trotsky. The History of the Russian Revolution. Volume 1. Pacifica, California: Marxists Internet Archive (Marxists.org) ebook edition. 1930. Page 3.]
         “The law of combined development of backward countries – in the sense of a peculiar mixture of backward elements with the most modern factors – here rises before us in its most finished form, and offers a key to the fundamental riddle of the Russian revolution. If the agrarian problem, as a heritage from the barbarism of the old Russian history, had been solved by the bourgeoisie, if it could have been solved by them, the Russian proletariat could not possibly have come to power in 1917. In order to realise the Soviet state, there was required a drawing together and mutual penetration of two factors belonging to completely different historic species: a peasant war – that is, a movement characteristic of the dawn of bourgeois development – and a proletarian insurrection, the movement signalising its decline. That is the essence of 1917.” [Leon Trotsky. The History of the Russian Revolution. Volume 1. Pacifica, California: Marxists Internet Archive (Marxists.org) ebook edition. 1930. Page 37.]
         “This article elaborates a theory of combined and uneven development that takes the dimensions of spatiality, labour and institutions seriously. Drawing on this conceptual framework, an account is given of the way the 2007–2008 crisis was inflected in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. The integration of these countries with the global economy has taken place in different ways through trade, investment and finance. This has not only been a source of unevenness within and between them, but has also determined the form and severity with which they have experienced the crisis. The combined and uneven development perspective is therefore able to provide a rich and more dynamic account of economic development and the transmission of the crisis. Further, rather than labour being treated as one among many institutions, it is privileged in its potential role of instigating deep social change.…
         “… the world economy and nation-states are not dichotomous entities, whereby the coercive laws of value in the former unfold and are inflected in the latter. Rather they are mutually constitutive in a process whereby nation-states are constrained and shaped by the parameters of accumulation processes in the global economy, but at the same time the strategies of states and capital reshape the accumulation processes in the global economy and forge a new set of parameters and dynamics. Therefore, combined and uneven development is retained as the preferred terms and way of distinguishing this extended understanding from approaches that privilege unevenness over combination.”
         [Jane Hardy, “Transformation and crisis in Central and Eastern Europe: A combined and uneven development perspective.” Capital & Class. Volume 38, number 1, February 2014. Pages 143-155.]
         “… I intervene in the extant internecine debate that is being conducted within neo-Trotskyist circles concerning the issue as to whether the concept of uneven and combined development (U&CD) should be historically generalised … or whether it should be withheld and reserved only for the modern capitalist international system that was in place by the late 19ᵗʰ century (the majority position).… My key claim is that the failure to historically generalise U&CD, at least to some extent, necessarily leads the analysis into a Eurocentric cul-de-sac. To this end, I discuss the socialising impact of U&CD in the context of the Eastern origins of the rise of the West in the 800–1800 period. To this end, I argue that there never was a ‘pre-combination Western Europe’ in general or a ‘pre-combination Britain’ in particular. Rather, the rise of the West provides a significant example of U&CD, given that Europe was a late-developing civilisation that undertook the journey into modernity by combining the innovations that were pioneered by the key early developers – especially in Islam/North Africa, India and, above all, China.” [John M. Hobson, “What’s at Stake in the Neo-Trotskyist Debate? Towards a Non-Eurocentric Historical Sociology of Uneven and Combined Development.” Millennium: Journal of International Studies. Volume 40, number 1, September 2011. Pages 147-166.]
         “This article seeks to elaborate a framework for the study of diversity in forms of labour using Trotsky’s theory of uneven and combined development (UCD). It argues that labour markets are constituted by systemic processes of capital accumulation and uneven development in the global economy, but that these processes have highly differentiated outcomes in terms of the forms of labour that have historically emerged within and across national boundaries.…
         “…The unevenness of capitalist development leads to differential outcomes in the combination of different forms of labour that exist within any given space. A better understanding of these forms, and of the way in which they are constituted and come together through transnational or inter-societal processes, gives us an empirically clearer picture of capitalist diversity and a means of theorising its dynamics from labour’s perspective ….”
         [Nick Taylor, “Theorising capitalist diversity: The uneven and combined development of labour forms.” Capital & Class. Volume 31, number 1, February 2014. Pages 129-141.]
         “… the basic concepts of an ‘international historical sociology’ are already available in Leon Trotsky’s remarkable, but hitherto insufficiently appreciated, theory of ‘uneven and combined development’ …. It is this theory which I attempt to critically apply to the structure of the premodern Iranian state in this article. In choosing medieval Iran I pursue three main objectives. First, extant approaches to the premodern Iranian state are to a considerable extent informed by Classical Social Theories (primarily various strands of Marxism). In showing their inability to account for the specificity of the premodern Iranian state and its dynamic formation, I therefore elaborate on and reinforce the claim regarding the international lacuna in Classical Social Theories.… Second, Trotsky formulated his theory of uneven and combined development in order to explicate and conceptualize the specificities of development and revolutionary change in Russia (and other ‘backward’ countries in general) in the capitalist epoch.… Third, at an analytical level, historical sociological approaches to the formation and transformation of premodern states have primarily focused on Europe …. Those studies which have dealt with the extra-European world have either pursued macro-analysis of ‘international systems’, without offering in-depth analysis of any particular state …, or they have focused on the changing configuration of anarchical and hierarchical relations within and between western and non-western international systems or geo-cultural areas …. My focus on Iran therefore seeks to contribute to the closure of this analytical gap too.” [Kamran Matin, “Uneven and Combined Development in World History: The International Relations of State-formation in Premodern Iran.” European Journal of International Relations. Volume 13, number 3, September 2007. Pages 419-447.]
      10. International Communist Union: This Trotskyist tendency is headquartered in France.
          “The Internationalist Communist Union is a current which bases itself on the heritage left successively, by Marx and Engels, Rosa Luxemburg, Lenin and Trotsky, through the ideas they fought for. The ICU [Internationalist Communist Union] considers that the capitalist organisation of human society belongs to its past, not to its future. Its considers that the capitalist society – which is based on private property, the market, competition and profit – will have to be replaced, on a worldwide scale, with a society based on the collective ownership of natural resources and means of production and on a democratically planned economy, capable of providing to each and everyone an equal access to all material and cultural resources and assets.
          “The ICU bases itself on the heritage of the 1917 Russian revolution, which it considers as the first and, so far, the only case of a revolution in which the proletariat took over state power for a significant length of time, in an attempt to implement a collectivist transformation of society, before being deprived of political power by the dictatorship of a usurping bureaucracy.”
          [Editor, “About the ICU.” International Communist Union. Undated. Retrieved on December 12th, 2016.]
      11. Trotskyist Fraction Fourth International: This tendency is attempting to rebuild Trotskyism.
          “Communism is not a state that can be imposed coercively by a bureaucracy. In fact, contrary to what all the different variants of Stalinism attempted to pass off as the truth, it is not designed to work with any form of state or with the existence of any social classes. The construction of communism can only be the outcome of conscious work. The development of the broadest working class democracy based on forms of self-organisation like the Soviets is the only means to advance towards communism and the absence of any form of state. The great revolutions that have triumphed in the 20th century, beginning with the Russian revolution of 1917, have taken place in underdeveloped, colonial or semi-colonial countries. However, these revolutions could only have meant the first step of the world revolution. Communism cannot emerge within the boundaries of underdeveloped countries since communism does not mean a more equal distribution of scarce resources. The shortage of goods only reignites the struggle for survival, and with it all the evils of the old society. The bureaucracy that established itself over the working class in those deformed and degenerated workers’ states ultimately faced the contradiction of having to struggle for its survival in the face of their underdevelopment and isolation. The 20th century has demonstrated how impossible the Stalinist utopia of ‘socialism in one country’ really is. If even under the control of a parasitic bureaucracy, the social basis of the Soviet State – nationalised property and a planned economy instead of the anarchic capitalist mode of production – enabled the Soviet Union to go from being an immature capitalist state with semi-feudal traits to the world’s second most powerful nation, imagine how much greater the possibilities of building communism would be if all the technical apparatuses and the enormous wealth of countries like the United States, Germany, or Japan were to fall into the hands of the working class.” [Editor, “Manifesto for a Movement for a Revolutionary Socialist International—The Fourth International.” Trotskyist Fraction Fourth International. August, 2013. Buenos Aires, Argentina. Retrieved on December 12th, 2016.]
      12. Workers International to Rebuild the 4ᵗʰ International: This Trotskyist tendency is headquartered in the United Kingdom.
          “Racism, Tribalism or Ethnicity – which all boil down to the same thing whatever you call them – are parasitic both in practice and outlook. Of course such an outlook leaves no room to recognise class.
          “Ethnic parasitism proceeds in the context of a world system of capitalist parasitism and it therefore tends to break up nations in the most savage manner rather than welding them together, as we can see in the case of Yugoslavia, Burundi and Rwanda, Nigeria (Biafra) and Namibia. Recent world events prove that ethnicity cannot keep multi-national nations together.
          “However, if one approaches the tribal State from the fact that Namibian society consist of classes, the picture changes drastically. You find that 98% of our society consist of the poor peasantry, the working class and the lower middle classes. These classes are the victims of the tribal regime. On top of the fact that they are already exploited to the bone by what was the colonial ruling classes and the multinationals, they now face total depletion of their lifesavings at the Government Institutions Pension Fund (GIPF), Social Security Commission (SSC), etc.”
          [Hewat Beukes, “Can ethnicity, racism and discrimination keep Namibia together?” Workers International Journal: Political and theoretical journal of Workers International (to Rebuild the 4ᵗʰ International). Number 17, September 2016. Page 8.]
      13. revolutionary integrationism (Richard S. “Dick” Fraser, James Baldwin, and others): According to this perspective—accepted by Trotskyists and others—the emancipation of African Americans can only occur in the context of a broader socialist revolution, not through civil rights struggles, reforms, or Black nationalism.
          “I believe that I have already demonstrated how completely integrated the Jim Crow system is with American capitalist production and its political superstructure. Nevertheless even after agreeing with many or even most or all of these facts there are still some who cling tenaciously to the false idea that in some way or another there is room for considerable progress towards the solution of the problem of racial discrimination within the framework of the capitalist parties.…
          “A hundred years ago Karl Marx, in urging the American workers to support the struggle of the slaves for emancipation and to support the northern cause in the Civil War, proclaimed the following truth: ‘Labor cannot emancipate itself in the white skin where in the black it is branded.’ This is just as true today in the modem context of racial discrimination as it was during the struggle against slavery.…
          “… capitalism, even in the southern United States, has created the conditions necessary for its own destruction. It has disrupted the old agrarian pattern, undermined the privileged white middle class, thus weakening the whole fabric of social repression. It has created great industries, proletarianizing white, urbanizing black. This process has centralized the Negro community in positions of great strategic advantage in large city communities, whereas before they were dispersed over the countryside. Capitalism has likewise created the conditions for the overthrow of race prejudice by working class solidarity.
          “It falls upon the shoulders of the proletarian revolution, in which the American workers will join together with the Negro people in the abolition of capitalism, to uproot the Jim Crow system. It is our task to build the party to lead that revolution: the Socialist Workers Party.”
          [Dick Fraser, “The Negro Struggle and the Proletarian Revolution: Two lectures by Dick Fraser—November 1953.” SWP Discussion Bulletin. Number A-19, August 1954. Online publication. No pagination.]
          “Black workers were demanding a piece of the war industry employment, defending themselves militantly against police and racist attacks in the northern cities and around southern army bases, and resisting persecution and discrimination in the Army and Navy. Almost alone among the socialist parties, the SWP [Socialist Workers Party] militantly defended them. Consequently the SWP newspaper, the Militant, became a popular paper in the ghetto, and soon black workers and some professionals began to stream into the party. We never had it so good.
          “The party faced two basic contradictions as it attempted to cope with this development. The first was in Theory and Program. The party leadership had been indoctrinated in the 1939 resolution, which was arrogantly nationalistic, calling for self-determination and separation, and characterizing the struggle for equality as reformist, and implicitly anti-revolutionary. But the blacks coming into the party were militant integrationists and had enough of separation, and rightly considered the demand for self-determination to be a justification for segregation.”
          [Richard S. Fraser, “A Letter to American Trotskyists: Too Little, Too Late: (Memorandum on the Problems of Building a Revolutionary Party).” In Memoriam: Richard S. Fraser—An Appreciation and Selection of His Work. Anonymous editor. New York: Prometheus Research Library imprint of Spartacist Publishing Co. August, 1990. Pages 83-92.]
          “Whether I like it or not the issue of integration is a false one, because we have been integrated here since as long as we’ve been here …. The history which has produced us in this country is something that, in any case we are going to have deal with one of these days …. This country has lied about the Negro situation for 100 years. Now … the lies are no longer viable…. No one in this country knows any longer.… what he means by freedom … [or] equality. We live in the most abysmal ignorance…. You cannot live for 30 years with something in the closet which you know is there, but which you pretend is not there without something terrible happening.… Silence has descended upon this country.” [James Baldwin in Spencer A. Leonard, “Black nationalism and the legacy of Malcolm X: An interview with Michael Dawson.” The Platypus Review. Issue 41, November 2011. Pages 1-7.]
          “Until the substantial entry of blacks into industry in World War I, anti-immigrant and anti-Catholic bigotry was the capitalists’ chief weapon in dividing and holding back the working class and impeding the development of a strong, politically conscious workers movement. Since that time, anti-black racism has been the most prominent factor in the lack of even a reformist mass political party of the working class organized separately from the capitalist parties, such as exists in all other advanced capitalist countries (and many not-so-advanced countries with a substantial working class). In the U.S., workers remain chained to the ‘liberal’ capitalist Democratic Party. Anti-black racism is at the root of the backwardness of the working class and, in general, of the reactionary features of U.S. society. It is on this basis that the centrality of the black question to the American workers revolution must be understood.” [Editor, “Revolutionary Integrationism: The Road to Black Freedom—Black History and the Class Struggle, Part One.” Workers Vanguard. Number 864, February 17th, 2006. Online publication. No pagination.]
          “As we have emphasized, a key aspect of revolutionary integrationism is that black workers, with their generally higher level of political consciousness, can and must lead the mass of white workers, mainly through the organizations of the labor movement.…
          “… The reformist left obscures the Marxist understanding of bourgeois ‘democracy’ as simply a facade that covers the reality of the capitalist state as an instrument of organized force and violence—consisting at its core of the police, army, courts and prisons—for maintaining capitalist property and profits. It is the task of proletarian revolution to smash the bourgeois state and establish a workers state, laying the basis for the abolition of classes in an international communist world.”
          [Editor, “Revolutionary Integrationism: The Road to Black Freedom—Black History and the Class Struggle, Part Two.” Workers Vanguard. Number 865. March 3rd, 2006. Online publication. No pagination.]
          “Of key importance in the U.S. is the perspective of revolutionary integrationism—for black liberation through socialist revolution—put forward by Richard Fraser and further developed by the Spartacist tendency. This methodology is also crucial in Brazil. The Spartacist tendency uniquely fought for proletarian opposition against all forms of class-collaborationist popular fronts. This brought it into sharp conflict with the centrists who ‘peddle their wares in the shadow of the Popular Front’ (as [Leon] Trotsky put it in the [19]’30s), from Sri Lanka to Chile, France and Portugal in the [19]’70s, as well as in the Vietnam ‘anti-war’ movement in the U.S., and in El Salvador and Mexico in the [19]’80s and [19]’90s.” [Editor, “Declaration of the League for the Fourth International: Reforge the Fourth International!” The Internationalist. Number 5, April–May 1998. Online publication. No pagination.]
      14. Socialist Equality Party (US): It is a Trotskyist party in the U.S. (with branches in other countries). Jerry White and Niles Niemuth—who were, respectively, the party’s 2016 presidential and vice-presidential candidates—faced a U.S. Constitutional challenge. At 28-years old, Niemuth would actually have been too young to become president (should the need arise). The minimum age is 35. Voters looking for a socialist or communist ticket might, therefore, have raised legitimate questions about the seriousness of the campaign. See also the World Socialist Web Site.
          “The world capitalist system is ensnared in its greatest crisis since the Great Depression of the 1930s. The financial turmoil that began in September 2008 with the sudden failure of Wall Street icons has metastasized into a global economic breakdown. For decades the apologists of capitalism have proclaimed that American-style ‘free enterprise’ is the most perfect form of economic organization. They ignored the many signs of the approaching crisis, while the corporate-controlled media celebrated the reckless financial speculation and irresponsible self-enrichment that define the business activities and personal lifestyles of the ruling class.…
          “The specter of past tragedies looms ever larger. On the eve of the Second World War, Leon Trotsky, the greatest strategist of revolutionary socialism in the twentieth century, described the world crisis as the ‘death agony of capitalism.’ He warned that ‘a catastrophe threatens the whole culture of mankind.’ His words were vindicated by the horrors that followed. Capitalism survived only by plunging the world into the cataclysm of war. By the time it ended, in 1945, approximately 70 million people had perished.
          “A new warning must be raised with all necessary urgency. The present crisis will not simply go away. There is no peaceful, let alone easy, way out of the economic and social impasse into which capitalism has led mankind. The program of the Socialist Equality Party—which works in political solidarity with the International Committee of the Fourth International—is not a collection of palliatives and half-measures. The aim of this party and its co-thinkers in the Fourth International is not the reform of American and international capitalism.”
          [First National Congress of the Socialist Equality Party (US), “The Breakdown of Capitalism & the Fight for Socialism in the United States: Program of the Socialist Equality Party.” Socialist Equality Party (US). August 11th–15th, 2010. Retrieved on July 21st, 2016.]
      15. Socialist Struggle Movement (Hebrew/ʿIḇəriyṯ, הָתְּנוּעָה הָמַאֲבָק הָסוֹצְיָאלִיסְטִי, hā-Tənūʿāh hā-Mạʾăḇāq hā-Sōṣəyʾliysəṭiy; or Arabic/ʿArabiyyaẗ, الحَرَكَة النِضَال الاِشْتِرَاكِيّ, ʾal-Ḥarakaẗ ʾal-Niḍāl ʾal-ʾIštirākiyy): It is a Trotskyist organization for both Palestinians and Israelis.
      16. Worker-Communist Party of Iraq (Arabic/ʿArabiyyaẗ, الحِزْب الشُيُوعِيّ العُمَّالِيّ العِرَاقِيّ, ʾal-Ḥizb ʾal-Šuyūʿiyy ʾal-ʿUmmāliyy ʾal-ʿIrāqiyy): It is a Trotskyist group.
      17. Left Worker-Communist Party of Iraq (Arabic/ʿArabiyyaẗ, الحِزْب الشُيُوعِيّ العُمَّالِيّ اليَسَارِيّ العِرَاقِيّ, ʾal-Ḥizb ʾal-Šuyūʿiyy ʾal-ʿUmmāliyy ʾal-Yasāriyy ʾal-ʿIrāqiyy): It is also a Trotskyist organization.
          “In countries afflicted with Political Islam, women’s situations are in their severest degrees of deterioration. In addition to being discriminated against on the basis of her gender, the woman is subjugated to the ‘divine’ reactionary laws of Islam which establish and reinforce women’s inferiority in non-debatable documents. Women in those societies find it impossible to show any sign of protest or objection to the Islamic violations of their humanity. The submission of millions of women to the tyranny and torture of mullahs, sheikhs and clerics, as well as of gangs of Political Islam and tribal leaders, has turned millions of women’s lives into unbearable torturous conditions.” [“The Struggle of Women’s Liberation Movement is linked to the Working Class’s Struggle for Socialism.” Left Worker-Communist Party of Iraq. March 8th, 2007. Retrieved on September 20th, 2015.]
      18. Communist Organization for the Fourth International: This Trotskyist organization was founded by the late Seymour “Sy” Landy (1931-2007). The Arabic-language name of the organization is the Communist Organization for the Fourth International (Arabic/ʿArabiyyaẗ, المُنَظَّمَة الشُيُوعِيَّة مِنْ أَجْل الأُمَمِيَّة الرَابِعَة, ʾal-Munaẓẓamaẗ ʾal-Šuyūʿiyyaẗ min ꞌaǧl ʾal-ꞌUmamiyyaẗ ʾal-Rābiʿaẗ). The League for the Revolutionary Party is the U.S. branch. Kommunistische Organisation für die Vierte Internationale (KOVI-BRD) is the German branch.
          “The LRP [League for the Revolutionary Party] upholds the method of permanent revolution. Imperialism whips up bloody racism, national chauvinism and war; it pits workers against each other across the globe. Internationalism and interracialism are critical aspects of revolutionary strategy.” [League for the Revolutionary Party: Communist Organization for the Fourth International. August 9th, 2015. Retrieved on September 10th, 2015.]
          “The answer presented in this book is that only Marxism can account for the remarkable turnabout in the Stalinist system. Only Marxism can probe to the roots of what makes these societies function as they do: the struggle between the exploited producing classes and the ruling class. Only Marxism could foresee Stalinism’s inevitable decay. Only Marxism can explain why the reformist Stalinists’ rescue plans will not suffice, why they cannot repair the contradictions at the heart of their system. And Marxism can show as well that the collapse of Stalinism presages a parallel crisis of world capitalism. If the West has won, its triumph will be brief.
          “This book uses the tools of Marxism to analyze the Stalinist system: the social and economic structure that arose out of the degeneration and defeat of the revolutionary Soviet workers’ state. It demonstrates that Stalinist society is fundamentally capitalist, an integral but subordinate part of international imperialism.
          “Naturally the rulers of the pseudo-socialist states and their apologists reject any such analysis. But so do most ‘Marxist’ critics of Stalinism. The Stalinist counterrevolution perverted not only the Soviet revolution but Marxism itself. The dialectical method — to study the change and development of society and uncover the essence beneath every surface appearance — has been abandoned. So has the analytic base of Marxism, the critique of political economy that exposes the internal contradictions and the impermanence of capitalism. Thus ‘Marxism’ has been transformed into its opposite, a counterrevolutionary ideology.
          “To understand Stalinism it is necessary to understand capitalism. For this task it is necessary to resurrect Marxism in its authentic form as the revolutionary science of the working class, the only agency capable of overthrowing capitalism and thereby creating a world fit for human beings. This book is an important weapon in the effort to revivify the Marxism of [Karl] Marx, of [Vladimir] Lenin, of [Rosa] Luxemburg, of [Leon] Trotsky, of the thousands of proletarians who have given their lives in the struggle for authentic communism.
          “For Marxists the test of theory is practice. The Marxist standpoint and method defended in this book already predicted, over a decade ago, the present devolution of Stalinism in the direction of more traditional capitalist forms. At the height of the Cold War we were able to predict that the dividing line for a future World War III would be drawn between Japan, Germany and the United States rather than between the U.S. and the USSR. When other ‘theories’ treated the Soviet Union as a powerful system, as the wave of the future (for good or for evil), we saw it as weak and collapsing.”
          [Sy Landy, “The Life and Death of Stalinism: Foreward,” in Walter Daum. The Life and Death of Stalinism: A Resurrection of Marxist Theory. New York: Socialist Voice Publishing. 1990. Ebook edition.]
          “The League for the Revolutionary Party (LRP) has been formed to carry out the struggle for revolutionary leadership of the working class that was undertaken in the past by the Revolutionary Socialist League (RSL). The RSL’s left wing, the Revolutionary Party Tendency, was expelled on February 15ᵗʰ of this year, and its members joined with previously-expelled comrades including Central Committee members Sy Landy and Walter Dahl to organize the LRP. The LRP stands for the program of [Vladimir] Lenin and [Leon] Trotsky, the revolutionary communism of our epoch, that is rapidly being abandoned by the RSL.…
          “In 1976 world capitalism is skirting the edge of a profound crisis. The bourgeoisie is seeking to claw its way out of the impending disaster by chipping away all the hard-won gains of the proletariat. In the face of this assault the workers are tragically misled and therefore disunited. The bulk of our class feels itself to be powerless, lacking any credible alternative to the trade union bureaucrats and liberal politicians who betray them at every turn. Many of these workers resign themselves to hanging on, hoping that the present shallow economic upswing will bring relief. Others, a distinct but crucial minority consisting of the most politically advanced workers, are still searching for an alternative. They are fighting, attempting to forge a new leadership built upon a program that will put an end to the prevailing desperation.”
          [Sy Landy, “The Struggle for the Revolutionary Party.” Socialist Voice. Number 1, fall 1976. Online publication. No pagination.]
      19. Workers’ Party (Arabic/ʿArabiyyaẗ, الحِزْب العُمَّال, ʾal-Ḥizb ʾal-ʿUmmāl, or French, Le Parti des Travailleurs as pronounced in this MP3 audio file): It is a Trotskyist party in Algeria.
      20. Committee for a Workers’ International: A socialist alternative to world capitalism.
          “If by killing Trotsky they [Joseph Stalin and his bureaucrats] thought they could destroy his ideas they were profoundly mistaken. Succeeding generations – the most politically aware layers – when they have moved into struggle against capitalism and Stalinism looked for explanations and inspiration in the works of Trotsky. Even in the post-1989 period of ideological counter-revolution his ideas still proved attractive. Now, confronted by the worst economic crisis of capitalism since the 1930s and the resulting inevitable mass revolt of the working class and poor, the ideologues of capitalism fear the influence of the ideas of Trotsky.” [Peter Taaffe, “Anniversary of Trotsky’s assassination. August 21st, 2015. Retrieved on September 20th, 2015.]
      21. World Socialist Web Site – Published by the International Committee of the Fourth International: This group is also Trotskyist.
          “If by killing Trotsky they [Joseph Stalin and his bureaucrats] thought they could destroy his ideas they were profoundly mistaken. Succeeding generations – the most politically aware layers – when they have moved into struggle against capitalism and Stalinism looked for explanations and inspiration in the works of Trotsky. Even in the post-1989 period of ideological counter-revolution his ideas still proved attractive. Now, confronted by the worst economic crisis of capitalism since the 1930s and the resulting inevitable mass revolt of the working class and poor, the ideologues of capitalism fear the influence of the ideas of Trotsky.” [Peter Taaffe, “Anniversary of Trotsky’s assassination. August 21st, 2015. Retrieved on September 20th, 2015.]
      22. League for the Fifth International: “The League for the Fifth International is a revolutionary organisation. Our goal is to build a world party of socialist revolution, fighting across the world for an end to capitalism and for socialism. We base our programme – From Protest to Power – and our day to day policies on the works of Marx, Engels, Lenin and Trotsky, on the revolutionary documents of the first four congresses of the Third International and the Transitional Programme of the Fourth International published in 1938.” [Editor, “Who are the Fifth Internationalists?” League for the Fifth International. September 23rd, 2009. Retrieved on September 10th, 2015.]
      23. Platypus Affiliated Societies: This school synthesizes elements of a rehabilitated Trotskyism with the thought of Rosa Luxemburg and critical social theory—particularly the work of Theodor Adorno, Walter Benjamin, and Georg Lukács.
          “Platypus presumes that the legacy of [Leon] Trotsky’s Marxism can best be evaluated by exchanging the much-cherished memory of Trotsky as the anti-Stalinist martyr for the more painful image of Trotsky as the last man standing among the ruins of revolutionary Marxism. I cherish nothing about martyrdom, but view Trotsky’s assassination in light of Stalinism’s legacy: the degeneration of the fundamental revolutionary program of proletarian internationalism into the politics of ‘socialism in one country,’ a profound shift that turned revolutionary possibility into its opposite and signaled the defeat of the world-historical accomplishment of 1917 while obliterating all protagonists of that original revolutionary victory.” [Bryan Palmer, Jason Wright, Mike Macnair, and Richard Rubin, “The legacy of Trotskyism.” Platypus Review. Issue 38, August 2011. Online publication. No pagination.]
          “… [A particular] label Platypus gets branded with is the most interesting one, and the one closest to the truth: that we are Trotskyists.
          “In fact, Platypus is in no way a Trotskyist organization, but we think that Leon Trotsky’s thought and the heroic—and losing—struggle that he fought after his exile from the Soviet Union are necessary for an understanding of the thwarted potential for emancipation represented by the Bolshevik revolution of 1917.
          “Trotsky and his project in exile represented ‘the last man standing’ of a kind of historical consciousness that we in Platypus have come to refer to as Second International radicalism.”
          [The Platypus Historians Group, “The dead Left: Trotskyism.” Platypus Review. Issue 6, September 2008. Online publication. No pagination.]
          “Whenever approaching any phenomenon, [Theodor] Adorno’s procedure is one of immanent dialectical critique. The phenomenon is treated as not accidental or arbitrary but as a necessary form of appearance that points beyond itself, indicating conditions of possibility for change. It is a phenomenon of the necessity for change. The conditions of possibility for change indicated by the phenomenon in question are explored immanently, from within. The possibility for change is indicated by a phenomenon’s self-contradictions, which unfold from within itself, from its own movement, and develop from within its historical moment.…
          “Everything is taken not merely as it ‘is,’ as it happens to exist, but rather as it ‘ought’ to be, as it could and should be, yielding as-yet unrealized potentials and possibilities. So it is with ‘authoritarianism,’ in Adorno’s view. For Adorno, the key is how psychological authoritarianism is self-contradictory and points beyond itself. Adorno is interested in the ‘actuality’ of authoritarianism: as Wilhelm Reich put it, the ‘progressive character of fascism;’ as Walter Benjamin put it, the ‘positive concept of barbarism.’”
          [Chris Cutrone, “Critical authoritarianism.” Platypus Review. Issue 91, November 2016. Online publication. No pagination.]
          “Hungarian literary critic and political theorist Georg Lukács is generally recognized, along with thinkers such as Antonio Gramsci and Rosa Luxemburg, as one of the most influential intellectual figures of twentieth century Marxism. And while Lukács’ reading of Marx is possibly the most sophisticated and intellectually rigorous to be found in the century and a half long trajectory of historical materialism, his legacy suffers from the “misfortune” that, unlike Gramsci and Luxemburg, he survived what is known as the heroic period of Third International Marxism: the late teens and early twenties. Not sharing the embattled demise and much deserved martyrdom of these figures of these figures, it has become easy for many subsequent Leftists to malign a thinker who unfortunately followed his convictions to the historical train wreck that they came to—namely, the left after Stalin—a train wreck that in the present threatens to obscure our vision of his contribution. Those of us that are today interested in the political possibilities of a serious re-engagement with Marxian critical theory have much to lose if the image of ‘Lukács the cranky Stalinist party-intellectual’of the fifties and sixties succeeds in eclipsing the memory of ‘Lukács the radical dialectician’ of the early twenties—we have much to lose if the carnage and decay that followed the brilliance of his insights scares us into seeing them merely as complex rationalizations for the use of political terror.” [Marco Torres, “Politics as a form of knowledge: A brief introduction to Georg Lukács.” Platypus Review. Issue 1, November 2007. Pages 2-3.]
          “We are motivated, after failed and betrayed attempts at emancipation, and in light of their inadequate self-understanding, to re-appropriate this history in service of possibilities for emancipatory struggle in the present – and the future.
          “Towards such ends, we might begin (perhaps provocatively) with the list of names that indicate the thoughts and problems issuing from events that, reading history against the grain (with [Walter] Benjamin), still speak to us in the present: [Karl] Marx, [Vladimir] Lenin, [Rosa] Luxemburg, [Leon] Trotsky, [Theodor] Adorno. – Not much more than what is represented by these figures, but absolutely nothing less.”
          [Editor, “What is a platypus?: On Surviving the Extinction of the Left.” Platypus Affiliated Society. 2016. Web page. Retrieved on November 17th, 2016.]
          “Platypus is a project for the self-criticism, self-education, and, ultimately, the practical reconstitution of a Marxian Left. At present the Marxist Left appears as a historical ruin. The received wisdom of today dictates that past, failed attempts at emancipation stand not as moments full of potential yet to be redeemed, but rather as ‘what was’ — utopianism that was bound to end in tragedy. As critical inheritors of a vanquished tradition, Platypus contends that — after the failure of the 1960s New Left, and the dismantlement of the welfare state and the destruction of the Soviet Union in the 1980s–90s — the present disorientation of the Left means we can hardly claim to know the tasks and goals of social emancipation better than the ‘utopians’ of the past did.
          “Our task is critique and education towards the reconstitution of a Marxian Left. Platypus contends that the ruin of the Marxist Left as it stands today is of a tradition whose defeat was largely self-inflicted, hence at present the Marxist Left is historical, and in such a grave state of decomposition that it has become exceedingly difficult to draft coherently programmatic social-political demands. In the face of the catastrophic past and present, the first task for the reconstitution of a Marxian Left as an emancipatory force is to recognize the reasons for the historical failure of Marxism and to clarify the necessity of a Marxian Left for the present and future. — If the Left is to change the world, it must first transform itself!
          [Editor, “What is Platypus?: The Platypus Affiliated Society.” The Platypus Affiliated Society. April 2007. Online pamphlet. No pagination. Retrieved on November 17th, 2016.]
          “The conception of ‘political practice’ as we find it in the letters and essays of [Max] Horkheimer, [Herbert] Marcuse, and [Theodor] Adorno during the thirties was (more implicitly than explicitly) the same as that of the revolutionary Marxists [Vladimir] Lenin, [Leon] Trotsky, and [Rosa] Luxemburg. Yet, they were anxious to omit any public mention of Trotsky. After the Second World War, Adorno and Horkheimer saw no possibility of any revolutionary practice, for they saw no revolutionary subject (class). With the notable exception of Marcuse, they didn't think that the German (and international) protest movement of the students had any chance to change capitalist society.” [Helmut Dahmer, “Trotsky and the Frankfurt School.” Platypus Review. Issue 80, October 2015. Online publication. No pagination.]
      24. Socialist Action: In solidarity with workers and the oppressed everywhere.
          “Socialist Action is a national group of activists committed to the emancipation of workers and the oppressed. We strive to revitalize the anti-war, labor, anti-racist, feminist, student and other social movements. In the process we hope to bring activists together from different backgrounds into a revolutionary workers’ party that can successfully challenge the wealthy elite. Our ultimate goal is a truly democratic society organized to satisfy human needs, rather than corporate greed. We’ve set up this page to introduce you to our organization, and to invite you to join us in the struggle to make the world a better place!…
          “… This famous theory [permanent revolution] by Leon Trotsky holds that revolution in modern times, even in under-developed countries, has to be led by the working class and has to be a fully fledged socialist revolution – revolution cannot go through stages and cannot be made in alliance with any wing of the capitalist class. To be ultimately successful it also needs to be an international revolution. We believe that a successful socialist revolution will result in a workers’ government that is based on elected workers’ councils.”
          [Editor, “About.” Socialist Action. 2015. Retrieved on September 12th, 2015.]
      25. Humanist Workers for Revolutionary Socialism: This Trotskyist group is also know as “Humanists for Revolutionary Socialism.”
          “Socialism is not a political system, it is an economic one. However, in the sense that I use the term, socialism is compatible only with a democratic political system – that is, one in which choices about policy, and about the leaders who will administer its implementation, are made by the people themselves. No totalitarian or autocratic system, like [Joseph] Stalin’s USSR or Mao’s China, can be considered socialist. (By the same token, I might add, no capitalist system can by considered genuinely democratic!)
          “Socialism, as I envision it, is an economic system under which all natural resources, as well as all means of producing goods and commodities (above the scale of individual artisanship), and of organizing the delivery of services, would be owned and managed by a democratically-run government for the benefit of the society as a whole. The government, in turn, would take full responsibility for meeting everyone’s fundamental needs – food, clothing, shelter, health care, education, transportation, a healthy ecosystem, access to cultural and recreational resources – at the highest level possible.”
          [Editor, “What I Mean by ‘Socialism’” Written by a founder of Humanist Workers for Revolutionary Socialism. Salon. November 22nd, 2008. Retrieved from Internet Archive: Wayback Machine on September 3rd, 2015.]
      26. Socialist Alternative: It is a Trotskyist organization in solidarity with Committee for a Workers’ International.
          “Socialist Alternative will support the strongest independent left campaign in the Presidential election in 2016. We want to build maximum pressure from below in the [Bernie] Sanders campaign to encourage him to not endorse Hillary Clinton and to run beyond the primaries and into the general election to challenge the corporate elites, or at least to support the strongest independent, left challenger. This will very likely be Jill Stein, and we want to get her on every ballot possible in the election.…
          “Socialist Alternative has acknowledged many times our political differences with Sanders. We disagree with his support for the Israeli state. We also urge the Sanders campaign to take a stronger stand in opposition to racist attacks and police brutality. While these criticisms are important, they will not stop us from putting forward our plans and ideas for how to win the positive things Sanders stands for.”
          [Bryan Koulouris, “Sanders’ Campaign Gains Momentum: How Do We Build a Decisive Challenge to Corporate Political Domination?” Socialist Alternative. Issue 15, July-August 2015. Page 4.]
   3. communist left: This generally non-Bolshevik branch of the Marxist tradition is also commonly referred to as “left–wing communism,” “left communism,” or by the French term «ultra–gauche» (MP3 audio file)—literally, “ultra–left.” As a highly variegated tradition, it can be broadly defined to incorporate a conglomeration of libertarian and democratic currents. These include: Marxism–Luxemburgism, Marxism–Bordigism, Zapatismo, communization, autonomism, council communism (the establishment of factory-based workers’ councils), Internationalist Communist Tendency, International Communist Current, Internationalist Perspective, and the anti–authoritarian current. Rosa Luxemburg, aside from the tendency named after her, has influenced some of the other approaches to left communism—particularly autonomist Marxism—as well as some approaches to Marxism–Trotskyism. Certain segments of the communist left accept a version of spontaneism (revolutionary spontaneity). In the anti–reformist tradition of impossibilism, a number of left communists (mostly autonomists) consider reforming, or improving, existing societies to be, for the most part, a waste of time. (Marxist–Luxemburgists, for the most part, disagree.)
      In addition, many left communists oppose “frontism” (forming alliances with groups outside of a particular left-communist tendency to fight a common enemy), nationalism (including purely national revolutions), and both voting and running in national elections (parliamentarism). Lenin’s emphasis on national revolutions is often regarded as a shift to the right. Indeed, left communists have developed various critiques of a Leninist, or centralist, viewpoint. As shown in the quotation directly below this paragraph, Lenin was obviously not a fan of the majority of the communist left (an opposition which did not extend to Luxemburg). For futher information see: Online Archives of the Communist Left, Controversies: Forum for the International Communist Left, “Left Wing” Communism, “Left” Communism, and one Class struggle, but no party! by Duncan Hallas (autonomism). Please not that, although Ian D. Thatcher considers Trotskyism to be a part of the communist left, most writers restrict this rubric to certain specifically non-Bolshevik versions of Marxist communism.
      “World revolution has been given a powerful impetus by the horrors, atrocities and villainies of the world imperialist war, and by the hopelessness of the position created by it. This revolution is spreading more widely and deeply with such supreme rapidity, with such splendid richness of varying forms, with such an instructive, practical refutation of all doctrinairism, that there is every hope of a speedy and thorough recovery of the international Communist movement from the infantile disorder of ‘Left’ Communism.” [Vladimir I. Lenin. ‘Left-Wing’ Communism: An Infantile Disorder. April 27th, 1920. Authorized translation (anonymous). Detroit, Michigan: The Marxian Educational Society. 1921. Page 103.]
      “Two figures stand out as emblematic of the dominant currents of left Marxism in the twentieth century: Rosa Luxemburg and Leon Trotsky. Both were revolutionaries who supported the October 1917 Bolshevik takeover. Both had a complex and changing relationship with Lenin and the Bolsheviks. Both were anti-parliamentary and in favour of a combination of vanguard leadership and workers’ councils. Luxemburg, however, was the more clearly libertarian, sympathetic to spontaneous mass activity and deeply attached to the preservation of civil liberties under socialism. Trotsky was the more vanguardist and the one who, despite his anti-Stalinism, was more willing to subordinate democratic means to revolutionary ends. These two figures have had a profound influence on Marxism and Marxist thought, albeit an influence felt mainly and most strongly in fringe and minority groupings of left politics. Trotsky initiated a trend of radical and anti-Stalinist vanguardism, while Luxemburg’s legacy has been more diffuse (there are few ‘Luxernburgists’ in the way that there are Trotskyists) but is felt and viewed positively by a range of left activists and thinkers, from the radical liberal through to the anarchist. In this chapter the complex relationship between Trotsky and Luxemburg during their lifetime is explored in order to convey a sense of what left Marxism is, and to see what light can be cast on the tensions and differences between its two main rival strands.” [Ian D. Thatcher, “Left Communism: Rosa Luxemburg and Leon Trotsky Compared.” Twentieth-Century Marxism: A Global Introduction. Daryl Glaser and David M. Walker, editors. London and New York: Routledge imprint of Taylor & Francis Group, an Informa PLC business. 2007. Pages 30-45.]
      “The second chapter [of Twentieth-Century Marxism: A Global Introduction] engages in a comparison of the thinking of Leon Trotsky and Rosa Luxemburg in which [Ian D.] Thatcher argues that the latter held to a more principled socialist position in believing that ‘Better the Russian revolution fail with honour that prolong itself in an undemocratic form.’ Thatcher suggests that Trotsky came to this much later, being more closely attuned linked to Lenin’s beliefs in the role of the vanguard party, in contrast to Luxembourg’s view of the importance of the involvement of the wider working class in the revolutionary process.” [Gerard Cotterell, “Twentieth-Century Marxism: A Global Introduction.” Critique. Volume 39, number 2, May 2011. Pages 218-324.]
      “We desired a libertarian, democratic revolution, without the hypocrisy and flabbiness of the bourgeois democracies— egalitarian and tolerant towards ideas and people, which would employ terror if it was necessary but would abolish the death penalty. From a theoretical point of view, we stated these problems very badly; certainly the Bolshevik put them better than we. From the human standpoint, we were infinitely nearer the truth than he was. We saw in the power of the Soviets the realization of our deepest hopes, as he did also. Our mutual understanding was based on deep misunderstanding, as well as on sheer necessity.” [Victor Serge. Memoirs of a Revolutionary. Peter Sedgwick with George Paizis, translators. New York: New York Review Books imprint of The New York Review of Books. 2012. Page 74.]
      “In Memoirs of a Revolutionary Victor Serge describes the first decade of Soviet rule as displaying ‘the obscure early stages of a psychosis’, the symptoms of which became increasingly pronounced as time wore on and the defeats and corpses piled ever higher. The experience of living through the twenty-year period from the October Revolution of 1917 to the Stalinist purges (which reached their apex in 1937) he declares ‘must be a psychological phenomenon unique in history.’” [Hannah Proctor, “Lost minds: Sedgwick, Laing and the politics of mental illness.” Radical Philosophy: Philosophical Journal of the Independent Left. Number 197, May/June 2016. Pages 36-48.]
      “If we are to designate the currents examined in this thesis as exponents of a ‘libertarian communist’ politics – with convergence of anarchist and Marxist ideas and analyses as a defining feature – the essential outlines of this current have been elaborated less as a formal doctrinal system or tradition and more along the lines of common considerations and commitments formulated during periods of social, political, and economic crisis. This perhaps helps to explain the historical invisibility of movements, whose vitality and substance is intimately linked to revolutionary periods in history and the social forms created in such periods, and which have thus far failed to reshape and radically transform the Western body politic. The Industrial Workers of the World (IWW) are a notable exception. As a continuously existing radical labour organisation, primarily although by no means exclusively in North America, the IWW represents an important historical link to Chicago Idea ideology; the council communists, anarchist, and syndicalist organisations in the interwar period, and a source of inspiration for factions within the ‘autonomist’ and anti-parliamentary Left of the 1970s, and beyond, in Europe.” [Saku Pinta. Towards a Libertarian Communism: A Conceptual History of the Intersections between Anarchisms and Marxisms. Ph.D. thesis (U.S. English, dissertation). Loughborough University. Loughborough, England. Creative Commons. 2013. Page 249.]
      Below are several references.
      1. Marxism–Luxemburgism (MP3 audio file): It is a movement for democratic communism—not libertarian socialism—inspired by the much-loved Rosa Luxemburg (MP3 audio file), in German, or Róża Luksemburg (MP3 audio file), in the original Polish. She developed the dialectic of spontaneity and revolution. Although Luxemburg supported a highly nuanced version of revolutionary spontaneity (though not a pure “spontaneism”), she opposed antireformism or so-called “impossibilism.” Her approach to party membership was inclusive. According to Luxemburg, socialism demands “a complete spiritual transformation.” “Red Rosa,” as she is sometimes affectionately called (including by this writer), was born in Poland, but she escaped persecution by fleeing to Switzerland. Luxemburg—who eventually emigrated to Germany and became a German citizen—was later assassinated. Although she died before left communism—the communist left—was formally established, her work is frequently categorized under that heading. Paul Levi (MP3 audio file)—Luxemburg’s collaborator, attorney, friend, and fleeting lover—is also an important figure.
         In this writer’s view, the withering away of “the state” might refer to a repressive or hegemonic state. Whether the eventual cosmopolitan communist society could be described as a state—in some sense—may simply be an issue of semantics. In any event, since Luxemburg did not oppose a proletarian state, the Marxist–Luxemburgist tendency of the communist left is not, in itself, a type of libertarian socialism. On the other hand, given that Luxemburg’s critique of Vladimir Lenin was based on authoritarianism, she was clearly not a Marxist–Leninist. If anything, Marxism–Leninism became even more authoritarian over time—particularly under Lenin’s successor, Joseph Stalin.
         “Capitalism is the first mode of economy with the weapon of propaganda, a mode which tends to engulf the entire globe and to stamp out all other economies, tolerating no rival at its side. Yet at the same time it is also the first mode of economy which is unable to exist by itself, which needs other economic systems as a medium and soil. Although it strives to become universal, and, indeed, on account of this its tendency, it must break down—because it is immanently incapable of becoming a universal form of production. In its living history it is a contradiction in itself, and its movement of accumulation provides a solution to the conflict and aggravates it at the same time. At a certain stage of development there will be no other way out than the application of socialist principles. The aim of socialism is not accumulation but the satisfaction of toiling humanity’s wants by developing the productive forces of the entire globe. And so we find that socialism is by its very nature an harmonious and universal system of economy.” [Rosa Luxemburg. The Accumulation of Capital. Agnes Schwarzschild, translator. London and New York: Routledge imprint of Taylor & Francis Group, an Informa PLC business. 2003. Page 447.]
         “Let us … try to understand the problem in its simplest form: the capitalist form of production is governed by the profit motive. Production only makes sense to the capitalist if it fills his pockets with ‘pure income,’ i.e. with profit that remains after all his investments; but the basic law of capitalist production is not only profit in the sense of glittering bullion, but constantly growing profit. This is where it differs from any other economic system based on exploitation. For this purpose the capitalist – again in contrast to other historical types of exploiters – uses the fruits of exploitation not exclusively, and not even primarily, for personal luxury, but more and more to increase exploitation itself. The largest part of the profits gained is put back into capital and used to expand production. The capital thus mounts up or, as [Karl] Marx calls it, ‘accumulates.’” [Rosa Luxemburg, “The Accumulation of Capital – An Anti-critique,” in Rosa Luxemburg and Nikolai I. Bukharin. The Accumulation of Capital – An Anti-critique and Imperialism and the Accumulation of Capital. Kenneth J. Tarbuck, editor. Rudolph Wichmann, translator. New York and London: Monthly Review Press. 1972. Pages 46-150.]
         “… there was no direct connection between these spontaneous stirrings of exploited masses and the various socialist theories. The revolutionary proletarian masses did not have a definite socialist goal in mind, nor did the socialist theorists seek to base their ideas on a political struggle of the working class.” [Rosa Luxemburg. The Complete Works of Rosa Luxemburg, Volume I: Economic Writings 1. David Fernbach, Joseph Fracchia, and George Shriver, translators. Peter Hudis, editor. London and New York: Verso imprint of New Left Books. 2013. Page 143.]
         “… [There is] the capitalist law of value, which on the one hand automatically takes care that wage workers never rise up from the proletarian state and escape labor under the command of capital, while on the other hand making possible an ever greater accumulation of unpaid labor into capital, and thereby ever greater concentration and extension of means of production ….” [Rosa Luxemburg. The Complete Works of Rosa Luxemburg, Volume I: Economic Writings 1. David Fernbach, Joseph Fracchia, and George Shriver, translators. Peter Hudis, editor. London and New York: Verso imprint of New Left Books. 2013. Page 293.]
         “Socialist theory up to now declared that the point of departure for a transformation to socialism would be a general and catastrophic crisis. We must distinguish in this outlook two things: the fundamental idea and its exterior form. The fundamental idea consists of the affirmation that capitalism, as a result of its own inner contradictions, moves toward a point when it will be unbalanced, when it will simply become impossible. There were good reasons for conceiving that juncture in the form of a catastrophic general commercial crisis. But that is of secondary importance when the fundamental idea is considered.” [Rosa Luxemburg. Reform or Revolution. Revolutionary Classics Course. London: Socialist Workers Party (UK). 2013. Page 7.]
         “Public control is indispensably necessary. Otherwise the exchange of experiences remains only with the closed circle of the officials of the new regime. Corruption becomes inevitable.… Socialism in life demands a complete spiritual transformation in the masses degraded by centuries of bourgeois class rule. Social instincts in place of egotistical ones, mass initiative in place of inertia, idealism which conquers all suffering, etc., etc. No one knows this better, describes it more penetratingly; repeats it more stubbornly than [Vladimir] Lenin. But he is completely mistaken in the means he employs. Decree, dictatorial force of the factory overseer, draconic penalties, rule by terror—all these things are but palliatives. The only way to a rebirth is the school of public life itself, the most unlimited, the broadest democracy and public opinion. It is rule by terror which demoralizes.” [Rosa Luxemburg. Reform or Revolution and Other Writings. Mineola, New York: Dover Publications, Inc. 2006. Pages 216.]
         “Comrades, we have here as extensive field to till. We must build from below upward, until the workers and soldiers councils gather so much strength that the overthrow of the [Friedrich] Ebert–[Philipp] Scheidemann or any similar government will be merely the final act in the drama; For us the conquest of power will not be effected at one blow. It will be a progressive act, for we shall progressively occupy all the positions, of the capitalist state, defending tooth and nail each one that we seize. Moreover, in my view and in that of my most intimate associates in the party, the economic struggle, likewise, will be carried on by the workers councils. The settlement of economic affairs; and the continued expansion of the area, of this settlement, must be in the hands of the workers councils. The councils must have all power in the state. To these ends must we direct our activities in the immediate future, and it is obvious that, if we pursue this line, there cannot fail to be an enormous and immediate intensification of the struggle. For step by step, by hand to hand fighting, in every province, in every town, in every village, in every commune, all the powers of the state have to be transferred bit by bit from the bourgeoisie to the workers and soldiers councils.” [Rosa Luxemburg, “On the Spartacus Programme.” The New International. Volume 9, number 1–3, January–March 1943. Online publication. No pagination.]
         “Only the Marxist scholar can best comprehend the deepest inner motives of Polish bourgeois society, its shameful past and its shameful present: he is in the best position to see in what directions our country’s history and the class struggle are driving. Only a penetrating study into the causes of the decline of the rebellious Polish nobility and of the disgraceful history of bourgeois-capitalist Poland, a study unclouded by romantic utopianism, made it possible to foresee the revolutionary regeneration of working-class Poland presently occurring before our eyes. Now, as in the past, it is an understanding of national and class development that enables us to grasp that the only real revolutionary deed at this juncture is bringing consciousness into this spontaneous historical process, there by foreshortening its course and speeding it onward toward its goal.” [Rosa Luxemburg. The Polish Questions and the Revolution in Russia. Northampton, Massachusetts: Anarcho-communist institute. August, 2014. Kindle edition.]
         “It is clear that the Russian Social Democracy should not organize itself as a federative conglomerate of many national groups. It must rather become a single party for he entire empire. However, that is not really the question considered here. What we are considering is the degree of centralization necessary inside the unified, single Russian party in view of the peculiar conditions under which it has to function.
         “Looking at the matter from the angle of the formal tasks of the Social Democracy, in its capacity as a party of class struggle, it appears at first that the power and energy of the party are directly dependent on the possibility of centralizing the party. However, these formal tasks apply to all active parties. In the case of the Social Democracy, they are less important than is the influence of historic conditions.”
         [Rosa Luxemburg. Revolutionary Socialist Organization. Ottawa, Ontario: Integer Press. 1934. No pagination.]
         “… so this wait-and-see attitude may continue for a while. It could be then that some “accident,” a new manifesto [by the tsar] or something similar, could set off a sudden, spontaneous outbreak. In general the work is going quite well and the mood is very good. One need only explain to the masses why the present strike seems outwardly to have gone by ‘without results.’—The organization is growing strongly everywhere, but at the same time it’s having trouble, because everything is in flux.” [Rosa Luxemburg, “To Luise and Karl Kautsky, January 2, 1906.” The Letters of Rosa Luxemburg. Annelies Laschitza, Georg Adler, and Peter Hudis, editors. George Shriver, translator. Brooklyn, London and New York: Verso imprint of New Left Books. 2013. Kindle edition.]
         [On identity politics:] “I am just as much concerned with the poor victims on the rubber plantations of Putumayo, the Blacks in Africa with whose corpses the Europeans play catch. You know the words that were written about the great work of the General Staff, about Gen. [Lothar von] Trotha’s campaign in the Kalahari desert: ‘And the death rattles of the dying, the demented cries of those driven mad by thirst faded away in the sublime stillness of eternity.’ Oh that ‘sublime stillness of eternity,’ in which so many cries of anguish have faded away unheard, they resound within me so strongly that I have no special place in my heart for the [Jewish] ghetto. I feel at home in the entire world, wherever there are clouds and birds and human tears.” [Rosa Luxemburg, “To Mathilde Wurm, February 16, 1917.” The Letters of Rosa Luxemburg. Annelies Laschitza, Georg Adler, and Peter Hudis, editors. George Shriver, translator. London and New York: Verso imprint of New Left Books. 2013. Kindle edition.]
         “The true dialectic of revolutions … stands this wisdom of parliamentary moles on its head: not through a majority, but through revolutionary tactics to a majority – that’s the way the road runs.” [Rosa Luxemburg. Rosa Luxemburg or: The Price of Freedom. Natascha Mueller-Hirth, translator. Berlin, Germany: Karl Dietz Verlag. 2008. Page 68.]
         “… every socialist economic reform on the land must obviously begin with large and medium land-ownership. Here the property right must first of all be turned over to the nation, or to the state, which, with a socialist government, amounts to the same thing; for it is this alone which affords the possibility of organizing agricultural production in accord with the requirements of interrelated, large-scale socialist production.…
         “It is precisely the revolution which creates by its glowing heat that delicate, vibrant, sensitive political atmosphere in which the waves of popular feeling, the pulse of popular life, work for moment on the representative bodies in most wonderful fashion.…
         “… every socialist economic reform on the land must obviously begin with large and medium land-ownership. Here the property right must first of all be turned over to the nation, or to the state, which, with a socialist government, amounts to the same thing; for it is this alone which affords the possibility of organizing agricultural production in accord with the requirements of interrelated, large-scale socialist production.”
         “… Socialism in life demands a complete spiritual transformation in the masses degraded by centuries of bourgeois rule. Social instincts in place of egotistical ones, mass initiative in place of inertia, idealism which conquers all suffering, etc., etc. No one knows this better, describes it more penetratingly; repeats it more stubbornly than [Vladimir] Lenin. But he is completely mistaken in the means he employs. Decree, dictatorial force of the factory overseer, draconian penalties, rule by terror – all these things are but palliatives. The only way to a rebirth is the school of public life itself, the most unlimited, the broadest democracy and public opinion. It is rule by terror which demoralizes.
         “When all this is eliminated, what really remains? In place of the representative bodies created by general, popular elections, [Vladimir] Lenin and [Leon] Trotsky have laid down the soviets as the only true representation of political life in the land as a whole, life in the soviets must also become more and more crippled. Without general elections, without unrestricted freedom of press and assembly, without a free struggle of opinion, life dies out in every public institution, becomes a mere semblance of life, in which only the bureaucracy remains as the active element. Public life gradually falls asleep, a few dozen party leaders of inexhaustible energy and boundless experience direct and rule. Among them, in reality only a dozen outstanding heads do the leading and an elite of the working class is invited from time to time to meetings where they are to applaud the speeches of the leaders, and to approve proposed resolutions unanimously – at bottom, then, a clique affair – a dictatorship, to be sure, not the dictatorship of the proletariat but only the dictatorship of a handful of politicians, that is a dictatorship in the bourgeois sense, in the sense of the rule of the Jacobins (the postponement of the Soviet Congress from three-month periods to six-month periods!) Yes, we can go even further: such conditions must inevitably cause a brutalization of public life: attempted assassinations, shooting of hostages, etc. (Lenin’s speech on discipline and corruption.)…
         “Freedom only for the supporters of the government, only for the members of one party – however numerous they may be – is no freedom at all. Freedom is always and exclusively freedom for the one who thinks differently. Not because of any fanatical concept of ‘justice’ but because all that is instructive, wholesome and purifying in political freedom depends on this essential characteristic, and its effectiveness vanishes when ‘freedom’ becomes a special privilege.
         “The Bolsheviks themselves will not want, with hand on heart, to deny that, step by step, they have to feel out the ground, try out, experiment, test now one way now another, and that a good many of their measures do not represent priceless pearls of wisdom. Thus it must and will be with all of us when we get to the same point—even if the same difficult circumstances may not prevail everywhere.”
         [Rosa Luxemburg. The Russian Revolution. Bertram Wolfe, translator. New York: Workers Age Publishers. 1940. No pagination.]
         “… the Spartacus League demands:
         1. “As immediate measures to protect the Revolution:
            1. “Disarmament of the entire police force and of all officers and nonproletarian soldiers; disarmament of all members of the ruling classes.
            2. “Confiscation of all weapons and munitions stocks as well as armaments factories by workers’ and soldiers’ councils.
            3. “Arming of the entire adult male proletarian population as a workers’ militia. Creation of a Red Guard of proletarians as an active part of the militia for the constant protection of the Revolution against counter-revolutionary attacks and subversions.
            4. “Abolition of the command authority of officers and noncommissioned officers. Replacement of the military cadaver discipline by voluntary discipline of the soldiers. Election of all officers by their units, with right of immediate recall at any time. Abolition of the system of military justice.
            5. “Expulsion of officers and capitulationists from all soldiers’ councils.
            6. “Replacement of all political organs and authorities of the former regime by delegates of the workers’ and soldiers’ councils.
            7. “Establishment of a revolutionary tribunal to try the chief criminals responsible for starting and prolonging the war, the Hohenzollerns, Ludendorif, Hindenburg, Tirpitz, and their accomplices, together with all the conspirators of counter-revolution.
            8. “Immediate confiscation of all foodstuffs to secure the feeding of the people.
         2. “In the political and social realm:
            1. “Abolition of all principalities; establishment of a united German Socialist Republic.
            2. “Elimination of all parliaments and municipal councils, and takeover of their functions by workers’ and soldiers’ councils, and of the latter’s committees and organs.
            3. “Election of workers’ councils in all Germany by the entire adult working population of both sexes, in the city and the countryside, by enterprises, as well as of soldiers’ councils by the troops (officers and capitulationists excluded). The right of workers and soldiers to recall their representatives at any time.
            4. “Election of delegates of the workers’ and soldiers’ councils in the entire country to the central council of the workers’ and soldiers’ councils, which is to elect the executive council as the highest organ of the legislative and executive power.
            5. “Meetings of the central council provisionally at least every three months – with new elections of delegates each time – in order to maintain constant control over the activity of the executive council, and to create an active identification between the masses of workers’ and soldiers’ councils in the nation and the highest governmental organ. Right of immediate recall by the local workers’ and soldiers’ councils and replacement of their representatives in the central council, should these not act in the interests of their constituents. Right of the executive council to appoint and dismiss the people’s commissioners as well as the central national authorites and officials.
            6. “Abolition of all differences of rank, all orders and titles. Complete legal and social equality of the sexes.
            7. “Radical social legislation. Shortening of the labor day to control unemployment and in consideration of the physical exhaustion of the working class by world war. Maximum working day of six hours.
            8. “Immediate basic transformation of the food, housing, health and educational systems in the spirit and meaning of the proletarian revolution.
         3. “Immediate economic demands:
            1. “Confiscation of all dynastic wealth and income for the collectivity.
            2. “Repudiation of the state and other public debt together with all war loans, with the exception of sums of certain level to be determined by the central council of the workers’ and soldiers’ councils.
            3. “Expropriation of the lands and fields of all large and medium agricultural enterprises; formation of socialist agricultural collectives under unified central direction in the entire nation. Small peasant holdings remain in the possession of their occupants until the latters’ voluntary association with the socialist collectives.
            4. “Expropriation by the council Republic of all banks, mines, smelters, together with all large enterprises of industry and commerce.
            5. “Confiscation of all wealth above a level to be determined by the central council.
            6. “Takeover of the entire public transportation system by the councils’ Republic.
            7. “Election of enterprise councils in all enterprises, which, in coordination with the workers’ councils, have the task of ordering the internal affairs of the enterprises, regulating working conditions, controlling production and finally taking over direction of the enterprise.
            8. “Establishment of a central strike commission which, in constant collaboration with the enterprise councils, will furnish the strike movement now beginning throughout the nation with a unified leadership, socialist direction and the strongest support by the political power of the workers’ and soldiers’ councils.”
         [Rosa Luxemburg, “What Does the Spartacus League Want? (December 1918).” Selected Political Writings: Rosa Luxemburg. Martin Nicolaus, translator. Dick Howard, editor. New York and London: Monthly Review Press. 1971. Pages 366-376.]
         “Not until the early [eighteen-]eighties did the spontaneous factory revolts in the Moscow district with their smashing up of machines provide the impetus for the first rudiments of factory legislation in the Czarist Empire.” [Rosa Luxemburg. The Accumulation of Capital. Agnes Schwarzschild, translator. W. Stark, editor. New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press. 1951. Kindle edition.]
         “The Russian proletariat, … who are destined to play the leading part in the bourgeois revolution, enter the fight free from all illusions of bourgeois democracy, with a strongly developed consciousness of their own specific class interests, and at a time when the antagonism between capital and labour has reached its height. This contradictory situation finds expression in the fact that in this formally bourgeois revolution, the antagonism of bourgeois society to absolutism is governed by the antagonism of the proletariat to bourgeois society, that the struggle of the proletariat to bourgeois society is directed simultaneously and with equal energy against both absolutism and capitalist exploitation, and that the programme of the revolutionary struggle concentrates with equal emphasis on political freedom, the winning of the eight-hour day, and a human standard of material existence for the proletariat. This two-fold character of the Russian Revolution is expressed in that close union of the economic with the political struggle and in their mutual interaction which we have seen is a feature of the Russian events and which finds its appropriate expression in the mass strike.” [Rosa Luxemburg. The Mass Strike, the Political Party and the Trade Unions. Patrick Lavin, translator. Detroit, Michigan: Marxist Educational Society of Detroit. 1925. Ebook edition.]
         “… a day will come when another volcano lifts its voice of thunder: a volcano that is seething and boiling, whether you need it or not, and will sweep the whole sanctimonious, blood-splattered culture from the face of the earth. And only on its ruins will the nations come together in true humanity, which will know but one deadly foe—blind, dead nature.” [Rosa Luxemburg, “Martinique.” Monthly Review: An Independent Socialist Magazine. Volume 56, issue 08, January 2005. Pages 49-52.]
         “At first view the title of this work may be found surprising. Can the Social Democracy be against reforms? Can we contrapose the social revolution, the transformation of the existing order, our final goal, to social reforms? Certainly not. The daily struggle for reforms, for the amelioration of the condition of the workers within the framework of the existing social order, and for democratic institutions, offers to the Social Democracy the only means of engaging in the proletarian class war and working in the direction of the final goal—the conquest of political power and the suppression of wage-labor. Between social reforms and revolution there exists for the Social-Democracy an indissoluble tie. The struggle for reforms is its means; the social revolution, its aim.” [Rosa Luxemburg. Reform or Revolution and Other Writings. Dover Books on History, Political and Social Science. Mineola, New York: Dover Publications, Inc. 2006. Page 3.]
         “The most important and fruitful changes in its tactical policy during the last ten years have not been the inventions of several leaders and even less so of any central organizational organs. They have always been the spontaneous product of the movement in ferment. This was true during the first stage of the proletarian movement in Russia, which began with the spontaneous general strike of St. Petersburg in 1896, an event that marks the inception of an epoch of economic struggle by the Russian working people. It was no less true during the following period, introduced by the spontaneous street demonstrations of St. Petersburg students in March 1901. The general strike of Rostov-on-Don, in 1903, marking the next great tactical turn in the Russian proletarian movement, was also a spontaneous act. ‘All by itself,’ the strike expanded into political demonstrations, street agitation, great outdoor meetings, which the most optimistic revolutionist would not have dreamed of several years before.” [Rosa Luxemburg. Reform or Revolution and Other Writings. Dover Books on History, Political and Social Science. Mineola, New York: Dover Publications, Inc. 2006. Page 85.]
         “… as to private matters. Of course, you are right, that for some time now we have been leading a separate spiritual life, but this in no way began only in Berlin. We were already spiritually estranged for years in Zurich. The last two years in Z(urich) — it is firmly entrenched in my mind that I felt terribly lonely. But then I wasn’t the one who cut herself off and separated herself from you, it was the other way round. You ask whether I have never asked myself: how do you live, how are you going? I can only smile with bitterness. Oh yes, I asked myself these questions thousands of times, and not only of me, but also of you, loudly and consistently. But always got the reply that I did not understand, that you do not rely upon me, that I can give you nothing, etc. Until I stopped asking and showed in no way that I saw anything or was interested in anything. You write and ask how I could believe that you were interested in somebody else, as no one else could satisfy you or understand you. I used to say that to myself too.” [Rosa Luxemburg, “Rosa Luxemburg: Letters to Jogiehes.” Henry Zimmerman, translator. Australian Left Review. Volume 1, issue 30, May 1971. Pages 31-38.]
         “LUXEMBURG,   ROSA   1870-1919,   Cosmopolitan, charismatic, and articulate Marxist activist for whom nationalism was a gigantic impediment to peace and progress. She was born in the Russian part of Poland and became a German citizen in 1895 by marrying a German worker. A brilliant, independent-minded revolutionary, she participated in the failed 1905 revolution in Russia. Returning to Germany, she joined Karl Liebknecht to found the Spartacus League. Because of her vocal opposition to the German war effort, she was imprisoned for the duration of World War I. But she reentered German politics as soon as the empire fell in November 1918. Although she was damned in the right-wing press as an agent of Moscow, her ‘Spartacus Program’ differed essentially from [Vladimir] Lenin’s Bolshevik theory in that it advocated a more democratic Communism. She proclaimed that ‘freedom only for the supporters of the government and for members of a single party’ is no freedom at all. Her assertion that ‘freedom is the freedom of those who think differently’ was displayed by dissidents in the former German Democratic Republic (GDR) on January 17, 1988, much to the embarrassment of the ruling Socialist Unity Party of Germany (SED), which had always glorified Luxemburg in its propaganda.” [Multiple authors, “Luxemburg, Rosa 1870–1919.” Encyclopedia of Nationalism: Leaders, Movements, and Concepts—Volume 2. Alexander J. Motyl, editor. San Diego, Californa: Academic Press, A Harcourt Science and Technology Company. 2001. Page 307.]
         “As the reform movement within the national leadership of the UMWA [United Mine Workers of America] crumbles, the miners realise they may be banned from conducting future strikes without approval at the national level. But [Barbara] Kopple’s point is that the struggle itself – the Luxemburgian dialectic of spontaneity and organisation we see operating throughout Harlan County U.S.A. – is crucial even when it is defeated.” [Eingestellt von Malte, “The earth a common treasury for all.” Soliloquies of the English Cloister. Blog. January 21st, 2012. Retrieved on September 9th, 2015. Page 3.]
         “Rosa Luxemburg (1871-1919) continues to polarize the political landscape to this day: to some she is a Bolshevik terrorist, to others she is a left-wing icon. Rosa Luxemburg strove to create a society in which political freedom and equality would not be limited, but rather complemented by the principle of social freedom and equality – a demand which has still not been fulfilled today.
         “Rosa Luxemburg knew what it meant to be disadvantaged and to belong to an often-persecuted minority. This was partly due to an accident of birth and fate. She was Jewish, and although she was not at all religious, this did not protect her from anti-Semitism. But this was also due to her strong will to lead a self-determined life as opposed to abiding by the narrow-minded conventions and moral concepts prevailing at the time.”
         [Rosa Luxemburg: Freedom only for the supporters. Berlin, Germany: Rosa Luxemburg Foundation (German, Rosa Luxemburg Stiftung). Undated. Page 5.]
         “The Rosa Luxemburg Stiftung is one of the six political foundations in the Federal Republic of Germany associated with political parties. The Foundation’s main task is to provide political education. It is closely connected to the Left Party.
         “Since 1990, the work of the Foundation has been in keeping with its eponym, Rosa Luxemburg, and represents the main current of democratic socialism with an unwavering international focus. The Foundation considers itself committed to a radical perspective of enlightenment and social criticism. It stands within the tradition of the workers’ and women’s movements, as well as anti-fascism and anti-racism.
         “The Rosa Luxemburg Stiftung is a registered non-profit organization, whose most important body is the General Assembly. Its work is supported by the dedication and commitment of a large number of volunteers throughout Germany.
         “With its work, the Foundation promotes a critical analysis of society and fosters networks of emancipatory, political, social and cultural initiatives. It is active internationally in development cooperation and advocates an equal dialogue between the North and the South. At the same time, with the help of the Archive of Democratic Socialism, it documents important events and the results of left-wing politics. Within the framework of its Scholarship Department, the Foundation also provides grants to young academics.”
         [Stefan Thimmel. Everything you ever wanted to know about the Rosa Luxemburg Stiftung. Berlin, Germany: Rosa Luxemburg Stiftung. 2013. Page 13.]
         “Relations between the Bolsheviks, the Communist International (Comintern) and the national communist parties from 1919 onwards have always been the subject of controversy. In Germany, for example, there has long been a dispute over the existence of a kind of early ‘Luxemburgism’ or ‘democratic communism,’ the collapse of which was followed after 1924 by the forced ‘Stalinization’ postulated by Hermann Weber. Alternatively, should one speak of an early ‘Bolshevization,’ which had started in 1920–21 to take away the freedom of manoeuvre possessed initially by independent forces within each national party? This was how many contemporaries perceived the situation, and Richard Löwenthal gave solid evidential backing to this view in 1960.…
         “In Germany, the legacy of an early ‘Luxemburgist’ or, indeed, ‘democratic’ communism was liquidated along with Paul Levi.”
         [Andreas Wirsching, “The Impact of ‘Bolshevization’ and ‘Stalinization’ on French and German Communism: A Comparative View.” Bolshevism, Stalinism and the Comintern: Perspectives on Stalinization, 1917–53. Norman LaPorte, Kevin Morgan, and Matthew Worley, editors. New York: Palgrave Macmillan imprint of St. Martin’s Press, LLC. 2008. Pages 89-104.]
         “… Bolshevism and Stalinism were seen as foreign bodies in the movement, preventing the autonomous development of any kind of local, regional or national left socialism or communism. For example, Hermann Weber, in his well-known and influential thesis about the stalinisation of the KPD [German, Kommunistische Partei Deutschlands, Communist Party of Germany], insistently points to the supposed existence of a ‘democratic’ communism of a Luxemburgist type, which he claims was dominant in the early years of the party. Only after 1924, he says, was this promising and locally autonomous tendency of German communism destroyed by Stalinisation.” [Andreas Wirsching, “Comparing local communisms.” Twentieth Century Communism: A Journal of International History. Issue 5, 2013. Pages 21-40.]
         “The literature on [Rosa] Luxemburg is voluminous, and much of it rather uncritical. For a particularly misplaced example, see Hermann Weber’s effort to distinguish among bureaucratic-dictatorial, revolutionary, and democratic communism. He places Luxemburg only in the latter camp, thereby ignoring her pronounced revolutionary commitments, and fails to provide any critical appraisal of her views ….” [Eric D. Weitz, “Politics Unhinged: The Formation of the Communist Party of Germany and the Collapse of the German Democratic Republic.” Report number 806-31. National Council for Soviet and East European Research. April 12th, 1993. Pages 1-149.]
         “Unlike so many of the leaders of the workers’ movement, especially the Bolsheviks, and particularly [Vladimir] Lenin, Rosa [Luxemburg] did not restrict her life to political activity. She was a complete being, open to all things, to whom nothing human was strange. Her political action was only the expression of her generous nature. From the disagreement between her and the Bolsheviks over the attitude of the militant in regard to revolutionary action came the great political disputes which surge among us, disputes which, no doubt, time would only have deepened had Rosa lived
         “It is by grace of Rosa’s profoundly human character that her correspondence will always retain a current interest whatever the course of history. We are, these days, in a situation very much worse, morally speaking, than that of the militants of the war years. Rosa believed firmly, in spite of the failure of social democracy, that the war would end by putting into motion the proletariat of Germany and lead to a socialist revolution. This hope has not been confirmed. The embryo of the proletarian revolution which was produced in 1918 rapidly suffocated in blood and dragged with it in its ruin the life of Rosa Luxemburg and of Liebknecht. Since then, all the hopes which had been able to make militants have been dashed. We can no longer have blind confidence, like Rosa, in the spontaneity of the working class; their organizations have fallen apart.”
         [Simone Weil quoted in Andrea Nye. Philosophia: The Thought of Rosa Luxemburg, Simone Weil, and Hannah Arendt. New York and London: Routledge. 1994. Page 2.]
         “Essential in any recovery of a Luxemburgian socialist feminism would be the reworking of the vexed concept of democracy. Marxists, like [Vladimir] Lenin, were quick to point out the lack of real democracy in the legislative maneuvering of interest groups and the corporate financing of elections in capitalist countries. Concentrated as they were on winning state power, democracy was hardly a priority for the Bolsheviks either.” [Andrea Nye. Philosophia: The Thought of Rosa Luxemburg, Simone Weil, and Hannah Arendt. New York and London: Routledge. 1994. Page 47.]
         “[Rosa] Luxemburg’s universalist stance of Enlightened Marxism, however, implies a valuable criticism of ‘Third World’ or populist socialism.…
         “… it is an undeniable fact that Luxemburg stood firmly in the tradition of Marxist internationalism. Her idea of territorial autonomy presupposed the international socialist community.…
         “The important thing for Luxemburg was not to stick to [Karl] Marx’s old views on Polish independence, but rather to apply the dialectical materialist method to changed conditions.…
         “In short, Luxemburg sought the path of national liberation not in the right of national self-determination but in the conquest of socialism itself.… She was convinced that social emancipation would drive out all kinds of human oppression, including both national and sexual.”
         [Jie-Hyun Lim, “Rosa Luxemburg on the Dialectics of Proletarian Internationalism and Social Patriotism.” Science & Society. Volume 59, number 4 winter 1995/1996. Pages 498-530.]
         “… no, [Rosa] Luxemburg was not what we’d call a ‘libertarian socialist.’ She was certainly a part of the broader left-communist/left-Marxist movements of her day (which often included libertarian socialists) but she herself was not a libertarian socialist.
         “Particularly, she advocated the use of a state-apparatus organized via democratic workers councils. In most ways, she was really a less authoritarian Marxist-Leninist. While Leninists were advocating for a Vanguard Party made up of Marxist intellectuals to organize the working class, Rosa claimed that workers themselves had to be their own Vanguard Party. In fact, I think her political affiliations are best summed up in her pamphlet ‘The Russian Revolution’ where she shows her overall support for the Russian Revolution while simultaneously criticizing its authoritarian aspects.
         “That being said, nearly every socialist ideology wants to claim Rosa for themselves.”
         [comix_corp (user name), “Was Rosa Luxemburg a libertarian socialist?” reddit inc. August 23rd, 2013. Retrieved on June 16th, 2016.]
         “… [Rosa] Luxemburg’s conviction [was] that no group of revolutionaries, however forward thinking, simply “makes” a revolution from scratch. We make our own history, but not just as we please. That was [Karl] Marx’s view, and Luxemburg’s as well.” [Scott Tucker, “Rosa Luxemburg and the Libertarian Left.” Truthdig: A Progressive Journal of News and Opinion. Jan 14th, 2011. Retrieved on June 19th, 2016.]
         “Rosa Luxemburg’s very entrance, May 1898, into the German arena, center of the Second International, shook up the largest and most prestigious of world Marxist organizations—the German Social-Democratic Party (SPD). From the start, she became the subject of contention—contention that has not abated to this day.” [Raya Dunayevskaya. Rosa Luxemburg, Women’s Liberation, and Marx’s Philosophy of Revolution. Atlantic Highlands, New Jersey: Humanities Press, Inc. 1982. Page 1.]
         “I examine how [Hannah] Arendt, in the company of Frantz Fanon and Rosa Luxemburg, illuminates nationalism as an especially explosive form of ‘identity politics.’ …
         “… Not mutual recognition on the part of autonomous peoples, each fortified inside its own territorial nation-state, but a community’s composition of itself as an ethnoculturally multiple political identity is for Luxemburg the only democratic path that modern polities can take.…
         “As appealing as Luxemburg’s formula of a unity of political identity and ethnic difference may be, it is easy to suspect it of hinging on the substitution of a dream of ethnic harmony for the reality of ethnic conflict. It is also easy to suspect it of hinging on a presumption that ethnic differences in the long run will not be very great. Certainly the spread of bourgeois political liberties and the eventual triumph of social democracy which Luxemburg views as the road to inter-ethnic peace and understanding, she also portrays as part and parcel of the general shift in the world from traditional cultural particularities to the universal characteristics of modern social life. Then, too, from the perspective of minority peoples, any attempt to extend the ties of solidarity to cover the entire human race is likely to appear as a threatening move by a large and morally arrogant but still particular people dressed up in universal-culture disguise.”
         [Joan Cocks, “On Commonality, Nationalism, and Violence: Hannah Arendt, Rosa Luxemburg, and Frantz Fanon.” Women in German Yearbook. Volume 12, 1996. Pages 39-51.]
         “… [Rosa] Luxemburg’s much-ridiculed faith in the vigor of the proletariat is the presupposition of a theory that does not relegate the individual’s right to autonomy to a distant future, but rather brings it as a requirement into the present: in the social struggle for the redistribution of goods and in the conflict over political rights, identity-constituting self-awareness can and must be achieved through one’s own actions as an individual and as part of the collective.” [Sidonia Blättler, Irene M. Marti, and Senem Saner, “Rosa Luxemburg and Hannah Arendt: Against the Destruction of Political Spheres of Freedom.” Hypatia. Volume 20, number 2, spring 2005. Pages 88-101.]
         “Perhaps what’s attractive about Rosa Luxemburg is the fact that she was a bit confused, that she didn’t produce ‘a coherent set of theories or principles,’ that there isn’t ‘a cogent body of organization and theory’; in fact, she’s a bit like the rest of us. She tried to think, to understand, to act, not only in opposition to capitalism, but also to what she thought she saw as the problems with [Vladimir] Lenin’s ideas and Bolshevik practice; in fact, a bit like the rest of us.…
         “It’s because Luxemburg doesn’t already have all the answers, that she leaves room for the coming generations to think, to criticise, to disagree, that she’s at least as important as Lenin and [Leon] Trotsky for us in trying to understand the events of the early part of the 20ᵗʰ century.
         “I’m not a Leninist, Bolshevik or Trotskyist (anymore!), at least in part because of ‘Red Rosa.’ I’m as confused as she was, and I don’t already have the answers. I prefer people (and organisations) that way.
         “I want to discuss, not to be told. The ‘answer’ is in the future. It doesn’t yet exist, and maybe it never will. It certainly isn’t the property of any party.…
         “… [Rosa] Luxemburg’s The Mass Strike [can be] useful, not as a prescription, but as a description of spontaneity.” [Sewer Socialist, “What would it take?” Revleft: Home of the Revolutionary Left. Forum. November 10th, 2016. Retrieved on December 21st, 2016.]
         “… she [Luxemburg] was pretty definite about the mass strike, the national question, the economic crisis and the decline of capitalism to name a few. But she was certainly ready to put things into question: Marx on the problem of reproduction, the Bolshevik policy of Red Terror, and so on. And there were areas where she was inconsistent or contradictory, but it’s hard to look back and find any revolutionaries who don’t fall into that category. This includes us of course, even though we don’t know it yet.…
         “Our [Luxemburgist] positions could be sumarized as below:
         1. “We don’t oppose social reforms to revolution. They are both linked in a dialectical way, the former being an mean (in the class struggle) of the latter. We oppose mere reformism and abstract revolutionaries slogans disconected from reality;
         2. “We oppose any top-down structure, both social and organizational. The workers’ organizations must be controlled by the base and opened (we thus disagree with Lenin);
         3. “We stand for direct democracy for the organization and the social system we want after revolution;
         4. “We see mass strike (as it had been experienced in History) as a tool of struggle. One can define it as a self-managed strke movement uniting economical and political demands and that potentially enable workers to take power directly without leaders.…;
         5. “We stand for internationalism and oppose nationalism (even ‘red’) as bourgeois.”
         [Various authors, “Luxemburgism.” libcom.org. December, 2010. Retrieved on July 11th, 2016.]
         “Her [Rosa Luxemburg’s] notion of a workers’ state (what has sometimes been called ‘dictatorship of the proletariat’) had nothing to do with a one-party dictatorship ruling in the name of the people. Rather it meant what [Karl] Marx and [Friedrich] Engels said in the Communist Manifesto when they spoke of the working class winning the battle of democracy, what [Vladimir] Lenin meant in The State and Revolution, when he spoke of a thorough-going political rule by the working class. This was in contrast to the authoritarian political forms that began to develop all-too-soon in the wake of the 1917 Russian Revolution.” [Paul Le Blanc, “The Challenge of Revolutionary Democracy in the Life and Thought of Rosa Luxemburg.” International Viewpoint – online socialist magazine. September 23rd, 2006. Retrieved on July 1st, 2016.]
         “I am an internationalist whose most profound experiences have included joining with radical activists from different countries at Amsterdam’s International Institute for Research and Education, going to Nicaragua just as an inspiring revolution was about to succumb to its own contradictions and to the pressures of U.S. imperialism, participating in an international conference in Paris to critically evaluate the 1917 Russian Revolution 80 years after the fact, discussing the relevance of Rosa Luxemburg at a conference of militant activists in Johannesburg, and again at an international conference on Luxemburg at China’s Wuhan University, and participating in the World Social Forum in the Brazilian city of Porto Alegre and the Indian city of Mumbai with tens of thousands of activists from all continents.” [Paul Le Blanc. Marx, Lenin, and the Revolutionary Experience. London and New York: Routledge imprint of Taylor & Francis Group, an Informa PLC business. 2006. Pages 10-11.]
         “Luxemburgism is against the formation/use of a vanguard party to lead the revolution and instead it relegates the role of the party to one of agitation and propaganda. They believe that the party is composed of the most class conscious members of the proletariat, but it is not the job of the party to direct the revolution or to dictate to the masses. It would be more proper to think of the party that represents a Luxemburgist tendency as more of a political club rather than a political party, since this club would run no political candidates. Unlike other strains of Left Communism such as Council Communism, a Luxemburgist would not oppose voting in elections on principle since policies could be passed that increase the rights of workers under the current capitalist system. It also does not completely place its hope in proletarian spontaneity (council communism) as the only way of having a successful revolution but a combination of spontaneity and the party form. It stands in opposition to all revisionist tendencies as well as with more well known currents such as Leninism. Luxemburgists, and Left Communists in general, take seriously The First International’s and [Karl] Marx’s view of the proletarian revolution and the role of the party.…
         “I think it’s worth pointing out that neither modern Leninists or Luxemburgists are simply taking their namesakes as dogma and can/do differ from them in many ways.”
         [Different authors, “Communism 101: What is Luxemburgism and how does it differ from other tendencies?” Reddit. 2013. Retrieved on July 12th, 2016.]
         “What exactly is the difference between Trotskyist revolutionary theory and Luxemburgist revolutionary theory? …
         “The Bolsheviks think that the proletariat is incapable for itself of realizing the revolution. That’s why it would need the party, which it must direct to the proletariat. The Luxemburgists … think that the proletariat is perfectly capable as [a] class of doing the revolution. The parties are organizations of the class, but they are not essential.”
         [Different authors, “Luxemburgism vs. Trotskyism.” International Luxemburgist Forum. June, 2008. Retrieved on July 13th, 2016.]
         “In her book The Accumulation of Capital, Rosa Luxemburg asks herself, regarding [Karl] Marx’s schemes of expanded reproduction: where does the increase in demand required to absorb the goods in which the accumulated part of surplus value is embodied come from? Her central argument is based on a revision of Marx’s accumulation schemes.… The conclusion Luxemburg draws from her analysis is that ‘the immediate and vital conditions for capital and its accumulation is the existence of non-capitalist buyers of the surplus value,’ because that part of the surplus value which is earmarked for capitalisation must be realised outside the capitalist market ….” [Daniel Gaido and Manuel Quiroga, “The early reception of Rosa Luxemburg’s theory of imperialism.” Capital & Class. Volue 37, number 3, 2013. Pages 437-455.]
         “I have … described the evolution of what one might call Marxism-Luxemburgism ….
         “… Polish socialist Rosa Luxemburg, despite her celebrated differences with [Vladimir] Lenin about the desirable structure of a revolutionary political party, came to a conclusion virtually identical to his about the self-organization and self-activity of the labor movement. Experience shows, Luxemburg wrote (very much as Edward Thompson was to write a half century later) that ‘every time the labor movement wins new terrain, [the directing centralized organs] work it to the utmost. They transform it at the same time into a kind of bastion, which holds up advance on a wider scale’ ….
         “For Luxemburg, just as for Lenin, the dilemma was this: On the one hand, the self-activity of workers is the indispensable force propelling a transition to socialism, and it is folly to look to any other social group for that purpose. On the other hand, the trade union form of organization that workers over and over again create will predictably become a business and a bastion against change.
         “Thus the clash of thesis and antithesis. And from the same tumultuous event, the Russian Revolution of 1905, Luxemburg and Lenin derived essentially the same synthesis. Just as Marx had said, the working class would emancipate itself. But at moments of social crisis, workingclass self-activity would take on new organizational forms, outside the trade union movement. The locus classicus for this argument, and for me the most significant Marxist work of the twentieth century, is Rosa Luxemburg’s assessment of the 1905 Revolution, The Mass Strike, the Political Party and the Trade Unions. I shan’t attempt to summarize it here. Read it.”
         [Staughton Lynd, “Local unions, ‘primitive democracy,’ and workers’ self-activity.” WorkingUSA: The Journal of Labor and Society. Volume 4, issue 4, March 2001. Pages 49-58.]
         “… for all of her [Rosa Luxemburg’s] democratic sensibilities—and despite the immense and largely uncritical following she has won—Luxemburg’s conception of democratic politics is immensely problematic, reflecting the insufficiences of both the Marxian socialist tradition and her own particular contribution to it. Most seriously, politics for Luxemburg always aimed auf das Ganze [at the whole], a totalizing position fully in keeping with the Marxian tradition, but raised to new heights by her unswerving celebration of mass activism. As a result, she devoted precious little attention to the institutional grounding of a democratic-socialist polity. Instead, she continually promoted mass activism in demonstrations and strikes both as a tactic for accomplishing the tradition from capitalism to socialism and as the substance of democracy. Unwilling to countenance compromise even with other socialists, she infused her politics with the language of unwavering hostility to the institutions of bourgeois society, of militant and irreconcilable conflict between the forces of revolution and reaction, of hard-fought class struggle and proletarian revolution as the sole and exclusive means of political progress.…
         “But like all ideological traditions, Luxemburg’s offered a multitude of possibilities.… Luxemburg contra Luxemburg, a fitting enactment of the ambiguities intrinsic to her language and ideas.”
         [Eric D. Weitz, “‘Rosa Luxemburg Belongs to Us!’: German Communism and the Luxemburg Legacy.” Central European History. Volume 27, number 1, 1994. Pages 27-64.]
         “[Rosa] Luxemburg’s economic theory of capitalist expansion into non-capitalist milieus is a good starting point to strategize about anti-colonial struggles of all sorts but she never developed this question beyond the abstract quest for proletarian internationalism. In this regard, two issues must be distinguished: the difference between ‘centers’ and ‘peripheries’ in the North-South division of global capitalism and the distinction between struggles within capitalist sectors of global capitalism and struggles against capitalist expansion into non-capitalist milieus.” [Ingo Schmidt, “Rosa Luxemburg: Economics for a New Socialist Project.” New Politics. Summer, 2014. Pages 103-114.]
         “… for years the Soviet authorities denounced her [Rosa Luxemburg] for having criticised the Leninist approach to power, ‘Luxemburgism’ becoming a term used to describe those who showed an heretical tendency to think they knew better than the Party. As the intellectual authority of Soviet communism dwindled among Western Marxists, such character assassination later rebounded to her favour. But still, this tended to lead to a celebration of her character rather than a rediscovery of her theory of capitalist breakdown.…
         “To treat [Rosa] Luxemburg the woman with the proper respect ought to mean engaging seriously with Luxemburg the thinker – this is only what she would have demanded, after all. But at last there are signs today that her ideas are ripe for rediscovery. There is something about the times we live in that makes a widely-understood rediscovery of her thought both possible and necessary.”
         [Bill Blackwater, “Rediscovering Rosa Luxemburg.” Renewal. Volume 23, number 3, 2015. Pages 71-85.]
         “I choose here to return once more to Rosa Luxemburg because she is an exemplary figure in the present context. The democratic cast of her ideas is well-known. Her work not only predates the Stalinist descent, it is also free of the anti-democratic distortions or ‘substitutionist’ ambiguities or compromises, as they are variously regarded, of [Vladimir] Lenin and his followers. Together with the democratic resources of her thought, any shortcomings in it may therefore help to illuminate the contours of a Marxism not yet dominated by the Bolshevik experience and its sequel.” [Norman Geras, “Democracy and the Ends of Marxism.” New Left Review. Series I, number 203, January–Feruary 1994. Pages 92-106.]
         “… there is a problem about simply attaching the spontaneist label to Luxemburg, and hence the qualifications and contradictions which arise whenever she is used, negatively and polemically, as the convenient bearer of it. This use of her is problematic because, on reading her work, one is confronted at every turn with concepts and arguments which radically separate her Marxism from that determinist science of iron economic laws which is the usual foundation of fatalism and spontaneism.” [Norman Geras, “Rosa Luxemburg: Barbarism and the Collapse of Capitalism.” New Left Review. Series I, number 82, November–December 1973. Pages 17-37.]
         “By the outbreak of war [World War I], the relationship [between Rosa Luxemburg and Paul Levi] seems to have mellowed into a sympathetic friendship; but Paul would have had, as Rosa’s lover, a privileged access to her mind. In this woman half a generation older, Paul found the word of Marxism made flesh, and, though this unique apprenticeship was apparently unknown even to her closest circle, Levi’s close intellectual relationship to his mentor was certainly recognized, and played no small part in his qualification for the KPD [German, Kommunistische Partei Deutschlands, Communist Party of Germany] leadership.” [David Fernbach, “Rosa Luxemburg’s Political Heir: An Appreciation of Paul Levi.” New Left Review. Series I, number 238, November–December 1999.]
         “It seems to me … that after 1914–15 the theoretical problematic of Rosa Luxemburg underwent a profound change under the impact of the war and the collapse of the International. It is only after this watershed that she began to talk of a historical alternative: socialism or barbarism.…
         “In the huge and uneven body of writings on Rosa Luxemburg that has been published since the mid-sixties, genuine analysis of the highest quality may be found alongside the worst confusion and arbitrariness. While some writers mount a full-scale hunt for ‘Luxemburgist deviations,’ others use every means to convert Rosa Luxemburg’s work into an ideological weapon against Bolshevism. In many cases, however, interesting and fruitful attempts have been made to re-establish the authentic revolutionary dimension of her political legacy.”
         [Michael Löwy, “Rosa Luxemburg: a new evaluation.” New Left Review. Series I, numbers 102–103, January–April 1977. Pages 138-142.]
         “… [There] is certainly something new in the party founded by Rosa Luxemburg; it is a complete break with the past that the Communists are supposed to act like cheap hustlers and provoke the death of their brothers. I would rather not cite the evidence that this last remark is no exaggeration. This, I repeat, was the new theoretical basis on which the game began.” [Paul Levi, “Our Path: Against Putschism.” Historical Materialism. Volume 17, number 3, 2009. Pages 111-145.]
         “I would never compare myself with Rosa Luxemburg, but what is the difference here? I am told that Rosa Luxemburg had also been against that action [the March Action], and yet she wrote articles and appeals. You also know … that I too was against the movement at that time, but I also wrote leafl ets and articles. And why was this? From the quite different standpoint that it was great masses that were going astray, and not a small conventicle of leaders who were driving the non-straying masses to disaster, and at that time there was a genuine, large-scale, powerful and spontaneous mass-movement, with more workers assembled in the Berlin Tiergarten than the number involved this time in the whole of Germany.” [Paul Levi, “What Is the Crime: The March Action or Criticising It? Speech at the Session of the Central Committee of the German Communist Party on 4 May 1921.” Historical Materialism. Volume 17, number 3, 2009. Pages 146-174.]
         “The reformist bureaucrats dominated the official practice of the parties and unions in most of Europe before the First World War. However, each wave of mass strikes brought the conflicts between these officials and the more radical and militant ranks of their organizations into the open, precipitating the classic debates on socialist strategy in the prewar era. The struggles of the 1890s, and the subsequent consolidation of industrial unions and of socialist parties across Europe in a period of capitalist prosperity, produced the ‘revisionism’ debate of 1899-1900. Eduard Bernstein challenged predictions of capitalist stagnation and decline, giving a theoretical gloss to the union and party officials’ day-to-day practice and bolstering those social democrats who supported the French socialist [Alexandre] Millerand’s entering a capitalist dominated government as minister of commerce and labour. Arrayed against Bernstein and his allies were the most prominent theorists of German social democracy, Karl Kautsky and Rosa Luxemburg. Kautsky, prophetically, argued that ‘Millerandism’ would lead socialists to take responsibility for pro-capitalist policies – policies that involved attacks on workers’ wages, hours, working conditions and political rights. Luxemburg argued that the inherent instability of capitalist accumulation made mass struggles necessary to win and defend all temporary gains for workers under capitalism.” [Charles Post, “What Is Left of Leninism? New European Left Parties in Historical Perspective.” Socialist Register. Volume 49, 2013. Pages 174-197.]
         “… [Rosa] Luxemburg never insisted on expelling the right wing, nor did she (at least before 1914) try to organize her own left faction as a counterweight to the reformists inside the SPD [German Social Democratic Party] until after the outbreak of World War I. While there were important local groupings of the left wing, there was no identifiable, coherent national left-wing faction in the party. Luxemburg fully accepted that the party should encompass all political tendencies in the working-class movement. In a 1906 party debate, for example, she attacked the right wing for wanting to expel anarcho-syndicalists from the party by saying: ‘At least remain faithful to our old principle: nobody is evicted from the party for his views. Since we have never kicked out anyone on the far right, we do not now have the right to evict the far left.’” [Paul D’Amato, “Marx, Lenin, and Luxemburg: Party, organization, and revolution.” Internationalist Socialist Review. Issue 92, spring 2014. Online publication. No pagination.]
         “I discovered Rosa Luxemburg—along with Leon Trotsky—at a young age. In high school, actually, when I should have been doing something more immediately useful, like studying a foreign language or learning how to juggle.
         “I think I came to those Marxists first, before any others, because they seemed untainted by the crimes of Stalinism yet still offering uncompromisingly radical perspectives.
         “What distinguished Luxemburg in my mind was how much of a typical Third International Marxist she was.…
         “It was Luxemburg who reminded her peers that ‘the mistakes that are made by a truly revolutionary workers’ movement are, historically speaking, immeasurably more fruitful and more valuable than the infallibility of the best possible “Central Committee.”’ And it was Luxemburg who stood for the ‘bourgeois’ freedoms— freedom of speech, assembly, and expression—that would have been so valuable to life in the Soviet Union.”
         [Bhaskar Sunkara, “An Unoriginal Plan to Save the Planet.” Rosa Remix. New York: Rosa Luxemburg Stiftung. Stefanie Ehmsen and Albert Scharenberg, editors. August, 2016. Pages 66-69.]
         “The aim is to publicise and share articles, reviews and resources relating to Luxemburg’s life, ideas and legacy. The hope is to build a base for researchers (or anyone) interested in Rosa Luxemburg- and to help spread information about her as it becomes available.” [Rory Castle, “About the Blog.” Rosa Luxemburg Blog. Undated. Retrieved on September 19th, 2015.]
         “Luxemburgism never was attempted in the real world, and its ideas were later shadowed by the battle between ‘Stalinism’ and ‘Trotskyism.’ However, most ‘Trotskyist’ organizations at least give credit to the ideas of Rosa Luxemburg. These organizations include Solidarity and Socialist Action.” [Editor, “Luxemburgism.” Socialism Wiki. Undated. Retrieved on September 19th, 2015.]
         “… Rosa Luxemburg was the product of her times—the optimistic pre-war world of peace and progress. Her personality as much as her political ideas made her the champion of active revolution. Imperialism, with all its overtones of violence and inescapable confrontation of classes, was the hand-maiden of her obsession with the self-satisfaction and immobility of German Social Democracy. War was objectively inevitable but subjectively beyond imagination—and no one, except perhaps [Vladimir] Lenin, was more surprised than she when one day it broke out and engulfed pre-war Social Democracy. For her, peace and progress were not the usual bourgeois notions of economic development and a growing liberalism, but a Socialism strong enough to withstand the impact of international war and reassert the fundamental necessity of class conflict against it. Thus before 1914 wars no longer bad their primeval overriding power of pre-eruption; their impact was now limited by the requirements of the class struggle. All this of course proved an illusion, in 1914 as in 1939; and when the illusion was exposed the basis of her world collapsed. Unlike [Karl] Kautsky, Rosa Luxemburg was acute and revolutionary enough to realize that the collapse was final. She drew the consequences. But she herself had been too much part of this world. She survived the political collapse of Social Democracy, but the revolutionary requirements of the future, the kind of personality that built the modern Soviet Union, that created twelve years of the thousand-year Third Reich, even the socially inclined conservatives of England, [Francisco] Franco, and America—these were alien monsters to Rosa Luxemburg. Her brilliant and devoted efforts during the German revolution were still no more than an attempt to deal with the problems of a new world by using the best tools and precepts of the old. In the last resort the relevance of her ideas to the world of today must mean a return to the basically optimistic enthusiasms of the Second International.” [J. P. Nettl. Rosa Luxemburg I. London and New York: Oxford University Press. 1966. Pages 39-40.]
         “Capitalism is ruled by two iron dictums—maximize profit and reduce labor costs. And as capitalism advances and consolidates power in a world where resources are becoming scarce and mechanization is becoming more sophisticated, the human and environmental cost of profit mounts.
         “‘The exploitation of the working class as an economic process cannot be abolished or softened through legislation in the framework of bourgeois society,’ [Rosa] Luxemburg wrote. Social reform, she said, ‘does not constitute an invasion into capitalist exploitation, but a regulating, an ordering of this exploitation in the interest of capitalist society itself.’
         “Capitalism is an enemy of democracy. It denies workers the right to control means of production or determine how the profits from their labor will be spent. American workers—both left and right—do not support trade agreements. They do not support the federal bailouts of big banks and financial firms. They do not embrace astronomical salaries for CEOs or wage stagnation. But workers do not count. And the more working men and women struggle to be heard, the harsher and more violent the forms of control employed by the corporate state will become.
         “Luxemburg also understood something that eluded Vladimir Lenin. Nationalism—which Luxemburg called ‘empty petty-bourgeois phraseology and humbug’—is a disease. It disconnects the working class in one country from another—one of the primary objectives of the capitalist class.”
         [Chris Hedges, “Reform or Revolution.” Truthdig: Drilling Beneath the Headlines. May 22nd, 2016. Online publication. No pagination.]
         “Rosa Luxemburg, the originator of the theory of capitalist economic catastrophe, … neglected entropy and scarcity. She was more interested in explaining the collapse of capitalism as the result of its immanent logic. Particularly, she asserted that regional markets exhaust profit opportunities. The dearth of investment opportunities then forces capitalists to expand globally to generate demand for products and ‘realize’ their surplus. It is a theory of imperialism. But when the market conquers the globe, economic development will reach a sudden crisis, a discontinuity, and the laws of economic expansion will break down.” [Anastasios Papathanasis, “Entropy, Foster’s Treadmill and Luxenburg’s Catastrophe: A Synthesis.” Journal of Political and Military Sociology. Volume 25, number 1, summer 1997. Pages 77-89.]
         “[Rosa] Luxemburg examines the reproduction process in the face of technological change which [Karl] Marx himself analyzed, in the sense of an increasing organic composition of capital. She examines the reproduction process in face of pre-capitalist economies, thought of as colonial economies or economies towards which the capitalist system expanded at a world level. She analyzes still the fundamental role of economies external to capital’s pure movement, such as military and State intervention expenditures, which also become explanatory elements of the real movement of capitalist reproduction and accumulation. Rosa Luxemburg compels us to think capitalism as a world system in order to reach a right conception of its evolution and its theoretical movement.” [Theotônio dos Santos, “World Economic System: On the Genesis of a Concept.” Journal for World-Systems Research. Volume 1, number 2, summer/fall 2000. Pages 456-477.]
         1. International Luxemburgist Network: “The International Luxemburgist Network groups together activists who are in general agreement with the ideas of Rosa Luxemburg. We stand for the democratic self-organization of the working class and mass strike as a major tool in the class struggle. It is through this process that workers can form themselves into a class capable of leading a truly democratic society, self-managed by all, according to social needs and not profit.” [The International Luxemburgist Network. Undated. Retrieved on September 19th, 2015.]
         2. Communist Democracy (Luxemburgist): “Basing ourselves on the analysis of Rosa Luxemburg (since 1904), we see that the policies applied by all the different ‘leninist’ in power were completely opposed to our Marxist principles. Since 1917 and until today, the different ‘leninist’ governments have abandoned all the objectives of socialism and communism; on the contrary, they have set up a highly hierarchical and authoritarian state, based on one party, with a state centrally planned economy (State capitalism). These parties have betrayed the most basic revolutionary and democratic principles, their leaders becoming the new dominating and exploiting classes.” [Communist Democracy (Luxemburgist). Undated. Retrieved on September 19th, 2015.]
         3. International Rosa Luxemburg Society (German, Internationale Rosa-Luxemburg-Gesellschaft): “One of the most important contributions of Rosa Luxemburg to modern Marxist thought is her refusal to separate the concepts of ‘democracy’ and ‘revolution.’ This approach is developed in a) her criticism of the limits of bourgeois democracy, b) her conception of the revolutionary struggle as democratic self-emancipation of the great masses, c) her vision of socialist democracy with the workers’ councils’ system as a possible form of ‘dictatorship of the proletariat,’ and d) her firm insistence – in discussion with Russian revolutionaries – on the importance of democratic freedoms in the transition towards socialism.” [“Rosa Luxemburg’s Concepts of Democracy and Revolution.” International Rosa Luxemburg Society. Undated. Retrieved on September 19th, 2015.]
         4. Rosa Luxemburg Stiftung/Rosa Luxemburg Foundation: See also the Rosa Luxemburg Stiftung/Rosa Luxemburg Foundation—New York Office.
            “The Rosa Luxemburg Foundation is one of the largest political education institutions in Germany today and sees itself as part of the intellectual current of democratic socialism. The foundation evolved from a small political group, ‘Social Analysis and Political Education Association,’ founded in 1990 in Berlin into a nationwide political education organisation, a discussion forum for critical thought and political alternatives as well a research facility for progressive social analysis.” [Rosa Luxemburg Foundation. Berlin, Germany. Undated. Retrieved on September 19th, 2015.]
         5. Workers Democracy: Supports a working class which makes decisions democratically.
            “The goal of the Workers Democracy Network is to organize a democratic workers movement that unites all workers, on an equal basis, around our common interests. We oppose business unionism and all cooperation with the corporate elite. We will build neighborhood, city-wide, regional and continental organizations that unite the entire working class: union and non-union workers; students, employed, self-employed and unemployed; immigrants and native-born; men and women of all ethnic backgrounds. We stand in solidarity with workers all over the world and oppose all nationalism, oppression and bigotry, which pit one group of workers against another….
            “By building a democratic, unified workers movement, we will lay the basis for a new world, free of capitalism, where workers will democratically run society and control their own lives.”
            [Editor, “Statement of Agreement.” Workers Democracy. Undated. Retrieved on September 19th, 2015.]
         6. another Luxemburgism (William A. Pelz): Centered on five principles, Pelz argues for a reevaluation of the work of Rosa Luxemburg.
            “With the defeat of Nazism and the establishment of the German Democratic Republic (DDR) in what had been the Soviet zone of occupation, one would have hoped for a more positive reevaluation of Rosa Luxemburg and her theories.…
            “This paper will argue that a new appreciation of Rosa, ‘another Luxemburgism,’ true to Rosa’s [Rosa Luxemburg’s] principles and free of Stalinist revisionism, might develop from certain key aspects of her work. Among the tenants [tenets?] that cry out for inclusion in such a list, I will focus on five: 1) steadfast belief in democracy; 2) complete faith in the common people (the masses); 3) dedication to internationalism in word and deed; 4) commitment to a democratic revolutionary party; and 5) unshakable practice of humanism. There are, of course, many more areas of her thought which hold vital clues for those who would follow her in the twenty-first century. For reasons of time, I will limit my discussion to the above-mentioned five points.”
            [William A. Pelz, “Another Luxemburgism is Possible: Reflections on Rosa and the Radical Socialist Project.” Presented at the International Rosa Luxemburg Conference. April 1st–2nd, 2007. Tokyo, Japan. Pages 1-7. Retrieved on December 2nd, 2016. Also published in Spectrezine. Volume 21, number 21, November 2008. Online publication. No pagination.]
         7. The Collective to Fight Neurelitism™ (CFN™): It is “the Emancipated Autism Project”—a Marxist–Luxemburgist movement rooted in Dialectical metaRealism™ (a critical realist perspective). CFN focuses upon the worldwide community of Autists. The Autistic dialectic is absented or completed by forging unity, through struggle, with other Autists and, more generally, with all humanity. We accept the concept, from Marxism-Luxemburgism, of the dialectic of spontaneity and organization. The following is taken from the main page of the website:
            “The heart of this public sociology collective is Emancipated Autism™ (MP3 audio file), demonstrated in solidarity with other dominated peoples and in revolutionary community organizing against Neurelitism™ (neurological elitism). Neurelitism (MP3 audio file), a term coined here for a type of sanism, justifies disability or oppression. As a social–and–economic–development project for Autists and the similarly dissimilar, based upon Marxism–Luxemburgism, we value UN human rights, Agenda 21, the 2030 Agenda, and sustainable development. Membership and participation are informal.
            “Materially, we fight Neurelitism by struggling against domination. Spiritually, we fight through our unity with intersections of humanity, while praying for the inner healing, and targeted scientific cures, of Autism’s empathy and other problems. With Dialectical metaRealism™, the dialectic absents (contradicts) empathy’s absence. We shift the center of thinking [epistemically], in nonviolent resistance, to the subaltern. When applying The Echoing Practice™ (a heart meditation) and Echoes of Cosmic Unity™, we enter the cosmic envelope of unity and become, thereby, emancipated Autists. Think you are an Autist? Take some free tests.”
            [Mark A. Foster. The Collective to Fight Neurelitism: The Emancipated Autism Project. 2015. Updated and retrieved on November 19th, 2016.]
            “Like many autistics of my generation, the diagnosis I received was childhood schizophrenia. Indeed, autism was not even a category in the nosological (classification) system of the DSM-I [the first version of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual from the American Psychiatric Association]. Since they had not yet devised a way to explain people like myself, they made us all psychotic. That was the common construction of the time. Yet, by today’s standards, I exhibited none of the usual symptoms of schizophrenia, the hallucinations, auditory or visual, and the delusions, nor was I, in any sense I can tell, out of touch with reality. In fact, I was very much in touch with my reality – often, in light of the constant bullying I received, painfully so.” [Mark A. Foster, “Fighting Neurelitism.” Many Voices – One Community. Volume 1, issue 2, article 13, 2009. Page 1.]
      2. Marxism–Bordigism (MP3 audio file): This communist-left tendency is associated with the Italian Marxist Amadeo Bordiga (MP3 audio file).
         “In launching our communist programme, which contained the outlines of a response to many vital problems concerning the revolutionary movement of the proletariat, we expected to ace a broad discussion develop on all its aspects. Instead there has been and still is only furious discussion over the incompatibility of electoral participation, which is soberly affirmed in the programme. Indeed, although the electionist maximalists proclaim that for them electoral action is quite secondary, they are in fact so mesmerized by it as to launch an avalanche of articles against the few anti-electionist lines contained in our programme.” [Amadeo Bordiga, “The System of Communist Representation.” Soviet. Volume II, number 38, September (13th) 1919. Online publication. No pagination.]
         “Historical materialism, presenting the course of prehistory in a new and original way, has not only considered, studied and evaluated the process of formation of families, groups, tribes, races and peoples up to the formation of nations and political states, but has precisely explained these phenomena in the context of their connection with and how they are conditioned by the development of the productive forces, and as manifestations and confirmations of the theory of economic determinism.” [Amadeo Bordiga, “The factors of race and nation in Marxist theory.” Originally published under the title, “I fattori di razza e nazione nella teoria marxista”, in issues 16–20 of Il Programma Comunista. September–November 1953. Translated in December 2013-January 2014 from the Spanish translation of the Partido Comunista Internacional. No pagination.]
         “Until the proletariat has seized state power and consolidated its rule once for all, and made it secure against a bourgeois restoration, the Communist Party will have in its organised ranks only a minority of the workers. Before the seizure of power, and in the transition period, the Communist Party can, in favourable circumstances, exercise an undisputed ideological and political influence on all proletarian and semi-proletarian strata of the population, but it cannot unite them all organisationally in its ranks. Only after the proletarian dictatorship has deprived the bourgeoisie of such powerful means of exerting influence as the press, the schools, parliament, the church, the administrative machine, etc., only after the final defeat of the bourgeois order has become clear to everybody, only then will all or practically all the workers begin to enter the ranks of the Communist Party.” [Amadeo Bordiga, “Theses on the Role of the Communist Party in the Proletarian Revolution.” From Communiste Program. Number 2, March 1976. Translated from the Protokoll des II Weltkongresses der Kommunistischen Internationale. Hamburg, Germany. 1921. No pagination.]
         “A recent leaflet of the M.R.A.P. (Movement against Racism, Anti-semitism and for Peace) attributed to Nazism the blame for the death of 50 million human beings, of whom 6 million were Jews. This position identical to the fascist warmongers slogan of self-styled communists, is typically bourgeois. In refusing to see that capitalism itself is the cause of the crises and cataclysms that periodically ravage the globe, the bourgeois ideologues and reformists have always pretended instead to explain them by each other’s wickedness. One can see here the fundamental similarity of the ideologies (if one dares say it) of fascism and anti-fascism. Both proclaim that it is thoughts, ideas, the will of human groupings which determine social phenomena. Against these ideologies, which we call bourgeois because both defend capitalism, against all these faded idealists, of today and tomorrow, Marxism has demonstrated that it is, on the contrary, social relations which determine the movement of ideas. This is the keystone of Marxism, and in order to see to what a degree pseudo-Marxists have disowned it, it is sufficient to point out that as far as they are concerned, everything comes about through ideas: colonialism, imperialism, capitalism itself, are nothing more than mental states.” [Amadeo Bordiga, “Auschwitz – the Big Alibi.” Communist Left. Number 6, July–December 1993. Translated from La Gauche Communiste. Number 13, 1987. The original was published in Programme Communiste. Number 11, 1960. No pagination.]
         “The analysis of the counterrevolution in Russia and its reduction to formulas will not be a crucial problem for the strategy of the proletarian movement in the new revolutionary upsurge which we expect, since it was not the first counterrevolution that ever took place; Marxism has experienced and studied a whole series of counterrevolutions. On the other hand, opportunism and the betrayal of the revolutionary strategy have followed a different course from that of the involution of the Russian economic forms.” [Amadeo Bordiga, “Lessons of the Counterrevolutions.” originally published in Bollettino interno del PCInt. September 10th, 1951. Translated into Spanish in El Programa Comunista. Numbers 36–37, January–April 1981. Translated into English from the Spanish translation in November–December 2013. No pagination.]
         “For those members who follow the teachings of Italian Left Communist Amadeo Bordiga, or sympathize with his views [an online interest group].
         “Bordigism is a tendency a part of the left communist tradition. It is opposed to the united frontism of Trotskyism and opposed to Stalinism. It opposes syndicalism and anarchism on the grounds that these positions are utopian, immediatist, and workerist. Bordigism maintains the importance of a restrictive vanguard party. As Bordiga says in his writing Fundamentals of Revolutionary Communism ‘By putting forward the idea of a proletariat without a party, a party which is sterilized and impotent party, or by looking for substitutes for it, the latest corrupters of Marxism have actually annihilated the class by depriving it of any possibility of fighting for socialism, or even, come to that, fighting for a miserable crust of bread.’ Bordigism takes the stance that democracy is not an end, but a means to an end and that, if we mean democracy to mean ‘the rule of all people’ and, consequently, ‘the rule of all classes’ then Marxists should be anti-democracy because, if society is broken down into two antagonistic classes (the bourgeoisie and the proletariat), and all states are organs of class rule, then we seek the rule of the proletariat over that of the bourgeoisie until a classless society can exist and terms such as ‘proletariat democracy’ are contradictory.”
         [“Bordigist.” RevLeft. Undated. Retrieved on September 10th, 2015.]
         “… [The] label of ‘Bordigism,’ which was often stuck to it, was always rejected by the Left in emigration, because it tended to give credence to a cult of ‘great men,’ which it had nothing to do with, at least until the end of the war… The theoretical and political development of this left, enriched by its experience, was to go beyond and enrich the contribution of the man Bordiga. Thus the exasperated reaction of the Italian Fraction in 1933 was perfectly understandable ….” [Philippe Bourrinet. The “Bordigist Current”: (1919-1999), Italy, France, Belgium. 2013 revised edition. No location given. No pagination.]
         1. International Communist Tendency: “The Internationalist Communist Party (Battaglia Comunista) was founded with these objectives during the Second World War (1943) and immediately condemned both sides as imperialist. Its roots are in the Italian Communist Left, which from 1920 condemned the degeneration of the Communist International and Stalinization imposed on all the parties that belonged to it. In the Seventies and Eighties it promoted a series of conferences that led to the creation of the International Bureau for the Revolutionary Party and finally the Internationalist Communist Tendency (2009).” [“About Us.” International Communist Tendency. Undated. Retrieved on September 19th, 2015.]
         2. International Communist Party: “An initial distinction, embedded within all of our theses, should be made between democratic mechanisms posed as a ‘matter of principle,’ and their necessary use by the party in a particular historical period. We have already established that Lenin attributed no inherent value to democracy either inside or outside the party; in fact whenever he could, and whenever necessary, he didn’t hesitate to transgress it and stamp it underfoot; but in order to build the party organisation, he was obliged to use it as an ‘circumstantial mechanism’ with all its statutory, formalistic and bureaucratic baggage. As for us, we not only never attributed any value to it ‘as a principle,’ but we have rid ourselves of it for good, along with all the attendant rubbish about its use as an instrument for building the party. In 1920 we proposed that we no longer say we subscribed to the principle of ‘democratic centralism’ since democracy is not a principle we can ever uphold, while centralism is one we surely can.” [“The Communist Party in the Tradition of the Left.” International Communist Party. 1974. Retrieved on September 19th, 2015.]
            “The apparatus of the proletarian State, insofar as it is a means and arm of struggle in a transitional period between two social systems, does not derive its organizational strength from any existing constitutional canons or schemas that aim to represent all classes.…
            “… The defence of the proletarian regime against the ever present dangers of degeneration can be ensured only if the running of the proletarian State is continually coordinated with the international struggle of the working class of each country against its own bourgeoisie, State and military apparatus; there can be no let up in this struggle even in wartime.…
            “… the fact of the proletarian State having the means of production at its disposal makes possible (after the draconian repression of all useless or anti-social economic sectors, begun already in the transitory phase) an accelerated development of those sectors neglected under capitalism, above all housing and agriculture: moreover, it enables a geographical reorganization of the apparatus of production, leading eventually to the suppression of the antagonism between city and countryside, and to the formation of large production units on a continental scale.…
            “Only by means of force will the proletarian State be able to systematically intervene in the social economy, and adopt those measures with which the collective management of production and distribution will take the place of the capitalist system.”
            [“What distinguishes our party.” International Communist Party. Undated. Retrieved on June 2nd, 2016.]
      3. Zapatismo (MP3 audio file) or, in English, “Zapatism”: This communist-left tendency is associated with the Mexican Marxist Emiliano Zapata (MP3 audio file): It is a left-wing communist system in Mexico.
         “The Zapatistas presented themselves to the world on January 1, 1994, though the roots of the rebellion can be traced back 500 years to the European invasion of the Americas. During those five centuries, indigenous communities lost control of historic lands and were often forced into various forms of slavery and/or virtual slavery. Many rebellions occurred during this period, making the Zapatista uprising part of a long history of struggle and resistance. By the late 20ᵗʰ century, indigenous communities in Chiapas lived on the most marginal and isolated lands in the state. High levels of poverty, and lack of health care and education plagued the communities. The Zapatista uprising was a direct result of these conditions.” [“Alternative Economy.” Zapatismo. Undated. Retrieved on September 19th, 2015.]
      4. communization (MP3 audio file): It is a revolutionary, an anti-state, and a non-dogmatic approach to establishing libertarian communism.
         “The goal of any insurrection is to become irreversible. It becomes irreversible when you’ve defeated both authority and the need for authority, property and the taste for appropriation, hegemony and the desire for hegemony. That is why the insurrectionary process carries within itself the form of its victory, or that of its defeat. Destruction has never been enough to make things irreversible. What matters is how it’s done. There are ways of destroying that unfailingly provoke the return of what has been crushed. Whoever wastes their energy on the corpse of an order can be sure that this will arouse the desire for vengeance. Thus, wherever the economy is blocked and the police are neutralized, it is important to invest as little pathos as possible in overthrowing the authorities. They must be deposed with the most scrupulous indifference and derision.” [The Invisible Committee. The Coming Insurrection. Los Angeles: Semiotext(e). 2009. Page 86.]
         “Communization is getting out of factories and connecting them to each other without exchange, destroying them as enterprises. Communization will circulate goods without money, open the gate isolating a factory from its neighborhood, close down another factory where the work process is too alienating to be technically improved, do away with school as a specialized place which cuts off learning from doing for 15 odd years, pull down walls that force people to imprison themselves in 3-room family units – in short, it will tend to break all separations.…
         “Communization at its most simple level is the production of what one needs without entering into exchange or commodity production. Getting a little more knotty, communization as an act or set of actions is either the establishment of social relations that are outside of capitalist organization or the set of activities that destroy capitalism itself by establishing communism here and now.
         “Communization is also connected to a heterodox body of theories generally referred to as communization theory. One of the most important theorists in this area is Gilles Dauvé.… Alain Badiou’s book Ethics can also loosely be said to be in this field of thought. Since I am not particularly well versed in these perspectives I will simply leave these names here so that people can track down pertinent information for themselves.
         “Communization theory (CT) is distinct from conventional marxist theories and organizational forms in a few ways. ONE, CT is non-dogmatic. Conventional marxist approaches adhere to particular organizational forms and need a revolutionary agent (the party, the workers, new social movements, the multitude). CT maintains a degree of humility in saying that revolution is not a science that we cannot say with certainty who or what will be capable of causing a rupture large enough to unseat capital. So CT lacks the prescriptive, dogmatic, totalitarian baggage that is so deeply a part of marxist practice generally.
         “TWO, CT does away with the evolutionary schema of stages of history and the necessity of mediating forms of social organization. Conventional marxism calls for all sorts of totalitarian schemes to consolidate order after a succesful revolution: dictatorship of the proletariat, one party rule, the rapid industrialization of the means of production, and so on. It also disciplines its desired masses into obedient hordes waiting for something called the ‘Ideal Conditions.’ CT does away with the call for transitional states and instead values immediacy. The idea is that, in CT, communizing acts are not dependent upon a party or dogma to mediate ones actions. Furthermore, there is no need to wait for anything or anyone else to act. Do not wait for the so-called ideal conditions, act now. CT is an explicitly anti-statist approach within marxism.
         “THREE, CT looks for the possibilities for communization within the moment of any revolt. There is an optimism, absent in dogmatic or formalized variations of marxism, that any outburst or revolt can organize spontaneously organize and exceed its original cause leading to a rupture that the professionals of revolution could neither predict nor bring into it’s fold. A friend of mine said that communization theory is an intentional forgetting of the 20ᵗʰ century. What distinguishes CT from conventional marxism is that it is a non-strategic theory – it is a theory of tactics. It asks the question, ‘What is the tactic(s) that are capable of or generates the rupture that overthrows capitalism and its social relations?’
         “But all that being said, it worth mentioning that communization and CT are marxian perspectives, not anachist ones.”
         [Different authors, “What in the hell is ‘Communization’?” Anarchy101. February, 2013. Retrieved on July 18th, 2016.]
         “Short of treating the historical mutations of the class-relation as themselves the sources of class power, the power to undertake communization (something that would smack of ‘historical mysticism’), communization theory, as a thoroughgoing theory of emancipation from capital’s abstract domination, cannot do without some theory of power. What’s more, unless we treat the capabilities of the state as themselves entirely subsumed by capital, something that seems unpersuasive given the different articulations of state(s) and capital(s) on the present scene, it would appear necessary to consider the relevance, for strategic purposes, and thus for the particular shape taken by communizing activity, of the distinction between economic and extra-economic coercion.” [Alberto Toscano, “Now and Never.” Communization and its Discontents: Contestation, Critique, and Contemporary Struggles. Benjamin Noys, editor. Brooklyn, New York: Minor Compositions imprint of Autonomedia. 2012. Pages 85-101.]
         “The neo-communists – ex-anarchists do not speak for a moment about the destruction of the state. Instead, they speak in a denunciatory, political way aiming for its wide consumption and present themselves as the far left of the left government, which they denounce, but without openly declaring war against it.… We do not seek neither a reform of the system, nor its leftist grooming; all we want is its total destruction. However, we live in strange days and we have to rearm even the most fundamental parts of anarchy ….” [Imprisoned members’ cell, Communization: The senile decay of anarchy (or re-inventing anarchy). No location given. Undated. Page 8.]
         “There is no need to create the capitalist preconditions of communism any more. Capitalism is everywhere, yet much less visible than 100 or 50 years ago when class distinctions ostensibly showed up. The manual worker identified the factory owner at one glance, knew or thought he knew his enemy, and felt he’d be better off the day he and his mates got rid of the boss. Today classes still exist, but manifested through infinite degrees in consumption, and no one expects a better world from public ownership of industry. The ‘enemy’ is an impalpable social relationship, abstract yet real, all-pervading yet no monster beyond our reach: because the proletarians are the ones that produce and reproduce the world, they can disrupt and revolutionize it. The aim is immediate communization, not fully completed before a generation or more, but to be started from the beginning. Capital has invaded life, and determines how we feed our cat, how we visit or bury friends, to such an extent that our objective can only be the social fabric, invisible, all-encompassing, impersonal. (Although capital is quite good at hiring personnel to defend it, social inertia is a greater conservative force than media or police.) A human community is at hand: its basis is present, a lot more so than a century ago. Passivity prevents its emergence. Our most vital need: others, seems so close and so far at the same time. Mercantile ties are both strong and fragile.” [Gilles Dauvé and François Martin. Eclipse and re-emergence of the communist movement. Revised edition. London: Antagonism Press. 1997. Ebook edition.]
         “Communism is not a set of measures to be put into practice after the seizure of power. It is a movement which already exists, not as a mode of production (there can be no communist island within capitalist society), but as a tendency which originates in real needs. Communism does not even know what value is. The point is not that one fine day a large number of people start to destroy value and profit. All past revolutionary movements were able to bring society to a standstill, and waited for something to come out of this universal stoppage. Communization, on the contrary, will circulate goods without money, open the gate isolating a factory from its neighbourhood, close down another factory where the work process is too alienating to be technically improved, do away with school as a specialized place which cuts off learning from doing for 15 odd years, pull down walls that force people to imprison themselves in 3-room family units – in short, it will tend to break all separations.” [Gilles Dauvé. Capitalism and communism. No location. Undated. Ebook edition.]
      5. autonomism: Autonomists place a priority on spontaneous direct action (“spontaneism”) over organized activity. ROAR Magazine is an online publication which presents autonomist perspectives. Like many other libertarian Marxists, autonomists have tended to strongly favor direct over representative democracy.
         “Today autonomism can be seen as a global network of alliances between occupied social centers and media activists in Europe, Zapatistas and Piqueteros in Latin America, Black Blockers in North America, cyber hacktivists in Japan, and autonomous workers, unemployed youth, students, dispossessed peasants, and urban squatter movements in South Korea, South Africa, and India who have preferred to coordinate their anticapitalist global days of actions through the structure of People’s Global Action (PGA) rather than the World Social Forum (WSF), united in their disparity and diversity by the overriding principle and practice of autonomy from all forms of capitalist institution, authority, or power, but also along the lines of the autonomy of one section of the multitude from the rest in order to prevent their absorption by traditional socialist ‘workers’ centrality,’ for example, women, immigrants, and youth.” [Patrick Cuninghame, “Autonomism as a Global Social Movement.” WorkingUSA: The Journal of Labor and Society. Volume 14, issue 4, December 2010. Pages 451-464.]
         “Many autonomists and anarchists believe that radical change, and ultimately, freedom and the good life, can be discovered through direct action (protests, but also various forms of ‘squatting’) and the development of cooperative projects and countercultural communities, and not through the realization of a predetermined revolutionary moment or participation in electoral processes abstracted from the conditions of daily life. They distinguish themselves from other groups on ‘the left’ by finking their antistatism with an anticapitalist critique of the ways in which exploitation and the logic of state sovereignty have permeated all levels of social life. They tend to be critical of progressive NGOs [non-governmental organizations] and social democratic groups that seek to bolster social programs and political influence within legal structures and the electoral sphere rather than argue for a more systemic change.” [Heather Gautney, “Between Anarchism and Autonomist Marxism.” WorkingUSA: The Journal of Labor and Society. Volume 12, issue 3, August 2009. Pages 467-487.]
         “Autonomist Marxism is that school of Marxism centered on the class struggle …, as opposed to more conventional political economist readings of Marx focused on capital accumulation, or philosophical ones such as those of the Frankfurt School …. Class, per definition, is the relation of a social group to the means of production, and class antagonism comes to the fore when a class constitutes itself as engaging in struggle, as resisting.… This primacy in politico-economic analysis of the class struggle from the perspective of labor and the constitution of the working class as agent of resistance form the cornerstones of 1960s and 1970s Italian operaismo or workerism, out of which present day (post) Autonomia (and post-Operaismo as well) branched.” [Mithun Bantwal Rao, Joost Jongerden, Pieter Lemmens, and Guido Ruivenkamp, “Technological Mediation and Power: Postphenomenology, Critical Theory, and Autonomist Marxism.” Philosophy & Technology. Volume 28, issue 3, September 2015. Pages 449-474.]
         “Often misidentified by anarchists as a Marxist deviation, and by Marxists as a form of anarchism, autonomism is something in between: a form of Marxism with a strong bent toward localism, horizontal decision-making, and anti-authoritarianism.…
         “Autonomism is a growing force in the global left. Less a theory than a practice with an organizational bent toward localism, self-management and horizontal methods of decision making, autonomism is an important influence in the ‘movements of the squares’: from Puerto del Sol in Madrid to Tahrir Square in Cairo to Gezi Parki in Istanbul to Occupy encampments in New York, Lagos, Oakland, and Hong Kong. Like ‘Occupy’ itself, autonomism has become a meme, without textual or organizational centers, absent any foundational origin, yet spreading globally. There are, and have always been, multiple lefts: autonomism has been steadily expanding its share of left uprisings throughout the world.”
         [Linda Martín Alcoff and José Alcoff, “Autonomism in Theory and Practice.” Science & Society. Volume 79, number 2, April 2015. Pages 221-242.]
         “Autonomism is one of the varieties of minority-nation nationalism. Most autonomist movements are part of the national movements of sub-state national societies. Automomists have a strong sense of identification with their sub-state national society as their nation, although some do have dual identities. Autonomism is the political orientation of the autonomist nationalist component of these national movements, and its two rivals are independentist nationalism and pro-federation nationalism. Thus, the difference between regionalism and autonomism is that the latter is typically espoused by nationalist parties, while the former not necessarily so.” [Jaime Lluch, “Towards a Theory of Autonomism.” Working paper number 197. Collegio Carlo Alberto. Moncalieri, Italy. January, 2011. Pages 1-39.]
         “The defense of social struggle at the expense of political action leads many of the autonomists to promote the expansion of an ‘anti-power’ outside the boundaries of bourgeois institutions. They proclaim this alternative will be constructed by means of direct democracy, with horizontal methods and by avoiding all types of hierarchies. But they do not present evidence of the implementation of these proposals, nor do they take into account the obstacles that confront these mechanisms.
         “These difficulties have been, for example, recognized by many autonomist militants who have participated in the neighborhood assemblies in Argentina. That experience proved that the absence of rules of procedure and the lack of criteria for adopting majority decisions were as damaging as doing without an elected and accountable leadership.”
         [Claudio Katz, “Problems of Autonomism.” International Socialist Review. Issue 44, November–December 2005. Online edition. No pagination.]
         “Assuming the political supremacy of the proletariat, [Karl] Marx allowed for the temporary use of despotic means to reverse the backwards conditions of bourgeois production, to safeguard revolutionary changes, and to help create the conditions under which despotic means are no longer necessary. But precarious communists do not need to worry about the uses of despotism. We are incapable of despotism because we have no grand plan to carry out, we are unskilled in bureaucracy, and would seek the negation of any supreme power as a matter of dialectics, distrust, or subversive inclination. Precarious communists know too much history to look for answers in state power. As has been discussed, we have healthy anarchist sensibilities. Our capabilities are for autonomy, not for autocracy. Precarious communists are autonomists.” [Richard Gilman-Opalsky. Precarious Communism: Manifest Mutations, Manifesto Detourned. Creative Commons. Brooklyn, New York: Minor Compositions imprint of Andromedia. 2014. Page 92.]
         “Precarious communists don’t want to run the government. We have been running from or against governments everywhere in various ways for a very long time. And we cannot follow the lead of those fake libertarians who oppose the government, yet do not oppose capital, for they haven’t noticed the colonization of government by capital, which is largely what has made government so dangerous.” [Richard Gilman-Opalsky. Precarious Communism: Manifest Mutations, Manifesto Detourned. Creative Commons. Brooklyn, New York: Minor Compositions imprint of Andromedia. 2014. Page 123.]
         “… the dynamic of the rehab squatter movement was based first and foremost on the ‘radical’ forces that made use of the political power vacuum to occupy a substantial number of houses in the shortest possible time, thereby ensuring a level of conflict potential that largely prevented immediate evictions. Such strategies were focused on confrontation, and benefited at the same time from public acceptance and support, which resulted from the long ‘work of fermentation’ by citizens’ action groups and tenants’ representative offices and their strategy, which was largely aimed at negotiation and mediation. Soon, however, the conflict between a political course of confrontation, on the one hand, and the strategic pursuit of alternative urban political goals on the other, came to the fore. By the time the issue of legalization of houses arose, conflicts between ‘negotiators’ and ‘non-negotiators’ could no longer be covered up: the faction that could be attributed to the alternative movement wanted to hold on to the houses and was increasingly prepared to put this interest before an earlier consensus – no negotiation until ‘political’ prisoners were released, and an ‘overall solution’ for all squatted houses. The contingent of ‘non-negotiators’ began to differentiate themselves from the alternative movement by referring to themselves as ‘autonomists’ …, and accused negotiators of giving up the political struggle and of resorting to the mere preservation of their own spaces.” [Andrej Holm and Armin Kuhn, “Squatting and Urban Renewal: The Interaction of the Squatters’ Movement and the Strategies or Urban Structuring in Berlin.” Squatting in Europe: Radical Spaces, Urban Struggles. Squatting Europe Kollective, editor. Creative Commons. Brooklyn, New York: Minor Compositions imprint of Andromedia. 2013. Page 161-184.]
         “The Western middle class can still determine to a certain extent where we want to work, thanks to new technologies such as the computer and the mobile phone, both of which played a central role in this development. As such, they are both perfect media for the new revolutionary life of neoliberal capitalism. They constitute a technological and work-related revolution in themselves; thanks to them, you can transcend the bureaucracy and hierarchy of the Fordist work process in favour of autonomy and freedom.” [Mikkel Bolt Rasmussen. Crisis to Insurrection: Notes on the ongoing collapse. Creative Commons. Brooklyn, New York: Minor Compositions imprint of Autonomedia. 2015. Page 59.]
         “… [The] notion of autonomy of proletarian emancipation, born out of the particularity of the subject, had to be discovered as a refusal of any preconceived generality, any burden of idealism and humanism that could be ascribed to the proletariat as such. [Vladimir] Lenin’s affirmation of this notion gave great intensity to his Marxism, but this concept of the proletariat as a particular class was completely forgotten after Lenin, by social democrats and Marxist theorists alike, with their watered-down versions at the service of the pacific road to socialism. Sometimes this was done astutely, for instance, when, accompanying theoretical declarations in honor of the classics and tradition, they placed their emphasis on the general emancipating function of the actions of the proletariat. And from this, they moved toward the issue of alliances, the reaffirmation of the generality of workers’ comportment. But this is all false, practically and theoretically. The particularity of workers’ interests, the autonomous particularity of the interests of the working class, is absolutely irreducible and can only increase its autonomous particularity and turn into dictatorship.” [Antonio Negri. Factor of Strategy: Thirty-Three Lessons on Lenin. Arianna Bove, translator. New York: Columbia University Press. 2014. Pages 281-282.]
         “While the theoretical vocabulary and language of autonomist politics has proliferated like so many Brooklyn hipsters, fittingly enough, it has done so in a superficial manner. Paradoxically, the radical intent underlying autonomism has seemingly vanished. Rather than understanding capitalist development as having been determined by the movement of working class resistance, autonomist concepts have been used in ways that make capitalist development seem like a hermetically closed, self-directing process.… By understanding primitive accumulation not as a one-time event that underlies the formation of capitalism, but rather a process of violence and separation that persists and is expanded through the incorporation of the energies of social resistance, I hope to provide some new considerations for moving beyond capitalism.” [Stevphen Shukaitis. Imaginal Machines: Autonomy & Self-Organization in the Revolutions of Everyday Life. Creative Commons. Brooklyn, New York: Minor Compositions imprint of Autonomedia. 2009. Page 32.]
         “Stigmergy is a fancy word for systems in which a natural order emerges from the individual choices made by the autonomous components of a collective within the sphere of their own self-sovereignty. To the extent coercion skews markets by distorting the decisions of those autonomous components (individual people), it ought to be seen that a truly free market (a completely stigmergic economic system) necessarily implies anarchy, and that any authentic collectivism is necessarily delineated in its bounds by the the natural rights of the individuals composing the collective.” [Brad Spangler, “Market Anarchism as Stigmergic Socialism.” Markets Not Capitalism: Individualist Anarchism against Bosses, Inequality, Corporate Power, and Structural Poverty. Gary Chartier and Charles W. Johnson, editors. Creative Commons. Brooklyn, New York: Minor Compositions imprint of Autonomedia. 2011. Pages 85-92.]
         “As the Italian ‘autonomous’ Marxist Franco ‘Bifo’ Beradi has suggested, ‘Capital no longer recruits people, it buys packets of time […] de-personalised time is now the real agent of the process of valorisation, and de-personalised time has no rights.’ In this sense, we find that we are living in a state of precarity, where despite the fact we find ourselves permanently investing in ourselves, we increasingly work on fixed-term contracts or without a contract altogether.” [Andre Pusey and Bertie Russell, “Do the entrepreneuriat dream of electric sheep?: Why contemporary activists talk about power.” Occupy Everything: Reflections on Why It’s Kicking Off Everywhere. Alessio Lunghi and Seth Wheeler, editors. Creative Commons. Brooklyn, New York: Minor Compositions imprint of Autonomedia. 2012. Pages 75-80.]
         “… [There] was also an assessment of the meaning of autonomous action: the rebellion is not a means towards political power. Revolution is not about the collapse of the state. The best way to define the new rebellion is the Deleuzian concept of line of flight: exodus from the kingdom of exploitation and the creation of a new social sphere, which has nothing to do with power, labor or the market.” [Franco “Bifo” Berardi. Precarious Rhapsody: Semiocapitalism and the pathologies of the post-alpha generation. Arianna Bove, Erik Empson, Michael Goddard, Giuseppina Mecchia, Antonella Schintu, and Steve Wright, translators. Erik Empson and Stevphen Shukaitis, editors. Creative Commons. Brooklyn, New York: Minor Compositions imprint of Autonomedia. 2009. Page 25.]
         “While all of the speakers could be considered Italian autonomists and they were ostensibly there to discuss Immaterial Labor, a concept that emerged from the Italian autonomist (aka Post-Workerist) tradition, surprisingly few concepts specific to that tradition were deployed. Rather, the theoretical language drew almost exclusively on the familiar heroes of French [19]’68 thought: Michel Foucault, Jean Baudrillard, [Gilles] Deleuze and [Félix] Guattari ….” [David Graeber. Revolutions in Reverse: Essays on Politics, Violence, Art, and Imagination. Creative Commons. Brooklyn, New York: Minor Compositions imprint of Autonomedia. 2011. Page 85.]
         “The question of collectivism, i.e. the question of how to organise communication and enable the coexistence of various autonomous individuals in a community, can be dealt with in two different ways. Modern states continue to be preoccupied with the question of how to collectivise and socialise the individual, whereas avant-garde movements tried to answer the question of how to individualise the collective. Avant-garde movements tried to develop autonomous social organisms in which the characteristics, needs, and values of individualism, which cannot be comprised in the systems of a formal state, could be freely developed and defined. The collectivism of avant-garde movements had an experimental value. With the collapse of the avant-garde movements, social constructive views in art fell into disgrace, which led to the social escapism of orthodox modernism and consequently triggered a crisis in basic values in the period of postmodernism.” [Eda Čufer and IRWIN, “NSK State in Time.” State in Time. IRWIN, editor. Creative Commons. Brooklyn, New York: Minor Compositions imprint of Autonomedia. 2010. Pages 13-15.]
         “An important component of the student self-organization was the directly democratic manner of decision-making. Beside the goal itself (‘free education available to all’), this was one of the main aspects of the whole action. Direct democracy is a system in which all (the most important) decisions are made in an absolutely democratic manner, with the majority of the votes of those present. As opposed to the system of representational democracy, in which a smaller number of representatives are elected in elections held every few years and given a mandate to make autonomous decisions, without immediate democratic supervision, in the direct democratic system all decisions are made directly by the majority. Thus direct democracy encourages people to be active and interested and to participate in decision-making. All decisions made during the occupation, as well as after it, are made in such a democratic manner. The direct democratic system is organized through plenums – general assemblies of all interested individuals at which everyone has equal right to express their opinion and at which everyone can vote.” [Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences in Zagreb. The Occupation Cookbook. Creative Commons. Brooklyn, New York: Minor Compositions imprint of Autonomedia. 2009. Page 23.]
         “Today the principle of domination is the autonomization of the market, capital flows, and the (macro)economy with respect to the institutions charged – until now – with regulating them. Thus, neoliberalism constitutes a displacement of the proper political terrain of domination and a substitution of this principle.” [Colectivo Situaciones. 19 & 20: Notes for a New Social Protagonism. Nate Holdren and Sebastián Touza, translators. Jay Blair, Malav Kanuga, and Stevphen Shukaitis, editors. Creative Commons. Brooklyn, New York: Minor Compositions imprint of Autonomedia. 2011. Page 91.]
         “Debt at a distance is forgotten, and remembered again. Think of autonomism, its debt at a distance to the black radical tradition. In autonomia, in the militancy of post-workerism, there is no outside, refusal takes place inside and makes its break, its flight, its exodus from the inside. There is biopolitical production and there is empire. There is even what Franco ‘Bifo’ Berardi calls soul trouble. In other words there is this debt at a distance to a global politics of blackness emerging out of slavery and colonialism, a black radical politics, a politics of debt without payment, without credit, without limit. This debt was built in a struggle with empire before empire, where power was not with institutions or governments alone, where any owner or colonizer had the violent power of a ubiquitous state. This debt attached to those who through dumb insolence or nocturnal plans ran away without leaving, left without getting out. This debt got shared with anyone whose soul was sought for labor power, whose spirit was borne with a price marking it. And it is still shared, never credited and never abiding credit, a debt you play, a debt you walk, and debt you love.” [Stefano Harney and Fred Moten. The Undercommons: Fugitive Planning & Black Study. Creative Commons. Brooklyn, New York: Minor Compositions imprint of Autonomedia. 2013. Page 64.]
         “The organisation of the revolts [the Arab spring] resembles what we have seen for more than a decade from Seattle to Buenos Aires and Genoa and Cochabamba, Bolivia: a horizontal network that has no single, central leader. Traditional opposition bodies can participate in this network but cannot direct it. Outside observers have tried to designate a leader for the Egyptian revolts since their inception: maybe it’s Mohamed ElBaradei, maybe Google’s head of marketing, Wael Ghonim. They fear that the Muslim Brotherhood or some other body will take control of events. What they don’t understand is that the multitude is able to organise itself without a centre – that the imposition of a leader or being co-opted by a traditional organisation would undermine its power. The prevalence in the revolts of social network tools, such as Facebook, YouTube, and Twitter, are symptoms, not causes, of this structure. These are the modes of expression of an intelligent population capable of organising autonomously.” [Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, “Comment: Arabs are democracy’s new pioneers: The leaderless Middle East uprisings can inspire freedom movements as Latin America did before.” The Guardian. London newspaper. February 25th, 2011.]
         “The power of all individual or limited subjects to think and act autonomously corresponds proportionally to the relation between their powers and the power of nature as a whole.… The fact that the power of the world outside of us so far surpasses our own power means that we are affected by others much more than we affect the world or even autonomously affect ourselves, and thus, our capacity for sovereign decision-making is minimal too.” [Michael Hardt, “The Power to be Affected.” International Journal of Politics, Culture, and Society. Volume 28, number 3, September 2015. Pages 215-222.]
         “Everyone may possess in some sense the capacities for autonomy, but current social conditions prevent the majority from activating them and require instead their obedience. Exodus thus means a collective project to overturn the existing structures of hierarchy and obedience and render active the thinking and action of all. Linking these two senses of the exit from minority, in other words, conjoins the striving for autonomy with that for democracy. The enlightenment role of intellectuals, as well as political leaders, thus becomes something much more than critique: to destroy their own minority status, or to generalize to others the powers çf autonomous thought and action they exercise.” [Michael Hardt, “The Militancy of Theory.” The South Atlantic Quarterly. Volume 110, number 1, winter 2011. Pages 19-35.]
      6. council communism or councilism: Proponents of this position advocate for an economy controlled by workers’ councils. See the website, Left-Wing, Anti-Bolshevik and Council Communism.
         “Whereas the Communist Parties, directed by the Moscow Comintern, refer to Marxism as their guiding doctrine, they meet with more and more opposition from the most advanced workers in Western Europe and America, most radically from the ranks of Council communism. These contradictions, extending over all important problems of life and of the social struggle, can be cleared up only by penetrating into the deepest, i.e., the philosophical principles of what is called Marxism in these different trends of thought.” [Anton Pannekoek. Lenin As Philosopher: A Critical Examination of the Philosophical Basis of Leninism. Revised edition. Lance Byron Richey, editor. Milwaukee, Wisconsin: Marquette University Press. 2003. Pages 63-64.]
         “They [workers] must, every man of them, act themselves, decide themselves, hence think out and know for themselves. Only in this way will a real class organization be built up from below, having the form of something like workers’ councils. It is of no avail that they have been convinced that their leaders know what is afoot and have gained the point in theoretical discussion—an easy thing when each is acquainted with the writings of his own party only. Out of the contest of arguments they have to form a clear opinion themselves. There is no truth lying ready at hand that has only to be imbibed; in every new case truth must be contrived by exertion of one’s own brain.” [Anton Pannekoek. Lenin As Philosopher: A Critical Examination of the Philosophical Basis of Leninism. Revised edition. Lance Byron Richey, editor. Milwaukee, Wisconsin: Marquette University Press. 2003. Page 157.]
         “With this work the Group of International Communists have put forward for debate, for the first time in the post-war history of the working class movement, the practical possibility of ordering social production and distribution on the basis of a use-value economy. They have brought together all the experience accumulated as a result of earlier attempts, by theoretical representatives of the working class of a previous era, to solve this most ultimate and conclusive of all areas of the revolutionary theory of the proletariat, in order that the root causes which in the final outcome render all those earlier efforts scientifically untenable may be laid bare and so prevented from generating further confusion.…
         “The simple language and the clear methods of analysis employed, which are understandable to every class-conscious worker, ensure that every revolutionary who diligently studies the following pages can also fully grasp their content. The clarity and disciplined objectivity of the writing likewise open up the possibility of a broad arena of discussion within the working class movement, one which can draw into its orbit all the varied schools of opinion represented within its ranks. Since we Council Communists also, within our own ranks, must subject the possibilities projected here to the most thoroughgoing discussion, we reserve for a latter date the final expression of our standpoint towards the exposition which follows.”
         [Group of International Communists. The Fundamental Principles of Communist Production and Distribution. Mike Baker, translator and editor. London: Movement for Workers’ Councils. 1990. Page 27.]
         “In the course of 1921, the council-communist movement thus began to demarcate itself clearly from official Communism. The movement’s starting points can be summarised simply. Firstly, capitalism is in decline and should be abolished immediately. Secondly, the only alternative to capitalism is a democracy of workers’ councils, based on an economy controlled by the working class. Thirdly, the bourgeoisie and its social-democratic allies are trying to save capitalism from its fate by means of ‘democratic’ manipulation of the working class. Fourthly, in order to hasten the establishment of a democracy of councils, this manipulation must be consistently resisted. This means, on the one hand, boycotting all parliamentary elections and, on the other hand, systematically fighting against the old trade unions (which are organs for joint management of capitalism). Finally, Soviet-type societies are not an alternative to capitalism but, rather, a new form of capitalism.” [Marcel van der Linden, “On Council Communism.” Historical Materialism. Volume 12, issue 4, 2004. Pages 27-50.]
         “At its [council communism’s] high-point in 1919 and 1920, this movement [in Germany] represented a powerful anti-bureaucratic Marxist alternative to the rapidly consolidating Leninist communist movement. The most articulate theorization of revolutionary council communism was provided by the Dutch Marxist theorist Anton Pannekoek, who had a long career of activism in both Dutch and German social democracy.… Although left radicalism in Bremen [Germany] represented one of the two poles around which the early German communist movement gravitated and exemplified what was, perhaps, at the heart of the west European revolutionary Marxist tradition, few historians have paid much attention to this movement or attempted to trace its evolution into council communism. The purpose of this article, therefore, is to describe and analyse the development of the left radical movement in Bremen from its origins shortly after the turn of the century to its rapid demise as a form of council communism in the period after 1920.” [John Gerber, “From Left Radicalism to Council Communism: Anton Pannekoek and German Revolutionary Marxism.” Journal of Contemporary History. Volume 23, number 2, April 1988. Pages 169-189.]
         “In the course of 1921, the council-communist movement … began to demarcate itself clearly from official Communism. The movement’s starting points can be summarised simply. Firstly, capitalism is in decline and should be abolished immediately. Secondly, the only alternative to capitalism is a democracy of workers’ councils, based on an economy controlled by the working class. Thirdly, the bourgeoisie and its social-democratic allies are trying to save capitalism from its fate by means of ‘democratic’ manipulation of the working class. Fourthly, in order to hasten the establishment of a democracy of councils, this manipulation must be consistently resisted. This means, on the one hand, boycotting all parliamentary elections and, on the other hand, systematically fighting against the old trade unions (which are organs for joint management of capitalism). Finally, Soviet-type societies are not an alternative to capitalism but, rather, a new form of capitalism.” [Marcel van der Linden, “On Council Communism.” Historical Materialism. Volume 12, number 4, 2004. Pages 27-50.]
         “The self-expropriation and proletarianization of the bourgeoisie by the second World War, the surmounting of nationalism by the abolition of small states, the state-capitalistic world-politic based on state federations, the spreading of the class concept until it fosters a majority interest in socialism, the shift of gravity from the typically laissez-faire form of bourgeois competition to the unavoidable collectivization of the future, the transformation of the class-struggle from an abstract-ideological category into a practical-positive-economic category, the automatic rise of factory councils after the unfolding of labor democracy as a reaction to bureaucratic terror, the exact rational regulations and directions of human activities and conduct through the abolition of the power of the impersonal, unconscious and blind market economy – all these factors car make us aware of the enormous upsurge of energies made free when the primitive, mechanical, raw and brutal beginnings of social collectivism, such as fascism presents, are at last overcome.” [Editor, “Prelude to Hitler—The International Politics of Germany: 1918-1933.” Living Marxism. Volume V, number 2, fall 1940. Ebook edition.]
         “Given the impossibility to collect the workers of all the factories into one meeting, they can only express their will by means of delegates. For such bodies of delegates in later times the name of workers’ councils has come into use. Every collaborating group or personnel designates the members who in the council assemblies have to express its opinion and its wishes. These took an active part themselves in the deliberations of this group, they came to the front as able defenders of the views that carried the majority. Now they are sent as the spokesmen of the group to confront the views with those of other groups in order to come to a collective decision. Though their personal abilities play a role in persuading the colleagues and in clearing problems, their weight does not lay in their individual strength, but in the strength of the community that delegated them. What carries weight are not simple opinions but still more the will and the readiness of the group to act accordingly. Different persons will act as delegates according to the different questions raised and the forthcoming problems.” [Anton Pannekoek. Workers’ Councils. Anton Pannekoek, translator of his own Dutch-language text into the English language. Oakland, California: AK Press. 2003. Page 24.]
         “Searching in the past for radical elements which are of vital importance for present and future anti-capitalist struggles, this paper presents and discusses the critique of the Russian Revolution and the Soviet Union developed by the two largely neglected political and theoretical traditions of anarchism and Council Communism. It argues that despite their theoretical and political inconsistencies, ambiguities and mistakes, both trends have provided valuable insights that could contribute to our better understanding of the Russian Revolution and the formation of the Soviet Union. A critical assessment of the anarchist and councilist evaluation of the Russian Revolution represents a fundamental part of the process of critically assessing the radical anti-capitalist tradition and, therefore, it constitutes part of the present struggles for human emancipation. In this sense, the essay, firstly, examines the anarchists’ account of the Russian Revolution and their analysis of the new Soviet regime. Next, it considers the appraisal of the Soviet social formation carried out by the Council Communist tradition. It goes on to outline the contribution and the common perspectives that anarchists and Council Communists have shared.” [Christos Memos, “Anarchism and Council Communism on the Russian Revolution.” Anarchist Studies. Volume 20, number 2, autumn–winter 2012. Pages 22-47.]
      7. Internationalist Communist Tendency: This tendency is a descendent of the Italian left communist movement.
         “We stand in the tradition of the revolutionary currents of the workers’ movement, begun by the Communist League around Karl Marx, down to the Third International, which was founded in the wake of the October Revolution. It continued with the minorities of the Communist Left, which fought both against the degeneration of the revolution inside Russia and inside the Third International in the [19]‘20s. We have always resolutely rejected Stalinist and Trotskyist currents as the product of the state-capitalist counter-revolution in Russia, and have politically combated them. For this reason, too, for us the collapse of the Stalinist regimes represents no loss for the working class.
         “The immediate origins of our tendency go back to the international conferences which the Internationalist Communist Party (Battaglia Comunista) of Italy called between 1977 and 1980. In these conferences, the Communist Workers’ Organisation (CWO) convinced itself of the coherence of the methods and positions which the Italian comrades had developed since their foundation in 1943, and began to examine their own positions. In 1983 the two organisations founded the International Bureau for the Revolutionary Party (IBRP) on the basis of a shared platform. Thereafter, groups from other countries joined the Bureau and the IBRP became the Internationalist Communist Tendency (ICT). Today it coordinates the international efforts of the organisations constituting it.”
         [Editor. We Have a World to Win: An Introduction to the Politics of the Internationalist Communist Tendency. London: International Communist Tendency. November, 2013. Page 2.]
         “As we have explained many times before, capitalism had managed to mitigate the effects of its long running crisis since the 1970s. This capitalist crisis is rooted in the tendency for profit rates to decline as capitalists, in competition with each other, vastly increase the productivity of the labour force by introducing technological innovations. The end result is that the ratio of capital invested in non-profitable components, such as machinery, plant, raw materials increasingly outweighs that invested in the only profitable (i.e. exploitable) commodity which is labour power. However, despite all the restructuring of the last two decades, the fact of capitalism’s crisis leaves the bosses no choice but to attack the working class. This is now leading to a resurgence in working class resistance.” [Ant, “Nationalism against the Working Class.” Revolutionary Perspectives Quarterly Magazine of the Communist Workers’ Organisation British Affiliate of the Internationalist Communist Tendency. Series 3, number 52, winter 2009. Page 3.]
         “It is true that we live in a contradictory society, which works against social needs, as in the increase in productivity which, in the long run, triggers the falling rate of profit, thus challenging the very mechanism of capital valorisation. Increased labour productivity, instead of creating free time for workers, leads to greater exploitation, a lengthening of the working day and higher unemployment. Its the same with the development of the productive forces which, instead of creating more and better welfare, enriches only 10% of the population, while the remainder live between a halfway decent existence and the notorious poverty line. As ‘social progress’ is combined with more and more job insecurity the dismantling of the welfare state is inversely proportional to the growing needs of the population from health to pensions. But having to pay to lend money to the state is the final straw.” [Fabio Damen, “On the Supposed International Economic Recovery.” Revolutionary Perspectives Quarterly Magazine of the Communist Workers’ Organisation British Affiliate of the Internationalist Communist Tendency. Series 4, number 6, summer 2015. Pages 5-12.]
         “It is now almost 5 years since the subprime bubble burst leading to the collapse of Lehmann Brothers and the run on Northern Rock in the UK. However, after half a decade of state bail outs and nationalisation of banks, printing of money and draconian austerity programmes, global capitalism still hovers on the verge of an abyss. The collapse of Northern Rock, a minor bank, signalled the start of the present acute phase of capitalism’s crisis. But it soon became clear that this collapse was only a symptom of the general rottenness of the whole system. Today the bourgeoisie openly consider the possibility of the collapse of sovereign states, such as Spain or Italy, the breakup of the Eurozone and a global economic collapse leading to 25% contraction in global Gross Domestic Product.” [EC, “Draft Perspectives 2012: The Crisis of Global Capitalism.” Revolutionary Perspectives Quarterly Magazine of the Communist Workers’ Organisation British Affiliate of the Internationalist Communist Tendency. Series 3, number 62, summer 2012. Pages 24-27.]
         “Left communist positions are rarely known in this part of the world [the UK]. We are often asked what exactly our differences with the ICC (International Communist Current) consist of, as this is an organisation which claims to stand in the tradition of the Communist Left. After long consideration, we have therefore decided to sketch out the most important differences. As our divergences with the ICC are really comprehensive, we have endeavoured to be as brief as possible and to especially select the questions which are of immediate importance for the activity of revolutionaries. Some may consider this to be a petty squabble between revolutionary groups. But such an attitude underestimates the need for debate. Without sharp discussions, that political clarification which enables us to develop a workable programme for the overthrow of capitalism will not be possible.” [GIS, “Marxism or Idealism: Our Differences with the ICC.” Revolutionary Perspectives Quarterly Magazine of the Communist Workers’ Organisation British Affiliate of the Internationalist Communist Tendency. Series 3, number 57, spring 2011. Pages 19-22.]
         “Peace, prosperity and freedom – heavy sacrifices are demanded for these objectives in the form of blood, sweat, and a reduced quality of life. Not only are these ideals more distant with every passing year, but time reveals them for what they are: a cynical deception. However, things cannot be otherwise since we are witnessing the effect of the crisis in the cycle of capital accumulation which has been with us now for more than thirty years. In fact the crisis is tightening its grip.” [International Bureau for the Revolutionary Party, “May Day 2008 – Against Capitalism’s Onslaughts, International Class Struggle.” International Notes: Journal of the Internationalist Workers Group/Groupe Internationaliste Ouvrier. Volume 1, number 4, spring 2008. Pages 1-3.]
         “According to the Cato Institute’s National Police Misconduct Reporting Project, which compiles statistics only on those actions that were reported on in the press, police are more likely to commit assault, rape and murder than the general population. They are more likely to abuse family members. They are more likely to commit child sexual assault. Making the citizens of the grand republic ‘safer’ isn’t a primary task of the police.
         “The question is how to fight this brutality, this expression of the violence perpetrated by the servants of the oppressor class. Protests against police brutality usually call for reforms, better training or community policing or civilian revue boards but you can’t just reform away a blood stained system.”
         [AS, “USA – How a Republic Enforces its Order.” International Notes: Journal of the Internationalist Workers Group/Groupe Internationaliste Ouvrier. Volume 1, number 1, spring 2014. Pages 5-6.]
      8. International Communist Current: This movement claims to have synthesized elements from various left communist tendencies.
         “Capitalism is not just the banks, or a ‘deregulated’ market. Capitalism is a social relation based on the wage system, on the production of commodities for profit, and it functions only on a world wide scale. The economic crisis of capitalism is a result of the fact that this social relation has become obsolete, a blockage on all future advance.
         “Regulating the banks, bringing in a ‘Robin Hood Tax’ or extending state control does not uproot the essential capitalist social relation between the exploited and their exploiters, and gives us a false goal to fight for. The unions’ call for ‘growth’ is no better: under capitalism this can only mean the growth of exploitation and environmental destruction, and in any case, today it can only be based on the racking up of huge debts, which has now become a major factor in the deepening of the economic crisis.”
         [Amos, “It’s not just the bankers, it’s not just the Tories: The struggle against capitalism is a struggle between classes.” World Revolution. Number 349, November 2011. Pages 1-2.]
         “In reality, not only is capitalism not rational, it has also shown its capacity to escalate conflicts from minor skirmishes into all-out war on numerous occasions. The Iranian military might be ‘puny’ but its forces have shown a capacity to intervene in a number of conflicts. Whether supporting the government in Syria, or oppositional forces in Iraq and Afghanistan, Iran seems never far away from the scenes of war. In the Guardian article cited above an Iranian journalist specialising in military and strategic issues is quoted: ‘I recall a famous Iranian idiom that was quite popular among the military officials: “If we drown, we’ll drown everyone with us.”’ That applies to the capitalist ruling class in every country across the globe. This is not just at the level of the official military apparatus but in the desperate actions of terrorists. In Iraq, for example, following the US exodus, conflict continues, with suicide car bombs killing dozens in crowded locations on a regular basis. Whoever is behind them is not part of the resistance to capitalism but just adding to the precariousness of life in Baghdad and elsewhere. None of this behaviour is rational, but the bourgeoisie is not going without a fight, whether against other imperialisms or against its mortal enemy, the working class.” [Car, “Syria, Iran, Iraq: Imperialist bloodletting worsens in Middle East.” World Revolution. Number 351, February 2012. Page 5.]
         “Capitalism, the system of exploitation which rules the planet, cannot maintain itself by force and violence alone. It cannot do without the power of ideology – the endless production of ideas which turn reality on its head and persuade the exploited that their best interests lie in lining up behind their own exploiters. Exactly a hundred years ago, hundreds of thousands of workers from Britain, France, Germany and other countries, at the Battle of the Somme, paid the ultimate price for believing the basic lie of the ruling class – that the workers should ‘fight for their country,’ which could only mean fighting and dying for the interests of the ruling class. The horrible massacres of World War One proved once and for all that nationalism is the deadliest ideological enemy of the working class.” [Amos, “EU, Brexit, populism: Against nationalism in all its forms!” World Revolution. Number 374, July/August/September 2016. Pages 1-2.]
         “… the ruling class is trapped in a downward spiral because its financial machinations can’t overcome the basic contradictions of its system, which is perpetually driven to produce more than what [Karl] Marx called the ‘restricted consumption of the masses’ can absorb. This is not overproduction in relation to need, but overproduction in relation to demand backed by the ability to pay. The drug of easy credit may bring temporary relief to the patient but in the end the medicine only exacerbates the disease: giving the consumer money to pay for your own production is ultimately self-defeating unless it is accompanied by the possibility of opening up new markets, and this is severely limited in a world where capital already dominates almost every corner of human existence.” [Hardin, “‘Recovery’: once again the bourgeoisie administers the drug of credit.” World Revolution. Number 364, January/February 2014. Page 3.]
         “The only true solution to the capitalist impasse will emerge from the more and more numerous, massive and conscious struggles of the working class against the economic attacks of the bourgeoisie. It will lead naturally to the overthrow of this system whose principle contradiction is that of the production for profit and accumulation and not the satisfaction of human needs.” [Vitaz, “Capitalism has no way out of its crisis.” International Review. Number 144, 1st quarter 2011. Pages 6-9.]
         “By increasing demand artificially, that is, generating demand that is not based on the need for investment to become more profitable but is motivated by the need to keep the productive apparatus working. This is typically the case with Keynesian measures, in which the state pays out and which therefore have repercussions on the competitive edge of the national economy which uses such measures. This is why it can only be used if conditions allow it to compensate for the loss of competivity by means of a significant increase in productivity. This kind of measure may involve either wage increases or else public works programmes which yield no immediate profit.” [Silvio, “Is capitalism a decadent mode of production and why?” International Review. Number 149, 2nd quarter 2012. Pages 13-22.]
         “As for the positive potentialities that capitalism carries, this is classically, from the point of view of the labour movement, the development of productive forces, which constitutes the foundation for the building of a future human community. These forces principally consist of three elements, which are closely related and combined in the efficient transformation of nature by human labour: discoveries and scientific progress; the production of tools and increasingly sophisticated technological knowledge; and the workforce provided by the proletarians. All the knowledge accumulated in these productive forces will be usable in the construction of a new society; similarly, the workforce would be increased tenfold if the whole world population was integrated into production on the basis of human activity and creativity, instead of being increasingly rejected by capitalism. Under capitalism, the transformation, the mastery as the understanding of nature is not a goal in the service of humanity, the majority of which is excluded from the benefits of the development of these productive forces, but a blind dynamic in the service of profit.” [Silvio, “Scientific advances and the decomposition of capitalism: The system’s contradictions threaten the future of humanity.” International Review. Number 151, April 2013. Pages 1-5.]
         “From the point of view of the working class, accepting the logic of capitalism means submitting itself to a future of increasing impoverishment, a deterioration of working and living conditions comparable to the misery of the period of the so-called Great Depression. The reality is that there is no solution to the crisis of capitalism other than getting rid of this obsolete mode of production, which can only continue to survive by denying the means of survival to increasing sectors of society while a tiny minority of the population lives a lavish and parasitic existence. The only way forward out of this social madness is the class struggle, starting by an uncompromising resistance to capitalist austerity attacks and the development of a movement able to challenge the bourgeoisie and its capitalist state. In a few words, for the working class the only way out of the present society’s malaise is to get rid of capitalism’s social relations of production and creating instead a system of production geared in the needs of society as a whole and not for the profit of tiny minority.” [Eduardo Smith, “Debt-Crisis: The State Is Bankrupt, Workers Must not Bail it Out.” Internationalism. Number 155, July–October 2010. Pages 1-3.]
         “Much of the analysis of this crisis in the bourgeois media has focused on the role played in the debt-ceiling negotiations by the freshman Tea Party Congressmen elected in the 2010 mid-term elections. According to this narrative, the Tea Party bears ultimate responsibility for the crisis, as they approached the debt-ceiling negotiations with a no-holds barred approach that would refuse to allow the debt ceiling to be raised without corresponding budget cuts. Against the ‘balanced approach,’ slash and cut was the only method to fiscal sustainability the Tea Party would accept. The problem for the U.S. bourgeoisie was that the Tea Party now has a stranglehold on the GOP [Grand Old Party] itself, threatening to render the entire Republican apparatus politically obsolete. The ideological meltdown of a significant faction of the U.S. political class is now an acknowledged fact in Washington.” [Henk, “Debt Ceiling: Political Wrangling While Economy Burns.” Internationalism. Number 160, October 2010–February 2011. Page 3.]
         “* The communist transformation of society by the workers’ councils does not mean ‘self-management’ or the nationalisation of the economy. Communism requires the conscious abolition by the working class of capitalist social relations: wage labour, commodity production, national frontiers. It means the creation of a world community in which all activity is oriented towards the full satisfaction of human needs.
         “* The revolutionary political organisation constitutes the vanguard of the working class and is an active factor in the generalisation of class consciousness within the proletariat. Its role is neither to ‘organise the working class’ nor to ‘take power’ in its name, but to participate actively in the movement towards the unification of struggles, towards workers taking control of them for themselves, and at the same time to draw out the revolutionary political goals of the proletariat’s combat.”
         [Editor, “Political positions of the ICC.” Internationalism. Number 160, October 2010–February 2011. Page 8.]
         “Since the First World War, capitalism has been a decadent social system. It has twice plunged humanity into a barbaric cycle of crisis, world war, reconstruction and new crisis. In the 1980s, it entered into the final phase of this decadence, the phase of decomposition. There is only one alternative offered by this irreversible historical decline: socialism or barbarism, world communist revolution or the destruction of humanity.” [Editor, “Basic Positions.” International Communist Current. January 21st, 2007. Retrieved on September 19th, 2015.]
         “We, the IMMENSE MAJORITY, exploited and oppressed, but also indignant, we workers of the public and private sectors, the unemployed, students, pensioners, immigrants…we are posing a lot of questions about everything that’s going on. We need to pose these questions collectively, in the streets, on the squares, in the workplaces, so that we can come up with answers together and make a massive, powerful and sustained response.” [Editor, “Austerity in Spain: The worst attacks on our living conditions (up till now): How far will they go? How can we respond?” London: International Communist Current. Two–page pamphlet (PDF). Undated. Retrieved on October 25th, 2016.]
         “In 1992, U.S. imperialism officially adopted the strategic goal of preventing the rise of any rival bloc or rival power in Europe and Asia so that it would remain the only superpower in the world and this goal has guided U.S. foreign policy ever since, whether Republicans or Democrats have occupied the White House. It is this strategy which explains U.S. imperialism’s increasing number of military excursions throughout the world – to send a warning and block any potential rival, including America’s onetime allies, to remind them that the U.S. is the only superpower in the world. The U.S. invasion of Iraq was not a greedy attempt to boost oil profits for U.S. corporations – far more has been and will be spent on the war and occupation of Iraq than will ever be compensated for by Iraqi oil production. It’s not a policy error, or the result of Republican or [George W.] Bush administration stupidity, but a conscious decision supported by all factions of the ruling class, except for the extreme right-wing isolationists. The invasion of Iraq was the lynchpin in the American geopolitical strategy to keep European imperialisms from making inroads in the Middle East. Coupled with the invasion and occupation of Afghanistan, and new American alliances with former Soviet republics in Central Asia and the Caucasus, it meant growing U.S. control of one of the most strategically important areas in the world.” [Editor, “What Are the Real Reasons for the War in Iraq?” New York: Internationalism (U.S. section of the International Communist Current). September 24th, 2005. One–page PDF file. Retrieved on October 25th, 2016.]
      9. Internationalist Perspective: This offshoot from the International Communist Current rejects the notion that the state can be captured and redirected toward revolutionary goals.
         “From its start, Internationalist Perspective (IP) has believed in the importance of revolutionary theory, because, in our view, the communist revolution can only be a conscious act of social transformation, not something the working class stumbles into unconsciously, driven automatically by crisis and calamity. But we also believed that revolutionary theory is not a finished product, that it is not a pre-existing program that has to be merely assimilated and applied. Both misconceptions were and are present in the traditional Communist Left, the political current within which our group originated. We still identify with the Communist Left, with its fight against the degeneration of the Second and Third Internationals, with its unwavering defense of revolutionary positions even in the worst of times. However, some came to believe that theory is irrelevant because the working class will simply be compelled by economic conditions to overthrow capitalism, while others claimed that revolutionary theory is essentially finished and merely needs to be absorbed by the class. It was this latter view which in 1985 led to a split between those who would form IP and the organization they were then a part of, the Internationalist Communist Current (ICC). In that year, the ICC adopted the position that ‘class consciousness’ was different from ‘consciousness of the class,’ that Marxist theory embodied the first, and that it would require an ever larger army of militants to spread the first into the second. This dogma was not to be challenged, and those who did were literally shown the door.…
         “Among the most pernicious myths haunting the revolutionary movement since its inception, is the illusion that the modern state has some degree of autonomy or neutrality in relation to the social balance of power, specifically in relation to capitalism. That the state can be captured and directed towards revolutionary ends, or that its institutions can be pressured to alleviate the worst conditions of the proletariat while simultaneously acting as a stepping stone towards revolutionary consciousness and self-organization, is at the heart of this myth. We are categorically opposed to the idea that any institution of the state can be used for revolutionary anti-capitalist purposes. In short, we are opposed to all tendencies of ‘reformism’ as futile and dangerously misleading attempts to manage the accumulation of capital for the benefit of humanity.…
         “[Karl] Marx’s theoretical legacy is therefore no more than it could have been: crucial systematic studies, valuable insights, and some errors among them. This is not a belittlement but an acknowledgement that much of his valuable legacy is in his relentless quest for understanding, in the concreteness and the totality of his approach and in its revolutionary standpoint. To benefit from his work requires that we today consider the whole of this legacy critically and in its historical context.
         [Editor, “Internationalist Perspective – The World As We See It: Reference Points.” Internationalist Perpective. Don Mills, Ontario. 2016. Pages 1-26.]
         “… Internationalist Perspective (IP) is a political organization basing itself on Marxism as a living theory, one that can go back to its sources, criticize them, and develop hand in hand with the historical social trajectory. As such, if Internationalist Perspective bases itself on the theoretical accomplishments of the Communist Left, IP believes that its principal task is to go beyond the weaknesses and the insufficiencies of the Communist Left through an effort of incessant theoretical development. IP does not believe that that is our task alone, but rather that it can only be accomplished through debate, discussion and participation in the class struggle with other pro-revolutionaries. That vision conditions the clarity of its contribution to the struggle and to the development of the class consciousness of the proletariat. IP does not aim to bring to the class a finished political program, but rather to participate in the general process of clarification that unfolds within the working class.” [Editor, “Internationalist Perspective.” Internationalist Perspective. Number 57, fall/winter 2012. Page 34.]
         “The myth of the New Deal or what generations of progressives have designated as the ‘Roosevelt Revolution,’ has an even firmer hold on the imagination of the left, as does the nostalgia for the Popular Front, and its model in France (1936), for both are now – especially now – held up as exemplars of progressive social and political policy, and as assaults on the temples of wealth, forerunners and models for today’s demands for income redistribution and government spending to overcome the economic crisis. Both the New Deal and the Popular Front are portrayed by the capitalist left today as having brought about economic recovery and social justice through a redistribution of wealth that put an end to the ‘Great Depression’ that began in 1929.…
         “At the heart of the myth of the New Deal lay the social and economic programs which Roosevelt championed: first the abortive National Recovery Administration (struck down by the Supreme Court), which actually set aside the anti-trust laws introduced by earlier progressive administrations, and legalized a network of compulsory cartelization of industry with the aim of jumpstarting the capitalist economy. The failure of that gambit aside, there were the social programs that have come to define the New Deal in the hearts of much of the left today: The Tennessee Valley Authority, the Works Progress Administration, the Wagner Act, Social Security, more progressive taxation.…
         “The myth that a redistribution of wealth can solve the crisis implies another one: the myth of national independence; the myth that governments have the leeway to chart an independent course and transfer wealth from rich to poor at will. But the more developed the economy has become the more each country has become a part of a global production chain.”
         [Sander and Mac Intosh, “Why Wealth Redistribution Cannot Solve Capitalism’s Crisis.” Internationalist Perspective. Number 60, winter 2015/2015. Pages 21-29.]
      10. anti–authoritarian current (Chris Dixon, Tamara Myers, Uri Gordon, Barbara Epstein, and others): Dixon describes a twenty-first-century tendency, or current, which encompasses aspects of Marxist libertarian left communism and left anarchism.
          “Together, we are a political current that cuts across a range of left social movements in North America. However, there is no consensus about what we call ourselves, and we have only a general sense that we even exist as something that can be named. For shorthand, I call us ‘the anti-authoritarian current.’ This is not a self-description that everyone associated with these politics would choose. Nor is this current the only political tendency with a claim on the term ‘anti-authoritarian.’ What I discuss here is one current in a growing landscape of North American anti-statist, anti-capitalist politics composed of various anarchist and left communist tendencies. I’m certain that, through further collective reflection, those of us in this current can develop more precise terms to describe ourselves. We’re not there yet, though, so I use the inadequate terminology that is presently available.” [Chris Dixon. Another Politics: Talking across Today’s Transformative Movements. Oakland, California: University of California Press. 2014. Page 5.]
          “Anti-capitalism opposes capitalist social relations. This ‘anti’ in another politics comes from several overlapping sources. Some organizers draw on longstanding socialist political traditions, including Marxism and anarchism. Others have developed anticapitalist politics through struggles against borders, prisons, environmental destruction, militarism, poverty, the mainstreaming of queer politics, university restructuring, animal exploitation, and cuts to public services. Some have come into anti-capitalism through experiences in the labor movement with union organizing campaigns, workers’ centers, and labor solidarity work. Still others have been influenced toward this analysis by Indigenous land struggles.” [Chris Dixon. Another Politics: Talking across Today’s Transformative Movements. Oakland, California: University of California Press. 2014. Pages 67-68.]
          “… this article is about the ‘anti-authoritarian, anti-capitalist, non-sectarian left’ across the United States and Canada. This tendency pulls together a growing set of activists and organisers who are developing shared ideas and approaches based in over-lapping areas of work. At the core, what distinguishes them is their commitment to combining anti-authoritarian, anti-capitalist politics with grassroots organising among ordinary, non-activist people. In doing this, they use many labels to describe themselves – abolitionists, anarchists, anti-authoritarians, anti-capitalists, autonomists, and radicals, among others – and some choose to organise without political labels. Yet, together, they are a political current that cuts across a range of left social movements in North America. For shorthand, I call this the ‘anti-authoritarian current,’ though I recognise this is not a self-description that everyone would choose. And for reasons I explain below, I call the emerging shared politics, practices, and sensibilities in this current ‘another politics.’
          “Those in the anti-authoritarian current collectively engage in a wide range of organising efforts across multiple movements. As part of these, they have been building networks, campaigns, and organisations that reflect their politics and sensibilities. Examples include the No One Is Illegal and No Border networks, the Mobilization for Climate Justice, the Peoples’ Global Action Bloc in Eastern Canada, national organisations such as Critical Resistance and INCITE! Women of Color Against Violence, and networks around publications such as Left Turn, Make/Shift, and Upping the Anti.”
          [Chris Dixon, “Building ‘Another Politics’: The Contemporary Anti-Authoritarian Current in the US and Canada.” Anarchist Studies. Volume 20, number 1, 2012. Pages 32-60.]
          “Although I consider myself an anarchist, my political positioning can be understood as part of what [Chris] Dixon … has referred to as the ‘anti-authoritarian current’ and my perspective and commitments have been influenced by such theoretical foundations as multiracial/women of color feminism, critical race theory, several participatory democratic traditions, queer theory, and indigenous philosophies. I consider myself part of the broad anticapitalist but eclectic, non-sectarian left. Similar to my formal teaching work, many of my community efforts have been animated by my commitment to intentionally work with others to expand our sense of horizons of possibility and to experiment with prefigurative relations in spaces that have ranged from large scale street protests to affinity group actions, from one-off community workshops to multi-year study groups, from anarchist collectives to the range of coops, communes, and collectives in which I have lived. I strongly value intergenerational partnerships and have worked hard to knock down walls between my role as a university-based educator and my pedagogical work in other spaces. While these collaborations have not always been easy, I have many experiences living, collaborating, organizing, and building friendships with people I have also worked with in classroom spaces. For me, what has been common in each of these endeavors is a commitment to striving our best to put into practice the idea that the Great Refusal … is most effective when joined with the ‘politics of yes’ …. I am pulled toward people and projects that couple a deconstructive impulse which acknowledges the many ‘anti’s of radical movements … with a reconstructive one that seeks to move ‘against and beyond’ … today’s harmful realities.” [Tamara Myers. Teaching Toward Utopia: Promise, Provocation, and Pain in Pedagogies of Radical Imagination. Ph.D. dissertation. University of Washington. Seattle, Washington. 2014. Creative Commons. Page 11.]
          “Specific research methodologies take second place to the emergent process of collaboration and dialogue which empowers and develops solidarity. By providing critically engaged and theoretically informed analyses generated through collective practice, the debates in anarchist political theory offered in this book aim to provide tools for activists’ ongoing reflections.
          “My own path has landed me among many comrades and groups, taking part in diverse local campaigns and projects, conferences and discussions, international mobilisations and mass protest events. In the UK I worked locally with the vibrant anti-capitalist and anti-war network in Oxford, and with anti-authoritarian coalitions organising for May Day actions and anti-war demonstrations, the British Earth First! network (which unlike its US counterpart is unambiguously anarchist) and the Dissent! network resisting the 2005 G8 summit.”
          [Uri Gordon. Anarchy Alive!: Anti-authoritarian Politics from Practice to Theory. London and Ann Arbor, Michigan: Pluto Press. 2008. Page 8.]
          “… the episodic, fleeting character of Occupy is shared by movements around the world: an incident sets off protest over long-standing grievances, protest mushrooms into a mass movement, the protest is repressed, and the movement collapses, having altered public discourse but leaving no organization or institution capable of bringing about social change. This is the weakness of the ascendant form of leftist or protest politics that emphasizes spontaneity and avoids organizational forms able to last.
          “Where does this leave the U.S. Left? The anarchist/anti-authoritarian current can play an important role with its moral stance, compelling vision, and capacity to mobilize major protests, but it will not attract all who are drawn to the Left. Its anti-hierarchical politics and discomfort with strategy and the building of institutions needs to be balanced by a more conventional form of leftist politics that includes strategic discussion and institution building and that can attract constituencies not likely to engage directly in Occupy-like protest.”
          [Barbara Epstein, “Prospects for a Resurgence of the U.S. Left.” Tikkun: to heal, repair, and transform the world. Volume 29, number 2, spring 2014. Pages 41-44.]
          “The anti-authoritarian current developed in many countries, both ‘Latin’ as well as ‘Germanic’. It was accompanied by a strong resurgence of anarcho-syndicalist and revolutionary syndicalist tendencies which, as in France, Spain and Italy, developed sympathies towards the bolsheviks because of their rejection of the official Socialist movement, and through the discovery of [Vladimir] Lenin’s theses calling for the destruction of the state.” [Philippe Bourrinet. The Dutch and German Communist Left (1900–1968). Online PDF file. No publication information. Page 325.]
          “With desire and mutual understanding as our guide, each of us undertook to do what we felt most capable of. For example, if someone was a good driver or a skilful thief, or perhaps had a knack for writing, that didn’t mean their creative abilities would be suppressed in the name of some false collective homogeneity. It was up to each comrade to offer their abilities and methodologies to the other comrades without making a ‘sacrifice’ of their own participation, and it was even better if that happened in the broadest possible way, going beyond the narrow context of the collective and facilitating access by the entirety of the anti-authoritarian current ….
          “We’ve always felt that an organization doesn’t necessarily have to be exclusive to the comrades who are part of it. Our action neither begins nor ends within the context of the group. The group is the means to revolution, not an end in itself.…
          “The enemy can be found in every mouth that speaks the language of domination. It is not exclusive to one or another race or social class.…
          “… The great empires weren’t just built on oppression. They were also built on the consent of the applauding masses in the timeless Roman arenas of every dictator.”
          [Gerasimos Tsakalos, Olga Economidou, Haris Hatzimichelakis, Christos Tsakalos, Giorgos Nikolopoulos, Michalis Nikolopoulos, Damiano Bolano, Panayiotis Argyrou, and Giorgos Polydoras, “The Sun Still Rises.” 325: An Insurgent Zine of Social War and Anarchy. Number 9, October 2011. Pages 41-45.]
          “… the classical conflict between the different sections of Alpha Kappa and the Black Bloc differs completely from city to city. In some areas the people are old friends who hate each other, in other places they organise demonstrations together, in other cities they don’t even say hello. In some cities the punks like the Black Bloc and in other cities they punch each other in the squares. In some cities the anarcho-junkies hate the Black Bloc, in other cities they show respect. In some cities the anarcho-hooligans fight with the Black Bloc, in other cities they fight with Anti-authoritarian Current.” [Void Network. Greek December 2008 Revolt Revisited: Answers from Void Network to questions from US comrades. Berkeley, California: The Anarchist Library imprint of Open Guild Organization. 2009. Page 8.]
          “… about eighty anti-authoritarian people gathered to talk about how to avoid such a takeover of a general assembly in the future. In the following weeks, the struggle about how to organize became a dominant topic in the movement, and again and again the student unions, socialists, Trotzkists [from the German spelling of ‘Trotskyists’] and the like tried to impose some kind of centralized structure with representatives at the top. Because the anti-authoritarian current was quite strong, these attempts were never successful.” [International Student Movement. Demand nothing, occupy everything!: Reflections on the student movement in Vienna 2009/2010. Online PDF file. No publication information. No pagination.]
      11. ultra–leftism (A USW study group, Nick Nesbitt, Arun Kumar [Hindī, अरुण कुमार, Aruṇa Kumāra as pronounced in this MP3 audio file], and others): In the English language, this term is generally—though not always—used as a critique of left communism.
          “Ultra-leftism: Ultra-leftists will tend to judge real-world revolutionaries in the light of principles that only Jesus/Moses/Muhammad-type figures could implement. Ultra-leftism thus smacks of religion/idealism. The ultra-left also tends to go to extremes to achieve their objectives.” [A USW study group, “Strategy & Tactics in the Belly of the Beast.” Under Lock & Key. Number 13, March/April 2010. Page 3.]
          “Ultra-leftism classically refers to a militant revolutionary desire for the total destruction of an unjust world and its replacement by a more egalitarian one, an anarchist struggle more specifically undertaken in the absence of or subtraction from any direct engagement with the structures of the actually-existing state and state of affairs.” [Nick Nesbitt, “Early Glissant: From the Destitution of the Political to Antillean Ultra-Leftism.” Callaloo. Volume 36, number 4 fall 2013. Pages 932-948.]
          “Not surprisingly, the history the Ultra Left movements is filled with instances of brutal corporal punishments. What is alarming is that despite 30-odd years of violent struggles, these punishments continue to grow and find new forms instead of declining. If one included the cases of chopping off of thumbs or hands for exercising the right vote, amputating legs or cutting off tongues of a police informant, slitting throats of those who dared to defy the diktat issued the revolutionary high command, one thing becomes clear. It may not tell us how exactly violence has paid dividends to the patrons themselves, but it may settle the debate about the political nature of society for them: now there is no need to quarrel whether is semi-feudal or semi-capitalist; the nature of violence suggests, it is outrightly feudal.” [Arun Kumar, “Violence and Political Culture: Politics of the Ultra Left in Bihar.” Economic and Political Weekly. Volume 38, number 47, November 2003. Pages 4977-4983.]
          “Ultra-leftism is not a new phenomenon in the world revolutionary movement. Alongside opportunism it has been a permanent danger to building the revolutionary party, and the axis of some of the most violent political battles waged by Lenin and Trotsky. Two of these battles have left a rich theoretical and practical experience: Lenin’s fight in the Communist International (when he wrote Left-Wing Communism: an Infantile Disorder) and Trotsky’s fight against Stalinism of the “third period.”
          “Currently, a new version of ultra-leftism has emerged: Guevarism. These three types of ultra-leftism have different historical origins and social content.
          “The first, opposed by Lenin in the Communist International, was an ultra-leftism reflecting radicalised sectors impacted by the Russian Revolution who were eager to repeat the same experience in all countries. It was the ultra-leftism of the younger generation.
          “The second type of ultra-leftism, opposed by Trotsky, was diametrically opposite. It was nothing more than a moment, a turn to the far left by Stalinist centrism. It expressed the circumstantial policy of the counter-revolutionary caste, which would lead the world workers movement to the worst defeat in its history: the triumph of Nazism.
          “The third type of ultra-leftism, the Guevarist, it closely resembles the first for its historical origin and social content. It is ultra-leftism of the radicalised youth repelled by Stalinism. For its historical origins and its contents it has nothing to do with the Stalinist ultra-leftism of the “third period”, but it does resemble it in its theoretical postulates and in the mechanics of its political reasoning.
          “We have accused the majority comrades a thousand and one times of having a Guevarist conception and following a Guevarist — and therefore ultra-leftist — policy. We still maintain this characterisation, and in order to demonstrate it we will begin by spelling out clearly the Guevarist concept and political line.”
          [Nahuel Moreno. The Party and the Revolution: Theory, program and policy – A polemic with Ernest Mandel. Buenos Aires, Argentina: El Socialista. 2014. Pages 27-28.]
          “AQ [Al Qaeda] is an avatar of the ultra-leftist radicalism. Its targets are the same as the traditional targets of the ultra-left: US imperialism, symbols of globalisation. When [Osama] Bin Laden referred to Vietnam in his video speech of September 2007, instead of quoting the Koran, he was in fact addressing an audience more sensitive to the political dimension than to the religious one. When AQ executed western hostages in Iraq, it staged the execution by using the same mise en scène [staging] invented by the Red Brigades when they killed Aldo Moro [Aldo Romeo Luigi Moro].” [Olivier Roy, “Al Qaeda in the West as a Youth Movement: The Power of a Narrative.” CEPS Policy Briefs. Number 168, August 2008. Pages 1-8.]
   4. Marxism–De Leonism (MP3 audio file): It is a syndicalist communist movement inspired by Daniel De Leon (MP3 audio file).
      “The capitalist class seeks to uphold the trust in order to maintain its own class supremacy. Its spokesmen tire not truthfully to point out the inevitableness of concentration in productive powers, together with the advantages that flow therefrom in increased production and cheapness; they conceal, however, the blood that stains the trail of the trust, or even deny the existence of such by inundating the country with rosy statistics, gotten up to order, on the condition of the people.” [Daniel De Leon. The Trust—From the Socialist Standpoint. March 14th, 1897. Page 3. Retrieved on September 8th, 2015.]
      “It goes without saying that the appearance of Marxism in America denoted a ripening of Social conditions away from the conditions known to the ‘Revolutionary Fathers.’ In the measure that Evolution was plowing the field for Revolution, and in the measure that Evolution was recruiting, even organizing, the forces for the Social Revolution, the Capitalist Class ‘threw up breastworks’—met the arguments of the approaching Revolution with counter-arguments. The crudities of the arguments of the pre-Marxian days furnished the counter-arguments with welcome handles. The ‘handles’ grew fewer and fewer in the measure that Marxism ‘took possession.’ From year to year the clash narrowed down more and more to Marxism and anti-Marxism.” [Daniel De Leon. James Madison and Karl Marx: A Contrast and a Similarity. New York: National Executive Committee, Socialist Labor Party. 1920. Page 27.]
      “Labor alone produces all wealth. Wages are that part of Labor’s own product that the workingman is allowed to keep; profits are the present and running stealings perpetrated by the capitalist upon the workingman from day to day, from week to week, from month to month, from year to year; capital is the accumulated past stealings of the capitalist—corner-stoned upon his ‘orlginal accumulation.’” [Daniel De Leon. What Means this Strike?: Address delivered by Daniel De Leon in the City Hall of New Bedford, Mass., February 11, 1898. New York: New York Labor News Company. 1899. Page 12.]
      “It is the constant contention of Socialism that—based up on the undeniable principle that labor is the sole producer of all wealth values—the only quality requisite to a rational medium of exchange is that it specify the time expended by the holder in contributing to the common stock; that in that way only he who did so contribute could draw from that stock; while today the reverse happens; he who does not contribute gets the lion's share, while he who does must be satisfied with a pittance; and that it is one of the irrational features and results of capitalism that the medium of ex change must have value with all that thereby hangs. None more than the Socialists recognize this principle and strive for its establishment—by establishment of time certificates as a medium of exchange, without intrinsic value. Whence then, their firm opposition to the ‘fiat moneyists?’ Simply because the ‘fiat moneyists’ are striving after the impossible, to wit, the establishment of the exchange medium of the Co-operative Commonwealth under the capitalist system of production.” [Daniel De Leon, “Money,” in Arnold Petersen and Daniel De Leon. High Cost of Living and Money. New York: National Executive Committee of Socialist Labor Party. 1914. Pages 25-45.]
      “My distinguished adversary says we are the worst factors in society. We are not afraid of such charges. That was the charge that the patriciate of the old Eoman Empire made against the early Christians; that was the charge that the Eoman Catholic political hierachy later hurled at the Protestants; that was exactly the charge that the Democratic Bourbon Copperheads flung at the Abolition ists. We Socialists have not yet been tarred and feathered and ridden on rails as the Abolitionists were. (Voice from the audience: ‘What are they doing in California?᾿) Be not too hasty. The Socialist of America denies all affinity with the clement whose leading song has for its refrain: ‘Hallelujah, Hallelujah, I’m a bum!’ Mere declamation is not enough to prove that the Socialist is ‘the worst enemy in society.’” [Daniel De Leon in Daniel De Leon and Thomas F. Carmody. Individualism vs. Socialism. Fourth edition. National Executive Committee of Socialist Labor Party. 1912. Page 36.]
      1. The Socialist Industrial Union Program of Daniel De Leon: “There is no advocacy of state ownership of the industries. There is no belief that political government should nationalize the industries, under the leadership of a supposed working class party. The goal, rather, is direct democratic control of all industries and services by the workers united in an industrial union. Rather than governing in the name of the working class, as in the Leninist countries, De Leon asserted that a socialist political party has but one thing to do upon winning control of the political offices, and that is to transfer all management authority to the workers' councils, and, in so doing, abolish all political forms of power, including abolition of the socialist political party itself, without delay.” [Mike Lepore, “A Short Review of the Life and Work of Daniel De Leon.” The Socialist Industrial Union Program of Daniel De Leon. April 3rd, 1996. Retrieved on September 19th, 2015.]
      2. Socialist Labor Party of America: The Home of Marxism-De Leonism. “To win the struggle for socialist freedom requires enormous efforts of organizational and educational work. It requires building a political party of socialism to contest the power of the capitalist class on the political field, and to educate the majority of workers about the need for socialism. It requires building Socialist Industrial Union organizations to unite all workers in a classconscious industrial force, and to prepare them to take, hold and operate the tools of production.” [Editor, “What is Socialism?” Socialist Labor Party of America: The Home of Marxism-De Leonism. Undated. Retrieved on September 19th, 2015.]
      3. Industrial Workers of the World (the Wobblies): A Union for All Workers.
         “The IWW [Industrial Workers of the World] is a member-run union for all workers, a union dedicated to organizing on the job, in our industries and in our communities. IWW members are organizing to win better conditions today and build a world with economic democracy tomorrow. We want our workplaces run for the benefit of workers and communities rather than for a handful of bosses and executives.
         “We are the Industrial Workers of the World because we organize industrially.
         “This means we organize all workers producing the same goods or providing the same services into one union, rather than dividing workers by skill or trade, so we can pool our strength to win our demands together. Since the IWW was founded in 1905, we have made significant contributions to the labor struggles around the world and have a proud tradition of organizing across gender, ethnic and racial lines – a tradition begun long before such organizing was popular.”
         [Editor, “About the IWW.” Industrial Workers of the World: A Union for All Workers. Undated. Retrieved on September 19th, 2015.]
   5. Marxism–Titoism as pronounced in this MP3 audio file (Serbo-Croatian Cyrillic, Титоизам, Titoizam): In the former country of Yugoslavia, Maršal or Marshal J̌osip Broz Tito (Serbo-Croatian Cyrillic, Маршал Јосип Броз Тито), 1892-1980, established his own political brand of Marxist communism or socialism. It was based upon the principle of workers’ self-management. Titoism, while rooted in Marxist-Leninism, departed significantly from the (arguable) orthodoxy of the former Soviet Union.
      “Our workers have come to the conclusion that their self-management in factories and enterprises is a great achievement which offers them the best prospects for creating a better life and prosperity for themselves. Since our working class are satisfied with this system of self-management, and I am convinced that they are and that they are always ready to defend their great achievement with their lives, then it is hard to understand why certain people outside our country are so much concerned whether the system of workers self-management is good or not, and why do they deny its socialist character. In this connection I must note that some foreign critics often pass judgement on whether it is or is not something socialist, although many of them do not possess anything like the necessary qualifications for this or indeed possess none at all. I should not like to mention and enumerate all the sorts of absurdity that are talked and written about our workers self-management, and I'm not going to refute them, because the best answer to all that will be given by this Congress and by the facts about our social system. But I would recommend now that all who doubt the achievements of workers self-management should come here and see for themselves. We shall be very glad to explain everything to them, attempt to explain, if any of the sceptics should be so inclined.” [Maršal Tito. Speech at the First Congress of Workers’ Councils. June 25th, 1957. Retrieved on August 26th, 2015.]
      “Since [Karl] Marx’s argument in the 1840s is literally inapplicable today (who cares about the State of King Frederick William IV?), I am violently tearing out, assembling, and re-functioning these passages for today’s purposes. I start from a dozen passages by Marx that I completely or incompletely metamorphosise, and the resulting metamorphic text then demands to be supplemented with other considerations. This makes the whole of my essay anamorphic in relation to that of Marx: rotated into the dimension of Post-Fordism, the new Leviathan. The text is therefore mine, written because of Yugoslavia after the 1941–45 revolution, and uses Marx as an indispensable stimulus and catalyser – because his style is consubstantial to some fundamental methodological insights into philosophical anthropology that I would like, mutatis mutandis [Late Latin, mūtātīs mūtandīs, ‘once the necessary changes have been made’], to preserve.” [Darko Suvin, “Fifteen theses about communism and Yugoslavia, or the two-headed Janus of emancipation through the State: (Metamorphoses and anamorphoses of ‘On the Jewish Question’ by Marx).” Critical Quarterly. Volume 57, number 2, July 2015. Pages 90-110.]
   6. Marxism–Sorelianism or, as it more commonly called, revolutionary syndicalism as pronounced in this MP3 audio file (Georges Sorel as pronounced in this MP3 audio file): In revolutionary syndicalism, class warfare, by the workers against the capitalists, will result from general strikes by workers’ syndicates. Marxism–Sorelianism is generally regarded to be a form of communist revisionism. Another version of revisionism, evolutionary socialism, is examined later in the chapter.
      “A. To most people the class war is the principle of Socialist tactics. That means that the Socialist party founds its electoral successes on the clashing of interests which exist in an acute state between certain groups, and that, if need be, it would undertake to make this hostility still more acute; their candidates ask the poorest and most numerous class to look upon themselves as forming a corporation, and they offer to become the advocates of this corporation; they promise to use their influence as representatives to improve the lot of the disinherited.…
      “B. Contemporary democracy in France finds itself somewhat bewildered by the tactics of the class war. This explains why Parliamentary Socialism does not mingle with the main body of the parties of the extreme left.
      “In order to understand this situation, we must remember the important part played by revolutionary war in our history; an enormous number of our political ideas originated from war; war presupposes the union of national forces against the enemy, and our French historians have always severely criticised those insurrections which hampered the defence of the country.…
      “C. The Syndicalist organisation gives a third value to the class war. In each branch of industry employers and workmen form antagonistic groups, which have continual discussions, which negotiate and make agreements. Socialism brings along its terminology of class war, and thus complicates conflicts which might have remained of a purely private order; corporative exclusiveness, which resembles the local or the racial spirit, is thereby consolidated, and those who represent it like to imagine that they are accomplishing a higher duty and are doing excellent work for Socialism….
      “It is very difficult to understand proletarian violence as long as we think in terms of the ideas disseminated by middle-class philosophers; according to their philosophy, violence is a relic of barbarism which is bound to disappear under the influence of the progress of enlightenment. It is therefore quite natural that Jaures, who has been brought up on middle-class ideology, should have a profound contempt for people who favour proletarian violence; he is astonished to see educated Socialists hand in hand with the Syndicalists; he wonders by what miracle men who have proved themselves thinkers can accumulate sophistries in order to give a semblance of reason to the dreams of stupid people who are incapable of thought. This question worries the friends of Jaures considerably, and they are only too ready to treat the representatives of the new school as demagogues, and accuse them of seeking the applause of the impulsive masses.
      “Parliamentary Socialists cannot understand the ends pursued by the new school; they imagine that ultimately all Socialism can be reduced to the pursuit of the means of getting into power. Is it possible that they think the followers of the new school wish to make a higher bid for the confidence of simple electors and cheat the Socialists of the seats provided for them? Again, the apologia of violence might have the very unfortunate result of disgusting the workers with electoral politics, and this would tend to destroy the chances of the Socialist candidates by multiplying the abstentions from voting! Do you wish to revive civil war? they ask. To our great statesmen that seems mad.”
      [Georges Sorel in Georges Sorel, Andre Tridon, Bertrand Russell, and John Spargo. Syndicalism: Writings On Revolutionary Socialist Unions. St. Petersburg, Florida: Red and Black Publishers. 2010. Pages 6-14.]
      “For a long time I had been struck by the fact that the normal development of strikes is accompanied by an important series of acts of violence; but certain learned sociologists seek to disguise a phenomenon that every one who cares to use his eyes must have noticed. Revolutionary syndicalism keeps alive in the minds of the masses the desire to strike, and only prospers when important strikes, accompanied by violence, take place. Socialism tends to appear more and more as a theory of revolutionary syndicalism—or rather as a philosophy of modem history, in as far as it is under the influence of this syndicalism. It follows from these incontestable data, that if we desire to discuss Socialism with any benefit, we must first of all investigate the functions of violence in actual social conditions” [Georges Sorel. Reflections on Violence. Thomas Ernest Hulme, translator. London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd. 1916. Page 43.]
      “The more Syndicalism develops, by abandoning the old superstitions which come to it from the Old Regime and from the Church—through the men of letters, professors of philosophy, and historians of the Revolution,—the more will social conflicts assume the character of a simple struggle, similar to those of armies on campaign. We cannot censure too severely those who teach the people that they ought to carry out the highly idealistic decrees of a progressive justice. Their efforts will only result in the maintenance of those ideas about the State which provoked the bloody acts of ’93 [1893], whilst the idea of a class war, on the contrary, tends to refine the conception of violence.” [Georges Sorel. Reflections on Violence. Thomas Ernest Hulme, translator. London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd. 1916. Page 122.]
      “Research into the history of revolutionary-syndicalist movements has yielded a great many new insights in the last twenty-five to thirty years. Nevertheless it is still much too early to make an internationally comparative synthesis. Some attempts in this direction have been made, but these are still very much explorative, and leave many questions unanswered or even undiscussed. In this contribution I want to discuss some problems which seem important to resolve before we can achieve a comprehensive interpretation of syndicalism as a world-wide phenomenon.” [Marcel van der Linden, “Second thoughts on revolutionary syndicalism.” Labour History Review. Volume 63, number 2, July 1998. Pages 182-196.]
      “In supporting a union movement independent of electoral socialism, for example, revolutionary syndicalists were allied with business unionists against Marxist socialists. The alliance did not extend, however, to syndicalist campaigns against militarism, patriotism, and capitalism. Those views united syndicalists and political socialists. But unlike the Marxist socialists, who disdained the gains to be won through economic action, syndicalists and business unionists believed strikes were the central tool of working-class collective action. Superficially, revolutionary syndicalist strikes were indistinguishable from those of business unions; they differed only in their ultimate goals.” [Gerald C. Friedman, “Revolutionary Unions and French Labor: The Rebels behind the Cause; Or, Why Did Revolutionary Syndicalism Fail?” French Historical Studies. Volume 20, number 2, spring 1997. Pages 155-181.]
      “Syndicalism … refers to a form of revolutionary trade unionism, centred on the view that revolutionary union action can establish a collectivised, worker-managed social order resting on union structures. Syndicalists argued that ‘the trade union, the syndicate, is the unified organisation of labour and has for its purpose the defence of the interests of the producers within existing society and the preparing for and the practical carrying out of the reconstruction of society after the pattern of Socialism.’” [Lucien van der Walt and Steven J. Hirsch, “Rethinking Anarchism and Syndicalism: The Colonial and Postcolonial Experience, 1870-1940.” Anarchism and Syndicalism in the Colonial and Postcolonial World, 1870–1940: The Praxis of National Liberation, Internationalism, and Social Revolution. Steven J. Hirsch and Lucien van der Walt, editors. Leiden, the Netherlands, and Boston, Massachusetts: Leiden. 2010. Pages xxi-lxxiii.]
   7. evolutionary socialism (Eduard Bernstein, pronounced Ēd′-wǎrd Běrn′-shtǎyn as in this MP3 audio file): This highly problematic communist revisionary approach—which was referred to as evolutionary socialism by Bernstein (1850-1932)—is frequently called Bernsteinism, reformism, or, a bit less kindly, revisionism. Although Bernstein accepted some of Marx’s positions, he was a gradualist. That is to say, Bernstein claimed that socialism could be established developmentally and democratically. By asserting that a revolution was unnecessary, he repudiated the revolutionary heart of Marxism. In my view, world socialism can never be established via the medium of electoral politics. Therefore, anyone who supports the implementation of radical systemic change, through spontaneous or organized uprisings of the subaltern, will oppose evolutionary socialism.
      Early in the 20th century, Bernstein’s revisionary program morphed into an evolutionary socialism divided. Bernsteinist democratic socialists, many of whom avoid making any Marxian arguments, have continued advocating for evolutionary socialism. Social democracy, the second faction of evolutionary socialism, supports the “welfare state” as a supposedly more humane form of capitalism. Social democrats have, by and large, rejected Marxism, neo-Marxism, and socialism entirely. Well, differences aside, in the U.S., both branches of Bernsteinism are commonly described as progressivism.
      Although U.S. Senator Bernie Sanders—an ultimately unsuccessful 2016 Democratic presidential contender—refers to himself as a democratic socialist, his positions place him, arguably, closer to European–style social democracy. Either way, an evolutionary socialist president, in the capitalist and imperialist U.S., would spend his tenure locked in permanent gridlock, even political warfare, with Congress. Aside from issuing executive orders, his presidency, or at least his agenda, would be a failure. Ultimately, Bernie Sanders inaccurately designated a presidential election as a revolution. Even if unwittingly, he was setting up his supporters for disappointment. Elections are, by definition, non-revolutionary and gradualist.
      As capitalism continues on its road to implosion, a revolution will, I think, occur at some point. When that time arrives, such as revolution will surely involve warfare and bloodshed, not voting for one’s favorite candidate. Perhaps revolutions could be relatively peaceful in some parts of the world, but doubtfully so in the U.S.—the most violent country in the Western world.
      “Opponents of socialism declared it [this book] to be the most crushing testimony of the unsoundness of the socialist theory, and criticism of capitalist society and socialist writers….
      “… the views put forward in the book have received the bye-name of Revisionism, and although some of those who are called Revisionists in German social democracy hold on several points views different from mine, the book can, all in all, be regarded as an exposition of the theoretical and political tendencies of the German social democratic revisionists….
      “Unable to believe in finalities at all, I cannot believe in a final aim of socialism. But I strongly believe in the socialist movement, in the march forward of the working classes, who step by step must work out their emancipation by changing society from the domain of a commercial landholding oligarchy to a real democracy which in all its departments is guided by the interests of those who work and create.”
      [Eduard Bernstein. Evolutionary Socialism: The Classic Statement of Democratic Socialism. Edith C. Harvey, translator. New York: Schocken Books. 1961. Pages xxi-xxii.]
      “The theory which the Communist Manifesto sets forth of the evolution of modern society was correct as far as it characterised the general tendencies of that evolution. But it was mistaken in several special deductions, above all in the estimate of the time the evolution would take. The last has been unreservedly acknowledged by Friedrich Engels, the joint author with Marx of the Manifesto, in his preface to the Class War in France. But it is evident that if social evolution takes a much greater period of time than was assumed, it must also take upon itself forms and lead to forms that were not foreseen and could not be foreseen then.” [Eduard Bernstein. Evolutionary Socialism: The Classic Statement of Democratic Socialism. Edith C. Harvey, translator. New York: Schocken Books. 1961. Page xxiv.]
      “… [There has been a] division between ‘social democrats’ and ‘democratic socialists.’ The former had made peace with capitalism, and concentrated on humanizing the system. Social democrats supported and tried to strengthen the basic institutions of the welfare state—pensions for all, public health care, public education, unemployment insurance. They supported and tried to strengthen the labor movement. The latter, as socialists, argued that capitalism could never be sufficiently humanized, and that trying to suppress the economic contradictions in one area would only see them emerge in a different guise elsewhere ….” [David Schweickart, “Democratic Socialism.” Encyclopedia of Activism and Social Justice. Volume I. Gary L. Anderson and Kathryn G. Herr, editors. Thousand Oaks, California: SAGE Publications, Inc. 2007. Page 447.]
      “Within … [the] ‘revisionist’ camp [of Marxism], two distinct strands of thinking emerged. The first was revolutionary and epitomized by the work of Georges Sorel. For Sorel, a radical and perhaps violent overthrow of the existing order seemed the surest path to a better future. Socialism, in this view, would emerge from ‘active combat that would destroy the existing state of things.’ The second strand of revisionism was democratic and epitomized by the work of Eduard Bernstein. Like Sorel, Bernstein believed that socialism would emerge from an active struggle for a better world, but unlike Sorel he thought this struggle could and should take a democratic and evolutionary form. Where Sorel’s work would help lay the groundwork for fascism, Bernstein’s would help lay the groundwork for social democracy.
      “Bernstein attacked the two main pillars of orthodox Marxism—historical materialism and class struggle—and argued for an alternative based on the primacy of politics and cross class cooperation. His observations about capitalism led him to believe that it was not leading to an increasing concentration of wealth and the immiseration of society, but rather was becoming increasingly complex and adaptable. Instead of waiting until capitalism collapsed for socialism to emerge, therefore, he favored trying to actively reform the existing system. In his view the prospects for socialism depended ‘not on the decrease but on the increase of … wealth,’ and on the ability of socialists to come up with ‘positive suggestions for reform’ capable of spurring fundamental change.”
      [Sheri Berman, “Understanding Social Democracy.” Pages 1-38. Presented at: What’s Left of the Left: Liberalism and Social Democracy in a Globalized World: A Conference at the Center for European Studies, Harvard University. May 9th–10th, 2008. Retrieved on September 20th, 2015.]
      “What are the differences between social democracy, liberalism and conservatism? The search for socio-political ideal models and their discussion is more urgent than ever in a period of global economic and financial crisis. The consequences of market failure have seldom been so obvious and the calls for an active and effective state so strong as they are today. The collapse of Lehman Brothers and its consequences have not only brought the largest national economies in the world to their knees, but have also put to the test many political principles and dogmas which not so long ago were deemed self-evident. Centuries-old fundamental questions facing democratic polities have suddenly become topical again: How can social justice be achieved in an age of globalisation? How can the tension be resolved between self-interest and solidarity in today’s societies? What is the meaning of freedom and equality in the face of current socio-political realities? And what is the role of the state in implementing these principles?” [Christiane Kesper, “Foreward to the International Edition.” Social Democracy Reader 1: Foundations of Social Democracy. Julia Bläsius, Tobias Gombert, Christian Krell, and Martin Timpe, editors. Berlin, Germany: Division for International Development Cooperation. November, 2009. Page 6. Retrieved on September 20th, 2015.]
      “This paper questions how liberal democracy has come to symbolize an ideal, or a universal set of values ready to be exported elsewhere in the world. It critically assesses the EU’s [European Union’s] almost messianic mission to promote its successful project of liberal democracy, and the ways in which the EU seeks to teach others about its meaning while refusing to aspect learn about alternative forms of political organization in different contexts. It discusses the implications of such a narrow framing of EU conceptions of liberal democracy, drawing on extensive fieldwork carried out in Palestine and Egypt in September 2007 and March 2008, respectively. The paper argues for a new framing of political transformation in the Middle East and North Africa. It concludes by employing Aletta Norval’s notion of Aversive Democracy to highlight the need for recognition of crucial aspects of political change that stem from what is emerging in the Middle East.” [Michelle Pace. Liberal or Social Democracy?: Aspects of the EU’s Democracy Promotion Agenda in the Middle East. Abstract. Stockholm, Sweden: International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance. 2009. Page 3. Retrieved on September 20th, 2015.]
      “… not all is gloomy. Clarity about the task ahead helps addressing it. A group of thinkers and practitioners from all over Europe have worked on a new social democratic politics for several years now. What has been developed under the concept of the ‘Good Society’ is a new social democratic narrative that takes a thorough value-driven analysis of our current economic and political problems as a starting point to craft a new politics. The underlying idea is to develop a political vision that provides direction. The goal is to define the ‘Good Society’ to make a ‘better society’ possible and sketch the political way towards it. Such a value-driven political compass provides an important tool to navigate the stormy political seas we are currently facing and is a useful starting point from which to address wider challenges.
      “The idea of a Good Society is based on democracy, community and pluralism. It is democratic because only the free participation of every citizen can guarantee true freedom and progress. The Good Society is based on a community approach because it recognizes our mutual interdependencies and joint interests. And it is pluralistic because it draws vitality out of the diversity of political institutions, economic activities and cultural identities.”
      [Henning Meyer, “Reforming Social Democracy: The Good Society Project.” Social Europe Occasional Paper. London: Social Europe Ltd. March, 2014. Pages 1-7. Retrieved on September 20th, 2015.]
      “The … economic liberal, vision of a society in which the problems of risk, insecurity and public good provision are dealt with by a combination of markets and contracts has proved unsustainable. Financial markets, which were supposed to supplant the social democratic state, are now calling on that same state for protection. Bankruptcy, the first state intervention to deal with failed contracts, is now being called upon on an unprecedented scale, and many other rescue measures are needed.
      “Social democrats have long stressed the argument that we have the capacity to share and manage risks more effectively as a society than as individuals. The set of policies traditionally associated with social democracy may be regarded as responses to a range of risks facing individuals, from health risks to uncertain life chances.”
      [John Quiggin. An agenda for social democracy. Penrith, New South Wales, Australia: Witlam Institute of Western Sydney University. April, 2009. Page 4. Retrieved on September 20th, 2015.]
      “Over the last quarter-century, we have witnessed a sea-change in the nature of leftist activism. Formerly grassroots or nationally focused social movements, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and other collectivities are increasingly sharing information, networking, coordinating action, launching campaigns, petitioning, lobbying, protesting, and framing their claims, targets, and visions at the transnational level of contention. These emerging, cross-border networks have even forged a unique and autonomous space, the World Social Forum (WSF) along with a web of regional and local offshoots.” [Ruth Reitan. Global Activism. London and New York: Routledge imprint of Taylor & Francis Group, an Informa PLC business. 2007. Page 1.]
      A few contemporary examples of evolutionary socialism are enumerated below.

      1. deep socialism (Peter Wilberg): In this type of democratic socialism, which incorporates both social democracy and economic socialism, differences in hourly wages would not be based on the substance of a individual’s work but, rather, on its method and quality.
         “Deep socialism is democratic socialism, based on the principle of social democracy and economic socialism. Democracy is based on the principle that each person’s vote carries equal weight irrespectie of their wealth or status: On equality of rights. Socialism economics is based on the principle that each person’s labour has the same basic value as every other person’s irrespective of its nature: On equality of labour. Why should a corporate boss earn hundreds more per hour than a hard-working secretary, cleaner or assembly-line worker?… Hourly pay differentials would be based not on what people did, but on how they did it. Not on the nature of their work but on its quality…
         “The establishment of a democratic, planned economy and the phasing out of money in favour of labour time-and-quality credits recorded on smart cards would take advantage of the enormous developments in information and communications technology brought about by computers and microchips. In this way, the basic Marxist theory of social development and transformation would be fulfilled; namely that is is development in the technology of production that makes changes in the economic structure of society both necessary and possible.”
         [Peter Wilberg. Deep Socialism: A New Manifesto of Marxist Ethics and Economics. London: New Gnosis Publications. 2003. Pages 14-15.]
         “The aim of socialism is deep value fulfillment, a society in which ‘the free development of each is the condition for the free development of all.’ The association of market capitalism with individualism is fundamentally false, for capitalism thrives only on proving symbolic value fulfillment….
         “Marketing translates deep values into symbolic ones, thus making them into commodities. Advertising and promotion use symbols to attach deep values to commodities, thus transforming them into purely symbolic values….
         “When an individual sells their labour power as a commodity, the individual qualities they embody and materialize in their work become merely the material embodiment of their symbolic value, cultural and economic.”
         [Peter Wilberg. Deep Socialism: A New Manifesto of Marxist Ethics and Economics. London: New Gnosis Publications. 2003. Pages 82-83.]
      2. Our Revolution (Bernie Sanders and others): This organization was started by Senator Sanders after his unsuccessful run for the nomination of the U.S. Democratic Party.
         “Frankly, … [the] lack of political consciousness is exactly what the ruling class of this country wants. The Koch brothers spend hundreds of millions to elect candidates who represent the rich and the powerful. They understand the importance of politics. Meanwhile, people who work for low wages, have no health insurance, and live in inadequate housing don’t see a connection between the reality of their lives and what government does or does not do. Showing people that connection is a very big part of what a progressive political movement has to do. How can we bring about real social change in this country if people in need are not involved in the political process? We need a political revolution. We need to get people involved. We need to get people voting.” [Bernie Sanders. Our Revolution: A Future to Believe In. New York: Thomas Dunne Books imprint of St. Martin’s Press, LLC. 2016. Ebooks.com edition.]
         “Political campaigns open and break hearts, then disappear. In the end, signs come down, campaign offices empty out, voter and volunteer lists coated with coffee and sweat are shredded. The moment and the movement dissolve.
         “But in this most important election year, Bernie Sanders and his passionate supporters aim to break that pattern. Sanders’s call for a ‘political revolution’ ignited a fierce urgency that had been percolating under the surface of America’s stultifying politics—and initiatives such as Our Revolution and Brand New Congress, and smaller ‘Berniecrat’ clubs and networks sprouting from the grassroots, are carving new pathways for progressive reform.
         “The passion of the post-Bernie movement is undeniable. Within days of Sanders’s first public mention of Our Revolution in late June, 24,000 people expressed interest in joining. The group’s August 24 launch inspired more than 2,600 house parties around the country, and more than 240,000 viewers on Facebook Live alone. Brand New Congress, meanwhile, is touring the country to build support for running more than 400 reform candidates in 2018.
         “This revolution-in-progress confronts many challenges.”
         [Christopher D. Cook, “What’s Next for Bernie’s Revolution?” The Progressive. Volume 80, number 9, October 2016. Pages 14-17.]
      3. capital in the twenty-first century (Thomas Piketty as pronounced in this MP3 audio file): Piketty proposes progressive taxation and a tax on capital to address the issue of global economic inequality. His re-imagining of Marx’s Capital is pure social democratic revisionism.
         “Modern economic growth and the diffusion of knowledge have made it possible to avoid the Marxist apocalypse but have not modified the deep structures of capital and inequality—or in any case not as much as one might have imagined in the optimistic decades following World War II. When the rate of return on capital exceeds the rate of growth of output and income, as it did in the nineteenth century and seems quite likely to do again in the twenty-first, capitalism automatically generates arbitrary and unsustainable inequalities that radically undermine the meritocratic values on which democratic societies are based. There are nevertheless ways democracy can regain control over capitalism and ensure that the general interest takes precedence over private interests, while preserving economic openness and avoiding protectionist and nationalist reactions. The policy recommendations I propose … tend in this direction.” [Thomas Piketty. Capital in the Twenty-First Century. Arthur Goldhammer, translator. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The Belknap Press imprint of Harvard University Press. 2014. Pages 1-2.]
   8. Left Refoundation and Regroupment (MP3 audio file): With the demise of the Soviet Union and the practical rejection of the Maoist project in Mainland China, various organizations which identity with either left refoundation (re-theorizing) or left regroupment (re-organizing), by one name or another, have aimed to cooperatively chart a new course for the left. Certain aspects of the older tendencies may be accepted, but a new Marxian communism, one better suited to the needs of the present era, should, according to some, be proposed and developed. A number of these Marxist multi-tendency movements and organizations focus upon forming “frontist” alliances between communist, socialist, or other leftist organizations from different schools of thought.
      “I believe the time has come to acknowledge the long-term theoretical and political cost of the Russian Revolution, which channelled Marxism into its own self-serving orthodoxy. It is especially important to look again at the debates on representative democracy, the historically necessary conditions for the transition to socialism and the concept of ‘ultra-imperialism.’ These are issues which Western Marxism has neglected or allowed Leninism to preempt. The time has come for a redefinition, even a refoundation, of socialism in the West, now that strategic debate is no longer polarized and displaced by Cold War politics.” [Peter Wollen, “Our Post-Communism: The Legacy of Karl Kautsky.” New Left Review. Series I, number 202, November–December 1993. Pages 85-93.]
      “… while [Louis] Althusser loudly proclaimed the necessity and autonomy of theory, his own intellectual activity was indissolubly linked to the perspective of a ‘refoundation’ of the Communist movement: the attempt to anticipate its reconstruction, at national and international levels, on the far side of its present crisis.” [Étienne Balibar, “Althusser and the Rue d’Ulm.” New Left Review. Series II, number 58, July–August 2009. Pages 91-107.]
      “The reflections here submitted for your discussion have obviously been made in my personal capacity, because that is the basis on which I was invited. But they largely reflect orientations that were quite widespread in the quest of the old Communist Party, and a fortiori in the one that is seeking a refoundation.” [Lucio Magri, “The European Left: Between Crisis and Refoundation.” New Left Review. Series I, number 189, September–October 1991. Pages 5-18.]
      “The urgent necessity of creating a revolutionary regroupment on the basis of the existing organized groups is … evident. The formation of such a revolutionary party must not be prevented by denying the organization of these groups or by any form of sectarianism.” [Ricard Soler, “The New Spain.” New Left Review. Series I, number 58, November–December 1969. Pages 3-27.]
      “… it has been practical experience of the contradictory processes of left-regroupment on an international scale – from reconfigurations over the last decade on the Latin American left, to the varying success of coalition parties in Europe such as Die Linke in Germany, Izquierda Unida in Spain, Syriza in Greece and the Front de Gauche in France, to the tentative emergence of new political formations across North Africa and the Arab world – that has firmly placed the question of the party back on the contemporary agenda.” [Peter D. Thomas, “The Communist Hypothesis and the Question of Organization.” Theory & Event. Volume 16, number 4, 2003. Pages 10+.]
      “The overall conclusion is that a general left-wing convergence is still some way off, despite the best efforts of some. What we wish to do in this introduction is to make the case for such a convergence today, addressing the questions of why such a convergence is needed, what form it might take, and to what end – strategic, tactical or ideological.” [Alex Prichard and Owen Worth, “Left-wing convergence: An introduction.” Capital & Class. Volume 40, number 1, 2016. Pages 3-17.]
      “In the wake of the financial crisis that began in 2007, there have been a growing number of calls for convergence on the radical left. In particular, there have been appeals for a rapprochement or alliance between anarchism and Marxism …. These calls have a certain logic, given that both anarchism and Marxism appear especially well placed to address the neoliberal conditions that led to the crisis. The consequences of neoliberal globalisation have after all vindicated some of the central arguments of both ideologies: in The Communist Manifesto, [Karl] Marx and [Friedrich] Engels presciently anticipated economic globalisation and its effects, while the dispersion of state sovereignty that it has produced has arguably validated claims that at least at a global level we already live in an anarchic world … More importantly, both anarchism and Marxism have played high-profile roles in responding to the crisis: anarchist activists, ideas, and strategies have been central to resistance movements like Occupy …, while Marxist political economy has proved invaluable in analysing events over which mainstream classical economics has only been able to maintain an embarrassed silence ….” [Simon Choat, “Marxism and anarchism in an age of neoliberal crisis.” Capital & Class. Volume 40, number 1, February 2016. Pages 95-109.]
      1. Freedom Road Socialist Organization (FRSO): This movement, which apparently coined the term “left refoundation,” originated out of Maoism. In Freedom Road’s Left Refoundation, relationships are established between different socialist organizations and movements (a type of “frontism”). The controveries surrounding the Theses on Left Refoundation resulted in a permanent split between Freedom Road Socialist Organization (Left Refoundation) and Freedom Road Socialist Organization (Maoist). Each group has continued to claim its own legitimacy. Communist historian Doug Enaa Greene has provided a interesting autobiographical critique of Freedom Road Socialist Organization (Left Refoundation) in a YouTube Video: Cold Water in the Eye. The organization also maintains its own YouTube channel.
         “Left Refoundation, a dialectical process between the ‘organized Left’ and the ‘social movement Left.’ In general, the ‘organized Left’ refers to revolutionaries belonging to existing Left organizations. The ‘social movement Left’ generally refers to individuals who self-identify as leftists or revolutionaries, participate in on-the-ground movement work, but haven’t joined any existing organization.” [“Revolutionary Work In Our Times and Left Refoundation: Building a New Culture of the Left.” Freedom Road Socialist Organization (Left Refoundation). September 18th, 2009. Retrieved on August 30th, 2015.]
         “Given all that is required of us in this moment, we know that we cannot accomplish our goals without a stronger Left. Left Refoundation work must continue to play a guiding role in our strategies. Building on relationships we’ve developed with advanced forces in the social movement Left, we will embark on a new Left Refoundation effort, the construction of a new ‘Socialist Front.’ This Front will provide an opportunity to collaborate with left forces around shared work. In addition to the Front, the US Social Forum and continued participation in Revolutionary Work in Our Times (RWIOT) will also be important elements in our Left Refoundation work.“ [“A Strategy for the Coming Period: 2010 – 2013.” Freedom Road Socialist Organization (Left Refoundation). January 27th, 2010. Retrieved on September 12th, 2015.]
         “Left Refoundation is a process for recreating, reestablishing, and reasserting an ideological and institutional base in the U.S. for overthrowing capitalism and beginning to create a socialist society. One initial objective of Left Refoundation is to create public discourse on the subject of revolution and socialism. Another objective is to evaluate socialist theory and practice in a way that encourages collaboration and development of strategy on the Left. Building the ideological and institutional base for a new type of socialist party will require public debate, collaborative analysis and broad scale struggles that have revolutionary potential. In the past, party building preoccupied major sectors of the Socialist Left. In recent years, most independent socialists and socialist organizations have paid little attention to this element of our overall strategy for revolution.” [“Meeting the Challenge of Crisis and Opportunity: Left Refoundation and Party Building.” Freedom Road Socialist Organization (Left Refoundation). Undated. Page 3. Retrieved on September 18th, 2015.]
         “In 1999, a social democratic grouping left to pursue a strategy the splitters call ‘left refoundationism.’ ‘Left refoundationism’ rejects Leninism in favor of the goal to build a ‘mass socialist party.’ While they continue to use the name of our organization to build a social democratic project, we continue to build FRSO [Freedom Road Socialist Organization] as a Marxist-Leninist organization.” [“Unity Statement of Freedom Road Socialist Organization.” Freedom Road Socialist Organization (Maoist). 2005. Retrieved on August 30th, 2015.]
         “… it is necessary to turn to a subject that has become a touchstone issue for so many self-described socialist and communist organizations: left unity. Also called regroupment, rapprochement [MP3 audio file], left refoundation and a number of other equally pretentious terms, advocating left unity is seen as: a) being the same as multi-tendency, non-doctrinaire or non-sectarian (or a combination thereof), and/or b) either a substitute or prerequisite for the building of a proletarian party.” [“General Platform of the Workers Party.” Workers Party in America: The Workers’ Communist Party in the United States. November 25th, 2012. Retrieved on September 12th, 2015.]
         “From our discussions, drawing on many sources both inside and outside the socialist movement, we have concluded that the prospects for full democracy and working-class power and leadership in this country require a re-examination and overhaul of the theory, program (practice) and organizational components of socialism and revolutionary movements as they exist today. This process, which we are calling Left Refoundation, includes the task of building a revolutionary party or parties for socialism. It will require the collective input of not only those forces who already see the need for a decisive victory over capitalism, but also the tens of thousands of working-class and oppressed peoples who know something is wrong, but as yet don’t have a place and means to actualize their dreams.” [“Which Way is Left?: Theory, Politics, Organization and 21ˢᵗ–Century Socialism.” Freedom Road Socialist Organization. 2007. Page 3.]
         “The FRSO [Freedom Road Socialist Organization] was founded in 1985 with the merger of two organizations: the Proletarian Unity League and the Revolutionary Workers Headquarters; this was followed by mergers with the Organization for Revolutionary Unity and the Amilcar Cabral/Paul Robeson Collective. All of these mergers gave FRSO direct ties to the labor movement, the liberation movements of oppressed nationalities (Chicano and African American) and oppressed national minorities (Asian/Asian American, Puerto Rican), the Lesbian/Gay/Bisexual/Transgender movements, the anti-imperialist movement, and the student movement. In 1993, the Socialist Organizing Network merged into FRSO. In 1999, FRSO suffered an organizational crisis that led to a split, and there are currently two separate organizations identifying themselves as FRSO. The organization that I am working with can be identified by the title of its newspaper, Fight Back, and when I discuss FRSO in this article, I will be referring to this organization.” [John D. Holst, “Globalization and Education within Two Revolutionary Organizations in the United States of America: A Gramscian Analysis.” Adult Education Quarterly. Volume 55, number 1, November 2004. Pages 23-40.]
      2. Solidarity: This multi-tendency neo-Trotskyist organization, while historically rooted in Trotskyism, later broadened its base to include communists representing different tendencies or schools of thought. They publish the magazine, Against the Current.
         “The socialist left needs to project … [a] labor movement vision, and engage in the hard work of helping make it happen. A picture of what kind of movement is possible—and how those movements relate to left refoundation—can be seen in the Chicago Teachers Union strike two years ago, spearheaded by an energetic rank-and-file union leadership in which socialist activists play a meaningful role.
         “Movements we work with can often end up in competition with each other for resources, media attention, or capacity, especially in times like the current crisis where working class people are asked to ‘make more with less.’ And any victories riding on the efforts of one organization or social movement working in isolation cannot last in the long run. This indicates the necessity of a left refoundation perspective that seeks to break down barriers—both material and ideological—between movements and socialist organizations. The continued future success of any one movement requires it.”
         [Greg Chern, Susan Schmitt, and David Finkel, “Solidarity Statement: Rebuilding the Left.” New Politics. Volume 15, issue 2, winter 2015. Pages 17-20.]
         “Solidarity believes that the creation of new forms of revolutionary socialist organisation would mark an important step forward for socialist politics in the US. The shape taken by a revolutionary refoundation could have a variety of possible contours, depending on the actual unfolding of any process of regroupment and renewal. (Or, nothing much could happen; sadly, that’s also a possibility.)
         “The collapse of the bureaucratic post-capitalist regimes in the East and the emergence of the new anti-capitalist global justice movement makes such a new revolutionary socialist organisation both possible and desirable. However imperative it might be, history does show that socialist refoundation will not come about spontaneously, but will require the conscious engagement of old and new anti-capitalist currents. To be viable, such a newly created organisation should incorporate not only those existing organisations that are non-vanguardist in character, but newer and younger layers of radical and revolutionary activists.
         “Refoundation has the potential of creating a new organisation that would bring together currents which historically and in present practice are considerably more distant from each other. Structures and modes of comradely collaboration will be necessary in order to allow for authentic coexistence and cross-fertilisation of tendencies. The search for dialogue and partnerships is not necessarily guided by ‘who’s closest to us.’ That would eliminate much of the emergent leadership in the anti-globalisation movement, and a wide swatch of the left wing of people of colour movements. The stepping off point is not only the desire to build a stronger and more effective socialist presence, but also the genuine belief that we can all learn from one another.”
         [“Left regroupment/refoundation.” Solidarity. July, 2002. Retrieved on September 14th, 2015.]
         “We invite the broad left to think collectively about: 1) the political state of the world, 2) the major political movements which structure our landscape of possibilities, and 3) the tasks and possibilities of some kind of left refoundation/regroupment which might have the audacity to really propose a social transformation. This analysis is necessarily incomplete and impressionistic. It is not a ‘line’ in the classic Leninist sense, but more of an arc (a line of flight, rather than a line of march): an act of thinking together which we hope will clarify our project for ourselves as well as contribute to a dialogue with others – other groups as well as the ones and twos out there hungering for new ideas and forms of organization.” [Regroupment & Refoundation of a U.S. Left: A Solidarity Draft Working Paper. July, 2008. Page 8. Retrieved on November 8th, 2015.]
         “The socialist left needs to project that kind of labor movement vision, and engage in the hard work of helping make it happen. A picture of what kind of movement is possible—and how those movements relate to left refoundation—can be seen in the Chicago Teachers Union strike two years ago, spearheaded by an energetic rank-and-file union leadership in which socialist activists play a meaningful role.” [Greg Chern, Susan Schmitt, and David Finkel (all members of Solidarity), “Solidarity Statement: Rebuilding the Left. New Politics. Volume XV, number 2, winter 2015.]
         “… after the limited momentum for left regroupment seemed to have played out, other organizations – notably our comrades in FRSO/OSCL [the English-language name, Freedom Road Socialist Organization, and its Spanish-language translation, Organización Socialista del Camino para la Libertad] – raised the term ‘left refoundation’ to highlight the role of a small but growing U.S. ‘social movement left’ in cohering a vibrant, combative, revolutionary force.
         “The two words – regroupment and refoundation – mean different things, but the process we are looking at is actually a combination. The exact proportion of one in relationship to the other is impossible for us to predict. We should pursue both, and let natural processes determine how the balance works out. Today, the social movement left that actually exists suffers greatly because there is no organized revolutionary movement worthy of the name. The organized revolutionary movement suffers equally because there is no mass social movement left worthy of the name. Each, in its future development, is dependent on the other. We favor, therefore, a ‘regroupment/refoundation’ perspective which pays attention to both sides of the equation.”
         [“Regroupment, Refounding and the Arc of Resistance.” Solidarity. Undated. Retrieved on September 11th, 2015.]
         “Another world is possible, socialism: a system that is democratic, international, and ecologically sustainable. Corporate media and mainstream intellectuals present capitalism as a system without an alternative, and use the collapse of 20ᵗʰ-century efforts at socialism to discredit all anti-capitalist visions. We stand with the millions of people worldwide who challenge this logic through the slogan, ‘Another World is Possible.’ As socialists, we have a specific vision for that world: one in which society’s productive capacity is worker- and community-controlled and used for the public good in an environmentally responsible way. Under socialism, planning and decisions are made democratically, rather than determined by a political elite. We strive to build a world in which all people can live equally without the hierarchies of race, ethnicity, religion, sexuality, gender, age, and ability that oppress the great bulk of the world’s people today. A society liberated from oppression, poverty, and economic inequality, and from the alienation inherent in capitalist social relations, would be free to pursue far greater creative possibilities.” [“Basis of Political Agreement.” Solidarity. 2013. Retrieved on September 10th, 2015.]
         “We [Solidarity] reject the ideas that capitalism can be reformed from within by the Democratic Party or trade union bureaucrats; or that the socialism is possible without the fullest development of democratic forms of working class and popular power. However, we believe that revolutionaries can legitimately differ on a wide variety of questions, from the theoretical analysis of the former bureaucratic societies in the East to the tactics socialists should pursue in the labor movement. Solidarity is building this sort of revolutionary organization because we do not pretend to be either the vanguard party or its nucleus. Therefore, we advocate revolutionary regroupment—the coming together of different revolutionary currents who agree on a common practice—as the best way to lay the foundation for a real revolutionary party in the United States.” [Charlie Post and Kit Wainer, “Socialist Organization Today.” Solidarity. 2006. Retrieved on September 10th, 2015.]
         “Our strategic goal is revolution—led by the working class and oppressed—that shatters the foundations of patriarchy, white supremacy, settler-colonialism, and capitalist rule. We believe that the potential for realizing socialism lies in the contradictions of the current system. Under capitalism, the exploited and oppressed are in constant struggle with the political and economic elites. We seek to participate in all manifestations of this struggle, aiming to help develop them into movements against the capitalist class and we fight for reforms that may serve as bridges to deeper class consciousness. We also support efforts to begin building alternative, democratic institutions and social relations in the present. Only through a revolutionary, mass political movement of working and oppressed people can the political and economic domination of society by the capitalist class be ended. This future will not be realized by simply ‘taking power.’ Rather, the revolutionary process should seek to uproot the settler-colonial foundations and dismantle the institutions of the capitalist state—e.g., the police, borders, courts, and military that protect the current social order. In their place, we must construct new institutions of the working class and develop relations which support the right to self-determination for indigenous peoples and oppressed nationalities.” [“Solidarity Founding Statement.” Solidarity. 1986. Retrieved on September 10th, 2015.]
         “The left, particularly the socialist left, remains divided and weak, while the Democratic Party continues its hollow role as society’s ‘left’ option—despite consistent evidence to the contrary. While the members of socialist organizations have played important roles in the most important mass struggle of recent years (the Ferguson [Missouri] protests that swept the nation) the organized socialist presence has been negligible on the national stage. The socialist left must find a way to project a popular socialist counter-narrative to capitalism in the here and now.” [David Finkel (a member of Solidarity’s National Committee), “Statement of Purpose.” eMERGE. Undated. Retrieved on September 13th, 2015.]
         “Politically, I am torn between the neo-Trotskyism of Solidarity and the semi-Anarchism of ZNet. I am not opposed to parties and governments, but still mostly pacifist and would want a socialist economy to allow for a great deal of personal autonomy. Basic Income Grants are appealing to me, if they could be the basis for each person operating their own business from their home, neighborhood coop, or commune, with local economic councils.” [Charley Earp, “Have you ever changed ideologies?” RevLeft. August 22nd, 2011. Retrieved on September 11th, 2015.]
         “They’re [the members of Solidarity are] multitendencied and allow factions within the organization. I believe a couple minuscule Trot [Trotskyist] sects dissolved into tendencies. I believe there is a Luxemburgist tendency. Supposably, there were/are a number of former anarchists who joined in mass after Love & Rage dissolved, but that might just be myth. They’re involved in a Left Refoundation/Regroupment conference with New York Study Group (the NY branch of Solidarity now?), Malcolm X Grassroots Movement, the League of Revolutionaries for a New America, Left Turn, and softer Maoist Freedom Road Socialist Organization (as opposed to the harder Maoist, Freedom Road Socialist Organization that puts out the Fight Back! newspaper and was raided by the FBI recently).” [Juan Conatz, “About the US leftist group Solidarity.” December 5th, 2013. Retrieved on September 11th, 2015.]
      3. the new communism (Slavoj Žižek, Alain Badiou, and others): They attempt to resurrect communism from its Marxist-Leninist past. To Žižek, a twenty-first communism involves the resuscitation of the commons, not a return to the revolutionary struggles of yesteryear. This new communism, sometimes called 21st–century communism, might be understood as a collection of academic approaches to left refoundation. The first quotation, while clearly written from an oppositional perspective, sets out the basic contours of the new communist framework.
         “A specter is haunting the academy—the specter of ‘new communism.’ A worldview recently the source of immense suffering and misery, and responsible for more deaths than fascism and Nazism, is mounting a comeback; a new form of left-wing totalitarianism that enjoys intellectual celebrity but aspires to political power.
         “The Slovenian cultural theorist Slavoj Žižek and the French philosopher and ex-Maoist Alain Badiou have become the leading proponents of this new school.… Among new communism’s most important English-language texts, all published in the last few years, are The Idea of Communism, edited by Costas Douzinas and Žižek, Badiou’s The Communist Hypothesis, and [Bruno] Bosteels’s The Actuality of Communism.”
         [Alan Johnson, “The New Communism: Resurrecting the Utopian Delusion.” World Affairs. Volume 175, number 1, May/June 2012. Pages 62-70.]
         “What really remains of the great ideological machinery of freedom, human rights, the West and its values? It all comes down to a simple negative statement that is as bald as it is flat and as naked as the day it was born: socialisms, which were the communist Idea’s only concrete forms, failed completely in the twentieth century. Even they have had to revert to capitalism and non-egalitarian dogma. That failure of the Idea leaves us with no choice, given the complex of the capitalist organization of production and the state parliamentary system. Like it or not, we have to consent to it for lack of choice.… As our ideologues admit, it is not as though relying on the greed of a few crooks and unbridled private property to run the state and the economy was the absolute Good. But it is the only possible way forward.” [Alain Badiou. The Communist Hypothesis. London and New York: Verso imprint of New Left Books. 2010. Pages 4-5.]
         “[Alain Badiou:] I believe four teachings that are equivalent to criteria can be deduced from his [Karl Marx’s] thinking. First of all, Marx developed an idea that was very important, indeed fundamental, in my opinion: according to him, communists aren’t ‘outsiders,’ they’re not a distinct or isolated historical and political component. On the contrary, they’re directly involved in a pre-existing general movement that they’ll later be responsible for directing.…
         “The basic concept is less that of leadership than of direction. Indeed, this is the second criterion: the bearers of the communist Idea are characterized by an ability to communicate what the next step is.…
         “The third criterion of communist organization is that it must follow an internationalist logic. Marx stressed this point heavily, and that’s why he created the First International. But once again, internationalism must not harden into a separate entity. Communists are internationalists, but they must be so right within the local processes of emancipation.… And finally, the fourth and last criterion, communists must defend a global strategic vision, subsumed by the Idea as I have presented it, and whose matrix is anti-capitalism.…
         “[Marcel Gauchet:] Like in the good old days! But tell me: do you really think today’s working classes are converting to this new communist program? …
         “[Alain Badiou:] Don’t be ironic.… When you see how loads of people – many of whom are involved in local struggles and organizations – come to hear us and interact productively with us, you should take that as a beginning, as yet very modest, no doubt, but real, of verification of what matters to me: the Idea and its development in reality.”
         [Alain Badiou and Marcel Gauchet. What Is To Be Done?: A Dialogue on Communism, Capitalism, and the Future of Democracy. Malden, Massachusetts: Polity Press. 2016. Pages 52-54.]
         “… to provide a vigorous subjective existence to the communist hypothesis is the task those of us gathered here today are attempting to accomplish in our own way. And it I insist, a thrilling task. By combining intellectual constructs, which are always global and universal, with experiments of fragments of truths, which are local and singular, yet universally transmittable, we can give new life to the communist hypothesis, or rather to the Idea of communism, in individual consciousnesses. We can usher in the third era of this Idea’s existence. We can, so we must.” [Alain Badiou. The Communist Hypothesis. London and New York: Verso imprint of New Left Books. 2010. Page 260.]
         “The general horizon of the era is communist. And this communism will have to be constructed on the basis of society’s self-organizing capacities, of processes for the generation and distribution of communitarian, self-managing wealth. But at this moment it is clear that this is not an immediate horizon, which centers on the conquest of equality, the redistribution of wealth, the broadening of rights. Equality is fundamental because it breaks a chain of five centuries of structural inequality; that is the aim at the time, as far as social forces allow us to go-not because we prescribe it to be thus but because that is what we see. Rather, we enter the movement with our expecting and desiring eyes set upon the communist horizon. But we were serious and objective, in the social sense of the term, by signaling the limits of the movement.” [Bruno Bostells, The Actuality of Communism. London and New York: Verso imprint of New Left Books. 2011. Page 227.]
         “One should be careful … [to avoid] a Kantian … [conception of] communism as a ‘regulative Idea,’ thereby resuscitating the spectre of an ‘ethical socialism’ with equality as its a priori norm-axiom. One should rather maintain the precise reference to a set of social antagonisms which generate the need for communism — [Karl] Marx’s good old notion of communism not as an ideal, but as a movement which reacts to actual social antagonisms, is still fully relevant. If we conceive communism as an ‘eternal Idea,’ this implies that the situation which generates it is no less eternal, that the antagonism to which communism reacts will always exist — and from here, it is only one small step to a ‘deconstructive’ reading of communism as a dream of presence, of abolishing all alienating re-presentation, a dream which thrives on its own impossibility.” [Slavoj Žižek, “How to Begin From the Beginning.” The Idea of Communism. Costas Douzinas and Slavoj Žižek, editors. London and New York: Verso imprint of New Left Books. 2010. Pages 209-226.]
         “[Karl] Marx always emphasized that the exchange between worker and capitalist is ‘just’ in the sense that workers (as a rule) get paid the full value of their labor-power as a commodity – there is no direct ‘exploitation’ here; that is, it is not that workers ‘are not paid the full value of the commodity they are selling to the capitalists.’ So while, in a market economy, I remain de facto dependent, this dependency is nonetheless ‘civilized,’ enacted in the form of a ‘free’ market exchange between me and other persons instead of the form of direct servitude or even physical coercion.” [Slavoj Žižek, “Answers without Questions.” The Idea of Communism. Volume 2. Slavoj Žižek, editor. London and New York: Verso imprint of New Left Books. 2013. Page 177-205.]
         “… it is not enough simply to remain faithful to the communist Idea; one has to locate within historical reality antagonisms which give this Idea a practical urgency. The only true question today is: do we endorse the predominant naturalization of capitalism, or does today’s global capitalism contain antagonisms which are sufficiently strong to prevent its indefinite reproduction? There are four such antagonisms: the looming threat of an ecological catastrophe; the inappropriateness of the notion of private property in relation to so-called ‘intellectual property’; the socioethical implications of new techno-scientific developments (especially in biogenetics); and, last but not least, the creation of new forms of apartheid, new Walls and slums.” [Slavoj Žižek. First as Tragedy, Then as Farce. London and New York: Verso imprint of New Left Books. 2009. Pages 90-91.]
         “The ‘hard real’ of the ‘logic of the capital’ is what is missing in the historicist universe of Cultural Studies, not only at the level of content (the analysis and critique of political economy), but also at the more formal level of the difference between historicism and historicity proper. Moishe Postone is among those rare theorists who pursue the ‘critique of political economy,’ with his attempt to rethink the actuality of [Karl] Marx in the conditions following the disintegration of the Communist regimes in 1990.” [Slavoj Žižek. Living in the End Times. London and New York: Verso imprint of New Left Books. 2011. Page 185.]
         “… ‘commons’ [include] the shared substance of our social being whose privatization is a violent act that should also be resisted with violent means, if necessary. These commons include those of culture, the immediately socialized forms of ‘cognitive’ capital (primarily language), and our means of communication and education.… ‘Commons’ also include the shared infrastructure of public transport, electricity, post, etc., and the commons of external nature threatened by pollution and exploitation (from oil to forests and natural habitat), as well as the commons of internal nature (the biogenetic inheritance of humanity). What all these struggles share is an awareness of the destructive potential—up to the self-annihilation of humanity itself—if the capitalist logic of enclosing these commons is allowed a free rein. It is this reference to ‘commons’—this substance of productivity that is neither private nor public—that justifies the resuscitation of the notion of Communism.” [Slavoj Žižek, “Nature and its Discontents.” SubStance. Issue 117, volume 37, number 3, 2008. Pages 37-72.]
         “… communism, for me, is not an answer. Communism is not the name of a solution but the name of a problem: the problem of the commons in all its dimensions – the commons of nature as the substance of our life, the problem of our biogenetic commons, the problem of our cultural commons (‘intellectual property’), and, last but not least, the problem of the commons as that universal space of humanity from which no one should be excluded. Whatever the solution might be, it will have to solve this problem. So what you are trying to capture with the common good is the name of a problem. This is communism for me. What will be the answer? I don’t know. Maybe we don’t have an answer. Maybe it will be a catastrophe. Maybe … I don’t know.” [Slavoj Žižek. Demanding the Impossible. Yong-june Park, editor. Malden, Massachusetts: Polity Press. 2013. Pages 21-22.]
         “It is … [a] reference to ‘commons’ which justifies the resuscitation of the notion of Communism: it enables us to see the progressing ‘enclosure’ of the commons as a process of proletarization of those who are thereby excluded from their own substance, a proletarization also points towards exploitation.” [Slavoj Žižek, “Descartes and the Post-Traumatic Subject.” Filozofski vestnik. Volume XXIX, number 2, 2008. Pages 9-29.]
         “Communism … may … be understood as Serge Halimi understands it (with reference to its Marxian roots) as a thoroughgoing critique in advance of capitalist globalization.” [Paul Thomas, “Communism.” Encyclopedia of Governance. Mark Bevir, editor. Thousand Oaks, California: SAGE Publications, Inc. 2007. Page 124]
         “According to [Slavoj] Žižek, since communism is an ‘eternal idea,’ it works as a Hegelian ‘concrete universality’: ‘it is eternal not in the sense of a series of abstract-universal features that may be applied everywhere, but in the sense that it has to be reinvented in each new historical situation.’ … I can sum up Žižek’s idea of communism by presenting the following four aspects of it.
         “The most important aspect (at the level of setting up the stage) is the question of fidelity to the idea of communism. It is not sufficient to evoke the idea of communism as an ideal …. [S]econdary antagonisms … are presented as the problems of the commons: the commons of culture, the commons of external nature, and the commons of internal nature. Note that from the perspective of the principle of contradiction, the commons is a negative category, while in the secondary antagonisms, the commons becomes a localized and positive category.… This brings us to the third aspect …. When [Karl] Marx defined communism as ‘the real movement which abolishes the present state of things,’ he had in mind that ‘bourgeois cannot exist without constantly revolutionising the instruments of production, and thereby the relations of production, and with them the whole relations of society.’ … This leads us to the fourth aspect …. [W]e should bravely move from the problem of the commons to a new conception of the state, and finally we must get rid of the unilateral connotation of mastery as an alienating force, in order to conceive of a notion of mastery that reveals, rather than sutures, what is common.
         [Agon Hamza, “A Plea for Žižekian Politics.” Repeating Žižek. Agon Hamza, editor. Durham, North Carolina: Duke University Press. 2015. Pages 242-256.]
         “… [The] daring reconfiguration of the Jacobin imaginary against the grain of insipid postmodern liberalism, however, loses ground when it collapses into grandstanding calls for a new communism, following primarily Alain Badiou’s directions. Here … [Slavoj] Žižek’s position is more nuanced, but at the same time confusing the deserved demolition of postmodern liberalism with a nostalgic invocation of the language of ‘lost causes’ – lost universals. The desire is right on mark; but the name of desire means a historical somersault.… But, of course, communism is not an eternal idea. (The very thought would make [Karl] Marx’s skeleton rattle.) It is a social-historical formation and, as such, a finite one, except for the added twist that it is a core element of modernity, a social-historical formation that has so far defied its finitude.” [Stathis Gourgouris, “Recoil from the Real? – Žižek out of Athens.” Psychoanalysis, Culture & Society. Volume 16, number 3, September 2011. Pages 281–290.]
         “Instead of a politics thought primarily in terms of resistance, playful and momentary aesthetic disruptions, the immediate specificity of local projects, and struggles for hegemony within a capitalist parliamentary setting, the communist horizon impresses upon us the necessity to abolish capitalism and to create global practices and institutions of egalitarian cooperation. The shift in perspective the communist horizon produces turns us away from the democratic milieu that has been the from of the loss of communism as a name for left aspiration and toward the reconfiguration of the components of political struggle—in other words, away from general inclusion, momentary calls for broad awareness, and lifestyle changes, and toward militant opposition, tight organizational forms (party, council, working group, cell), and the sovereignty of the people over the economy through which we produce and reproduce ourselves.” [Jodi Dean. The Communist Horizon. London and New York: Verso imprint of New Left Books. 2012. Pages 11-12.]
         “Whereas Proudhonism proclaimed the abolition of capital, albeit equating it with big capital and the evil of wage labour, as their goal, the new communists appear at best confused and at worst disingenuous when they take the name of a movement which aimed at the revolutionary transformation of capitalism but aimed explicitly at its preservation. At best the new communists seek to prevent the abolition of their own conditions of labour through neoliberal privatization, though here too they are inconsistent, saying on the one hand that ‘any attempt to privatize [intellect] becomes problematic’ thanks to its social character and, on the other, launching their philippics against the possibility. In fact, they need not have bothered. In reality the intellectual property rights regime which the West and particularly the United States have attempted to impose on the world ‘has not and could not change the nature of knowledge and the ways in which this can be transferred [or not] among economic agents’ ….” [Radhika Desai, “The new communists of the commons: Twenty-first-century Proudhonists.” International Critical Thought. Volume 1, issue 2, 2011. Pages 204-223.]
         “… [Slavoj] Žižek proposes a radicalization of the proletarian subject. He refers to the wider concept of ‘the commons’ that potentially includes all types of people coming from various perspectives of the lower classes who realize they share a common distinction: an imminent zero-point in which fundamental change will be inevitable. ‘The commons’ then supplant the simple dichotomy proposed by [Karl] Marx – that of the proletariat and the owners – and represents a ‘singular universality of the proletariat’ ….” [Douglas Reeser, “First as Tragedy, Then as Farce.” Review article. International Journal of Žižek Studies. Volume 4, number 1, 2010. Pages 1-5.]
      4. democratic communism for the twenty-first century (Alexander J. Means): He proposes a communist proposal for radical democracy and new communism.
         “I would argue that communism conceived only as anticapitalism detached from democratic values and aspirations cannot provide a solid ethical or theoretical foundation for reconstructing a transformative conception of common education today. The communist hypothesis does mark an important new willingness to open a broader discussion of emancipatory possibilities beyond capitalism without apology. However, for communism to become an inspirational historical force again, it would need to offer more than just an anticapitalist politics, but also different visions of life in common that are full of richness and meaning across all facets of human existence. Such alternative visions of common life can only emerge through educational processes of informed criticism, dialogue, collaboration, and dissent. Thus, in my view, the new communists would do well to think through how the traditions of radical-progressive education, as embodied by John Dewey, W. E. B Dubois, George Counts, Paulo Freire, bell hooks, and others, and its emphasis on human autonomy and democratic development could contribute in meaningful ways to imagining a democratic communism for the twenty-first century. Such a project also has the potential for enriching educational theory as well.” [Alexander J. Means, “Educational commons and the new radical democratic imaginary.” Critical Studies in Education. Volume 55, issue 2, 2014. Pages 122-137.]
      5. hermeneutic communism (Gianni Vattimo as pronounced in this MP3 audio file and Santiago Zabala as pronounced in this MP3 audio file): They discuss the problems and implications of a hermeneutic communism.
         “… communism must function as a ‘specter,’ that is, not as a political program that proposes more ‘rational’ ways for unfettered development (which were part of the agenda of scientific socialism) but rather as a movement that embraces the programmatic cause of ‘degrowth’ as the only way to save the human species. In this way, the function of the specter—which disturbs and shocks the serene routine of those who, as in the case of Hamlet, must reap the fruit of violence—is useful for shocking into awareness those who prefer not to recognize capitalism’s consequences. Leaving aside any metaphors, we believe that hermeneutic communism today, that is, a programmatically ‘weak’ communism, can hope for a different future only if it has the courage to act as a specter by refusing to follow capitalism’s emphasis on rational development. And if hermeneutic communism does not imply immediate violent revolutions, this is both because armed capitalism is impossible to defeat and because a violent acquisition of power would be socially counterproductive. After all, as the new South American governments have demonstrated, communist access to power may still take place within the framework of the formal rules of democracy.” [Gianni Vattimo and Santiago Zabala. Hermeneutic Communism: From Heidegger to Marx. New York: Columbia University Press. 2011. Page 121.]
      6. Organizing Upgrade: A forum for innovative progressive and left organizers.
         “In the aftermath of the defeat of the Paris Commune [Karl] Marx and [Friedrich] Engels had to reflect on that experience and question some of their own propositions. This level of both self-analysis and self-criticism has been repeated occasionally in Left circles, but more frequently the radical Left holds onto certain ideological assertions as basic canon rather than making a concrete and exhaustive analysis.
         “Addressing the crisis of socialism is our ‘post-Paris Commune’ moment, that is, we on the Left are called upon to assess the socialist experience in the 20ᵗʰ century rather than assessing one specific instance of the class struggle (as important as was that examination in the case of the Paris Commune or today in assessing the Arab democratic revolutions, the anti-austerity movements and Occupy). Several important theorists have begun doing this work, such as Samir Amin, Marta Harnecker and Michael Lebowitz, not to mention leaders in some of the parties and organizations noted earlier in this essay. For the remainder of this essay we will suggest a few propositions for further exploration as part of a process of Left renewal or refoundation.”
         [Bill Fletcher, “Marxism, the 21ˢᵗ Century and Social Transformation (Part 3).” Organizing Upgrade. October 24th, 2012. Retrieved on November 8th, 2015.]
         “Organizing Upgrade is a forum for innovative progressive and left organizers to engage in dialogue about big-picture political strategy.
         “We aim to promote a strategic approach to left organizing that is truly mass in character and that aims to win.
         “Towards that end, Organizing Upgrade hosts feature essays, strategy analysis, high-profile blogs, and news aggregation on today’s pressing issues and questions.
         “Initiated by Sushma Sheth, Harmony Goldberg and Joseph Phelan in 2009, Organizing Upgrade began by asking three key questions:
         • Current Conditions: What do you think are the most significant shifts happening right now, and how do they change the context of our work?
         • Strategic Priorities: What are the key interventions that community organizers should make in this moment? Are there particular contributions that left organizers should be making?
         • Changing Orientation: What are old strategies that organizers should turn away from? What new tools and ideas are you experimenting with?”
         [“About.” Organizing Upgrade. 2012. Retrieved on November 8th, 2015.]
      7. The League of Revolutionaries for a New America (LRNA): This movement is rooted in Marxist-Leninism.
         “The United States of America – indeed the entire world – is in the throes of epochal economic revolution.” [“Program.” The League of Revolutionaries for a New America. Undated. Retrieved on September 11th, 2015.]
         “Tens of thousands of socially conscious people declare themselves revolutionaries in opposition to the degenerating social and economic conditions. The League’s mission is to unite these scattered revolutionaries on the basis of the demands of the new class, to educate and win them over to the cooperative, communist resolution of the problem. The demands of this new impoverished class for food, housing, education, health care and an opportunity to contribute to society are summed up as the demand for a cooperative society. Such a society must be based on the public ownership of the socially necessary means of production and the distribution of the social product according to need.
         “The new class must have political power to achieve these goals. In the effort to achieve this political power the League supports all political organizations and sections of society that fight against the growing poverty, social and ecological destruction, fascism and war.”

         [“Program.” The League of Revolutionaries for a New America. Undated. Retrieved on September 11th, 2015.]

         “We don’t need a state that is the owner of all the means of production to guarantee their development. The state as we know it today will collapse almost immediately. We need a government that regulates things, but not people. [“Basic Curriculum 2.1.” LRNA Education. Undated. Retrieved on September 11th, 2015.]

         “LRNA [League of Revolutionaries for a New America] has its initial roots among individuals who quit or were expelled from the Communist Party USA in the mid-1950s. A group of these individuals involved themselves in the Provisional Organizing Committee to Reconstitute a Marxist-Leninist Party that formed in 1958 with mainly African American and Puerto Rican membership. This organization gradually disintegrated and in 1968, a small group expelled from the organization went on to found the California Communist League that became the Communist League in 1970. In 1974, the Communist League called for the formation of a Marxist-Leninist party called the Communist Labor Party that officially disbanded in 1993. Out of the disbanding of the Communist Labor Party emerged the National Organizing Committee and then the LRNA in 1995. The move from the Communist Labor Party to LRNA is directly related to the core members’ analysis of globalization ….” [John D. Holst, “Globalization and Education within Two Revolutionary Organizations in the United States of America: A Gramscian Analysis.” Adult Education Quarterly. Volume 55, number 1, November 2004. Pages 23-40.]
      8. Green Party US: They are a progressive political party focused on economic justice and environmental issues. They also nominate U.S. presidential candidates.
         “The Green Party of the United States is a federation of state Green Parties. Committed to environmentalism, non-violence, social justice and grassroots organizing, Greens are renewing democracy without the support of corporate donors. Greens provide real solutions for real problems. Whether the issue is universal health care, corporate globalization, alternative energy, election reform or decent, living wages for workers, Greens have the courage and independence necessary to take on the powerful corporate interests. The Federal Elections Commission recognizes the Green Party of the United States as the official Green Party National Committee. We are partners with the European Federation of Green Parties and the Federation of Green Parties of the Americas.…
         “We propose a vision of our common good that is advanced through an independent politics free from the control of corporations and big money, and through a democratic structure and process that empowers and reaches across lines of division to bring together our combined strengths as a people.”
         [Green National Committee, “Platform 2014: Green Party of the United States.” Green Party US. Pages 1-71.]
      9. The Greens/Green Party USA: This party does not nominate U.S. presidential candidates.
         “The Green Party USA calls for activists and Greens worldwide to join in solidarity against the illegal U.S. war on the people of Afghanistan. We have urged a ‘hands off’ policy in that region, but now we are disappointed to find some European Greens in government breaking solidarity and supporting our aggressor government against Green values. We urgently call on Die Gruenen, the German Green Party, to come home, to reverse their vote and withdraw from their government coalition supporting this war. The historic Green commitment to nonviolence means breaking the cycle of war and revenge, of patriarchal domination and corrupt corporate enclosure. We cannot, we will not trade the lives of thousands or millions of innocent civilians in the poorest countries, along with the destruction of entire ecosystems, to gain a few windmills at home and a seat at the table of Power. Their lives are not ours to trade. We must support peoples’ right to make the decisions that affect their own lives.…
         “The Green Party USA promotes the broad-based movement for sustainability and justice in our Ten Key Values: Grassroots Democracy, Ecological Wisdom, Social Justice and Equal Opportunity, Nonviolence, Decentralization, Community Based Economics, Feminism, Respect for Diversity, Personal and Global responsibility, Future Focus and Sustainability.”
         [Coordinating Committee, “Green Party USA Urges: Come Home to Peace.” The Greens/Green Party USA. January 13th, 2002.]
         “This [World Economic Forum] is the social arena in which the deals are made to poison the world’s air through the trade in pollution allowances, plow the world’s soil with genetically engineered crops that no sane person wants, privatize the world’s water supply, patent genetic sequences of the world’s plants and animals and privatize their reproduction in order to ‘own’ their offspring.” [Coordinating Committee, “Globalization & Its Discontents.” The Greens/Green Party USA. July 18th, 2002.]
         “The Green Party USA blasted Junior Bush’s administration for escalating the oil-pipeline global domination policies of Papa Bush as well as the Democrats, and denounced government plans for an all-out bombardment of Iraq. ‘The Green Party USA condemns this brazen act of lawlessness on the part of the US government which is in clear violation of the UN Charter and International Law,’ [Green Party USA spokesperson Mitchel] Cohen charged.” [Coordinating Committee, “No Blood For Oil – Stop the War Against Iraq.” The Greens/Green Party USA. January 29th, 2002.]
      10. Left Turn: The print publication, using this name, has been disbanded. However, Left Turn, minus the magazine, continues as a branch of the anti-capitalist wing of the global justice movement.
          “Left Turn is a [U.S.] national network of activists engaged in exposing and fighting the consequences of global capitalism and imperialism. Rooted in a variety of social movements, we are anti-capitalists, radical feminists, anti-racists, queer and trans- liberationists, and anti-imperialists working to build resistance and alternatives to corporate power and empire.” [“About Us.” Left Turn. Undated. Retrieved on September 11th, 2015.]
      11. U.S. Social Forum (USSF): It is a movement-building process focused on economic and ecological issues.
          “The US Social Forum (USSF) is a movement building process. It is not a conference but it is a space to come up with the peoples’ solutions to the economic and ecological crisis. The USSF is the next most important step in our struggle to build a powerful multi-racial, multi-sectoral, inter-generational, diverse, inclusive, internationalist movement that transforms this country and changes history.” [“About USFF.” U.S. Social Forum. 2015. Retrieved on September 12th, 2015.]
          “We, the organizers of the first United States Social Forum:
          “… Believe that there is a strategic need to unite the struggles of oppressed, exploited, and dispossessed communities and peoples, classes, and genders within the United States (particularly Black, Latino, Asian/Pacific Islander and Indigenous communities) to the struggles of marginalized, oppressed, and dispossessed peoples and classes around the world.
          “… Believe the USSF should place the highest priority on groups that are actually doing grassroots organizing with working class people and people of color, who are training organizers, building long term structures of resistance, and who can work well with other groups, seeing their participation in USSF as building the whole, not just their part of it.…
          “… Believe the USSF should link US-based youth organizers, activists, and cultural workers to the struggles of their brothers and sisters abroad, drawing common connections and exploring the deeper meanings of solidarity.…
          “… Believe that the USSF will help build national networks that will be better able to collaborate with international networks and movements.”
          [“What We Believe.” U.S. Social Forum. 2015. Retrieved on September 12th, 2015.]
      12. Anticapitalist Initiative: “The Anticapitalist Initiative brings people together to discuss, debate and take action for a better world.”
          “The Anticapitalist Initiative is a network that enables anti-capitalist activists to debate current political issues. Where possible it aims to unite these activists to fight against capitalism, for the interests of working people, the unemployed and the oppressed.
          “We were established to work towards a realignment on the radical left. We want to help develop a revolutionary organisation capable of rising to the challenges of the 21ˢᵗ century, one that can help popularise anticapitalism again after the defeats of the last century. This is all the more important at a time of capitalist crisis, when working class communities are suffering the effects of austerity, but the left wing ideas are still on the fringes. We want to overcome divisions between the socialist left and the new left movements by working together in a spirit of common activity and dialogue. We are not afraid of critical debate, but also don’t want to let dogmatism and sectarianism obstruct common action.
          “The organisation we want to build should should draw from the best elements across the radical traditions; the experience and ideas thrown up by struggles against racism, for women’s liberation, LGBT and disabled rights, and the intellectual legacies of all the radical political traditions. It will need to reappraise past differences undogmatically in light of new challenges. It will have to take care not to make the mistake of believing our new circumstances render obsolete the lessons of past struggles. And should equally be willing to learn from the numerous global struggles confronting all forms of social oppression and exploitation today. We want to see a process that ends in a left that is plural enough to allow differences to co-exist in the spirit of free and open debate, and united enough to develop a coherent revolutionary answer to a world in crisis.”
          [“About Us.” Anticapitalist Initiative. Undated. Retrieved on September 12th, 2015.]
      13. International Socialist Network (IS Network): It comes out of the Trotskyist Marxist tendency.
          “We thought it would be useful to write to you following our Politics Conference at which we passed a motion calling for ‘immediate discussions with the ACI [Anticapitalist Initiative] with a view to forming a new united organisation,’ explaining why we would like to pursue this and why we feel a united organisation is the right approach.
          “The IS Network is a new organisation, and our members are still in the process of coming together and thrashing out our views on many topics. While a majority of our members share the experience of having previously been members of the [UK Trotskyist] Socialist Workers Party (SWP) and see ourselves as more or less in the ‘International Socialist’ tradition, what we should do now and what that tradition means in 2013 are still very much open questions. We also have a number of new members who don’t have the same background of SWP membership, which demonstrates the appetite people have for a new kind of organisation….
          “Part of the reason they [other socialist groups] fail to come up with adequate analyses is each of them being wedded to their particular pieces of dogma, the things that mark them out from all the other groups on the revolutionary left, and which they cannot let go of for fear of losing their uniqueness, however out of date they become or however much they don’t match reality….
          “The IS Network is committed to a project of working with much wider groups of people, from a variety of different political backgrounds and traditions, and indeed people from no particular background or tradition. We want to test things out, see what is successful and what is less so. We think that our organisations contain enough diversity to mean that unity would boost the exchange of ideas, but enough of a common goal to make it constructive and worthwhile.”
          [“Open letter to members of the Anticapitalist Initiative.” October 29th, 2013. Retrieved on September 12th, 2015.]
      14. Left Unity: Socialist, anti-capitalist, feminist, environmentalist, anti-racist, and opposed to all forms of discrimination.
          “Left Unity stands for equality and justice. It is socialist, feminist, environmentalist, anti-racist and against all forms of discrimination. WE ARE SOCIALIST because our aim is to end capitalism. We will pursue a society where the meeting of human needs is paramount, not one which is driven by the quest for private profit and the enrichment of a few. We are in favour of a radical system where democratic control extends across the economy. The natural wealth, and the means of production, distribution and exchange should be owned in common and democratically run by and for the people as a whole, rather than being owned and controlled by a small minority to enrich themselves.
          “We are feminist because our vision of society is one without the gender oppression and exploitation which blights the lives of women and girls and makes full human emancipation impossible.
          “We are environmentalist because we recognise that if humankind is to survive, it has to establish a sustainable relationship with the rest of the natural world – an economy based on achieving maximum profits in the shortest possible time is destroying our planet.
          “We are anti-racist and opposed to all forms of discrimination. The current economic onslaught disproportionately affects already disadvantaged groups and we oppose their persecution and oppression. No society is just and equal while some people remain without the support needed to achieve their full potential.”
          [“Left Unity Manifesto 2015.” Left Unity. 2015. Retrieved on September 12th, 2015.]
      15. Socialist Resistance: Ecosocialist, feminist, anti-racist, revolutionary, and internationalist.
          “We need to start to discuss what kind of new organisation we want to build if the regroupment process is successful, as appears to be the case. The following are some comments on the general principles involved in this rather than trying to propose a detailed constitution at this stage, though we will have to have a constitution before we can create a new organisation.
          “The new organisation should be strongly committed to building Respect as its central project. Or more precisely it should be strongly committed to building a broad party of the left to tackle the crisis of working class representation – at this stage this means building Respect, but it could mean at a latter stage arguing that Respect should became a part of something bigger and broader which could do the job more effectively.”
          [Alan Thornett, “What Kind of New Organisation do we Need?” Socialist Resistance. June 13th, 2009. Retrieved on September 12th, 2015.]
      16. ecological integrative revolutionary communism: Charley Earp’s perspective on anti-capitalism, radical democracy, feminism, anti-racism, pacifism, environmentalism, sexual identity, and progressive religion.
          “… it can be suggested that at least six social movements are candidates for the new radical paradigm, namely, Marxism, anarchism, feminism, anti-racism, pacifism, and environmentalism. Since Marxism and anarchism are defined as exclusive theories that have unifying claims that will be evaluated during the second part of this essay, it is their more generic definitions – anti-capitalism and radical democracy, respectively – that will be considered….
          “The next step will be to consider these candidates for primary social movements – anti-capitalism, radical democracy, feminism, anti-racism, pacifism, environmentalism, sexual identity, and progressive religion – and propose their unification by either merging them into larger wholes or even a single unified whole.”
          [Charley Earp, “Dynamics of Radical Progress: Envisioning Revolutionary Global Change.” Radical Progress: Ecological Integrative Revolutionary Communism. February 3rd, 2010. Retrieved on September 12th, 2015.]
      17. Committees of Correspondence for Democracy and Socialism (CCDS): A U.S. nationwide movement with deep roots in many social movements.
          “… we are first of all committed to both democracy and socialism. In fact, the path to socialism in our time is largely one of winning battles for democracy in the here and now—in politics, in social and cultural life, and in the workplace and the economy. Nor does it stop there. A socialism of the 21ˢᵗ century will widen participation and public citizenship beyond even democracy’s best practices today. We are a unique group that is at once Marxist and pluralist. We use Marx’s analysis and method to understand economics and make political assessments, but we have many traditions and schools of thought within that context. Diversity is a strength fueling our creativity.” [“About Us.” Committees of Correspondence for Democracy and Socialism. 2015. Retrieved on September 14th, 2015.]
          “The Committees of Correspondence (CofC) is an organization of women and men of all ages who seek a society based on community, human equality, economic and social rights, and respect for the natural environment. We believe that a society of social justice is inseparable from a world in which relations between peoples are governed by the principles of peace and disarmament, economic development and the equality and sovereignty of nations, and striving to live in harmony with nature. We believe that to achieve such a society and world requires a joint struggle to democratically transform our present society, to end the existing vast inequalities of wealth, power and conditions. We welcome and join with all people involved in day-to-day efforts to enhance the quality of life. We view socialism as the struggle for democracy carried to its logical conclusion. We commit ourselves to an open dialogue with others about the way forward and to joint action on all shared goals. Toward these ends, we establish an organization based on openness, effective rule by membership, pluralism of opinion, mutual respect and support, and solidarity in the struggle for justice.” [“Bylaws.” Committees of Correspondence for Democracy and Socialism. 2015. Retrieved on September 14th, 2015.]
          “We’re looking for committed activists to fight for peace, equality, jobs and justice—all within the wider context of winning the battles for democracy and getting us to 21ˢᵗ century socialism.” [“Join CCDS!” CCDS-Discussion: Organizing for a Progressive Majority. 2015. Retrieved on September 14th, 2015.]
      18. LeftRoots: A U.S. national organization of left social movement organizers.
          “LeftRoots intends to help pave the way for the type of revolutionary organization in the U.S. that will successfully link diverse struggles into a common quest to bring about a system which achieves freedom, equality, and self-determination for all. For LeftRoots, this means a global social and economic system based on popular participation in politics, the economy, and democratically-planned production that is in balance with the planet’s regenerative capacities. We call this system ‘twenty-first century socialism.’ …
          “LeftRoots is non-sectarian and aims to draw from the best ideas and practices across Left revolutionary traditions: Marxist, Anarchist, Gramscian, Anti-authoritarian, Feminist, Revolutionary Nationalist, Indigenous along with others. We aim to build on the inspiring work of past social movements. While we are informed by the lessons and struggles of those who have come before us, LeftRoots recognizes that liberation and dogmatism do not go together. We live in unique conditions, and our struggles must be rooted in a sober assessment of our specific time, place, and conditions….
          “The development of capitalism and white supremacy in the U.S. are inseparable. White supremacy provided the logic that enabled chattel slavery – the primitive accumulation which enabled the birth of the capitalist class in the U.S.. White supremacy was created and used by the white ruling class to divide the oppressed classes by granting both material and psychological privileges to whites, while denying people of color basic human rights. We recognize the central role that race plays in both the development of and the survival of the capitalist system. We believe that fighting white supremacy will play a decisive role in defeating the ruling class in the U.S.”
          [“Why LeftRoots.” LeftRoots. 2013. Retrieved on September 14th, 2015.]
      19. Alternatives International: Creating new paradigms.
          “We are social and political movements struggling against social injustices, neoliberalism, imperialism and war. We are building solidarity between social movements at the local, national and international level. Our approach is both concrete (action-oriented) and intellectual (creating new paradigms).” [“About us.” Alternatives International. Undated. Retrieved on October 25th, 2015.]
      20. The North Star: They argue for a distinctively American left.
          “The North Star website was named after the newspaper that Frederick Douglass published from December 1849 to June 1851 in the belief that the American Left must adopt the symbols, language and traditions of our national experience rather than those of another time and another place. Frederick Douglass, Eugene V. Debs, Emma Goldman and Malcolm X—these are the people who lived and fought in the belly of the beast and who should inspire us.
          “For too long the Left has drawn upon the iconography of the Russian Revolution, including the hammer and sickle that was meaningful to the people who fought against Czarist oppression. It is also necessary for us to stop idealizing V.I. Lenin as if his writings can be mechanically applied to our own experience. Likewise we must avoid treating other such figures as if they had some special insights into the challenges we face, including Mao Zedong or Fidel Castro who fought guerrilla wars based on the peasantry. If we are to succeed in developing the leadership so urgently needed in our own struggle for a new and more just society, it will only be through the process of overcoming the obstacles that the American one percent puts in our path. We are in a highly advanced industrialized system and we have to employ means that are appropriate to our environment, especially the Internet.”
          [“About.” The North Star. 2016. Retrieved on July 15th, 2016.]
      21. Kasama Project: It is a neo-Maoist approach to regroupment.
          “The name Kasama: In Tagalog, a language of the Philippines, Kasama is the word for the companions who travel the road together – in this case, the revolutionary road.” [Editor, “What is the Kasama Project?” Kasama Project. Undated. Retrieved on September 5th, 2015.]
          “Over a long weekend this Fall, comrades of the Kasama Project from across the country gathered in the US south for a national conference, the first formal national gathering since our founding in 2008. With the goal of consolidating our project and strategizing a path forward for our work in the coming period, we adopted a new Political Unity statement, reflecting the understanding, experience, and unity forged over the half dozen years since our founding.
          “Over the course of a long pre-conference period and our four days together, comrades discussed our commitment, our work, our priorities, and our values, raising crucial points of criticism and self-criticism. We put special emphasis on continuing our mission of the creative regroupment of revolutionaries, and toward fusing our movement with the most advanced fighters among the people. We discussed how to investigate the state of the class struggle in the United States, and prioritized the importance of working with new generations of young potential revolutionaries.
          “Six years ago the Kasama Project agreed on this solitary brief statement: ‘Kasama is a communist project that, in theory and practice, fights for the forcible overthrow of all existing social conditions.’ And so our new statement, reproduced below, marks a significant new period for us as an organization of committed revolutionaries. It reflects the significant theoretical and ideological growth and unity among us that is the fruit of our work, study and discussion over the past few years.”
          [Editor, “‘This vision is not just a dream’: New Statement from the Kasama Project.” Kasama Project. March 2nd, 2015. Retrieved on July 15th, 2016.]
          “By communism we mean: the abolition of all class distinctions that divide humanity; the abolition of the capitalist relations of production on which those distinctions rest; the abolition of all the other oppressive social relations that mutually reinforce these relations of production; the revolutionary transformation of all the oppressive ideas and values that have arisen from, or are attached to, all of these oppressive social relations; and finally, the abolition of the political instrument of class domination, the state.” [Editor, “‘This vision is not just a dream’: New Statement from the Kasama Project.” Kasama Project. March 22nd, 2015.]
          “… a basic assessment of the Kasama project is that we have a need and an opportunity to do something very different. And that requires a break – both with [Bob] Avakian’s claims, but also with a deeper component of existing Maoism.” [Enzo Rhyner, J.B. Connors, John Steele, Kobayashi Maru, Mike Ely, Rita Stephan, and Rosa Harris. “Shaping the Kasama Project: Contributing to Revolution’s Long March.” Kasama Project. May, 2009. Page 5.]
          “… revolutionaries have a responsibility to have a plausible plan for making revolution. Obviously there are not enough revolutionaries to make a revolution at this moment. We can reasonably anticipate that the future will bring upsurges in popular opposition to the existing system. Without being any more specific about where those upsurges might occur it seems clear that it is from the ranks of such upsurges that the numbers of the revolutionary movement will be increased, eventually leading to a revolutionary situation (which is distinguished from the normal crises of the current order only by the existence of a revolutionary movement ready to push things further).” [Christopher Day. “The Historical Failure of Anarchism.” Kasama Project. July, 2009. Page 4.]
      22. Alliance for Global Justice: A little bit people’s thinktank, a whole lot of organizing.
          “We envision societies which explore and implement alternatives to the unjust domination of governments, global financial institutions and multinational corporations which denigrate the world’s peoples and devastate ecosystems. We envision the development of a unified domestic and international movement of transformational grassroots organizations that promote a socially, ecologically and economically just world.…
          “It is the mission of the Alliance for Global Justice to achieve social change and economic justice by helping to build a stronger more unified grassroots movement. We recognize that the concentration of wealth and power is the root cause of oppression requiring us to work together across ideologies, issues and communities. The Alliance nurtures organizations seeking fundamental change in international and national conditions that disempower people, create disparities in access to wealth and power, poison the earth, and plunder its resources.
          “We support locally-based grassroots organizing by sharing political analysis, mobilizing for direct action, monitoring the centers of corporate and government power, expanding channels of communication, and sharing skills and infrastructure. Our commitment to solidarity and to non-hierarchical democratic process enables us to respectfully listen and respond to each other within the movement.…
          “We identify four main areas of interwoven struggle for liberation from Empire and for a better, more beautiful world. These are the struggles:
          “For Economic Justice ….
          “Against US Militarism ….
          “For Real Democracy ….
          “For Ecological Integrity ….”
          [“Our Mission.” Alliance for Global Justice. 2013. Retrieved on October 25th, 2015.]
      23. Realcommunism (Ianko Stoianov [Russian Cyrillic, Ианко Стоянов, Ianko Stoânov as pronounced in this MP3 audio file]): He develops a new version of communism in which “Real” is adopted from Realpolitik (MP3 audio file).
          “Obviously, the new category of Realcommunism needs a definition. Here it is. Realcommunism bears only the positive meaning of the prefix ‘Real’ from the world-famous German category of Realpolitik. Like Realpolitik, Realcommunism means realistic, practical and actual for it is based on the real – not idealised, – human nature; it aims at political realism and pragmatic politics. However, unlike Realpolitik with its disgusting lack of ethical premises, Realcommunism aims at constituting a political order which expresses the highly ethical principles of free political communities.
          “It is well worth expanding the meaning of the German category Realpolitik to describe the politics of the dominating classes: aiming at possession of virtually unlimited power over all the other classes, their policies consider predominantly their own interests in dealing with the other classes. Realcommunism vigorously reject the egoistic and unethical Realpolitik of the dominating classes. It aims at radical overthrow of the elected dictatorship of the Big Bourgeoisie and Big Capital, in other words, it aims at radical overthrow of the capitalist state and reforming all ‘democratic’ institutions imposed by the Big Bourgeoisie with a view to defending and securing its total power over the political community. Realcommunism aims at advancement of the common good and establishing Real Direct Democracy – the rule of the sovereign People organised as a free political community of equals.”
          [Ianko Stoianov. The New Communist Manifesto. Seattle, Washington: Amazon.com. 2011. Kindle edition.]
      24. international revolutionary democratic communism: The Communist Party of Great Britain—which publishes the Weekly Worker—proposes a new anti–Stalinist approach to communism.
          “The world struggle for democracy, taking place in a combined and uneven way in different countries across the world, culminates in the replacement of global capitalism with world communism. This struggle can only be conducted successfully by the international working class whose advanced section organises itself into a world party which combines the revolutionary struggle for democracy with the aim of communism.
          “We recognise the unfortunate tendency for communists to identify themselves with the names of their favourite dead leaders, for example as Marxists, Leninists, Stalinists, Maoists and Trotskyists, etc. We agree to encourage the use of the term ‘international revolutionary democratic communism’ as the most scientific summary of the essential class politics of the working class. Critical assessment can and should be made of the contributions that leading theoretical and practical activists, beginning with [Karl] Marx and [Friedrich] Engels, have made to international revolutionary democratic communism.”
          [Steve Freeman, Moshé Machover, and Dave C. Spencer, “A New Tendency/Initiative.” New Interventions. Volume 13, number 1, spring 2009. Page 50.]
          “The party we must fight for is the world party. What is the scientific name for this? Of course, [Vladimir] Lenin spoke about Marxism. But he used the term ‘international revolutionary social democracy.’ This should be used in modified form. ‘Social’ refers to socialism. This should be replaced by ‘communism.’ Our aim is world communism or human liberation. In 1917 the Bolshevik Party changed its name to ‘Communist.’ We should follow that advance.
          “The words ‘revolutionary’ and ‘democracy’ are in the original. However, since the rise of Stalinism they take new significance. Stalinism destroyed democracy in the world communist movement and undermined or destroyed many democratic movements. Stalinist communism played a counterrevolutionary role. Any new world communist party must emphasise its revolutionary and democratic component. Real democracy is revolutionary. It requires a revolution to achieve it. International revolutionary democratic communism identifies the aims of the world party and the means of achieving it.
          “We must have no illusions in any idea of a British Marxist party. Building an independent national Marxist party is a dead end. National communism or communism in one country is impossible. It makes no more sense than a national communist party. Unfortunately ultra-leftism is liable to forget this in its urgent desire to launch a revolutionary party where it is. The error is voluntarism and the belief that we can do anything if we try hard enough.”
          [Editor, “Marxist party – an illusion.” Weekly Worker. Issue 647, November 2006. Online publication. No pagination.]
          “The term ‘communist’ is associated with Stalinism. Most parties bearing the name ‘communist’ are connected historically with [Joseph] Stalin’s USSR. We must differentiate ourselves by emphasising a new communism which is revolutionary democratic and internationalist. This takes us back to [Karl] Marx’s own politics.…
          “International revolutionary democratic communism can be used alongside ‘Marxism’ or simply ‘communism.’”
          [Editor, “What now for the Marxist Party campaign?” Weekly Worker. Issue 657, January 2007. Online publication. No pagination.]
          “What does a ‘revolutionary democratic attitude’ mean in practice? …
          “… the draft platform of the ‘Revolutionary Democratic Communist Tendency’ is fundamentally flawed as the programme of a revolutionary tendency.”
          [Ian Donovan, “Reply to ‘Draft Revolutionary Democratic Communism.’” Revolution and Truth (website). February, 1998. Online publication. No pagination. Retrieved on October 25th, 2016.]
   9. left anarchism (Pierre-Joseph Proudhon, Mikhail Alexandrovich Bakunin, Murray Bookchin, Rudolf Rocker, Jeff Shantz, Peter Kropotkin, Takis Fotopoulos, Karl Klien, Robert Paul Wolff, John Moore, Joe Peacott, Sébastien Faure, and many others): This section of the chapter features various anarchist approaches to communism and socialism. The original Greek word is a̓narchismós (Greek/Hellēniká, ἀναρχισμός, “anti–authoritarianism”).
      “Anarchism is a doctrine that aims at the liberation of peoples from political domination and economic exploitation by the encouragement of direct or non-governmental action. Historically, it has been linked to working-class activism, but its intellectual roots lie in the mid-nineteenth century, just prior to the era of mass organization. Europe was anarchism’s first geographical centre, and the early decades of the twentieth century marked the period of its greatest success. Yet the influence of anarchism has extended across the globe, from America to China; whilst anarchism virtually disappeared after 1939, when General Franco crushed the Spanish revolution to end the civil war, today it is again possible to talk about an anarchist movement or movements. The origins of contemporary anarchism can be traced to 1968 when, to the delight and surprise of activists – and disappointment and incredulity of critics – student rebellion put anarchism back on the political agenda. There is some dispute in anarchist circles about the character and composition of the late-twentieth and twenty-first-century anarchism and its relationship to the earlier twentieth-century movement. But all agree that anarchism has been revived and there is some optimism that anarchist ideas are again exercising a real influence in contemporary politics. This influence is detectable in numerous campaigns – from highly publicized protests against animal vivisection, millitarization and nuclear arms, to less well-known programmes for urban renewal, the development of alternative media, free education, radical democracy and co-operative labour. Anarchist ideas have also made themselves felt in the anti-capitalist, anti-globalization movement – sometimes dubbed by activists as the pro-globlization movement or the movement for globalization from below.” [Ruth Kinna. Anarchism: A Beginner’s Guide. Oxford, England: Oneworld Publications. 2005. Pages 2-3.]
      “Not only Anarchism, but any other real revolutionary movement is dragged into some forms of Nihilism. This understandably occurs especially in the formative stages as well as sometimes in the declining, depressive stages. Who can deny the historical importance of the wrecking of machinery by the Luddites (though today we are so clever that we tell them what they should have done instead)? There is no doubt that the assassination of czars and Russian governors effected, if nothing else, different treatment of political ‘criminals’—something which still has not been achieved in the ‘free’ United States. Without denying the truly revolutionary character of the Palestinian commandos, their newest weapon, hijacking, is surely an aberration in their struggle for recognition But the taking of hostages is nothing new in revolutionary history. The Paris Commune did it, as well as such partisans as the Titoists in Yugoslavia, the Maquis in France, and, before them, the Max-Hoelz Brigade in Weimar Germany.” [William Powell. The Anarchist Cookbook. New York: Barricade Books Inc. 1971. Page 10.]
      “There are many popular misconceptions about anarchism, and because of them a great many people dismiss anarchists and anarchism out of hand.
      “Misconceptions abound in the mass media, where the term ‘anarchy’ is commonly used as a synonym for ‘chaos,’ and where terrorists, no matter what their political beliefs or affiliations, are often referred to as ‘anarchists.’ As well, when anarchism is mentioned, it’s invariably presented as merely a particularly mindless form of youthful rebellion. These misconceptions are, of course, also widespread in the general public, which by and large allows the corporate media to do what passes for its thinking.”
      [Keith McHenry with Chaz Bufe. The Anarchist Cookbook. Tucson, Arizona: See Sharp Press LLC. 2015. Page 1.]
      1. mutualism or communal anarchism (Pierre-Joseph Proudhon as pronounced in this MP3 audio file): This approach synthesizes a market with aspects of communism.
         “Under this system [private property] the poor and the rich distrust, and make war upon, each other. But what is the object of the war? Property. So that property is necessarily accompanied by war upon property. The liberty and security of the rich do not suffer from the liberty and security of the poor; far from that, they mutually strengthen and sustain each other. The rich man’s right of property, on the contrary, has to be continually defended against the poor man’s desire for property. What a contradiction!” [Pierre-Joseph Proudhon. What is Property. Benj. R. Tucker, translator. Princeton, Massachusetts: Benj. R. Tucker. 1876. Page 48.]
         “To the true economist, society is a living being, endowed with an intelligence and an activity of its own, governed by special laws discoverable by observation alone, and whose existence is manifested, not under a material aspect, but by the close concert and mutual interdependence of all its members. Therefore, when a few pages back, adopting the allegorical method, we used a fabulous god as a symbol of society, our language in reality was not in the least metaphorical: we only gave a name to the social being, an organic and synthetic unit.” [Pierre-Joseph Proudhon. System of Economical Contraditions: or, the Philosophy of Misery. Benj. R. Tucker, translator. Boston, Massachusetts: Benj. R. Tucker. 1888. Page 114.]
      2. collectivist anarchism or anarcho–collectivism (Mikhail Alexandrovich Bakunin [Russian Cyrillic, Михаил Александрович Бакунин, Mihail Aleksandrovič Bakunin as pronounced in this MP3 audio file] and others): This approach originated following a dispute between Bakunin and Karl Marx.
         “What is authority? Is it the inevitable power of the natural laws which manifest themselves in the necessary concatenation and succession of phenomena in the physical and social worlds? Indeed, against these laws revolt is not only forbidden—it is even impossible. We may misunderstand them or not know them at all, but we cannot disobey them; because they constitute the basis and fundamental conditions of our existence; they envelop us, penetrate us, regulate all our movements, thoughts, and acts; even when we believe that we disobey them, we only show their omnipotence.
         “Yes, we are absolutely the slaves of these laws. But in such slavery there is no humiliation, or, rather, it is not slavery at all. For slavery supposes an external master, a legislator outside of him whom he commands, while these laws are not outside of us; they are inherent in us; they constitute our being, our whole being, physically, intellectually, and morally: we live, we breathe, we act, we think, we wish only through these laws. Without them we are nothing, we are not. Whence, then, could we derive the power and the wish to rebel against them?”
         [Mikhail Bakunin. God and the State. Benjamin R. Tucker, translator. New York: Dover Publications, Inc. 1970. Pages 28-29.]
      3. social ecology (Murray Bookchin): His anarchistic critical social theory of ecology is grounded in a dialectical naturalism. The Institute for Social Ecology focuses upon this radically democratic approach developed by Bookchin.
         “Decentralization entered city planning as a mere strategem for community design, while alternative technology became a narrow discipline, increasingly confined to the academy and to a new breed of technocrats. In turn, each notion became divorced from a critical analysis of society-from a radical theory of social ecology.” [Murray Bookchin. The Ecology of Freedom: The Emergence and Dissolution of Hierarchy. Palo Alto, California: Cheshire Books. 1982. Pages 2-3.]
         “… let us frankly acknowledge that organic societies spontaneously evolved values that we rarely can improve. The crucial distinction in radical theory between the ‘realm of necessity’ and the ‘realm of freedom’—a distinction that [Pierre-Joseph] Proudhon and [Karl] Marx alike brought to radical ideology—is actually a social ideology that emerges along with rule and exploitation. Viewed against the broad tableau of class ideologies, few distinctions have done more than this one to validate authority and domination.” [Murray Bookchin. The Ecology of Freedom: The Emergence and Dissolution of Hierarchy. Palo Alto, California: Cheshire Books. 1982. Page 319.]
         “English socialism today is riddled by movements or tendencies that emphasize the locality rather than the nation-state, a new ‘local socialism’ from which there is much to be learned. In any case, it is only on the local level – in the village, town, city, or neighborhood – that a new politics can be developed, one which brings together all of these ‘forces’ as a form of ecological politics. Here, in municipalities, where people live out their lives in the most immediate and personal sense, we find the locus of real popular power. This public sphere provides the existential arena that makes for citizenship in an active sense. Social ecology brings all of these threads together in its opposition to hierarchy and domination as a critical theory and its emphasis on participation and differentiation as a reconstructive theory.” [Murray Bookchin. Post-Scarcity Anarchism. Second edition. Buffalo, New York: Black Rose Books. 1986. Pages 42-43.]
         “As a dialectician in the tradition of Aristotle, [Georg Wilhelm Friedrich] Hegel, and [Karl] Marx, [Murray] Bookchin breaks with all static and essentialist views of reality. Bookchin not only analyzes reality in terms of its developmental possibilities, he also shows how opposites are interdependent, and he tries to effect a synthesis between the opposed terms. Similar to Marx, Bookchin rejects Hegel’s idealist definition of dialectics, but he also refuses [Friedrich] Engels’s crude mechanistic reading of nature and what he takes to be Marx’s own antiecological views. Bookchin finds Marx’s materialist recasting of dialectics inadequate insofar as it fails to break from the Western ideology of the natural world as something inert, cruel, and stingy, as the realm of necessity rather than freedom, as the Other of the human world to be subdued and conquered. Unlike any of these theorists, Bookchin seeks to ecologize the dialectical method and to unify the study of natural and social worlds in a comprehensive theory that sees human beings and the natural world as potentially complementary, not antagonistic, partners in evolution.
         “Bookchin’s theory of dialectical naturalism interprets nature, society, and the human individual as dynamic processes that constantly change. Bookchin identifies a coherence to the entire process of evolution, and he rejects nominalistic postmodem theories that see history as nothing but random events.”
         [Steven Best, “Murray Bookchin’s Theory of Social Ecology.” Organization & Environment. Volume 11, number 3, September 1998. Pages 334-353.]
         “In the 1970s Murray Bookchin’s Post-Scarcity Anarchism argued that the ‘affinity group’ could be regarded as ‘a new type of extended family, in which kinship ties are replaced by deeply empathetic human relationships—relationships nourished by common revolutionary ideas and practice.’ In the context of an affinity-group encounter, ‘class’ perhaps evokes something meaningful principally in terms of a class-conscious ruling elite. The rest of us, those who do not rule, are an assorted and fragmented layering of disparate people who are neither conscious of class nor motivated to act in its name.” [Andy Merrifield, “Crowd Politics.” New Left Review. Series II, number 71, September–October 2011. Pages 103-114.]
         “One of the most significant methodological contributions of social ecological research has been the development of standardized scales to measure the psychosocial attributes of different environments …. From the use of these instruments in a variety of settings (e. g., dormitories, classrooms, offices, hospitals), three categories of environmental attributes have been delineated: relationship dimensions, personal development dimensions, and system maintenance dimensions. These categories provide the basis for evaluating behavior settings along standardized dimensions, and for relating the obtained environmental profiles to psychological, social, and physical conditions within the setting.” [Arnold Binder, Daniel Stokols, Ralph Catalano, “Social Ecology: An Emerging Multidiscipline.” The Journal of Environmental Education. Volume 7, number 2, 1975. Pages 32-43.]
      4. libertarian municipalism (Murray Bookchin): Bookchin extends his social ecology by proposing a non–state union of democratic and civil local assemblies.
         “Libertarian municipalism represents a serious, indeed a historically fundamental project, to render politics ethical in character and grassroots in organization. It is structurally and morally different from other grassroots efforts, not merely rhetorically different. It seeks to reclaim the public sphere for the exercise of authentic citizenship while breaking away from the bleak cycle of parliamentarism and its mystification of the ‘party’ mechanism as a means for public representation. In these respects, libertarian municipalism is not merely a ‘political strategy.’ It is an effort to work from latent or incipient democratic possibilities toward a radically new configuration of society itself—a communitarian society oriented toward meeting human needs, responding to ecological imperatives, and developing a new ethics based on sharing and cooperation. That it involves a consistently independent form of politics is a truism. More important, it involves a redefinition of politics, a return to the word’s original Greek meaning as the management of the community or polis by means of direct face-to-face assemblies of the people in the formulation of public policy and based on an ethics of complementarily and solidarity.
         “In this respect, libertarian municipalism is not one of many pluralistic techniques that is intended to achieve a vague and undefined social goal. Democratic to its core and nonhierarchical in its structure, it is a kind of human destiny, not merely one of an assortment of political tools or strategies that can be adopted and discarded with the aim of achieving power. Libertarian municipalism, in effect, seeks to define the institutional contours of a new society even as it advances the practical message of a radically new politics for our day.…
         “Moreover, libertarian municipalism also involves a clear delineation of the social realm — as well as the political realm — in the strict meaning of the term social: notably, the arena in which we live our private lives and engage in production. As such, the social realm is to be distinguished from both the political and the statist realms. Enormous mischief has been caused by the interchangeable use of these terms — social, political, and the state. Indeed, the tendency has been to identify them with one another in our thinking and in the reality of everyday life. But the state is a completely alien formation, a thorn in the side of human development, an exogenous entity that has incessantly encroached on the social and political realms. Often, in fact, the state has been an end in itself, as witness the rise of Asian empires, ancient imperial Rome, and the totalitarian state of modern times. More than this, it has steadily invaded the political domain, which, for all its past shortcomings, had empowered communities, social groupings, and individuals.”
         [Murray Bookchin. Libertarian Municipalism: An Overview. Berkeley, California: The Anarchist Library imprint of Open Guild Organization. 1991. Pages 3-4.]
         “Any self-managed community, however, that tries to live in isolation and develop self-sufficiency risks the danger of becoming parochial, even racist. Hence the need to extend the ecological politics of a direct democracy into confederations of ecocommunities, and to foster a healthy interdependence, rather than an introverted, stultifying independence. Social ecology would be obliged to embody its ethics in a politics of libertarian municipalism, in which municipalities conjointly gain rights to self-governance through networks of confederal councils, to which towns and cities would be expected to send their mandated, recallable delegates to adjust differences. All decisions would have to be ratified by a majority of the popular assemblies of the confederated towns and cities. This institutional process could be initiated in the neighborhoods of giant cities as well as in networks of small towns. In fact, the formation of numerous ‘town halls’ has already repeatedly been proposed in cities as large as New York and Paris, only to be defeated by well-organized elitist groups that sought to centralize power rather than allow its decentralization.” [Murray Bookchin. Social Ecology and Communalism. Oakland, California: AK Press. 2006. Pages 49-50.]
         “Libertarian municipalism is one of many political theories that concern themselves with the principles and practices of democracy. In contrast to most such theories, however, it does not accept the conventional notion that the State and governmental systems typical of Western countries today are truly democracies. On the contrary, it considers them republican States with pretensions of being democratic. Republican States, to be sure, are more ‘democratic’ than other kinds of States, like monarchies and dictatorships, in that they contain various kinds of representative institutions.
         “But they are nonetheless States—overarching structures of domination in which a few people rule over the great mqiority. A State, by its very nature, is structurally and professionally separated from the general population—in fact it is set over and above ordinary men and women. It exercises power over them, making decisions that affect their lives. Its power in the last instance rests on violence, over whose legal use the State has a monopoly, in the form of its armies and police forces. In a structure where power is distributed so unevenly, democracy is impossible. Far from embodying rule by the people, even a republican State is incompatible with popular rule.
         “Libertarian municipalism advances a kind of democracy, by contrast that is no mere fig leaf for State rule. The democracy it advances is direct democracy—in which citizens in communities manage their own affairs through face-to-face processes of deliberation and decision-making, rather than have the State do it for them.”
         [Janet Biehl with Murray Bookchin. The Politics of Social Ecology: Libertarian Municipalism. Montreal, New York, and London: Black Rose Books. 1998. Page 1.]
      5. spontaneity and organization (Murray Bookchin): He examines the dialectical relations between these two dimensions of libertarian communism.
         “It is in the light of … demands for a society based on self-management, achieved through self-activity and nourished by self-consciousness, that we must examine the relationship of spontaneity to organisation.…
         “Today it is not a question of whether spontaneity is ‘good’ or ‘bad,’ ‘desirable’ or ‘undesirable.’ Spontaneity is integrally part of the very dialectic of self-consciousness and self-de-alienation that removes the subjective fetters established by the present order. To deny the validity of spontaneity is to deny the most liberatory dialectic that is occurring today; as such, for us it must be a given that exists in its own right.
         “The term should be defined lest its content disappear in semantic quibbling. Spontaneity is not mere impulse, certainly not in its most advanced and truly human form, and this is the only form that is worth discussing. Nor does spontaneity imply undeliberated behaviour and feeling. Spontaneity is behaviour, feeling and thought that is free of external constraint, of imposed restriction. It is self-controlled, internally controlled, behaviour, feeling, and thought, not an uncontrolled effluvium of passion and action. From the libertarian communist viewpoint, spontaneity implies a capacity in the individual to impose self-discipline and to formulate sound guidelines for social action.…
         “Spontaneity does not preclude organisation and structure. To the contrary, spontaneity ordinarily yields non-hierarchical forms of organisation, forms that are truly organic, self-created, and based on voluntarism.…
         “We are beginning to see that spontaneity yields its own liberated forms of social organisation. The tragedy of the socialist movement is that it opposes organisation to spontaneity and tries to assimilate the social process to political and organisational instrumentalism.”
         [Murray Bookchin, “On spontaneity and organisation.” Anarchos. Number 4, 1972. No pagination.]
      6. anarcho–syndicalism (Rudolf Rocker as pronounced in this MP3 audio file, Michael Schmidt, Noam Chomsky, and others): This tendency focuses on industrial unionism (“syndicates”) as an organizational approach for overthrowing capitalism.
         “Anarcho-Syndicalists are of the opinion that political parties, even when they bear a Socialist name, are not fitted to perform either of these two tasks. The mere fact that, even in those countries where political Socialism commanded powerful organizations and had millions of voters behind it, the workers had never been able to dispense with trade unions, because legislation offered them no protection in their struggle for daily bread, testifies to this. It frequently happened that in just those sections of the country where the Socialist parties were strongest the wages of workers were lowest and the conditions of labour worst. That was the case, for example, in the northem industrial districts of France, where Socialists were in the majority in numerous city administrations, and in Saxony and Silesia, where throughout its existence German Social Democracy had been able to show a large following.” [Rudolf Rocker. Anarcho-Syndicalism. Alexander Berkman and Ray E. Chase, translators. London: Pluto Press. 1989. Pages 86-87.]
         “First and foremost: the historical record shows that anarchism and its primary mass-organisational strategy, syndicalism, are a remarkably coherent and universalist set of theories and practices, despite the movement grappling with an immensely diverse set of circumstances. From the establishment of the first non-White unions in South Africa and the first unions in China, through the resistance to fascism in Germany, Italy, Eastern Europe and the Southern Cone of Latin America—to the establishment of practical anarchist control of cities and regions, sometimes ephemeral, sometimes longer—lived.…
         “In sum, the lessons for anarchists and syndicalists is that the movement always was, and remains, universally ideologically and ethically coherent because of its implacable engagements with the abuse of power at all levels—from the domestic home to the empire—in all, intersectional, circumstances: gender, race, colour, creed, sexuality, ability and so on.”
         [Michael Schmidt, “A Map Towards Revolution: An Interview with Michael Schmidt.” Imminent Rebellion. Number 13, 2014. Pages 56-64.]
         “… within the French, Italian and Spanish syndicalist movements anarchists or so-called ‘anarcho-syndicalists’ were able to gain significant, albeit variable, influence. They were to be responsible in part for the respective movements’ rejection of political parties, elections and parliament in favour of direct action by the unions, as well as their conception of a future society in which, instead of a political state apparatus, the only form of government would be the economic administration of industry exercised directly by the workers themselves. Other features of the syndicalist movements in these three countries, such as federalism, anti-clericalism and anti-militarism, were also profoundly influenced by specifically anarchist ideas and organisation.” [Ralph Darlington, “Syndicalism and the influence of anarchism in France, Italy and Spain.” Anarchist Studies. Volume 17, number 2, autumn–winter 2009. Pages 29-54.]
         “I should say to begin with that the term anarchism is used to cover quite a range of political ideas, but I would prefer to think of it as the libertarian left, and from that point of view anarchism can be conceived as a kind of voluntary socialism, that is, as libertarian socialist or anarcho-syndicalist or communist anarchist, in the tradition of say [Mikhail] Bakunin and [Peter] Kropotkin and others. They had in mind a highly organized form of society, but a society that was organized on the basis of organic units, organic communities. And generally they meant by that the workplace and the neighborhood, and from those two basic units there could derive through federal arrangements a highly integrated kind of social organization, which might be national or even international in scope. And the decisions could be made over a substantial range, but by delegates who are always part of [he organic community from which they come, to which they return and in which, in fact, they live.” [Noam Chomsky, “The Relevance of Anarcho-Syndicalism.” Chomsky on Anarchism. Barry Pateman, editor. Oakland, California: AK Press. 2005. Pages 133-148.]
         “Anarchosyndicalists sought, even under capitalism, to create ‘free associations of free producers’ that would engage in militant struggle and prepare to take over the organization of production on a democratic basis. These associations would serve as ‘a practical school of anarchism.’ If private ownership of the means of production is, in [Pierre-Joseph] Proudhon’s often quoted phrase, merely a form of ‘theft’—‘the exploitation of the weak by the strong’—control of production by a state bureaucracy, no matter how benevolent its intentions, also does not create the conditions under which labor, manual and intellectual, can become the highest want in life. Both, then, must be overcome.” [Noam Chomsky. On Anarchism. New York and London: The New Press. 2013. Page 11.]
         “Once the revolution was underway propaganda for construction would have to take over from demands for destruction if anarchism was to have any influence at all. This necessitated clearly distinguishing between individualism and communism. However at the same time there arose – for non-individualists the question of tactics and strategies in an ongoing revolution. This led to a clear separation between the anarcho-communists with their focus on the problem of organising the consumption of the ‘masses,’ and the Syndicalists with their focus on the problems of the revolutionary fighting and post-revolutionary productive organisation of the ‘workers.’ Anarchocommunism, lacking any clear tactical or strategic bases, then split between simple armed opposition to everything ‘statist’ and collaboration with (and subordination to) the bolshevik party. Anarchosyndicalism, more coherent in its organisational, tactical and post-revolutionary ideas than the other variants, also faced problems with the emergence of the factory committees which had no place in the original syndicalist scheme of things, but these problems were at least surmountable within its own universe of ideas. Despite this syndicalism was born and fated to remain a minority tendency in a trade union movement dominated by Mensheviks and a factory committee movement with strong links to the bolsheviks.” [G. P. Maximoff. Constructive Anarchism: The development of anarcho-syndicalist ideas on working class organisation and the revolutionary struggle for the libertarian reconstruction of society, from the 1st International to the 1930’s. A defence of Anarcho-syndicalism against ‘Platformism’ and ‘Synthetical’ anarchism. Ada Siegel, translator. Sydney, Australia: Monty Miller Press. 1988. Page 3.]
      7. green syndicalism (Jeff Shantz): This approach fuses anarcho–syndicalism with ecology.
         “The greening of syndicalist discourses and practices is significant not only in offering practical examples of rank-and-file organizing and alliance building between union members and environmental activists. It also raises a number of interesting possibilities and questions regarding anarcho-syndicalism and ecology, indeed questions about the possibilities for a radical convergence of social movement organizing. While most attempts to form labor and environmental alliances have pursued Marxist approaches, more compelling solutions might be expected from anarchists and libertarian socialists. Numerous others … suggest that Greens should pay more attention to anarcho-syndicalist ideas, though few of these authors have examined green syndicalism in any detail.” [Jeff Shantz. Green Syndicalism: An Alternative Red/Green Vision. Syracuse, New York: Syracuse University Press. 2012. Page 102.]
         “Significantly, green syndicalists reject the productivist premises of ‘oldstyle’ Marxists who often viewed issues such as ecology as external to questions of production, distracting from the task of organizing workers at the point of production. Within green syndicalist perspectives, ecological concerns cannot properly be divorced from questions of production or economics. Rather than representing ‘separate discursive universes,’ nature, producers or workplace become understood as endlessly contested features in an always-shifting terrain. Furthermore these contests, both over materiality and over meanings, contradict notions of unitary responses. Green syndicalists thus stress the mutuality and interaction of what had been discursively separated – nature, culture, workers ….” [Jeff Shantz, “Radical Ecology and Class Struggle: A Re-Consideration.” Critical Sociology. Volume 30, issue 3, May 2004. Pages 691-710.]
         “In order to appreciate the context from which a green syndicalist discourse could take the stage, it is helpful to mention something of each company’s background. Georgia Pacific, the only unionised timber company in the region lowered wages by 25% in 1986, claiming a need to modernise the mill in order to remain competitive. The notoriously compliant International Woodworkers of America (IWA), the workers’ union, agreed to the cuts in exchange for a promise to restore wages in the next contract. The modernisation resulted in the elimination of jobs in addition to the lowered wages, but G-P [Georgia Pacific] was rewarded with record profits. When the new contract came up for negotiation in 1989 the company treated workers to a wage increase of 3%. Angered by what they understood as a clear act of betrayal mill-workers overwhelmingly voted to strike. The IWA, however, used the assistance of a federal labour mediator to challenge the vote on the grounds that a strike would result in the loss of jobs.” [Jeff Shantz, “Ecology and Class: The Green Syndicalism of IWW/Earth First Local 1.” The International Journal of Sociology and Social Policy. Volume 19, number 7/8, 1999. Pages 43-72.]
         “Green Syndicalists argue for the construction of ‘place’ around the contours of geographical regions, in opposition to the boundaries of nation-states which show not only contempt for ecological boundaries as marked by topography, climate, species distribution or drainage. Affinity with bioregionalist themes is recognised in green syndicalist appeals for a replacement of nation-states with decentralised federations of bioregional communites …. For green syndicalism such communities might constitute social relations in an articulation with local ecological requirements to the exclusion [of] the bureaucratic, hierarchical interference of distant corporatist bodies.” [Jeff Shantz, “Green Syndicalism: An Alternative Red-Green Vision.” Environmental Politics. Volume 11, number 4, winter 2002. Pages 21-41.]
         “Green syndicalists are revolutionaries who view their efforts as laying the groundwork necessary to replace state and capital with decentralized federations of bioregional communities …. In doing so, green syndicalists argue for the construction of ‘place’ around the contours of geographical regions, in opposition to the boundaries of nation-states which show only contempt for ecological boundaries as marked by topography, climate, species distribution or drainage. Affinity with bioregionalist themes is recognized in green syndicalist appeals for a replacement of nation-states with bioregional communities. For green syndicalism such communities might constitute social relations in view of local ecological requirements and to the exclusion of the bureaucratic, hierarchical interference of distant corporatist bo dies. Local community becomes the context of social and ecological identification.” [Jeff Shantz, “Solidarity in the Woods: Redwood Summer and Alliances Among Radical Ecology and Timber Workers.” Environments. Volume 30, number 3, December 2002. Pages 79-93.]
      8. radical criminology (Jeff Shantz, Herman Schwendinger, and others): The radical criminology of Jeff Shantz and many other writers, which develops an anarchist approach, opposes state violence, state-corporate crime, the growth of surveillance regimes, and the prison-industrial complex.
         “Radical criminology must be anti-statist and anti-capitalist. It must not succumb to the myth, as libertarians do, that there is an opposition between capitalism and the state. The emergence, development, and continuance of capitalism have been entirely facilitated by state practices. Indeed, capitalism is unimaginable without the state. The expropriation of land, enclosure of commons, defense of privatized property, and repression of peasant and working class opposition—the very foundations of capitalism—are all acts of the state. Without the repressive apparatuses of the state, capitalism would quickly collapse. The idea that the state and capitalist market are oppositional forces is falsity that serves only to distort history and confuse matters.
         “Capitalism is founded on the dual mechanisms of force and law. Criminal justice systems deploy legal means to sanction the forced theft of land and labor.
         “Legislative and material violence are the twin foundations of criminal justice systems. From the Enclosure Acts in England and the military violence used to impose them through the legislative foundations of slavery, colonialism, and genocide to the anti-panhandling and poor laws and social cleansing of today, these dual features are deployed against poor and working class communities (often on racialized terms)….
         “… Criminal justice systems are themselves profit maximizing machines. The manner of their profit-making is the processing and punishment of the poor. Without the criminalization of the poor—as poor—criminal justice systems in Western liberal democracies would collapse or wither on the vine. In Canada, around 10% of the population live under the poverty line (even more are actually poor). Yet, the poor make up nearly 100% of incarcerated people.
         “Policing is primarily a racket for soft crime mining. They pan for crime in poor neighborhoods (typically after instigating or stoking moral panics to criminalize harmless activities like squeegeeing or panhandling from which they can then profit by pursuing) to keep arrest rates and crime stats higher and thus justify appeals for greater spending on their services.
         “And the cost of policing in times of austerity, which is no small expense, shows the hypocrisy of governments that claim tight budgets and limited funding for social services. In Vancouver, for example, the police account for around 21% of the City budget. This expense is rising and politically untouchable as far as possible cuts are concerned.
         [Jeff Shantz, “Radical Criminology: A Manifesto.” Radical Criminology. Issue 1, November 2012. Pages 7-17.]
         “Shortly before receiving Herman’s [Herman Schwendinger’s] PhD, the Schwendingers applied for a half-million-dollar grant to extend their ‘instrumental theory’ of delinquency. Since neither Herman nor Julia actually had a doctoral degree in hand, they needed a sponsor who would assure the National Institute of Mental Health that the grant would be administered responsibly. Joseph Lohman offered to be their sponsor, funneling the grant through the Berkeley School of Criminology, even though the research was conducted in Los Angeles. Their project was partly dependent on well-established contacts with young criminals who were actively engaged in illegal market activities; therefore, it had to be conducted in this southern California city.
         “… To obtain data required by his [Herman Schwendinger’s] ‘instrumental theory,’ he developed, among other things, methods for quantifying subcultural identities and sociometric/mathematical procedures for analyzing networks composed of thousands of youth.”
         [Herman and Julia Schwendinger. Who Killed the Berkeley School?: Struggles Over Radical Criminology. Brooklyn, New York: Thought Crimes imprint of Punctum Books. 2014. Pages 189-191.]
         “Critical criminology stands shoulder to shoulder with its radical criminology cousin in recognizing such gross injustices brought about by the capitalist and colonialist state and, more importantly, its dedication to bringing about meaningful changes that will lead to a more just, hospitable, caring and inclusive world for all—not just those who just happen to be born into affluence …. It does not seek to render the criminal justice state more efficient, but takes it to task for its unwarranted buoying of the capitalist state, for its advancement of the colonialist programme, and for aggregating increasing levels of pain onto Canada’s most marginalized. We are not content solely with unmasking systemic conditions of disadvantage. We are vexed by the world so often takenforgranted and encourage other ways of being with others that push current ways of being in the world.” [Andrew Woolford and Bryan Hogeveen, “Public Criminology in the Cold City: Engagement and Possibility.” Radical Criminology. Issue 3, October 2014. Pages 17-36.]
      9. anarchist–sociology (Dana M. Williams and Jeff Shantz): They propose the conditions required for this sociology.
         “This essay will establish the groundwork for the ontological understanding of anarchist-sociology—what it is or, more importantly, what it could be? The major goal is to answer: What does ‘anarchist-sociology’ mean to the discipline of Sociology? There are lots of potential understandings to the phrase ‘anarchist-sociology’; it is a rather flexible noun, particularly since it lacks any prior definition. We do not claim that anarchist-sociology is exclusively any of these, but offer the following as descriptions of possible meanings.
         “This essay explores possible meanings of ‘anarchist-sociology,’ compares the two traditions of anarchism and sociology, establishes a basic definition of anarchist-sociology, and reconceptualizes Sociology along anarchist values.”
         [Dana M. Williams and Jeff Shantz, “Defining an Anarchist-Sociology: A Long Anticipated Marriage.” Theory in Action. Volume 4, number 4, October 2011. Pages 9-30.]
      10. anarchist communism or anarcho–communism (Peter Kropotkin [Russian Cyrillic, Пётр Алексе́евич Кропо́ткин, Pëtr Alekséevič Kropótkin as pronounced in this MP3 audio file] and others): They advocate an immediate transition to communism without the Marxist intermediary stage of a proletarian state.
          “If our productive powers were fully applied to inceasing the stock of the staple necessities for life; if a modification of the present conditions of property increased the number of producers by all those who are not producers of wealth now; and if manual labor reconquered its place of honor in society, the communist tendencies already existing would immediately enlarge their sphere of application.
          “Taking all this into account, and still more the practical aspects of the question as to how private property might become common property, most of the anarchists maintain that the very next step to be made by society, as soon as the present regime of property undergoes a modification, will be in a communist sense. We are communists. But our communism is not that of the authoritarian school: it is anarchist communism, communism without government, free communism. It is a synthesis of the two chief aims pursued by humanity since the dawn of its history—economic freedom and political freedom.
          “I have already said that anarchism means no-government.…
          “By taking for our watchword anarchy in its sense of nogovernment, we intend to express a pronounced tendency of human society. In history we see that precisely those epochs when small parts of humanity broke down the power of their rulers and reassumed their freedom were epochs of the geatest progress, economic and intellectual.”
          [Peter Kropotkin, “Anarchist Communism: Its Basis and Principles.” Kropotkin’s Revolutionary Pamphlets: A Collection of Writings by Peter Kropotkin. Roger N. Baldwin, editor. New York: Dover Publications, Inc. 1970. Pages 46-78.]
      11. existential Kantian cosmopolitan anarchism (Robert Hanna): He develops a version of anarchism informed by Immanuel Kant’s moral philosophy.
          “I think that a highly original, politically radical, and if not revolutionary, then at least robustly State-resistant, State-subversive, and even outright civilly-disobedient cosmopolitan, existentialist version of anarchism that I call existential Kantian cosmopolitan anarchism, very naturally flows from [Immanuel] Kant’s moral philosophy, his philosophy of religion, and his political anthropology. Roughly, the idea is that if we take Kant’s famous injunction to have the courage to use your own understanding, and apply this morally courageous act not merely to ‘the public use of reason’ (that is, to intellectual activity, writing, and speech or self-expression in the broad sense of ‘free speech’), but also to our individual choices, our individual agency, our shared social life, and especially to what Kant quite misleadingly calls ‘the private use of reason’ (that is, to our social lives as functional role-players, or functionaries, within the State, including, e. g., citizenship or public office), then the result is existential Kantian cosmopolitan anarchism.” [Robert Hanna, “Radical Enlightenment: Existential Kantian Cosmopolitan Anarchism, With a Concluding Quasi-Federalist Postscript.” Join, or Die — Philosophical Foundations of Federalism. Dietmar H. Heidemann and Katja Stoppenbrink, editors. Berlin, Germany, and Boston, Massachusetts: Walter de Gruyter GmbH. 2016. Pages 59-88.]
      12. participatory economics or participism (Michael Albert, Robin Hahnel, Markus Pausch as pronounced in this MP3 audio file, and others): This anarchist, libertarian socialist perspective—commonly referenced by the acronym “parecon”—is sometimes applied to workplace democracy. Parecon incorporates aspects of both direct and representative democracy. Albert advocates economic self–management and classlessness. Two websites which focus on the perspective are IOPS: International Organization for a Participatory Society and Participatory Economics – A model for a new economy.
          “Innovative theorization of approaches to workplace democracy can be seen in ‘participism’ and inclusive democracy. Both theories emerged in the 1990s, but both have won special attention in the twenty-first century as a form of libertarian socialism, based on participatory economics (PARECON) and participatory politics (PARPOLITY). Michael Albert and Robin Hahnel are the founders of participism, an ‘anarchistic economic vision’ where the means of production are in the hands of the workers …. This is also foreseen in the theoretical concept of Inclusive Democracy, involving direct democracy and economic democracy in a stateless, moneyless and marketless economy, self-management (democracy in the social realm) and ecological democracy ….” [Markus Pausch, “Workplace Democracy: From a Democratic Ideal to a Managerial Tool and Back.” The Innovation Journal. Volume 19, number 1, 2014. Pages 1-19.]
          “Our model of a participatory economy was designed to promote: a) economic justice, or equity, defined as economic reward commensurate with sacrifice, or effort; b) economic democracy, or self-management, defined as decision-making power in proportion to the degree one is affected by a decision; and c) solidarity, defined as concern for the well-being of others – all to be achieved without sacrificing economic efficiency while promoting a diversity of economic life styles as well. The major institutions used to achieve these goals are: 1) democratic councils of workers and consumers; 2) jobs balanced for empowerment and desirability; 3) remuneration according to effort as judged by one’s work mates; and 4) a participatory planning procedure in which councils and federations of workers and consumers propose and revise their own activities under mies designed to guarantee outcomes that are both efficient and equitable.” [Michael Albert and Robin Hahnel, “In Defense of Participatory Economics.” Science & Society Volume 66, number 1, spring 2002. Pages 7-28.]
          “Parecon [participatory economics] doesn’t reduce productivity, but instead provides adequate and proper incentives to work at the level people desire to consume. It doesn't bias toward longer hours, but allows free choice of work versus leisure. It doesn’t pursue what is most profitable regardless of impact on workers, ecology, and even consumers, but reorients output toward what is truly beneficial, in light of the lull social and environmental costs and benefits.
          “Parecon doesn’t waste the human talents of people now doing surgery, composing music, or otherwise engaging in skilled labour by requiring that they do offsetting less empowering labour as well, but by this requirement unlocks a gargantuan reservoir of previously untapped talents throughout the populace, while apportioning empowering and rote labour not only justly, but in accord with self management and classlessness.”
          [Michael Albert, “Towards Life After Capitalism: An Introduction to Participatory Economics.” Briarpatch. Volume 34, number 6, September–October 2005. Pages 14-19.]
          “The pareconist [participatory economist] internationalist says that we ought to receive for our labors remuneration in tune with how hard we have worked, how long we have worked, and how great a sacrifice we have made in our work. We shouldn’t get more because we use more productive tools, have more skills, or have greater inborn talent, much less should we get more because we have more power or own more property. We should get more only by virtue of how much effort we have expended or how much sacrifice we have endured in our useful work. This is morally appropriate, and it also provides proper incentives by rewarding only what we can affect and not what is beyond our control.” [Michael Albert. Parecon: Life After Capitalism. London and New York: Verso imprint of New Left Books. 2003. Page 10.]
          “… I and many folks I have worked with were quite influenced by [Rosa] Luxemburg and [Anton] Pannekoek, in particular, and by [Michael] Kropotkin, [Mikhail] Bakunin, and various other anarchists, as well. I think parecon is an extension of that very broad heritage, and I think participatory society is too, though that is a larger leap given the relative economism in the past.
          “The idea of councils is consistent, clearly, with past priorities of this broad trend. I think parecon spells out self-management more carefully than many others have, but nonetheless, my guess is they would have no problem with it. The ideas of equitable remuneration shouldn’t cause any of them any difficulty, I think — were they here to let us know — but these ideas are again, spelled out more carefully and I hope more clearly in the parecon literature.”
          [Michael Albert, “There is an alternative: participatory economics.” ROAR Magazine. April 21st, 2012. Online publication. No pagination.]
          “Movement dynamics would have to create a diverse movement culture, institute real participatory democracy, and elevate nonwhite, nonacademic, nonmale leadership as critical elements of a strategy for change.…
          “… a true theory of the working class must pay more attention to qualitative activity, information flows, and decision-making hierarchies. It must help reveal that existence and interests of the coordinator class and correct the longstanding confusion of coordinatorism for socialism. It must help devise forms of participatory allocation superior to markets and central planning, and forms of council organization and equitable local role definition superior to traditional hierarchy. And it must help conceive strategies capable of empowering workers rather than coordinators.”
          [Michael Albert, “Why Marxism isn’t the activist’s answer.” Monthly Review: An Independent Socialist Magazine. Volume 39, issue 7, December 1987. Pages 43-55.]
          “Longer presentations of parecon [participatory economics] assess ease of operations, efficiency and quality of outcomes, etc. But for here, the reader may note that for full self-management the decisions of a workplace regarding what to produce must also be influenced by the people affected by its production. Those who consume the workplace’s books, bicycles, or band-aids must affect their production. Even those who don’t get some other product because energy, time, and assets went to the books, bicycles, or band-aids and not to producing what they wanted, have to affect the choice. And even those tangentially affected, such as by pollution, have to have influence. Accommodating the will of the workers with the will of other actors in appropriate balance is a matter of allocation, not of workplace organization, and it enters our discussion shortly.” [Michael Albert. Realizing Hope: Life Beyond Capitalism. London and New York: Zed Books. 2006. Page 10.]
          “Parecon [participatory economics] certainly urges the need to build experiments in future organization today, which is what solidarity economy centrally emphasizes. No problem there. Parecon also urges the need to organize and fight for changes inside existing economic institutions, which I suspect solidarity economy agrees is centrally important, even though it doesn’t itself emphasize that. There is probably no problem here, either. Parecon urges that a few key institutions are necessary if an economy is to foster solidarity, equity, self management, etc., and that certain others must be rejected, if those are the goals. This, however, may be a problem, though I can’t see why it ought to be. Pareconists [participatory economists] should have no problem, at least in my view, relating to a movement that contains lots of people who think differently about these matters, or who even think markets or private ownership have a place in the future, supposing the people are open to discussing these claims. Is solidarity economy equally open to incorporating and relating to the work and ideas of people who do have strong ideas about future institutions, both those favored and those rejected? If so, let’s get together!” [Michael Albert, “Solidarity and Participatory Economics,” in Ethan Miller and Michael Albert. Post-Capitalist Alternatives: New Perspectives on Economic Democracy. London, Ontario: Socialist Renewal Publishing Project. 2009. Creative Commons. Pages 23-29.]
          “… a participatory economy entails social ownership of productive property, self-managed workplaces and neighbourhood councils. Inside workplaces decisions are made democratically and each worker has one vote, jobs are balanced so that no-one is left with only rote and disempowering work and payment is made according to one’s effort or personal sacrifice. Citizens in communities belong to neighbourhood councils where they can participate in decisions over consumption and local public goods. Workers’ and consumers’ councils are linked through a democratic federated structure made up of larger geographical units, and a de-centralised democratic planning procedure is used to create the overall plan for the economy.” [Anders Sandstrom, Chris Chrysostomou, Jason Chrysostomou, and Florian Zollman. Participatory Economics: A Model for a New Economy. London: Participatory Economics. 2014. Page 5.]
          “The difference between a planned economy and an unplanned, market economy, is that to the extent that consumers submit proposals that reflect their changed circumstances and tastes, and to the extent that worker councils submit proposals that reflect their new technologies and work preferences, the plan creates an initial situation that reduces the number and size of adjustments that are necessary. All mechanisms for making adjustments in a market economy are available if wanted in a planned economy as well, although presumably a participatory economy would put a higher priority on using mechanisms that distribute the costs of adjustments more fairly.” [Robin Hahnel, “In Defence of Participatory Economics,” in Robin Hahnel and Erik Olin Wright. Alternatives to Capitalism: Proposals for a democratic economy. Location unknown: New Left Project. 2014. Pages 37-58.]
          “How might an economy fail to distribute goods and services in a way that is beyond moral reproach? Proponents of participatory economics believe that ignoring differences in sacrifice would be immoral. We also believe that ignoring differences in need is morally unacceptable. But there are two ways to think about and pose these objections. One is to describe either failure as ‘unjust.’ In effect this makes ‘economic justice’ and ‘morally acceptable’ synonymous. The other way is to draw a distinction between what it means for an economy to be just and what it means for an economy to be humane. In this usage it is conceivable that a just economy—which provides compensation commensurate with people’s efforts and sacrifices—might fail to be humane by denying those with greater needs what they require. In this usage it is also possible that a humane economy— which compensates all with greater needs appropriately—might fail to treat people fairly; for example, by rewarding people on the basis of the contribution of their person and property rather than their efforts and sacrifices.” [Robin Hahnel. Of the People, By the People. London: Soapbox Press. 2012. Kindle edition.]
      13. Inclusive Democracy project (Takis Fotopoulos [Greek/Hellēniká, Τάκης Φωτόπουλος, Tákēs Phōtópoulos as pronounced in this MP3 audio file] and others): Fotopoulos has developed a stateless, cashless, approach to direct economic and political democracy, including a critique of Michael Albert’s participatory economics (discussed previously). Inclusive Democracy—unlike participatory economics—opposes representative democracy. The open-access journal associated with Fotopoulos’ approach is called The International Journal of Inclusive Democracy: A theoretical journal published by the International Network for Inclusive Democracy. It is a continuation of the journal, Democracy & Nature.
          “It is … obvious that economic democracy requires … [a] type of social ownership which secures a democratic ownership and control of productive resources and that the only form of ownership which can guarantee it is demotic (community) ownership. This type of ownership leads to the politicization of the economy, the real synthesis of economy and polity – a synthesis, which can only be achieved within the institutional framework of an inclusive democracy. This framework, by definition, excludes any divorce of ownership from control and secures the pursuit of the general interest. This is so because, as shown below, economic decision-making is carried out by the entire community, through the citizens’ assemblies, where people take the fundamental macro-economic decisions which affect all the community, as citizens, rather than as vocationally oriented groups (workers, technicians, engineers, farmers, etc.). At the same time, people at the workplace, apart from participating in the community decisions about the overall planning targets, would also participate as workers (in the above broad sense of vocationally oriented groups) in their respective workplace assemblies, in a process of modifying/implementing the Democratic Plan and in running their own workplace.” [Takis Fotopoulos. Towards an Inclusive Democracy: The crisis of the growth economy and the need for a new liberatory project. London and New York: Cassell. 1997. Page 247.]
          “… we need not just a new type of politics which would embrace the politics of difference as part of a general project for human emancipation, but also a new kind of analysis that would interpret the class divisions which characterise today’s internationalised market economy. This new type of analysis and politics could be based on the Inclusive Democracy (ID) project which, founded on a conception of democracy in terms of individual and collective autonomy, offers an ideal focus to discuss the politics of difference and identity. Furthermore, the ID project, albeit a general project for human emancipation that explicitly recognises the importance of the institutional framework and of the ‘dominant social paradigm,’ does not involve any grand narrative. An inclusive democracy is conceived as the result of a self-reflective choice for individual and collective autonomy, rather than as the outcome of a historical process that creates the possibility for it.” [Takis Fotopoulos, “Class Divisions Today—the Inclusive Democracy Approach.” Democracy & Nature. Volume 6, number 2, July 2000. Pages 211-251.]
          “It is … obvious that the crisis which began about two centuries ago, when the system of the market economy and representative democracy was established, has, in the past twenty years or so, intensified, as it has led to the present huge concentration of economic power and the related ecological crisis. In other words, the Inclusive Democracy project, which proposes the equal distribution of power, is suggested as the only long-term solution to this chronic and constantly worsening crisis.” [Takis Fotopoulos, “The Inclusive Democracy Project—A Rejoinder.” Democracy & Nature. Volume 9, number 3, November 2003. Pages 429-471.]
          “… a market economy today can only be an internationalised one—something that implies that markets have to be as open and as flexible as possible. So, globalisation and its main effects, i.e. the present concentration of power and the continuous worsening of the ecological crisis, will persist for as long as the present institutional framework—that secures the concentration of political and economic power—reproduces itself, in other words, for as long as the market economy system and representative ‘democracy’ are not replaced by an institutional framework securing the equal distribution of political and economic power among all citizens, i.e. an inclusive democracy.” [Takis Fotopoulos, “Transitional Strategies and the Inclusive Democracy Project.” Democracy & Nature. Volume 8, number 1, March 2002. Pages 17-62.]
          “At the outset, it has to be made clear that Parecon [Michael Albert’s participatory economics], unlike Inclusive Democracy, is not a political project about an alternative society, with its own analysis of present society, an overall vision of a future society and a strategy and tactics that will move us from here to there. Parecon is simply an economic model for an alternative economy and as such does not feature any political, cultural and broader social institutions. The explanation given for this is that ‘models for such institutions still await development’ …. However, given that the Parecon model was developed well over a decade ago, one can hardly accept this explanation.” [Takis Fotopoulos, “Inclusive Democracy and Participatory Economics.” Democracy & Nature. Volume 9, number 3, November 2003. Pages 401-425.]
          “… the unifying element of neo-nationalists is their struggle for national sovereignty, which they (rightly), see as disappearing in the era of globalization. Even when their main immediate motive is the fight against immigration, indirectly their fight is against globalization, as they realize that it is the opening of all markets, including the labor markets, particularly within economic unions like the EU [European Union], which is the direct cause of their own unemployment or low-wage employment, as well as of the deterioration of the welfare state, given that the elites are not prepared to expand social expenditure to accommodate the influx of immigrants.” [Takis Fotopoulos, “Austrian Elections, Globalization, the Massive Rise of Neo-Nationalism and the Bankruptcy of the Left.” The International Journal of Inclusive Democracy: A theoretical journal published by the International Network for Inclusive Democracy. Volume 12, numbers 1/2, winter–summer 2016. Pages 63-75.]
          “Inclusive democracy is a new conception of democracy, which, using as a starting point the classical definition of it, expresses democracy in terms of direct political democracy, economic democracy (beyond the confines of the market economy and state planning), as well as democracy in the social realm and ecological democracy. In short, inclusive democracy is a form of social organisation which re-integrates society with economy, polity and nature. The concept of inclusive democracy is derived from a synthesis of two major historical traditions, the classical democratic and the socialist, although it also encompasses radical green, feminist, and liberation movements in the [Global] South. Within the problematique of the inclusive democracy project, it is assumed that the world, at the beginning of the new millennium, faces a multi-dimensional crisis (economic, ecological, social, cultural and political) which is caused by the concentration of power in the hands of various elites, as a result of the establishment, in the last few centuries, of the system of market economy, representative democracy and the related forms of hierarchical structure. In this sense, an inclusive democracy, which involves the equal distribution of power at all levels, is seen not as a utopia (in the negative sense of the word) but as perhaps the only way out of the present crisis.” [The Editorial Committee, “What is Inclusive Democracy?: The contours of Inclusive Democracy.” The International Journal of Inclusive Democracy: A theoretical journal published by the International Network for Inclusive Democracy. Volume 1, number 1, October 2004. Pages 1-9.]
      14. platformism (Karl Klien as pronounced in this MP3 audio file and others): This version of anarchism is based upon the 1926 Organisational Platform of the General Union of Anarchists (Draft).
          “Platformists also take far more seriously the challenge that working class activists face in terms of the authoritarian and reformist tendencies faced in everyday organising. Often anarchists will retreat into a scene either out of a desire for organisational purity, in order to better embody the ideals and practices they advocate, or simply through lack of an alternative. In reality, until there is a revolutionary reconstruction of our current society, there can be no space untouched by the influence of capitalism, patriarchy, hetero-normativity and the State. These things permeate every aspect of our lives, at work, in the homes, even amongst partners and within friendship groups. The response should not be to retreat, but to strengthen our ideals through action towards the society we hope to create. The reality is that there is no perfect or pure struggle. Everywhere anarchists will face reformists and authoritarians (from the Left and Right) who will attempt to control or subdue struggles. Individuals involved in these struggles will also often exhibit contradictory ideas, or have ideas that may seem to conflict with those we wish to advocate (many people are nationalist, or religious, for example). Against this, Platformists argue that we need to be well organised, we need to have confidence in our own ideas and we need to act on a common programme. Being an organised anarchist means having trust in your comrades, being able to put forward a coherent strategy and embodying a common set of ideals that inspires others to do the same.” [Karl Klien. Contemporary Platformism: a critical study. Sheffield, England: Outrages Press. 2010. Pages 12-13.]
          “The principle of the enslavement and exploitation of the masses through force lies at the root of modern society. All areas of society – economics, politics, social relations – rely on class violence, whose official organs are state bodies, the police, the army and the courts. Everything in this society, from each individual factory right up to the entire political system of the state, is nothing but a fortress of capital, where the workers are forever being monitored, and where special forces are on constant alert to crush any movement of the workers that may threaten the foundations of the present society or as much as disturb its tranquillity.” [Nestor Makhno, Ida Mett, Piotr Archinov, Valevsky, Linsky, Workers Cause (Dielo Truda) Group of Russian Anarchists Abroad, Maria Isidine, Errico Malatesta, Pieter Archinov, Jeff Shantz & P. J. Lilley, Alan MacSimoin, Nick Heath, Nestor McNab, and the Anarkismo editorial group, “Organizational Platform of the General Union of Anarchists (Draft), 1926.” Nestor Makhno Archive, translator. Rome, Italy: Nestor Makhno Archive. 1989. PDF file. No pagination.]
      15. philosophical anarchism (Robert Paul Wolff): He develops a philosophical, as contrasted with a political, version of anarchism.
          “This essay on the foundations of the authority of the state marks a stage in the development of my concern with problems of political authority and moral autonomy. When I first became deeply interested in the subject, I was quite confident that I could find a satisfactory justification for the traditional democratic doctrine to which I rather unthinkingly gave my allegiance. Indeed, during my first year as a member of the Columbia University Philosophy Department, I taught a course on political philosophy in which I boldly announced that I would formulate and then solve the fundamental problem of political philosophy. I had no trouble formulating the problem — roughly speaking, how the moral autonomy of the individual can be made compatible with the legitimate authority of the state. I also had no trouble refuting a number of supposed solutions which had been put forward by various theorists of the democratic state. But midway through the semester, I was forced to go before my class, crestfallen and very embarrassed, to announce that I had failed to discover the grand solution.
          “At first, as I struggled with this dilemma, I clung to the conviction that a solution lay just around the next conceptual corner. When I read papers on the subject to meetings at various universities, I was forced again and again to represent myself as searching for a theory which I simply could not find. Little by little, I began to shift the emphasis of my exposition. Finally — whether from philosophical reflection, or simply from chagrin — I came to the realization that I was really defending the negative rather than looking for the positive. My failure to find any theoretical justification for the authority of the state had convinced me that there was no justification. In short, I had become a philosophical anarchist.”
          [Robert Paul Wolff. In Defense of Anarchism. Berkeley, California: The Anarchist Library imprint of Open Guild Organization. 1970. Page 3.]
          “If autonomy and authority are genuinely incompatible, only two courses are open to us. Either we must embrace philosophical anarchism and treat all governments as non-legitimate bodies whose commands must be judged and evaluated in each instance before they are obeyed; or else, we must give up as quixotic the pursuit of autonomy in the political realm and submit ourselves (by an implicit promise) to whatever form of government appears most just and beneficent at the moment. (I cannot resist repeating yet again that if we take this course, there is no universal or a priori reason for binding ourselves to a democratic government rather than to any other sort. In some situations, it may be wiser to swear allegiance to a benevolent and efficient dictatorship than to a democracy which imposes a tyrannical majority on a defenseless minority. And in those cases where we have sworn to obey the rule of the majority, no additional binding force will exist beyond what would be present had we promised our allegiance to a king!)” [Robert Paul Wolff. In Defense of Anarchism. Berkeley, California: The Anarchist Library imprint of Open Guild Organization. 1970. Pages 32-33.]
          “[Robert Paul] Wolff’s philosophical anarchist critique of the state is actually …, as I am interpreting it, against the view that the citizen is strictly bound to obey laws just in so as they are laws. The essence of the opposed view, as I see it, towards laws as such, as distinct whether it is prescribed by one is to do what one is told is a strict one; it attaches if at all, only in the case bound to obey laws just in so far as they are laws. The essence of this opposed view, as I see it, is the claim that citizens have a special obligation towards laws as such, as distinct from an obligation to do a certain thing whether it is prescribed by law or not. The nature of this obligation is that one is to do what one is told to do because it is mandated by law. The obligation is a strict one; it attaches to all laws as the rule and can be overridden, if at all, only in the case where a special exception can be made out.” [Rex Martin, ”Wolff’s Defence of Philosophical Anarchism.” The Philosophical Quarterly (1950-). Volume 24, number 95, April 1974. Pages 140-149.]
          “Philosophical anarchism—as opposed to the ‘political’ anarchism we find in writes such as [Mikhail] Bakunin, [Peter] Kropotkin, [Emma] Goldman, and others—is the position that maintains that either there are, a priori, no possible, or there are or have never been, a posteriori, any legitimate states. Robert Paul Wolff’s work is an example of the ‘a priori’ argument for philosophical anarchism. Wolff argues that the obligation to be an autonomous individual is incompatible with political obligations to a legitimate state because to be autonomous is to act only on those reasons that one can affirm as good reasons. However, to obey an authority is to ‘surrender’ one’s judgment and obey another simply because of their authoritative position. Thus, one cannot autonomously obey authority. From the moment the argument emerged in book form it was quickly challenged and for many, including some anarchists, the a priori approach is a dead end ….” [Jeremy Arnold, “Philosophical anarchism and the paradox of politics.” European Journal of Political Theory. Volume 15, number 3, July 2016. Pages 293-311.]
      16. anarcho–primitivism (John Moore and others): This version of anarchism rejects modern civilization and advocates a return to primitive communism or, perhaps, foraging.
          “Anarcho-primitivism (a.k.a. radical primitivism, antiauthoritarian primitivism, the anti-civilization movement, or just, primitivism) is a shorthand term for a radical current that critiques the totality of civilization from an anarchist perspective, and seeks to initiate a comprehensive transformation of human life. Strictly speaking, there is no such thing as anarcho-primitivism or anarcho-primitivists. Fredy Perlman, a major voice in this current, once said, ‘The only -ist name I respond to is “cellist.”’ Individuals associated with this current do not wish to be adherents of an ideology, merely people who seek to become free individuals in free communities in harmony with one another and with the biosphere, and may therefore refuse to be limited by the term ‘anarchoprimitivist’ or any other ideological tagging. At best, then, anarcho-primitivism is a convenient label used to characterise diverse individuals with a common project: the abolition of all power relations — e.g., structures of control, coercion, domination, and exploitation — and the creation of a form of community that excludes all such relations. So why is the term anarcho-primitivist used to characterise this current? In 1986, the circle around the Detroit paper Fifth Estate indicated that they were engaged in developing a ‘critical analysis of the technological structure of western civilization[,] combined with a reappraisal of the indigenous world and the character of primitive and original communities. In this sense we are primitivists…’ The Fifth Estate group sought to complement a critique of civilization as a project of control with a reappraisal of the primitive, which they regarded as a source of renewal and anti-authoritarian inspiration. This reappraisal of the primitive takes place from an anarchist perspective, a perspective concerned with eliminating power relations. Pointing to ‘an emerging synthesis of post-modern anarchy and the primitive (in the sense of original), Earth-based ecstatic vision,’ the Fifth Estate circle indicated: We are not anarchists per se, but pro-anarchy, which is for us a living, integral experience, incommensurate with Power and refusing all ideology… Our work on the FE as a project explores possibilities for our own participation in this movement, but also works to rediscover the primitive roots of anarchy as well as to document its present expression. Simultaneously, we examine the evolution of Power in our midst in order to suggest new terrains for contestations and critique in order to undermine the present tyranny of the modern totalitarian discourse — that hyper-reality that destroys human meaning, and hence solidarity, by simulating it with technology. Underlying all struggles for freedom is this central necessity: to regain a truly human discourse grounded in autonomous, intersubjective mutuality and closely associated with the natural world. The aim is to develop a synthesis of primal and contemporary anarchy, a synthesis of the ecologically-focussed, non-statist, anti-authoritarian aspects of primitive lifeways with the most advanced forms of anarchist analysis of power relations. The aim is not to replicate or return to the primitive, merely to see the primitive as a source of inspiration, as exemplifying forms of anarchy. For anarcho-primitivists, civilization is the overarching context within which the multiplicity of power relations develop. Some basic power relations are present in primitive societies — and this is one reason why anarcho-primitivists do not seek to replicate these societies — but it is in civilization that power relations become pervasive and entrenched in practically all aspects of human life and human relations with the biosphere. Civilization — also referred to as the megamachine or Leviathan — becomes a huge machine which gains its own momentum and becomes beyond the control of even its supposed rulers. Powered by the routines of daily life which are defined and managed by internalized patterns of obedience, people become slaves to the machine, the system of civilization itself. Only widespread refusal of this system and its various forms of control, revolt against power itself, can abolish civilization, and pose a radical alternative. Ideologies such as Marxism, classical anarchism and feminism oppose aspects of civilization; only anarcho-primitivism opposes civilization, the context within which the various forms of oppression proliferate and become pervasive — and, indeed, possible. Anarcho-primitivism incorporates elements from various oppositional currents — ecological consciousness, anarchist anti-authoritarianism, feminist critiques, Situationist ideas, zero-work theories, technological criticism — but goes beyond opposition to single forms of power to refuse them all and pose a radical alternative.” [John Moore. A Primitivist Primer. Berkeley, California: The Anarchist Library imprint of Open Guild Organization. 2009. Pages 4-5.]
          “Anarcho-primitivists comprise a subculture and political movement that, generally, advocates hunting and gathering as the ideal human subsistence method (from the point of view of sustainable resource use) and the band as the ideal human social structure (for its features of egalitarianism). While the goal may seem improbable, a primitivist would contend that more modest goals are either undesirable or unachievable within the system. The past 10,000 years have after all been largely a history of ‘solutions’ to the problems of an agricultural society. This critique of ‘civilization’ inherently rejects less radical ideals and claims to go uniquely to the heart of all social discontent. It is multi-faceted, drawing on several traditions of thought. These include the nineteenth century social speculators, anthropology of hunter-gatherers, situationism, anarchism, radical (deep) ecology, and anti-technological philosophy. The potential problem of implementation is largely solved by a growing consensus that an end to ‘economic growth’ is fast approaching, making revolutionary change inevitable. The direction of that change is the focus of anarcho-primitivist interest.” [Anonymous. What is Anarcho-Primitivism? Berkeley, California: The Anarchist Library imprint of Open Guild Organization. 2005. Page 3.]
          “Unfortunately for anarchists, plunging into the primitivist miasma has become necessary. Over the past few decades, primitivists have successfully assimilated themselves into the anarchist movement. Within the U.S., their influence has grown so strong that anarchists can no longer afford to ignore it. The corporate media, in its infinite wisdom, has often decided to present primitivism as ‘the new anarchism,’ blissfully ignoring the classical strand of anarchist thought that agitates for worker and community control within a stateless society. Unfortunately, this generous free advertising ensures that many new members of the anarchist movement will arrive through primitivism’s feral gates.” [Brian Oliver Sheppard. Anarchism vs. Primitivism. Berkeley, California: The Anarchist Library imprint of Open Guild Organization. 2003. Page 4.]
      17. individualist anarchism (Joe Peacott, Henry David Thoreau, and many others): This diverse anarchist tendency opposes the state, collectivism, and profit.
          “Like all other anarchists, individualists think the way to maximize human freedom and happiness is to abolish the state and all other involuntary relationships, organizations, and institutions. They believe that all people should be free to choose with whom they associate, what kind of work they do, how they dispose of the products of their labor, where they live, and what kinds of recreation in which they engage. The only limit on someone’s freedom of action should be the equal freedom of others to live their lives unmolested. In other words, the area in which someone may freely swing their arm ends where the nose of another person begins.
          “Where individualists differ most from other anarchists is in the area of economics. Unlike communist anarchists, individualists advocate the private ownership of property and individual retention of the products of one’s labor. This means the whole product of one’s labor. Individualists reject profit as an unjust theft of the product of the labor of another, and therefore have as little in common with capitalists as they have with socialists.
          “Individualists support tenure of land based on use and occupancy and believe rent is simply another form of profit-taking by the unproductive. People should have title only to the amount of land they can use and work themselves, but would be free to pool their resources in order to engage in larger scale operations for the sake of efficiency and greater productivity. The parties to such cooperative arrangements would still be entitled to the full product of their labor, thus generating no profit.”
          [Joe Peacott. An Overview of Individualist Anarchist Thought: Economic Notes No. 97. London: Libertarian Alliance. 2003. Page 2.]
          “Like the water, the Walden ice, seen near at hand, has a green tint, but at a distance is beautifully blue, and you can easily tell it from the white ice of the river, or the merely greenish ice of some ponds, a quarter of a mile off. Sometimes one of those great cakes slips from the ice—man’s sled into the village street, and lies there for a week like a great emerald, an object of interest to all passers. I have noticed that a portion of Walden which in the state of water was green will often, when frozen, appear from the same point of view blue. So the hollows about this pond will, sometimes, in the win ter, be filled with a greenish water somewhat like its own, but the next day will have frozen blue. Perhaps the blue color of water and ice is due to the light and air they contain, and the most transparent is the bluest. Ice is an interesting subject for contemplation. They told me that they had some in the ice-houses at Fresh Pond five years old which was as good as ever. Why is it that a bucket of water soon becomes putrid, but frozen remains sweet forever? It is commonly said that this is the difference between the affections and the intellect.” [Henry D. Thoreau. Walden or Life in the Woods. Boston, Massachusetts: Houghton Mifflin Company. 1910. Pages 327-328.]
          “I heartily accept the motto,—‘That government is best which governs least;’ and I should like to see it acted up to more rapidly and systematically. Carried out, it finally amounts to this, which also I believe,—‘That government is best which governs not at all;’ and when men are prepared for it, that will be the kind of government which they will have. Government is at best but an expedient; but most governments are usually, and all governments are sometimes, inexpedient. The objections which have been brought against a standing army, and they are many and weighty, and deserve to prevail, may also at last be brought against a standing government; The standing army is only an arm of the standing government. The government itself, which is only the mode which the people have chosen to execute their will, is equally liable to be abused and perverted before the people can act through it. Witness the present Mexican war, the work of comparatively a few individuals using the standing government as their tool; for, in the outset, the people would not have consented to this measure.” [H. D. Thoreau, “Resistance to Civil Government; a Lecture delivered in 1847.” Æsthetic Papers. Elizabeth P. Peabody, editor. New York: G. P. Putnam. 1849. Pages 189-211.]
      18. anarchist synthesis (Sébastien Faure as pronounced in this MP3 audio file): He creates a synthesis of anarcho–syndicalism, libertarian communism (or anarcho–communism), and anarchist individualism (or individualist anarchism).
          “… these three currents — anarcho-syndicalism, libertarian communism and anarchist individualism, distinct currents but not contradictory — have nothing that makes them irreconcilable, nothing that puts them in opposition to each other, nothing that proclaims their incompatibility, nothing that can prevent them from living in harmony, or even coming together for joint propaganda and action ….
          “… the existence of these three currents not only does not harm in any way or to any degree the total force of anarchism — a philosophical and social movement envisaged, and rightly so, in all its breadth, but can and logically must contribute to the overall strength of anarchism ….
          “… each of these currents has its own place, its role, its mission within that broad, deep social movement that goes by the name of ‘anarchism’, whose goal is the establishment of a social environment that can assure the maximum well-being and freedom to each and every one ….
          “ … in these conditions, anarchism may be compared to what in chemistry is called a compound, that is to say a substance made up of a combination of various elements.
          “This particular compound is created by the combination of three elements: anarcho-syndicalism, libertarian communism and anarchist individualism.…
          “This particular compound is created by the combination of three elements: anarcho-syndicalism, libertarian communism and anarchist individualism.…
          “Whatever the case, these three elements — anarcho-syndicalist, libertarian communist and anarchist individualist (S.C.I.) — are made to combine with each other and, by amalgamating, go to make up what I shall call ‘The Anarchist Synthesis.’”
          [Sébastien Faure. The Anarchist Synthesis. Nestor McNab, translator. Berkeley, California: The Anarchist Library imprint of Open Guild Organization. 2011. Pages 7-8.]
      19. participatory democracy (Stewart Davidson, Stephen Elstub, Elisabeth Soep, and many others): This approach to direct democracy and anarchism is explored on various websites, including Participedia, ZCommunications, and Adbusters.
          “This special section contributes to this process of contextualisation by studying developments in, obstacles to, and prospects for, a more deliberative and participatory democracy in the UK. The UK has a distinct political culture and political system, which generates both opportunities and barriers to the institutionalisation of deliberative and participatory processes. Although these opportunities and barriers are not always exclusive to the UK, they nonetheless manifest themselves in distinct ways and must therefore be considered in a specific UK context. For example, the combination of a devolved political system within aWestminster model is distinct to the UK. It is therefore vital that we take note of these contextual factors, which include a devolved and multi-level political system, distinct modes of path dependency and the particular cultural characteristics of the citizenry.” [Stewart Davidson and Stephen Elstub, “Deliberative and Participatory Democracy in the UK.” BJPIR: The British Journal of Politics and International Relations. Volume 16, number 3, August 2014. Pages 367-385.]
          “Young people have always circulated media in various forms, engaged in dialogue, produced content, investigated their worlds for information and insights, and mobilized peers toward shared goals. But evidence suggests that these activities have become less centralized and more prominent in the context of civics, in large part because of the dynamics of digital and social media. Participatory politics build on and reinforce three important shifts operating at the level of the individual, the collective, the institution, and the systems that connect all three.” [Elisabeth Soep. Participatory Politics: Next-Generation Tactics to Remake Public Spheres. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press. 2014. Page 10.]
          “Since the 1970s participatory democracy has been a catchword for genuine, popular or progressive democratization. Since then the general climate has changed in several respects. The Enlightenment confidence in large-scale social engineering is past and, in addition, wholesale ideology has lost appeal. Arguably, limitations of ‘participatory democracy’ as previously or conventionally conceived are the following.” [Jan Nederveen Pieterse, “Participatory democratization reconceived.” Futures. Volume 32, number 5, June 2001. Pages 407-422.]
          “Populist mobilization and participatory democracy make strange bedfellows. The two processes seem simultaneously quite similar yet radically distinct. Both are forms of political participation that privilege regular people (i.e. non-elites). But populist mobilization is often associated with personalistic control over decision-making, electoral instrumentalism, politically discretionary resource distribution, and state control over society. Participatory democracy, by contrast, is frequently associated with popular control over deliberative decision-making, politically universalistic resource distribution, and social control of the state. Few places exemplify the tensions between populist mobilization and participatory democracy as well as [Hugo] Chávez-era Venezuela.” [Gabriel Hetland, “The Crooked Line: From Populist Mobilization to Participatory Democracy in Chávez-Era Venezuela.” Qualitative Sociology. Volume 37, number 4, December 2014. Pages 373-401.]
          “what are the potential pathologies of participatory democracy? Civil society participation promises the building of the general will from the ‘bottom up.’ However, we should be aware that under the appearance of widespread participation, we might find the manufacturing of participation or what is generally labelled ‘participatory engineering.’ Political interference in fixing the presumed accountability issues of CSOs [civil society organizations] in terms of managerial principles and neo-plural forms of interest intermediation might result in the domination of bureaucratic and neoliberal rationalities within the CSOs. Thus conceived, the legal norms of participation and current consultation practices might in fact be defining and prescribing the boundaries of a legitimate civil society in a de-politicised way. If that were so, the result would be to restrict, exclude and de-legitimise other groups in civil society.” [Acar Kutay, “Limits of Participatory Democracy in European Governance.” European Law Journal. Volume 21, number 6, November 2015. Pages 803-818.]
          “Participatory democracy is a process of collective decision making that combines elements from both direct and representative democracy: Citizens have the power to decide on policy proposals and politicians assume the role of policy implementation. The electorate can monitor politicians’ performance simply by comparing citizens’ proposals with the policies actually implemented. As a result, the discretion of politicians is severely constrained. In this system, the extent to which citizens can affect policy and determine social priorities is directly aligned with the degree to which they choose to involve themselves in the process.” [Enriqueta Aragonès and Santiago Sánchez-Pagés, “A theory of participatory democracy based on the real case of Porto Alegre.” European Economic Review. Volume 53, number 1, January 2009. Pages 56-72.]
          “Participatory democracy as a viable political practice independent of the state has seldom been a serious object of scholarly attention.” [Amory Starr, María Elena Martínez-Torres, and Peter Rosset, “Participatory Democracy in Action: Practices of the Zapatistas and the Movimento Sem Terra.” Latin American Perspectives. Volume 38, number 1, January 2011. Pages 102-119.]
          “Participatory democracy was introduced to promote a strong democracy grounded on the interactions between all actors (elected and nonelected) who were affected by a public decision …. However, as only a weak(ened) version of participatory democracy tends to become manifest in practice, there are “serious concerns about an emerging gap between the rhetoric of hoped-for or taken-for-granted benefits and their materialisation in reality” …. Participatory democracy may have become the standard for public problem solving; making it work in practice continues to be exceedingly difficult.” [Koen P. R. Bartels, “Communicative Capacity: The Added Value of Public Encounters for Participatory Democracy.” American Review of Public Administration. Volume 44, number 6, November 2014. Pages 656-674.]
          “Efforts to create “smart communities” using Internet-based technology are just beginning to emerge, and important problems like the “digital divide” will present serious impediments to large-scale use of the opportunities technology provides for enhancing participatory democracy. Technology may also pose problems for citizen privacy and security as more and more information is collected and stored on computers. At the same time, the rapid development of information technologies such as the Internet may open new doors to direct, participatory democracy that just a few short years ago were not even known to exist.” [Timothy D. Sisk. Democracy at the Local Level: The International IDEA Handbook on Participation, Representation, Conflict Management, and Governance. Stockholm, Sweden: The International IDEA Handbook Series imprint of International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA). 2001. Page 180.]
          “Since its launch, Otakantaa.fi [Finnish–language website] has attracted approximately 6,000 unique visitors a month. The services aim to increase citizens’ levels of competence in participation and, consequently, their empowerment towards active citizenship. The services support participatory democracy and increase interaction between the government and civil society. They also aim to improve the quality of decision-making and the drafting of legislation and introduce citizens’ everyday knowledge to complement expert information on these processes.” [Kristina Reinsalu. Handbook on E-democracy. Tampere, Finland: Tampereen Yliopistopaino Oy Juvenes Print. 2010. Page 34.]
          “Participatory governance is the most important component of participatory democracy. It implies engagement of population at large in the issues of community governance. In the first instance, participatory governance prioritises engagement of people in customised governance issues, which are left out of traditional regulation processes. This means introduction and establishment of systems, which would promote direct involvement of those citizens, which for a number of reasons suffer complications in participation. In particular, these people are particularly in socially vulnerable groups, representatives of national minorities and women.” [David Tumanyan and Vahram Shahbazyan. Participatory democracy at local level: How and why participate in local self-governance? Yerevan, Armenia: Communities Finance Officers Association. 2011. Page 15.]
          “The concepts of local governance and decentralization, at times used interchangeably, are related but different concepts.Decentralization is primarily a national political, legislative, institutional and fiscal process. While local governance can be affected by decentralization processes – for example, if local governments are expected to provide services formerly offered through national organisations – it may or may or may not be accompanied by decentralization, representative or participatory democratic processes, transparency, accountability or other defining characteristics of ‘good’ local governance.” [Alexandra Wilde, Shipra Narang, Marie Laberge, and Luisa Moretto. A Users’ Guide to Measuring Local Governance. Joachim Nahem, editor. Oslo, Norway: UNDP (United Nations Development Programme) Oslo Governance Centre. 2009. Page 5.]
          “Rather than viewing new kinds of collaborations simply as ways of solving problems, we should see them as ways of creating social capital and a more participatory democracy which include healthy local communities and ongoing dialogues among all sectors and citizens. We advocate a holistic approach that advances racial equality, respect for religious differences, healthy families and children, educational opportunities, and economic self-sufficiency for all. We are pas sionate in our belief that collaborations are the best vehicle to accomplish this kind of comprehensive change. Working together to solve intractable problems in our society, we are convinced that there is value per se in joint efforts across sectors to achieve healthy communities and in practicing democracy rather than just living in one. Collaborative efforts will build community by enhancing civic engagement and increasing citizen participation.” [Anita DeFrantz, Chris Gates, Claire Gaudiani, William W. George, James A. Joseph, Charles E. M. Kolb, Ellen McCulloch-Lovell, Carol Prendergast, Bruce Sievers, Edson Spencer, and Harris Wofford. Uniting America: Collaborating to Make Democracy Work. New York: The American Assembly. 2001. Page 18.]
          “This movement [the e-government/e-citizen movement] is interested in exploring all the ways technology can be used to help government reach citizens and vice versa. Supporters of this movement believe technology can reform traditional governmental administrative processes and introduce exciting new participatory elements. They also believe this approach has great potential for stimulating young people’s interest in government because of the large amount of time young people already spend using communications and information media for other uses. The bottom line for public officials is that they will have to get smart fast about the capabilities of the myriad tools that now exist for communicating with, informing, and engaging citizens (websites, chat rooms, electronic bulletin boards, electronic town halls, e-mail, and so on), and be prepared to meet higher standards of accountability and accessibility. The place to look for some of the most innovative applications of technology to politics and governing is at the state and local level, where the Internet is being used to improve transparency. Backers of this approach envision unlimited benefits for our democracy from technology, including citizen-centric public services that are seamlessly integrated across levels of government and creative new partnerships among government, the private sector, academia, nonprofit organizations, and foundations.” [Gail Christopher, Chris Gates, Edie Goldenberg, Elizabeth Hollander, and Brian O’Connell. Strengthening Democracy through Citizen Engagement: Insights for Public Administrators. Washington, D.C.: National Academy of Public Administration. July, 2003. Page 15.]
          “The greatest potential benefit of participatory democracy seems to lie in the organization of decision making within the workplace. As a vehicle for coordinating activities among enterprises or for determining what kinds of consumer goods should be produced, it seems to offer far less promise.” [Joseph H. Carens. Equality, Moral Incentives, and the Market: An Essay in Utopian Politico-Economic Theory. Chicago, Illinois: The University of Chicago Press. 1981. Page 206.]
          “As I worked for change, my vision of a good society grew clearer. I read more books on cooperation, participatory democracy, self-esteem, nonviolence, education, socialism, anarchism, and feminism.” [Randy Schutt. Inciting Democracy: A Practical Proposal for Creating a Good Society. Cleveland, Ohio: SpringForward Press. 2001. Page 2.]
          “Rather than a system of winner-take-all elections for representatives who may or may not represent a constituency or may or may not look out for the common good, a good society would have a more direct and participatory decision system. If important decisions were decentralized to the local level, people could meet in relatively small groups to discuss the issues and look for solutions that would best solve society’s problems. This might require a great deal of time, but would result in much better decisions. It would also ensure that society was responsive to the needs of people.” [Randy Schutt. Inciting Democracy: A Practical Proposal for Creating a Good Society. Cleveland, Ohio: SpringForward Press. 2001. Page 26.]
          “Forum-Asia aims to ‘empower people by advocating social justice, sustainable human development, participatory democracy, gender equality, peace and human security through collaboration and cooperation among human rights organisations in the region’ …. In order to achieve these goals, its members have recognized a need to establish a network of organizations at the local and global levels through which to develop ‘effective engagement with state and non-state actors.’ As it draws on a broad set of issues situated around the idea of human rights, the scope of issues enables Forum-Asia to act as a coherent amalgamation of interests. For the most part, the Forum has worked to influence larger fora, by adopting a strategy of parallel summitry. In particular, it works very closely with the UN [United Nations] and since 2004 has enjoyed consultative status within the UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC). It has also used such engagement as a means of lobbying the Human Rights Council in Geneva.… Forum-Asia has a network-oriented role to act as a mechanism for capacity building among regional, ‘local,’ NGOs [nongovernmental organizations]. However, this role is seen as a cornerstone for the principal aim of activist lobbying against particular state actions, where the target of action is the states of the region themselves. Specific campaigns to date have included: a fight to highlight and seek redress for those adversely affected by chemical mining in Mongolia; seeking justice for victims of the 1991 Santa Cruz massacre in Timor Leste; lobbying against the human rights record of the Lao government; and encouraging the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) to prioritize human rights issues. Thus, the Forum is viewed as providing its members with a means of monitoring state actions from an ‘above-region’ or ‘beyond-region’ position.” [Julie Gilson, “Governance and non-governmental organizations in East Asia: Building region-wide coalitions.” Civil Society and International Governance: The Role of Non-State Actors in the EU, Africa, Asia and Middle East. David Armstrong, Valeria Bello, Julie Gilson, and Debora Spini, editors. London and New York: Routledge imprint of Taylor & Francis Group, an Informa PLC business. 2011. Page 181-206.]
          “Deference to national and local sovereignty, or to NGOs [nongovernmental organizations] and participatory democracy, requires that national and local institutions are viable and legitimate. Yet throughout Africa and in other parts of the developing world, national governments are unable to launch the initiatives neces sary to combat hunger. Beleaguered by a lack of private or public capital, plagued by corruption and cronyism, it is not an exaggeration to say that the state as an agent of change is often hollow: ‘The state collapses from within, leaving citizens bereft of even the most basic conditions of a stable existence: law and security, trust in contracts, and a sound medium of exchange’ …. NGOs have, unsurprisingly, been drawn into this space, functioning as extensions of developed-country aid agencies, both national and multilateral. In one sense they fill a role left empty by the hollow state, providing needed support, infrastructure, and technical skills. But in another sense, they often project the values and preferences of the North, lowered onto the stage of the South.” [C. Ford Runge, Benjamin Senauer, Philip G. Pardey, and Mark W. Rosegrant. Ending Hunger in Our Lifetime: Food Security and Globalization. Baltimore, Maryland: The Johns Hopkins University Press. 2003. Page 127.]
          “Rarely can-and with great caution, should-a book be described as a genuine service to our world and our capacity for sympathies and connections. Yet Ending Hunger in Our Lifetime: Food Security and Globalization overcomes the natural skepticism attendant to such an appellation and should inspire readers to think of ending hunger as not only a moral imperative but also an attainable goal. In Ending Hunger in Our Lifetime, authors C. Ford Runge, Benjamin Senauer, Philip G. Pardey, and Mark W. Rosegrant write clearly about the experiences of the world’s hungry and the local, national, and global factors that figure in and bode for their situation. Furthermore, Ending Hunger in our Lifetime is not only extremely informative on food policy and security, but it also offers an illuminating non-doctrinaire grasp of globalization and the institutions, forces, and defaults that shape it.” [Richard J. Blaustein, “Ending Hunger in Our Lifetime: Food Security and Globalization.” Review article. Electronic Green Journal. Volume 1, number 20, 2004. Pages 1-5.]
      20. horizontalism (Marina Sitrin, David Marcus, and many others): Marcus sees horizontalism as “a product of the growing disaggregation and individuation of Western society.” The English-language term, which can also be rendered as “horizontality,” is a translation of the Spanish word, horizontalidad (MP3 audio file). Horizontalism, which would be contrasted with “verticalism,” refers to a system of non-hierarchical, non-authoritarian, and generally anarchistic decision-making. The Occupy Wall Street—which was started by Adbusters—and the Occupy movement more generally have been identified with this perspective.
          “Horizontalidad is a word that has come to embody the new social arrangements and principles of organization of these movements in Argentina. As its name suggests, horizontalidad implies democratic communication on a level plane and involves—or at least intentionally strives towards-non-hierarchical and anti-authoritarian creation rather than reaction. It is a break The banging of a pot in protest. with vertical ways of organizing and relating.
          “Horizontalidad is a living word that reflects an ever-changing experience. Months after the popular rebellion in December of 2001, many movement participants began speaking of their relationships as horizontal in order to describe the new forms of decision-making. Years after the rebellion, those continuing to build new movements speak of horizontalidad as a goal, as well as a tool.
          “… Simply desiring egalitarian relationships does not make them so. But the process of horizontalidad is also a tool to achieve this goal. Thus horizontalidad is desired and is a goal, but it is also the means—the tool—for achieving this end.”
          [Marina Sitrin. Horizontalism: Voices of Popular Power in Argentina. Oakland, California: AK Press. 2006. Pages 3-4.]
          “… the change that has occurred … in Argentina, is most fundamentally a change in individuals’ subjectivity and, as is often said, their ‘protagonism.’ This is a change that cannot be taken away. It is a sense of identity, dignity and power, grounded in the collective. It is a break from old hierarchical ways of organizing and toward a new horizontalism.” [Marina Sitrin, “Horizontalidad en/in Argentina.” Privately published paper. September, 2003. Pages 1-39.]
          “The Occupy movements throughout the United States, Spain, and Greece all have sought to use direct democracy to create horizontal, nonhierarchical social relationships that would allow participants to openly engage with each other. The term ‘horizontalism,’ from the Spanish horizontalidad, was first used in Argentina after the 2001 popular rebellion there.” [Marina Sitrin, “Horizontalism and the Occupy Movements.” Dissent. Online magazine. Spring, 2012.]
          “The use of ‘horizontalidad,’ horizontality, and horizontalism, first put forth in Argentina by the autonomous movements in the wake of the 2001 crisis, has become widespread to describe the new social relationships developing around the globe. Horizontalism and horizontal are words that encapsulate the relationships on which many of the new global movements are grounded—from those in Spain and Greece to the Occupy movement in the United States.
          “Horizontalidad is a social relationship that implies, as its name suggests, a flat plane on which to communicate. Horizontalidad necessarily implies the use of direct democracy and a striving for consensus, processes in which attempts are made to ensure that everyone is heard and new relationships are created.”
          [Marina Sitrin, “Goals without Demands: The New Movements for Real Democracy.” The South Atlantic Quarterly. Volume 113, number 2, spring 2014. Pages 245-258.]
          “… we believe that those doing the work should make the decisions in these [anti-war] organizations. We recommend the model of assemblies, spokescouncils, or other horizontal networks of small, decentralized groups that are unified around an anti-authoritarian vision of social change. This will ensure that those at the base hold decision-making power and thus that the mobilization reflects the political consciousness of the base, which is typically more radical and sane than that held by the leadership. It will still be possible for sectarian groups to infiltrate the base, but much harder for them to seize control. We believe that instituting such a decentralized structure is consistent with a principled commitment to democracy and should be our first act of defense against the party-building backs and the omnipresent ‘leadership.’” [Marina Sitrin and Chuck Morse, “An Anti-Authoritarian Response to the War Efforts.” Synthesis/Regeneration: A Magazine of Green Social Thought. Volume 30, winter 2003. Pages 6-7.]
          “The once prevalent conviction that a handful of centripetal values could bind society together has transformed into a deeply skeptical attitude toward general statements of value. If it is, indeed, turtles all the way down, then decisions can take place only on a local scale and on a horizontal plane. There is no overarching platform from which to legislate; only a ‘local knowledge.’ …
          “Occupy Wall Street has come to represent the latest turn in this movement toward local and more horizontal spaces of freedom. Occupation was, itself, a matter of recovering local space: a way to repoliticize the square.…
          “… Marina Sitrin, … [a] prominent Occupier [participant in the Occupy Movement], has offered another name for this politics—‘horizontalism’: ‘the use of direct democracy, the striving for consensus’ and ‘processes in which everyone is heard and new relationships are created.’ It is a politics that not only refuses institutionalization but also imagines a new subjectivity from which one can project the future into the present.…
          “It can be argued that horizontalism is, in many ways, a product of the growing disaggregation and individuation of Western society; that it is a kind of free-market leftism: a politics jury-rigged out of the very culture it hopes to resist.”
          [David Marcus, “The Horizontalists.” Dissent. Online magazine. Fall, 2012.]
          “Occupations depend on bodies filling space. But they also involve communication, in at least two aspects – horizontalist general-assembly decision-making and networked social media: the very slow and the very fast.…
          “Entangled with the net-wide media of Occupy [the Occupy Movement] is … [an] occult communications story: that of the interface between anarchist horizontalists in the square and the vertical bureaucratized US labour movement – sclerotic, fractured, defeated, yet not extinct – and with some emergent sectors touched by the same dynamics as Occupy itself.”
          [Nick Dyer-Witheford, “Net, square, everywhere?” Radical Philosophy: Philosophical Journal of the Independent Left. Number 171, January/February 2012. Pages 2-7.]
          “… Podemos [a Spanish left-wing party] broke with Spanish norms and the horizontalism of the indignados [Indigenous peoples] to use Pablo Iglesias’s face as its symbol on ballot papers.” [Susan Watkins, “Oppositions.” New Left Review. Series II, number 98, March–April 2016. Pages 5-30.]
          “… Podemos’s círculos [circles] … [are] the party’s political organs for revitalizing democracy and instituting a more horizontalist approach to policy decision-making.” [Bécquer Seguín, “Podemos and its critics.” Radical Philosophy: Philosophical Journal of the Independent Left. Number 193, September/October 2015. Pages 20-32.]
          “If consensus and horizontalism are not to remain stuck in nursing such quasi-neoliberal egos, then we must be able to delineate how they can contribute towards a more substantive notion of radical politics – one which also involves a verticalism. Perhaps this would be a better way of reviving a communist politics instead of taking politically correct vows of horizontalism and consensus.” [Saroj Giri, “Communism, occupy and the question of form.” Ephemera: Theory & Politics in Organization. Volume 13, number 3, August 2013. Pages 577-601.]
          “… [There are] four types of cultural orientation: horizontal individualism, vertical individualism, horizontal collectivism, and vertical collectivism. Horizontal individualism refers to the tendency to be self-reliant, unique, and distinctive from groups, and to see the individual as being equal to all others. Vertical individualism is characterized as the tendency to want to be distinguished from others and move up in the hierarchy as a result of competition with others. Horizontal collectivism refers to the tendency to see oneself as being equal to others and to highlight common goals, interdependence, and sociability. Finally, vertical collectivism is the tendency to stress loyalty to one’s group and adherence to hierarchical relationships with others, both of which lead to a willingness to sacrifice individual goals for the goal of a group and to submit to authority” [Heungsik Park, John Blenkinsopp, M. Kemal Oktem, and Ugur Omurgonulsen, “Cultural Orientation and Attitudes toward Different Forms of Whistleblowing: A Comparison of South Korea, Turkey, and the U.K.” Journal of Business Ethics. Volume 82, number 4, November 2008. Pages 929-939.]
          “… one perceives and knows according to where one is, and what impedes or enhances one’s range. This is not just to say that Occupy managed to generate a broad, indistinct but clear perception of its own force by gradually gaining self-perception by way of social media, but also that within each Occupy site there were moments of relative distinction where divergent demands of racial, ethnic, sexual and gendered justice came into relative conflict. It was occupation, or the assembling together of bodies, that generated multiple lines of resistance – both resistance to Occupy’s outside – the 1% – and within Occupy.” [Claire Colebrook, “Resistance to Occupy.” Occupy: A People Yet to Come. Ann Arbor, Michigan: Open Humanities Press imprint of imprint of Michigan Publishing. 2015. Pages 125-157.]
          “… on December 4, 2011, members of Occupy Oakland’s People of Color caucus put forward a motion encouraging participants in that city’s General Assembly to consider dropping ‘Occupy’ and adopting ‘Decolonize’ as their watchword.…
          “The call to ‘decolonize’ the Occupy movement was motivated by the sincere hope that America’s history of violent conquest might finally, mercifully, be undone. But while there’s no reason to suspect the motivations that compelled people to call for an end to the indiscriminate use of the term ‘occupation,’ this should not lead us to conclude that the analytic basis of their exhortation should likewise be beyond scrutiny.”
          [AK Thompson, “‘Occupation’ Between Conquest and Liberation.” Situations: Project of the Radical Imagination. Volume 6, number 1 and 2, 2016. Pages 213-227.]
          “The ‘mortgage meltdown’ of ‘toxic assets’ which knocked the globally networked financial system off its pins had widespread devastating consequences for poor and working people. Shantytowns sprang up across the U.S. of jobless former homeowners. Informal and orchestrated defenses against the wave of foreclosure and evictions were occurring nationwide, supported by new grassroots community organizations. The ideas of squatting and occupation were often discussed as political strategies in the U.S., and a number of artists were working with affected people and activist groups on these issues.” [Alan W. Moore. Occupation Culture: Art & Squatting in the City from Below. Creative Commons. Brooklyn, New York: Minor Compositions imprint of Autonomedia. 2015. Page 50.]
      21. ethical anarchism (Emmanuel Lévinas as pronounced in this MP3 audio file [born with the Lithuanian name, Emmanuelis Levinas], Cindy Milstein, and others): They develop non–authoritarian approaches to ethics.
          “In the relationship with beings, which we call consciousness, we identify beings across the dispersion of silhouettes in which they appear; in self-consciousness we identify ourselves across the multiplicity of temporal phases. It is as though subjective life in the form of consciousness consisted in being itself losing itself and finding itself again so as to possess itself by showing itself, proposing itself as a theme, exposing itself in truth. This identification is not the counterpart of any image; it is a claim of the mind, proclamation, saying, kerygma [Greek/Hellēniká, κῆρυγμα, kē̂rygma, ‘to proclaim’ or ‘to preach’]. But it is not at all arbitrary, and consequently depends on a mysterious operation of schematism, in language, which can make an ideality correspond to the dispersion of aspects and images, silhouettes or phases. To become conscious of a being is then always for that being to be grasped across an ideality and on the basis of a said. Eyen an empirical, individual being is broached across the ideality of logos. Subjectivity qua consciousness can thus be interpreted as the articulation of an ontological event, as one of the mysterious ways in which its ‘act of being’ is deployed. Being a theme, being intelligible or open, possessing oneself, the moment of having in being – all that is articulated in the movement of essence, losing itself and finding itself out of an ideal principle, an ἀρχή [in Greek/Hellēniká, a̓rchḗ, ‘principle’], in its thematic exposition, being thus carries on its affair of being. The detour of ideality leads to coinciding with oneself, that is, to certainty, which remains the guide and guarantee of the whole spiritual adventure of being. But this is why this adventure is no adventure. It is never dangerous; it is self-possession, sovereignity, ἀρχή. Anything unknown that can occur to it is in advance disclosed, open, manifest, is cast in the mould of the known, and cannot be a complete surprise.” [Emmanuel Levinas, “Substitution.” The Levinas Reader. Alphonso Lingis, translator. Seán Hand, editor. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Basil Blackwell Inc. 1989. Pages 89-125.]
          “It will be said that the radical questioning of certitude reduces itself to the search for another certitude: the justification of freedom would refer to freedom. Indeed that is so, in the measure that justification cannot result in non-certitude. But in fact, the moral justification of freedom is neither certitude nor incertitude. It does not have the status of a result, but is accomplished as movement and life; it consists in addressing an infinite exigency to one’s freedom, in having a radical non-indulgence for one’s freedom. Freedom is not justified in the consciousness of certitude, but in an infinite exigency with regard to oneself, in the overcoming of all good conscience. But this infinite exigency with regard to oneself, precisely because it puts freedom in question, places me and maintains me in a situation in which 1 am not alone, in which 1 am judged. This is the primary sociality: the personal relation is in the rigor of justice which judges me and not in love that excuses me. For this judgment does not come to me from a Neuter; before the Neuter I am spontaneously free. In the infinite exigency with regard to oneself is produced the duality of the face to face.” [Emmanuel Levinas. Totality and Infinity: An Essay on Exteriority. Alphonso Lingis, translator. Hingham, Massachusetts: Kluwer Boston, Inc. 1979. Page 304.]
          “Man is not to be conceived in function of being and not-being, taken as ultimate references. Humanity, subjectivity – the excluded middle, excluded from everywhere, null-site – signify the breakup of this alternative, the one-in-the-place-of-another, substitution, signification in its signifyingness qua sign, prior to essence, before identity. Signification, prior to being, breaks up the assembling, the recollection or the present of essence. On the hither side of or beyond essence, signification is the breathlessness of the spirit expiring without inspiring, disinterestedness and gratuity or gratitude; the breakup of essence is ethics. This beyond is said, and is conveyed in discourse, by a saying out of breath or retaining its breath, the extreme possibility of the spirit, its very epoche, by which it says before resting in its own theme and therein allowing itself to be absorbed by essence. This breakup of identity, this changing of being into signification, that is, into substitution, is the subject’s subjectivity, or its subjection to everything, its susceptibility, its vulnerability, that is, its sensibility.– [Emmanuel Levinas. Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence. Alphonso Lingis, translator. Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania: Duquesne University Press. 1998. Page 14.]
          “Objective whole or world of values recognised in a primordial axiology that is the originary attachment of the living to life, tension that underlies, if you like, the reference, formally necessary, of beings to their being. For men as living beings, it is surely in their existing that their very existence is at stake. Originary valorisation that articulates itself in those needs called natural or material: attachment to the existing, to the event of being, to the very esse [Latin for ‘to be’] that matters to men and about which they worry, to which they fix themselves and where, in the world, they are fixed: originary, natural and naïve interestedness.” [Emmanuel Levinas, “Sociality and money.” François Bouchetoux and Campbell Jones, translators. Business Ethics: A European Review. Volume 16, number 3, July 2007. Pages 203-207.]
          “It is I who support the Other and am responsible for her. One thus sees that in the human subject, at the same time as a total subjection, my primo-geniture manifests itself. My responsibility is untransferable, no one could replace me. In fact, it is a matter of expressing the very identity of the human I, starting from responsibility—that is, starting from this position or deposition of the sovereign I in self-consciousness, a deposition which is precisely its responsibility for the Other. Responsibility is what is incumbent on me exclusively, and what, humanly, I cannot refuse. This charge is the supreme dignity of the unique. I am I only to the degree that I am responsible, a non-interchangeable I. I can substitute myself for everyone, but no one can substitute himself for me. Such is my inalienable identity of subject.” [Emmanuel Levinas, “Ethics and Infinity.” CrossCurrents. Volume 34, number 2, summer 1984. Pages 191-203.]
          “Against an analysis that wants to show the disruption of habitual structures of understanding in hearing the divine word, one opposes the possibility of this disruption as an effect of any speech whatsoever. It will be a question of showing that all speech is disruptive – that this disruption is critique – moral [accuser].” [Emmanuel Levinas, “Notes on Metaphor.” International Journal of Philosophical Studies. Volume 20, issue 3, July 2012. Pages 319-330.]
          “The process Of reflection stirred by the face of another individual is not a thought about—a representation—but at once a thought for, a non-indifference towards the other which upsets the equilibrium of the calm and impassive soul of pure knowledge. It is an awakening to a uniqueness in the other person which cannot be grasped by knowledge, a step towards the newcomer as someone who is both unique and a fellow being. I am speaking of the face itself, over and above any particular expression it may bear, the face that exists beneath every expression that crosses its countenance and cloaks its nudity. To look at it in this way is not so much an unveiling as a stripping bare of something exposed and undefended, revealed as it is, naked as mortality itself. The extreme precariousness of something unique, the precariousness of the stranger. The totality of the exposure lies in the fact that it is not merely a new awareness of the familiar revealed in its true light; it is a form of expression, a primal language, a summons, an appeal.” [Emmanuel Levinas, “The face of a stranger.” UNESCO Courier. Volume 45, number 7, July–August 1992. Page 66.]
          “In brief, the problem of being that [Martin] Heidegger poses leads us to man, for man is a being who understands being. But, on the other hand, this understanding of being is itself being-it is not an attribute, but man’s mode of existence. This is not a question of a purely conventional extension of the word ‘being’ to one of man’s faculties, which in our case would be the understanding of being, but the bringing into relief of the very specificity of man, whose ‘actions’ and ‘properties’ are modes of being.” [Emmanuel Levinas, “Martin Heidegger and Ontology.” Diacritics. Volume 26, number 1, spring 1996. Pages 11-32.]
          “… responsibility precedes liberty, which means precisely belonging to God, a unique belonging which, though prior to liberty, does not destroy liberty, and thus defines, one might say, the meaning of that exceptional word: God; God appearing in the name of an assembly of the just, itself called divine; God as the very possibility of such an assembly. And inversely, an assembly of the just that is not exclusively the ultimate source of its own judgment: another will is present within it; the decision of the judge is more than human spontaneity — it is in spired. That is what our text will go on to say. Justice is not decided by means of an order that it imposes or restores; nor does it emerge from a system whose rationality commands, without distinction, both men and gods, revealing itself in human legislation like the structures of space in geometry. Such a justice is what Montesquieu calls the Logos of Jupiter, a metaphor that rescues religion but eliminates transcendence. In the justice of the rabbis, however, the difference between divine and human retains its significance. Ethics is not the simple corollary of the religious, but is, by itself, the element in which religious transcendence receives its original meaning.” [Emmanuel Levinas, “The Jewish Understanding of Scripture.” CrossCurrents. Volume 44, number 4, winter 1994/1995. Pages 488-504.]
          “… [The] impossibility of encountering the Other without speaking to him or her signifies that in this instance thought is inseparable from expression. But such expression does not consist in decanting in some manner a thought in connection with the Other into the mind of the Other.…
          “Nothing theological, nothing mystical lies hidden behind the analysis that we have just given of the encounter with the Other, an encounter whose formal structure it was important to underline; namely, that its object is at one and the same time given to us and in society with us, without this event of sociality being able to reduce itself to an ordinary property revealed in the given, without knowledge being able to take precedence over sociality. If the word religion is taken to imply, however, that the Infinite is rejoined through human faces, or that the relation with human beings, which, separated from the exercise of power, is irreducible to comprehension, then it has an ethical resonance all of whose Kantian echoes we accept.”
          [Emmanuel Levinas, “Is Ontology Fundamental?” Philosophy Today. Volume 33, number 2, summer 1989. Pages 121-129.]
          “As well as outlining Levinas’ an-archic ethics, its implications for corporations will be investigated.…
          “In his paper ‘Substitution’ Emmanuel Levinas … notes that our conscious apprehension of other people is organized in an idealized way. It is idealized in the sense that once we seek to understand others we do so using the themes and categories that we apply to them. In consciousness other people are not individual or particular but rather are understood as they relate to the ‘types’ we use to compare and categorize them.… Levinas retains that exposure to the other person is not limited to consciousness and thematization. The other person can never be fully exposed through symbols, images and language. The spiritual dimension of the encounter with the other is, for Levinas, that which exceeds our ability to know them categorically; it exceeds any principle that would apply. To such a principle Levinas attributes the Greek work arche: an ideal principle imagined to be able to define experience prior to its occurrence.”
          [Carl Rhodes, “Ethical anarchism, business ethics and the politics of disturbance.” Ephemera: Theory & Politics in Organization. Volume 14, number 4, 2014. Creative Commons. Pages 725-737.]
          “It’s never a matter of ethics versus pragmatism; it’s a question of which informs the other. Humans have shown themselves capable of almost unlimited imagination and innovation-qualities that could be said to define human beings. People have used this capacity to do both great good and great harm. The point is that when humans set their minds to doing something, it’s frequently possible. It makes sense to first ask what people want to do and why, from an ethical standpoint, and then get to the pragmatic how-to questions. The very process of asking what’s right is how people fill out ethics in praxis, to meet new demands and dilemmas, new social conditions and contexts.
          “Anarchism, then, brings an egalitarian ethics out into the world, making it transparent, public, and shared. It maintains an ethical orientation, while continually trying to put such notions into practice, as flawed as the effort might be. When other people come into contact with this ethical compass, they will hopefully ‘get it’ and incorporate the same values into their lives, because it works. It offers directionality to political involvement and buttresses people’s efforts to remake society. It turns surviving into thriving. That’s the crucial difference between a pragmatic versus ethical impulse: people, in cooperative concert, qualitatively transform one another’s lives.”
          [Cindy Milstein. Anarchism and Its Aspirations. Oakland, California: AK Press. 2010. Pages 48-49.]
          “[Cindy] Milstein’s focus on ethics is absolutely correct. In particular I like her commitment to democracy (direct democracy), which many anarchists reject. But we do not have to choose between values and a materialistic analysis of how capitalism works and how it can be challenged. Whatever [Karl] Marx—or [Murray] Bookchin—thought, these are not incompatible perspectives. A moral analysis can show us the goal and cause us to reject the current system. A materialistic analysis can offer guidance as to which forces are going in a libertarian direction and which are moving in a regressive direction. And morality can, again, guide us in deciding which to choose. That is a discussion and a decision. Cindy Milstein’s book [Anarchism and Its Aspirations] is a valuable contribution to that discussion.” [Wayne Price, “The Ethical Anarchism of Cindy Milstein: Review of Cindy Milstein, Anarchism and Its Aspirations (2010), Oakland CA: AK Press.” Anarkismo.net. August thth, 2011. Online publication. No pagination. Retrieved on November 26th, 2016.]
          “In the nineteenth century, anarchists were strict individualists favouring clandestine organization and violent revolution: in the twentieth century, they have been romantic communalists favouring moral experiments and sexual liberation. This article examines the growth of this ethical anarchism in Britain in the late nineteenth century, as exemplified by the Freedom Group and the Tolstoyans. These anarchists adopted the moral and even religious concerns of groups such as the Fellowship of the New Life. Their anarchist theory resembled the beliefs of countercultural groups such as the aesthetes more closely than it did earlier forms of anarchism. And this theory led them into the movements for sex reform and communal living.…
          “To the Victorians, anarchism was an individualist doctrine found in clandestine organizations of violent revolutionaries. By the outbreak of the First World War, another very different type of anarchism was becoming equally well recognized. The new anarchists still opposed the very idea of the state, but they were communalists not individualists, and they sought to realize their ideal peacefully through personal example and moral education, not violently through acts of terror and a general uprising.”
          [Mark Bevir, “The Rise of Ethical Anarchism in Britain, 1885-1900.” Historical Research. Volume 69, 1996. Pages 143-165.]
      22. functional anarchism(s) (Michael Frederick Rattray): He examines “the intersection of art and anarchism.”
          “… a part of modernity, at least from an anarchist perspective, was to recognize the equality of all in the absence of State-defined difference and institutional coercion. The intersection of art and anarchism opened a theoretical trajectory that explored freedom from institutional coercion and provided alternative models of organization that problematized the status of the art object and the role the artist plays in contemporary life. I call this latent anarchism that existed, and continues to exist in the art world functional anarchism(s). I pluralize anarchism because of the many models that can exist across the anarchist spectrum and, indeed, to announce that these functional anarchism(s) are not static, or fixed, but kinetic, pluralized, and generative.” [Michael Frederick Rattray. Functional Anarchism(s) and the Theory of Global Contemporary Art. Ph.D. thesis (U.S. English, dissertation). Concordia University. Montreal, Quebec. January, 2014. Page 6.]
      23. anarchist pedagogy (Robert H. Haworth): The articles in this edited work offer various anarchist perspectives on pedagogy.
          “Unfortunately, the dismissal of anarchist thought tends to move even further away when discussing philosophical and theoretical frameworks in education. Although there are many educational researchers who frame their work within critical perspectives (Marxism, neo-Marxism, Autonomist Marxism, and Marxist Humanism), the majority of research and teaching practices are confined to ‘liberal’ and ‘conservative’ ideological debates.
          “… I wanted to emphasize the important contributions anarchism has made to educational praxis. Additionally, I wanted the book to disrupt dominant discussions regarding formal state-run education and explore the more creative spaces of resistance that emerge out of anarchist pedagogies and nonstatist structures. Moreover, from the body of work illustrated by the contributors, it is evident that there is not one defining position on anarchist pedagogy. In some cases, the fluid characteristics of anarchism and the pedagogical processes that individuals and collectives engage in are situated and nestled into the different educative spaces we inhabit. With this in mind, within these pages there are opportunities for anarchists to explore and critically reflect.”
          [Robert H. Haworth, “Introduction.” Anarchist Pedagogies: Collective Actions, Theories, and Critical Reflections on Education. Robert H. Haworth, editor. Oakland, California: PM Press. 2012. Pages 1-10.]
      24. post–left anarchism (Jason McQuinn, Bob Black, and others): They develop a version of anarchism which incorporates a critique of the left.
          “The alternative argued for by the post-left anarchist synthesis is still being created. It cannot be claimed by any single theorist or activist because it’s a project that was in the air long before it started becoming a concrete set of proposals, texts and interventions. Those seeking to promote the synthesis have been primarily influenced by both the classical anarchist movement up to the Spanish Revolution on the one hand, and several of the most promising critiques and modes of intervention developed since the 60s. The most important critiques involved include those of everyday life and the spectacle, of ideology and morality, of industrial technology, of work and of civilization. Modes of intervention focus on the concrete deployment of direct action in all facets of life. Rather than aiming at the construction of institutional or bureaucratic structures, these interventions aim at maximal critical effectiveness with minimal compromise in constantly changing networks of action.” [Jason McQuinn. Post-Left Anarchy: Leaving the Left Behind. Berkeley, California: The Anarchist Library imprint of Open Guild Organization. 2009. Pages 3-4.]
          “Why has there been such a long history of conflict and enmity between anarchists and the left? It is because there are two fundamentally different visions of social change embodied in the range of their respective critiques and practices (although any particular group or movement always includes contradictory elements). At its simplest, anarchists-especially anarchists who identify least with the left—commonly engage in a practice which refuses to set itself up as a political leadership apart from society, refuses the inevitable hierarchy and manipulation involved in building mass organizations, and refuses the hegemony of any single dogmatic ideology. The left, on the other hand, has most commonly engaged in a substitutive, representational practice in which mass organizations are subjected to an elitist leadership of intellectual ideologues and opportunistic politicians. In this practice the party substitutes itself for the mass movement, and the party leadership substitutes itself for the party.” [Jason McQuinn. Post-Left Anarchy?. Berkeley, California: The Anarchist Library imprint of Open Guild Organization. 2009. Page 2.]
          “The expression post-left anarchism is implicitly critical of leftism. Certainly I meant it that way. Leftism is something to be surpassed. “Post-left anarchy,” I wrote, ‘is poised to articulate – not a program – but a number of revolutionary themes with contemporary relevance and resonance.’ Writing as I was against Bookchin, I provided a short, non-exclusive list of differences. I suggested that post-left anarchism was (1) ‘unambiguously anti-political’ – no voting, for instance; (2); hedonistic (‘Many people wonder what’s wrong with wanting to be happy’); and (3) if not necessarily rejective, then at least suspicious of modern technology and the extravagant liberatory claims made for it.” [Bob Black. Notes on ‘Post-Left Anarchism.’ Berkeley, California: The Anarchist Library imprint of Open Guild Organization. 2015. Pages 7-8.]
      25. anarchist economics (Chris Spannos, Abbey Volcano, Deric Shannon, and others): They develop various non-hierarchical approaches to economics.
          “While still recognising the contextual and temporal natures of economic practices – systems of ‘archy’ and ‘anarchy’ could theoretically found within any taxonomy – a general interpretation of anarchist modes of organisation in this taxonomy would also capture these as a continuum. All things being equal, anarchist economic praxis will be most present toward the top-left hand side [non-exchanged labor], and be more absent the further right [including formal paid and unpaid work in the private sector] the work practices appear along the spectrum. In this context two important caveats need to be made.” [Richard J. White and Colin C. Williams, “Anarchist economic practices in a ‘capitalist’ society: Some implications for organisation and the future of work.” Ephemera: Theory & Politics in Organization. Volume 14, number 4, 2014. Pages 951-975.]
          “The term ‘anarchist economics’ contains two related concepts. One is the anarchist critique of capitalism, the other the suggestions for how an anarchist economy would function. Both are interrelated. What we are opposed to in capitalism will be reflected in our visions of a libertarian economy just as our hopes and dreams of a free society will inform our analysis of the current system. Both need to be understood as both are integral to each other.” [Chris Spannos, “Examining the History of Anarchist Economics to See the Future.” The Accumulation of Freedom: Writings on Anarchist Economics. Oakland, California: AK Press. 2012. AK Press ebook edition.]
          “It is … [a] post-capitalist future that motivates us to write, study, and struggle. It is the power of possibility that often gives us the desire to even get out of bed in the morning in a world like ours where possibilities are so often pushed to the margins in favor of a boring, violent, and fundamentalist belief in the necessity and superiority of the status quo. It is our hope that we can add to our resistance strategies against capital, but more so that we can aid in toppling capitalism altogether and creating a livable future for ourselves, each other, and the many inhabitants that we share this world with. Anarchist economics, to be worthy of the name, should be a part of that larger project.” [Abbey Volcano and Deric Shannon, “Capitalism in the 2000s: Some Broad Strokes for Beginners.” The Accumulation of Freedom: Writings on Anarchist Economics. Oakland, California: AK Press. 2012. AK Press ebook edition.]
          “… as anti-capitalists, anarchists have always been concerned with economics. We participated (and continue to participate) in revolutions and insurrections directed against capitalism and class society. We attempt to embody anti-capitalist values in the ways that we engage with other people and our world more generally. Since anarchists have always been preoccupied with the problem of capitalism and how we might move beyond it into communities of mutual aid and cooperation, it is necessary to start, in an anarchist economics, with that which we oppose in economics—capitalism.” [Deric Shannon, Anthony J. Nocella, II, John Asimakopoulos, “Anarchist Economics: A Holistic View.” The Accumulation of Freedom: Writings on Anarchist Economics. Oakland, California: AK Press. 2012. AK Press ebook edition.]
          “By focusing on economics, a severely neglected component of anarchist thought, The Accumulation of Freedom represents one of the latest contributions to the ongoing development of anarchist studies. It seeks to refute the common misconception that Marxism encompasses the entirety of anti-capitalist economics while anarchism is an irrational dream.” [Mark Bray, “The Accumulation of Freedom: Writings on Anarchist Economics.” Theory In Action. Volume 5, number 4, October 2012. Pages 103-106.]
          “The book invites lots of other questions. How to implement anarchist economics in a world that is interdependent on a world scale? Will we be able to produce differently goods that nowadays are made in large industries (aeroplanes, ships)? What to do with people who do not want to comply with the new economy? Should we force them into liberty, should we apply democratic-centralist methods of decision-making? It is to be hoped that this book will find a welcome not only in anarchist circles. The problems it addresses, the choices various authors suggest, the solutions they propose, have to be considered by a wide audience.” [Bert Altena, “The Accumulation of Freedom: Writings on Anarchist Economics.” Anarchist Studies. Volume 21, number 1, spring–summer 2013. Pages 117-119.]
      26. anarchist political economy (Angela Wigger): She proposes a new heterodox political economy based upon anarchism.
          “Anarchist theory encompasses a heterodox compilation of ideas, which mean different things to different people and which are constantly in flux and evolving.…
          “Although clear-cut blueprints about an anarchist political economy and concise roadmaps on how to get there are impossible to draw up, anarchist utopias provide valuable inspiration for prefiguring an egalitarian distribution of wealth and power in a society. If we understand utopianism as ‘perpetually exploring new ways to perfect an imperfect reality’ …, then the mere possibility of envisioning a different world already holds the prospect of it becoming a viable project …. Such utopias should however not be unduly romanticized or idealised as they can easily transmute into dogmatic orthodoxies …. Importantly, utopias always have to be re-envisaged in the light of past and real-existing practices.”
          [Angela Wigger, “A critical appraisal of what could be an anarchist political economy.” Ephemera: Theory & Politics in Organization. Volume 14, number 4, November 2014. Pages 739-751.]
      27. anarchist psychotherapy (Daniel Rhodes): He develops an anti–capitalist version of psychotherapy which is informed by ecospirituality.
          “The irony of spirituality in contemporary society is that ad agencies and corporations have taken advantage of the need for meaning in individual’s lives and the fact that our disconnection from the natural world and each other has caused a ‘spiritual’ emptiness. Capitalism exploits this emptiness as a way to encourage people to consume more and to fill that void. We have established a society of consumerism, a consuming civilization where money and things have become our religion. Ecospirituality becomes engagement and a way to build communities that has a foundation of sustainability. It shifts our thinking from a pedagogy of death through ecocide to a pedagogy of life. This will lead into the conclusions and what I call an anarchist psychotherapy.” [Daniel Rhodes. An Anarchist Psychotherapy: Ecopsychology and a Pedagogy of Life. Ph.D. dissertation. The University of North Carolina at Greensboro. Greensboro, North Carolina. 2008. Page 34.]
      28. anarchist anthropology (David Graeber): He proposes a non–vanguardist anarchist approach to anthropology.
          “… any anarchist social theory would have to reject self-consciously any trace of vanguardism. The role of intellectuals is most definitively not to form an elite that can arrive at the correct strategic analyses and then lead the masses to follow. But if not that, what? This is one reason I’m calling this essay ‘Fragments of an Anarchist Anthropology’—because this is one area where I think anthropology is particularly well positioned to help. And not only because most actually-existing self-governing communities, and actually-existing non-market economies in the world have been investigated by anthropologists rather than sociologists or historians. It is also because the practice of ethnography provides at least something of a model, if a very rough, incipient model, of how nonvanguardist revolutionary intellectual practice might work. When one carries out an ethnography, one observes what people do, and then tries to tease out the hidden symbolic, moral, or pragmatic logics that underlie their actions; one tries to get at the way people’s habits and actions makes sense in ways that they are not themselves completely aware of. One obvious role for a radical intellectual is to do precisely that: to look at those who are creating viable alternatives, try to figure out what might be the larger implications of what they are (already) doing, and then offer those ideas back, not as prescriptions, but as contributions, possibilities—as gifts.” [David Graeber. Fragments of an Anarchist Anthropology. Chicago, Illinois: Prickly Paradigm Press, LLC. 2004. Pages 11-12.]
      29. anarchist cultural studies (Jesse Cohn): He writes a proposal for a new version of cultural studies.
          “While anarchist scholars decline to play the role of a Leninist vanguard dictating correct ‘theory’ to activists charged with ‘practice,’ this does not mean that they have to disavow any critical role at all. On the contrary: much of anarchist cultural studies is a kind of self-study, a reflection by anarchists on the conditions and possibilities of their own activity. Among the best work we have produced are studies of contemporary as well as historical anarchist tactics of cultural resistance – studies of Indymedia and infoshops, anti-roads camps and Reclaim The Streets parties, collectively-produced journals and giant puppets. Rather than simply affirming these practices, however, a number of these studies raise significant questions about their potentials and their limitations.…
          “I would argue that an important dimension of anarchist cultural studies research, for the near future, will consist in historical research: a thorough re-examination of the role of cultural resistance in the anarchist movements of the ‘classical’ period, from the First International through the Spanish Civil War.”
          [Jesse Cohn, “What Is Anarchist Cultural Studies?: Precursors, Problems, and Prospects—Beyond Banality.” New Perspectives on Anarchism. Nathan J. Jun and Shane Wahl, editors. Lanham, Maryland: Lexington Books imprint of Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc. 2010. Pages 403-424.]
      30. critical anarchist theory (Charles Thorpe and Ian Welsh):
          “This article develops an anarchist political theory of science and technology that highlights the latent forms of anarchist praxis present within a diverse range of social movement engagements with contemporary techno-science. We argue that there is a marked congruence between contemporary social movement engagement and the key concepts and principles underpinning anarchist writing on science and technology from the nineteenth century onwards.…
          “… Key questions explored here are what does the philosophical and political tradition of anarchism have to contribute to such contemporary challenges to dominant social-epistemic orders and is there a theory of science embedded in anarchist political thought that is relevant and applicable to contemporary struggles?
          “Given the continuing importance of science to modern states and the neo-liberal ‘global knowledge economy,’ a critical anarchist theory of science and technology needs to overcome the limitations within various forms of ‘primitivism’ ….”
          [Charles Thorpe and Ian Welsh, “Beyond primitivism: towards a twenty-first century anarchist theory and praxis for science and technology.” Anarchist Studies. Volume 16, number 1, spring–summer 2008. Pages 48-75.]
      31. radical contextualism (Jerry Zaslove): He develops an anarchist approach to literary theory.
          “The contextualist must find ways to realise the experience and represent that experience with an empirical basis for his or her belief that the representation of experience which she or he ‘has’ can be realised in this society and culture. The critic completes the experience of the work of art by giving evidence of herself as a thinking and feeling individual who is impressed by changing historical circumstances, shifting contexts of value, the insufficiency of cultural norms, and the difficulty of accepting permanence as an aesthetic value. The act of completion is a social act which demonstrates the situational immediacy of aesthetic experience.” [Jerry Zaslove, “Radical Contextualism: Studies in Critical Approaches to Literature.” Anarcho-Modernism: Toward a New Critical Theory—In Honour of Jerry Zaslove. Ian Angus, editor. Vancouver, British Columbia: Talonbooks. 2001. Kindle edition.]
          “Issues regarding academic controversies were discussed in the classroom and not just at meetings. Another missing element today is the continuing labour struggles of sessionals. Strikes at the time provided an opportunity for education to confront reality in regard to the professional behaviour of academics about meeting classes and crossing picket lines. Of course today, with the technological fix, one may not have an actual classroom to picket or a course that is not a part of commodity production or course management. At the time the fear of violence was in the air about student movements and their characterization as strikers and anti-war agitators.” [Jerry Zaslove, “A Report to an Academy: Some Untimely Meditations Out of Season.” English Studies in Canada. Volume 38, issue 1, 2013. Pages 27-50.]
          “In the DVD We Dance On Your Grave, the documentary view of Simon Fraser’s 40ᵗʰ Anniversary Party is transformed into a slow-motion silent video of pathos-ridden dancing on the premises of Arthur Erickson’s imitation Crystal Palace Mall. Alex Morrison prepared the video by filming the celebration of a fabricated public sphere. The video reveals no genuine joy or celebration of the origins of a university in 1965 in the muddy construction site of the time, but reveals a form of stupidity about their own amnesiac actions. It is fake. It mimics the dropout culture by dropping in. This is the kind of stupidity that comes with the erasure of history and the substitution for historical consciousness — displacing any class-consciousness — with ersatz carnivalesque posturing. This is not a celebration of individual memories but of the taboos on ‘academic freedom’ that appear artistically as a strange concoction of exotic costumes that imitate the now mythical ‘Sixties.’ In the context of the entire installation this integrates the objects into figures of loss. The camouflaging of the legacy of academic freedom across the centuries becomes reified nonsense commingling with a question of ‘Why Are We Here At All?’” [Jerry Zaslove, “Silence, Counterfeit and Aesthetic Act in Alex Morrison’s Vision of ‘Academic Freedom as Academic’—Installations of the Phantoms of a Utopian Will.” Anthology of Exhibition Essays: 2006 | 2007. Catriona Jeffries, editor. Vancouver, British Columbia: CJ Press. 2008. Pages 96-111.]
          “… both textualist and contextualist readings can be reductive, even though the label is, in literary studies especially, usually attached to the former. If we take seriously the claim that analysis of all kinds of texts is not only acceptable but also necessary in cultural studies, the question remains, what would this mean in practice? What does analysis of texts involve in a post cultural studies situation? One solution, referred to in passing above, would be an integrated approach which attempts to cover all the levels and aspects of the texts in question. Analysis of a text would then need to account for all aspects and levels of text – production, text, and reception – and also to try out different perspectives on it. Since these aspects are not independent in the real world, a division of labour e.g. according to disciplinary lines distorts the research object.” [Urpo Kovala, “Cultural Studies and Cultural Text Analysis.” CLCWeb: Comparative Literature and Culture. Volume 4, issue 2, article 2, 2002. Pages 1-7.]
      32. Muslim anarchism (Zaheer Kazmi [ʾUrdū, ظَہِیر کَاظْمِی. Ẓahīir Kāẓmī]): Kazmi critically examines this subject.
          “I use the term “Muslim anarchism” in a qualified manner to describe specific examples of contemporary radical anti-authoritarian thought which self-identify as being Islamic and acknowledge affinities with anarchism. The paper is not concerned with mapping Muslim anarchism as a “tradition” of thought or a social movement, or with revisionist interpretations of Islam as being anarchistic. In this sense, it is intended neither as a survey or typology of Muslim anarchism nor as implying that the specific writers under discussion here are representative of a wider Muslim anarchist tradition. Muslim anarchism is thus a contested social and intellectual category which has, nonetheless, been used to describe radical forms of Islamic hermeneutics that lie at global Islam’s very periphery. While a comparatively minor ideological outgrowth, there is now a marginal literature on the subject, mainly by its proponents, who self-identify as anarchists or draw on anarchism. In this sense, it can be viewed alongside other ideologized forms of Muslim activism which seek legitimacy through divergent hermeneutic practices. There is also a growing, largely activist, literature on the compatibility of religion with anarchism and studies of non-Western anarchism, within which Muslim anarchism has increasingly come to be situated.” [Zaheer Kazmi, “Automatic Islam: Divine Anarchy and the Machines of God.” Modern Intellectual History. Volume 12, number 1, April 2015. Pages 33-64.]
      33. Christian anarchism (Alexandre Christoyannopoulos as pronounced in this MP3 audio file): He develops an anarchist approach to political theology.
          “… this book can act as a first important step towards a better understanding of Christian anarchism in political theology and political thought. Moreover, it also opens up areas of potential dialogue for instance with other trends in anarchism, with pacifist thinking, with liberation theology, and in general with the growing literature on religion and politics. It provides a unique perspective to Christians pondering how their faith is to inform their politics. It might also be of interest to non-Christians who are curious about the political dimension of what continues to be one of the world’s most widespread religions. Obviously, it also makes available to Christian anarchist activists and similar Christian radicals a fairly comprehensive summary that weaves together many of the thinkers they might have read so far on the topic. Indeed, it will also be relevant to those who have studied other aspects of some of these thinkers, by clarifying that side of their thinking. This is especially the case for Tolstoy, whose Christian anarchism is rarely given serious academic attention. In synthesising Christian anarchism and presenting it as a tradition, therefore, this book is—I hope—potentially relevant to a wide range of (academic and lay) thinkers, Christians, and activists.” [Alexandre Christoyannopoulos. Christian Anarchism: A Political Commentary on the Gospel. Abridged edition. Exeter, England: Imprint Academic. 2013. Kindle edition.]
      34. unkingdom of God (Mark Van Steenwyk): He proposes a version of “Christo–anarchism”—an anarchist approach to Christianity.
          “We must mourn the old world, the old ways and its cycle of death—the cycle of greed and violence and oppression—as we move into the unkingdom of God. And, as we do so, we must let go of the illusion of our own righteousness. We can’t render ourselves radicals because we happen to have superficially opted out of the system and picked up a new vocabulary.
          “If we are able to live the part of the radical without mourning our own complicity and mourning for those trapped in the cycle, we are simply a clanging cymbal. If, because of some strong exercise of willpower, we manage to—based upon the heat of our own frustration—carve out an entire way of life that stands in contrast to the empire, but have not love, we are simply the beat of an angry drum.
          “Too often justice work has the goal of turning marginalized folks into middle-class Americans. Perhaps our affluence is a deeper problem than their poverty.”
          [Mark Van Steenwyk. The Unkingdom of God: Embracing the Subversive Power of Repentance. Downers Grove, Illinois: IVP Press imprint of InterVarsity Press. 2013. Pages 132.]
          “Jesus’ kingdom isn’t the sort that one holds with an iron fist. Rather, it is an unkingdom ….
          “Jesus is calling for a loving anarchy. An unkingdom. Of which he is the unking.”
          [Mark Van Steenwyk. That Holy Anarchist: Reflections on Christianity & Anarchism. Minneapolis, Minnesota: Missio Dei. 2012. Creative Commons. Page 14.]
          “The best way forward, it seems to me, is to be rooted in the particularity of the story of Jesus and the church. I assume—and I realize this is a big assumption—that Jesus shows us a bold new way to be human: a way that not only challenges domination, but also transforms us. It is more than political (but isn’t less than political…it offers real insight in how we live together in communities of practice). But it is also more than spiritual (but it isn’t less than spiritual…it offers real insight in how our hearts can be animated by the Spirit of God). The way of Jesus is integrated; the ‘unkingdom of God’ confronts our political, economic, religious realities. It challenges both the social world and our interior spaces.
          “A Christian anarchism must be rooted in Jesus’ vision. However, I don’t believe we can really live into that vision without learning from sources outside of the Christian tradition. We can’t bible-study our way past our imaginative impasse. Our tradition is so enmeshed within the story of imperialism that we must be open to external critiques of both imperialism and Christianity.”
          [Mark Van Steenwyk. That Holy Anarchist: Reflections on Christianity & Anarchism. Minneapolis, Minnesota: Missio Dei. Creative Commons. 2012. Page 62.]
          “‘No gods, no masters’ is a slogan embraced by most anarchists. Many anarchists I know assume that Christo–anarchists are either anarchists who refuse to let go of their childhood fantasies or Christians who really don’t understand anarchism. Their assumptions are often correct.
          “Anarchism, particularly as a loose set of principles, doesn’t often ‘play well’ with Christianity. Most Christians I know assume that I am either amazingly impractical or a heretic. (I am more comfortable with the latter than the former.) …
          “I am an anarchist because I believe that our world works best when we live with a sense of mutuality – when we care for each other and the land. I’m a Christian because I believe Jesus shows us a way to do that, and I believe this way is rooted in the source of all life. To be a Christo-anarchist is, to me, the logical conclusion of taking Jesus seriously when he calls us to love God and neighbour.”
          [Mark Van Steenwyk, “Christo-anarchism is a move toward non-domination.” Geez: Contemporary Cultural Resistance. Issue 28, winter 2012. Online publication. No pagination.]
      35. social anarchist aesthetic (Neala Schleuning as pronounced in this MP3 audio file): She focuses on the “age of fragmentation.”
          “A social anarchist aesthetic is … concerned with the general ambiance or an attitude of wholeness and completeness that is expressed in the work of art. A work of art of any sort must be created and comprehended as a whole, and all aspects of the work need to be integrated. In the process of arranging the parts, there is always the need to understand and to express the whole, to see it emerge from the process itself and to result in a completion. Here is where postmodern art generally fails us. It refuses and even denies that there is a coherent context, a meaningful reality – even in the work of art itself.” [Neala Schleuning. Artpolitik: Social Anarchist Aesthetics in an Age of Fragmentation. Creative Commons. Brooklyn, New York: Minor Compositions imprint of Autonomedia. 2013. Page 251.]
      36. structural–anarchism (Michel Luc Bellemare as pronounced in this MP3 audio file): He develops an anarchist approach which incorporates aspects of Marxist theory. Aspects of the approach are discussed within a pair of animated YouTube videos.
          “Marxism is an ideological framework.…
          “For the logic of structural-anarchism—species-being is not some ephemeral empty concept, but is specifically the insatiable drive for ownership/knowledge within all entities. The notion of the insatiable drive for ownership/knowledge surpasses [Karl] Marx’s species-being analysis in the sense that it specifies a specific definition of what species-being consists of, comprises of and the set of working relationships it embodies in a most accurate and precise fashion. The insatiable drive for ownership/knowledge is species-being, i.e. the mechanism within all existential entities which manufactures value, i.e. all sorts of forms of capital that are seized from it by the logic of capitalism. For example, the species-being, i.e. the insatiable drive for ownership/knowledge, of a snake is a specific type of entity that interprets, perceives, acts and is in the world according to a very distinct and unique insatiable drive for ownership/knowledge. The snake manufactures a specific type of capital specific to the characteristics of its specles-being, i.e. its specific insatiable drive for ownership/knowledge. Its specific insatiable drive for ownership/knowledge always attempting to understand, conquer and own greater and greater portions of its specific environment so as to manufacture greater portions of its specific surplus value so it can increase its influence in the world and propagate itself and its species-being in general. The same applies to the human species, which embodies a specific insatiable drive for ownership/knowledge, which enables it to accumulate and extract its own specific forms of surplus values that permit the human species to expand and intensify its dominion over the globe. As a result, the logic of structural-anarchism refines the Marxist concept of species-being by giving it a more specific definition and procedural definition and by expanding the concept beyond strictly the human species to include all species.”
          [Michel Luc Bellemare. The Structural-Anarchism Manifesto: The Logic of Structural-Anarchism Versus The Logic of Capitalism. Montreal, Quebec: Blacksatin Publications. 2016. Pages 61-62.]
      37. anarchist studies (Ruth Kinna, Lewis Call, and many others): It is a multidisciplinary approach which focuses on anarchism.
          “Riding the wave of nearly twenty years of global activism, anarchism has established a niche hold in a diverse range of research fields. It would be a wild exaggeration to say that anarchism research has entered the mainstream, but hardly an embellishment to argue that the possibilities of the anarchist turn have been recognised by significant groups of scholars.” [Ruth Kinna, “Anarchism and critical management studies: a reflection from an anarchist studies perspective.” Ephemera: Theory & Politics in Organization. Volume 14, number 4, 2014. Pages 611-621.]
          “By 1996, the anarchist community had begun to view AS [the journal, Anarchist Studies] as a major site of intellectual discussion and (in the best sense of the word) argument.…
          “AS has published papers on a remarkably diverse array of topics over the past fifteen years. Still, certain general trends have emerged. For example, AS has always recognized the vital role which postmodernism and post-structuralism play in contemporary debates about anarchist theory. By no means has AS provided an uncritical endorsement of the various ‘post-’ theories. Instead, the journal has consistently offered a stimulating conversation about the relevance (or irrelevance) of these theories to contemporary anarchism.”
          [Lewis Call, “A brief history of Anarchist Studies (so far).” Anarchist Studies. Volume 15, number 2, autumn–winter 2007. Pages 100-106.]
      38. anarcha-feminism (Lindsay Grace Weber, Mary Fridely, Debi Withers, and others): It is a version of feminism based upon the elimination of hierarchies of power.
          “Situating ‘anarcha-feminism’ as movement, however, necessarily limits historical inquiry by ignoring the wide range of influences and relationships that impacted its theoretical development.… Situating ‘anarcha-feminism’ only within the feminist milieu similarly ignores the influences of anarchist philosophy and practice, which played an important part in emergent articulations; interrogating the basis of this framing of ‘anarcha-feminism’ requires a brief historical contexualization. While post-sixties feminism facilitated a platform for the first articulations of anarch@-feminism in the early seventies, the political and cultural radicalism of the New Left and counterculture also played a decisive role in anarch@-feminism’s development.” [Lindsay Grace Weber. On the Edge of All Dichotomies: Anarch@–Feminist Thought, Process and Action, 1970-1983. B.A. Honors thesis. Wesleyan University. Middletown, Connecticut. April, 2009. Page 36.]
          “Most of the theory workshop involved women defining what anarcha-feminism was to them, and how they had integrated it into their lives. Some women used anarchism to ‘explore the positive side of struggle.’ One woman said she would be connected to anarchism ‘as long as it was a place to be a rebel.’ Another viewed anarchism as ‘action’ with feminism being ‘what led to that action.’ It seemed that most women, even though they saw anarcha-feminism as a revolutionary force, used it primarily to redefine their personal environment, which leaves unanswered the question of how anarcha-feminism applies to the day-to-day struggles of all women. The question of privilege was raised and the concern is a very real one. All but one of the women at the conference were white and most were middle-class. A lack of class consciousness was apparent in most workshops. Sometimes I was uncomfortably aware that being at the conference seemed too much like being part of an exclusive club, not only because most ‘members’ were white but because they spoke largely of personal oppression, all defined within a middle-class framework. Any movement which claims to be revolutionary but does not incorporate the struggles of poor, working class, Black, and Third World women into its philosophy is not revolutionary – it is no better than the Democratic party.” [Mary Fridely, “Anarcha-feminism: growing stronger.” Off Our Backs: A Women’s News Journal. Volume 8, number 7, July 1978. Page 20.]
          “RAG (Revolutionary Anarcha-feminist Group) is a publishing collective based in Dublin, Ireland. They have been working together since 2005 and collectively publish an annual magazine The Rag that melds feminist and anarchist concerns within an Irish (but nonetheless globally orientated) context.…
          “The magazine’s production is subject to a particular set of processes in which a non-hierarchical, consensus based method is placed at the forefront of their publishing concerns. This is a central part of the anarcha-feminism which the group enact in creating the magazine.”
          [Debi Withers, “Anarcha-feminist process and publishing in Ireland: the RAG collective.” Anarchist Studies. Volume 19, number 1, spring–summer 2011. Pages 9-22.]
          “Anarcha-feminism is, ultimately, a tautology. Anarchism seeks the liberation of all human beings from all kinds of oppression and a world without hierarchies, where people freely organise and self-manage all aspects of life and society on the basis of horizontality, equality, solidarity and mutual aid. Consequently, such a struggle necessarily entails working to change hierarchical relationships between the sexes, that is, anarchism is a specific type of feminism.…
          “In what follows I will argue that there has long been an anarcha-feminist movement. In particular, I will discuss the contribution to this movement of Mujeres Libres (Free Women), an anarcha-feminist group active during the Spanish civil war, from 1936-1939. Although many anarchists, including Mujeres Libres, rejected a feminist label because feminism was understood to be an ideology of the bourgeoisie, and although I do not call myself an Anarcha-feminist because I purport that anarchism is what best describes my feminism, I argue that anarcha-feminism is useful as both a term and in practice in both anarchist and feminist movements. With regards to the former, anarcha-feminism can serve to ‘mainstream’ gender and feminist struggle, thereby making anarchist practice more consistent with anarchist theory. With regards to the latter, anarcha-feminism can contribute to other feminist critiques of and struggles against gender oppression.”
          [Marta Iniguez de Heredia, “History and actuality of Anarcha-feminism: lessons from Spain.” Lilith: A Feminist History Journal. Volume 16, 2007. Pages 44-60.]
      39. queer anarchism (Gwendolyn Windpassinger): This approach synthesizes aspects of queer theory and anarcha-feminism.
          “The main part of the article examines recent theoretical connections between queer theory and anarchism … and the role of anarcha-feminism in the genealogy of what I term ‘queer anarchism,’ leading on to a discussion of a particular queer anarchist group in Buenos Aires called Proyectil Fetal (Fetal Projectile), and the critical debate surrounding the group’s work.…
          “But what characterizes the anarchist philosophy? The term ‘anarchism’ is derived from the Greek for ‘no ruler’ …. Many definitions have been made of anarchism. The essence of this philosophy is a deep questioning of hierarchies and a critique of exploitation and domination, with a strong dedication to equality and strategy for change. If a feminist critique centres on the concept of patriarchy, the lynchpin of an anarchist critique is the more general concept of hierarchy. If combined, feminism plus anarchism become anarchist feminism, or anarcha-feminism, a strand of thought that plays an essential part in the genealogy of queer anarchism.…
          “… I understand queer theory broadly as the study of heteronormativity and other normative discourses related to sexuality and gender. Marxist queer theorists subject these concerns to a broader critique of capitalism …. ‘Queer anarchism’ … critically assesses hegemonic discourses related not only to gender and sexuality, but to any form of domination, including but not reduced to a critique of the mechanics of exploitation and domination that exist within capitalism.”
          [Gwendolyn Windpassinger, “Queering anarchism in post-2001 Buenos Aires.” Sexualities. Volume 13, number 4, 2010. Pages 495-509.]
      40. anarchist transformative praxis (Angela Wigger as pronounced in this MP3 audio file): She discusses anarchist contributions to the literature of critical Marxism.
          “Anarchism as a lived praxis demonstrates that critical scholars have a role to play in social struggles, rather than being absent. In this sense, anarchism seems to entail what being critical is all about: emancipation from oppressive structures. Marxist (-inclined) literatures can gain valuable inspiration from anarchist transformative praxis, such as real existing prefiguration that points towards an egalitarian distribution of wealth and power, and that takes into the account the grassroots level as a crucial political site. At the same time, the anarchist approach to social transformation is also limited in the tendency to neglect deeply engrained macro-structures that cannot easily be changed, such as global capitalism. In social spaces in which the economic sphere is capitalist, capitalist logics tend to be more dominant than other logics.” [Angela Wigger, “Anarchism as emancipatory theory and praxis: Implications for critical Marxist research.” Capital & Class. Volume 40, number 1, 2016. Pages 129-145.]
      41. democratic confederalism (Abdullah Öcalan as pronounced in this MP3 audio file): Turkish–born Öcalan develops an ecological, feminist, and libertarian socialist approach to politics and economics.
          “Democratic confederalism is open towards other political groups and factions. It is flexible, multi-cultural, anti-monopolistic, and consensus-oriented. Ecology and feminism are central pillars. In the frame of this kind of self-administration an alternative economy will become necessary, which increases the resources of the society instead of exploiting them and thus does justice to the manifold needs of the society.” [Abdullah Öcalan. Democratic Confederalism. International Initiative, translators. London: Transmedia Publishing Ltd. 2011. Page 21.]
          “In democratic confederalism there is no room for any kind of hegemony striving. This is particularly true in the field of ideology. Hegemony is a principle that is usually followed by the classic type of civilization. Democratic civilizations reject hegemonic powers and ideologies. Any ways of expression which cut across the boundaries of democratic self-administration would carry self-administration and freedom of expression ad absurdum. The collective handling of matters of the society needs understanding, respect of dissenting opinions and democratic ways of decision-making. This is in contrast to the understanding of leadership in the capitalist modernity where arbitrary bureaucratic decisions of nation-state character are diametrically opposed to the democratic-confederate leadership in line with ethic foundations. In democratic confederalism leadership institutions do not need ideological legitimization. Hence, they need not strive for hegemony.” [Abdullah Öcalan. Democratic Confederalism. International Initiative, translators. London: Transmedia Publishing Ltd. 2011. Page 30.]
          “Democratic confederalism understands itself as a coordination model for a democratic nation. It provides a framework, within which interalia minorities, religious communities, cultural groups, gender-specific groups and other societal groups can organize autonomously. This model may also be called a way of organization for democratic nations and cultures.… This project builds on the self-government of the local communities and is organized in the form of open councils, town councils, local parliaments, and larger congresses. The citizens themselves are the agents of this kind of self-government, not state-based authorities. The principle of federal self-government has no restrictions. It can even be continued across borders in order to create multinational democratic structures. Democratic confederalism prefers flat hierarchies so as to further decision finding and decision making at the level of the communities.” [Abdullah Öcalan. War and Peace in Kurdistan: Perspectives for a political solution of the Kurdish question. Second edition. International Initiative, translators. London: Transmedia Publishing Ltd. 2009. Page 32.]
          “The disappointment experienced due to failure of any struggle, be it for freedom or equality, or be it a democratic, moral, political or class struggle bears the imprint of the archetypal struggle for power relationship, the one between woman and man. From this relationship stem all forms of relationship that foster inequality, slavery, despotism, fascism and militarism. If we want to construe true meaning to terms such as equality, freedom, democracy and socialism that we so often use, we need to analyse and shatter the ancient web of relations that has been woven around women. There is no other way of attaining true equality (with due allowance for diversity), freedom, democracy and morality.” [Abdullah Öcalan. Liberating Life: Woman’s Revolution. International Initiative, translators. London: Transmedia Publishing Ltd. 2013. Page 11.]
          “In describing me as ‘feared and worshipped,’ I detect hostility towards those who are forced to rely on their self-belief in their struggle against slavery, massacres and policies of denial. Since I have been imprisoned under conditions of solitary confinement on an island for the last 14 years, it is difficult to see how I can be credibly described as a source of fear for anyone except perhaps my captors.” [Abdullah Öcalan, “Reply: Letter: My real role in Kurds’ struggle for freedom.” The Guardian. Newspaper. London. January 21st, 2014.]
      42. Left Daoist Network (Max Cafard): He proposes a tongue-in-cheek anarchist approach to Daoism or Taoism (Chinese, 道教, Dàojiào, Natural Law teaching).
          “The difficult truth is that acceptance of the label ‘left’ means acceptance of our oppositional relationship to the dominant culture. But face the facts, fellow dissidents: calling for a ‘new paradigm’ means having a leftist relationship to the ‘old paradigm’!
          “So much for ‘neither left nor right.’ And when the world’s going to Hell, who wants to be in front?
          “I propose to organize a new politico-spiritual tendency within the Greens! I am issuing a ‘call’ on behalf of the ‘Left Daoist Network.’ We Left Daoists have lacked nothing but a slogan, and this sad state of affairs is about to end. We considered calling ourselves ‘The Left Wing of the Right Brain.’ But this will not do, since we Daoists, believing in the Yin [Chinese, 陰, yīn, ‘dark’] and Yang [Chinese, 陽, yáng, ‘bright’] of all things, cannot choose one brain over another, or even one piece of a brain over another piece. Thus, the slogan of the Left Daoists: ‘Neither Left Brain nor Right Brain, but A Head!’”
          [Max Cafard. The Surre(gion)alist Manifesto and Other Writings. Baton Rouge, Louisiana: Exquisite Corpse. 2003. Pages 20-21.]
      43. communitarian anarchism or libertarian communitarianism (John P. Clark): He develops an approach to anarchism informed by the political theory of communitarianism.
          “In contemporary political theory, libertarianism and communitarianism are looked upon more or less as opposite ends of the political spectrum. Thus, this work, which is in large part the elaboration of a libertarian communitarianism, might be met with a certain skepticism, and, indeed, might even be seen as entirely self-contradictory. But such skepticism would reveal more than anything the unfortunate limits of contemporary political discourse, and, more particularly, those of its dominant Anglo-American forms of expression. The actual existence of a phenomenon is a powerful argument in favor of its possibility. And there is, in fact, a long tradition of libertarian communitarian thought, a tradition that possesses considerable coherence and consistency. There exists, moreover, a vast range of historical phenomena that have inspired this tradition, and which instantiate many of its claims concerning social possibilities. The goal here is not only to continue this tradition and defend it, but also to explore what it would mean to realize its most radical implications. It is to show how a radically anarchistic conception of freedom and a radically communitarian conception of solidarity complement and fulfill one another. It is to show, to paraphrase Bakunin, that liberty without solidarity is privilege and injustice, while solidarity without liberty is slavery and despotism. It is to defend the thesis that it is to the degree that these values are synthesized in the free community that both injustice and despotism can be avoided.” [John P. Clark. The Impossible Community: Realizing Communitarian Anarchism. New York: Bloomsbury Academic imprint of Bloomsbury Publishing Plc. 2013. Page 1.]
          “… by immersing oneself in the particularities of local issues and struggles, one discovers how they are related in very specific ways to the global capitalist economy, the global nation-state system, the global system of industrial technology, neocolonialism, various forms of racism and ethnic domination, patriarchal values and institutions, the global ecological crisis, and, indeed, every significant dimension of the world system, and the complex ways that all these elements interact at various levels, including the national, regional, bioregional, ecosystemic, local, and even personal ones. One discovers that the more deeply one delves into the particular, the more the universal appears in its greatest concreteness and specificity.” [John P. Clark. The Impossible Community: Realizing Communitarian Anarchism. New York: Bloomsbury Academic imprint of Bloomsbury Publishing Plc. 2013. Page 23.]
          “Many traditions have recognized the importance of the traumatic breakthrough. In the Buddhist tradition, the primary teaching is that one must be shaken out of complacency and come to the shocking realization of the universality of sickness, aging, and death, if one is ever to attain wisdom and compassion. In the Jewish tradition, a break with everyday reality and the traumatic experience of the sacred is described the beginning of wisdom. In the vision quest of indigenous traditions, extreme stresses are part of the path to a spiritual breakthrough. Both Western and Asian mysticism describe a traumatic ‘dark night of the soul’ that is part of the path to spiritual awakening. Finally, dialectic is a kind of philosophical vision quest that works through traumatic challenges to all stereotyped thinking. In each case, trauma releases the ability to look at the gaps in our supposed reality and the incoherence in our conventional accounts of the world. Trauma is an encounter with death, but it is also an opportunity for rebirth. It helps us to see the possibility of the impossible and to think the unthinkable.” [John P. Clark, “The Impossible Community: An Interview With John P. Clark on Grassroots Revolution.” Truthout. June 9th, 2013. Online publication. No pagination.]
      44. nihilist anarchism or anarcho–nihilism (Duane Rousselle, Federico Buono as pronounced in this MP3 audio file, Aragorn!, and others): They develop various nihilist approaches to anarchism.
          “… [I] offer … [a] point of departure: an anti-essentialist and anti-foundationalist philosophy that I have classified as nihilist anarchism. The nihilist anarchist, like [Friedrich] Nietzsche’s passive nihilist, demonstrates ‘strength’ in that her ’previous goals (“convictions,” articles of faith) have become incommensurate (for a faith generally expresses […] submission to […] authority)’ …. Where once constraint was thought to be exercised by the state, the contemporary anarchist finds this power to be manifested in a whole range of places, reducible only to the subject of the state-ment. But Nietzsche also described an ‘active nihilism’ and this problematizes the ’lack of strength’ that nihilist anarchists may feel toward ’oneself, [and] productively [toward] a goal, a why, a faith’ …. Consequently, the active nihilist creates her own values in life and leaves them uncoded – her ethical act is performed in silence.… My conclusion is that nihilist anarchism, as the tradition that lurks always beneath anarchism, maintains that all ethical acts are the ones that do not get reified by language – precisely, this is its meta-ethics.” [Duane Rousselle. Kropotkin is Dead: A Second Order Reading of Ethics in the Philosophies of Georges Bataille and Post-anarchism. M.A. thesis. The University of New Brunswick. Fredericton, New Brunswick. April, 2011. Pages 166-167.]
          “The Anarcho-nihilism/anti-social imprints strength to my own words that are my ‘evil passions’ ….
          “Condemned by ‘human’ laws (which are devoted to utilitarianism), the free spirit – the anarchonihilist, is tied to a small community, with a common ‘thread’: the informal ‘happening’ of events.…
          “The Anarcho-nihilist incipient ‘crushes’ the overall structure of values and the alleged uniqueness of things, which break up into an ‘apparent world’, and in the advent against what we can ‘see’, against what is embodied in men.”
          [Federico Buono. The Anarchist and Amoral Anti-Judicial Attitude. Berkeley, California: The Anarchist Library imprint of Open Guild Organization. 2012. Pages 3-4.]
          “Libertarian Socialists also had another name that may be useful to differentiate from it from its Socialist brethren, anarchism. If Libertarian Socialism is overly concerned with self-management, federations, and workingmen’s associations then anarchism may very well have been concerned with how to integrate the Russian innovations of nihilism. [Mikhail] Bakunin is the case in point. Revisionists, of the Libertarian Socialist stripe, would focus entirely on Bakunin’s positive agenda of arguing for collective action to achieve anarchy; freedom of press, speech and assembly; and the eventual voluntary associations that would federate to organize society, including the economy. They do not attend to his negative agenda of demolishing political institutions, political power, government in general, and the State. As Bakunin provided the Nihilists with a formative gift in his essay ‘Reaction in Germany’ (1842), he also received a gift from the practice of the Nihilist Dmitry Karakozov and his failed assassination attempt of the Tsar Alexandar II. Ten years later this nihilist practice (that was is full swing by this time) became the policy of the largest anarchist federation on the European Continent. This so called ‘propaganda by the deed’ is the primary historical vehicle by which we know anarchism (and which Libertarian Socialists spend much of their time apologizing for and distancing themselves from).”

          [Aragorn! Nihilism, Anarchy, and the 21ˢᵗ century. Berkeley, California: The Anarchist Library imprint of Open Guild Organization. 2009. Pages 16-17.]

          “Anarchism and nihilism share a common antecedent. [Mikhail] Bakunin’s dictum ‘Let us put our trust in the eternal spirit which destroys and annihilates only because it is the unsearchable and eternally creative source of all life. The desire for destruction is also a creative desire.’ in 1842 sparked both movements. Nihilism’s cultural peak was in the 1860’s, although its activism continued almost to the early twentieth century. It is arguable that anarchists inherited ‘propaganda by the deed’ from the Russian nihilists. Nihilism’s theorists continued to be cited as precursors to the revolutionary activity in Russia until they were ‘disappeared’ well into the Bolshevik regime.”

          “What does nihilism have to offer beyond a mere avocation of destruction? The nihilist position does not allow for the comforts of this world. Not only is God dead to a nihilist, but also everything that has taken God’s place; idealism, consciousness, reason, progress, the masses, culture, etc. Without the comforts of this metaphysical ‘place’ a strategic nihilist is free to drift unfettered by the consequences of her actions. ‘A nihilist is a person who does not bow down to any authority, who does not accept any principle on faith, however much that principle may be revered’ Philosophically much has resulted from the nihilist ideas on value, aesthetics and practice. Most notably in [Theodor] Adorno’s conception of Negative Dialectics, a principle which refuses any kind of affirmation or positivity, a principle of thorough-going negativity.”

          [Aragorn! Nihilism, Anarchy, and the 21ˢᵗ century. Berkeley, California: The Anarchist Library imprint of Open Guild Organization. 2009. Pages 20-21.]
      45. dialectical political ecology (John P. Clark): He develops an anarchist approach to ecology.
          “Consider the many areas in which various political ecologies have already made important contributions. Socialist ecology and world systems theory offer insights concerning the analysis of value, globalization, crisis theory (encompassing economic, political, cultural, psychological, and ecological dimensions), the critique of ideology, the interaction between conditions, forces and relations of production, and core-periphery relations. Social ecology has made contributions in such areas as the critique of the state and political power, techno-bureaucratic domination, theories of democratization, and the analysis of the system of hierarchy and domination. Ecofeminism presents insights concerning embodied practice and forms of consciousness, the critique of patriarchy, the relational self, and the ethics and politics of care. Deep ecology and related tendencies raise important issues concerning the critique of anthropocentrism, intrinsic value, intrinsic good and ethical value theory. Cultural ecology, including bioregional theory, raises important questions regarding language, the imaginary, social creativity, ethos, regional realities, the sense of place, and cultural situatedness. Neoprimitivism, post-Situationism and related forms of eco-anarchism present challenging ideas concerning the technological system, the spectacle, and the mass society of commodity consumption. And this brief summary is very far from exhausting even the most general areas in which important work has taken place, and which cannot be neglected by any comprehensive dialectical political ecology.” [John Clark, “Contributions to the Critique of Political Ecology.” Capitalism, Nature, Socialism. Volume 12, number 3, September 29-36.]
          “One of my strongest interests is the development of a critical and radically dialectical political ecology. It has never occurred to me that this goal could be furthered by rejecting ‘political action and education’ for the sake of ‘personal redemption, ritualistic behavior, the denigration of human will, and the virtues of human irrationality’ or by adopting ‘self-effacement, passivity, and obedience to the “laws of nature” that are held to be supreme over the claims of human activity and praxis.’” [John Clark, “Marx’s Natures: A Response to Foster and Burkett.” Organization & Environment. Volume 14, number 4, December 2001. Pages 432-442.]
          “… the way is opened for the development of a truly ecological dialectic that avoids what [Karl] Marx aptly diagnoses as ‘the antithesis of nature and history.’ In such a dialectic, the entire course of natural history, including the emergence of life, consciousness, and self-consciousness (with all its modes of rationality and symbolization) are seen as aspects of the development of a complex whole. Central to such an analysis is an elaboration of the mutual determination of all forms of life within the biosphere as a unity-in-diversity.” [John P. Clark, “Marx’s inorganic body.” Environmental Ethics. Volume 11, issue 3, fall 1989. Pages 243-258.]
          “The question for ecological ethics is not whether every sentient animal should be able to flourish but rather the degree to which communities of life are allowed to flourish, often at the expense of countless individual organisms.” [John P. Clark, “Capabilities Theory and the Limits of Liberal Justice: On Nussbaum’s Frontiers of Justice.” Human Rights Review. Volume 10, 2009. Pages 593-604.]
          “There are (at least) four spheres that are essential to the analysis of how social reality is generated, how it is maintained, and how it might be transformed. These spheres are the social institutional structure, the social ideology, the social imaginary, and the social ethos. The complex dialectic between these four spheres and various dimensions of these spheres must be explored in specific detail to make sense out of the senseless folly of the Non-Act. Since there is a dialectical relationship between the spheres they should not be thought of as discrete realms. They are analytically distinguishable but at the same time dialectically identical with one another. The detailed analysis of this dialectic and the possibilities for transcending it cannot be undertaken here, but a brief sketch of the project might be helpful.” [John Clark, “Critique of the Gotham Program.” Situations: Project of the Radical Imagination. Volume 3, number 2, 2010. Pages 57-84.]
      46. critical animal studies (Steve Best, Anthony J. Nocella II, Richard Kahn, Carol Gigliotti, Lisa Kemmerer, Dawne McCance, and others): It is an anarchist, intersectional approach to animal studies.
          “The aim of the Institute for Critical Animal Studies (ICAS) is to provide a space for the development of a ‘critical’ approach to animal studies, one which perceives that relations between human and nonhuman animals are now at a point of crisis which implicates the planet as a whole.…
          “… In recent years Critical Animal Studies has emerged as a necessary and vital alternative to the insularity, detachment, hypocrisy, and profound limitations of mainstream animal studies that vaporizes their flesh and blood realities to reduce them to reified signs, symbols, images, words on a page, or protagonists in a historical drama, and thereby utterly fail to confront them not as ‘texts.’ but rather as sentient beings who live and die in the most sadistic, barbaric, and wretched cages of technohell that humanity has been able to devise, the better to exploit them for all they are worth.”
          [Steve Best, Anthony J. Nocella II, Richard Kahn, Carol Gigliotti, and Lisa Kemmerer, “Introducing Critical Animal Studies.” The Institute for Critical Animal Studies. 2007. No pagination.]
          “The problem of moving beyond anthropomorphism and the centuries-old human/animal hierarchy has preoccupied feminists for several decades now, so both feminist studies and critical animal studies involve questions of how to inherit tradition.” [Dawne McCance. Critical Animal Studies: An Introduction. Albany, New York: State University of New York Press. 2013. Page 89.]
          “Law is anthropocentric. With the limited exception of its treatment of the corporation, law is a system of rules that privileges the concept of the human and ascribes reality through a human perspective. Appreciating this, it is truly impressive that animal issues in the law have become so prominent throughout the legal education system. With this increased exposure to posthumanist critiques of the legal system and its status for and treatment of animals, an increasing number of those involved in legal education are rethinking the law’s species-based hierarchy that places humans at the apex. This flourishing interest in animal law is paralleled by growth in the field of Critical Animal Studies (CAS). However, these two disciplines have developed independently of each other. Acknowledging this, animal law scholarship is currently poised to incorporate the insights of CAS. Integrating such insight into the analysis of animal issues in the law will rectify the speciesist and otherwise exclusionary formulations of the socially constructed differences between various species, which have so far been unquestioned assumptions. CAS offers an understanding of these socially constructed differences and advances a common mission between issues identified as animal injustices and those identified as human injustices. CAS stresses the interconnection between human and animal issues, not simply parallels. This important synthesis can subvert the confinement of animal issues in the legal sphere and is key to extending these essential issues into a more diverse community.” [Maneesha Deckha, “Critical animal studies and animal law.” Animal Law. Volume 18, issue 2, October 2012. Pages 207+]
          “All the essays that constitute this issue take up productive trans-pollinations among human, animal, sex, and gender. While cuts and division of any kind among these original and powerful contributions could only be antithetical to their very arguments, in broad strokes, we can say that half the pieces bring the theoretical juncture of trans, feminist, queer, and posthuman theories and critical animal studies to bear on the issue of sexual difference, indifference, and humanism. These theoretical explorations interrogate topics such as species panic, the animal symbolic, and the relation between difference and indifference from a trans perspective. They do so in order to demonstrate the extent to which tranimals have the transformative power to interrupt humanism and its sexually differentiated legacy by challenging the boundaries between, and existence of, differentiated, essential kinds.” [Eva Hayward and Jami Weinstein, “Introduction: Tranimalities in the Age of Trans* Life.” TSQ: Transgender Studies Quarterly. Volume 2, number 2, May 2015. Pages 195-208.]

          Return to the table of contents.

3. Global Southernism and Third World (Mao Tse-tung, Frantz Fanon, Paulo Freire, Kwame Nkrumah, Gayatri Chakravort Spivak, Kim Il Sung, Enrique Dussel, Gustavo Gutiérrez, Edward Wadie Said, Nikolai Brown, Ali Shariati, Paul A. Baran, Paul Marlor Sweezy, Immanuel Wallerstein, and many others)
   1. general information: This section of the book—on Global Southernism (Foster’s coined term for approaches which focus on the Third world)—lists various perspectives which originated in, or which concentrate upon, the developing world. Global Southern revolutionary praxis (practice) has promoted the liberation of the Third World from the oppressive dystopian legacies of First-World colonialism, neocolonialism, and imperialism.
      Nevertheless, in the writer’s view, some of the more myopic versions of Global–Southernism (such as Marxist “Third–Worldism”) constitute a functional idolatry. There is certainly no basis for such poisonous revisionism in the writings of Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels—who anticipated that the first revolutions would occur in Europe. Like all forms of domination, the oppression of the Third World must be challenged. However, to privilege the imperialistic marginalization of the Global South would inevitably result in ignoring, even if inadvertently, the contradictions of capitalism fomenting in the West. As is evident from the alienation and discontent characteristic of contemporary societies, dialectical potentiality, or “absence,” is universal. The issue, then, is how to productively canalize that alienation.
      To put it another way, Third–Worldism may tend towards the sort of idealistic utopian socialism which was harshly critiqued by Engels. If the activist or organizer has a particular conception of revolution in mind, she or he might, through selective perception, fail to recognize the revolutionary mechanisms when they manifest in the actual events of her or his lifeworld.
      “In the context of exploring the nature of place, identity with space and especially region, within a global framework, the American South looms as an important case—not unique, but distinctive and important. Peacock discusses what the South is, what globalism is, the prospects of the South in a global world, the intertwining of ‘Southernism’ and globalism, and what Southerners should do to seize new opportunities not just for wealth and development but also to build and sustain good and viable society and culture.…
      “… What are the prospects for the South (or any regional identity) in a global world? How are globalism and ‘Southernism’ intertwined?”
      [James Peacock, “The South in a Global World.” The Virginia Quarterly Review. Volume 78, number 4, autumn 2002. Pages 581-594.]
      “Revolutionary theory is what informs revolutionary practice. At the same time, revolutionary practice informs revolutionary theory. The lack of success of revolutionary movements in imperialist countries should be enough for revolutionaries the world over to take pause and recalibrate their theories. Third-Worldism is the movement to re-frame these theoretical and practical positions accordingly: to understand the world so as to change it.” [Nikolai Brown. Third Worldism: Marxist Critique of Imperialist Political Economy. Second edition. Red Zone Publishers (location not provided). 2013. Page 34.]
      “First Worldism, which is ignorant or evasive on the issue of class and class struggle under imperialism, and Third Worldism, which opposes such opportunism and social-chauvinism, offer two very different visions of socialism. First Worldism is a reformist program which merely represents an idealized further expansion of bourgeois privilege. Third Worldism promotes a revolution in the relations and means of production and distribution. For Third Worldists, socialism aims for an expansion of use-values such that radically transforms the everyday lives and character of humanity at large.” [Nikolai Brown. Third Worldism: Marxist Critique of Imperialist Political Economy. Second edition. Red Zone Publishers (location not provided). 2013. Page 57.]
      “In its simplest terms, Third Worldism is a trend within Marxism which upholds that class analysis is as crucial as ever to the communist movement today. Third Worldists believe that without a clear understanding of who our real enemies and friends are, without uncovering the concrete relations to the forces of production that people really hold, then the communist movement in the First World will continue to stagnate. Namely, we believe that the vast majority of the world’s people – the masses of workers in the Third World along with a minority of people in the First World – are exploited and/or ground down by capitalism and imperialism to the point of being unable to flourish. On the other hand, we also believe that the vast majority of workers in First World nations have been ‘bought off’ by imperialist super-profits. Monopoly capitalists in imperialist states glean most of their profits from exploitation of Third World labor, and they make such a killing on Third World exploitation that they can afford to pay their ‘own’ workers in the First World a value well above what those workers themselves produce, while still maintaining average profit rates. In other words, high wages in the First World are supplemented with profit extracted from Third World workers. This means that class struggle has been largely deadened in the First World, because most workers in the imperialist core depend upon imperialism to sustain their current living standards. The contradiction between the working class in the imperialist nations and the bourgeoisie has become a non-antagonistic one.” [Morton Esters (editorial introduction). The Weapon of Theory: A Maoist (Third Worldist) Reader. Morton Esters, editor. January, 2014.]
      “… Third World Marxism grapples with the dilemmas of underdevelopment as well as colonial and post-colonial struggles.” [Michael Burawoy, “Marxism after Polanyi.” Rhuthmos. October 9th, 2014. Also published in Marxisms in the 21ˢᵗ Century: Crisis, Critique & Struggle. Michelle Williams and Vishwas Satgar, editors. Johannesburg, South Africa: Wits University Press. 2013. Pages 34-52.]
      “This paper argues that young Senegalese and Congolese radicals shaped local demands through their vision of a globe-spanning, Third World Marxist revolution. At the time, young agitators in Senegal and the Congo were frequently branded as ‘Maoists.’ While their rhetoric borrowed heavily from Maoism, in practice, they adopted heterogeneous and fluctuating political ideals, and few exhibited uncritical adoration for any single Cold War regime.” [Matthew Swagler, “Third World Marxism in Africa and the Global Revolt of 1968.” Abstract. Historical Materialism Journal. Eighth annual conference. November, 2011. Retrieved on September 1st, 2015.]
      “Third Worldism can be defined roughly as the political theory and practice that saw the major fault-line in the global capitalist order as running between the advanced capitalist countries of the West and the impoverished continents of Africa, Asia, and Latin America, and saw national liberation struggles in the Third World as the major force for global revolution. Third Worldism was the form of internationalism specific of an age in which colonial rule was coming to an end – an age in which the economic power of western capital remained intact, but its global political dominance was contested. It was the internationalism of the age in which the capitalist divide between the economic and political power was in the process of being globalised but was not yet firmly established, in which formal equality among nation-states accompanied and then growing inequality in the global economy.” [Andrew Nash, “Third Worldism.” African Sociological Review. Volume 7, number 1. Pages 94-116.]
      “The most striking political development of the last two decades has been the emergence of what French geographers and social scientists term the Tiers Monde—the Third World. This term is applied to a great bloc of countries stretching from the Andean republics of South America, across Africa and the Middle East, to Indonesia and the islands of the tropical Pacific. It is made up of over a hundred political units, greatly differing in size, in population or in political status.” [Keith Buchanan, “The Third World—Its Emergence and Contours.” New Left Review. Series I, number 18, January–February 1963. Pages 5-23.]
      “The difference between revolutionary Marxists and supporters of ‘Third Worldism’ does not lie in the fact the first deny this inter-relationship and the second uphold it. It lies in two basically distinct approaches to the nature of that inter-relationship. Revolutionary Marxists do not believe in a fatal time-sequence, whereas ‘Third Worldists’ do believe that imperialism has first to be overthrown in all, or the most important underdeveloped countries, before socialist revolution is on the agenda again in the West.… Revolutionary Marxists do not believe that the loss of an important or even a decisive part of foreign colonial domains will automatically create a revolutionary situation inside the imperialist countries; they believe that these losses will only have revolutionary effects if they first trigger off internal material changes inside imperialist society itself.” [Ernest Mandel, “The Laws of Uneven Development.” New Left Review. Series I, number 59, January–February 1970. Pages 19-38.]
   2. specific examples: This section incorporates a variety of approaches to Global Southernism.
      1. dependency school or dependency theory (Hans Singer, Raúl Prebisch as pronounced in this MP3 audio file, Ronald H. Chilcote, Paul A. Baran, Paul Marlor Sweezy, John Bellamy Foster, Andre Gunder Frank as pronounced in this MP3 audio file, Immanuel Wallerstein, Theotonio Dos Santos, Henrique Cardoso, and others): Resources (“capitalist profits”) are redistributed from the periphery (underdeveloped countries) to the core (developed countries).
         “… [Dependency] theory explains underdevelopment throughout Latin America as a consequence of outside political and economic influence. More specifically, the economy of certain nations is believed to be conditioned by the relationship to another economy which is dominant and capable of expanding and developing. Thus the interdependence of such economies assumes contrasting forms of dominance and dependence so that dependent nations might develop as a reflection of the expansion of dominant nations or underdevelop as a consequence of their subjective relationship.” [Ronald H. Chilcote, “Dependency: A Critical Synthesis of the Literature.” Latin American Perspectives. Volume 1, number 1, spring 1974. Pages 4-29.]
         “One significant contribution of … the entire representatives of the Dependency School of Thought is that some two decades later their intellectual prophecy that warned of the dangers of economic growth patterned after the West had come to be appreciated with subdued silence in Africa just before the end of the 20ᵗʰ Century. The worry of the dependency theorists became an embodiment of the goals, aspirations and expectations in the struggle for self-determination, self-sufficiency, and self-reliance in the Third World countries; determination to legitimize and assert their political and economic independence.” [Luke Uka Uche, “Some Reflections on the Dependency Theory.” Africa Media Review. Volume 8, number 2, 1994. Pages 39-55.]
         The following are examples of theories and approaches which developed out of, or within, the dependency school:
         1. theory of monopoly capitalism or the underdevelopment school (Paul A. Baran, Paul Marlor Sweezy, John Bellamy Foster, Andre Gunder Frank, and others): Develops a neo-Marxian approach to political economics. Further refinements to the theory of monopoly capitalism (John Bellamy Foster), along with the Marxist ecology of John Bellamy Foster and Brett Clark, have continued in this theoretical tradition. The objective of Marxist ecology is to replace the currently influential “green” theories with a reinvigorated Marxist ecology incorporating natural as well as historical materialism.
            “… [Vladimir] Lenin, who was strongly influenced by [Rudolf] Hilferding’s analysis of the origins and diffusion of monopoly, based his theory of imperialism squarely on the predominance of monopoly in the developed capitalist countries. But … neither he nor his followers pursued the matter into the fundamentals of Marxian economic theory. There, paradoxically enough, in what might have been thought the area most immediately involved, the growth of monopoly made the least impression.
            “We believe that the time has come to remedy this situation and to do so in an explicit and indeed radical fashion.
            [Paul A. Baran and Paul M. Sweezy. Monopoly Capital: An Essay on the American Economic and Social Order. New York: Monthly Review Press. 1966. Kindle edition.]
            “One can no longer today speak of either industrialists or bankers as the leading echelon of the dominant capitalist classes. The big monopolistic corporations, which were formed and in their early years controlled by bankers, proved to be enormously profitable and in due course, through paying off their debts and plowing back their earnings, achieved financial independence and indeed in many cases acquired substantial control over banks and other financial institutions. These giant corporations are the basic units of monopoly capitalism in its present stage; their (big) owners and functionaries constitute the leading echelon of the ruling class. It is through analyzing these corporate giants and their interests that we can best comprehend the functioning of imperialism today.” [Paul A. Baran and Paul M. Sweezy, “Notes on the Theory of Imperialism.” MRzine of Monthly Review. June 24th, 2010. Retrieved on September 30th, 2015.]
            “As to [Vladimir] Lenin’s use of the term ‘imperialism,’ that is quite another matter [than that underdeveloped countries will advance by overthrowing capitalist hegemony]. My main point in this connection was a semantic one and as such not terribly important. By identifying monopoly capital with imperialism, by giving that name to the latest stage of capitalism, Lenin inevitably suggested that imperialism, in the usual meaning of the term, did not characterize the earlier stages of capitalism. I cited my own intellectual history to support this point. I don’t suggest, or think there would be any point in, an overt criticism of his usage—at least not in the context of the opus. But I do suggest that we avoid that usage and that when we want to refer to monopoly capital we use that term.” [Paul M. Sweezy, “Four Letters to Paul Branan.” Monthly Review: An Independent Socialist Magazine. Volume 56, issue 5, October, 2004. Pages 93-110.]
            “In 1966, Paul Baran and Paul Sweezy published Monopoly Capital, a monumental work of economic theory and social criticism that sought to reveal the basic nature of the capitalism of their time. Their theory, and its continuing elaboration by Sweezy, Harry Magdoff, and others in Monthly Review magazine, influenced generations of radical and heterodox economists….
            “John Bellamy Foster is a leading exponent of this theoretical perspective today, continuing in the tradition of Baran and Sweezy’s Monopoly Capital.
            [The Theory of Monopoly Capitalism (New Edition): An Elaboration of Marxian Political Economy. Promotional information. April, 2014. Retrieved on October 3rd, 2015.]
            “This book is a revised and expanded version of my doctoral dissertation, defended at York University in Toronto in October 1984. Although its main concern is with the work of Paul Baran and Paul M. Sweezy, this is mainly a vehicle for examining an entire tradition of thought, loosely associated with the magazine Monthly Review, to which numerous theorists—some of no less importance—have contributed. In this respect, Baran and Sweezy belong to what might be referred to—after [Antonio] Gramsci, though not precisely in his way—as a ‘collective intellectual.’” [John Bellamy Foster. The Theory of Monopoly Capitalism: An Elaboration of Marxian Political Economy. New edition. New York: Monthly Review Press. 2014. Kindle edition.]
            “The Theory of Monopoly Capitalism was centered on precisely this core conceptual structure of Baran and Sweezy’s analysis—the treatment of economic surplus and waste—while also seeking to correct misinterpretations of their work. The economic surplus was understood as the full social accumulation fund potentially available in a rationally organized society, much of which was systematically wasted away under monopoly capitalism. I ended my book by noting: ‘Only [Paul A.] Baran and [Paul M.] Sweezy [after [Thorstein] Veblen] extended the concept of waste into the “consumption basket of wage goods.” And it seems probable that this is the missing link in understanding the evolution of class relationships under monopoly capitalism.’” [John Bellamy Foster. The Theory of Monopoly Capitalism: An Elaboration of Marxian Political Economy. New edition. New York: Monthly Review Press. 2014. Kindle edition.]
            “The argument of this book is based on a very simple premise: that in order to understand the origins of ecology, it is necessary to comprehend the new views of nature that arose with the development of materialism and science from the seventeenth through nineteenth centuries. Moreover, rather than simply picturing materialism and science as the enemies of earlier and supposedly preferable conceptions of nature, as is common in contemporary Green theory, the emphasis here is on how the development of both materialism and science promoted—indeed made possible—ecological ways of thinking.” [John Bellamy Foster. Marx’s Ecology: Materialism and Nature. New York: Monthly Review Press. 2000. Google Play edition.]
            “The most pressing problem confronting humanity in the 21ˢᵗ century is the ecological crisis. The ‘problem of nature’ is really a problem of capital, as natural cycles are turned into broken linear processes geared to private accumulation. Important advances in ecosocialist theory illuminate the continuing importance of Marx’s materialist and metabolic approach for studying the dialectical interchange between humans and nature and the creation of ecological rifts within ecosystems. Additionally, Marx’s ecology serves as a foundation for understanding environmental degradation, given his critique of capital as a whole and his focus on the contradiction between use value and exchange value (which facilitates the expansion of private riches at the expense of public wealth, i.e., the Lauderdale Paradox). In stark contrast to the market mechanisms proposed to address the ecological crisis, which place profit above protecting nature, Marx’s ecology stresses the necessity of establishing a social order that sustains the conditions of life for future generations.” [Brett Clark and John Bellamy Foster, “Marx’s Ecology in the 21ˢᵗ Century.” Abstract. World Review of Political Economy. Volume 1. Pages 142-156.]
            “The ecological crisis cannot be properly approached unless the relations between humanity and nature are properly understood. In his important new work, Marx’s Ecology, John Bellamy Foster argues that this must take place through an appropriation of materialism, specifically, the materialism of Karl Marx, who was, along with Darwin, one of ‘the two greatest materialists of the nineteenth century.’ Foster’s ambition is to extend the recognition of Marx’s historical materialism, grounded in the primacy of production in human existence, into the domain of nature. Because Marx had as profound a grasp of natural science as of history, Foster argues that this expanded materialism is as authoritative a guide to ecological struggles as it has been to the struggles of labor.
            “As Marx got it right, there are those who got it wrong, that is, have placed ecology in a nonmaterialist framework. These Foster broadly categorizes as ‘greens.’ It is the purpose of Marx’s Ecology to displace what Foster views as the currently influential green theories with a revivified Marxist ecology incorporating natural as well as historical materialism.”
            [Joel Kovel, “A Materialism Worthy of Nature.” Capitalism, Nature, Socialism. Volume 12, number 2, June 2001. Pages 73-84.]
            “A mounting body of evidence suggests, and I am confident that future historical research will confirm, that the expansion of the capitalist system over the past centuries effectively and entirely penetrated even the apparently most isolated sectors of the underdeveloped world. Therefore, the economic, political, social, and cultural institutions and relations we now observe there are the products of the historical development of the capitalist system no less than are the seemingly more modern or capitalist features of the national metropoles of these underdeveloped countries. Analogous to the relations between development and underdevelopment on the international level, the contemporary underdeveloped institutions of the so-called backward or feudal domestic areas of an underdeveloped country are no less the product of the single historical process of capitalist development than are the so-called capitalist institutions of the supposedly more progressive areas. I should like to sketch the kinds of evidence which support this thesis and at the same time indicate lines along which further study and research could fruitfully proceed….
            “… [A] historical and structural approach can also lead to better development theory and policy by generating a series of hypotheses about development and underdevelopment such as those I am testing in my current research. The hypotheses are derived from the empirical observation and theoretical assumption that within this world-embracing metropolis-satellite structure the metropoles tend to develop and the satellites tend to underdevelop….
            “A second hypothesis is that the satellites experience their greatest development and especially their most classically capitalist industrial development if and when their ties to the metropolis are weakest.”
            [Andre Gunder Frank, “The Development of Underdevelopment.” Monthly Review: An Independent Socialist Magazine. Volume 18, issue 4, September 1966. Pages 17-31]
            “In this work, I propose a critique of what can be called ‘culturalism.’ I define culturalism as an apparently coherent and holistic theory based on the hypothesis that there are cultural invariants able to persist through and beyond possible transformations in economic, social, and political systems. Cultural specificity, then, becomes the main driving force of inevitably quite different historical trajectories.
            “… Modernity is constructed on the principle that human beings, individually and collectively (i.e., societies), make their own history. Up until that time, in Europe and elsewhere, responsibility for history was attributed to God or supernatural forces. From that point on, reason is combined with emancipation under modernity, thus opening the way to democracy (which is modern by definition). The latter implies secularism, the separation of religion and the state, and on that basis, politics is reformed.
            “Modernity is the product of nascent capitalism and develops in close association with the worldwide expansion of the latter. The specific logic of the fundamental laws that govern the expansion of capitalism leads to a growing inequality and asymmetry on a global level. The societies at the peripheries are trapped in the impossibility of catching up with and becoming like the societies of the centers, today the triad of the United States, Europe, and Japan. In turn, this distortion affects modernity, as it exists in the capitalist world, so that it assumes a truncated form in the periphery. The culture of capitalism is formed and develops by internalizing the requirements of this asymmetric reality. Universalist claims are systematically combined with culturalist arguments, in this case Eurocentric ones, which invalidate the possible significance of the former.
            “Inevitably, modernity compelled a reinterpretation of religious beliefs, making them compatible with its main principle, that human beings can and must make their own history. Eurocentric culturalism maintained that it was the religious revisions, and particularly the Protestant Reformation, that were the prime cause of the social transformation that led to modernity. My position is precisely the opposite of these theories, particularly the one proposed by Max Weber. Religious reinterpretations were, on the contrary, more the product of the necessities of the social transformation than their cause. They were not any less important, whether they facilitated or retarded change on one particular evolutionary path or another.
            “Today, modernity is in crisis because the contradictions of globalized capitalism, unfolding in real societies, have become such that capitalism puts human civilization itself in danger. Capitalism has had its day. The destructive dimension that its development always included now prevails by far over the constructive one that characterized the progressive role it fulfilled in history.
            [Samir Amin. Eurocentrism – Modernity, Religion, and Democracy: A Critique of Eurocentrism and Culturalism. Second edition. Russell Moore and James Membrez, translators. New York: Monthly Review Press. 2009. Pages 7-9.]
            “What is good for a developed country is bad for a country undergoing development, and vice versa. The rich countries used to complain about foreign dumping, the poor countries complain today about the high prices asked by their suppliers. The rich countries used to worry about finding employment for plentiful factors of production, if necessary exporting them, if they could not export their products. For the poor countries today the problem is to make up for their shortage of these factors, if necessary importing them, if they cannot create them by internal accumulation…. [B]izarre doctrines like that of ‘balanced growth’ teach us nowadays that when there is balanced growth the simultaneous establishment of a variety of branches creates its own market….
            “… if Adam Smith and J. R. Say seeem to be rehabilitated this is, it should be said, only in a certain sense, since in order to do without the market balanced growth implies a kind of direction of the economy by the state such as the classical economists never tired of denouncing as harmful.”
            [Arghiri Emmanuel. Unequal Exchange: A Study in the Imperialism of Trade. Brian Pearce, translator. New York: Monthly Review Press. 1972. Page xxiv.]
            “… [One school associated with dependency theory is] the Development of Underdevelopment paradigm. Mainly, Andre Gunder Frank, Paul Baran, and other Latin American scholars such as Osvaldo Sunkel, Dos Santos, Helio Jaguaribe, Frank Bonilla and Raul Prebrisch among others are associated with this school. The main thrust of the underdevelopment school is that there is a dialectical connection between development and underdevelopment …. Put this way, development and underdevelopment represent two different sides of a given coin. They are, in fact, two sides of a given historical process.” [B. O. G. Nwanolue, Osegbue Chike, and Iwuoha Chidubem Victor, “An Analysis of the Impact of the European Union and Africa Development Partnership.” Sacha Journal of Policy and Strategic Studies. Volume 2, number 1, 2012. Pages 29-40.]
            “We offer the following reasons for raising the possibility that the ‘laws of motion’ of monopoly capitalism (the law of rising surplus and the tendency toward stagnation) may soon undergo considerable modification. First, General Motors (admittedly the extreme case) is big and diversified enough at present to consider the effects of its investment and other decisions on the economy as a whole.…
            “For another thing, independent corporations located in different industries presently formulate common investment policies at the municipal and regional levels. Sometimes municipal and regional planning is initiated by the corporations themselves (as in the case of many aspects of ‘urban renewal’), but often the initiative springs from the local, state, and regional development agencies and the giant independent public authorities.”
            [James O’Connor, “Monopoly Capital.” New Left Review. Review article. Volume I, number 40, November–December 1966. Pages 38-50.]
            “The strategic developmental agenda of regimes in question included revolutionary breaking-through – industrialization, collectivization, mass education, and forging party cadres as well as national political community building. Because of the grand failure of the Leninist project, post-Leninist political regimes face a similar challenge – they have to make an attempt at becoming modern but under the conditions of rapid post-modernization of the countries belonging to the core of the capitalist world system. Though ambiguous, the notion of post-modernity goes beyond the mere discourse of philosophers and students of culture. Its implications can be traced in all societal spheres of advanced capitalist liberal-democratic countries.” [Pavlo Kutuev, “Development of Underdevelopment: State and Modernization Project in the post-Leninist Ukraine.” Thinking Fundamentals: IWM Junior Visiting Fellows Conferences. Volume IX, number 10. Pages 1-15.]
            “The dominance of monopolistic accumulation at the center of the system meant that the whole nature of competition under capitalism had been altered, taking on the form of oligopolistic rivalry. Individual firms or small clusters of firms, protected by barriers to entry and by the sheer scale of their operations, gained extensive control over price, output, investment, and innovation. Such giant firms increasingly operated on a global scale as multinational corporations, and attained significant leverage over the state. These new, mammoth entities were long-lived accumulation mechanisms, constantly mutating into larger, more centralized corporations. The typical firm was not a price taker but a price maker. Genuine price competition or price wars of the kind that would destabilize the co-respective relations between oligopolistic enterprises was effectively banned. Above all, such firms enjoyed widening profit margins and typically grew in size relative to the economy as a whole.” [John Bellamy Foster, “Monopoly Capital at the Half-Century Mark.” Monthly Review: An Independent Socialist Magazine. Volume 68, issue 3, July/August 2016. Pages 1-25.]
            
            Diagram A (click on the image to see an enlargement)
         2. world–systems analysis (Immanuel Wallerstein as pronounced in this MP3 audio file): This perspective was influenced by dependency theory. The capitalist world system, which Wallerstein considers to be in decline, benefits wealthy countries. You can watch these YouTube videos: Immanuel Wallerstein on the future of Capitalism and Immanuel Wallerstein opens Left Forum 2013.
            “The modern world-system in which we are living, which is that of a capitalist world-economy, is currently in … a crisis, and has been for a while now. This crisis may go on another twenty-five to fifty years. Since one central feature of such a transitional period is that we face wild oscillations of all those structures and processes we have come to know as an inherent part of the existing world-system, we find that our short-term expectations are necessarily quite unstable. This instability can lead to considerable anxiety and therefore violence as people try to preserve acquired privileges and hierarchical rank in a very unstable situation. In general, this process can lead to social conflicts that take a quite unpleasant form.” [Immanuel Wallerstein. World-Systems Analysis: An Introduction A John Hope Franklin Center Book. Durham, North Carolina: Duke University Press. 2004. Kindle edition.]
            “The key difference between a developmentalist and a world-system perspective is in the point of departure, the unit of analysis. A developmentalist perspective assumes that the unit within which social action principally occurs is a politico-cultural unit—the state, or nation, or people—and seeks to explain differences between these units, including why their economies are different. A world-system perspective assumes, by contrast, that social action takes place in an entity within which there is an ongoing division of labour, and seeks to discover empirically whether such an entity is or is not unified politically or culturally, asking theoretically what are the consequences of the existence or non-existence of such unity.” [Immanuel Wallerstein, “A World-System Perspective on the Social Sciences.” The British Journal of Sociology. Volume 27, number 3, September 1976. Pages 343-352.]
            “Social science has been Eurocentric throughout its institutional history, which means since there have been departments teaching social science within university systems. This is not in the least surprising. Social science is a product of the modern world-system, and Eurocentrism is constitutive of the geoculture of the modern world. Furthermore, as an institutional structure, social science originated largely in Europe. We shall be using Europe here more as a cultural than as a cartographical expression; in this sense, in the discussion about the last two centuries, we are referring primarily and jointly to Western Europe and North America.” [Immanuel Wallerstein, “Eurocentrism and its Avatars: The Dilemmas of Social Science.” New Left Review. Series I, number 226, November–December 1997. Pages 93-107.]
            “The existence of a quasi-monopoly permits the expansion of the world-economy in terms of growth and allows for trickle-down benefits to large sectors of the world-system’s populations. The exhaustion of the quasi-monopoly leads to a system-wide stagnation that reduces the interest of capitalists in accumulation through productive enterprises. Erstwhile leading industries shift location to zones with lower costs of production, sacrificing increased transactions costs for lowered production costs (notably wage costs). The countries to which the industries are relocated consider this relocation to constitute ‘development,’ but they are essentially the recipients of cast-off, erstwhile core-like operations. Meanwhile, unemployment grows in the zones in which the industries are relocated, and former trickledown advantages are reversed, or partially reversed.” [Immanuel Wallerstein, “Structural Crisis in the World-System: Where Do We Go from Here?” Monthly Review: An Independent Socialist Magazine. Volume 62, issue 10, March 2011. Pages 31-39.]
            “We have entered an anarchic transition—from the existing world-system to a different one. As in any such period, no one controls the situation to any significant degree, least of all a declining hegemonic power like the us. Though the proponents of a us imperium may think they have the wind in their sails there are strong gales blowing from all directions and the real problem—for all our boats—will be to avoid capsizing. Whether the ultimate outcome will be a less or more egalitarian and democratic order is totally uncertain. But the world that emerges will be a consequence of how we act, collectively and concretely, in the decades to come.” [Immanuel Wallerstein, “Entering Global Anarchy.” New Left Review. Series II, number 22, July–August 2003. Pages 27-35.]
            “If, as I have argued elsewhere, the modern world-system is in structural crisis, and we have entered an ‘age of transition’—a period of bifurcation and chaos—then it is clear that the issues confronting antisystemic movements pose them selves in a very different fashion than those of the nineteenth and most of the twentieth centuries. The two-step, state-oriented strategy has become irrelevant, which explains the discomfort of most existing descendants of erstwhile antisystemic organizations in putting forward either long-term or immediate sets of political objectives.” [Immanuel Wallerstein, “New Revolts Against the System.” New Left Review. Series II, number 18, November–December 2002. Pages 29-39.]
            “A world-system is not the system of the world, but a system that is a world and which can be, most often has been, located in an area less than the entire globe. World-systems analysis argues that the units of social reality within which we operate, whose rules constrain us, are for the most part such world-systems (other than the now extinct, small minisystems that once existed on the earth). World-system analysis argues that there have been thus far only two varieties of world-systems: world-economies and worldempires. A world-empire (examples, the Roman Empire, Han China) are large bureaucratic structures with a single political center and an axial division of labor, but multiple cultures. A world-economy is a large axial division of labor with multiple political centers and multiple cultures. In English, the hyphen is essential to indicate these concepts. ‘World system’ without a hyphen suggests that there has been only one world-system in the history of the world.” [Immanuel Wallerstein, “World-Systems Analysis.” World System History. George Modelski, editor. In Encyclopedia of Life Support Systems (EOLSS). Developed under the Auspices of the UNESCO, Eolss Publishers (Oxford, United Kingdom). 2004.]
            “… in previous historical social systems, one or more of these elements [products and workers] was not ‘commodified’ or was insufficiently ‘commodified.’ What this means is that the process was not considered one that could or should be transacted through a ‘market.’ Historical capitalism involved therefore the widespread commodification of processes—not merely exchange processes, but production processes, distribution processes, and investment processes—that had previously been conducted other than via ‘market.’” [Immanuel Wallerstein. Historical Capitalism with Capitalist Civilization. London and New York: Verso imprint of New Left Books. 1995. Page 15.]
            “Alternate modernities are but attempts to bypass the unwanted antagonisms inherent in the global world-system by condensing them in a singular modernity, the Western one, instead of seeing in the latter precisely concrete universality, an embodiment of the vagaries of the universal field itself. Of course, modernity exists solely in particular local actualizations, but its concrete universality lies in the necessity of local acceptance of and adaptation to universal modernity.” [Jernej Habjan, “From Cultural Third-Worldism to the Literary World-System.” CLCWeb: Comparative Literature and Culture. Volume 15, issue 5, article 13, 2013. Pages 1-10.]
         3. new dependency theory (Theotonio Dos Santos as pronounced in this MP3 audio file): Distinguishes various stages of dependency.
            “By dependence we mean a situation in which the economy of certain countries is conditioned by the development and expansion of another economy to which the former is subjected….
            “Drawing on an earlier study, we may distinguish: (1) Colonial dependence, trade export in nature, in which commercial and financial capital in alliance with the colonialist state dominated the economic relations of the Europeans and the colonies, by means of a trade monopoly complemented by a colonial monopoly of land, mines, and manpower (serf or slave) in the colonized countries. (2) Financial-industrial dependence which consolidated itself at the end of the nineteenth century, characterized by the domination of big capital in the hegemonic centers, and its expansion abroad through investment in the production of raw materials and agricultural products for consumption in the hegemonic centers. A productive structure grew up in the dependent countries devoted to the export of these products (which Levin labeled export economies [11]; other analysis in other regions), producing what ECLA has called ‘foreign-oriented development’ (desarrollo hacia afuera). (3) In the postwar period a new type of dependence has been consolidated, based on multinational corporations which began to invest in industries geared to the internal market of underdeveloped countries. This form of dependence is basically technological-industrial dependence ….” [Theotonio Dos Santos, “The Structure of Dependence.” The American Economic Review. Volume 60, number 2, May 1970. Pages 231-236.]
            “… [One dependency] school of thought: the New Dependency Theory, was primarily propelled by Dos Santos in his article titled ‘The Structure of Dependency [sic; Dependence]’ published in 1970. Theotonio Dos Santos identified and distinguished various stages of dependency as they evolved historically. First, he distinguished the colonial dependence which was based on trade and resulted in the exploitation of natural resources. Secondly, he identified the industrial-financial dependence which manifested itself at the end of the 19ᵗʰ century. Finally, he identified a new type of dependence industrial-technological relations. He reconciled this stage with the emergence of multinational corporations after the World War II ….” [B. O. G. Nwanolue, Osegbue Chike, and Iwuoha Chidubem Victor, “An Analysis of the Impact of the European Union and Africa Development Partnership.” Sacha Journal of Policy and Strategic Studies. Volume 2, number 1, 2012. Pages 29-40.]
         4. dependency and development paradigm (Henrique Cardoso as pronounced in this MP3 audio file): Focuses upon corporate, as well as financial, control.
            “I see ‘cultural identities’ not as unchangeable realities. ‘Cultural identities’ are to a greater or lesser degree the temporary amalgamation resulting from the interaction of different people, values, traditions, institutions, and so on, over history. The vitality of a ‘cultural identity’ is commensurate to its ability to absorb and digest other influences, constantly changing itself but not beyond recognition. I reject a fundamentalist conception of cultural identity. By the same token, when I refer to a ‘cosmopolitan vision,’ I do not have in mind a monolithic vision dictated by abstract reason. A true cosmopolitan vision stems from the perception that there are an increasing number of issues that can be appropriately dealt with only globally and only by multilateral institutions. And it requires a commitment to make existing multilateral institutions more effective, comprehensive and democratic. In terms of its contents, a cosmopolitan vision is not an ex ante definition but an ex post product of deliberation within multilateral institutions. My emphasis on procedures leads me to your second question.
            “Mitigating unjustifiable asymmetries of power within multilateral institutions—either by redistributing formal power among their members or by giving more voice to civil society—is certainly a great challenge. However, no matter how imperfect multilateral institutions may be, they are the best mechanisms in place to avoid the sheer prevalence of the strong in world affairs. Given that, with respect to the MDGs [Millennium Development Goals], I am more concerned with the relative weakness of existing multilateral institutions—be it to ensure peace and security, to prevent severe financial crisis or to foster development—than with the risks associated with big donors influencing the policy choices of small recipients.”
            [Fernando Henrique Cardoso in Sara Regine Hassett and Christine Weydig, “An interview with Fernando Henrique Cardoso.” Journal of International Affairs. Volume 58, number 2, spring 2005. Page 211-219.]
            “[Enzo] Faletto and I tried to address these truths [that many Third World countries were strongly developing under capitalism] not by formulating a new theory, but by coldly examining some key facts in several Latin American countries. We looked at the management of the economies in each country and saw that some governments and business communities had done a better job than others at attracting foreign capital and growing their economies. We also saw that some countries, particularly Argentina and Brazil, had been able to accommodate foreign companies without ceding control over their national interests. We postulated, then, that poor countries in a position of ‘dependency’ on the rich ones could take certain steps toward progress in spite of the existing system. All of this sounds quite elementary and obvious now, but in Latin America in 1968, these thoughts were borderline heresy.
            “The book was widely interpreted as leftist because of its worldview—our delineation of the divisions between rich and poor nations, and our description of the existing relationship. However, the conclusions were not very leftist at all.
            “The primary message of Dependency and Development was that the people of Latin America had control over their own fate. Under certain circumstances, we could indeed operate within the existing system. Many alternatives were possible within that system, and the fatalism that dominated the region at that time was entirely pointless, we wrote. There would, of course, be certain restrictions, and we did not advocate blind free-market capitalism. In fact, we didn’t advocate many specific initiatives at all. We simply described the changing world as we saw it, much as [Karl] Marx would have.”
            [Fernando Henrique Cardoso. The Accidental President of Brazil: A Memoir. New York: PublicAffairs. 2006. Page 97.]
            “… [One dependency] school of thought is the Dependency and Development paradigm. Fundamentally, Henrique Cardoso maintains that the notion of capitalist development occurs in dependent situations …. The main thesis here is that capital accumulation is a direct consequence of corporate rather than mere financial control. Cardoso observed that ‘monopoly capitalism and development are not inherently contradictory terms, and dependent capitalist development has become a new form of monopolistic expansion in the Third World’ …. This has some serious implications. It means that Third World nations can only achieve development under the condition of dependency upon the monopoly capitalism of the First World, as the Third World do not have sufficient capital base to drive autochthonous development. Again, it is assumed that under this arrangement (contact with developed countries), a developing nation should expand sufficient capital base and exploit some other underdeveloped virgin areas if development must occur to such a nation.” [B. O. G. Nwanolue, Osegbue Chike, and Iwuoha Chidubem Victor, “An Analysis of the Impact of the European Union and Africa Development Partnership.” Sacha Journal of Policy and Strategic Studies. Volume 2, number 1, 2012. Pages 29-40.]
      2. Marxism–Maoism as pronounced in this MP3 audio file (Chinese, 毛主义, Máo-Zhǔ-Yì as pronounced in this MP3 audio file): Under Mao Tse-tung (Chinese, 毛泽东, Máo-Zé-dōng as pronounced in this MP3 audio file), 1893-1976, Maoism was a distinctive variant of Marxist-Leninism. Today’s Mainland China has moved away from Maoism, and from Marxist-Leninism, and toward a market-based economy.
         One of the principal contributions of Maoism is that revolutionary tactics need to be adapted to each society. For instance, Maoism originated in an economically underdeveloped area of the world, but Maoist parties and organizations are also found elsewhere, including throughout the First World. Within China specifically, the peasants, rather than the factory workers, were regarded as the revolutionary class, but a Maoist revolution elsewhere might proceed differently (as with the Black Panthers, a U.S. Maoist organization, from the 1960s). Although all Maoists are not Third-Worldists (just as not all liberation theologians or all critical pedagogues are Third-Worldists), Maoism began in the Third World. Therefore, Maoism has been included in this chapter. In Maoism, revolution can begin in one country and, later, be exported.

         “We must have faith, first, that the peasant masses are ready to advance step by step along the road of socialism under the leadership of the Party, and second, that the Party is capable of leading the peasants along this road. These two points are the essence of the matter, the main current.” [Chairman Mao Tse-tung. Quotations from Chairman Mao: The Little Red Book. Undated. Page 12.]

         1. Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (Arabic/ʿArabiyyaẗ, الجَبْهَة الدِيمُوقرَاطِيَّة لِتَحْرِير فِلَسْطِين, ʾal-Ǧabhaẗ ʾal-Dīmūqrāṭiyyaẗ li-Taḥrīr Filasṭīn) or the DFLP: It is a secular, non-Islamic Third-Worldist Maoism and Marxist-Leninist organization in Palestine.
         2. Afghanistan Liberation Organization (Persian/Fārsī, سَازْمَانِ رِهَایِیِ افْغَانِسْتَان‎, Sāzmān-i Rihāyī-i ʾAfġānistān): It is a Third-Worldist Maoism group in Afghanistan.
         3. Naxalite (Bengali/Bāṅāli, নকশাল, Nakaśāla): It is a designation for a Third-Worldist Maoism movement in India. Jason Unruhe discusses the Naxalites in these two YouTube videos: Massive Naxalite Attack Kills Salwa Judum Founder and Changing Naxalite Communication Methods.
            “ The Naxalites’ absolute rejection of parliamentary struggle, and their complete faith in guerilla warfare as the only right tactic at all times for a revolutionary movement can also be condemned in the light of many passages from Lenin. But theoretically important criticism of this kind should not ignore what the Naxalites do in practice, as opposed to what they say. Any correct assessment of their role in India today must also look at the content of their activities, and the quality of their cadres. Here it is clear that the Naxalites are at present grappling with the principal contradiction in contemporary India, viz. the predominance of feudalism in the countryside. In most large holdings, which account for more than a third of the land, feudal or semi-feudal relationships—tied labour, payment in kind and so on—exist.” [Gautam Appa, “The Naxalites.” New Left Review. Series I, number 61, May–June 1970. Pages 34-40.]
         4. Maoist Rebel News (Jason Unruhe): This service, from Jason Unruhe, operates a Third-Worldist Maoism YouTube channel and a Patreon page.
            “Karl Marx spoke of capitalism being a system of contradiction. This could not be anymore a perfect example of it. The economy recovers when the money becomes liquid. But the financial institutions won’t allow it because they don’t have confidence that it will be paid back. They don’t have confidence because the economy is not moving, but the only way it moves is buy loaning out that money. This is one of the reasons why capitalism is in my opinion stupid.” [Jason Unruhe. Utopian Capitalism: The Fed, the Gold Standard, Crypto-Currency, and Other Nonsense Monetary Theory. Niagra Falls, Ontario: MRN Publishing. 2015. Page 6.]
            “A lot of libertarians and some conservatives have a much romanticized view of the gold standard era. They have a view of this perfect currency that made the economy function smoothly and without trouble. Unfortunately a good deal of what is believed about this time period is not true and has lead to some completely incorrect assumptions about its function. This seems to be a reoccurring problem throughout the libertarian community; they have an unrealistic view of past and fictitious scenarios. Being grounded in economic reality seems to be wholly rejected from their ideology.” [Jason Unruhe. 10 Reasons the Gold Standard Doesn’t Work …and Never Will. Privately published. December 10th, 2013. Page 24. Retrieved on September 6th, 2015.]
         5. Conscious Fighters Vanguard: It is a Third-Worldist Maoist movement.
            “Cease the global military-industrial occupation, super-exploitative offensive, and proxy-puppet-lackey oppression perpetuated by the First World against the Third World! Oppressed and exploited peoples of all countries, take up an internationalist stance in direct opposition to U.S. imperialist aggression! Form a two-fold, united domestic and international anti-imperialist liberation front operating counter to a) the super-profiteering of outsourced sweatshop labor, b) the expropriation and depletion of natural resources and subsequent environmental devastation, c) the eternal debt and mandatory privatized structural adjustments imposed by the likes of the IMF, World Bank, and IDB, and d) the repeated political bombings of any economic developments the underdeveloped nations attempt to make. Oh, starved of the earth! Splinter, shatter, shake this neocolonial, monopolist yoke! People of Asia, Africa, and Latin America—lay down your chains! Take back your land, dignity, and culture. Throw the Yankee imperialists out!” [Comrade Red Raw. Conscious Fighters Vanguard: Praxis Program—A Guide to Action. Conscious Fighters Vanguard. Privately published. Undated. No pagination. Retrieved on September 2nd, 2016.]
            “Nobody likes me
            “Everybody loves me
            “Guess I’m gonna get
            “Eaten by worms
            “Scatter the ashes
            “Before they can rape
            “My 86 course corpse”
            [Comrade Red Raw. Poetic Polemic. Conscious Fighters Vanguard. Privately published. Undated. No pagination. Retrieved on September 2nd, 2016.]
            “In a revolution, revolutionary culture exists before, during, and after the revolution. Presently, we’re at the stage of pre-revolution, i.e., cultural revolution. Thus, we promote the artwork (posters, philosophy, poetry, stencils, murals, music, film, etc.) of the Conscious Fighters Vanguard. This is the method of raising people’s political consciousness. It is only after a significant level of consciousness has been raised that we can move to the next phase away from purely cultural revolution to revolution by intensified means.” [Comrade Red Raw. Interested in Social-Political-Economic-Cultural Change? Conscious Fighters Vanguard. Privately published. Undated. No pagination. Retrieved on September 2nd, 2016.]
         6. Shubel Morgan: A Third-Worldist Maoism YouTube channel.
         7. Guevarism as pronounced in this MP3 audio file (Spanish, Guevarismo as pronounced in this MP3 audio file): Ernesto “Che” Guevara as pronounced in this MP3 audio file (1928-1967) was sympathetic to the Third-Worldist Maoism form of Marxist-Leninism. He was intimately involved in the early years of the Cuban revolution. Guevara’s emphasis was upon guerrilla warfare.
         8. Black Panthers (Huey P. Newton and others): A 1960s Maoist African American movement.
            “The concept of revolutionary suicide is not defeatist or fatalistic. On the contrary, it conveys an awareness of reality in combination with the possibility of hope—reality because the revolutionary must always be prepared to face death, and hope because it symbolizes a resolute determination to bring about change. Above all, it demands that the revolutionary see his death and his life as one piece. Chairman Mao says that death comes to all of us, but it varies in its significance: to die for the reactionary is lighter than a feather; to die for the revolution is heavier than Mount Tai.” [Huey P. Newton with the assistance of J. Herman Blake. Revolutionary Suicide. New York: Penguin Publishing Group. 2009. Kindle edition.]
            “The Black Panthers are not suicidal; neither do we romanticize the consequences of revolution in our lifetime. Other so-called revolutionaries cling to an illusion that they might have their revolution and die of old age. That cannot be.” [Huey P. Newton with the assistance of J. Herman Blake. Revolutionary Suicide. New York: Penguin Publishing Group. 2009. Kindle edition.]
            “We believe that the racist and fascist government of the United States uses its domestic enforcement agencies to carry out its program of oppression against black people, other people of color and poor people inside the united States. We believe it is our right, therefore, to defend ourselves against such armed forces and that all Black and oppressed people should be armed for self defense of our homes and communities against these fascist police forces.
            “… We believe that the various conflicts which exist around the world stem directly from the aggressive desire of the United States ruling circle and government to force its domination upon the oppressed people of the world. We believe that if the United States government or its lackeys do not cease these aggressive wars it is the right of the people to defend themselves by any means necessary against their aggressors.”
            [The Black Panthers: Ten Point Program. Retrieved on September 17th, 2015.]
         9. Freedom Road Socialist Organization: This name is used by two factions of the original group. While Freedom Road Socialist Organization (Maoist) is a Marxist-Leninist organization, Freedom Road Socialist Organization (Left Foundation), with a wider constituency, is not specifically Marxist-Leninist.
         10. Revolutionary Communist Party, U.S.A.: This U.S. Maoist party was founded by Bob Avakian. Their definition of “communism” is superb.
             “… [There are] unresolved contradictions under socialism. What is said there is another way of expressing the understanding that the struggle for the complete emancipation of women will be a crucial part of ‘the final revolution.’ In other words, it will be a crucial component in propelling and driving forward not only the revolutionary struggle to overthrow the rule of capitalism-imperialism but to continue the revolution, within the new, socialist society itself, in order to advance on the road toward the final aim of communism. The point is that, among the unresolved contradictions which will remain in socialist society, and which can be a driving force propelling that revolution forward, the continuing ways in which the emancipation of women will need to be fought for and fought through will be one of the most decisive aspects and expressions of that.” [Bob Avakian. Break ALL the Chains!: Bob Avakian on the Emancipation of Women and the Communist Revolution. Chicago, Illinois: RCP Publications. 2014. Page 2.]
             “It is this [capitalist-imperialist] system that has got us in the situation we’re in today, and keeps us there. And it is through revolution to get rid of this system that we ourselves can bring a much better system into being. The ultimate goal of this revolution is communism: A world where people work and struggle together for the common good… Where everyone contributes whatever they can to society and gets back what they need to live a life worthy of human beings… Where there are no more divisions among people in which some rule over and oppress others, robbing them not only of the means to a decent life but also of knowledge and a means for really understanding, and acting to change, the world.” [Revolutionary Communist Party, USA, “The Revolution We Need… The Leadership We Have: A Message, And A Call, From The Revolutionary Communist Party, USA.” Revolution. Number 170, July 19th, 2009.]
      3. Marxism–Juche (Korean, 맑스주의 주체, Maksŭjuŭi Chuch’e as pronounced in this MP3 audio file): This term refers to the unique Global Southern variant, or offshoot, of Marxism which was developed by President Kim Il Sung (Korean, 김일성 주석, Kim-Il-Sŏng Chusŏk), 1912-1994 A.D., in North Korea. Juche (Korean, 주체 or 主體, Chuch’e as pronounced in this MP3 audio file, “self-reliance” or, more literally, “subject”), as the party of North Korea, no longer defines itself as strictly Marxist–Leninist. Instead, North Korea is managed a bit like a hereditary totalitarian dictatorship or, perhaps, an absolute monarchy (similar to the medieval European divine right of kings).
         “The Juche idea is a new and original philosophical idea that clarifies the man-centered philosophical principle.
         “But it does not mean that the Juche idea has nothing common with Marxism-Leninism or the former denies the latter.
         “The basic principles of Marxism-Leninism are the truth. The Juche idea has a close connection with Marxism-Leninism with commonness in its mission and class ideal.
         “In other words, the Juche idea inherits the mission and class principle of Marxism-Leninism. The Juche idea approves the truthfulness of Marxism-Leninism and regards it as its presupposition. The Juche idea is a theory founded, developed and enriched in the course of applying and developing it creatively in accordance with requirements of the revolutionary practice in our times.
         “However, the historical exploit of the Juche idea is not to have developed Marxism-Leninism but to have clarified a new man-centered philosophical principle.
         “In a word, there is inheritance between the Juche idea and Marxism-Leninism, but the main is the originality of the Juche idea. The Juche idea approves historical exploits of Marxism-Leninism, but does not consider it as a complete revolutionary idea of the working class.”
         [Official USA Delegate, “What is the Interrelationship Between the Juche Idea and Marxism-Leninism and What is the View of the Juche Idea on Marxism?” Korean Friendship Association. October 21st, 2014.]
         “The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea [DPRK] is guided in its activities by the Juche idea authored by President Kim Il Sung. The Juche idea means, in a nutshell, that the masters of the revolution and construction are the masses of the people and that they are also the motive force of the revolution and construction.
         “The Juche idea is based on the philosophical principle that man is the master of everything and decides everything. It is the man-centred world outlook and also a political philosophy to materialize the independence of the popular masses, namely, a philosophy which elucidates the theoretical basis of politics that leads the development of society along the right path.
         “The Government of the DPRK steadfastly maintains Juche in all realms of the revolution and construction.
         “Establishing Juche means adopting the attitude of a master towards the revolution and construction of one’s country. It means maintaining an independent and creative standpoint in finding solutions to the problems which arise in the revolution and construction. It implies solving those problems mainly by one’s own efforts and in conformity with the actual conditions of one’s own POLITICS country. The realization of independence in politics, self-sufficiency in the economy and self-reliance in national defence is a principle the Government maintains consistently.
         “The Korean people value the independence of the country and nation and, under the pressure of imperialists and dominationsts, have thoroughly implemented the principle of independence, self-reliance and self-defence, defending the country’s sovereignty and dignity firmly.
         “It is an invariable policy of the Government of the Republic, guided by the Juche idea, to treasure the Juche character and national character and maintain and realize them. The Government of the Republic always adheres to the principle of Juche, the principle of national independence, and thus is carrying out the socialist cause of Juche.”
         [Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, “Juche Ideology.” Official Webpage of the DPR of Korea. 2011.]
      4. Revolutionary Anti-Imperialist Movement (RAIM): This Third–Worldist organization no longer considers itself to be strictly Maoist.
         “The communist movement in the west has shown a consistent lack of understanding about its own location in relation to imperialism. This lack has caused the choking of the communist movement with opportunism, and has generated a movement which is antagonistic to its own explicit goals. First Worldism has thus presented itself as an obstacle to the communist movement’s success in the west, and as the enemy of Third Worldist communists and anti-imperialists. For this reason, we do not see the primary dividing line in the communist movement today as one between Marxists of various tendencies, since most of the proponents of these various tendencies are in fact united around an acceptance of First Worldist ideology. RAIM’s greater unity is with Third Worldists of any particular tendency, as at the current conjecture the struggle against First Worldism is the principle internal struggle in the communist movement. This is why RAIM has ceased to conceive of itself as an explicitly Maoist organization.
         “RAIM has not ‘rejected’ Maoism per se. The Revolutionary Anti-Imperialist Movement is first and foremost a Third Worldist and Communist organization whose unifying principles include an analysis of political economy that identifies the imperialist subsidy of the ‘developed’ world’s mode of life via the super-exploitation of the ‘underdeveloped’ world. From this foundation, RAIM posits a global class analysis which illuminates the community of interest between the imperialist ruling-class and the great mass of working people in the ‘developed’ world. All RAIM organizers are united on these basic principles; beyond this, we do not require our members to be Maoists, nor do we turn away Maoists from our organization. The glue that holds RAIM together politically is our Principles of Unity, rather than adherence to this or that Marxist tendency.”
         [The Revolutionary Anti-Imperialist Movement. “Clarifying RAIM’s stance on Maoism.” Undated. The Revolutionary Anti-Imperialist Movement. Retrieved on September 3rd, 2015.]
         “Our [RAIM’s] aim is to build public opinion internationally in support of Third Worldism and People’s War, and to build and defend oppositional political cultures and independent institutions of the oppressed within ‘the belly of the beast’ as part of world revolution. We want the complete dismantling of imperialism and the victory of the proletariat in revolution. Ultimately, we want communism – the end of all oppression and exploitation. [The Revolutionary Anti-Imperialist Movement. About: Who are we? What unites us? What do we do?” Undated. The Revolutionary Anti-Imperialist Movement. Retrieved on September 3rd, 2015.]
         “Revolutionary Ecology is a collaborative project that seeks to popularize Marxism within the environmentalist and animal liberation movements…..
         “We are quite literally faced with two options: Communism or annihilation.”
         [“About.” Revolutionary Ecology: Marxist Discourse on Environmentalism and Animal Rights. Undated. Retrieved on September 4th, 2015.]
         “Anti-Imperialism.com is a website that provides news, analysis, and culture from a socialist perspective, featuring content that is relevant to the struggle against capitalism-imperialism and for a revolutionary transformation of society. Anti-Imperialism.com functions as a popular website with news, commentary, essays, and other media for the growing tide of support for revolutionary global democracy.” [“About.” Anti-Imperialism.com: News—Analysis—Culture. Undated. Retrieved on September 4th, 2015.]
         “The purpose of this journal is to explore questions of Chicano-Mexicano national liberation from a Third Worldist perspective. Siglo De Lucha will explore issues of history, theory, news analysis and cultural reviews.” [“About.” Siglo de Lucha: Journal of Chicano National Liberation. Undated. Retrieved on September 4th, 2015.]
         “Dare to Win is the news and commentary magazine of the Revolutionary Anti-Imperialist Movement. We encourage cadre and comrades to distribute Dare to Win on the streets, at protests, or at other political events.” [“About.” Dare to Win. Undated. Retrieved on September 4th, 2015.]
      5. third universal (or, more loosely, “international”) theory (Arabic/ʿArabiyyaẗ, النَظَرِيَّة العالَمِيَّة الثَالِثَة, ʾal-naẓariyyaẗ ʾal-ʿamiyyaẗ ʾal-ṯāliṯaẗ) was developed by Muʻammar Gaddafi (Arabic/ʿArabiyyaẗ, مُعَمَّر مُحَمَّد أبُو مِنْيَار القَذَّافِيّ, Muʿammar Muḥammad ꞌAbū Minyār ʾal-Qaddāfiyy). It is a simplified Global Southern version of Marxism.
         “It is probable that the outbreak of the revolution to achieve socialism will start with the appropriation by the producers of their share in what they produce. The objective of the workers’ strikes will shift from a demand for the increase of wages to a demand for sharing in the production. All that will, sooner or later, take place under the guidance of The Green Book.
         “But the final step is when the new socialist society reaches the stage where profit and money disappear. It is through transforming society into a fully productive society and through reaching, in production, the level where the material needs of the members of society are satisfied. In that final stage profit will automatically disappear and there will be no need for money.”
         “The recognition of profit is an acknowledgement of exploitation. The mere recognition of profit removes the possibility of limiting it. Measures taken to put a limit to it through various means are mere attempts at reform, which are not radical, in order to stop man’s exploitation by man.
         “The final solution is the abolition of profit. But as profit is the driving force of economic activity, its abolition is not a decision that can be taken lightly. It must result from the development of socialist production which will be achieved if the satisfaction of the material needs of society is realised. The endeavour to increase profit will ultimately lead to its disappearance.”
         [Muʻammar Gaddafi. The Green Book: Part Two—The Solution of the Economic Problem. Tripoli, Libya: Publishing, Advertising and Distribution. 1975. Pages 29-30.]
      6. critical pedagogy as pronounced in this MP3 audio file (Paulo Freire as pronounced in this MP3 audio file): The goal of education is emancipation from oppression through conscientization (“kŏn´-shē-ĕn-tī-zā´-shŭn” as pronounced in this MP3 audio file), the English-language version of the Portuguese conscientização (MP3 audio file). Conscientization refers to critical consciousness or consciousness raising. The root of conscientização is the French word, conscience (MP3 audio file), which can be translated into English as either conscience or consciousness. Concienciación (MP3 audio file) is a Spanish-language spelling. Conscientisation (MP3 audio file) is the French-language version. Coscientizzazione (MP3 audio file) is the Italian-language translation. Critical pedagogy is a Third-Worldist version of critical social theory.
         “I have encountered, both in training courses which analyze the role of conscientização and in actual experimentation with a truly liberating education, the ‘fear of freedom’ discussed in the first chapter of this book. Not infrequently, training course participants call attention to ‘the danger of conscientização’ in a way that reveals their own fear of freedom. Critical consciousness, they say, is anarchic. Others add that critical consciousness may lead to disorder. Some, however, confess: Why deny it? I was afraid of freedom. I am no longer afraid!” (Paulo Freire. Pedagogy of the Oppressed. 30th anniversary edition. Myra Bergman Ramos, translator. New York: The Continuum International Publishing Group Inc. 2005. Page 35.]
         “[Paulo] Freire developed his conception of education as a practice of freedom from a critical reflection on various adult education projects he undertook in Brazil in the late 1950s and early 1960s …. That is, the theory was part of a praxis, ‘reflection and action upon the world in order to transform it’ …. At the same time, Freire’s theory was based on an ontological argument that posited praxis as a central defining feature of human life and a necessary condition of freedom. Freire contended that human nature is expressed through intentional, reflective, meaningful activity situated within dynamic historical and cultural contexts that shape and set limits on that activity. The praxis that defines human existence is marked by this historicity, this dialectical interplay between the way in which history and culture make people even while people are making that very history and culture.” [Ronald David Glass, “On Paulo Freire’s Philosophy of Praxis and the Foundations of Liberation Education.” Educational Researcher. Volume 30, number 2, March 2001. Pages 15–25.]
         “Achieving critical consciousness
         “In addition to adopting methods similar to those of ‘quad texts,’ which align curriculum to the Common Core, using critical theory helps students understand power structures and provides students with the language to examine their own relation to power.
         “If the purpose of education is to achieve critical consciousness, then our role is to help students become critical readers who question the world and who seek change.”
         [Ashley Wolstein, “Critical Theory: A language for questioning the world and the status quo.” Literacy Today. Volume 34, number 1, July–August 2016. Pages 28-29.]
         “There have been a large number of movements and protests that have developed over the past twenty years in opposition to neoliberalism and the attendant attack on public education.…
         “While exemplary in their intent and actions, most of these movements have treated the symptoms of neoliberalism rather than the disease. What is missing is the understanding of the nature of capitalism, an understanding only possible through the use of a Marxian analysis. A crucial part of every movement needs to be, therefore, a critical pedagogy, one that pushes the participants in every movement, including, of course, the radical education movement, to think and act critically.”
         [Peter McLaren and Ramin Farahmandpur, “The Pedagogy of Oppression: A Brief Look at ‘No Child Left Behind.’” Monthly Review: An Independent Socialist Magazine. Volume 58, issue 3, July 2006. Pages 94-99.]
         “American soft power exports liberal assumptions around the world as educational commodities, and as part of the sales package, critical pedagogy offers no positive program other than a hollowed-out construct of “democracy” and a series of critiques against colonialism, capitalism, sexism, racism and so on. However, in this therapeutic mode of righting wrongs critical pedagogy as an ethico-political disposition does little more, at best, than enhance the adaptive capacity of global capitalism and deepen inequalities in private property or, at worst, provide more ammunition for pannationalist communities of difference that regress into warring traditionalisms. According to Alain Badiou …, the solution is to believe in the resurrection of the Idea of communism.” [Jerrold L. Kachur, “The Liberal Virus in Critical Pedagogy: Beyond “Anti-This-and-That” Postmodernism and Three Problems in the Idea of Communism.” Journal for Critical Education Policy Studies. Volume 10, number 1, April 2012. Pages 1-21.]
      7. pedagogies of resistance (Patricia E. “Ellie” Perkins): She examines environmental education is Paulo Freire’s home country of Brazil.
         “This paper discusses Brazilian initiatives and models for community-based environmental education, ‘pedagogies of resistance,’ which are using the democratic opening provided by watershed-based legal structures to overcome cynicism and demonstrate the value of grassroots participation in water decision-making. There is a burgeoning theoretical literature, including the work of Third World theorists, on the potential and value of such organized subaltern movements …. At both theoretical and practical levels, these examples from Brazil offer insights and hope about the potential of women's grassroots networks to help build woman-friendly democratic processes, in Brazil and globally.
         “Broadening public involvement in public decision processes—and watershed committees in particular—requires a creative combination of grassroots environmental education and community organizing.”
         [Patricia E. “Ellie” Perkins, “Pedagogies of resistance: community-based education for women’s participation in watershed management in Sao Paulo, Brazil.” Canadian Woman Studies. Volume 27, number 1, fall 2008. Pages 107-111.]
      8. theater of the oppressed (Augusto Boal as pronounced in this MP3 audio file): Boal’s approach to theatrical performance as a theatrical director, explained in his book Theatre of the Oppressed, was influenced by fellow Brazilian Paulo Freire’s critical pedagogy.
         “… a Marxist artist … must promote the movement toward national liberation and toward the liberation of the classes oppressed by capital.” [Augusto Boal. Theatre of the Oppressed. Charles A. and Maria-Odilia Leal McBride and Emily Fryer, translators. London: Pluto Press. 2008. Page 87.]
         “… the oppressed people are liberated themselves and, once more, are making the theatre their own. The walls must be torn down. First, the spectator starts acting again: invisible theatre, forum theatre, image theatre, etc. Secondly, it is necessary to eliminate the private property of the characters by the individual actors: the ‘Joker’ System.” [Augusto Boal. Theatre of the Oppressed. Charles A. and Maria-Odilia Leal McBride and Emily Fryer, translators. London: Pluto Press. 2008. Page 95.]
      9. consciencism (MP3 audio file) or, in effect, conscience-ism (Kwame Nkrumah as pronounced in this MP3 audio file): An emphasis is placed upon pan-Africanism (universal Africanism) based upon common experiences, history, and culture. Colonialism and slavery are opposed by socialism. Nkrumah’s (1909-1972) perspective is somewhat similar to Paulo Freire’s concept of conscientization (in critical pedagogy).
         “Revolution has two aspects. Revolution is a revolution against an old order; and it is also a contest for a new order. The Marxist emphasis on the determining force of the material circumstances of life is correct. But I would like also to give great emphasis to the determining power of ideology. A revolutionary ideology is not merely negative. It is not a mere conceptual reputation of a dying social order, but a positive creative theory, the guiding light of the emerging social order.” [Kwame Nkrumah. Consciencism: Philosophy and Ideology for Decolonisation. August 15th, 1969.]
         “Philosophical consciencism does not assert the sole reality of matter. Rather it asserts the primary reality of matter. Here again, if space were absolute and independent, matter could not with respect to it be primary. Therefore philosophical consciencism, in asserting the primary existence of matter, also maintains that space must, to the extent that it real, derive its properties from those of matter through a categorial conversion. And since the properties of space are geometrical, it then follows from philosophical consciencism that the geometry of space is determined by the properties of matter.” [Kwame Nkrumah. Consciencism: Philosophy and Ideology for Decolonisation. August 15th, 1969.]
         “But if philosophical consciencism connects knowledge with action, it is still necessary to inquire whether it conceives this connection as a purely mechanistic one, or whether it makes it susceptible of ethical influence and comment.” [Kwame Nkrumah. Consciencism: Philosophy and Ideology for Decolonisation. August 15th, 1969.]
         “In its political aspect, philosophical consciencism is faced with the realities of colonialism, imperialism, disunity and lack of development. Singly and collectively these four militate against the realization of a social justice based on ideas of true equality.” [Kwame Nkrumah. Consciencism: Philosophy and Ideology for Decolonisation. August 15th, 1969.]
         “Now let us consider one aspect of the political situation in the country today. I will describe it stage by stage in order to make the position clear. In every country things have to be done and it is the people who decide what particular things should be done at any particular time. In other words, it is necessary to determine what the people want. Secondly, there is the question of how things that have been agreed upon are to be carried out, and thirdly, there is the question of who should provide the leadership in carrying out what the people want. Differences of opinion concerning these three things exist in every country. In democratic countries differences of opinion are put before the electorate and at election time a decision is taken by the people. This decision in the first place is taken as to who should provide the leadership.” [Kwame Nkrumah, “Movement for Colonial Freedom.” Phylon (1940-1956). Volume 16, number 4, 1955. Pages 397-409.]
         “The struggle for self-determination which was started by our forbears is, in our time, coming to a successful end and the prospect of gaining our independence which, through accidents of history, pleasant and unpleasant, was surrendered to a foreign power is indeed exciting. It is most important, Mr. Speaker, to emphasize that the unity of our country is necessary not only in the interests of our own immediate independence, but as an example to all the other peoples of this vast continent.” [Kwame Nkrumah, “On Freedom’s Stage.” Africa Today. Volume 4, number 2, March-April 1957. Pages 4-8.]
         “If … now that we are independent we allow the same conditions to exist that existed in colonial days, all the resentment which overthrew colonialism will be mobilised against us. The resources are there. It is for us to marshal them in the active service of our people. Unless we do this by our concerted efforts, within the framework of our combined planning, we shall not progress at the tempo demanded by today’s events and the mood of our people. The symptoms of our troubles will grow, and the troubles themselves become chronic. It will then be too late for pan-African unity to secure for us stability and tranquillity in our labours for a continent of social justice and material wellbeing.” [Kwame Nkrumah, “Kwame Nkrumah: ‘The people of Africa are crying for unity.’” New African Magazine. Volume 519, July 2012. Pages 26-31.]
         “A … difficulty that arises from the anthropological approach to socialism, or ‘African socialism,’ is the glaring division between existing African societies and the communalistic society that was. I warned in my book Consciencism that ‘our society is not the old society, but a new society enlarged by Islamic and Euro-Christian influences’ This is a fact that any socio-economic policies must recognise and take into account. Yet the literature of ‘African socialism’ comes close to suggesting that today’s African societies are communalistic. The two societies are not coterminous; and such an equation cannot be supported by any attentive observation. It is true that this disparity is acknowledged in some of the literature of ‘African socialism’; thus, my friend and colleague Julius Nyerere, in acknowledging the disequilibrium between what was and what is in terms of African societies, attributes the differences to the importations of European colonialism.” [Kwame Nkrumah, “African Socialism Revisited.” From a paper read at the Africa Seminar. Cairo, Egypt. 1967. Retrieved on July 1st, 2016.]
         “[Kwame] Nkrumah’s concept of the African Personality challenged the emotional emphasis of Negritude that dichotomized reason as innately Western and sensitivity and emotion as inherently African attributes. His definition envisaged a society of cooperation and equality. It was built on the morality and cordiality integral to African cultures. Later, in his book Consciencism, Nkrumah argued “the African Personality is defined by the cluster of humanist principles which underlie the traditional African society.” More importantly, his concept of the African Personality became part of the ideological lens through which his domestic and foreign policies were conceived.” [Ama Biney. The Political and Social Thought of Kwame Nkrumah. New York: Palgrave Macmillan imprint of St. Martin’s Press LLC. 2011. Page 120.]
         “… philosophical consciencism is the ‘map in intellectual terms of disposition of forces which will enable African society digest the Western and Islamic and the Euro-Christian elements in Africa, and develop them in such a way that they fit into the African personality’. According to [Kwame] Nkrumah, the African personality is defined by the cluster of humanist principles which underlie the traditional African society. Philosophical consciencism is that philosophical standpoint which, taking its start from the present content of African conscience indicates the way in which progress is forged out of the conflict in that conscience The above view brings about the dialectical nature of the doctrine of philosophical consciencism. As a matter of fact, Nkrumah believes that his doctrine has its basis in materialism, the view that asserts the absolute and independent existence of matter.” [Lawrence O. Bamikole, “Nkrumah and the Triple Heritage Thesis and Development in Africana Societies.” International Journal of Business, Humanities and Technology. Volume 2, number 2, March 2012. Pages 68-76.]
         “[Kwame] Nkrumah’s search for the right formula for the decolonization of Africa reached its pick with his development of the idea of consciencism. The reason for the need for philosophical consciencism is built on the irreversibility of the dynamic changes which had taken place in African society under the influence of alien cultures, together with the view that for any institution or ideology to be effective, it must relate to the conditions of the people it seeks to serve. Through a process comparable to gestation or grafting, philosophical conscientism would synthesis a harmonious whole out of the otherwise conflicting cultures in Africa.” [Ikechukwu Anthony Kanu, “Nkrumah and the Quest for African Unity.” American International Journal of Contemporary Research. Volume 3, number 6, June 2013. Pages 111-114.]
      10. theologies of liberation (Gustavo Gutiérrez as pronounced in this MP3 audio file and many others): Jesus Christ is interpreted as a revolutionary defending the rights of the poor. Although liberation theology began within The Society of Jesus (the Jesuits) in Latin America, later versions, some of them outside of the Third World, have included Black liberation theology, feminist liberation theology (sometimes called “thealogy [MP3 audio file]” for “Goddess talk”), Gay liberation theology, and Palestinian Christian liberation theology. The Jewish liberation theology of Marc H. Ellis draws connections between the Holocaust and the Third World.
          “The Bible presents liberation—salvation— in Christ as the total gift, which … gives the whole process of liberation its deepest meaning and its complete and unforeseeable fulfillment. Liberation can thus be approached as a single salvific process.” [Gustavo Gutiérrez. A Theology of Liberation. Sister Caridad Inda and John Eagleson, translators and editors. 15ᵗʰ Anniversary Edition. Maryknoll, New York: Orbis Books. 1988. Page xiv.]
          “To conceive of history as a process of human liberation is to consider freedom as a historical conquest; it is to understand that the step from an abstract to a real freedom is not taken without a struggle against all the forces that oppress humankind, a struggle full of pitfallls, detours, and temptations to run away. The goal is not only better living conditions, a radical change of structures, a social revolution; it is much more: the continuous creation, never ending, of a new way to be human, a permanent cultural revolution.” [Gustavo Gutiérrez. A Theology of Liberation. Sister Caridad Inda and John Eagleson, translators and editors. 15ᵗʰ Anniversary Edition. Maryknoll, New York: Orbis Books. 1988. Page 21.]
          “Forty years ago, we began speaking in Latin America about liberation theology and how important it was for us ‘to live liberation,’ to be in solidarity with the poor. Reflection is very important also; for the first time in centuries we have theological reflections coming from countries outside of Europe and North America. We have today, theologies coming from Africa and Asia–reflections on the human condition from minorities in the rich countries. Behind these reflections we have movements. We have realities. We have a people committed. We have people killed for their commitments.” [Gustavo Gutiérrez, O.P. A Hermeneutic of Hope. September, 2012. Retrieved on August 24th, 2015.]
          “In spite of the Orthodox Church’s lack of interest in the theology of liberation as practiced in Latin America for the reasons that we have discussed, there were voices in Russia in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries that were critical not only of the social and political structures, but also of the ecclesiastical hierarchy.
          “In the tradition of St. John Chrysostom, they recognised the poor and downtrodden as the ones favoured by God and spoke against their wealthy oppressors. Nicolas Berdyaev [Russian Cyrillic, Никола́й Бердя́ев, Nikoláj Berdấev as pronounced in this MP3 audio file] was one of such modern prophets whose writings have influenced many people, not least, the liberation theologian, Juan Luis Segundo [MP3 audio file].”
          [Ambrose Mong Ih-Ren, “Towards an Orthodox Theology of Liberation: An Examination of the Works of Nicolas Berdyaev.” International Journal of Orthodox Theology. Volume 4, number 2, 2013. Pages 43-74.]
          “A Jewish theology of liberation must … question Jewish empowerment in the United States. As we have seen, the Jewish community looks to the United States to guarantee Israel’s security. Rarely is the cost of this guarantee discussed. Too often the quid pro quo is unquestioning support of United States military build-up and intervention around the world. Our ethics propel us toward solidarity; our realpolitik sees the poor here and in the Third World as threats to a system that is working in our favor.” [Mark H. Ellis. Towards a Jewish Theology of Liberation. London: SCM Press imprint of SCM-Canterbury Press Ltd. 2002. Kindle edition.]
          “A Jewish theology of liberation begins here, in the welter of Jewish life, its inheritance and contemporary life, situated within that life and aware of that which is outside as well. In short, a Jewish theology of liberation seeks a way forward for Jews, aware of and affirming others, with a particularity intact, knowing that its particularity is internally and externally contested, with a sense that Jewish particularity, especially its covenantal reality, has significance for itself and beyond itself. As an original carrier of the prophetic, with the potential of continuing to carry the covenant at stake, a Jewish theology of liberation is insistent on the practice of justice and concrete concern for the other—as justice and more than justice. For the covenant in history represents a way of being in the world, received and practiced, a light in the world that has spread and can be extinguished.” [Marc H. Ellis, “On Jewish Particularity and Anti-Semitism: Notes From a Jewish Theology of Liberation.” Human Architecture: Journal of the Sociology of Self-Knowledge. Open access. Volume VII, number 2, spring 2009. Pages 103-129.]
          “Liberation theologians have also contributed to the dissimulation of that crisis marked by the theologies of liberation. This to the extent that they have failed to adequately negotiate the two sets of tensions that have undergirded the history of the development of liberation theology: namely, the tension between poiesis and praxis, and the tension between the universality of the idea of liberation and the plurality of particular liberationist perspectives. Due to obscure foundations, rather than enhancing and radicalizing the liberationist point of view, the back-and-forth between these two tensions, would, with the demise of real socialism, end up de-radicalizing liberation theology to the point that the theologies of liberation began to move ‘back toward’ theology understood as a historical-hermeneutic science.” [Manuel Mejido Costoya, “A Reconstruction of the Theologies of Liberation: The Lacanian Corrective to the Ellacurian Synthesis.” Journal for Cultural and Religious Theory. Volume 8, number 1, winter 2006. Open access. Pages 10-36.]
          “The pedagogical theory that I most readily employ grows out of my training as a liberation theologian and ethicist where my methodological commitments lie in the epistemological power of situated knowledge. The methodological commitment of liberation theologians and ethicists is the development and practice of theology and ethics connected to the material life and well-being of lived communities. Our use of the ‘spiral of praxis’ as a methodological tool for theological inquiry offers solid foundations for the development of pedagogical models of undergraduate education that are focused on transformative teaching and what Paulo Freire called ‘education as the practice of freedom.’ This essay will explore the epistemological importance of situated knowledge and the practical implications of a theoretical commitment to dialogical learning and transformative pedagogy as represented in the work of Paulo Freire.” [Rebecca Todd Peters, “Teaching for Social Justice: Creating a Context for Transformation.” Journal for Cultural and Religious Theory. Volume 12, number 2, fall 2012. Pages 215-227.]
          “A Jewish theology of liberation recognizes that the world has changed and that by simply applying pre-Holocaust and Holocaust categories to the contemporary world we close our eyes and ears to the pain and possibility of the present. By carrying our own history we bequeath insight to contemporary struggles. If we are overwhelmed, though, by history and seek to overwhelm others, our memory becomes a wedge of anger and insularity, a blunt instrument rather than a delicately nurtured memory.” [Mark H. Ellis. Towards a Jewish Theology of Liberation. London: SCM Press imprint of SCM-Canterbury Press Ltd. 2002. Kindle edition.]
          “In summary, by being aware of pervasiveness and complexity of the problem of injustice and poverty, and the negative consequences of globalization, the struggle for justice and liberation as a constitutive dimension of the proclamation of the Gospel will be effective and fruitful if it is carried out by involving all Christians with persons of other religions and of the good will, especially those who love justice based on the preferential option for the poor. It must be undertaken in fidelity to the gospel and in service to all humanity, starting from the most vulnerable of society. This requires an ongoing conversion of all Christians and the Church that must be concretized in an authentic witness of life, the preferential option for the poor and a willingness to dialogue with the world so that the Church will be able to analyze the signs of the times and listen to the voice of God who speaks through the cries of the oppressed and the marginalized in the world. As a result, the proclamation of the Gospel will truly be the Good News and the saving and liberating message of hope.” [Laurentius Tarpin. The Struggle for Justice and Liberation as a Constitutive Part of the Proclamation of the Gospel in Gustavo Gutiérrez’s Thought: A Critical Analysis. Doctor in moral theology thesis (U.S. English, dissertation). Pontificia Universitas Lateranensis. Rome, Italy. 2003. Pages 229-230.]
          “The North American slave owners, those ‘Babylonians,’ prototypes of the empire and the imperialistic mind-set that disregards anything everybody else has ever done, did away with the natives’ names in an attempt to take away their history. As Chancellor Williams of Howard University puts it in his question posed from a Sumer legend: ‘What became of the black people of Sumer?’ the traveler asked the old man (for ancient records show that the people of Sumer were black). ‘What happened to them? Ah,’ the old man sighed. ‘They lost their history, so they died.’ As Dr. Ofori Atta Thomas of the Interdenominational Theological Center puts it, ‘They forgot their story.’ They lost their history, so they died. Our children don’t know our story. Any people who lose their story are a dead people. And the established authority, the empire, knows that, so it makes every deliberate attempt to take away the exiles’ history. The empire tells them that they have no history prior to the Babylonians introducing them to civilization; the empire tells them outright lies and blatant distortions so that they will disown any linkage that they once had with Africa and they become more Babylonian than the Babylonians.” [Jeremiah A. Wright, Jr., “Words from the Pulpit: Faith in a Foreign Land.” CrossCurrents. Volume 57, number 2, summer 2007. Pages 237-251.]
          “During the [U.S.] presidential campaign of 2008, there emerged what for many Americans was a strange, new term ‘Black theology.’ A videotape of the fiery and impassioned preaching of Jeremiah Wright, candidate Barack Obama’s pastor, initiated a spontaneous yet poorly framed national dialogue that placed Black theology squarely onto the national stage. Wright channeled the Hebrew prophets and ‘damned’ America for practicing racism and violence and denounced her invasion of Iraq. These acts, according to Wright, were evidence of America’s fall from God. The media and general public saw it differently. They denounced Wright’s language as racist hate speech, anti-Christian and anti-America, and condemned candidate Obama for associating with a rogue pastor. Supporters of Wright defended him by situating him within Black prophetic traditions and educating a naive public about the fiery nature of Black homiletics. What supporters and critics miss is that Wright had an Afrocentric orientation … to Christian faith. It is this Afrocentric orientation that drove his prophetic critique of America’s racial practices and inspired him to imagine alternative futures. Wright’s African-centered orientation to Christian faith fits into a long tradition of freedom fighters such as Edward Wilmont Blyden, Maria Stewart, Bishop Henry McNeal Turner, and Marcus Garvey. These thinkers used African-centered thinking to reshape Christianity into an instrument of racial uplift.” [Adam Clark, “Honoring the Ancestors: Toward an Afrocentric Theology of Liberation.” Journal of Black Studies. Volume 44, number 4, 2013. Pages 376-394.]
          “The Black Caucus of the United Church of Christ as made up of both clergy and lay is United Black Christians. Both its national body and its local chapters have been involved in social justice issues since the early 1970s. (In recent years Ministers for Racial and Social Justice has included economic empowerment as one of their primary foci. That resulted in a name change to: The Ministers for Racial, Social and Economic Justice or MRSEJ).
          “The other two groups that are ‘spin-offs’ from the Commission for Racial Justice are the National Black Staff and the National Black Women’s Clergy Caucus. These groups of African-American clergy (and non-clergy) have kept our denomination on the cutting edge in terms of issues of gender and race, Black theology, womanist theology and liberation theology.”
          [Jeremiah Wright, “The African-American Contribution to the United Church of Christ.” Privately published. 2006. Pages 1-3.]
      11. mujerista theology (Ada María Isasi-Díaz as pronounced in this MP3 audio file, Fernando F. Segovia as pronounced in this MP3 audio file, and others): This feminist version of liberation theology, which was originally proposed by Isasi-Díaz, focuses upon the mujerista (MP3 audio file)—literally, “womanist” (from the Spanish word, mujer, “woman”). The mujerista is a Latina who struggles for liberation alongside other Latinas.
          “As a theology of liberation, mujerista theology is contextual. It deals with a historical context, which in turn we understand to be a social construct. Latinas share many of the elements of our sociohistorical context with others of the ‘minoritazed,’ whether they are ethnic/racial groups, women’s groups, or those considered as ‘other,’ that is, apart from the dominant group. We have never thought that the sociohistorical status of Latinas is unique. What we have insisted on is our own specificity made up of social characteristics, historical perspectives, and struggles we share with others. In our case, we see these as coming together in a unique way that we call ‘Latina’ or ‘Hispanic.’ Our Latina specificity, for example, includes the fact that the majority of us find ways to relate in a concrete way to our countries or communities of origin. We send money on a monthly basis; we often return to visit. Those of us who were born outside the U.S.A. work to be allowed to vote in government elections in the countries from which we come. For these reasons we think of ourselves not only as integral to Hispanic/Latino communities here in the U.S.A. but also in close relation to our native or ancestral communities. Liberation for us, therefore, has to do with more than better participation in the benefits that accrue to us because we live in the U.S.A. It demands much more. It means that we have to struggle to bring about radical sociopolitical change so we will not continue to live at the expense of our sisters and brothers in our countries or communities of origin. Without doubt, the historical project of liberation for us seeks to include the most needy instead of seeking to create certain improvements merely for us and for our communities.” [Ada María Isasi-Díaz. En la Lucha: In the Struggle—Elaborating a Mujerista Theology. Minneapolis, Minnesota: Fortess Press. 2004. Pages 1-2.]
          “First of all, from a temporal perspective, … [the] locus is characterized as both of the present, insofar as it is grounded in the given situation of Latinas, and of the future, insofar as it advances a preferred vision for Latinas in the light of their actual situation. Second, from a sociocultural perspective, this locus is portrayed as both one of displacement, marked by oppression, and one of fulfillment, signified by liberation. Thus, the fundamental direction of the project is evident: a move from a present of oppression toward a future of liberation. Finally, its fundamental inclusiveness is similarly clear: liberation is the goal not only for Latinas but also for all others who find themselves in a context of displacement and oppression. This historical project of Mujerista Theology calls for a broad set of strategies of struggle in the move toward the preferred vision of liberation for Latinas and others. Two such strategies involve the use of the Bible and thus biblical interpretation and the recovery of personal grounding and hence Political Theology.” [Fernando F. Segovia, “Mujerista Theology: Biblical Interpretation and Political Theology.” Feminist Theology. Volume 20, number 1, 2011. Pages 21-27.]
      12. liberation buddhology as pronounced in this MP3 audio file (Laurence Cox, Trevor Ling, Anna Mazzoldi, Bhikkhu Bodhi [Siṃhala, භික්කු බෝධි, Bhikku Bōdhi], and others): This term refers to various approaches which integrate Buddhism and the study of Buddhism (buddhology) with Marxism.
          “As an institutional separation, though, this situation recognises a state of affairs which from my own vantage point I’d characterise as the recognition that most western activists are not Buddhists and most western meditators are not Marxists. At least initially, then, liberation Buddhology makes little sense as a proposition that all Buddhists should take a particular political line or engage in particular kinds of political action – or that all activists should become meditators.” [Laurence Cox. Liberation Buddhology. Undated. Retrieved on August 24th, 2015.]
          “The Buddhist – Marxism Alliance was founded by the Oxford Collective on the 20ᵗʰ of July 2013 in Oxford, United Kingdom. Its primary mission is to emphasis the similarity and compatibility of the Buddhist teachings with those of Classical Marxism, and to assert that both systems of thought are motivated by compassion for the suffering of humanity, and emphasis a method of escape from that suffering. Buddhism and Marxism share a common philosophical grounding that is dynamic, ingenious, and transformative. The transformation of the individual develops society, and the transformation of society develops the individual. Buddhism and Marxism arrive at exactly the same conclusions, but through diverse and yet complimentary pathways.” [“Mission Statement.” Buddhist – Marxism Alliance. Undated. Retrieved on September 23rd, 2015.]
          “Both Buddhism and Marxism are based on a philosophical rather than a theological view of the human situation, and both envisage the future in terms of ‘cells’ or growth-points, characterized by the respective principles of corporate existence which each sets out, and devoted to the dissemination of these principles in theory and action. Both envisage a state in which the growth of these revolutionary cells will enable the center of political and economic power to be brought within the revolutionary sphere.” [Trevor Ling. The Buddha: The Social-Revolutionary Potential of Buddhism. Fortieth anniversary edition. Onalaska, Washington: Pariyatti Press. 2013. Page 176.]
          “In sum, the Buddhist prescription for personal happiness lacks one key ingredient: an understanding of the relatively durable social conditions that block our ability to limit suffering and live happy, fulfilled lives. At the same time, the Marxist vision of an ideal society elides the obdurate, existential facts of human suffering. Yet, both perspectives also provide us with valuable insights about how all human beings can attain a good life.” [Michael Slott, “Can You be a Buddhist and a Marxist?” Contemporary Buddhism. Volume 12, number 2, November 2011. Pages 347-363.]
      13. engaged Buddhism (Thich Nhat Hanh [Vietnamese, Thích Nhất Hạnh as pronounced in this MP3 audio file] and others): Hanh develops Buddhism into an activist movement.
          “… the first meaning of Engaged Buddhism is the kind of Buddhism that is present in every moment of our daily life. While you brush your teeth, Buddhism should be there. While you drive your car, Buddhism should be there. While you are walking in the supermarket, Buddhism should be there—so that you know what to buy and what not to buy!
          “Also, Engaged Buddhism is the kind of wisdom that responds to anything that happens in the here and the now—global warming, climate change, the destruction of the ecosystem, the lack of communication, war, conflict, suicide, divorce. As a mindfulness practitioner, we have to be aware of what is going on in our body, our feelings, our emotions, and our environment. That is Engaged Buddhism. Engaged Buddhism is the kind of Buddhism that responds to what is happening in the here and the now.”
          [Thich Nhat Hanh, History of Engaged Buddhism: A Dharma Talk by Thich Nhat Hanh—Hanoi, Vietnam, May 6-7, 2008.” Human Architecture: Journal of the Sociology of Self-Knowledge. Volume 6, number 3, summer 2008. Pages 29-36.]
          “Linking [Thich Nhat] Hanh’s interbeing with pragmatism enables a stronger sociological imagination in which personal troubles within the context of public issues awaken us from our misrecognition of isolated suffering, to an understanding of our interdependent fragile existence …. Moreover, Sociology may benefit from an Eastern approach to the nature of suffering and how one uses such experiences as a vehicle for spiritual awakening.… Hanh’s sociological imagination is deeply concerned with how human beings can liberate themselves from the yoke of ego and societal–economic–political constraints.” [Michael C. Adorjan and Benjamin W. Kelly, “Pragmatism and ‘Engaged’ Buddhism: Working Toward Peace and a Philosophy of Action.” Human Architecture: Journal of the Sociology of Self-Knowledge. Volume 6, number 3, summer 2008. Pages 37-49.]
          “… the themes of community, selflessness, non-violence, and deep empathy are central in the writing and activism of the most prominent scholars and activists of engaged Buddhism and deep ecology …. Moreover, the two main ecological themes of (both traditional and engaged) Buddhism are the importance of cultivating ‘empathy toward the suffering of others’ and ‘empathetic identification’ …. These themes seem to correspond with what deep ecologists call ‘identification’ and ‘Self’ …, respectively. In addition, adherents of both Buddhism and deep ecology offer meditation as an ideal means toward recognition of interconnectedness.” [Julie Gregory and Samah Sabra, “Engaged Buddhism and Deep Ecology: Beyond the Science/Religion Divide.” Human Architecture: Journal of the Sociology of Self-Knowledge. Volume 6, number 3, summer 2008. Pages 51-65.]
          “This article develops a dialogue between Communism and Buddhism on one shared aspect; the need for a humane society in which all things are held in common (although beyond this paper’s scope are both Marxist economic theory and the intricacies of Buddhist philosophy, the comparison of which could highlight many points of difference, which would only increase ideological conflict, instead of promoting joint working for the common good). In furtherance of this goal, the paper focuses on the Zen Buddhist tradition, which privileges mindfulness, a way of living and being (not a religion that can be scorned by Communists) and a way of interbeing (that can be embraced by Communists, emphasising as it does comradeship and solidarity between people, with an understanding that all people ‘interare’). Indeed, interbeing extends to all species, extending comradeship beyond humanity. A focus on Zen not only avoids doctrinal disputes with Marxism but also serves to align Buddhism with Communism; interbeing leads to inter-living, holding all things in common. Buddhist awareness of the interconnections with others leads to an awareness of their suffering and a concern to alleviate it. Communist societies aim to develop full human potential, to allocate resources for the benefit of all, and to guarantee an income, health services and education, thereby diminishing insecurity …
          “Buddhism is closely related to Communism on this issue. In Buddhism, the consequence of no self is no possession; thus Buddhism opposes capitalism’s privileging of private property, instead advocating Socialism because it provides the best way to overcome economic bondage and attain freedom …. Accordingly, Thich Nhat Hanh … stated ‘… in Plum Village we live simply. Monks, nuns, and laypersons – we live together like a family. No one has a private car. No one has a private bank account. No one has a private telephone. Actually, we are the true communists.’”
          [Jeff Waistell, “Marx and Buddha: A Buddhist-Communist Manifesto.” Buddhism for Sustainable Development and Social Change. Volume 1, number 13, 2004. Pages 195-217.]
      14. philosophy of liberation (Enrique Dussel): “‘Philosophy of Liberation’ set out from the locus enuntiationis [Latin, locus ēnuntiātiōnis, place of enunciation] of the material victim, from the negative effect of authoritarianism, capitalism, and patriarchy. However, this is the root of a profound divergence with Critical Theory that continues up to the present (and which should be an explicit subject of our dialogue), that of the material negativity of colonialism (of the indigenous peoples, the African slave, the Opium Wars in China, etc.), a phenomenon which corresponds to metropolitan capitalism, Modernity [MP3 audio file], and Eurocentrism [MP3 audio file].” [Enrique Dussel, “From Critical Theory to the Philosophy of Liberation: Some Themes for Dialogue.” TRANSMODERNITY: Journal of Peripheral Cultural Production of the Luso-Hispanic World. Volume 1, Issue 2, 2011. Pages 16-43.]
      15. postcolonial theory (Frantz Fanon as pronounced in this MP3 audio file, Edward Wadie Said [Arabic/ʿArabiyyaẗ, إِدْوَارْد وَدِيع سَعِيد, ꞌIdwārd Wadiʿ Saʿīd as pronounced in this MP3 audio file], Amilcar Cabral as pronounced in this MP3 audio file, Eric Stokes, Ranajit Guha, Antonio Gramsci, Muhammad Ali Khalidi [Arabic/ʿArabiyyaẗ, مُحَمَّد عَلِيّ الخَالِدِيّ, Muḥammad ʿAliyy ʾal-H̱ālidiyy], and many others): This perspective on colonized indigenous peoples was influenced by certain forms of critical social theory (explained in the chapter on Western Marxism and Critical Theory), including cultural hegemony, as well as by other perspectives. It examines the impact of colonialism on the marginalization (“othering”), dehumanization, and alienation (estrangement or separation of the self) of colonized peoples. One of the classic works in postcolonial theory is Frantz Fanon’s The Wretched of the Earth. Postcolonial theory can also be referred to as postcolonialism or postcolonial studies.
          “‘Post-colonialism/postcolonialism’ is now used in wide and diverse ways to include the study and analysis of European territorial conquests, the various institutions of European colonialisms, the discursive operations of empire, the subtleties of subject construction in colonial discourse and the resistance of those subjects, and, most importantly perhaps, the differing responses to such incursions and their contemporary colonial legacies in both pre-and post-independence nations and communities. While its use has tended to focus on the cultural production of such communities,it is becoming widely used in historical, political, sociological and economic analyses, as these disciplines continue to engage with the impact of European imperialism upon world societies.” [Bill Ashcroft, Gareth Griffiths, and Helen Tiffin. Post-Colonial Studies: The Key Concepts. Second edition. London and New York: Routledge imprint of Taylor & Francis Group, an Informa PLC business. 2007. Page 169.]
          “I want to stress the presuppositional location of this post-colonial scramble—I want to articulate its foundations within the problematic of colonial discourse theory and within an unresolved debate within the Western humanities institution—because I suspect that at times workers in various orders of post-colonial analysis are made to feel a disempowering energy at work in their field—a disempowerment which stems from their sense that these debates ought to be resolved within post-colonial studies itself. And I also raise the question of an effect to these debates, not because I want to suggest they are anything other than crucial ones for the field, but because I think the terrain of post-colonial studies remains in danger of becoming colonised by competing academic methodologies, and being reparcelled into institutional pursuits that have no abiding interest in the specifics of either colonialist history or post-colonial agency.” [Stephen Slemon, “The Scramble for Post-colonialism.” The Post-colonial Studies Reader. London and New York: Routledge imprint of Taylor & Francis Group, an Informa PLC business. 2003. Pages 45-52.]
          “… the Orient has helped to define Europe (or the West) as its contrasting image, idea, personality, experience. Yet none of this Orient is merely imaginative. The Orient is an integral part of European material civilization and culture. Orientalism expresses and represents that part culturally and even ideologically as a mode of discourse with supporting institutions, vocabulary, scholarship, imagery, doctrines, even colonial bureaucracies and colonial styles. In contrast, the American understanding of the Orient will seem considerably less dense, although our recent Japanese, Korean, and Indochinese adventures ought now to be creating a more sober, more realistic ‘Oriental’ awareness. Moreover, the vastly expanded American political and economic role in the Near East (the Middle East) makes great claims on our understanding of that Orient.” [Edward Said. Orientalism. London and New York: Penguin Books imprint of the Penguin Group. 2003. Pages 1-2.]
          “The main battle in imperialism is over land, of course; but when it came to who owned the land, who had the right to settle and work on it, who kept it going, who won it back, and who now plans its future—these issues were reflected, contested, and even for a time decided in narrative. As one critic has suggested, nations themselves are narrations. The power to narrate, or to block other narratives from forming and emerging, is very important to culture and imperialism, and constitutes one of the main connections between them. Most important, the grand narratives of emancipation and enlightenment mobilized people in the colonial world to rise up and throw off imperial subjection; in the process, many Europeans and Americans were also stirred by these stories and their protagonists, and they too fought for new narratives of equality and human community.” [Edward Said. Culture and Imperialism. New York: Vintage Books imprint of Random House, Inc. 1994. Pages xii-xiii.]
          “What I was doing in Orientalism, twenty years ago when I was writing it, was pointing out two things: the extraordinary degree to which the Orient had become feminised by male writers in Europe; and the way in which the women’s movement in the West was hand in glove with the imperialist movement. It was not a deterrent. It’s only very recently – I would say in the last four or five years – that the questions of race and gender have been joined, in a historical and theoretical way – as opposed to just gender.” [Edward Said, “Orientalism and After: An Interview with Edward Said.” Radical Philosophy: Philosophical Journal of the Independent Left. Number 63, November 1993. Pages 22-32.]
          “National liberation, national reawakening, restoration of the nation to the people or Commonwealth, whatever the name used, whatever the latest expression, decolonization is always a violent event…. [D]ecolonization is quite simply the substitution of one ‘species’ of mankind by another.” [Frantz Fanon. The Wretched of the Earth. Richard Philcox, translator. New York: Grove Press imprint of Grove/Atlantic, Inc. 2004. Page 1.]
          “We have had occasion many times to point out the appearance of radically new types of behavior in various aspects of the private and public life of the Algerian. The shock that broke the chains of colonialism has moderated exclusive attitudes, reduced extreme positions, made certain arbitrary views obsolete. Medical science and concern for one’s health have always been proposed or imposed by the occupying power. In the colonial situation, however, it is impossible to create the physical and psychological conditions for the learning of hygiene or for the assimilation of concepts concerning epidemic diseases. In the colonial situation, going to see the doctor, the administrator, the constable or the mayor are identical moves. The sense of alienation from colonial society and the mistrust of the representatives of its authority, are always accompanied by an almost mechanical sense of detachment and mistrust of even the things that are most positive and most profitable to the population.” [Frantz Fanon. A Dying Colonialism. Haakon Chevalier, translator. New York: Grove Press imprint of Grove/Atlantic, Inc. 1965. Page 139.]
          “In terms of consciousness, the black consciousness is held out as an absolute density, as filled with itself, a stage preceding any invasion, any abolition of the ego by desire. Jean-Paul Sartre, in this work, has destroyed black zeal. In opposition to historical becoming, there had always been the unforeseeable. I needed to lose myself completely in negritude. One day, perhaps, in the depths of that unhappy romanticism.” [Frantz Fanon. Black Skin, White Masks. Charles Lam Markmann, translator. London: Pluto Press. 2008. Page 103.]
          “Because [Frantz] Fanon grounds the social vision on the movement’s experience of radical change he does not propose a Leninist-type vanguard party to fill the void. Instead ideology should enlighten the social experiences and bring out their meaning. Liberatory ideology, therefore, is constructed in a social relationship, between the militant intellectual and the mass movement. Such a relationship is crucial to Fanon’s conception of ‘radical mutation’ and represents for him a ‘new form of political activity’ which he claims is history in the making: ‘These politics are national, revolutionary and social and these facts which the native will now come to know exist only in action.’” [Nigel Gibson, “Beyond manicheanism: dialectics in the thought of Frantz Fanon.” Journal Of Political Ideologies. Volume 4, number 3, October 1999. Pages 337-364.]
          “The recent death of Edward Said has reignited the debate as to whether his landmark work Orientalism still has something to teach us about the study of Arab-Islamic civilization. In this article, I will argue that Said’s central thesis in Orientalism has a direct explanatory role to play in our understanding of the work produced in at least one area of scholarship about the Arab and Islamic worlds, namely Arab-Islamic philosophy from the classical or medieval period. Moreover, I will claim that it continues to play this role not only for scholarship produced in the West by Western scholars but also within the Arab world itself.” [Muhammad Ali Khalidi, “Orientalisms in the interpretation of Islamic philosophy.” Radical Philosophy: Philosophical Journal of the Independent Left. Number 135, January/February, 2006. Pages 25-33.]
          “The erudition, range and élan of Edward Said’s work as a literary scholar, cultural critic and politically engaged public intellectual have produced a mountain of commentary, within and beyond academic communities and across continents. With his death, friends, colleagues, collaborators, former students and acquaintances all over the world have been offering tributes to the reach of his intellect and imagination, his fervent convictions, integrity and courage. In all of these the pleasure of his iridescent company, the excitement of a formidable intelligence and the wit of his irreverent remarks have been remembered. Proper evaluations of his stature as an international figure with immense influence within the academy and the public sphere are still to come.” [Benita Parry, “Obituary: Edward Said, 1935–2003.” Radical Philosophy: Philosophical Journal of the Independent Left. Number 123, January/February 2004. Pages 57-60.]
          “This paper explores the decolonial potential of an oral history project out of an elementary school in Salt Lake City, Utah. The Adelante Oral History Project (AOHP) is part of a larger university-school-community partnership called Adelante that seeks to increase the awareness and expectation of college attendance as early as kindergarten. AOHP seeks to promote academic achievement through the development and implementation of culturally relevant oral history projects that interject the histories, cultures, and experiences of the predominantly Latina/o and low-income students at Jackson Elementary. While this is the official goal of the oral history project and larger Adelante partnership, I aim to explore the decolonial potential of the AOHP for decolonizing school curriculums because I argue discourses around decoloniality applied within schooling institutions can positively transform the educational experiences of marginalized students and further humanize these students.” [Sylvia Mendoza, “The Adelante Oral History Project as a Site of Decolonial Potential in Transforming School Curriculums.” Regeneración Tlacuilolli. December, 2014. Pages 11-26.]
          “Though [Frantz] Fanon charts the development of new subjectivities in The Wretched of the Earth, the book’s critical focus remains the analysis of nationalist leaders, intellectuals, and the middle class. All come under Fanon’s sharp tongue, with his sharpest critique saved for the nationalist bourgeoisie. Whether in uniform or not, this kleptocratic caste, either in the context of state capitalism or neo-liberalism, was embedded in the circuit of capital with the former metropole. Perhaps the most interesting of Fanon’s critiques has to do with spontaneity as a central but unstable force in the revolution. Unlike The Wretched of the Earth, however, A Dying Colonialism gives us examples, though not explicitly, of how an ‘organization is inside the people.’ … ‘This is the Voice of Fighting Algeria’ intimates the form that might be taken by the dialectic of spontaneity and organization.” [Nigel Gibson, “The Oxygen of the Revolution: Gendered Gaps and Radical Mutations in Frantz Fanon’s A Dying Colonialism.” Philosophia Africana. Volume 4, issue 2, August 2001. Pages 47-62.]
          “This essay gives an overview of the institutional history of postcolonial studies in order to provide a map for future developments in the field. More specifically, it locates postcolonial studies within the larger project of US multicultural educational reform. The beginnings of this reform can be traced to the mid-sixties, when the instituting of black and ethnic studies was seen as a way of redressing the historical under-representation of racial minorities in traditionally white colleges. Multiculturalism was expanded during the eighties through a mainstreaming of US minority and non-Western cultures into core curriculum. This stage of multicultural educational reform was as much a response to the increased presence of people from Third World countries in the United States as to the historical under-representation of racial minorities in universities.” [Jenny Sharpe, “Postcolonial Studies in the House of US Multiculturalism.” A Companion to Postcolonial Studies. Henry Schwarz and Sangeeta Ray, editors. Malden Massachusetts: Blackwell Publishing. 2005. Pages 112-125]
          “Postcolonial theory, especially in the writings of Gayatri Spivak, has undertaken intricate critiques of specifically Western Enlightenment humanism and foundationalism and by extension the broad European philosophical tradition. While postcolonial theory in its deconstructive mode can face many ways at once in its claims about the West, Europe and (post)colonial India, it contains some consistent themes that can sharply demarcate European Enlightenment, conceived as science, truth, rationality and humanism, from its truly abject other, the colonized or the genuinely subaltern that can only be ‘impossibly,’ if ever, articulated by or heard within humanist, rationalist paradigms.” [Chetan Bhatt, “Primordial Being: Enlightenment, Schopenhauer and the Indian subject of postcolonial theory.” Radical Philosophy: Philosophical Journal of the Independent Left. Number 100, March/April 2000. Pages 28-41.]
          “He [Frantz Fanon] strove to redraw the geography of struggles for emancipation, or, put another way, to decolonize revolution as a concept and an object of historical inquiry.” [Matthieu Renault, “Decolonizing revolution with C.L.R. James: or, What is to be done with Eurocentrism?” Radical Philosophy: Philosophical Journal of the Independent Left. Number 199, September/October 2016. Pages 35-45.]
          “Postcolonial studies problematizes postcoloniality, which is characterized frequently by a desire on the part of the newly independent nation-states to forget the colonial past. This willful postcolonial amnesia springs from an urge for historical self-invention by way of eliding painful and shameful memories of colonial subordination.” [Narasingha P. Sil, “Postcolonialism and Postcoloniality: A Premortem Prognosis.” Alternatives: Turkish Journal of International Studies. Volume 7, number 4, winter 2008. Pages 20-33.]
          “A further movement which draws on the more radical implications of poststructuralism is the study of colonial discourse, or what is usually termed ‘postcolonial criticism’ – although we should offer a caveat about settling too neatly on a name for this internally diverse cluster of writers and writings. Analysis of the cultural dimension of colonialism/ imperialism is as old as the struggle against it; such work has been a staple of anti-colonial movements everywhere. It entered the agenda of metropolitan intellectuals and academics as a reflex of a new consciousness attendant on Indian independence … and as part of a general leftist reorientation to the ‘Third-World’ struggles (above all in Algeria) from the 1950s onwards. Frantz Fanon’s The Wretched of the Earth … was and remains an inspirational key text (it had an important preface by the metropolitan ‘convert’, Jean-Paul Sartre). Thereafter, ‘postcolonial studies’ overtook the troublesome ideological category of ‘Commonwealth literature’ to emerge in the 1980s as a set of concerns marked by the decentredness otherwise associated, philosophically, with poststructuralism and particularly deconstruction ….” [Raman Selden, Peter Widdowson, and Peter Brooker. A Reader’s Guide to Contemporary Literary Theory. Fifth edition. Harlow, England: Pearson Education Limited. 2005. Page 218.]
      16. postcolonial melancholia (Eli Sorensen): The article develops a critique of postcolonial studies.
          “It is true that the danger of institutionalization, which haunts the contemporary field of postcolonial studies in the age of global commodification, would seem to demand even more pronounced calls for a self-critical approach; but at the same time it may equally be relevant to see this demand in itself as something that has become a fetishized, empty, and self-congratulating gesture, or a theoretical short-circuit or impasse, playing a vital part in the process of contemporary melancholia. In other words, while the dimension of self-criticism or self-reflexivity seems to constitute a necessary disciplinary manoeuvre in postcolonial studies, it may simultaneously be conceived as a symptom of a certain methodological narcissism, which legitimizes institutionally an increasingly prescriptive framework that dogmatically maintains its position as the critical position in academia.” [Eli Sorensen, “Postcolonial Melancholia.” Paragraph. Volume 30, number 2, July 2007. Pages 65-81.]
      17. necroecology (Gautam Basu Thakur [Hindī, गौतम बसु ठाकुर, Gautama Basu Ṭhākura as pronounced in this MP3 audio file): He critically examines the relations between human beings and the nonhuman as expressing a “colonial ecology.”
          “I conceive of ‘necroecology’ as a critical, philosophical approach for studying the human in relation to the nonhuman. In the immediate context of the nineteenth century, necroecology offers a way to explore representations of human-nonhuman networks in Victorian texts. Necroecology seeks to examine interrelations between the Empire and colonial ecology and attempts made by Victorian writers to conceive of the nonhuman as constitutive of the human.
          “Structurally speaking, necroecology is one among many practices that together plot the ‘nonhuman turn’ in the academy.… Like ecological thought, the term necroecology perceives human lives qua other human lives and nonhuman presences but its prefix underlines the neologism’s particular investment in situating the human in relation to real and metaphoric ecologies of death and dying. In the context of the imperial conquests and resultant devastations of colonial ecologies and material cultures, I contend that relations between humans and nonhumans in the colony are always fraught, always rotten, always in a state of death and dying—and that the colonizer and the colonized are always in the state of undead dead. As such, colonial ecology is always necroecology.”
          [Gautam Basu Thakur, “Necroecology: Undead, Dead, and Dying on the Limits of the Colony.” Victorian Studies. Volume 58, number 2, winter 2016). Pages 202-212.]
      18. subaltern studies (Gayatri Chakravort Spivak as pronounced in this MP3 audio file and many others): The field known as subaltern (MP3 audio file) studies is a specifically nonessentialist approach to postcolonialism. As the bar–mitzvahed child of two Jewish parents, I would suggest that Jewish anti–Palestinian pro–imperialists are shameful. Globally, contemporary Jews should have learned, from the horrific Jewish experiences with subalternity, marginalization, or othering during the Nazi Holocaust, to honor, to respect, and, above all, to treasure the subaltern of today.
          “… everything that has limited or no access to the cultural imperialism is subaltern—a space of difference. Now, who would say that’s just the oppressed? The working class is oppressed. It’s not subaltern.” [Gayatri Chakravort Spivak interviewed by Leon de Kock. Interview With Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak: New Nation Writers Conference in South Africa.]
          “‘Subaltern studies’ refers to the study of social groups excluded from dominant power structures, be these (neo)colonial, socio-economic, patriarchal, linguistic, cultural and/or racial. When people lack voice, when they are barred from systems of political or cultural representation, they are called subaltern; their subalternity is the consequence of their limited access to structures of authority. Subaltern studies investigate both these structures of authority and the consequent conditions of subordination experienced by marginalized groups.” [Ilan Kapoor, “Subaltern Studies.” The SAGE Encyclopedia of Action Research. David Coghlan and Mary Brydon-Miller, editors. Thousand Oaks, California: SAGE Publications, Inc. 2014. Pages 737-738.]
          “The original usage of the term subaltern in social sciences can be traced to the prison writings of Antonio Gramsci, who used the term as a disguise to refer to the working class. In a more recent interpretation, the term is not confined to an economic class and is used more broadly to connote subordinate groups. Some scholars have cautioned against a broader interpretation of the term and have argued that subaltern should be specifically employed to refer to the most oppressed groups in a society. This entry uses the term subaltern to refer to the economically marginalized groups such as urban proletariat and peasants, among others. In delineating a state of oppression, this entry briefly delves into subaltern consumers’ material deprivation, subjectivity, and methodological challenges in interpreting marginalized groups.” [Rohit Varman, “Subaltern.” Encyclopedia of Consumer Culture. Dale Southerton, editor. Thousand Oaks, California: SAGE Publications, Inc. 2011. Pages 1392-1394.]
          “The subaltern as a concept within political theory gained momentum through the work of the Italian Marxist Antonio Gramsci. His conception of the subaltern has been reworked by Indian scholars such as Ranajit Guha and Gayatri Spivak and is now a fundamental concept in postcolonial studies. Subalternity refers to diminished political voice, organization, and representation on the part of nonelite social groups, their relative invisibility in historical documentation, and their non- or extrahegemonic subjection to the power of elites. For Gramsci, these groups include peasants, slaves, women, religious groups, different races, and the proletariat in Southern Italy; Guha includes all groups in South Asia subordinated by class, caste, age, gender, and office, or any other modality; for Spivak, a paradigmatic figure is the gendered and racialized peasant or subproletarian of the global division of labor. For all three, the subaltern is unpossessed by the state and outside the purview of state hegemony; theoretical consideration of the subaltern is based on a political concern with radical social transformation at multiple levels. Conceptually, subalternity has been significant to the field of political theory in its challenge to the prevalent categories of (sovereign) subjectivity, agency, political representation, and (rigid definitions of) class.” [Nalini Persram, “Subaltern.” Encyclopedia of Political Theory. Mark Bevir, editor. Thousand Oaks, California: SAGE Publications, Inc. 2010. Pages 1340-1341.]
          “The notion of subalternity is associated with the subaltern, in other words marginalized individuals or groups who are disenfranchised because they are not part of the hegemonic power structure of a society or colony. It means belonging to or being the subaltern. The word subaltern has a long history of usage. The perspective of the marginalized, or the study of cultures ‘from below,’ has been part of colonial histories and literature from the eighteenth century onwards. The term as it has come to be used today, however, has its origins in [Antonio] Gramsci’s writings on the proletariat or working-class struggles.” [Muiris Ó Laoire, “Subalternity.” The SAGE Encyclopedia of Action Research. David Coghlan and Mary Brydon-Miller, editors. Thousand Oaks, California: SAGE Publications, Inc. 2014. Pages 738-739.]
          “… the subaltern studies collective have, in the last two decades, emphasized the importance of decentralized anti-colonial histories as correctives to and deconstructive of the established belief in nationalism as the only discourse challenging colonial hegemony. The subaltern historians have found the Uprising suitable to and supportive of their writing of non-bourgeois cultural consciousness; an endeavor to write an alternative history of colonialism and anti-colonial resistance ‘from down below.’ But, these studies, too, have either revolved around questions of subaltern consciousness in relation to modalities of dominant consciousness or sought connections to link subaltern histories to state (imperial or national) histories for critiquing and revisioning traditional historiographies. Either way, overbearingly, the discourses of nationalism have been identified as complicit with colonial hegemony and as predicated upon a complex process of domestication of alien colonial discourse into a nationalist thesis, thereby solidifying the dominant belief in bourgeois indifference.” [Gautam Basu Thakur. Scripting Anxiety/scripting Identity: Indian Mutiny, History, and the Colonial Imaginary, 1857–1911. Ph.D. dissertation. University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. Champaign, Illinois. 2010. Page 165.]
      19. two contradictions of the politics of secularism in India (Partha Chatterjee [Bengali/Bāṅāli, পার্থ চ্যাটার্জি, Pārtha Cyāṭārji as pronounced in this MP3 audio file]): Coming out of the tradition of subaltern studies, Chatterjee examines issues related to religion and politics.
          “In an essay published a few years ago [‘Secularism and Toleration’], I had identified what seemed to me two contradictions of the politics of secularism in India. First, although a significant section of Indian political leaders shared the desire to separate the domains of religion and politics, the independent Indian state, for various historical reasons, had no option but to involve itself in the regulation, funding and, in some cases, even the administration of various religious institutions. Second, even as sections of Indian citizens were legally demarcated as belonging to minority religious communities following their own personal laws and having the right to establish and administer their own educational institutions, there was no procedure to determine who was to represent these minority communities in their dealings with the state.” [Partha Chatterjee. The Politics of the Governed: Reflections on Popular Politics in Most of the World. New York: Columbia University Press. 2004. Pages 115-116.]
          “What is important for our purposes is a discussion of how the nationalist project of putting an end to colonial riule and inaugurating an independent nation-state became implicated, from its very birth, in a contradictory movement with regard to the modernist mission of secularisation.…
          “… ‘temple entry’ wvas sometimes defended by extending the argument that the denial of access to public places on the grounds of untouchability was unlawful. However, a contradiction appeared in this ‘civil rights’ argument since all places of worship were not necessarily thrown open to all citizens; only Hindu temples were declared open for all Hindus and non-Hindus could be, and actually still are, denied entry.…
          “Looking now at the doctrine of the secular state as it has evolved in practice in India, it is clear that whereas all three principles [liberty, equality, and neutrality] have been invoked tojustify the secularstate, their application has been contradictory and has led to major anomalies.”
          [Partha Chatterjee, “Secularism and Toleration.” Economic and Political Weekly. Volume 29, number 28, July 1994. Pages 1768-1777.]
          “One of the central arguments of [Partha] Chatterjee’s The Politics of the Governed is that ‘it is no longer productive to reassert the utopian politics of classical nationalism,’ because its concepts neither sufficiently appreciate the phenomenon of governmentality nor allow us to identify the ‘political society’ that seeks to democratize the politics of the governed. This is not a modest claim—Chatterjee essentially argues for a comprehensive shift in methods of analyzing and engaging in democratic politics in the South.” [Kathryn Trevenen, “Stretching ‘the Political’: Governmentality, Political Society, and Solidarity across Borders.” Review article. Political Theory. Volume 33, number 3, June 2005. Pages 426-431.]
      20. postcolonial sociology (Julian Go): He develops an application of postcolonial theory to sociology.
          “While the strategy of indigenizing sociology is one route towards a new postcolonial sociology, I … propose another. In this approach, at stake is not just whether we study colonialism or whether our theories are ‘European’ but also whether our studies overcome sociology’s analytic bifurcations. The idea is straightforward enough: if one of the limits of conventional sociology is that it analytically bifurcates social relations, a postcolonial sociology might also seek to reconnect those relations that have been covered up in standard sociological accounts—regardless of whether those theories are of the north or of the south, or whether they are about colonialism or not. More specifically, I suggest that this strategy of reconnection would involve, at the level of social theory, relational over substantialist understandings of the social world; and, as historical sociology, the deployment of these relational theories to reconstruct otherwise bifurcated histories and connections.” [Julian Go, “For a postcolonial sociology.” Theory and Society. Volume 42, number 1, January 2013. Pages 25-55.]
      21. postcolonial bioethics (Christy A. Rentmeester): She applies postcolonial theory to the field of bioethics.
          “Inequalities in healthcare access and health status include not only racial and ethnic inequalities but also underservice to people with mental illnesses. This article shows how postcolonial theory illuminates the interesting, important, and complex intersections of these two kinds of health injustice. I apply postcolonial bioethics to health justice inquiry. Specifically, I articulate how postcolonial bioethics generates a vocabulary useful for considering important conceptual and temporal connections (1) between historical trauma suffered by people of color and current racial and ethnic inequalities in healthcare access and health status and (2) between colonial domination of people of color, epistemic violence, and underservice to people of color with mental illnesses.” [Christy A. Rentmeester, “Postcolonial Bioethics: A Lens for Considering the Historical Roots of Racial and Ethnic Inequalities in Mental Health.” Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics. Volume 21, number 3, July 2012. Pages 266-374.]
      22. postcolonial geographies (James R. Ryan): He applies postcolonial theory to cultural geography.
          “At their most basic then, postcolonial geographies encompass studies that draw on postcolonial perspectives in order to challenge forms of colonial and imperial domination, in the past and in the present and across a diverse set of spatial locations ….
          “… we might identify at least three broad themes within postcolonial geographies. Firstly, the different ways in which forms of geographical knowledge have shaped – and been shaped by – colonial power relations in different locations. Secondly, the spatiality of colonial power and its effects and expressions, past and present. Thirdly, the ways that colonial practices are encountered and resisted by different groups within the everyday worlds and spaces of colonized peoples.”
          [James R. Ryan, “Postcolonial Geographies.” A Companion to Cultural Geography. James S. Duncan, Nuala C. Johnson, and Richard H. Schein, editors. Malden, Massachusetts: Blackwell Publishing Ltd. 2004. Pages 469-484.]
      23. post-postcolonial criticism (Erin O’Connor): She develops a critique of postcolonial criticism.
          “The distorted, distorting idea that literary criticism should be about modeling politicized styles of thought is not confined to postcolonial criticism; it prevails in Marxist, feminist, new historicist, and queer criticism, too. It is, indeed, simply the way of our fraught, unhappy field. I would argue, too, that it is a major reason why our field is as fraught and unhappy as it is. A post-postcolonial criticism would—could—help launch a much-needed process of disciplinary reform, one that would begin by acknowledging the damage agenda-driven scholarship has done to the fragile, increasingly embattled field of literary study.” [Erin O’Connor, “Preface for a Post-Postcolonial Criticism.” Victorian Studies. Winter 2003. Pages 207-246.]
      24. postcolonial feminism (Kumari Jayawardena [Siṃhala, කුමාරි ජයවර්ධන, Kumāri Jayavardhana], Chandra Talpade Mohanty [Hindī, चंद्र तलपदे मोहंती, Caṃdra Talapade Mohaṃtī as pronounced in this MP3 audio file], Cheryl McEwan, and Raj Kumar Mishra [Hindī, राज कुमार मिश्रा, Rāja Kumāra Miśrā as pronounced in this MP3 audio file], and others): This type of feminist theory, influenced by postcolonialism, focuses upon the emancipation of women in places which have been colonized.
          “Postcolonial feminism is a relatively novel wing of postcolonial feminine scholarship. Postcolonial feminism or ‘third world feminism’ emerged in response to Western mainstream feminism. Western feminism has never been heedful to the differences pertaining to class, race, feelings, and settings of women of once colonized territories. Postcolonial feminism rejects Western feminism on the ground of its utter ‘eurocentricism.’ Hence it is fallacious to hope postcolonial females to be valued, appreciated and justified by the Western hands. Of course, the long Western tendency to homogenize and universalize women and their experiences led to the emergence of ‘postcolonial feminism.’ Postcolonial feminism is a hopeful discourse it seeks peaceful solutions for all world marginalized women. Postcolonial feminists imagine a world in which differences are celebrated and enjoyed. Postcolonial feminists work for social, cultural, economic, and religious freedoms for women.” [Raj Kumar Mishra, “Postcolonial feminism: Looking into within-beyond-to difference.” Abstract. International Journal of English and Literature. Volume 4, number 4, June 2013. Pages 129-134.]
      25. postcolonial theology (Catherine Keller and others): The authors in whose work is included in the volume, Postcolonial Theologies: Divinity and Empire, apply postcolonial theory to theology.
          “There is no precolonial Christianity. But is there a postcolonial Christianity? The present conversation suggests a meaningful use of the concept. The postcolonial contribution properly comes from the peripheries, diasporas, and boundary zones of empire, from people in some sense speaking for those peoples who over the past century and a half achieved national independence, and yet find themselves subject to new forms of imperial subjugation. From Latin America, the Caribbean, Asia, Africa, Oceania, where formally a postcolonial situation obtains, come the new voices of Christianity, of a self-renewing Christianity continuing the polyglossia (not infrequently literally Pentecostal and accompanied by glossolalia, speech not of many languages but exceeding language itself). And as all those continents have cast their people back into the urban centers of the West, postcolonial theology will take place in the strange spatiality of the postmodern globe, both ‘here’ and ‘there.’ ‘Ours’ and ‘theirs’?” [Catherine Keller, “The Love of Postcolonialism: Theology in the Interstices of Empire.” Postcolonial Theologies: Divinity and Empire. Catherine Keller, Michael Nausner, and Mayra Rivera, editors. St. Louis, Missouri: Chalice Press. 2004. Pages 221-242.]
      26. evangelical postcolonialisms (Robert S. Heaney and others): The authors in the collaborative volume, Evangelical Postcolonial Conversations: Global Awakenings in Theology and Praxis, develop applications of postcolonial theory to evangelical Christianity.
          “At least six evangelical attributes emerged from discussions and submissions at the roundtable. Not all of the characteristics are affirmed explicitly by each participant. Undoubtedly, certain respondents would be uncomfortable with some of these evangelical attributes. Indeed, a degree of hesitancy to self identify as evangelical was present not least because of attendant thought and practice sometimes associated with evangelicalism, including patriarchy, nationalism, social conservatism, racial discord, conservative Republicanism, the privatization of faith, Reformed theology, imperialism and the desire to make evangelicalism a uniquely American civil religion. Despite such hesitancies, which should not be gainsaid but may indeed be the very loci for evangelical postcolonialisms, the following six evangelical attributes emerged from the group as a whole: christocentrism, conversionism, charism, textualism, activism and communitarianism. These articulated characteristics will be discussed and developed presently.
          “First, evangelicals declare a christocentrism, which means understanding God’s mission and God’s intent toward creatures and creation as inextricably grounded (incarnated) in the person and work of Jesus Christ. The gospel (euangelion) is the declaration that God’s transformative action toward humanity’s alienation (sin) comes through the sacrificial and redemptive agency of Christ and the cross of Christ. Second, this Christ is risen, and in this resurrection a re-created humanity emerges and a renewed kind of communitarianism is instantiated. Church, at its most basic, is an assembly of those who have met the risen Christ. Indeed, church is created by an encounter with the risen Christ. Third, in conversionism an evangelical community of Christ testifies to the conviction that the ministry, resurrection and ascension of Christ, as well as the crucifixion, are the means through which God reconciles the world to God’s self. Because of this life-giving mission of God, humans are called to align themselves intentionally or be converted to God’s ongoing mission toward the re-creation of all things. However, this realignment or conversion is not possible simply through human resolve. The fourth element, charism, signifies the effective work of the Holy Spirit in the life and gospel of Christ that evangelicals affirm. The Spirit who raised Christ from the dead is the same Spirit who re-creates and reorients human lives (Rom 8:11) and guides the church into God’s future. Fifth, the guidance of the Spirit is mediated and tested through the practice of textualism. That is to say, the Bible is considered by evangelicals to be God’s living and authoritative Word. In interpreting it they see themselves contextualizing God’s will in their activism and thought. Sixth, evangelicals are well known for activism, and in part this comes from their desire to see God’s will done in human societies. Thus, for example, evangelicals organize themselves into movements and missions for evangelism, social action, education, ecological practice, the arts, church growth and leadership development.”
          [Robert S. Heaney, “Prospects and Problems for Evangelical Postcolonialisms.” Evangelical Postcolonial Conversations: Global Awakenings in Theology and Praxis. Kay Higuera Smith, Jayachitra Lalitha, and and L. Daniel Hawk, editors. Downers Grove, Illinois: IVP Academic imprint of InterVarsity Press. 2014. Pages 29-42.]
      27. archaeology of colonialism (Michael Rowlands): He examines the archaeological study of the impact of colonialism on the colonized.
          “To some degree a willing complicity in reproducing the colonialisms of past archaeological practice depends on the degree to which identity and dependence on powerful others provides an access to a future for the powerless. Anthony Appiah has asked whether the post in postcolonialism was the same as in postmodernism, and concluded by stating that what both share in common is the negation of a previous authority. If postmodernism negates the modern as rational then the postcolonial negates the authority of the colonial state as the only path to modernity …. Contemporary archaeology is replete with signs of the powerless taking back their archaeological pasts and reshaping them in local terms that do not describe them as a variant of food production, urbanism or the origins of the state. It suggests that defining epochs of colonial archaeology, as well as an archaeology of colonialism, is part of the same process of producing a sense of discontinuity, a clearing of the ground in order to create new pasts to allow new futures.” [Michael Rowlands, “The Archaeology of Colonialism.” Social Transformations in Archaeology: Global and local perspectives. Kristian Kristiansen and Michael Rowlands, editors. London and New York: Routledge imprint of Taylor & Francis Group, an Informa PLC business. 2005. Pages 318-323.]
      28. critical Fanonism (Henry Louis Gates, Jr.): He applies critical social theory to the views of Frantz Fanon.
          “Rehistoricizing [Frantz] Fanon, we can hear a lament concerning the limits of liberation, concerning the very intelligibility of his dream of decolonization. And while the colonial paradigm proved valuable in foregrounding issues of power and position, it may be time to question its ascendance in literary and cultural studies, especially because the ‘disciplinary enclave’ of anti-imperialist discourse has proved a last bastion for the project, and dream, of global theory. In the context of the colonial binarism, we’ve seldom admitted fully how disruptive the psychoanalytic model can be, elaborating a productive relation between oppressed and oppressorproductive of each as speaking subjects. And yet we can chart the torsional relation of the discourses in the exceptional instability of Fanon’s own rhetoric.” [Henry Louis Gates, Jr., “Critical Fanonism.” Critical Inquiry. Volume 17, number 3, spring 1991. Pages 457-470.]
      29. postcolonial computing (Kavita Philip, Lilly Irani [ʾUrdū, لِّلِی اِیْرَانِی, Lillī ʾIyrānī; or Gujarātī, લીલ્લી ઈરાની, Līllī Īrānī] and Paul Dourish): They apply postcolonial theory to computing.
          “Reading some common—one might call them hegemonic—forms of postcolonial computing, this article offers a few tactics for rereading, rewriting, or reimagining those scripts. Our reimagined model is also called Postcolonial Computing. That is, we see critique and rewriting as part of the same tactical process. We offer no absolute escape from ideology, no newly ‘appropriate’ technologies or quick cultural fixes. Postcolonial Computing is a bag of tools that affords us contingent tactics for continual, careful, collective, and always partial reinscriptions of a cultural–technical situation in which we all find ourselves.…
          “Postcolonial Computing advocates a focus not simply on the negative critique of constructions of cultural difference, but on the productive possibilities of ‘difference’ itself. The seams among differences are not simply a source of undesirable unevenness and aberration, but also sites of creativity and possibility.”
          [Kavita Philip, Lilly Irani, and Paul Dourish, “Postcolonial Computing: A Tactical Survey.” Science, Technology, & Human Values. Volume 37, number 1, January 2012. Pages 3-29.]
      30. ideology of peace studies (Gerald M. Steinberg): He critiques a impact of postcolonial theory on peace studies.
          “… [There is] the ideological nature of peace studies. This ideology enhances the tendency inherent in peace studies to move from academic inquiry and research to advocacy, and without careful navigation, it is all too easy for peace studies programmes to be drawn into the conflicts that students and faculty claim to be studying.
          “Furthermore, the postcolonial framework condemns the use of military force in self-defence by non-postcolonial state actors (the West and Israel). In a major departure from academic norms of conduct, and in a manner that undermines the credibility of peace studies, faculty members encourage their students to participate in political rallies, boycotts, and similar activities.”
          [Gerald M. Steinberg, “Postcolonial Theory and the Ideology of Peace Studies.” Israel Affairs. Volume 13, number 4, October 2007. Pages 786-796.]
      31. postcolonial peace (Brendan Hokowhitu and Tiffany Page): They discuss the power of “white-hetero-patriarchy” and the “omnipotent coloniser.”
          “The state of postcolonial peace or occupation fundamentally impacts on the psyche of indigenous populations. Since the advent of the global revolution against the dominant culture of white-hetero-patriarchy in the late 1960s, indigenous people have written extensively on the history of oppression, ostensibly at the expense of theorising their existentiality. That is, indigenous ontology has tended to reify and lament the past at the expense of theorising the present and future. The state of postcolonial peace for indigenous peoples has come to mean an eternal struggle—a fight without end—framed by resistance to the biopolitical management of life by the neo-colonial state. Thus, postcolonial peace has etched upon the indigenous psyche an eternal defiance to an omnipresent coloniser.” [Brendan Hokowhitu and Tiffany Page, “Postcolonial Peace.” Junctures: The Journal for Thematic Dialogue. Volume 14, July 2011. Pages 13-25.]
      32. shifting children from object to subject (Kate M. Ott): She develops a postcolonial approach to “the socio-historical construction of childhood.”
          “Understanding both the socio-historical construction of childhood and the similarities and differences with the real lives of children is a necessary step in shifting children from object to subject. One of the primary claims in postcolonial studies is a methodological commitment to the postcolonial subject writing for themselves. There are inherent problems with this claim as it relates to children specifically, but also language issues as it is applied to the various global postcolonial adult subjects. In response to this methodological issue, I present in ethnographic style children ‘speaking’ for themselves.… We must also untangling [sic; untangle] the ways in which dominant constructions shape our hearing and influence the speaker—an apt description of the task of postcolonial studies.” [Kate M. Ott, “Children as An/other Subject: Redefining Moral Agency in a Postcolonial Context.” Journal of Childhood and Religion. Volume 5, issue 2, May 2014. Pages 1-23.]
      33. politics of co-development (Dominic Thomas): He examines the negative impact of development policies on the Third World.
          “The creation in 2007 of the new Ministry of Immigration, National Identity, Integration and Co-Development essentially completed a project Nicolas Sarkozy started as minister of the interior (2005–07). In that capacity, he had already made the fight against illegal immigration a priority, resulting in dramatic increases in expulsions during both this period (35,921 in 2005, 34,127 in 2006, and 20,411 during the first six months of 2007, a 19 per cent increase over the similar period in the previous year) and in the last couple of years.…
          “The structure of the new French ministry is organized around four main priorities: chosen/selective immigration based on certain skill sets; the fight over illegal immigration, the introduction of integration contracts (comprising language proficiency tests and a commitment to respecting Republican values and ideals); and measures aimed at co-development partnerships with sending countries.…
          “The politics of ‘co-development,’ meanwhile, essentially reproduce age-old patterns of labour acquisition in the global South; all that has changed is that the coordinates of human capital exploitation have shifted from the healthiest and the strongest (slaves) to the best and the brightest (employees).”
          [Dominic Thomas, “Sarkozy’s law: The institutionalization of xenophobia in the new Europe.” Radical Philosophy: Philosophical Journal of the Independent Left. Number 153, January/February 2009. Pages 7-12.]
      34. subaltern realism (Mohammed Ayoob; Arabic/ʿArabiyyaẗ, مُحَمَّد أَيُّوب, Muḥammad ꞌAyyūb): A form of political realism which draws upon the experiences of subalterns in the international system.
          “It is disingenuous to advise Third World states to remove all barriers to external economic penetration and reduce the role of the state in formulating economic policy in the hope that foreign trade and investment will solve their underdevelopment and poverty problems…. Moreover, economic liberalization appears irrational when, in exchange for opening their economies, most poor states receive but a pittance in terms of foreign direct investment (FDI) from the multinational corporations (MNCs) based in the global North.
          “I call this alternative perspective ‘subaltern realism’ because it draws upon the experience of subalterns in the international system. These subalterns are largely ignored by the elitist historiography popularized by both neorealists and neoliberals as a result of their concentration on, respectively, the dynamics of interaction among the great powers and the affluent, industrialized states of the global North. The dictionary definition of ‘subaltern’ denotes those that are weak and inferior. Yet it is the common experience of all human societies that these are the elements that constitute the large majority of members in any social system. Although borrowed from the subaltern school of history, my use of the term does not conform strictly to the usage by that school. Third World states, rather than subaltern classes, form the quintessential subaltern element within the society of states, given their relative powerlessness and their position as a large majority in the international system. This is a deliberate application of the term, emanating from my position that, despite the emergence of a plethora of nonstate actors, the contemporary international system is essentially a system of states. Therefore, states should still form the primary unit of analysis in International Relations.
          “At the same time, this perspective is a part of the realist tradition because it accepts the three fundamental elements of ‘essential realism’—statism, survival, and self-help. I refer to realism as a tradition rather than as a theory or school because the term ‘tradition’ does greater justice to the richness and variety of realist thinking. The subaltern realist perspective attempts to go beyond the narrow structural confines of neorealism and examine the essential nature of the subaltern category of states. It does so by adopting a historical sociology approach that conforms to Theda Skocpol’s prescription: ‘Truly historical sociological studies … [m]ost basically ask questions about social structures or processes understood to be concretely situated in time and space…. They address processes over time, and take temporal sequences seriously in accounting for outcomes.’”
          [Mohammed Ayoob, “Inequality and Theorizing in International Relations: The Case for Subaltern Realism.” International Studies Review. Volume 4, number 3, autumn 2002. Pages 27-48.]
      35. Red Shiʽism (Persian/Fārsī, سُرْخِ تَشِیعَ Surẖ-i ta-Šīʿa): This Iranian Shiʽah form of Marxism was developed by Ali Shariati (Persian/Fārsī, عَلِی شَرِیعَتِی‎, ʿAlī Šarīʿatī). He lived 1933-1977 A.D.
          “[Ali] Shariati claimed the existentialist ideas could easily be compatible with faith, despite [Jean-Paul] Sartre’s staunch atheism. Shariati achieved this synthesis by answering Sartre’s ethical question, left wide open by Sartre’s rejection of the divine, by adding a superstructure of Sufic mysticism atop the base ontology of existentialism. This form of extroverted mysticism … expressed itself as a divinization of the universe that held the only reality to literally ‘be’ God.” [Ryland Witzler. Ali Shariati: Red Shiism and Revolution in Iran. Undergraduate honor’s project. Religious Studies Department, Macalester College. St. Paul, Minnesota. April 1st, 2010. Page 8. Retrieved on August 26th, 2015.]
      36. “ANC” Marxism: African-National-Congress Marxism.
          “The ANC [African National Congress] is a national liberation movement. It was formed in 1912 to unite the African people and spearhead the struggle for fundamental political, social and economic change.” [African National Congress: South Africa’s National Liberation Movement. Retrieved on September 5th, 2015.]
          “From the 1960s the Oliver Tambo-led African National Congress (ANC) increasingly used Marxist tools to develop its analysis of the South African social formation that had been shaped by three centuries of colonial dispossession and close to a century of capitalist development. The ANC defined and characterised this social formation as a ‘colonialism of a special type’ (CST) in which all classes and strata of black people were oppressed on the basis of their race. According to the ANC, what was needed to free black people from this national oppression was a multi-class revolutionary front uniting all the oppressed in prosecuting a national democratic revolution (NDR).” [Mazibuko K. Jara, “Critical Reflections on the Crisis and Limits of ‘Anc’ Marxism.’ Marxisms in the 21ˢᵗ Century: Crisis, Critique & Struggle. Michelle Williams and Vishwas, editors. Johannesburg, South Africa: Wits University Press. 2013. Kindle edition.]
      37. People’s Mojahedin of Iran as pronounced in this MP3 audio file (Persian/Fārsī, سَازْمَانِ مُجَاهِدِينِ خَلْقِ اِيْرَان, Sāzmān-i Muǧāhidīn-i H̱alq-i ʾIyrān): The organization, which has combined Marxism with Shiʽah Islam, advocated for a revolution in Iran. A mojahedin is, roughly, a militia.

          Return to the table of contents.

4. Indigenism (MP3 audio file) and First Peoples (Haunani-Kay Trask as pronounced in this MP3 audio file, Ward Churchill, Pamela Palmater, and many others)
   1. general information: These perspectives focus upon the emancipation of Indigenous peoples. However, in some contexts, the term is used negatively where, perhaps, “nativism” would be a more appropriate designation.
      “Very often in my writings and lectures, I have identified myself as being ‘indigenist’ in outlook. By this, I mean that I am one who not only takes the rights of indigenous peoples as the highest priority of my political life, but who draws on the traditions—the bodies of knowledge and corresponding codes of value—evolved over many thousands of years by native peoples the world over. This is the basis on which I not only advance critiques of, but conceptualize alternatives to, the present social, political, economic, and philosophical status quo. In tum, this gives shape not only to the sorts of goals and objectives I pursue, but the kinds of strategy and tactics I advocate, the variety of struggles I tend to support, the nature of the alliances I’m inclined to enter into, and so on….
      “It is the spirit of resistance that shapes the struggles of traditional Indian people on the land, whether the struggle is down at Big Mountain, in the Black Hills, or up at James Bay, in the Nevada desert or out along the Columbia River in what is now called Washington State. In the sense that I use the term, indigenism is also, I think, the outlook that guided our great leaders of the past: King Philip and Pontiac, Tecumseh and Creek Mary and Osceola, Black Hawk, Nancy Ward and Satanta, Lone Wolf and Red Cloud, Satank and Quannah Parker, Left Hand and Crazy Horse, Dull Knife and Chief Joseph, Sitting Bull, Roman Nose and Captain Jack, Louis Ríel and Poundmaker and Geronimo, Cochise and Mangus, Victorio, Chief Seattle, and on and on….
      “… As Chief Dan George once put it, I ‘endeavor to persevere,’ and I suppose this is a circumstance which is shared more-or-less equally by everyone presently involved in what I refer to as ‘indigenism.’
      “Others whose writings and speeches and actions may be familiar, and who fit the definition of indigenist—or ‘Fourth Worlder,’ as we are sometimes called—include Winona LaDuke and John Trudell, Simon Ortiz, Russell Means and Leonard Peltier, Glenn Morris and Leslie Silko, Jimmie Durham, John Mohawk and Oren Lyons, Bob Robideau and Dino Butler, Ingrid Washinawatok and Dagmar Thorpe. There are scholars and attorneys like Vine Deloria, Don Grinde, Pam Colorado, Sharon Venne, George Tinker, Bob Thomas, Jack Forbes, Rob Williams and Hank Adams. There are poets like Wendy Rose, Adrian Louis, Dian Million, Chrystos, Elizabeth Woody and Barnie Bush….
      “Bonfil Batalla contends that the nature of the indigenist impulse is essentially socialist, insofar as socialism, or what Karl Marx described as ‘primitive communism,’ was and remains the primary mode of indigenous social organization in the Americas.”
      [Ward Churchill. I Am Indigenist – Notes on the Ideology of the Fourth World. September, 2000. Retrieved on September 6th, 2015. Found also in Ward Churchill. From a Native Son: Selected Essays in Indigenism, 1985-1995. Cambridge, Massachusetts: South End Press. 1996. Pages 509-514.]
      “… having wholeheartedly accepted the European mainstream’s antidialectical premise that the human relation is paramount over all others in what are termed ‘external relations,’ [Karl] Marx inevitably set out to discover that which occupied the same preeminence among ‘internal relations’ (that is, those relations comprising the nature of the human project itself). With perhaps equal inevitability, his inverted hegelianism—which he dubbed ‘dialectical materialism’—led him to locate this in the need of humans to consciously transform one aspect of nature into another, a process he designated by the term ‘production.’ It is important to note in this regard that Marx focused upon what is arguably the most rationalized, and therefore most unique, characteristic of human behavior, thus establishing a mutually reinforcing interlock between the relation which he advanced as being most important externally, and that to which he assigned the same position internally.” [Ward Churchill. Acts of Rebellion: The Ward Churchill Reader. London and New York: Routledge imprint of Taylor & Francis Group, an Informa PLC business. 2005. Page 230.]
      “One approach which has yet to be considered thoroughly is that of indigenism, which reflects creative linkages between place-based struggles and transnational networks as enactments of self-determination in reconfiguring international relations and challenging (neo)colonial hierarchies within the state and inter-state system …. Importantly, the ‘self’ is not the sovereign man nor is the ‘nation’ the demarcated body politic of the traditional imaginings of western political science. Rather, indigenism asserts an altogether different registry in which to understand relations within local and global landscapes.” [Jacqueline Lasky, “Indigenism, Anarchism, Feminism: An Emerging Framework for Exploring Post-Imperial Futures.” Affinities: A Journal of Radical Theory, Culture, and Action. Volume 5, number 1. Pages 3-36.]
      “My interest here is in the way places are envisioned in relation-ship to two other paradigmatic phenomena of our times, indigenism and social movements. More than any other political and cultural orientation currently available, indigenism offers an indispensable critical perspective on the hegemonic assumptions that inform globalization. Social movements, on the other hand, offer a means to linking places in larger wholes that are important not only for overcoming the parochialism that is the predicament of place-based politics but also to answer to the demands of sustenance within political economic spaces that of necessity transcend places.” [Arif Dirlik, “Globalization, Indigenism, Social Movements, and the Politics of Place.” Localities. Volume 1, 2011. Pages 47-90.]
      “… all of us [Black, Brown, and American Indian] are the indigenous people of this planet.” [Minister Louis Farrakhan. “Farrakhan on ‘American Indians Truths’ Radio Show – Justice Or Else!” YouTube. July 13th, 2015. Retrieved on September 6th, 2015.]
      “Indigenism is a social movement with a strategic focus outside of states that seeks to activate rights to autonomy within states. In so doing, it imparts a new meaning to pluralism and a new challenge to the liberal project of recognizing differences.” [Ronald Niezen. The Origins of Indigenism: Human Rights and the Politics of Identity. Oakland, California: University of California Press. 2003. Page 136.]
      “Until very recently, citizens in many countries including some Southeast Asian states are divided into ‘indigenous citizens’ and ‘non-indigenous citizens.’ They are first-class and second-class citizens respectively. This division is often linked to the concept of indigenism.
      “The concept of indigenism is often considered nondemocratic as it gives special rights to one particular group in the population at the expense of the other groups. It has been argued that with globalization and democratization, this concept is gradually abandoned as reflected in the laws and regulations relating to the ethnic Chinese which were formulated in the course of globalization and democratization. How true is this argument?
      [Leo Suryadinata, “Citizenship, Indigenism and Ethnic Chinese in Southeast Asia: Some Observations.” Chinese Heritage Centre (CHC) Bulletin. Issue 11, May 2008. Pages 1-7].
      “Indigenousness is an identity constructed, shaped and lived in the politicized context of contemporary colonialism. The communities, clans, nations and tribes we call Indigenous peoples are just that: Indigenous to the lands they inhabit, in contrast to and in contention with the colonial societies and states that have spread out from Europe and other centres of empire. It is this oppositional, place-based existence, along with the consciousness of being in struggle against the dispossessing and demeaning fact of colonization by foreign peoples, that fundamentally distinguishes Indigenous peoples from other peoples of the world.” [Taiaiake Alfred and Jeff Corntassel, “Being Indigenous: Resurgences against Contemporary Colonialism.” Politics of Identity. Volume IX. Richard Bellamy, series editor. Malden, Massachusetts: Blackwell Publishing. 2005. Pages 597-614.]
      “Canada is in a crisis of epic proportions — and it’s killing our people. In every aspect life — culturally, politically, legally, economically, and physically — Indigenous peoples lives are needlessly put at risk. Culturally, 94% of Indigenous languages are at imminent risk of extinction. Politically, the federal government has taken an adversarial, last stand approach to dealing with Indigenous peoples — putting our rights, freedoms, and sovereignty at risk. Legally, though the Supreme Court of Canada continues to tell governments to work with Indigenous peoples — governments instead use the courts to stall real negotiations. Physically, federal and provincial laws and policies have created the impoverishment of our communities, which leads to our premature deaths (seven to twenty years earlier than Canadians); thousands of murdered and missing Indigenous women and girls; the over-representation of our people in prisons; the large scale transfer of 30,000 of our children into state care. Racism isn’t about political correctness — racism in Canada is killing our people.” [Pamela Palmater. Indigenous Nationhood: Empowering Grassroots Citizens. Black Point, Nova Scotia, and Winnipeg, Manitoba: Fernwood Publishing. 2015. Kindle edition.]
   2. specific examples: This category includes types of Indigenism.
      1. Hawaiʿian system of land use (Haunani-Kay Trask): Emancipation from land alienation. Note that the spellings of Hawaii and Hawaiian have been standardized, respectively, as Hawaiʿi and Hawaiʿian.
         “By inventing feudalism in ancient Hawaiʿi, Western scholars quickly transformed a spiritually based, self-sufficient economic system of land use and occupancy into an oppressive, medieval European practice of divine right ownership, with the common people tied like serfs to the land. By claiming that a Pacific people lived under a European system—that the Hawaiʿians lived under feudalism—Westerners could then degrade a successful system of shared land use with a pejorative and inaccurate Western term. Land tenure changes instituted by Americans and in line with current Western notions of private property were then made to appear beneficial to our people. But in practice, such changes benefited the haole, who alienated Hawaiʿians from the land, taking it for themselves.
         “The prelude to this land alienation was the great dying of the people. Barely half a century after contact with the West, our people had declined in number by eighty percent. Disease and death were rampant. The sandalwood forests had been stripped bare for international commerce between England and China. The missionaries had insinuated themselves everywhere. And a debt-ridden Hawaiʿian king (there had been no king before Western contact) succumbed to enormous pressure from the Americans and followed their schemes for dividing up the land.
         [Haunani-Kay Trask. From a Native Daughter: Colonialism and Sovereignty in Hawaiʿi. Revised edition. Honolulu, Hawaiʿi: A Latitude 20 Book imprint of University of Hawaiʿi Press. 1999. Google Play edition.]
         “… I added to my formal studies of Third World politics the new field of feminist theory. While the antiwar and African-American resistance efforts were enlarging the arena of contested issues, women were loudly asserting an alternative vision of life through the power of creative imagination. Inspired by this ferment, I identified myself with the rising tide of feminism. My intellectual interest expanded outward from Third World, anticolonial politics to encompass feminist theory. I saw then, as I do now, that the oppression of women is connected to larger cultural postures regarding the value of life, of the living earth, and her bounty….
         “… as I decolonized my mind and my commitments, the political and cultural environment at home splintered my acquired feminism from my Hawaiʿian existence. I recognized that a practicing feminism hampered organizing among my people in rural communities. Given our nationalist context, feminism appeared as just another haole [white] intrusion into a besieged Hawaiʿian world. Any exclusive focus on women neglected the historical oppression of all Hawaiʿians and the large force field of imperialism. Now that I was working among my people, I saw there were simply too many limitations in the scope of feminist theory and praxis. The feminism I had studied was just too white, too American. Only issues defined by white women as ‘feminist’ had structured discussions. Their language revolved around First World ‘rights’ talk, that Enlightenment individualism that takes for granted ‘individual’ primacy. Last, but in many ways most troubling, feminist style was aggressively American.
         “But I was no longer in America; I was in my Native country. And here, in Hawaiʿi, we were asserting our cultural posture, including our own style and language of argument, as defining of the political arena. American feminism, in contrast, had evolved in the First World and was informed by the long genocidal heritage that created the United States and made it the preeminent cultural and military force around the globe. Worse, American feminist ideology assumed the essential value of individual accomplishment and ambition. It viewed the liberal state as the proper arbiter of rights and privileges. It accepted capitalism as the despised but inevitable economic force. And finally, it insisted on the predictable racist assertion that all peoples are alike in their common ‘humanity’— a humanity imbued with Enlightenment values and best found in Euro-American states. Indeed, even socialist feminism was of Western origin with white women as the agents of action.
         “As our Native movement gained ground, and as I took my stand alongside other Hawaiʿian leaders, I realized that all American ideologies—feminist or otherwise—are foreign to us….
         “… Put bluntly, we are rejecting the United States and its dominance. For most Americans, especially white folks, an attack on the United States is a personal attack….
         “As for feminist theory, I rarely think about it. I have lost the patience, and the time, to do so. But I am also not particularly interested in the subject.”
         [Haunani-Kay Trask, “Feminism and Indigenous Hawaiʿian Nationalism.” Signs. Volume 21, number 4, summer 1996. Pages 906-916.]
         “We need to think very, very clearly about who the enemy is. The enemy is the United States of America, and everybody who supports it….
         “You name it. You name – you name the enemy. You name the enemy so your people know who the enemy is. The enemy is anybody who takes anything from Hawaiʿian people. I don’t care who they are. I don’t care what their position is. That is your enemy. And we need Hawaiʿians to understand that.
         “We need to have an analysis of the current situation and understand that. And once we understand that we will not be afraid to speak the truth. Malcolm X used to always say ‘Speak the truth brother, speak the truth.’ What’s wrong with the truth? It’s the truth. That’s why nobody wants us to speak the truth. And that’s what we need to do. And that’s what the purpose of this rally is today. To speak the truth.
         “And the truth is, that racists are taking everything away from Hawaiʿians, and they will not be content until Hawaiʿi has no Hawaiʿians left. That IS the truth. And I don’t care what their names are. That is their intent.”
         [Haunani-Kay Trask. Speech by the Native Hawaiʿian Leader Haunani-Kay Trask for the 1993 Centennial Commemoration of the American overthrow of the Hawaiʿian Kingdom.]
         The three organizations listed immediately below, while Indigenist, are not necessarily inspired by Marxian perspectives.
         1. Kingdom of Hawaiʿi: A Hawaiʿian sovereignty movement.
            “… you know that the Kingdom of Hawaiʿi is restored through me as King and supported by thousands, who are quite familiar with the historical and legal facts relevant to the current status of the Kingdom as suffering under a belligerent occupation.” [His Majesty Edmund K. Silva, Jr. “Cease and Desist.” Kingdom of Hawaiʿi. April 2nd, 2015. Retrieved on September 20th, 2015.]
            “By this divine law, all constructions upon Mauna Kea Shall Cease. And, all Telescopes will be forever removed from our sacred mountain. The law prior to my amendent is enshrined in the occupied state Constitution, Article 9, Section 10, and has become a model for modern human rights law regarding the treatment of civilians and other non-combatants. Kānāwai Māmalahoe has been applied to Hawaiʿian rights, elder law, children’s rights, homeless advocacy, and bicyclist safety.” [His Majesty Edmund K. Silva, Jr. “International Court of Justice.” April 7th, 2015. Retrieved on September 20th, 2015.]
         2. Hawaiʿian Kingdom: Another Hawaiʿian sovereignty movement.
            “Under the laws of war, the United States government is nothing more than the illegal belligerent occupant of the Kingdom of Hawaiʿi, pure and simple. Nothing more than that. And the state of Hawaiʿi is nothing more than the civilian arm of these military occupation forces. Under the laws of war at that time, the belligerent military occupation forces of the United States obtained no sovereignty over the Kingdom of Hawaiʿi. Sovereignty always remained with the Kingdom of Hawaiʿi. That’s black letter laws of war.” [Francis A. Boyle, “Restore the Kingdom of Hawaiʿi.” Hawaiʿian Governance Symposium on Independence. November 1st, 2014. Retrieved on September 20th, 2015.]
            “Under the international laws of occupation, more particularly Article 43 of the 1907 Hague Convention IV, the occupying government must establish a system of direct administration of the laws of the country that it’s occupying. In other words, the United States government, as an illegally occupying government in the Hawaiʿian Islands since its unprovoked incursion by its troops on August 13, 1898, was mandated to administer Hawaiʿian Kingdom law over the territory and not its own, until they withdraw. This is not a mere descriptive assumption by the occupying government, but rather it is the law of occupation.” [David Keanu Sai. Complaint Against the United States of America.” July 5th, 2001. Retrieved on September 20th, 2015.]
         3. The Koani Foundation (the late John “Butch” Kekahu III, founder): “On August 8, 1998 in observance of the 100th anniversary of the illegal overthrow of the Kingdom of Hawaiʿi, the Koani Foundation organized the first ‘Aloha March’ in Washington, D.C. Another ‘Aloha March’ followed in 2000. Native Hawaiʿians and their supporters traveled from Hawaiʿi and throughout the US to participate at the US capitol to heighten awareness and generate solutions to the issues of the indigenous people of the Hawaiʿian archipelago, Hawaiʿi Ka Pae ʿAina.” [“Mission & Purpose.” The Koani Foundation. Undated. Retrieved on September 21st, 2015.]
      2. radical indigenism (Eva Marie Garroutte and others): They develop approaches to American Indian scholarship.
         “I define a new theoretical perspective that brings together the goal of contributing to the health, survival, and growth of indigenous communities with the goal of the academy to cultivate knowledge. I consider some methods of inquiry that might be appropriate to this new perspective, and I give it a name: Radical Indigenism. I then develop this perspective by applying its theoretical and methodological assumptions to a specific question of concern to indigenous communities in the Americas: the issue of American Indian identity. My specific and overarching goal is tp demonstrate that it is possible to create distinctive bodies of thought and practice that can properly be called an American Indian scholarship.” [Eva Marie Garroutte, “Defining ‘Radical Indigenism’ and Creating an American Indian Scholarship.” Culture, Power And History: Studies in Critical Sociology. Stephen J. Pfohl, Aimee Van Wagenen, Patricia Arend, Abigail Brooks, and Denise Leckenby, editors. Boston, Massachusetts: Brill. 2006. Page 170.]
         “Understanding American Indian women’s roles is complex because of the diversity of gender systems among the diverse American Indian nations. This article will discuss a ‘radical indigenous womanism’ by drawing upon the examples of Eva Marie Garroutte’s notion of ‘radical indigeneity’ as its own epistemology that converges with Patricia Hill Collins’ insistence that black women’s experience is an epistemology in and of itself.” [Kathryn D. Manuelito, “Womanism to Indigenism: Identities and Experiences.” Works and Days 47/48: Intellectual Intersections: Ethnic and Racial Crossings. Volume 24, numbers 1 and 2, 2006. Pages 167-195.]
         “Eva Marie Garroutte … presented an approach to American Indian scholarship that she named ‘radical Indigenism.’ She explained, ‘It argues for the reassertion and rebuilding of traditional knowledge from its roots, its fundamental principles’ …. Radical Indigenist scholars resist the pressure to participate in academic discourse that strips Indigenous intellectual traditions of their spiritual and sacred elements. It takes the stand that if the spiritual and sacred elements are surrendered, then there is little left of our philosophies that will make any sense. I believe Garroutte’s call for radical Indigenism has to be reflected in an Indigenous research paradigm in order to be considered Indigenous.” [Michael Anthony Hart, “Indigenous Worldviews, Knowledge, and Research: The Development of an Indigenous Research Paradigm.” Journal of Indigenous Voices in Social Work. Volume 1, issue 1, February 2010. Pages 1-16.]
         “… Eva Marie Garroutte has proposed that ‘radical indigenism,’ a methodology that requires scholars to ‘enter,’ not merely observe, indigenous philosophies, represents a framework to move us beyond simplistic descriptions of Native American identities and illuminate the content that gives indigenous identities their meaning.” [Gregory D. Smithers, “‘What Is an Indian?’—The Enduring Question of American Indian Identity.” Native Diasporas: Indigenous Identities and Settler Colonialism in the Americas. Lincoln, Nebraska: University of Nebraska Press. 2014. Page 10.]
      3. Red pedagogy (Sandy Grande): A critical and historically materialist approach to American Indian education. The dual usage of “Red” as American Indian and Marxist is acknowledged.
         “The foundation of a new Red pedagogy is defined as that which emerges from a collectivity of critique and solidarity between and among indigenous peoples, other marginalized groups, and peoples of conscience.…
         “Though Marxist-feminist Teresa Ebert uses (I’m not sure if she ‘coined’ the term) the term Red Pedagogy to signify her own project of revitalizing the Marxist critique of feminist discourse, I employ the term as a historical referent to such empowering metaphors as ‘Red Power’ and ‘The Great Red Road,‘ reappropriating the signifier ‘Red‘ as a contemporary metaphor for the ongoing struggles of indigenous peoples to retain sovereignty and establish self-determination.”
         [Sandy Grande. Red Pedagogy: Native American Social and Political Thought. Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc. Page 8.]
         “The quest for a new Red pedagogy is, thus, at base, a search for the ways in which American Indian education can be deepened by its engagement with critical educational theory and for critical theory to be deepened by Indian education. While a Red pedagogy privileges ‘revolutionary critical pedagogy’ as a mode of inquiry, it does not simply appropriate or absorb its language and epistemic frames, but rather employs its vision as one of many starting points for rethinking indigenous praxis. The aim is ‘to diversify the theoretical itineraries’ of both indigenous and critical educators so that new questions and perspectives can be generated ….” [Sandy Grande. Red Pedagogy: Native American Social and Political Thought. Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc. Page 28.]
         “Indigenous epistemologies, such as red pedagogy ([Sandy] Grande …) and Radical Indigenism ([Eva Marie] Garroutte …), insist that researchers use an Indigenous lens to interpret data. Indigenous peoples have their ‘original instructions from our Creator’ through which research … must comply; not only must research have a practical application that benefits the people, the researcher must recognize the spiritual dimensions of inquiry. This includes respecting Native communities, oral traditions, and elders.” [Stephanie J. Waterman, “Home-Going as a Strategy for Success Among Haudenosaunee College and University Students.” Journal of Student Affairs Research and Practice. Volume 49, number 2. Pages 193-209.]
         “In Red Pedagogy: Native American Social and Political Thought Sandy Grande presents an important contribution to critical theory with the intention of bridging the ostensible gap between ‘whitestream’ theory and Indigenous philosophies and approaches to education. …. Her historical materialist approach is clearly informed by ‘revolutionary critical pedagogy’ as she understands the transformation of capitalist social relations as essential to the fundamental project of Red pedagogy: decolonization, self-determination, and sovereignty that is grounded in the spirituality of Indigenous nations.” [Beauline Sterling, “Red Pedagogy: Native American Social and Political Thought.” Book review. NeoAmericanist. Volume 6, number 1, spring/summer 2012. Pages 1-2.]
         “… Grande’s indigenous theory of subjectivity … is both ‘geographically rooted and historically placed’ and ‘is committed to providing American Indian students the social and intellectual space to re-imagine what it means to be Indian in contemporary U.S. society, arming them with a critical analysis of the intersecting systems of domination and the tools to navigate them’ ….” [Dolores Calderón, “Red Pedagogy: Native American Social and Political Thought.” Book review. InterActions: UCLA Journal of Education and Information Studies. Volume 2, number 1, 2006. Pages 1-5.]
      4. Red feminist literary analysis (Dorothy Ann Nason): Influenced by the work of the Red Feminist Collective, Nason applies a critical approach to the analysis of American Indian literature.
         “For a red feminist literary analysis, the project takes on the following dimensions. First red feminist literary analysis offers context specific political readings of Native literature that prioritize historical specificity and experience as a field of knowledge. It is a critical approach that recognizes that culturally specific understandings of gender exist and are a part of indigenous knowledge systems. This approach acknowledges that Native peoples do not live in a vacuum; we influence and are influenced by the non-Native world. For sure, this critical approach is not anti-intellectual and does not support invoking a false binary between ‘the community’ and Native scholars to limit critical questions offered by literary texts and authors. Finally, I see red feminist literary criticism as parallel in many ways to the aims of Native nationalist criticism with each arena providing important checks on one another.” [Dorothy Ann Nason. Red Feminist Literary Analysis: Reading Violence and Criminality in Contemporary Native Women’s Writing. Ph.D. dissertation. Ethnic Studies, University of California at Berkeley. Berkeley, California. Fall, 2010. Page 31.]
      5. Māori (MP3 audio file) communism: “We can detect another impulse in the nineteenth century Maori economy that had been felt before elsewhere, the desire of some individuals to farm for themselves. When the new modes of production had emerged out of primitive communism, they had done so alongside, or in some cases incorporating and underpinned by, the surviving communities of the first cultivators. But these communities too were subject to internal differentiations and transformation, from the kinship-based groupings such as those of the Maori, based on pervasive common property and equal distribution of the fruits of production, to rural settlements which were not bound together solely by blood ties, and in which varying degrees of private claim had been established over arable land and its product, at the same time as forests, pastures and other common land remained communal property. Marx and Engels identified features of what they called these ‘agricultural communes’ in various stages of evolution in, among others, the the Asian village, the Germanic Mark, the Peruvian Marca (the Ayllu), and the Russian peasant commune (the Mir, or Obshchina), and attributed their historical longevity, at least until the advent of modern capitalism, to their innate ‘dualism,’ which combined the ‘solid foundation’ of common ownership of the land with ‘a scope to individuality’ afforded by parcel farming under the control of separate households.” [James Robb, “The Destruction of Maori Communism.” A Communist at Large. January 11th, 2015. Retrieved on September 6th, 2015.]
      6. Ḥāḏā″š (Hebrew/ʿIḇəriyṯ, חָדָ״שׁ, literally, “new”): It is a Hebrew acronym for the Democratic Front for Peace and Equality (Hebrew/ʿIḇəriyṯ, הָחֲזִית הָדֶּמוֹקְרָטִית לְשִׁלּוּם וְלְשִׁוְיוֹן, hā-Ḥăziyṯ hā-Dẹmōqərāṯiyṯ lə-Šillūm wə-lə-Šiwəyōn; or Arabic/ʿArabiyyaẗ, الجَبْهَة الدِيمُقْرَاطِيَّة لِلسَلَام وَالمُسَاوَاة, ʾal-Ǧabhaẗ ʾal-Dīmūqrātiyyaẗ lil-Salām w-ʾal-Musāwāẗ). This Marxist organization is jointly Palestinian and Israeli.
      7. Onkwehón:we (MP3 audio file) Rising: An Indigenous Perspective on Third Worldism and Revolution.
         “July 11, 2015 marks the 25th anniversary of the courageous armed defence of sacred Kanien’kehá:ka land in the part of Occupied Turtle Island known as quebec. What the colonial state would come to label the uprising the “Oka Crisis”, for the Kanien’kehá:ka at Kanehsatà:ke it was the culmination of 270 years of silent war waged against them in the form pillage, subterfuge and land theft….
         “In the language of the Kanien’kehá:ka people, Ohenten Kariwatehkwen means “words that come before all else” and it refers to the traditional thanksgiving address of the Six Nations Rotinonshón:ni Confederacy, and indeed there are some words of thanksgiving that should come before all else is said about the resistance at Kanehsatà:ke. In the 25 years since the events we have lost a number of the brave warriors who stood up for Onkwehón:we everywhere in the name of freedom, independence and self-determination.”
         [Onkwehón:we Rising: An Indigenous Perspective on Third Worldism and Revolution. July 11th, 2015. Undated. Retrieved on September 4th, 2015.]
      8. Anishinabek (MP3 audio file) Confederacy to Invoke Our Nationhood: “ACTION was founded in May 2012 as an effort to combat the illegal colonial policies, land claim settlements that breach our Nation to Nation relationship we have with the Crown that Canada are imposing and which Indian Act Bands are accepting. There is no representation for our people who want to be represented and protect their lands and Aboriginal Rights in respect to these Nation to Nation agreements that are based on Peace, Coexistence and Non Interference and which are upheld in Canada’s own Constitution and Royal Proclamation.” [About.” Anishinabek Confederacy to Invoke Our Nationhood. Undated. Retrieved on September 5th, 2015.]
      9. Indigenous Peoples Liberation Party (IPLP): “The central ideology of The Indigenous People’s Liberation Party (IPLP) is Indigenous Socialism. We fight for a society in which all land, resources and labor are divided in a way that is just to all members of our ecosystems. We live in a way that honors the seven generations before us and provides for the seven generations after us, We reject the terms ‘Hispanic’ and ‘Latino’ because these are terms created by colonial invaders. We are Indigenous People (native, first nations, original people), from Alaska to Argentina and we are the only ones with the authority to Identify ourselves.” [“About.” Indigenous Peoples Liberation Party (IPLP): Organizing for Indigenous Revolution in Occupied Anawak/Turtle Island/Aztlán. Undated. Retrieved on September 5th, 2015.]
      10. Indigenous People’s Liberation Party–Kanada: “The Indigenous People’s Liberation Party–Kanada seeks to unite all indigenous people in so-called ‘Canada’ towards anti-colonialism and liberation.” [“About.” Indigenous People’s Liberation Party—Kanada. Undated. Retrieved on September 5th, 2015.]
      11. Party of Humanity (Richard Borshay Lee): He develops an anthropological approach to Indigenism in the twenty-first century.
          “A conjunctural circumstance has brought indigenism forward as a major item on political agendas around the world. If governments claiming legitimacy are going to pay more than lip service to democracy, they will have to acknowledge indigenous claims. Right of prior occupation is a powerful judicial principle that lies at the heart of capitalist land tenure. Thus indigenous peoples’ presence provides a point-of-purchase for critiques of capitalism and oppositional mobilization. In the emerging 21ˢᵗ century civil society, I see indigenous people as an essential component of the coalition of progressive forces fighting globalization, a mix that includes environmentalists, anti-WTOers [anti-World-Trade-Organizationers], feminists, health reformers, spiritual pilgrims, liberation theologists and all others who support the Party of Humanity in its historic struggle against the Party of Order.” [Richard Borshay Lee, “Twenty-first century indigenism.” Anthropological Theory. Volume 6, number 4, December 2006. Pages 455-479.]
      12. Global Indigenous Movement (Sylvia Escárcega as pronounced in this MP3 audio file): She considers contemporary issues relevant to this movement.
          “Notwithstanding states’ reluctance to acknowledge Indigenous Peoples’ full right to self-determination and, in some cases, lack of acceptance of the existence of Indigenous Peoples within their territories, in the last decades, the international community of nations has slowly come to recognize that Indigenous Peoples have a place within the United Nations (UN). Moreover, it can be said that what today is known as the Global Indigenous Movement is an important voice in global political processes that has gained currency and weight in several issues such as development, biodiversity, the protection of the environment, migration, intellectual property rights, traditional knowledge, and other issues that are of importance for Indigenous Peoples.” [Sylvia Escárcega, “Authenticating Strategic Essentialisms: The Politics of Indigenousness at the United Nations.” Cultural Dynamics. Volume 22, number 1, March 2010. Pages 3-28.]
      13. indigenous cosmopolitanism (Mark Goodale): He focuses upon the continuing struggles in Bolivia.
          “The danger is not that the second revolution in Bolivia will be missed by anyone; it is that it will be misread. The reason is not that anthropologists have ignored the wider political and economic factors that shape the practice of everyday life in Bolivia; if anything, they have been overemphasized at the expense of just the type of ‘Andean’ discursivity that [Orin] Starn believed had been inappropriately romanticized. To understand how new forms of indigenous cosmopolitanism are fueling shifts along several key cultural and political fault lines in Bolivia, shifts that are either actually or, possibly, revolutionary, it is necessary to reframe ongoing political and social struggles to take account of the broader moral and discursive contexts that give these current struggles both meaning and their radical potential.” [Mark Goodale, “Reclaiming Modernity: Indigenous Cosmopolitanism and the Coming of the Second Revolution in Bolivia.” American Ethnologist. Volume 33, number 4, November 2006. Pages 634-649.]

          Return to the table of contents.

5. Diasporism (MP3 audio file) and the Displaced: Geographically Uprooted Peoples
   1. general information: These perspectives focus upon the emancipation of peoples who, despite having been uprooted from their lands, maintain a sense of identity. However, in some contexts, the term is used negatively where, perhaps, “nativism” would be a more appropriate designation. Included are several varieties of diaspora politics, radical identity politics, revolutionary minority liberation or separatism, racial/ethnic nationalism, exoduses, or independence movements which are informed by Marxian perspectives.
      “… ‘Diaspora’ in different geographical settings has different meanings and different manifestations. Diasporism waxes and wanes with historical circumstances and groups that once dissociated from or denied Africanity may utilize diasporic political dialogue ….” [Aleia A. F. Benard. The Free African American Cultural Landscape: Newport, RI, 1774–1826. Ph.D. dissertation. University of Connecticut. 2008. Page 28.]
      “Though many colleagues have remained convinced that this is a marginal issue, I have continued to study and publish articles on various aspects of the Jewish diaspora experience and on more general topics concerning ethno-national diasporism and diaspora politics. Among other things, I have published articles elaborating my first definition of these diasporas, dealing with the emergence of new diasporas, and focusing on the radicalization of diasporas. I have also published articles on the security issues in host countries that involve diasporas, the impact of the new media and communications on diasporas, the distinction between trans-national and trans-state diasporas, and the continuing changes in the relationship between Israel and the Jewish diaspora….
      “The first major issue that will be addressed in this book involves the historical origins of ethno-national diasporism. As noted, this will be discussed within the context of ethnicity at large. Although we are mainly concerned with the inherent nature and political concerns of contemporary diasporas, some historical perspective on the phenomenon and on specific diasporas will be of significant interest for at least two reasons. First, examination of the historical dimension will provide further insight into a perplexing and frequently debated question regarding ethnicity and nationalism in general and diasporism and diasporas in particular – that of the ancient versus modern origins and nature of those formations. Is ethnic diasporism a recent and modern phenomenon, or does it have roots in much earlier historical periods? … A better understanding of this issue should contribute to clarification of further critical questions concerning the survival of some specific diasporas, such as the Jewish, Armenian, Greek/Hellēniká, Chinese, and Gypsy, that were formed in antiquity or during the Middle Ages and that against all odds have not perished.”
      [Gabriel Sheffer. Diaspora Politics: At Home Abroad. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press. 2003. Kindle edition.]
      “The dramatic military and political formation of nation-states in Europe in the nineteenth century often originated with exiled intellectuals and diaspora political movements, and in their creation the new states both contained dispersed communities of other people and left new diasporas of their compatriots outside the new polity.” [Ronald Grigor Suny. Looking Toward Ararat: Armenia in Modern History. Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press. 1993. Page 214.]
      “… diaspora political movements clearly constitute a factor in both intrastate conflicts and international relations ….” [Eva Østergaard-Nielsen, “Working for a Solution through Europe: Kurdish Political Lobbying in Germany.” New Approaches to Migration?: Transnational Communities and the Transformation of Home. Nadje al-Ali and Khalid Koser, editors. London and New York: Routledge imprint of Taylor & Francis Group, an Informa PLC business. 2004. Google Play edition]
      “By diaspora politics, I refer to migrants’ political activities pertaining to the domestic or foreign policy of the homeland as well as political activities that advance migrants’ rights in the country of settlement.” [Dominic Pasura. African Transnational Diasporas: Fractured Communities and Plural Identities of Zimbabweans in Britain. New York: Palgrave Macmillan imprint of St. Martin’s Press LLC. 2014. Page 86.]
      “The institutional strength and resources within diaspora communities themselves—the strength of political organizations, the level of economic resources, and the degree of communal solidarity—shape diaspora politics. Diasporas with well-developed internal organizations, extensive financial resources, and a strong intergenerational sense of ethnonational identity (usually older diasporas in the West) have been most effective in challenging the leading role of indigenous elites within the homeland and in becoming powerful independent actors both within the kin state and in the international arena.” [Charles King and Neil J. Melvin, “Diaspora Politics.” International Security. Volume 24, number 3, winter 1999. Page 108.]
      “This book pulls together three dominant themes in the history of Africa and the African diaspora since the fifteenth century—slavery, migrations, and contact with the West—to reflect on their cumulative impact over the years. The consequences of the interactions of Africa and the West transcend the boundaries of Africa itself and extend to locations where black people have been scattered over time and are now labeled as the ‘African diaspora.’” [Toyin Falola. African Diaspora: Slavery, Modernity, and Globalization. Rochester, New York: University of Rochester Press. 2013. Page 1.]
      “After the Egyptian and Indian, the Greek and Roman, the Teuton and Mongolian, the Negro is a sort of seventh son, born with a veil, and gifted with second-sight in this American world,—a world which yields him no true self-consciousness, but only lets him see himself through the revelation of the other world. It is a peculiar sensation, this double-consciousness, this sense of always looking at one’s self through the eyes of others, of measuring one’s soul by the tape of a world that looks on in amused contempt and pity. One ever feels his twoness,—an American, a Negro; two souls, two thoughts, two unreconciled strivings; two warring ideals in one dark body, whose dogged strength alone keeps it from being torn asunder.” [W. E. Burghardt Du Bois. The Souls of Black Folk: Essays and Sketches. Fifth edition. Chicago, Illinois: A. C. McClurg & Co. 1904. Page 3.]
      “… revolutionary separatism identifies the end of male domination as its goal and is concerned with institutional, rather than individual, solutions to women’s oppression, including the elimination of marriage and the family.” [Kayann Short. Publishing Feminism in the Feminist Press Movement, 1969·1994. Ph.D. dissertation. University of Colorado (Department of English). 1994. Page 57. Retrieved on September 19th, 2015.]
      “The concerns and programs of the cultural nationalists have recently come under heavy attack by the revolutionary nationalists, a group which represents still another phase of the Black Power movement. The revolutionary nationalists maintain that their primary task is to promote effective revolution in order to alter existing social and power arrangements between blacks and whites, hence improving the status of black people. The revolutionary nationalists, therefore, have become irritated with what they believe to be the cultural nationalists’ lack of political activity and frequent association with black capitalism.” [William J. Wilson, “Revolutionary Nationalism ‘versus’ Cultural Nationalism Dimensions of the Black Power Movement.” Sociological Focus. Volume 3, number 3, spring 1970. Pages 43-51.]
      “Words are the primary weapons on the battlefield of ideas. This notion, central to Marxian conflict theory, has rarely been more obvious than in the context of the controversy currently swirling around the use of the term racism….
      “Advocates of minority liberation, following the lead of 1960s militant leader H. Rap Brown (who declared that ‘racism is as American as apple pie’), have come to define as racist any pattern of thought or action that has negative consequences for a minority, whether or not these patterns are inspired by deliberate discriminatory intent. Thus, for example, the minimum height requirement for New York City firefighters, introduced years prior to the large-scale immigration of Puerto Ricans into the city, has been roundly denounced as racist (and eventually changed), because it had the practical consequence of disproportionately excluding Puerto Rican men, who tend to be shorter than Anglos, from being hired as firefighters. The intent of such uses of the term is to extend the public’s negative feelings about racism to almost anything that in any way, deliberately or unintentionally, supports, condones, or perpetuates the disadvantaged position of a minority.”
      [John Macionis. The Use of the Term Racism. Retrieved on September 17th, 2015.]
      “This work is about our people’s struggle, the historical Black struggle. It takes as a first premise that for a people to survive in struggle it must be on its own terms: the collective wisdom which is a synthesis of culture and the experience of that struggle. The shared past is precious, not for itself, but because it is the basis of consciousness, of knowing, of being. It cannot be traded in exchange for expedient alliances or traduced by convenient abstractions or dogma. It contains philosophy, theories of history, and social prescriptions native to it. It is a construct possessing its own terms, exacting its own truths. I have attempted here to demonstrate its authority. More particularly, I have investigated the failed efforts to render the historical being of Black peoples into a construct of historical materialism, to signify our existence as merely an opposition to capitalist organization.” [Cedric J. Robinson. Black Marxism: The Making of the Black Radical Tradition. Chapel Hill, North Carolina: The University of North Carolina Press. 2000. Kindle edition.]
   2. specific examples: These are varieties of Diasporism.
      1. New Afrikan Revolutionary Nationalism (N.A.R.N.): Unity is strength.
         “N.C.T.T. stands for: New Afrikan Revolutionary Nationalism (N.A.R.N.) Collective Think Tank.
         “Our mission is to create, develop, review and implement programs, initiatives and concepts with, and for, individuals, groups, community activists across the U.S. to realize 10 Core Objectives for Progress and Social Transformation as articulated by the N.A.R.N. Collective Think Tank.”
         [Editor, “About NCTT-Cor-SHU.” N.A.R.N. Collective Think Tank. 2012. Retrieved on September 18th, 2015.]
      2. African People’s Socialist Party USA: “We believe that the U.S. North American government and society were founded on the genocide of Native people, the theft of their land, and the forcible dispersal, enslavement, and colonization of millions of African people. We believe that the present condition of existence for African people within current U.S. borders is colonialism, a condition of existence where a whole people is oppressively dominated by a foreign and alien state power for the purpose of economic exploitation and political advantage. We believe further that this colonial domination is the primary basis of the problems of African people within the U.S. and that we shall know neither peace, prosperity, nor human dignity until this colonialist domination is overthrown and the power over our lives rests in our own hands.” [“What We Want – What We Believe.” African People’s Socialist Party USA. 2014. Retrieved on September 5th, 2015.]
      3. Provisional Government – Republic of New Afrika: “The basic policy of the government is to establish national strength through sovereignty, effective international relations, and inherent viability. Our position is that all the land where Black people live, in what has been called ‘the continental U.S.,’ is our land, where we have lived on it traditionally, worked and developed it, and fought for it. This is the subjugated territory of the Republic of New Africa. Our basic national objective is to free this land from subjugation: to win sovereignty.” [Provisional Government – Republic of New Afrika. Undated. Retrieved on September 5th, 2015.]
      4. New Afrikan Independence Party: Promotes self-determination for Black/New Afrikan people.
         “The New Afrikan Independence Party (NAIP) is committed to the pursuit of social justice, human rights and self/group determination for Black/New Afrikan people. We call for a revolutionary and radical reconstruction of the economic, political and social structures and institutions that impact our lives.” [New Afrikan Independence Party. Undated. Retrieved on September 5th, 2015.]
         “The New Afrikan Independence Party (NAIP) advocates a revolutionary and radical reconstruction of the economic, political and social structures and institutions that impact our lives.” [“About New Afrikan Independence Party. The New Afrikan Independence Party (Facebook). 2015. Retrieved on September 12th, 2015.]
      5. back–to–Africa movement (Marcus Mosiah Garvey, William Edward Burghardt “W. E. B.” DuBois, and others): They argued that African Americans should move to their ancestral continent of Africa.
         “God never intended that man should enslave his fellow, and the price of such a sin or such a violation of Heaven’s law must be paid by everyone. As for me, because of the blessed past, because of the history that I know, so long as there is within me the breath of life and the spirit of God, I shall struggle on and urge others of our race to struggle on to see that justice is done to the black peoples of the world. Yes, we appreciate the sorrows of the past, and we are going to work in the present that the sorrows of our generation shall not be perpetuated in the future. On the contrary, we shall strive that by our labors, succeeding generations of our own shall call us blessed, even as we call the generation of the past blessed today. And they indeed were blest. They were blest with a patience not yet known to man; a patience that enabled them to endure the tortures and the sufferings of slavery for two hundred and fifty years. Why? Was it because they loved slavery so?
         “No. It was because they loved this generation more—isn’t it wonderful. Transcendent? What then are you going to do to show your appreciation of this love, what gratitude are you going to manifest in return for what they have done for you? As for me, knowing the sufferings of my fore-fathers I shall give back to Africa that liberty that she once enjoyed hundreds of years ago, before her own sons and daughters were taken from her shores and brought in chains to this Western World.
         “No better gift can I give in honor of the memory of the love of my fore-parents for me, and in gratitude of the sufferings they endured that I might be free; no grander gift can I bear to the sacred memory of the generation past than a free and a redeemed Africa—a monument for all eternity—for all times.”
         [Marcus Garvey, “Speech Delivered on Emancipation Day at Liberty Hall in New York City: January 1, 1922.” Philosophy and Opinions of Marcus Garvey. Amy Jacques-Garvey, editor. Sun Village, California: The Journal of Pan African Studies. 2009. Pages 49-54.]
         “It was upon the tenth of August, in High Harlem of Manhattan Island, where a hundred thousand negroes live. There was a long, low, unfinished church basement, roofed over. A little, fat black man, ugly, but with intelligent eyes and big head, was seated on a plant platform beside a ‘throne,’ dressed in a military uniform of the gayest mid-Victorian type, heavy with gold lace, epaulets, plume, and sword. Beside him were ‘potentates,’ and before him knelt a succession of several colored gentlemen. These in the presence of a thousand or more applauding dark spectators were duly ‘knighted’ and raised to the ‘peerage’ as knight-commanders and dukes of Uganda and the Niger. Among the lucky recipients of titles was the former private secretary of Booker T. Washington!
         “What did it all mean! A casual observer might have mistaken it for the dress-rehearsal of a new comic opera, and looked instinctively for Bert Williams and Miller and Lyles. But it was not; it was a serious occasion, done on the whole soberly and solemnly. Another might have found it simply silly. All ceremonies are more or less silly. Some negroes would have said that this ceremony had something symbolic, like the coronation, because it was part of a great ‘back-to-Africa’ movement and represented self-determination for the negro race and a relieving of America of her most difficult race problem by a voluntary operation.”
         [William Edward Burghardt DuBois, “Back to Africa.” Century Magazine. Volume 150, number 4, February 1923. Pages 539-548.]
      6. Universal Negro Improvement Association (Marcus Mosiah Garvey): The full name of this organization, founded by Garvey, is the Universal Negro Improvement Association and African Communities League.
         “Over five years ago the Universal Negro Improvement Association placed itself before the world as the movement through which the new and rising Negro would give expression of his feelings. This Association adopts an attitude not of hostility to other races and peoples of the world, but an attitude of self respect, of manhood rights on behalf of 400,000,000 Negroes of the world.
         “We represent peace, harmony, love, human sympathy, human rights and human justice, and that is why we fight so much. Wheresoever human rights are denied to any group, wheresoever justice is denied to any group, there the U. N. I. A. [Universal Negro Improvement Association] finds a cause. And at this time among all the peoples of the world, the group that suffers most from injustice, the group that is denied most of those rights that belong to all humanity, is the black group of 400,000,000. Because of that injustice, because of that denial of our rights, we go forth under the leadership of the One who is always on the side of right to fight the common cause of humanity; to fight as we fought in the Revolutionary War, as we fought in the Civil War, as we fought in the Spanish American War, and as we fought in the war between 1914 and 1918 on the battle plains of France and of Flanders. As we fought on the heights of Mesopotamia; even so under the leadership of the U. N. I. A., we are marshaling the 400,000,000 Negroes of the world to fight for the emancipation of the race and of the redemption of the country of our fathers.”
         [Marcus Garvey, “The Principles of The Universal Negro Improvement Association.” The Marcus Garvey and Universal Negro Improvement Association Papers. Volume V. Robert A. Hill, editor. Berkeley, California: University of California Press. 1986. Pages 143-149.]
      7. Nation of Islam (Arabic/ʿArabiyyaẗ, الأُمَّة الإِسْلَام‎, ʾal-ꞌUmmaẗ ʾal-ꞌIslām) was a Black Muslim organization founded, in 1930, by Wallace Deen Fard Muhammad (Arabic/ʿArabiyyaẗ, وَالَاس الدِّين الفَرْد مُحَمَّد, Wālās ʾal-Ddīn ʾal-Fard Muḥammad). ʾal-Fard (Arabic/ʿArabiyyaẗ, الفَرْد) is “the individual” or “the unit.” The man was born in 1877 and disappeared in 1934. In the 1960s, the organization was led by his student, Elijah Muhammad (Arabic/ʿArabiyyaẗ, إِيلِيَا مُحَمَّد, ꞌIyliyā Muḥammad). The movement later factionalized. The largest branch was established by Louis Farrakhan (Arabic/ʿArabiyyaẗ, لُوِيس فَرَّخَان, Luwīs Farraẖān). The other branch was initiated by Elijah Muhammad’s son, Warith Deen Muhammad (Arabic/ʿArabiyyaẗ, وَارِث الدِّين مُحَمَّد, Wāriṯ ʾal-Ddīn Muḥammad).
         “According to the Holy Qur’an 59:7, the Muslims were very poor when they first started to Teach ISLAM and all contribution was given to ALLAH’s Apostle for him and his Family’s Support. And what the Apostle could spare, he gave to help take care of the Poor Muslims that were unable to help themselves and the other part was given to those who were confined to the Labor of ISLAM.
         “And soon, there arose an argument among the Hypocrites about the use of the money because they thought that they should share equally with the Apostle. Then ALLAH cast these Hypocrites out and ounished them for the false accusation that they had spread against the Prophet, that he was seeking to enrich himself and acting unjustly to the poor and needy.
         “And, then ALLAH, told the other Laborers that HE would soon enrich all of them but, at present, every effort should be to maintain the Prophet and his household.
         “The enemy, then, tried to stop every Muslim from helping the Apostle and said he should be killed. Then ALLAH Challenged the enemy to do so – to leave not a stone unturned in trying. This is in the 34 Problems that you have, if you understand.
         “So this is what is meant by ALLAH taking, under Analysis, the Consideration of the Laborers in the near future. The student could practice his or her Labor while under study if they were sincere, and Submit themselves to Obey and Follow the Apostle. And it is written that all who Railed against the Apostle, ALLAH made it impossible for them to live in Peace until they would Submit.
         “The Holy Qur’an does not contradict a Muslim to Swear his Allegiance to his Brother so long as he does not break his Allegiance – nor does the Bible in this case.”
         [Master Fard Muhammad. The Supreme Wisdom: Lessons by Master Fard Muhammad to His Servant, the Most Honorable Elijah Muhammad for the Lost-Found Nation of Islam in North America—The Supreme Wisdom Lessons. Privately published. Undated. No pagination.]
         “My people, I am here to fulfill a promise made long ago. I am here to bring you the truth. I am here with a solution to the problems of the so-called Negro and his white slave masters. You are seeking something. You are seeking an answer to your four hundred year old problem of slavery, servitude and fifth – class citizenship. I am here with the solution to that problem. How good it is, then, for Black brothers of like minds and similar burdens to get together for a spiritual feast. For more than four hundred years your pleas for justice, freedom, equality, a decent place in the sun have reverberated like thunderclaps sounding in the dark valleys of Lebanon. Yet there has been no answer. Never in the history of human evil have so many asked for a just pittance, so loud, so long and received in return so little, if anything at all.…
         “Although we are the chosen of God, when it comes to justice, the so-called American Negroes are the most deprived people on the planet earth. Had justice prevailed, there would be no need for a day of judgment to come today to plead, not to the unjust judges of the world, but to the just judge to give the Black man of America justice. That just judge is Allah, God. We have come to the end of the days of the unjust judges. Even though it may offend some, you must know the truth of it all. The truth hurts the guilty. According to the sayings of Jesus, the truth will make us free. The imperative need is for a clear cut definition of that truth that will make us free. We must distinguish between the truth and the false so-called truths that have been handed down to us from generation by our slave masters. We have been falsely taught that the truth was the matter of Jesus’ birth and death. It has been taught, and this is also false, that the truth is the revelation of Christianity. Neither of these is the truth. Neither of these will make you free. The truth to freedom is the knowledge of God and the devil, truth of yourselves, others and the real religion of God.”
         [Elijah Muhammad. The Fall of America. Privately published. 1973. No pagination.]
         “Traveling throughout the United States over the last year or more, I’ve been blessed to talk to about 150,000 or more Black men directly. And out of that I’ve thought that the Black man is specifically under assault, and all of the legislation that is coming on this crime bill is focused on really filling new prisons with Black men in particular. All of the movies that I have seen recently that talk about life in the ghetto or life in the ’hood have pictured Black men in a manner that when these movies are sent throughout the world, we are seen as an undermining reality in American life that America would do well to get rid of. We would like to structure a march calling on Black men in particular to stand in unity to declare to the world that we are ready to shoulder our responsibility as the heads of our families and leaders in our community. We want to reverse the ugly look of Black men throughout the world by giving the world a positive look at militant, dedicated, sober, determined Black men.” [Louis Farrakhan, “A call to march.” Emerge. Volume 7, number 1, October 1995. Pages 65-66.]
      8. Africana critical theory of contemporary society (Reiland Rabaka): He engaged with the civil-rights-icon Malcolm X—also known as El-Hajj Malik El-Shabazz (Arabic/ʿArabiyyaẗ, الحَاجّ مَالِك الشَبَازّ, ʾal-Ḥāǧǧ Mālik ʾal-Šabāzz)—as well as W. E. B. Du Bois, Frantz Fanon, and others as critical social theorists.
         “Although Malcolm X’s life and legacy have been analyzed, often critically, by historians, political scientists, philosophers, literary theorists, feminists, theologians, and psychologists, his lifework, to my knowledge, has never been examined for the import it may possibly have for an Africana critical theory, that is, theory critical of domination and discrimination in continental and diasporan African life-worlds and lived experiences.…
         “Unlike most Marxists, Malcolm X’s theory of social change considers and concurs with the class struggle thesis but also engages the realities of racial violence and oppression. In this sense, then, Malcolm X’s theory of social change offers a critique of and corrective to the original and/or orthodox Marxian position in several ways. First, his theory does not exaggerate or overassert the primacy of class. This is an important point to make because most Black Marxists, in traditional Marxian fashion, have a tendency to emphasize class and the effects of capitalism and downplay the weight and gravity that race and racism have in contemporary continental and diasporan African lifeworlds and life struggles …. Second, Malcolm X’s theory of social change has a much broader base and critical universe than the original and/or orthodox Marxian theory.”
         [Reiland Rabaka, “Malcolm X and/as Critical Theory: Philosophy, Radical Politics, and the African American Search for Social Justice.” Journal of Black Studies. Volume 33, number 2, November 2002. Pages 145-165.]
         “We may conclude in light of the foregoing chapters that the relationship between theory and praxis has always been a core concern within the classical Africana tradition of critical theory, and remains relevant for contemporary Africana critical theorists. In terms of [W. E. B.] Du Bois’s inauguration and contributions to classical Africana critical theory, we have witnessed that it not only promoted and provides a paradigm for an ongoing transdisciplinary synthesis of philosophy with history, sociology, psychology, political science and economics, among other disciplines, but that from its inception Africana critical theory distinguished itself from Eurocentric and Marxist class conflict-focused critical theory by strongly stressing the importance of race, racism, and white supremacy; gender, sexism, and patriarchy; colonialism, racial colonialism, and capitalist colonialism, as well as its unique race-centered and racism-conscious critique of capitalism and promotion of radical and, at times, revolutionary democratic socialism. For example, though Du Bois’s early work undoubtedly falls within the realm of black bourgeois intellectualism, his middle period and later work ultimately gave way to what can only properly be called praxis-promoting theory, or theory with practical intent, which he conceived to be the critical theoretical arm of radical, and later, revolutionary social and political struggles and movements. With regard to [Frantz] Fanon’s contributions to Africana critical theory, he consistently linked theory to revolutionary decolonization, calling on the wretched of the earth to shake free from the physical and psychological shackles that have long bound them and arrested their development. For [Amilcar] Cabral, theory is employed as a weapon in the war against imperialism. It is not the exclusive domain of petit bourgeois intellectuals, colonial administrators, or anti-colonial party or movement leaders, but can be utilized and put into action by anyone who is willing to think critically about the colonial world and its connections to capitalism, racism, and sexism.” [Reiland Rabaka. Africana Critical Theory: Reconstructing the Black Radical Tradition, from W. E. B. Du Bois and C. L. R. James to Frantz Fanon and Amilcar Cabral. Lanham, Maryland: Lexington Books imprint of Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc. 2009. Page 286.]
         “… the economic philosophy of black nationalism means in every church, in every civic organization, in every fraternal order, it’s time now for our people to become conscious of the importance of controlling the economy of our community. If we own the stores, if we operate the businesses, if we try and establish some i ndustry in our own community, then we’re developing to the position where we are creating employment for our own kind. Once you gain control of the economy of your own community, then you don’t have to picket and boycott and beg some cracker downtown for a job in his business.
         “The social philosophy of black nationalism only means that we have to get together and remove the evils, the vices, alcoholism, drug addiction, and other evils that are destroying the moral fiber of our community. We ourselves have to lift the level of our community, the standard of our community to a higher level, make our own society beautiful so that we will be satisfied in our own social circles and won’t be running around here trying to knock our way into a social circle where we’re not wanted.”
         [Malcolm X. Malcolm X Speaks: Selected Speeches and Statements. George Breitman, editor. New York: Grove Press imprint of Grove/Atlantic. 1965. Page 39.]
         “As you will recall, when I was in Mecca in September, I wrote back a letter which was printed in the New York Times in which I pointed out that it was my intention when I returned to expose Elijah Muhammad as a religious faker. (Ed. Note: This letter stated: ‘I shall never rest until I have undone the harm I did to so many well-meaning, innocent Negroes who through my own evangelistic zeal now believe in him even more fanatically and more blindly than I did. I totally reject Elijah Muhammad’s racist philosophy which he has labeled Islam only to fool and misuse gullible people ….’). This is what I wrote. Now, while I was in Mecca among the Muslims, I had a chance to meditate and think and see things with a great deal of clarity – with much greater clarity than I’ve achieved from over here. And I had made up my mind that I was going to tell the Black people in the Western Hemisphere, who I had played a great role in misleading into the hands of Elijah Muhammad, exactly what kind of man he was and what he was doing.“
         “So I feel responsible for having played a major role in developing a criminal organisation. It was not a criminal organization at the outset. It was an organization that had the power, the spiritual power, to reform the criminal. I, for one, disassociate myself from the movement completely. And I dedicate myself to the organizing of Black people into a group that is interested in doing things constructive for the entire Black community. This is what the purpose of the Organization of Afro-American Unity is. To have an action program that’s for the good of the entire black community, and we are for the betterment of the community by any means necessary.”
         [Malcolm X, “Malcolm Speaks on Nation of Islam: Condensed version of a speech delivered by Malcolm X in Harlem, New York, on February 15, 1965 – six days before his death.” Privately published. Retrieved on August 8th, 2016.]
         “As many of you know, I left the Black Muslim movement and during the summer months, I spent five of those months … in the Middle East and on the African continent. During this time I visited many countries, first of which was Egypt, and then Arabia, then Kuwait, Lebanon, Sudan, Kenya, Ethiopia, Zanzibar, Tanganyika — which is now Tanzania — Nigeria, Ghana, Guinea, Liberia, Algeria. And then the five months that I was away I had an opportunity to hold lengthy discussions with President Nasser in Egypt, President Julius Nyerere in Tanzania, Jomo Kenyatta in Kenya, Milton Obote in Uganda, Azikiwe in Nigeria, Nkrumah in Ghana, and Sékou Touré in Guinea.…
         “To straighten out my own position, as I did earlier in the day at Colgate, I’m a Muslim, which only means that my religion is Islam. I believe in God, the Supreme Being, the creator of the universe. This is a very simple form of religion, easy to understand. I believe in one God. It’s just a whole lot better. But I believe in one God, and I believe that that God had one religion, has one religion, always will have one religion. And that that God taught all of the prophets the same religion, so there is no argument about who was greater or who was better: Moses, Jesus, Muhammad, or some of the others. All of them were prophets who came from one God. They had one doctrine, and that doctrine was designed to give clarification of humanity, so that all of humanity would see that it was one and have some kind of brotherhood that would be practiced here on this earth. I believe in that.
         “I believe in the brotherhood of man. But despite the fact that I believe in the brotherhood of man, I have to be a realist and realize that here in America we’re in a society that doesn’t practice brotherhood. It doesn’t practice what it preaches. It preaches brotherhood, but it doesn’t practice brotherhood. And because this society doesn’t practice brotherhood, those of us who are Muslim — those of us who left the Black Muslim movement and regrouped as Muslims, in a movement based upon orthodox Islam — we believe in the brotherhood of Islam.”
         [Malcolm X, “‘Not just an American problem, but a world problem’: Address delivered in the Corn Hill Methodist Church, Rochester, New York, 16 February 1965.” Malcolm X: The Last Speeches. Bruce Perry, editor. New York: Pathfinder Press. 1989. Pages 151-181.]
         “… in my opinion, the young generation of whites, blacks, browns, whatever else there is, you’re living at a time of extremism, a time of revolution, a time when there’s got to be a change, people in power have misused it, and now there has to be a change. And a better world has to be built and the only way it’s going to be built is with extreme methods. And I, for one, will join in with anyone — don’t care what color you are — as long as you want to change this miserable condition that exists on this earth.” [Malcolm X, “‘By Any Means Necessary’: Malcolm X’s Speech to the Oxford Union Club, England—Dec 12, 1964.” Privately published. Retrieved on August 8th, 2016.]
         “When we say ‘our’ we do not mean Muslim nor Christian, Catholic nor Protestant, Baptist nor Methodist, Democrat nor Republican, Mason nor Elk. By ‘our’ Harlem Freedom, we mean the black people of Harlem, the black people of America, and the black people all over this earth. The largest concentration of black people on earth is right here in Harlem, so we are gathered here today in Harlem Square to a Freedom Rally, of black people, by black people, and for the benefit of black people.
         “We are not here at this Rally because we have already gained freedom. No! We are gathered here rallying for the freedom which we have long been promised, but have as yet not received. This Rally is for that perfect freedom which up until now this government has not granted us. There would be no need to protest to the government if we were already free.
         “Freedom is essential to life itself. Freedom is essential to the development of the human being. If we don’t have freedom we can never expect justice and equality. Only after we have freedom do justice and equality become a reality.”
         [Malcolm X, “Harlem Freedom Rally (1960).” Malcolm X: Collected Speeches, Debates and Interviews (1960-1965). Sandeep S. Atwal, editor. Online PDF document. No date or pagination.]
         “As the voice of the angry black ghetto, Malcolm X knew that the Southern-based civil rights struggle for formal equality could not achieve freedom for black people in capitalist America. No new civil rights bill could begin to address the systematic racist discrimination and dehumanizing conditions that the black population was forced to suffer in big Northern ghettos like Detroit, Roxbury and Harlem—where blacks were, of course, ‘equal’ under the law.” [Anonymous. Malcolm X: The Man, the Myth, the Struggle. Black History and the Class Struggle number 10. A Spartacist Pamphlet. New York: Spartacist Publishing Co. February, 1993. Page 8.]
      9. Malcolm X Grassroots Movement: Freeing the Land.
         “The NAIM [New Afrikan Independence Movement] is part of the Black liberation Movement in North Amerikka that wants independent Black Nation on land in north amerikka. The land identified by the New Afrikan Independence Movement is primarily known as South Carolina, Georgia, Alabama, Mississippi, and Louisiana, as well as other areas of what is now called the Black-Belt South, where Afrikan people are in the majority or have a historical/economical/socio-cultural relationship to. When we say ‘Free the Land’ this is the land we are talking about freeing.” [“Why We Say ‘Free the Land!’” Malcolm X Grassroots Movement. 2015. Retrieved on September 11th, 2015.]
         “The Malcolm X Grassroots Movement is an organization of Afrikans in America/New Afrikans whose mission is to defend the human rights of our people and promote self-determination in our community by any means necessary!“ [“About Malcolm X Grassroots Movement.” Malcolm X Grassroots Movement (Facebook). 2015. Retrieved on September 12th, 2015.]
      10. Kawaida theory and philosophy (Maulana Karenga): The Swahili word for “tradition,” “reason,” “normal,” or “common”—Kawaida—is used for a distinctive type of Black socialism. Karenga—who was born in 1941—is also the originator of the African American and pan-African seven-day annual holiday, Kwanzaa (December 26th – January 1st).
          “We talked … about agency and about being the injured physicians who must heal themselves and an oppressed people who must surely liberate themselves. And this process of repair and liberation requires that we repair and transform ourselves in the process of repairing and transforming the world, making it an ever-expanding realm of human freedom and flourishing. Such a self-understanding not only moves away from a discourse of pathology and hopeless victimization, but it also reaffirms our self-conscious capacity for and commitment to repair and transformation as a dual and indivisible project. This also expands the concept of reparations which has in some quarters been reduced to what we should be given rather than what we will do and gain from the struggle we wage for justice and good in the world. This expanded concept fits well within the Maatian or ancient Egyptian concept of serudj ta, the moral obligation to repair the world and transform it in the interest of truth, justice, good and beauty.” [Maulana Karenga, “Kawaida Philosophy and Practice: Questions of Life and Struggle.” Los Angeles Sentinel. Newspaper. August 2nd, 2007. Page A-7.]
          “Regardless of the misrepresentation of Kawaida cultural nationalism, it is thought and practice rooted in three fundamental propositions directed toward cultural and political transformation. First, the defining feature of any people or nation is its culture. Secondly, for a people to be itself and free itself, it must be self-conscious, self-determining and rooted in its own culture. And thirdly, the quality of life of a people and the success of its liberation struggle depend upon its waging cultural revolution within and political revolution without, resulting in the radical transformation of self, society and ultimately the world.” [Maulana Karenga, “Kawaida, cultural nationalism and struggle: setting the revolutionary record straight.” Journal of Pan African Studies. Volume 7, number 4, October 2014. Pages 1-6.]
          “Synthesizing the various yet similar ways in which the concept is used, Afrocentricity is essentially a quality of perspective or approach rooted in the cultural image and human interests of African people. To say an approach or perspective is in the African cultural image is to say it is rooted in an African value system and worldview, especially in the historical and classical sense. And to say that an approach or perspective is in the human interests of African people is to say it is supportive of the just claims African people have and share with other humans in terms of freedom from want, toil, and domination, and freedom to realize oneself in one’s human fullness, that is, to know and produce oneself through meaningful work, uncoerced and nonmanipulative leisure time, and effective and enjoyable encounters with other humans and nature without coercion or repressive limitation.” [Maulana Karenga, “Black Studies and the Problematic of Paradigm: The Philosophical Dimension.” Journal of Black Studies. Volume 18, number 4, June 1988. Pages 395-414.]
          “For [Marcus] Garvey, then, self-knowledge, as is argued in Kawaida, must ultimately become active self-knowledge, a self-knowledge that not only understands self but seeks to realize its inner-directed and socially purposeful goals. For Garvey and Kawaida, our identity and sense of self-worth are shaped in the process of purposeful action, action that is both self-liberating and self-formative. To simultaneously free and form oneself is at the heart of Garvey’s anthropology. Like all nationalist thought, knowledge, especially self-knowledge, is at the center of this process. For, as Kawaida contends, the process of self-realization is both a cognitive and practical enterprise, a coming to consciousness and an active initiative that reflects and advances that consciousness in concrete practice.” [Maulana Karenga, “The Moral Anthropology of Marcus Garvey: In the Fullness of Ourselves.” Journal of Black Studies. Volume 39, number 2, November 2008. Pages 166-193]
          “In addition to the general thrust toward revisionism and reductionism in the push to rename the discipline [Black Studies] and refocus it, there is also the specific motive among some to weaken and escape the conceptual grip and historical significance of the category ‘Black’ as a category of contestation and struggle. To say ‘Black Studies’ is to call into being a history of struggle on the intellectual and social level. Black Studies, like Black Power, the Natural, Black consciousness, Kawaida …, and ‘Back to Black,’ calls into mind and meaning the drawing of borders and battle lines and struggle as a way of learning and life.” [Maulana Karenga, “Names and Notions of Black Studies: Issues of Roots, Range, and Relevance.” Journal of Black Studies. Volume 40, number 1, September 2009. Pages 41-64.]
          “Each season and celebration of Kwanzaa reaffirms our commitment as African people to create, celebrate and sustain good in the world. For rightly conceived, the celebration of Kwanzaa is about embracing ethical views and values and practicing principles which are directed toward remaking the world so that the goodness of the world can be shared and enjoyed by us and everyone. Kwanzaa begins with a celebration of ourselves as African people, our families, communities and culture. But in its ancient African origins as a first-fruit harvest celebration, it is also a celebration of life and all the good in the world – fruit and flower, beast and bird, field and forest, star and stone, water, mountains and the mysteries and magnificence of the earth and the heavens. Kwanzaa also was conceived and constructed in the midst of the Black Freedom Movement and thus reflects the Movement’s emphasis on cultural grounding, self-determination, social justice, liberation and struggle.” [Maulana Karenga, “Celebrating and Living Kwanzaa.” Los Angeles Sentinel. Newspaper. December 26th, 2013. Page A-1.]
          “It is within the context of this rich and most ancient of histories and cultures [Africa] that we must constantly search for and bring forth the best of what it means to be African and pose new paradigms of human excellence and possibility. This ongoing search for solutions and models of human excellence and possibilities must occur, Kawaida contends, in every area of human life but especially in the seven core areas of culture: history; religion (spirituality and ethics); social organization; economic organization; political organization; creative production (art, music, literature, dance, etc.) and ethos, the collective self-consciousness achieved as a result of activity in the other six areas.” [Maulana Karenga, “African culture and the ongoing quest for excellence: dialog, principles, practice.” The Black Collegian. Volume 27, number 2, February 1997. Pages 160-163.]
          “Kawaida recognizes no pope or Vatican for socialism, accepts no group, state or party’s claim to a monopoly on Marxism’s or socialism’s contribution to human knowledge and practice” [Maulana Karenga quoted in Molefi Kete Asante. Maulana Karenga: An Intellectual Portrait. Malden, Massachusetts: Polity Press. 2009. Kindle edition.]
          “Over a considerable swath of contemporary African American thinking the prolific Karenga has been criticized and honored for his provocative cultural theories and proactive constructivist philosophy of Kawaida. The fact that few have taken his work as texts for critical review, preferring, it seems, to concentrate on his political or organizational activities, has a lot to do with the complexity of the topography of cultural science in the reality of African American practice. Blacks in the United States are not in a mere theoretical position, but in an existential one that might be examined critically with some attention to the texts written about the situation.
          “It is not that Karenga is not recognized by other major scholars as a uniquely capable and productive activist scholar. Cornel West, for example, describes him as ‘the most provocative and persistent proponent of a class nationalist position’ …. He recognizes Karenga’s creative intellect and how he ‘infuses a socialist analytic component within his cultural nationalism.’”
          [Molefi Kete Asante. Maulana Karenga: An Intellectual Portrait. Malden, Massachusetts: Polity Press. 2009. Kindle edition.]
          “… this paper represents the initiation of an exploratory analysis of the Nguzo Saba; the seven principles of Kawaida theory (an African communitarian cultural and social change philosophy); the Pan African holiday of Kwanzaa, and Afro-American communitarian discourse and development created by activist-scholar Maulana Karenga … as a source for engaging issues related to Afro-American substance abuse problems and its eradication.…
          “… a person can possibly find therapeutic value and purpose in the specific Afrocentric values of the Seven Cardinal Virtues of Maat which consist of truth, justice, propriety, harmony, balance, reciprocity and order; hence, a cultural spiritual value system that along with the Nguzo Saba mutually reinforce and reaffirm each other as a guide for thought and behavior ….
          “… the seven principles of the Nguzo Saba … [are] unity, self-determination, collective work and responsibility, cooperative economics, purpose, creativity, [and] faith ….”
          [Tukufu Kalonji, “The Nguzo Saba & Maat, a Path for Self-Reconstruction and Recoveredness: Exploring a Kawaida Paradigm for Healing Addiction in the Black Community.” The Journal of Pan African Studies. Volume 7, number 4, October 2014. Pages 195-210.]
          “… [The New Black Panther Party] promotes [the] Kawaida theory of Maulana Karenga, [which] includes black unity, collective action, [and] cooperative economics.” [New Black Panther Party. Philosophy, ideology, and criticism New Black Panther Party. Undated. Retrieved on September 20th, 2015.]
          “In this city [Boston] I have witnessed Black People called animals by media, politicians and police. I have heard my community referred to as ‘the jungle’ and seen it occupied by extremely hostile police forces. My community is often depicted as the root of violence and a breeding ground for criminals. Constantly, we see men of color incarcerated in the system behind small drug quantities and gun possession, who come out to little chance of employment or housing. The true question is where are all these drugs and guns coming from on the higher levels, and how can we offer redemption to those who wish to change their lives and their communities?” [Perfect Time for a Police State in Boston.” Boston Chapter of the New Black Panther Party. September 30th, 2004. Retrieved on September 20th, 2015.]
      11. Kawaida womanism (Maulana Karenga, Tiamoyo Karenga, and Chimbuko Tembo): They apply Kawaida theory and philosophy to Black feminism (womanism).
          “By a sankofa reading is meant an interpretive initiative directed toward a critical retrieval of classical African ideas, insights, paradigms and practices which serve as fruitful resources for addressing the major issues and life conditions of our times. And key to this project of recovery is establishing and explicating classical cultural and ethical grounding for defining and affirming women’s equal dignity, rights, and role in the world and elucidating essential modes of relating by which women and men can live and work together in the most moral, meaningful and mutually beneficial ways. Kawaida womanism is by self-conscious and self-determined decision anchored in Kawaida philosophy which defines itself as ala ongoing synthesis of the best of African thought and practice in constant exchange with the world and which has as a fundamental tenet the cultural importance and intellectual imperative of dialoguing with African culture ….” [Maulana Karenga, “Grounding Kawaida womanism: a sankofa reading of ancient sources.” The Western Journal of Black Studies. Volume 36, number 1, winter 2012. Pages 11-22.]
          “This womanist tradition is one of struggle, creativity and resourcefulness from which we can extract models of achievement and possibility. Kawaida womanism, rooted in Kawaida philosophy, builds on this ancient and ongoing tradition, stressing the rights, dignity and agency of African women and their liberation as an integral and indispensable part of the liberation of African people as a whole. It takes seriously the teaching of Mary McLeod Bethune … that ‘We must recognize that we are the custodians as well as the heirs of a great civilization,’ and must honor this identity by building on and expanding the legacy. And this legacy is one of both our history in general as a people and the specific history of Black women, not as a separate history, but as an integral and indispensable part of our larger history as a people.” [Tiamoyo Karenga and Chimbuko Tembo, “Kawaida womanism: African ways of being woman in the world.” The Western Journal of Black Studies. Volume 36, number 1, winter 2012. Pages 33-47.]
      12. Black Lives Matter (Patrisse Cullors, Opal Tometi, Alicia Garza, and many others): The organization was founded by Cullors, Tometi, and Garza.
          “Black Lives Matter is a US-based international movement co-founded by three black women: Alicia Garza, Patrisse Cullors, and Opal Tometi. The #BlackLivesMatter movement began as a hashtag for Twitter, after George Zimmerman’s acquittal for the murder of Trayvon Martin in 2013. It gained momentum after the 2014 shooting of Michael Brown, the death of Eric Garner, and subsequent events that continue to this day.” [Anonymous, “Black Lives Matter: Frequently Asked Questions.” Undated FAQ. Retrieved on August 8th, 2016.]
          “Three simple words: Black- Lives- Matter. These words have come to define this generation’s ongoing struggle against persistent state-sponsored violence with black bodies as its target. The simple slogan gestures towards a complex set of issues, each of which contributes to a state of unbroken and unmitigated racial terror. Though its seemingly common-sense exhortation de-mands nothing more than a bare minimum of human sympathy from the listener, not all have embraced the words (to say nothing of the movement that takes these words as its rallying cry). Right wing pundits routinely question the legitimacy of a movement that claims that black lives matter while remaining ‘silent’ vis-à-vis ‘black-on-black crime.’ Likewise, white liberals have balked at the phrase’s specificity, preferring instead to say ‘All lives Matter.’” [Julius Bailey and David J. Leonard, “Black Lives Matter: Post-Nihilistic Freedom Dreams.” Journal of Contemporary Rhetoric. Volume 5, number 3/4, 2015. Pages 67-77.]
          “‘Black lives matter” has become a rallying cry in light of evidence that the criminal justice system is failing to uphold this basic truth. Official data, although woefully inadequate, show that over half of those killed by police in recent years have been black or Latino. Officers involved in these killings are rarely indicted, much less convicted, for excessive use of force. And official responses to recent protests have spurred further controversy: militarized police forces disrupted public assemblies in Ferguson [Missouri], and New York City’s police union blamed pro-reform politicians and nonviolent protesters for the killing of two officers by a mentally unstable man.” [Nazgol Ghandnoosh. Black Lives Matter: Eliminating Racial Inequity in the Criminal Justice System. Washington, D.C.: The Sentencing Project. 2015. Page 3.]
          “It seems as if I have been ‘teaching Ferguson [Missouri]’ all of my adult life. In the fall of 1964 I applied to Yale Law School, and the admissions office encouraged me to supplement my written application with an interview. As I rode a Greyhound bus to New Haven I read James Baldwin’s The Fire Next Time, a paperback copy purchased for seventy-five cents just before boarding the bus.…
          “I write this essay for the young activists who have taken up the struggle, who have responded to Ferguson with a call for justice, who are using Ferguson to teach and to learn, as a forum for understanding the reasons for oppression and a location for the vocation of struggle against dehumanization. The young people at the vanguard of today’s freedom struggle know, as did Baldwin, that we can no longer ignore black anger. Our masks and lies will not suffice to heal our wounds. This fledgling young people’s justice movement has taken the name Black Lives Matter. The name itself shouts the failure of American laws that claim to do racial justice.”
          [Charles R. Lawrence III, “The Fire This Time: Black Lives Matter, Abolitionist Pedagogy and the Law.” Journal of Legal Education. Volume 65, number 2, November 2015. Pages 381-404.]
          “And here we are, at the center of the arc, trapped in the gaudiest, most valuable, and most improbable water wheel the world has ever seen. Everything now, we must assume, is in our hands; we have no right to assume otherwise. If we—and now I mean the relatively conscious whites and the relatively conscious blacks, who must, like lovers, insist on, or create, the consciousness of the others—do not falter in our duty now, we may be able, handful that we are, to end the racial nightmare, and achieve our country, and change the history of the world. If we do not now dare everything, the fulfillment of that prophecy, re-created from the Bible in song by a slave, is upon us: God gave Noah the rainbow sign, No more water, the fire next time!” [James Baldwin. The Fire Next Time. New York: Vintage International imprint of Random House LLC. 1993. Pages 105-106.]
          “As movement leaders, activists, and community organizers deeply dedicated to ending gender based violence, domestic violence, sexual assault, state-sanctioned systemic violence and community violence, we are joining voices to express our collective outrage at the failure of accountability for the deaths of Mike Brown, Eric Garner, Tamir Rice and many others killed at the hands of police. Our hearts are with their families and communities, from whom they have been taken far too soon. We write to uplift the names and lost lives of black cisgender and transgender women – including Tanisha Anderson, Islan Nettles, and 7-year-old Aiyana Stanley-Jones. These women and girls, just a few of many who are also killed by police or other representatives of the state, leave behind bereaved children, parents, friends, and community. Black lives matter.” [Anonymous, “Advancing An Inclusive Racial and Gender Justice Agenda: Move to End Violence and Movement Makers Assert that Black Lives Matter.” Press release. Washington, DC: Move to End Violence, a program of the NoVo Foundation. December 15th, 2014.]
          “Boys and men of color face unique and systemic challenges that negatively affect their own lives, as well as those of their families and communities. These challenges require immediate action through policy changes and innovative programming. Initiatives like Step Up, the Forward Promise Initiative, and school disciplinary code reforms will help to prevent boys and young men of color from repeating grades or dropping out, improving their educational outcomes and reducing their criminal justice contacts. Interventions like the Job One initiative and the Young Adult Internship Program can help combat employer bias, prevent poverty, decrease rates of unemployment and underemployment, and improve outcomes for future generations of boys and young men of color and their families.” [Dottie Lebron, Laura Morrison, Dan Ferris, Amanda Alcantara, Danielle Cummings, Gary Parker, and Mary McKay. The Trauma of Racism: Facts Matter! Black Lives Matter! New York: The McSilver Institute for Poverty Policy and Research, New York University. 2015. Page 8.]
          “On May Day 2015, union activists around the country rallied under the banner of Black Lives Matter, and … the International Longshore and Warehouse Union Local 10 ‘conducted a work stoppage that halted the flow of millions of dollars’ worth of goods and prevented them from being loaded onto cargo ships. This was the first time a major union had initiated a work stoppage in solidarity with the Black Lives Matter movement.’ Others, however, regard gestures of solidarity or connection with suspicion. When activists wanted to highlight racism against Arabs and Muslims by using the hashtag #MuslimLivesMatter, some in the Black Lives Matter movement objected that the phrase amounted to an ‘appropriation’ of a cause that rightfully belonged to black people.” [Brian P. Jones, “Black Lives Matter and the Struggle for Freedom.” Monthly Review: An Independent Socialist Magazine. Volume 68, issue 4, September 2016. Pages 1-8.]
      13. Autodeterminación del Pueblo Chicano Mexicano! (MP3 audio file) [in English, Mexican Chicano Pueblo Self-Determination]: “… we took the position that our struggle was for the Liberation of Aztlán, and that Aztlán is composed of five southwestern states; California, Arizona, Nuevo México, Tejas and Colorado. The PNLRU [Partido Nacional de La Raza Unida, or in English, the United People’s National Party] also took the position that our movimiento needed an ideology and that ideology MUST be based on OUR Nationalism,…Revolutionary Nationalism.” [Autodeterminación del Pueblo Chicano Mexicano! Undated. Retrieved on September 5th, 2015.]
      14. Movimiento Estudiantil Chicano de Aztlán (MP3 audio file) [in English, Chicano of Aztlán Student Movement]: “In March of 1969, at Denver, Colorado the Crusade for Justice organized the National Chicano Youth Conference that drafted the basic premises for the Chicana/Chicano Movement in El Plan de Aztlán (EPA). A synopsis of El Plan stipulates: 1) We are Chicanas and Chicanos of Aztlán reclaiming the land of our birth (Chicana/Chicano Nation); 2) Aztlán belongs to indigenous people, who are sovereign and not subject to a foreign culture; 3) We are a union of free pueblos forming a bronze (Chicana/Chicano) Nation; 4) Chicano nationalism, as the key to mobilization and organization, is the common denominator to bring consensus to the Chicana/Chicano Movement; 5) Cultural values strengthen our identity as La Familia de La Raza; and 6) EPA, as a basic plan of Chicana/Chicano liberation, sought the formation of an independent national political party that would represent the sentiments of the Chicana/Chicano community.” [“The Philosophy of MEChA.” Movimiento Estudiantil Chicano de Aztlán. Undated. Retrieved on September 5th, 2015.]
      15. Unión del Barrio (MP3 audio file) [in English, Barrio Union]: “Unión del Barrio is convinced that our future must be different. We have set for ourselves the goal of building a peoples organization capable of promoting and defending the human rights and class interests of la raza within the current borders of the U.S. The only possibility we have for securing a better future is to win our self-determination as a people. We support the struggles for freedom of all our sisters and brothers across Latin America which we consider a part of “Nuestra América,” and we unconditionally uphold the right of self-determination of indigenous people, and of all poor and oppressed people throughout the world. Furthermore, we recognize that the absolute and unequivocal liberation of mujeres in México and Nuestra América is a fundamental component of our struggle for liberation as a people. Fundamental to any liberation organization and pro-independence conscious movement is the absolute political, social, and economic equality between women and men.” [“What is Unión del Barrio?” Unión del Barrio. Undated. Retrieved on September 5th, 2015.]
      16. Asian Left Forum: An anticapitalist, anti-imperialist Asian American movement.
          “The Asian Left Forum (ALF) is a new national Left formation which seeks to unite Asian American and Asian immigrant leftists in an effort to strategize around our movement. We live in a moment when reactionary forces have consolidated their effort to win greater victories for capitalism, racial and national oppression, imperialism, sexism and hetero-sexism. While many of our local organizing efforts – particularly those of working-class Asian immigrant communities – have effectively organized resistance in areas such as labor, state violence, health care, and education, a broader strategy and vision capable of defeating the reactionary tide still awaits us.” [ What is the Asian Left Forum?” Asian Left Forum. Undated. Retrieved on September 12th, 2015.]
          “We [the Asian Left Forum] recognize that capitalism is a source of oppression for our people and poor and working people everywhere. We reject assimilation or ‘partnership’ into the market economy as a solution to racism and white supremacy in America. We believe that any truly democratic agenda for Asian Americans must revolve around the concerns of working-class Asian Americans.” [ The Principles of Unity of the Asian Left Forum.” Asian Left Forum. Undated. Retrieved on September 12th, 2015.]
      17. Jewish Socialists’ Group: A secular socialist organization of Jews.
          “We are socialists, diasporists and secularists. As socialists we know that there can be no secure future for Jews, other minorities, working people and the unemployed under an economic system that promotes greed over need. We are anti-capitalist and anti-imperialist and we campaign for social justice locally, nationally and internationally. We join with others to fight discrimination and persecution and we also challenge conservative forces within our own community. We work for a socialist solution to the Israel/Palestine conflict, based on equality and self-determination for Israeli and Palestinian Jews and Arabs, and we challenge the leaders of the Jewish community when they defend or excuse Israel’s treatment of the Palestinians.
          “As diasporists we celebrate the fact that the Jews are an international people. We support the right of Jews and other ethnic minorities to live in security and harmony with other communities wherever they are in the world, and to be free to express and develop their historical and cultural identities. In the diaspora we are at home, not in exile. We reject the negative ideology of Zionism, which subordinates the political, social, economic and cultural needs of diaspora communities to the demands of the Israeli state.”
          [Anonynmous, “Our politics.” Jewish Socialists’ Group. 2015. Retrieved on September 21st, 2015.]
      18. Tikkun (Rabbi Michael Lerner): The Hebrew word, tikkun (Hebrew/ʿIḇəriyṯ, תִּקּוּן, tiqqūn), translates as “repairing.” The full expression is hā-tiqqūn hā-ʿōlām (Hebrew/ʿIḇəriyṯ, הָתִּקּוּן הָעוֹלָם), the repairing of the world.
          “A spiritual progressive analysis reveals that the appeal of identity groups increases to the extent that they seem to provide an extension of the values of family life—a place where one is accepted and validated simply because of one's membership in that group, not solely because of some achievement or accumulation of money or power—in a class society whose primary ideology encourages self-blaming (‘if you are not part of the 1 percent, it’s because you have failed in some aspect of your life to take advantage of the equal opportunity our society offers everyone’), which tends to be psychologically debilitating and deeply painful. The affirmations that ‘Black is beautiful’ and that ‘Sisterhood is powerful’ are exciting in part because they provide alternative forms of validation. Similarly, religious communities gain some of their contemporary appeal by affirming the self-worth of those within their community, even though this sometimes occurs at the expense of those outside that particular community. The downside, unfortunately, is that ruling elites have often been able to manipulate these various identity groups to struggle against each other and thus to deflect attention from our shared oppression of living in a class society with a radically unfair distribution of wealth.
          “… we believe that a progressive movement needs to develop a ‘New Bottom Line’ that assesses the efficiency, rationality, and productivity of our corporations, laws, government policies, economic system, political system, educational system, legal system, and even to some extent our personal behavior by asking how much they produce human beings capable of and likely to exhibit love and kindness; generosity and genuine caring for others; ethical and ecological sensitivity; and awe, wonder, and radical amazement (as opposed to just utilitarian attitudes) at the grandeur and mystery of the universe.…
          “However, most of the people we invite to write in Tikkun do not share this perspective, and we use our pages not primarily to exhibit our view but to engage a wide variety of perspectives in our attempt to understand how to bring about tikkun (healing and transformation) of all societies distorted by the ethos of global capitalism.”
          [Michael Lerner, “Identity Politics, Class Politics, Spiritual Politics: The Need for a More Universalist Vision.” Tikkun: to heal, repair, and transform the world. Volume 29, number 4, fall 2013. Pages 20-22.]
      19. love-oriented Emancipatory Judaism (Rabbi Michael Lerner): He presents a contemporary interpretation of Judaism which welcomes Palestine into the family of nations.
          “The sexism and xenophobia built into Torah-based religious practices, the stories of conquering and annihilating the residents of Canaan, and the compromises that allowed slavery to persist— all these were part of the reality of ancient Israel. I could say that they were all the manifestations of the Right Hand of God and its domination consciousness, a manifestation of Settler Judaism that has persisted as one theme in Judaism for the past several thousand years, alongside the Left Hand of God and a love-oriented Emancipatory Judaism that has commanded us to ‘love the stranger’ and pursue justice. Both strands have been there since the earliest records we have of Jewish life and thought. Yet it’s important to remember that Judaism emerged among those Israelites who had been exiled to Babylon by the Babylonian conquerors. It was the religion of the homeless, the disempowered, the exiles of Babylonia who in remembering Zion also sought ways to build mythologies that would empower them to believe that they could once again regain their independence as a people. In that context, the Right Hand of God, the vision of Jews as having once had the power to conquer the land, was an empowerment that felt necessary to convince some of the Jews to return to their holy land once the Persian conqueror of Babylonia had issued an edict permitting and even encouraging that return.” [Michael Lerner. Embracing Israel/Palestine: A Strategy to Heal and Transform the Middle East. Berkeley, California: Tikkun Books imprint of North Atlantic Books. 2012. Kindle edition.]
          “In my forthcoming book Embracing Israel/Palestine, which is partly an update of my 2003 book Healing Israel/Palestine and partly a new discussion of embracing a love-oriented emancipatory Judaism could energize peace efforts, I show what could help spread the new spirit of openheartedness necessary to solve this conflict. It should be in bookstores by the end of November [2011], just in time to share with friends and family as a Christmas or Chanukah (or other winter holiday) gift. I would be so grateful if you could help me draw others into this discussion by setting up a speaking engagement for me in your local synagogue, church, mosque, ashram, local book store, community center, college or university, or any other institution that can afford to pay my way and give a little something to help keep Tikkun alive, which is one reason I’m willing to do this kind of travel!” [Michael Lerner, “Recognize Palestine and Give It UN Membership” Tikkun: to heal, repair, and transform the world. Volume 26, number 3, summer 2011. No pagination.]
          “Our challenge is not only to the Right—but also to those liberals and progressives, Greens and Democrats, who have not allowed themselves to get beyond their knee-jerk antagonism to religion and spirituality, and whose openness to religious or spiritual people is only utilitarian and does not include a willingness to learn about the actual dimensions of the spiritual deprivation which is endemic to the way global capitalism functions today, and the ways that it generates a global emotional depression….
          “… we [Tikkun] encourage an engagement with the Sacred, an Emancipatory Spirituality which affirms pleasure and joy and the recognition that ‘there is enough,’ a replacement of postmodernist self-alienation with a renewal of Being based on awe, wonder and radical amazement at the mystery of the universe and the mystery of every human being on the planet as a manifestation of the sacred.
          “Our economic, social and political institutions need to be replaced and rethought not only because they are unjust, but because they foster a consciousness that keeps us from connecting to the deepest truths of the universe and make it harder for us to recognize each other as fully free, fully conscious, self-creating, loving beings. In this sense, the globalization of Spirit is the antidote to the globalization of Capital. We reach out for a spiritual dimension not as a replacement for, but as a deepening of, our understanding of social action, and not as a replacement for but a deepening of our understanding of informed science. Our spirituality does not reject the value of rational thought nor does it suspend scientific enquiry.”
          [Editor, “Tikkun’s Core Vision.” Tikkun: to heal, repair, and transform the world. Undated. Retrieved on September 21st, 2015.]
      20. Jewdas: “Wouldn’t it be nice if there was an alternative – a way to live a rich Jewish life that is not exclusively religious that doesn’t imply that you support supression of the Palestinians and thus set you at odds with pretty much all progressive people everywhere? Fortunately there is, it’s just that no-one ever tells you about it. It’s been called many things – autonomism, non-territorialism, autonomy, diaspora nationalism. It has had support across modern Jewish politics – amongst Bundists, liberals, autonomists and Zionists. It holds that Jews constitute a nation just like other nations. It agrees that nations should be able to run their own affairs, promote their own language and culture etc. It just doesn’t agree that nation = territory. The right to self governance, to have autonomy, doesn’t imply the right to exclusive control of territory (where, inevitably you find other people in your way). And this right can be exercised wherever Jews find themselves – allowing for the creation of multiple centres of Jewish life rather than just one centre and a periphery. This approach already sums up the way many diaspora communities operate, with Jewish schools, welfare institutions and cultural organisations constituting a rich, and quasi-autonomous Jewish life, without the need for any overarching ‘Jewish state.’ But it could also describe how Jews in Israel could constitute themselves in a more just future; when discriminatory laws have been abolished and when the state becomes a state of all its citizens rather than an ethnocracy. Just as Jews in mandate Palestine had a self governing community (with schools, hospitals, internal elections) while overall control of the territory remained in the hands of the British, a future UN led/power sharing government could take control and guarantee equality for all, whilst allowing the Jewish and Palestinian communities to be non-territorial collective entitites that manage their own affairs in the spheres of culture, education, language and religion. Whether in Israel or the diaspora (terms we should start to rethink) secular, Jewish collective life could be separated from the discrimination and domination that inevitably occurs when an ethnic group seeks exclusive control of a given territory.” [“Zionism, Schmionism – Unpacking Our Identities.” Jewdas. May 15th, 2015. Retrieved on September 22nd, 2015.]
      21. Heeb Magazine: “Whether running a factory, running a sewing machine, or running a mouth off, there is nary a Jew who doesn’t have someone in his or her family tree who spent time on the sweatshop floor. Jews have toiled in sweatshops, organized against sweatshops and, now that most of those factories are shuttered, moved into housing converted from the sweatshops their ancestors ran from.” [Jessie, “Sweatshop Chic.” Heeb Magazine. April 1st, 2006. Retrieved on September 22nd, 2015.]
      22. dialectics of difference (Ramón Saldívar as pronounced in this MP3 audio file): He examines Chicano literary criticism.
          “The primary value of … [the] ‘new criticism’ and its dialectics of difference is that it allows us to examine the formal and thematic dynamics within the literary text and to account for the nature of its special interaction with both the Mexican and American social and literary history that surrounds it with a clarity which other critical methods do not allow. In short, this prospective literary history situates Chicano criticism where it properly belongs, as part of the history of dialectics in general and of the dialectics of difference in particular.” [Ramón Saldívar, “A Dialectic of Difference: Towards a Theory of the Chicano Novel.” Melus. Volume 6, number 3, autumn 1979. Pages 73-92.]
      23. critical diaspora studies as pronounced in this MP3 audio file (Lily Cho and others): Applies critical social theory to diaspora studies.
          “This is the second year of the Critical Diaspora Studies series at York University.
          “In 2014.2015, the series will focus on Pedagogy, Race and Area Studies. The series aims to build a space for critical conversations about the potentials, limits and challenges of teaching and learning about Asia and the Asian diaspora in Canadian universities. In particular, how do race, power and privilege inform pedagogical practices in area studies? How do we translate categories and practices across multiple contexts? How can the study of ‘other’ areas help us interrogate society and politics in Canada?”
          [Editor, “Critical Diaspora Studies Series.” York University. Toronto, Ontario. Undated. Retrieved on September 6th, 2015.]
          “… if we shift our understanding of Chinese diasporic subjectivity away from that of Chinese intellectuals in the West and towards those who are stranded in the West with none of the privileges with which the intellectual arrives, the space of critical diaspora studies might be something to explore rather than to avoid. [Lily Cho. Eating Chinese: Culture on the Menu in Small Town Canada. Toronto, Ontario: University of Toronto Press. 2010. Page 40.]
          “Diaspora studies, some scholars suggest, are now entering a ‘consolidation’ phase which seeks to combine the critical social and political insights of the ‘social constructionist’ (or metaphorical) diaspora theorists with the historical insights of the more empirical approaches to diaspora – what we might think of as ‘critical diaspora studies.’ Such an approach would examine the intersections of historical experiences of diaspora with contemporary politics of engagement in various local, national, and global contexts. [Claire Alexander, Joya Chatterji, and Annu Jalais. The Bengal Diaspora: Rethinking Muslim Migration. London and New York: Routledge imprint of Taylor & Francis Group, an Informa PLC business. 2016. Page 248.]

          Return to the table of contents.

6. Western Marxism and Critical Theory: The types of Marxism discussed in this chapter followed orthodox Marxism chronologically. Western Marxism began forming in the early 1920s. Generally speaking, Western Marxists give priority to social theory and philosophy over economic analysis. Various, frequently overlapping, versions of Western Marxism have developed in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries.
   In the Western Marxist critical social theoretical tradition, culture (way of life) among other factors are important tools of both oppression (domination) and emancipation (liberation from oppression). We are oppressed (dominated) by various mechanisms and by ideologies (shared oppressive belief systems), such as capitalism, racism, and sexism. The objective of critical social theory is to understand this ideological domination and to fight against it. The term critical social theory, which originally designated the Frankfurt School, can also be applied to a variety of similar, and in some cases not so similar, emancipatory perspectives, including the various strands of cultural studies. Indeed, Antonio Labriola’s critical communism, which is also considered in this chapter, actually predates the Frankfurt School. The first critical social theorists, in a sense, were Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels themselves.
   Although critical social theory is sometimes conveniently shortened to “critical theory,” it should be distinguished, historically, from the “literary critical theory,” or “literary criticism,” of literary studies. Even as critical social theory has its roots in Marxian approaches to domination (oppression) and emancipation (liberation), literary critical theory focuses upon various modes for the interpretation of texts or, more formally, hermeneutics. Both critical theories are ultimately rooted in Immanuel Kant’s critiques. Jürgen Habermas brought these two together through his theory of communicative action. Consequently, there has, in recent years, been increased dialogue and cross-fertilization between many critical theorists of both types. Some of the critical theorietical perspectives included in the chapter will reflect that synthesis.
   1. general information: Below are some basic references on the subject.
      “… the essay published here is concerned with the general coordinates of ‘Western Marxism’ as a common intellectual tradition; it does not contain a specific scrutiny or a comparative evaluation of any of the particular theoretical systems within it. This was to be the province of the studies to which it was a preamble. These were to constitute a series of critical expositions of each of the major schools or theorists of this tradition—from [György or Georg] Lukács to [Antonio] Gramsci, [Jean-Paul] Sartre to [Louis] Althusser, [Herbert] Marcuse to [Galvano] Della Volpe. The present text, focused on the formal structures of the Marxism that developed in the West after the October Revolution, abstains from substantive judgements of the relative merits or qualities of its main representatives. In fact, of course, these have not been equivalent or identical. A historical balance-sheet of the unity of Western Marxism does not preclude the need for discriminating estimates of the diversity of achievements within it. Debate over these, impossible here, is essential and fruitful for the Left.” [Perry Anderson. Considerations of Western Marxism. London and New York: Verso imprint of New Left Books. 1989. Page vii.]
      “Many different versions of Marxism emerged after the deaths of [Karl] Marx and [Friedrich] Engels. While the first generation of Marxist theorists and activists tended to focus on the economy and politics, later generations of Western Marxists appeared in Europe after the Russian revolution and developed Marxian theories of culture, the state, social institutions, psychology, and other thematics not systematically engaged by the first generation of Marxism and attempted to update the Marxian theory to account for developments in the contemporary era.” [Douglas Kellner, “Western Marxism.” Modern Social Theory: An Introduction. Austin Harrington, editor. Oxford, England, and New York: Oxford University Press. 2005. Pages 154-174.]
      “During the debates in the 1920s, unilinearism totally dominated Western-Marxist thought; all the leading participants assumed that an inexorable historical sequence of feudalism→capitalism→socialism would occur. However, while [Karl] Kautsky interpreted this sequence only within a national framework (in each individual country, each stage had to ‘ripen,’ before it could be replaced by the next stage) others recognised the possibility of building socialism in an underdeveloped capitalism with the aid of developed capitalist countries (among others Luxemburg) and/or with an appropriate national policy ….” [Marcel van der Linden. Western Marxism and the Soviet Union: A Survey of Critical Theories and Debates Since 1917. Jurriaan Bendien, translator. Leiden, the Netherlands, and Boston, Massachusetts: Brill. 2007. Page 43.]
      “The rhetorical dimension plays a different and far more important role in the language of literary criticism and philosophy. They are both faced with tasks that are paradoxical in similar ways. They arc supposed to feed the contents of expert cultures, in which knowledge is accumulated under one aspect of validity at a time, into an everyday practice in which all linguistic functions and aspects of validity are intermeshed to form one syndrome. And yet literary criticism and philosophy are supposed to accomplish this task of mediation with means of expression taken from languages specialized in questions of taste or of truth. They can only resolve this paradox by rhetorically expanding and enriching their special languages to the extent that is required to link up indirect communications with the manifest contents of statements, and to do so in a deliberate way. That explains the strong rhetorical strain characteristic of studies by literary critics and philosophers alike. Significant critics and great philosophers are also noted writers.” [Jürgen Habermas. The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity: Twelve Lectures. Frederick Lawrence, translator. Cambridge, England: Polity Press. 1990. Page 209.]
      “… [The] new rhetoric is characteristic of the postmodern condition, which is a turning point not only with respect to modern capitalism but also Western civilization itself. At such a turning, we cannot simply eliminate the doubles produced by the human sciences, as both [Michel] Foucault and [Jürgen] Habermas attempt. Rather, we must think through the intensification of the doubling that the two forms of critique bring forward.” [Ian Angus, “Habermas Confronts the Deconstructionist Challenge: On The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity.” Canadian Journal of Political and Social Theory/Revue canadienne de théorie politique et sociale. Volume 14, numbers 1–3, 1990. Pages 21-33.]
      “Perhaps it is … important to note that Critical Theory as literary critics understand it has a separate history from that of the Frankfurt School. But somehow there is an intertwining of these histories in the 1970s. Critical theory in literary criticism was originally a reaction in the 1960s against the New Criticism that was prevalent in Anglo-American literary theory during the 1920s to the 1960s. New Criticism sought to read literary texts from a purist standpoint, sans the consideration of the external circumstances that contribute to the writing of texts, especially the socio-historico-political contingencies that make up the texts, e.g., biography, the intention of the author, and the response of the reader.” [Paolo A. Bolaños, “What is Critical Theory?: Max Horkheimer and the Makings of the Frankfurt School Tradition.” Mabini Review. Volume 2, number 1, 2013. Pages 1-19.]
      “This book has evolved as a result of our own practice of teaching critical theory to undergraduates on English Studies degrees. It has been produced to meet the needs of students and teachers who are involved in the now standard practice of including a compulsory ‘theory’ course on most literature degree programmes. There are many introductions to literary theory available, not to mention introductory collections of essays, and criticism workbooks, but we wanted to produce a text which both deals with the complex problems of contemporary literary theory and gives students and teachers material to engage with in the seminar room or in private study.” [Keith Green and Jill LeBihan. Critical Theory and Practice: A Coursebook. London and New York: Routledge imprint of Taylor & Francis Group, an Informa PLC business. 2001. Page xv.]
      “One … issue is that of the reification of social facts, a discussion that has its roots in the Marxian notions of fetishism and ideology and has later been developed within the schools of so-called ‘critical theory.’ According to this view, certain facts (e.g. that there is a current unemployment of 8 per cent, a difference in the job prospects for men and women in the upper echelons of management, a large income differential between certain regions of the country, or a gap between the educational opportunities for children of working-class parents and children born into the higher classes) do not represent a genuine social reality. The belief that they do is an illusion, fostered by the process of reification. This means that the facts in question are easily changed, should we so desire, and owe their persistence to certain political or economic interests that they serve and by which they are reciprocally sustained. In other words, to be real, as opposed to being a reification, a social item must display a certain ‘robustness,’ or permanence. It must not occur only under a narrow range of conditions, especially not conditions controlled and manipulated by partisan interests.” [Finn Collin. Social reality. London and New York: Routledge imprint of Taylor & Francis Group, an Informa PLC business. 2002. Page 10.]
      “Here I shall only point out that if the aesthetic judgment in question is to be pure (unmixed with any teleological and hence rational judgment), and if we are to give an example of it that is fully appropriate for the critique of aesthetic judgment, then we must point to the sublime not in products of art (e.g., buildings, columns, etc.), where both the form and the magnitude are determined by a human purpose, nor in natural things whose very concept carries with it a determinate purpose (e.g., animals with a known determination in nature), but rather in crude nature (and even in it only insofar as it carries with it no charm, nor any emotion aroused by actual danger), that is, merely insofar as crude nature contains magnitude.” [Immanuel Kant. Critique of Judgement. Werner S. Pluhar, translator. Indianapolis, Indiana: Hackett Publishing Company. 1987. Page 109.]
      For academic discussions of critical social theory, you can watch any of the following YouTube videos: Mod-04 Lec-31 Culture Industry by Liza Das, Ideology and the Culture Industry by Stephen Binder, Introduction to Critical Theory by Mark Thorsby, or Critical Historical Theory – The Culture Industry by Tyler Stump.
      “What distinguishes a critical theory from traditional forms of social theory is that critical theory conceives of itself as part and parcel of a struggle for an ‘association of liberated human beings, in which everybody would have an equal chance of self-development.’ The theory asserts that the ‘real possibilibilty’ of such an association exists, given the current level of human productive forces, and it asserts, at the same time, the practical necessity of a struggle for the realization of this possibility. As to this struggle, however, [Max] Horkheimer distances himself from the strategies of the Bolshevist revolutionaries by postulating that ‘despite all the discipline, justified by the necessity to win through, the community of those engaged in the struggle experiences something of the freedom and spontaneity which will mark the future.’” [Albrecht Wellmer, “On Critical Theory.” Social Research. Volume 81, number 3, fall 2014. Pages 705-733.]
      “In the anglophone context of the last thirty years, the phrase ‘critical theory’ has been used in two quite different ways. On the one hand it refers to the project of the Frankfurt School, in its various formulations, over a fifty-year period from the early 1930s (from early [Max] Horkheimer through to ‘middle period’ [Jürgen] Habermas). On the other hand it has come to denote a far broader but nonetheless discrete tradition, with its roots in [Karl] Marx, [Friedrich] Nietzsche, [Sigmund] Freud and [Ferdinand de] Saussure, and its primary manifestations in France in the period from the late 1950s to the end of the 1990s, with [Roland] Barthes, [Jacques] Lacan, [Louis] Althusser, [Michel] Foucault, [Jacques] Derrida and [Jean-François] Lyotard as its main representatives. In the first case, the phrase is both self-designating and the object of explicit theoretical reflection. In the latter case, however, it was the result of the reception of a theoretically heterogeneous tradition into the literary departments of the Anglo-American academy, where ‘criticism’ was an established professional activity.” [Peter Osborne, “Spheres of action: Art and politics.” Radical Philosophy: Philosophical Journal of the Independent Left. Number 137, May/June 2006. Page 13.]
      “Critical theory holds that economics is the formula of an inverted and bewitched world. This stance raises the question about the meaning of critique in the critique of political economy. What is criticised? According to Marx, his critique of political economy amounts to a ‘critique of economic categories’ to reveal their origin in the social relations of production. He thus argued that economists deal with un-reflected presuppositions ….” [Werner Bonefeld, “Bringing critical theory back in at a time of misery: Three beginnings without conclusion.” Capital & Class. Volume 40, number 2, 2016. Pages 233-244.]
   2. specific critical theoretical perspectives: A generous sampling of work conducted under the rubric of critical theory—such as the Frankfurt School, Bhaskarian critical realism, and the theory of cultural hegemony—will follow this paragraph. Please note that the term “critical theory” has been liberally defined here to include some work which has been influenced by critical theoretical perspectives—such as progressive Marxism—or which otherwise, in Foster’s view, resembles critical theory. A number of additional critical theories have been incorporated into earlier chapters as well as into the next chapter. It is entitled Structuralism and Poststructuralism.
      1. Frankfurt School (Max Horkheimer as pronounced in this MP3 audio file and many others): Critical social theory, as an organized school of thought, began in Frankfurt, Germany. Many of the branches of the original Frankfurt School (German, Frankfurter Schule as pronounced in this MP3 audio file), along with other critical social theories, will be considered in this chapter.
         “The Institute for Social Research founded in 1923 and located in Frankfurt, Germany; it brought back concern with ideology, human intentionality and reflexivity into Marxist theory and into sociology. It was Marxist, Freudian, Weberian and neo-Hegelian all at once. In World War I, the working class of each country joined the capitalist class to fight other capitalists and workers in other countries. The founders of the Frankfurt Schule [sic; Frankfurter Schule, Frankfurt school] thought that ideology was part of the answer and began work on the social sources of fascism and authoritarian personality. They found it in the patriarchal family; in the racism, sexism and fascism of art, cinema, magazines and other mass culture. Then too, orthodox social science tended to adopt the model of objective ‘laws’ which seemed to be beyond human reach. Radical sociology had been depoliticized by adopting a positivist style after American, French, and British Philosophy of Science. Led by [Max] Horkheimer, [Theodor] Adorno, [Herbert] Marcuse, [Erich] Fromm, [Walter] Benjamin and others, the Marxian interest in alienated consciousness and the creative role of humans in constructing social forms is reasserted. Critical theorists, especially Marcuse, made a criticism of the obstacles to human praxis in both capitalist and ‘socialist’ societies.
         “Also known as the School of Critical Theory or critical sociology, it recognizes that structural Marxism leaves many questions unanswered. Critical theory seeks to remedy this by incorporating theory from freudianism, phenomenology, and existentialism and lately, from feminist and from postmodern scholarship.”
         [T. R. Young. The Red Feather Dictionary of Critical Social Science. May 20th, 2000. Retrieved on August 9th, 2009.]
         “critical theory, any social theory that is at the same time explanatory, normative, practical, and self-reflexive. The term was first developed by [Max] Horkheimer as a self-description of the Frankfurt School and its revision of Marxism. It now has a wider significance to include any critical, theoretical approach, including feminism and liberation philosophy. When they make claims to be scientific, such approaches attempt to give rigorous explanations of the causes of oppression, such as ideological beliefs or economic dependence; these explanations must in turn be verified by empirical evidence and employ the best available social and economic theories. Such explanations are also normative and critical, since they imply negative evaluations of current social practices. The explanations are also practical, in that they provide a better self-understanding for agents who may want to improve the social conditions that the theory negatively evaluates. Such change generally aims at “emancipation,” and theoretical insight empowers agents to remove limits to human freedom and the causes of human suffering. Finally, these theories must also be self-reflexive: they must account for their own conditions of possibility and for their potentially transformative effects. These requirements contradict the standard account of scientific theories and explanations, particularly positivism and its separation of fact and value. For this reason, the methodological writings of critical theorists often attack positivism and empiricism and attempt to construct alternative epistemologies. Critical theorists also reject relativism, since the cultural relativity of norms would undermine the basis of critical evaluation of social practices and emancipatory change.
         “The difference between critical and non-critical theories can be illustrated by contrasting the Marxian and Mannheimian theories of ideology. Whereas [Karl] Mannheim’s theory merely describes relations between ideas of social conditions, [Karl] Marx’s theory tries to show how certain social practices require false beliefs about them by their participants. Marx’s theory not only explains why this is so, it also negatively evaluates those practices; it is practical in that by disillusioning participants, it makes them capable of transformative action. It is also self-reflexive, since it shows why some practices require illusions and others do not, and also why social crises and conflicts will lead agents to change their circumstances. It is scientific, in that it appeals to historical evidence and can be revised in light of better theories of social action, language, and rationality. Marx also claimed that his theory was superior for its special “dialectical method,” but this is now disputed by most critical theorists, who incorporate many different theories and methods. This broader definition of critical theory, however, leaves a gap between theory and practice and places an extra burden on critics to justify their critical theories without appeal to such notions as inevitable historical progress. This problem has made critical theories more philosophical and concerned with questions of justification.”
         [James Bohman, “Critical Theory.” The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy. Second edition. Robert Audi, editor. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press. 1999. Page 195.]
         “In the long run things cannot change. The possibility of regression is always there. That means we have to reject both Marxism and ontology. Neither the good nor the bad remains, but the bad is more likely to survive. The critical mind must free itself from a Marxism which says that all will be well if only you become a socialist. We can expect nothing more from mankind than a more or less worn-out version of the American system. The difference between us is that Teddie [Theodor Adorno] still retains a certain penchant for theology. My own thoughts tend to move in the direction of saying that good people are dying out. In the circumstances, planning would offer the best prospect.” [Max Horkheimer in Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer. Towards a New Manifesto: Conversations between Adorno & Horkheimer. Rodney Livingstone, translator. New York: Verso imprint of New Left Books. 2011. Page 21.]
         “The reason why this entire question of spare time is so unfortunate is that people unconsciously mimic the work process, whereas what they really want is to stop working altogether. Happiness necessarily presupposes the element of effort. Basically, we should talk to mankind once again as in the eighteenth century: you are upholding a system that threatens to destroy you. The appeal to class won’t work any more, since today you are really all proletarians. One really has to think about whom one is addressing.” [Theodor Adorno in Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer, “Towards a New Manifesto?” New Left Review. Series II, number 65, September–October 2010. Pages 33-61.]
         “The Frankfurt School has become one of the mostly widely adopted forms of neo-Marxism. It grew out of the Institute of Social Research at the University of Frankfurt, Germany. It is sometimes referred to as critical theory, meaning a special kind of social philosophy. It gathered together people who were severe critics of capitalism but believed that Marxism had become too close to communism. They believed Karl Marx’s followers were supporting only a narrow selection of his ideas.
         “Neo-Marxists view class divisions under capitalism as more important than gender/sex divisions or issues of race and ethnicity. Neo-Marxism encompasses a group of beliefs that have in common rejection of economic or class determinism and a belief in at least the semiautonomy of the social sphere. They also claim that most social science, history, and literary analysis works from within capitalist categories and say neo-Marxism is based on the total political-economic-cultural system.
         “During the Nazi regime, the members of the school fled first to Geneva, Switzerland, then to the United States. They became attached to the department of sociology at Columbia University in 1935. In 1941, they relocated to California. In 1949, some of them—Max Horkheimer, Theodor Adorno, and Friedrich Pollock—returned to Germany and 2 years later reestablished the Institute for Social Research. Horkheimer served as director and believed in a holistic approach, combining theory and practice.
         “The neo-Marxists, after seeing the failure of working-class revolutions in Western Europe after World War I, chose the parts of Marx’s thought that might clarify social conditions that were not present when Marx was alive. They filled in what they perceived to be omissions in Marxism with ideas from other schools of thought.”
         [Pat McCarthy, “Neo-Marxism.” H. James Birx, editor. Encyclopedia of Anthropology. Volume 4. Thousand Oaks, California: SAGE Publications, Inc. 2006. Page 1546.]
         “… the Frankfurt School of Marxist aesthetics rejected realism altogether. The Institute for Social Research at Frankfurt practised what it called ‘Critical Theory,’ which was a wide-ranging form of social analysis grounded in Hegelian Marxism and including Freudian elements. The leading figures in philosophy and aesthetics were Max Horkheimer, Theodor Adorno and Herbert Marcuse. Exiled in 1933, the Institute was relocated in New York, but finally returned to Frankfurt in 1950 under Adorno and Horkheimer. They regarded the social system, in Hegelian fashion, as a totality in which all the aspects reflected the same essence. Their analysis of modern culture was influenced by the experience of fascism which had achieved hegemonic dominance at every level of social existence in Germany. In America they saw a similar ‘one-dimensional’ quality in the mass culture and the permeation of every aspect of life by commercialism.” [Raman Selden, Peter Widdowson, and Peter Brooker. A Reader’s Guide to Contemporary Literary Theory. Fifth edition. Harlow, England: Pearson Education Limited. 2005. Page 91.]
         “The denomination ‘Frankfurt School’ was not chosen by the members, but has been applied to them by others. Members of the group prefer their work to take its name from what they regard as their theoretical programme: ‘critical theory’. An examination of what they, and particularly [Max] Horkheimer, who coined the phrase, have meant by critical theory therefore serves as a convenient introduction to their work as a whole.” [Göran Therborn, “The Frankfurt School.” New Left Review. Series I, number 63, September–October 1970. Pages 65-96.]
         “Central to what is ordinarily meant by ‘Western Marxism’ is the work of the Frankfurt school, which took its name from the Institute of Social Research founded in Frankfurt in 1923. Originally concentrating on a more orthodox form of Marxism, the Institute changed its orientation with the appointment of Max Horkheimer as director in 1930. Hewas soon joined by Theodor Adorno and Herbert Marcuse whose work, together with the later contributions of [Jürgen] Habermas, formed the core of the Frankfurt school. Driven into exile in the United States by Nazism, the Institute was re-established in Germany in the early 1950s. The writings of the Frankfurt school thus have as their background, and are a reflection upon, the events which had so forcefully shaped the lives of its members: the collapse of working-class movements in Western Europe and the rise of fascism, the degeneration of the Russian Revolution as the grip of Stalinism stifled intellectual debate, and the lengthy capitalist boom in post-war Europe. They considered that the traditional Marxist approach of historical materialism needed to be supplemented by the work of thinkers outside the Marxist tradition such as [Max] Weber or [Sigmund] Freud.” [David McLellan, “Western Marxism.” The Cambridge History of Twentieth-Century Political Thought. Terence Ball, editor. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press. 2003. Pages 282-298.]
      2. Bhaskarian critical realism (Ram “Roy” Bhaskar; Hindī, राम „रॉय“ भास्कर, Rāma “Rôya” Bhāskara as pronounced in this MP3 audio file and many others): It can be regarded as an underlaborer of the larger critical social theoretical tradition. All forms of critical social theory focus, in one way or another, upon emancipation from domination. However, whereas critical realists assume the objective existence of a reality (called “ontology”), apart from consciousness or actual events, many others schools within the larger discipline of critical social scholarship do not make that assumption. For more detailed information on critical realism, visit the sister publication, In Reality: An Integrative Review of Critical Realism.
         In critical realism, oppression is an aspect of demireality (disunity in difference). On the other hand, oppressive ideologies, such as racism and sexism, are interpretive or epistemic. They refer to human knowledge about demireality. Attacking or refuting the ideologies, as in many varieties of critical theory, will likely do little to eliminate the demireality.
         “… I was well known to be a Marxist and to identify with the revolutionary left.” [Roy Bhaskar in Roy Bhaskar with Mervyn Hartwig. The Formation of Critical Realism: A Personal Perspective. London and New York: Routledge imprint of Taylor & Francis Group, an Informa PLC business. 2010. Page 47.]
         “… I wrote dictionary entries …, giving accounts of Marx’s method showing how he approximated to critical realism, and I think that kind of reconstruction of Marx’s method, namely as a critical realist, was probably the best that there was to date.” [Roy Bhaskar in Roy Bhaskar with Mervyn Hartwig. The Formation of Critical Realism: A Personal Perspective. Routledge imprint of Taylor & Francis Group, an Informa PLC business. 2010. Page 117.]
         “Dialectical critical realism provides the most abstract concepts for understanding being and therefore the most abstract concepts for a critique of developments within Marxism. It provides a critique of anti-Marxism, and I think on the whole my intention, certainly at the time of writing Dialectic [Bhaskar’s book, Dialectic: The Pulse of Freedom], was to support the science of history Marx had opened up.” [Roy Bhaskar in Roy Bhaskar with Mervyn Hartwig. The Formation of Critical Realism: A Personal Perspective. London and New York: Routledge imprint of Taylor & Francis Group, an Informa PLC business. 2010. Page 134.]
         “My main concern was not so much to be hermeneutically accurate to Marx as to clear the ground for the unfinished business of Marxism: historical materialism and the critique of political economy. I proceeded from the point of view that Marx had started something, but that Marxists have not well understood what he started; Marx had set an agenda, raising many important questions and it is the job of Marxists, as successors of Marx, to work on and develop this agenda.” [Roy Bhaskar in Roy Bhaskar with Mervyn Hartwig. The Formation of Critical Realism: A Personal Perspective. Routledge imprint of Taylor & Francis Group, an Informa PLC business. 2010. Page 140.]
         “I was very grateful to [Margaret Archer] …. I had done the work on the negative generalisation but I think she showed me in very stark terms that there was no way that my position was the same as that of Tony Giddens.” [Roy Bhaskar in Roy Bhaskar with Mervyn Hartwig. The Formation of Critical Realism: A Personal Perspective. London and New York: Routledge imprint of Taylor & Francis Group, an Informa PLC business. 2010. Page 80.]
         “For critical realism, philosophy does not speak about a world apart from the world of science and everyday life. Rather, it speaks about the most abstract features of just such a world. These abstract features are expressed by philosophical categories such as causality, substance, etc. For critical realism, such categories are real.” [Roy Bhaskar, “Prolegonenon: The consequences of the revindication of philosophical ontology for philosophy and social theory.” Engaging with the World: Agency, institutions, historical formations. Margaret S. Archer and Andrea Maccarini, editors. London and New York: Routledge imprint of Taylor & Francis Group, an Informa PLC business. 2013. Page 12.]
         “… [Perry Anderson] famously linked the philosophical attitude of ‘Western’ Marxism to its separation from practice while, writing from a broadly Trotskyist standpoint, he saw the superiority of ‘classical’ Marxism as guaranteed by its unity with the struggles of classical Marxism from critical scrutiny …. The problem that Anderson begins to formulate is this; if we reject the various errors of Western Marxism – such things as [Georg] Lukács’s views on reification and class consciousness, or [Jean-Paul] Sartre’s constitution of the totality through scarcity and praxis, or [Jürgen] Habermas’s Kantian separation of system and lifeworld, or [Louis] Althusser’s scientism – if we reject these views; what have we left to fall back on? Does the ‘classical’ Marxism of the post-war period have the necessary degree of scientificity and explanatory power, or is it also infested with schematic posturing? The problem seems to be that since the beginning of the last century, all the alternatives to Stalinism and reformism have been categorised as either ‘Western’ Marxist or ‘classical’ Marxist. Perhaps the answer to this Andersonian problem is to take up critical realism and, through its underlabouring [getting rid of the trash, rubbish, or weeds], rid ourselves of the unnecessaries so that we can get back to being just plain Marxists.” [Jonathan Joseph, “Five Ways in which Critical Realism Can Help Marxism.” Critical Realism and Marxism. Andrew Brown, Steve Fleetwood, and John Michael Roberts, editors. London and New York: Routledge imprint of Taylor & Francis Group, an Informa PLC business. 2002. Pages 40-41.]
         “[Roy] Bhaskar’s own view of the relationship between CR [critical realism] and Marxism is that ‘Marx’s work at its best illustrates critical realism; and critical realism is the absent methodological fulcrum of Marx’s work’ …, and he [Bhaskar] has remained a committed but non-dogmatic and increasingly controversial Marxist ….” [Peter Nielsen in Mervyn Hartwig. Dictionary of Critical Realism. London and New York: Routledge imprint of Taylor & Francis Group, an Informa PLC business. 2007. Page 286.]
         “In the early 1970s, [Roy] Bhaskar started as a Marxist existentialist, with a strong Althusserian flavour. For the early Bhaskar, life is ultimately meaningless.” [Heikki Patomäki, “How do Tell Better Cosmic Stories: A Rejoinder to Nick Hostettler.” Journal of Critical Realism. Volume 9, issue 1, April 2010. Pages 104-111.]
         “For those critical realists who regard critical realism as a form of neo-Marxism, the task of social science is not just that of explaining how structures and agents interact but also that of criticism …. Their argument runs thus. Any scientific account of how the capitalist structure works will show how it is oppressive and exploitative. It will also show how this structure needs to generate ideological beliefs to mask its nefarious character.” [Justin Cruickshank, “The positive and the negative: Assessing critical realism and social constructionism as post-positivist approaches to empirical research in the social sciences.” Working paper 42. August, 2011. International Migration Institute, University of Oxford. Oxford, England. Pages 1-20.]
         “Critical realism offers an ontology that can conceptualize reality, support theorizing, and guide empirical work in the natural and human sciences. It views reality as complex and recognizes the role of both agency and structural factors in influencing human behavior.” [Alexander M. Clark, “Critical Realism.” The SAGE Encyclopedia of Qualitative Research Methods. Lisa M. Given, general editor. Thousand Oaks, California: A SAGE Reference Publication imprint of SAGE Publications, Inc. 2008. Page 167.]
         “[Roy] Bhaskar continued to work metacritically within the conatus to freedom linking [René] Descartes, [Immanuel] Kant, [Georg Wilhelm Friedrich] Hegel and [Karl] Marx … and—uniquely among major contemporary philosophers—remained committed to a (libertarian) form of revolutionary socialism.” [Mervyn Hartwig, “Introduction” to Roy Bhaskar. Dialectic: The Pulse of Freedom. London and New York: Routledge imprint of Taylor & Francis Group, an Informa PLC business. 2008. Page xviii.]
      3. phenomenology of historical materialism as pronounced in this MP3 audio file or dialectical phenomenology as pronounced in this MP3 audio file (Herbert Marcuse as pronounced in this MP3 audio file and others): Reality, according to Marcuse, is personal experience. Through capitalism, oppressed peoples become one dimensional. They see reality through the eyes of the capitalists. Capitalism has taken away the subjective or intellectual ability to challenge social oppression (domination). Marcuse’s perspective is also known as phenomenological Marxism. You can watch this YouTube video of Marcuse: Herbert Marcuse on the Frankfurt School – Bryan Magee Series.
         “The forms of being involving existence are described through the many stages of the phenomenological investigation, Initially, the constitution of being involving existence appears as ‘being-in-the-world’ (In-der-Welt-Sein [MP3 audio file]). As such, being and world exist together. The problems of transcendence, reality, and the demonstrability of the world in their traditional contexts turn out to be pseudo-problems Existence is always ‘being-in-the-world.’ …
         “‘Phenomenology’ means to let things reveal themselves. But the objects themselves are already in historicity. This sphere of historicity begins as a concrete historical situation, and is already present in the formulation of the question. It encompasses the unique personality of the questioner, the direction of his quesion, and how the object first appears….
         “Only … a dialectical phenomenology as a method of continuous and radical concreteness, can do justice to the historicity of human existence.”
         [Herbert Marcuse, “Contributions to a Phenomenology of Historical Materialism.” TELOS: Critical Theory of the Contemporary. Volume 1, number 4, fall 1969. Pages 3-34.]
         “The discrepancy between essence and phenomena is a cornerstone of the Marxian method, but the metaphysical categories have become sociological ones. In the analysis of capitalism [Karl] Marx describes the discrepancy in terms of the ‘veil of commodity production’ (reification); he derives it from the separation of physical from intellectual work and from the ‘enslavement of man by the means of his labor.’ As applied to the proletariat, although it is ‘in reality’ the negation of the capitalist system, this objective reality will not immediately appear in the proletarian consciousness—the ‘class in itself’ is not necessarily ‘class for itself.’ Since, to Marx, the ‘essence’ of the proletariat is a historical force which the theoretical analysis only defines and demonstrates, the ‘real interest’ of the proletariat as defined by this analysis is not an abstract and arbitrary construct but a theoretical expression of what the proletariat itself is—although it may not or not yet be conscious of what it really is.” [Herbert Marcuse. Soviet Marxism: A Critical Analysis. New York: Columbia University Press. 1958. Page 24.]
         “We are dealing with a philosophical critique of political economy, for the basic categories of [Karl] Marx’s theory here arise out of his emphatic confrontation with the philosophy of [Georg Wilhelm Friedrich] Hegel (e.g. labour, objectification, alienation, supersession, property). This does not mean that Hegel’s ‘method’ is transformed and taken over, put into a new context and brought to life. Rather, Marx goes back to the problems at the root of Hegel’s philosophy (which originally determined his method), independently appropriates their real content and thinks it through to a further stage. The great importance of the new manuscripts further lies in the fact that they contain the first documentary evidence that Marx concerned himself explicitly with Hegel’s Phenomenology of Mind, ‘the true point of origin and the secret of the Hegelian philosophy’” [Herbert Marcuse. Studies in Critical Philosophy. Joris de Bres, translator. Boston, Massachusetts: Beacon Press. 1973. Page 4.]
         “The products indoctrinate and manipulate; they promote a false consciousness which is immune against its falsehood. And as these beneficial products become available to more individuals in more social classes, the indoctrination they carry ceases to be publicity; it becomes a way of life. It is a good way of life – much better than before – and as a good way of life, it militates against qualitative change. Thus emerges a pattern of one-dimensional thought and behaviour in which ideas, aspirations, and objectives that, by their content, transcend the established universe of discourse and action are either repelled or reduced to terms of this universe.” [Herbert Marcuse. One-Dimensional Man: Studies in the Ideology of Advanced Industrial Society. Boston: Beacon Press. 1964. Page 20.]
         “Inspired by his [Herbert Marcuse’s] reading of [Martin] Heidegger’s Being and Time, and having already been influenced by Marxism during his military days, Marcuse goes to Freiberg [a German town] to study with Heidegger in 1928. Between 1928 and 1932 he attempts to develop what has been called Heideggerian or phenomenological Marxism. This project was Marcuse [sic; Marcuse’s] response to what has been called the ‘crisis of Marxism.’ …
         “Does Marcuse continue to employ Heideggerian ideas in a new language? For example; is Marcuse’s critique of one-dimensionality nothing more than a Heideggerian critique of inauthenticity? Both terms refer to ‘a mass society of blind conformity’ ….”
         [Arnold Farr, “Herbert Marcuse.” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Edward N. Zalta, Uri Nodelman, and Colin Allen, executive editors. December 18th, 2013. Retrieved on August 29th, 2015.]
         “According to Herbert Marcuse, modern-day ‘efficiency’ derives from the capitalist project of commoditisation. Heterogeneous qualities are homogenised into universally comparable ones, thus allowing a quantifiable output to be designed, measured, managed, increased, etc. Such homogenisation is promoted as a neutral technical tool, thus denying its own value-laden character. ‘As universal functionalisation (which finds its economic expression in exchange value), it becomes the precondition of calculable efficiency – of universal efficiency’ ….” [Les Levidow, “Technological Change as Class Struggle.” Anti-Capitalism: A Marxist Introduction. London, England, and Sterling, Virginia: Pluto Press. 2003. Pages 94-105.]
      4. new materialist phenomenology (William S. Wilkerson): He develops a new critical theory informed by Herbert Marcuse’s phenomenological approach.
         “In light of this [rethinking grand projects], Herbert Marcuse’s very early essay, ‘Contributions to a Phenomenology of Historical Materialism’ (1969, originally published in 1928) presents an interesting theoretical promise, one that was only partially fulfilled in his later work. In this essay, Marcuse combines the ideals of Marxist materialism and liberatory theory with the phenomenological analysis of everyday existence provided in Martin Heidegger’s just published Being and Time (1927)….
         “Because each account, phenomenology and materialism, deals with only one aspect of human history, each faces limits. Analyses of historicity do not simply enumerate various things that people in fact believe and do, but instead present the structure in which any particular thing that someone believes or does is found.…
         “The contemporary relevance of materialist phenomenology, then, consists in its ability to show how the perpetuation of our everyday existence— the unity of historicity and historicality— is both the condition of continuing domination and the possibility of its transformation. For inhabitation does not describe the lost organic past, but the historical social life of true human existence contained in the moment that heritage is redeployed in present activity— contained but perpetually lost through an absorption into the everyday and through the development of a historical mode of existence that militates against its own discovery as historical, either through reification or through the distractions of consumer society.”
         [William S. Wilkerson, “Inhabiting Hope: Contributions to a New Materialist Phenomenology.” New Critical Theory: Essays on Liberation. William S. Wilkerson and Jeffrey Paris, editors. Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers. 2001. Pages 65-82.]
      5. Marxist aesthetics (Herbert Marcuse): He examines aesthetic form.
         “Aesthetic form, autonomy, and truth are interrelated. Each is a socio-historical phenomenon, and each transcends the socio-historical arena. While the latter limits the autonomy of art it does so without invalidating the transhistorical truths expressed in the work. The truth of art lies in its power to break the monopoly of established reality (i.e., of those who established it) to define what is real. In this rupture, which is the achievement of the aesthetic form, the fictitious world of art appears as true reality.
         “Art is committed to the perception of the world which alienated individuals from their functional existence and performance in society—it is committed to an emancipation of sensibility, imagination, and reason in all spheres of subjectivity objectivity. The aesthetic transformation becomes a vehicle of recognition and indictment. But this achievement presupposes a degree of autonomy which withdraws art from the mystifying power of the given and frees it for the expression of its own truth. Inasmuch as man and nature are constituted by an unfree society, their repressed and distorted potentialities can be represented only in an estranging form. The world of art is that of another Reality Principle, of estrangement—and only as estrangement does art fulfill a cognitive function: it communicates truths nocommunicable in any other language; it contradicts.
         [Herbert Marcuse. The Aesthetic Dimension: Toward a Critique of Marxist Aesthetics. Erica Sherover and Herbert Marcuse, translators. Boston, Massachusetts: Beacon Press. 1978. Pages 9-10.]
         “My aim is to show the ethical meaning of Herbert Marcuse’s aesthetics, especially in his last book, The Aesthetic Dimension. This book, which appeared in 1978, and represented Marcuse’s last statement on aesthetics, constitutes both a moral and an aesthetic dialogue with three ideas in Frankfurt school and Marxist art theory.…
         “… My problem is that I am trying to resolve the issue of the relation between ethics and aesthetics by using thinkers who, following a definite line of Hegelian Marxism, are often hostile to a language of value too autonomous from describing factual situations. But the most obvious link between aesthetics and ethics would be ethical and aesthetic value; and how can such a link be made by thinkers who seem to deny the autonomy of value and the possibility of an ethics based on such value?”
         [Norman Fischer, “Frankfurt School Marxism and the Ethical Meaning of Art: Herbert Marcuse’s The Aesthetic Dimension.” Communication Theory. Volume 7, issue 4, November 1997. Pages 362-381.]
         “Aestheticism, or the Aesthetic Movement, was a European phenomenon during the latter nineteenth century that had its chief headquarters in France. In opposition to the dominance of scientific thinking, and in defiance of the widespread indifference or hostility of the middle-class society of their time to any art that was not useful or did not teach moral values, French writers developed the view that a work of art is the supreme value among human products precisely because it is self-sufficient and has no use or moral aim outside its own being. The end of a work of art is simply to exist in its formal perfection; that is, to be beautiful and to be contemplated as an end in itself. A rallying cry of Aestheticism became the phrase ‘l’art pour l’art’—art for art’s sake.” [M. H. Abrams. A Glossary of Literary Terms. Seventh edition. Boston, Massachusetts: Heinle & Heinle imprint of Thomson Learning. 1999. Page 3.]
      6. aesthetics of appearing (Martin Seel as pronounced in this MP3 audio file): He examines the dimensions of aesthetic being and appearance.
         “All aesthetic showing originates in a self-showing that does not always include an intentional act of showing. All aesthetic illusion [Schein] originates in an appearing [Erscheinen] that is itself not illusory [scheinhaft]. For that reason, I believe, the indisputable insights of both an ‘aesthetics of being’ and an ‘aesthetics of appearance’ can be formulated plausibly only on the basis of an aesthetics of appearing.…
         “… aesthetic perception differs decisively from all theoretical and practical appropriation: it allows us to develop a sense of the passing presence of life.”
         [Martin Seel, “The aesthetics of appearing.” John Farrell, translator. Radical Philosophy: Philosophical Journal of the Independent Left. Number 118, March/April 2003. Pages 18-24.]
      7. theory of social revolution (Karl Korsch as pronounced in this MP3 audio file): Korsch, one of the founders of Western Marxism, developed his own version of Hegelian Marxism.
         “… the historical development of Marxist theory presents the following picture. The first manifestation of it naturally remained essentially unchanged in the minds of [Karl] Marx and [Friedrich] Engels themselves throughout the later period, although in their writings it did not stay entirely unaltered. In spite of all their denials of philosophy, this first version of the theory is permeated through and through with philosophical thought. It is a theory of social development seen and comprehended as a living totality; or, more precisely, it is a theory of social revolution comprehended and practised as a living totality.… Of course, it is not only economics, politics and ideology, but also the historical process and conscious social action that continue to make up the living unity of ‘revolutionary practice’ ….” [Karl Korsch. Marxism and Philosophy. Fred Halliday, translator. New York: Monthly Review Press. 2008. Page 57.]
         “Marxism and Philosophy offers four essays by Karl Korsch, all translated by Fred Halliday who also contributes an introduction dealing with the author’s life. Korsch, until 1926 a prominent member of the German Community Party and the Third International, was, with [Georg] Lukācs, one of the first Marxists to argue the important of re-examining the writings of the young Marx.” [H. Malcolm Macdonald, “Marxism and Philosophy.” Book review. Social Science Quarterly. Volume 53, number 1, June 1972. Pages 182-183.]
         “For Karl Korsch, one of the most provocative European Marxists of the 1920’s and 1930’s, the relationship between Marxism and philosophy is not one of synthesis or similarity, but one of transcendence ….” [Gerson S. Sher, “Marxism and Philosophy.” Book review. Contemporary Sociology. Volume 2, number 1, January 1973. Pages 28-32.]
      8. theory of communicative action (Jürgen Habermas as pronounced in this MP3 audio file): Communicative action is action which is coordinated through conversation or consensus. Since, to Habermas, society is based upon language, using human language in a rational manner, as well as discovering that others are using language irrationally, can contribute to emancipation.
         “When we use the expression ‘rational’ we suppose that there is a close relation between rationality and knowledge. Our knowledge has a propositional structure; beliefs can be represented in the form of statements. I shall presuppose this concept of knowledge without further clarification, for rationality has less to do with the possession of knowledge than with how speaking and acting subjects acquire and use knowledge.” [Jürgen Habermas. The Theory of Communicative Action: Volume 1. Reason and the Rationalization of Society. Thomas McCarthy, translator. Boston: Beacon Press. 1984. Page 8.]
         “In communicative action, beyond the function of achieving understanding, language plays the role of coordinating the goal-directed activities of different subjects, as well as the role of a medium in the socialization of these very subjects.” [Jürgen Habermas. The Theory of Communicative Action. Volume 2. Lifeworld and System: A Critique of Functionalist Reason. Thomas McCarthy, translator. Boston: Beacon Press. 1987. Page 5.]
         “While instrumental action corresponds to the constraint of external nature and the level of the forces of production determines the extent of technical control over natural forces, communicative action stands in correspondence to the suppression of man’s own nature. The institutional framework determines the extent of repression by the unreflected, ‘natural’ force of social dependence and political power, which is rooted in prior history and tradition. A society owes emancipation from the external forces of nature to labor processes, that is to the production of technically exploitable knowledge (including ‘the transformation of the natural sciences into machinery’). Emancipation from the compulsion of internal nature succeeds to the degree that institutions based on force are replaced by an organization of social relations that is bound only to communication free from domination. This does not occur directly through productive activity, but rather through the revolutionary activity of struggling classes (including the critical activity of reflective sciences). Taken together, both categories of social practice make possible what [Karl] Marx, interpreting [Georg Wilhelm Friedrich] Hegel, calls the self-generative act of the species. He sees their connection effected in the system of social labor. That is why ‘production’ seems to him the movement in which instrumental action and the institutional framework, or ‘productive activity’ and ‘relations of production,’ appear merely as different aspects of the same process.” [Jürgen Habermas. Knowledge and Human Interests. Malden, Massachusetts: Polity Press. 1987. Pages 42-43.]
         “Over and against the communicative domain of nonpublic opinion stands the sphere of circulation of quasi-public opinion. These formal opinions can be traced back to specific institutions; they are officially or semiofficially authorized as announcements, proclamations, declarations, and speeches. Here we are primarily dealing with opinions that circulate in a relatively narrow circle—skipping the mass of the population—between the large political press and, generilly, those publicist organs that cultivate rational debate and the advising, influencing, and deciding bodies with political or politically relevant jurisdictions (cabinet, government commissions, administrative bodies, parliamentary committees, party leadership, interest group committees, corporate bureaucracies, and union secretariats).…
         “In addition to this massive contact between the formal and informal communicative domains, there also exists the rare relationship between publicist organs devoted to rational-critical debate and those few individuals who still seek to form their opinions through literature—a kind of opinion capable of becoming public, but actually nonpublic.”
         [Jürgen Habermas. The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into a Category of Bourgeois Society. Thomas Burger with Frederick Lawrence, translators. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press. 1991. Pages 246-247.]
         “The structures of intersubjectivity are just as constitutive for experiences and instrumental action as they are for attitudes and communicative action.” [Jürgen Habermas. Legitimation Crisis. Thomas McCarthy, translator. Malden, Massachusetts: Polity Press. 1988. Pages 28-29.]
         “… the theory of communicative action can reconstruct [Georg Wilhelm Friedrich] Hegel’s concept of the ethical context of life (independently of the premises of the philosophy of consciousness). It disenchants the unfathomable causality of fate, which is distinguished from the destining of Being by reason of its inexorable immanence. [Jürgen Habermas. The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity: Twelve Lectures. Frederick Lawrence, translator. Cambridge, England: Polity Press. 1990. Page 316.]
         “Communicative action (CA) theory need not displace the critical insights of social scientists, geographers, and other urban scholars about the processes of social, economic, and political change that shape urban settlements. CA analysts believe we settle differences in research findings and interpretations by studying the consequences these differences produce instead of claiming philosophical trump. In the first part of this article, I summarize and critique the argument that CA theory is unrealistic explaining of how CA analysts care more about relevant consequences than causal certainty. In the second part of the article, taking some conceptual advice from social theorist Jurgen Habermas, I show how CA analysis can combine structural and intentional concepts to revise and integrate the apparent antagonism between comprehensiveness and compromise for planning practice. I conclude that a pragmatic CA provides a useful and critical theory for planning practice that remains open to future challenge and debate.” [Charles J. Hoch, “Pragmatic Communicative Action Theory.” Journal of Planning, Education and Research. Abstract. Volume 26, number 3, March 2007. Pages 272-283.]
         “In the midst of the social and political crisis of European-American civilization of the 1960s, the German social theorist Jürgen Habermas offered his inaugural lecture at Frankfurt on the theme ‘Knowledge and Human Interests.’ Habermas’s lecture over three decades ago marked the beginning of his systematic project to provide a ‘historically oriented attempt to reconstruct the prehistory of modern positivism with the systematic intention of analyzing the connections between knowledge and human interests.’” [Corey D. B. Walker, “‘How Does It Feel to be a Problem?’: (Local) Knowledge, Human Interests, and The Ethics of Opacity.” Transmodernity: Journal of Peripheral Cultural Production of the Luso-Hispanic World. Volume 1, number 2, fall 2011. Pages 104-119.]
         “The Internet appears to do the trick of giving the concept of the public sphere a new lease of life by reformulating it in a way that answers some of the major defects that critics have pointed out since its original formulation by [Jürgen] Habermas …. [T]he public sphere described by Habermas was far from democratic or even public. It was public only in the sense that a British public school is public, i.e. exclusive to all but white bourgeois males. Predicated on exclusion it could only ever be the basis for a partial version of democracy that would inevitably exclude other genders, sexualities, ethnicities and classes. Moreover the Habermas version of the public sphere and particularly his account of the role of the mass media are resolutely serious; pleasure and desire are denied space in a culture determined by ‘critical reasoning.’” [Martin Lister, Jon Dovey, Seth Giddings, Iain Grant, and Kieran Kelly. New Media: a critical introduction. Second edition. London and New York: Routledge imprint of Taylor & Francis Group, an Informa PLC business. 2009. Page 219.]
         “The present study was based on the principles of critical theory as postulated by [Jürgen] Habermas …, in which self-assessment essentially consists of becoming aware of teaching-learning experiences through reflection on learning and critical thinking. Self-assessment was considered in line with Habermas … and the types of scientific interest. Technical interest, inherent to the empirical and analytical sciences, is aimed at achieving resource efficacy from the perspective of the rational and technological paradigm. Practical interest, corresponding to the historical and hermeneutical sciences, is aimed at understanding themeaning of events to enable the agents involved to interpret reality and orient personal and social practice. This type of interest corresponds to an interpretive or hermeneutical paradigm, and its main goal is understanding, self-understanding, and comprehensive communication between teachers and learners.” [José Siles-González and Carmen Solano-Ruiz, “Self-assessment, reflection on practice and critical thinking in nursing students.” Nurse Education Today. Volume 45, October 2016. Pages 132-137.]
      9. Critical Theory of Peace Practice (J. Lauren Snyder): The approach is based upon Jürgen Habermas’ theory of communicative action.
         “The … most fundamental formulation of a Critical Theory of Peace Practice would put at its centre the formal pragmatics of language, raising validity claims through the employment of different discourses and the process of argumentation … in an approximated ideal speech environment. As humans, we all possess the capacity for intersubjective communication to reach understanding, form a consensus, learn appropriate behaviours, attain success, and ground our world views generally. Since the philosophical foundation of a Critical Theory of Peace Practice includes a communicative rationality concept and its consequent methodology, the outcomes resulting from facilitation efforts may differ from the problem-solving format. This is the difference between facilitated conflict resolution and a Habermasian-informed methodology of communicative rationality. Rather than engaging in facilitated analysis of needs, participants to a facilitation process employ discourses to contest the validity of uttered statements in order to find a way of moving beyond the protracted situation.… By including a methodology of communicative rationality, this proposed framework can finally overcome the bounded restrictions imposed by a commitment to needs theory.” [J. Lauren Snyder. A Critical Theory of Peace Practice: Discourse Ethics and Facilitated Conflict Resolution. Ph.D. thesis (U.S. English, dissertation). The London School of Economics and Political Science. London, England. 2000. Page 205.]
      10. postmetaphysical thinking (Jürgen Habermas): He examines the possibility of utopia in the context of a “critique of the philosophy of consciousness.”
          “… I would like to go into the critique of the philosophy of consciousness that paved the way for postmetaphysical thinking. Specifically, the transition from the philosophy of consciousness to the philosophy of language results in advantages not only from the standpoint of method but from the standpoint of content as well. This transition breaks out of the circle of a hopeless to-and-fro between metaphysical and antimetaphysical thinking, i.e., between idealism and materialism. Moreover, it makes it possible to attack a problem that cannot be solved using the basic concepts of metaphysics: the problem of individuality. But several very different themes come together in the critique of the philosophy of consciousness. I want at least to name the four most important of these.” [Jürgen Habermas. Postmetaphysical Thinking: Between Metaphysics and the Critique of Reason. William Mark Hohengarten, translator. Cambridge, England: Polity Press. 1995. Page 47.]
          “Among the characteristic experiences of modernity are an acceleration of the historical process and a constant expansion of the future horizon, with the result that present situations are ever more plainly interpreted in the light of pasts made present and, above all, future presents. One function of this transformed and reflexive consciousness of time is the imputation that present action will be placed under premises that anticipate future presents. This applies to systemic processes (such as long-term political commitments, debt-financing, etc.) as well as to simple interactions. The consciousness of crisis that is becoming more and more prevalent in modern societies is the underside of this now-endemic Utopian current.” [Jürgen Habermas. Postmetaphysical Thinking: Between Metaphysics and the Critique of Reason. William Mark Hohengarten, translator. Cambridge, England: Polity Press. 1995. Page 154.]
          “… [Jürgen] Habermas’s postmetaphysical conception of utopia … is clearly a key ingredient of any approach that seeks to avoid ‘bad utopianism,’ ‘finalism’ an‘totalitarianism.’ This is its dependence on transformative action. If utopian thinking is not to deny the influence on human existence of history and context, and if it is not to deny the creative spontaneity of human free will, it must eschew (substantive) teleological conceptions of the ‘good society’. Instead, it must endeavour to keep open the process of history by making emancipation a contingent matter, dependent on the perceptions, interpretations and actions of concrete, historically situated, social agents.” [Maeve Cooke, “Redeeming redemption: The utopian dimension of critical social theory.” Philosophy & Social Criticism. Volume 30, number 4, June 2004. Pages 413-429.]
      11. logics of collective action (Claus Offe as pronounced in this MP3 audio file): Offe’s perspective on “associational practices” was critiqued—as a “theory of actionism”—by his former professor and fellow second-generational Frankfurt School theorist Jürgen Habermas.
          “[Claus] Offe has developed experimental reflections on a theory of actionism.…
          “Offe starts from the thesis that the class character of the state, which he asserts, is not at all accessible to objectivating knowledge. In my opinion, we do not need to share this premise, since the model—introduced above—of suppressed but generalizable interests can indeed be applied to a reconstruction of non-decisions, selection rules, and latency phenomena. Even if we had to share Offe’s premises, his argumentation would remain inconsistent. Let us assume that the goal of removing a class structure could be grounded from the following point of view:
          “—a practice that can justify itself is an independent, that is, rational practice;
          “—the demand for a justifiable practice is rational wherever political consequences can result from actions;
          “—hence, it is rational to desire the transformation of a social system that can advance normative-validity claims only counterfactually, that is, that cannot justify its practice because it structurally suppresses generalizable interests.
          “If the class character of our system of domination were, as Offe states, not recognizable, revolutionary action would be able to base itself at best on conjectures that turn out, retrospectively, to be true or false. As long as class character is not recognized, political action cannot be justified on the basis of generalizable interests; it remains an irrational practice. An irrational practice (whatever goals it may claim for itself) cannot be singled out from any other given practice (even from an avowedly fascist one) with grounds. Indeed, in so far as such a practice is carried through with will and consciousness, it contradicts the (and precisely the) only justifications that can be laid claim to for the transformation of a class structure.
          “Such considerations need hinder no one from accepting a decisionistic action pattern —often enough there is no alternative. But in that case one acts subjectively and, in weighing the risks, can know that the political consequences of this action are only calculable in moral terms. Even then one must still presuppose a trust in the power of practical reason. Indeed, even one who doubts practical reason itself could know that he is not only acting subjectively but is also placing his action outside of the domain of argumentation in general. But then a theory of actionism is also superfluous. The execution of an action has to be sufficient unto itself. Unjustifiable hopes that are tied to the success of an action can add nothing to it. It must, rather, be done for its own sake, beyond argumentation. It is a matter of indifference how much rhetoric one employs to call it forth as an empirical event.”
          [Jürgen Habermas. Legitimation Crisis. Thomas McCarthy, translator. Malden, Massachusetts: Polity Press. 1988. Pages 142-144.]
          “[In Legitimation Crisis, Jürgen] Habermas categorically rejects [Claus] Offe’s ‘actionism’ as the ultimate criterion of the theory’s validity, that is, the view that a rational political praxis can only justify itself retroactively. Such a view, he argues, amounts to admitting that all action is ultimately an irrational ‘act of faith,’ incapable of theoretical justification in advance …. This, in turn, amounts to a de facto acceptance of the ‘decisionistic’ position advocated by positivism, which, with its rigorous separation of facts and values, its glorification of instrumental rationality, and its consequent belief that only means, not ultimate ends, can be rationally determined, has, perhaps unwittingly, contributed so much to the legitimation of a fundamentally irrational social order.” [Axel van den Berg, “Critical Theory: Is There Still Hope?” American Journal of Sociology. Volume 86, number 3, November 1980. Pages 449-478.]
          “Our main argument throughout this paper is that differences in the position of a group in the class structure (we consider here only the classes of labor and capital), not only lead to differences in power that the organizations can acquire, but also lead to differences in the associational practices, or logics of collective action, by which organizations of capital and labor try to improve their respective position vis-à-vis each other; these differences tend to be obscured by the ‘interest group’ paradigm and the underlying notion of a unitary and utilitarian logic of collective action that covers all associations.…
          “… those in the inferior power position can increase their potential for change only by overcoming the comparatively higher costs of collective action by changing the standards according to which these costs are subjectively estimated within their own collectivity. Only to the extent that associations of the relatively powerless succeed in the formation of a collective identity, according to the standards of which these costs of organization are subjectively deflated, can they hope to change the original power relation. Conversely, it is only the relatively powerless who will have reason to act nonindividualistically on the basis of a notion of collective identity that is both generated and presupposed by their association. The very fact that the more powerful will find the individualistic and purely instrumental form of collective action sufficiently promising for the preservation of their power position prevents them from transcending their basically utilitarian mode of collective action. In contrast, workers’ organizations in capitalist systems always find themselves forced to rely upon nonutilitarian forms of collective action, which are based on the redefinition of collective identities—even if the organization does not have any intention of serving anything but the members’ individual utilitarian interests, for example, higher wages.… The logic of collective action of the relatively powerless differs from that of the relatively powerful in that the former implies a paradox that is absent from the latter—the paradox that interests can only be met to the extent they are partly reidefined.”
          [Claus Offe and Helmut Wiesenthal, “Two Logics of Collective Action: Theoretical Notes on Social Class and Organizational Form.” Political Power and Social Theory. Volume 1. Maurice Zeitlin, editor. Greenwich, Connecticut: JAI Press. 1980. Pages 67-115.]
          “State power subject to such contradictory demands can determine its own strategies neither through a general consensus of citizens nor through technocratic calculation: its opportunistic actions can neither be willed nor calculated. However, this interventionist power does not draw quietly or exclusively on its own resources; it is constantly in danger of succumbing to the competitively-regulated movement of individual capital units. Consequently, it must procure for itself a basis for overall legitimation. Thus, because of the autonomization of the political-administrative system, the normative system must also break free from the relationship of positive subordination and become variable so that it can in turn satisfy the need of the political-administrative system for legitimation.” [Claus Offe. Contradictions of the Welfare State. London: Hutchinson & Co. (Publishers) Ltd. 1984. Page 50.]
          “… [A] strategy of maintaining the commodity form presupposes the growth of state-organized production facilities exempt from the commodity form. This, again, is a contradiction only in the structural sense, – a source of possible conflicts and destabilizing developments which in turn remain contingent upon political action. This contradiction can give rise to social conflicts and political struggles which try to gain popular control over exactly those ‘weakest links’ in the world of commodities. Although it is a puzzle to many Marxists who consider themselves ‘orthodox,’ it still is hardly deniable that the major social conflicts and political struggles that have taken place during the decade of the [nineteen] sixties did not take place within exchange relationships between labor and capital, but took place as conflicts over the control over the service organizations that serve the commodity form without themselves being part of the commodity nexus.” [Claus Offe and Volker Ronge, “Theses on the Theory of the State.” New German Critique. Number 6, autumn 1975. Pages 137-147.]
          “How likely is it that individuals actually practice – rather than merely agree to and proclaim – egalitarian social norms? One method to answer this question is through distribution experiments where persons must make a choice between more efficient and more egalitarian courses of action. … One finding is that professional self-selection and socialization into norms of efficiency play a major role in shaping such choices: Students of economics and business administration show significantly lower inclinations to act in ‘inequality averse’ ways and are much more likely than students of other disciplines to sacrifice equality for efficiency in their choices.” [Claus Offe, “Inequality and the Labor Market: Theories, opinions, models, and practices of unequal distribution and how it can be justified.” Zeitschrift für Arbeitsmarktforschung. Volume 43, number 1, 2010. Pages 39-52.]
          “… which circumstances and with what aims, which dilemmas are to be expected along the road, and how the new synthesis of a postrevolutionary order ought to be constituted, and what meaning should be assigned to the notion of ‘progress.’ In all of the revolutions of the last two centuries some kind of answers to these questions had been available, although most of them proved wrong. These answers of revolutionary theorists were formulated independently of the immediate contexts of action and were known to the participating agents ;r in that sense, they were theoretical answers.” [Claus Offe and Pierre Adler, “Capitalism by Democratic Design? Democratic Theory Facing the Triple Transition in East Central Europe.” Social Research Volume 58, number 4, winter 1991. Pages 865-892.]
          “The ‘new politics’ of the new social movements can be analyzed, as can any other politics, in terms of its social base, its issues, concerns, and values, and its modes of action. In order to do so, I will employ the term ‘political paradigm.’” [Claus Offe, “New Social Movements: Challenging the Boundaries of Institutional Politics.” Social Research Volume 52, number 4, winter 1985. Pages 817-868.]
          “Civil and criminal sanctions applied to perpetrators and victims all serve to accomplish what I will term first-order effects. From these, second-order effects of the judicial treatment of action and suffering that occurred in the past can be distinguished. Such second order effects of judicial sanctions condition, in a much less determinate fashion than first-order effects, the attitudes and dispositions for future action on the part of third parties and the public in general. They will make people trust or distrust the judicial system and have other rather diffuse and long term effects of various sorts.” [Claus Offe, “Coming to Terms with Past Injustices: an introduction to legal strategies available in post-communist societies.” European Journal of Sociology / Archives Européennes de Sociologie / Europäisches Archiv für Soziologie. Volume 33, number 1, 1992. Pages 195-201.]
          “The key figure within the collective rational action assumption is the property-less male wage laborer, employed full-time for most of his adult life, whose material subsistence and that of his family depend on a continuous stream of contractual income. He shares these features with a large number of fellow workers who, taken together, constitute the vast majority of the economically active population. Like them, he is exposed to risks partly inherent in the dynamics of the capitalist mode of production. These wage workers also share some common cultural patterns, such as a certain productivist discipline, a sense of solidarity and the perception of being involved in some fundamental social conflict that divides labor and capital. This overarching sense of solidarity and conflict manifests itself in certain political and economic forms of participation and association, experienced as the only available means of promoting their collective interests in income maintenance and social security, in adequate working conditions, in continuous full employment and the prevention of poverty, and in the redistribution of income and economic control. This configuration of conditions and orientations can be described summarily as labor-centered collectivist statism.” [Claus Offe, “Democracy against the Welfare State?: Structural Foundations of Neoconservative Political Opportunities.” Political Theory. Volume 15, number 4, Novembebr 1987. Pages 501-537.]
          “… rather than being a ‘methodological‘ controversy, we suggest that the structuralism-individualism dimension is a historical one: some social formations might be more adequately analyzed within the individualist ‘action’ framework, whereas others require a more ‘structuralist’ approach for their adequate understanding.” [Johannes Berger and Claus Offe, “Functionalism vs. Rational Choice?: Some Questions concerning the Rationality of Choosing One or the Other.” Theory and Society. Volume 11, number 4, July 1982. Pages 521-526.]
          “In general, the repressive character of a political system – that is, those of its aspects serving to strengthen authority – is measurable in terms of whether it exempts de facto certain spheres of action, corresponding to the interests of particular groups, from the use of public force, so that these areas be come sanctioned as natural and inviolable. The authoritarian character of a system of political institutions, on the other hand, is reflected in whether it accords equal prospects for political consideration to all the various classes of mutually incompatible social interests, needs, and claims, or whether these prospects are distorted or biased in some specific direction.” [Claus Offe and Michel Vale, “Political Authority and Class Structures — An Analysis of Late Capitalist Societies.” International Journal of Sociology. Volume 2, number 1, spring 1972. Pages 73-108.]
          “… one could dismiss the use of the notion of the common good as a rhetorical slogan, used to achieve strategic goals. On the one hand, those who use this slogan have the populist aim of enlisting the acclamation of a public that is known often to view politics, parties and associations with morose suspicion and cynical indifference. On the other hand, they oppose a set of related pressures: pressures that come from bearers of functional and territorial representation, thus from associations and regional bodies; that limit the scope of governmental action; and that can further diminish their credit with the voting public. In addition, it no doubt lies in the interest of ruling elites to shirk their own responsibilities and shift the burden of managing problem situations into the realm of ‘civic’ self-help and community spirit.” [Claus Offe, “Whose good is the common good?” Philosophy and Social Criticism. Volume 38, number 7, 2012. Pages 665-684.]
          “To turn to the cases of CEE [Central and Eastern Europe]: to many people’s surprise, the new political resources of democratic freedoms of participation and collective action were partly invested, as it were, not in a centripetal political competition among political parties but into the revival of ethnic identities and the promotion of their claim to statehood. The worst case of this dynamic of ethnic repression, secession and civil war was of course Yugoslavia. The good news within the family of the fourth wave comes from countries where there is little or no opportunity for ethnic conflict because 90 per cent or more of the resident population do belong to and identify with the titular nation.” [Claus Offe, “Political liberalism, identity politics and the role of fear.” Philosophy & Social Criticism. Volume 38, numbers 4–5, May/June 2012. Pages 359-367.]
          “I introduced this essay by saying that contemporary liberal democracies are ‘not functioning well.’ Apart from the question of normative standards concerning the characteristics and criteria of a ‘well-functioning’ democracy that this proposition suggests, it can also be read as an empirical generalisation: Many—and probably an increasing number and highly diverse sorts of—people converge on the belief, expressed in words and even more often in their patterns of behaviour and (in)action, that the way democracies function and the political outcomes they generate are often frustrating, disappointing, short-sighted, unfair, and thus seriously deficient. Rather than this disappointment leading to widely advocated rejection of liberal democracy and its principles, there is an ongoing and vivid democratic meta-discourse on possible improvements, extensions, and innovations of the democratic mode of organising political rule.” [Claus Offe, “Crisis and Innovation of Liberal Democracy: Can Deliberation Be Institutionalised?” Sociologický časopis/Czech Sociological Review. Volume 47, number 3, 2011. Pages 447-472.]
          “The changes in the legal-bureaucratic organization are analyzed, following [Claus] Offe’s approach [in his Contradictions of the Welfare State], throughout three series of overlapping and/or successive logico-historical models: action of public authorities adapted to legal regulations; action adapted to definite goals; and action adapted to more or less extensive processes of political or social consensus.
          “Each one of these three levels represents in some sense the paradigm of the mechanisms of action of the public authorities according to each one of the three successive State sub-models: State of Law, adaptation to regulations; Social State, adaptation to goals; advanced democratic State, adaptation to processes of consensus.”
          [Antonio J. Porras, “Claus Offe and the Late Democratic State Theory.” Working paper number 16. University of Seville. Seville, Spain. 1990. Pages 1-26.]
      12. crisis theory (Michael Heinrich, Andrew Kliman, Amy E. Wendling, Nick Dyer-Witheford, and others): They develop perspectives on Karl Marx’s approach to crisis.
          “The development of crisis theory within the Marxian tradition has been central to much of our work in the last several years. The view that the various fragmentary references to crisis theory in the three volumes of Capital constitute a fully developed coherent structure, which only requires däigent exegesis, is a view that has never seemed sensible to us.…
          “In [Karl] Marx’s work, no final presentation of his theory of crisis can be found. Instead, there are various approaches to explain crises. In the twentieth century, the starting point for Marxist debates on crisis theory was the third volume of Capital, the manuscript of which was written in 1864-1865. Later, attention was directed towards the theoretical considerations on crisis in the Theories of Surplus-Value, written in the period between 1861 and 1863.”
          [Michael Heinrich, “Crisis Theory, the Law of the Tendency of the Profit Rate to Fall, and Marx’s Studies in the 1870s.” Monthly Review: An Independent Socialist Magazine. Volume 64, issue 11, April 2013. Pages 15-31.]
          “In [Karl] Marx’s view, the fall in the rate of profit is only an indirect cause of financial crises and downturns. He acknowledged that it reduces capitalists’ willingness to invest in production …, but his crisis theory is not one in which a fall in the rate of profit causes a fall in the rate of accumulation, which then causes an economic crisis, in a mechanical fashion.…
          “Marx’s crisis theory can be characterized as an endogenous theory of recurrent crises. The downturn is endogenous because it is due to the dynamics of capitalism itself, not to external shocks (alone). The subsequent upturn is endogenous because the crisis itself generates conditions that lead to recovery; ad hoc external stimuli are not needed.”
          [Andrew Kliman, “The Great Recession and Marx’s Crisis Theory.” American Journal of Economics and Sociology. Volume 74, number 2, March 2015. Pages 236-277.]
          “Though [Karl] Marx will develop his crisis theory at length in other, later works, and particularly in Capital, the essential moments of his argument are already present here [Communist Manifesto]. These moments are: (1) empirical observation of a single commercial crisis; (2) overcoming singular or idiosyncratic aspects of this crisis in order to link it to a series of cyclical crises; (3) charting a causal path between features internal to capitalism and these recurrent crises, thereby refuting the objection that crisis results from accident, from features external to capitalism, or that it can be controlled while remaining within the capitalist mode of production; and, finally, (4) suggesting that commercial crises will worsen as the mode of production known as capitalism develops.” [Amy E. Wendling, “Crisis Theory and the False Desire of Home Ownership.” Philosophy Today. Volume 55, number 2, May 2011. Pages 199-210.]
          “Marxian crisis theory shows how difficulties in synchronizing activities around this circuit make capital liable to continuous breakdown and restructuring. The autonomist perspective emphasizes how these crises are, at root, problems in capital s control over human subjects, both cause and effect of contested social relations. Thus, for example, we can add to the work struggles at the point of production poor peoples movements that challenge the exclusion from consumption of the un- and underemployed, the multifarious mobilizations against the underfunding and degradation of the welfare state, and the green challenges to corporate environmental destruction. These contestations can link and interact with each other, producing a circulation of struggles that both mirrors and subverts the circulation of capital. These combinations can occur in sequences that start at different points and run in different directions.” [Nick Dyer-Witheford, “The New Combinations: Revolt of the Global Value-Subjects.” CR: The New Centennial Review. Volume 1, number 3, winter 2001. Pages 155-200.]
      13. political crisis theory (Claus Offe): The political sociologist here applies his perspective on collective action to a mechanistic theory of crises in politics.
          “In terms of research strategy the orientation of our project is determined by our intention to develop an empirically grounded political crisis theory. In this respect our work differs, on the one hand, from economic crisis theories (which, for reasons to be elucidated below, we consider to be inadequate) and, on the other, from normative-analytical approaches in political science (i.e., the ‘cookbook’ approach of the administrative sciences).…
          “… one conceptualizes crises not at the level of events but rather at the superordinate level of mechanisms that generate ‘events.’ According to this definition crises would be processes that vio late the ‘grammar’ of social processes.…
          “State power subject to … contradictory demands [intervention versus absention from intervention and planning versus freedom] can determine its own strategies neither through general consensus of the citizenry nor through technocratic calculation; for one can neither desire nor calculate opportunistic action.
          “However, this interventional power does not rest on itself but rather is constantly in danger of falling back into, or, being integrated into, the movement of individual capital units – which is regulated by competition; consequently, it must procure for itself a basis for overall legitimation. Thus because of the autonomization of the political-administrative system, the normative system must also be set free from the relationship of positive subordination and made so variable that it can satisfy the need of the political-administrative system for legitimation.”
          [Claus Offe, “Crisis of Crisis Management: Elements of a Political Crisis Theory.” International Journal of Politics. Volume 6, number 3, fall 1976. Pages 29-67.]
      14. objective theory of class consciousness (György Lukács as pronounced in this MP3 audio file; or German, Georg Lukács as pronounced in this MP3 audio file): Emphasizes alienation, class conflict, rationality, and emancipatory agency. Capitalism is the source of alienation. People become disconnected, or alienated, from aspects of their own humanness as a result of living in an oppressive capitalist society. The remedy, in Lukács’ Marxist form of humanism, is the development of class consciousness.
          “… where consciousness already exists as an objective possibility, they indicate degrees of distance between the psychological class consciousness and the adequate understanding of the total situation. These gradations, however, can no longer be referred back to socio-economic causes. The objective theory of class consciousness is the theory of its objective possibility. The stratification of the problems and economic interests within the proletariat is, unfortunately, almost wholly unexplored, but research would undoubtedly lead to discoveries of the very first importance.” [Georg Lukács. History and Class Consciousness: Studies in Marxist Dialectics. Rodney Livingstone, translator. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press. 1971. Page 79.]
          “… the class consciousness of the proletariat, the truth of the process ‘as subject’ is itself far from stable and constant; it does not advance according to mechanical ‘laws.’ It is the consciousness of the dialectical process itself: it is likewise a dialectical concept. For the active and practical side of class consciousness, its true essence, can only become visible in its authentic form when the historical process imperiously requires it to come into force, i.e. when an acute crisis in the economy drives it to action. At other times it remains theoretical and latent, corresponding to the latent and permanent crisis of capitalism: it confronts the individual questions and conflicts of the day with its demands, but as ‘mere’ consciousness, as an ‘ideal sum,’ in Rosa Luxemburg’s phrase.” [Georg Lukács. History and Class Consciousness: Studies in Marxist Dialectics. Rodney Livingstone, translator. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press. 1971. Pages 40-41.]
          “… Marx’s ‘humanism’ diverges most sharply from all the movements that seem so similar to it at first glance. Others have often recognised and described how capitalism violates and destroys everything human. I need refer only to Carlyle’s Past and Present whose descriptive sections received the approval and in part the enthusiastic admiration of the young Engels. In such accounts it is shown, on the one hand, that it is not possible to be human in bourgeois society, and, on the other hand, that man as he exists is opposed without mediation – or what amounts to the same thing, through the mediations of metaphysics and myth – to this non-existence of the human (whether this is thought of as something in the past, the future or merely an imperative).” [Georg Lukács. History and Class Consciousness: Studies in Marxist Dialectics. Rodney Livingstone, translator. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press. 1971. Page 190.]
          “It is true that for a long while the undeveloped state of natural knowledge, the limited control of nature, played a major role in making the practice criterion appear in limited or distorted forms of a false consciousness. The concrete forms of this, however, and in particular its influence, extension, power, etc., have always bee n determined by social relations, naturally in interaction with the narrow ontological horizon. Today, when the material level of development of the sciences would objectively facilitate a correct ontology, this false ontological consciousness in the realm of science, and its intellectual influence, are far more clearly rooted in the prevailing social needs.” [Georg Lukács. The Ontology of Social Being: Labour. David Fernbach, translator. London: The Merlin Press Ltd. 1980. Page 63.]
          “We have seen that the proletariat’s historical task is both to emancipate itself from all ideological association with other classes and to establish its own class-consciousness on the basis of its unique class position and the consequent independence of its class interests. Only thus will it be capable of leading all the oppressed and exploited elements of bourgeois society in the common struggle against their economic and political oppressors. The objective basis of the leading role of the proletariat is its position within the capitalist process of production. However it would be a mechanistic application of Marxism, and therefore a totally unhistorical illusion, to conclude that a correct proletarian class-consciousness – adequate to the proletariat’s leading role – can gradually develop on its own, without both frictions and setbacks, as though the proletariat could gradually evolve ideologically into the revolutionary vocation appropriate to its class.” [Georg Lukács. Lenin: A Study on the Unity of his Thought. Nicholas Jacobs, translator. London and New York: Verso imprint of New Left Books. 1970. Ebook edition.]
          “The attempt to summarize Marx’s ontology, in a theoretical sense, leads one into a somewhat paradoxical situation. On the one hand, it must be clear to any unbiassed reader of Marx that all of his concrete statements, understood correctly and without the fashionable prejudices, are in the last instance intended as direct statements about an existent, i.e. they are specifically ontological. On the other hand, however, we find in Marx no independent treatment of ontological problems. Marx never undertook a systematic or systematizing definition as to their specific place in thought, their distinctness from epistemology, logic, etc.” [Georg Lukács. The Ontology of Social Being: Marx’s Basic Ontological Principles. David Fernbach, translator. London: The Merlin Press Ltd. 1978. Page 1.]
          “Underlying … [the] total separation of consciousness and reality is the notion that reality itself cannot be known objectively. From this perspective, the contents of consciousness are either an immediate expression of experience or a subjective construct based upon experience. Lukács finds no problem in associating these two attitudes concerning the nature of knowledge with neo-positivism and neo-Kantianism respectively. In both cases empirical (immediate) reality is the only instance which can be used as a standard to evaluate the conformity between conceptions and the world ‘out there’ of which they are conceptions.” [Mário Duayer and João Leonardo Medeiros, “Lukács’ Critical Ontology and Critical Realism.” Journal of Critical Realism. Volume 4, issue 2, August 2005. Pages 395-425.]
          “Considering the fact that ideology/ideologisation is part of human societal existence, ideology/ideologisation is not simply an either true or false form of consciousness but one of the organic and necessary components of the ontology of social existence. To be short: the way we think in is part of what we truly are. Our working consciousness is also co-actor in our actions.” [Csaba Varga, “From the Ontology of Social Being to the Law’s Ontology.” Journal of Siberian Federal University. Volume 10, number 8, 2015. Pages 2002-2017.]
          “Notwithstanding the importance of objective social conditions, a Marxist ontology must advocate the realization of the transformative capacities of individuals – the development of knowledge, the necessity of understanding, thinking and action as resting on a correct choice between alternatives, and the mastery of self. A necessary foundation for the full realization of human potential is to understand the process by which people can emerge from the ordinary experience of existing social conditions and become capable of, and prepared to engage in, the transformation of social reality.” [Robert Lanning, “Ethics and Self-Mastery: Revolution and the Fully Developed Person in the Work of Georg Lukács.” Science & Society. Volume 65, number 3, fall 2001. Pages 327-349.]
      15. theory of reification (Georg Lukács and Andrew Feenberg): Feenberg explains Lukács’ approach to reification as “a theory of social practice and a work of social ontology.”
          “The more deeply reification penetrates into the soul of the man who sells his achievement as a commodity the more deceptive appearances are (as in the case of journalism). Corresponding to the objective concealment of the commodity form, there is the subjective element. This is the fact that while the process by which the worker is reified and becomes a commodity dehumanises him and cripples and atrophies his ‘soul’—as long as he does not consciously rebel against it—it remains true that precisely his humanity and his soul are not changed into commodities. He is able therefore to objectify himself completely against his existence while the man reified in the bureaucracy, for instance, is turned into a commodity, mechanised and reified in the only faculties that Inight enable him to rebel against reification. Even his thoughts and feelings become reified. As [Georg Wilhelm Friedrich] Hegel says: ‘It is much harder to bring movement into fixed ideas than into sensuous existence.’” [Georg Lukács. History and Class Consciousness: Studies in Marxist Dialectics. Rodney Livingstone, translator. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press. 1971. Page 172.]
          “[Georg] Lukács’s theory of reification, explained in his 1923 work, History and Class Consciousness, is often interpreted as a theory of ideology, but it is also a theory of social practice and a work of social ontology.…
          “Reification, according to Lukács, means mistaking social relations for things. An institution, a university for example, is in reality a complex of social relations, but it appears as a solid and substantial thing like a natural object. Breaking with the illusory thinghood of social institutions and recovering their contingency is ‘dereification.’ This idea is usually explained as a theory of ideology, but implied in the contrast between social relations and things is a deeper argument concerning the nature of action or practice, as Lukács calls it. Practices establish a world within which reified objects appear. These objects are understood ‘immediately’—that is to say, without critical awareness—from a reified standpoint. This standpoint is derivative of the practices, not of their origins, but the standpoint contributes to the reproduction of the world that the practices sustain.”
          [Andrew Feenberg, “Lukács’s Theory of Reification and Contemporary Social Movements.” Rethinking Marxism: A Journal of Economics, Culture & Society. Volume 25, issue 4, 2015. Pages 490-507.]
      16. art of loving (Erich Fromm as pronounced in this MP3 audio file): This well-known member of the original Frankfurt School writes about love.
          “In terms of this discussion of the practice of the art of loving, this means: love being dependent on the relative absence of narcissism, it requires the development of humility, objectivity and reason. One’s whole life must be devoted to this aim. Humility and objectivity are indivisible, just as love is. I cannot be truly objective about my family if I cannot be objective about the stranger, and vice versa. If I want to learn the art of loving, I must strive for objectivity in every situation, and become sensitive to the situations where I am not objective. I must try to see the difference between my picture of a person and his behavior, as it is narcissistically distorted, and the person’s reality as it exists regardless of my interests, needs and fears. To have acquired the capacity for objectivity and reason is half the road to achieving the art of loving, but it must be acquired with regard to everybody with whom one comes in contact. If someone would want to reserve his objectivity for the loved person, and think he can dispense with it in his relationship to the rest of the world, he will soon discover that he fails both here and there.” [Erich Fromm. The Art of Loving. New York: Open Road Integrated Media. 2013. Page 94.]
      17. humanistic psychoanalysis (Erich Fromm): Fromm turns his attention to psychoanalysis.
          “Man’s life is determined by the inescapable alternative between regression and progression, between return to animal existence and arrival at human existence. Any attempt to return is painful, it inevitably leads to suffering and mental sickness, to death either physiologically or mentally (insanity). Every step forward is frightening and painful too, until a certain point has been reached where fear and doubt have only minor proportions. Aside from the physiologically nourished cravings (hunger, thirst, sex), all essential human cravings are determined by this polarity. Man has to solve a problem, he can never rest in the given situation of a passive adaptation to nature. Even the most complete satisfaction of all his instinctive needs does not solve his human problem; his most intensive passions and needs are not those rooted in his body, but those rooted in the very peculiarity of his existence.
          “There lies … [a] key to humanistic psychoanalysis. [Sigmund] Freud, searching for the basic force which motivates human passions and desires believed he had found it in the libido. But powerful as the sexual drive and all its derivations are, they are by no means the most powerful forces within man and their frustration is not the cause of mental disturbance. The most powerful forces motivating man’s behavior stem from the condition of his existence, the ‘human situation.’”
          [Erich Fromm. The Sane Society. London and New York: Routledge imprint of Taylor & Francis Group, an Informa PLC business. 2002. Pages 26-27.]
      18. socialist humanism (Erich Fromm): He developed a humanistic approach to critical social theory.
          “This volume is an attempt to present the ideas of one branch of contemporary Humanism. Socialist Humanism differs in an important respect from other branches. Renaissance and Enlightenment Humanism believed that the task of transforming man into a fully human being could be achieved exclusively or largely by education. Although Renaissance Utopians touched upon the need for social changes, the socialist Humanism of Karl Marx was the first to declare that theory cannot be separated from practice, knowledge from action, spiritual aims from the social system. Marx held that free and independent man could exist only in a social and economic system that, by its rationality and abundance, brought to an end the epoch of ‘prehistory’ and opened the epoch of ‘human history,’ which would make the full development of the individual the condition for the full development of society, and vice versa. Hence he devoted the greater part of his life to the study of capitalist economics and the organization of the working class in the hopes of instituting a socialist society that would be the basis for the development of a new Humanism.” [Socialist Humanism: An International Symposium (from Erich Fromm’s introduction). Erich Fromm, editor. Garden City, New York: Doubleday. 1965. Page viii.]
          “… it [the struggle against Stalinism] is a revolt against inhumanity—the equivalent of dogmatism in human relationships and moral conduct—against administrative, bureaucratic and twisted attitudes towards human beings. In both sense it represents a return to man: from abstractions and scholastic formulations to real men: from deceptions and myths to honest history: and so the positive content of this revolt may be described as ‘socialist humanism.’ It is humanist because it places once again real men and women at the centre of socialist theory and aspiration, instead of the resounding abstractions—the Party, Marxism-Leninism-Stalinism, the Two Camps, the Vanguard of the Working-Class—so dear to Stalinism.” [E. P. Thompson, “Socialist Humanism: An Epistle to the Philistines.” The New Reasoner Summer. Number 1, summer 1957. Pages 105-143.]
          “The [German] working class had entered the postwar period with strong hopes for the realization of socialism or at least for a definite rise in its political, economic, and social position; but, whatever the reasons, it had witnessed an unbroken succession of defeats, which brought about the complete disappointments of all its hopes. By the beginning of 1930 the fruits of its initial victories were almost completely destroyed and the result was a deep feeling of resignation, of disbelief in their leaders, of doubt about the value of any kind of political organization and political activity. They still remained members of their respective parties and, consciously, continued to believe in their political doctrines; but deep within themselves many had given up any hope in the effectiveness of political action.” [Erich Fromm. Escape from Freedom. New York: Open Road Integrated Media. 2013. Google Play edition.]
      19. ambivalent legacy of psychoanalysis (Eli Zaretsky): He considers whether Freudian psychoanalysis can be regarded as a critical theory.
          “Frankfurt School theorists placed his [Sigmund Freud’s] work at the centre of twentieth-century critical theory. In the 1960s and 1970s, feminist and gay critiques certainly called into question Freud’s stature, but in some ways they also enhanced it. Kate Millett called Freud ‘the strongest individual … force’ in the twentieth-century gender counter-revolution, which granted him great power. Other feminists, beginning with Juliet Mitchell, argued that psychoanalysis, far from being counter-revolutionary, actually laid bare the psychodynamics of sexism.…
          “… the important question is whether psychoanalysis was, and can still be understood as, a critical theory, one that challenged the forms of domination and ideology that characterize our society, or whether it was an essentially conservative, anti-political and sexist body of thought.”
          [Eli Zaretsky, “Bisexuality, Capitalism and the Ambivalent Legacy of Psychoanalysis.” New Left Review. Series I, number 223, May–June 1997. Pages 69-89.]
          “… psychoanalysis is a method of treating nervous patients medically. And just at this point I can give you an example to illustrate how the procedure in this field is precisely the reverse of that which is the rule in medicine. Usually when we introduce a patient to a medical technique which is strange to him, we minimize its difficulties and give him confident promises concerning the result of the treatment. When, however, we undertake psychoanalytic treatment with a neurotic patient we proceed differently. We hold before him the difficulties of the method, its length, the exertions and the sacrifices which it will cost him; and, as to the result, we tell him that we make no definite promises, that the result depends on his conduct, on his understanding, on his adaptability, on his perseverance. We have, of course, excellent motives for conduct which seems so perverse, and into which you will perhaps gain insight at a later point in these lectures.” [Sigmund Freud. A General Introduction to Psychoanalysis. G. Stanley Hall, authorized translator. New York: Boni and Liveright Publishers. 1920. Page 1.]
          “For the purpose of self-observation with concentrated attention, it is advantageous that the patient occupy a restful position and close his eyes ; he must be explicitly commanded to resign the critique of the thought-formations which he perceives. He must be told further that the success of the psychoanalysis depends upon his noticing and telling everything that passes through his mind, and that he must not allow himself to suppress one idea because it seems to him unimportant or irrelevant to the subject, or another because it seems nonsensical. He must maintain impartiality towards his ideas; for it would be owing to just this critique if he were unsuccessful in finding the desired solution of the dream, the obsession, or the like.” [Sigmund Freud. The Interpretation of Dreams. A. A. Brill, authorized translator. New York: The Macmillan Company. 1913. Page 82.]
      20. existential critical theory (Yoko Arisaka [Japanese, よこ ありさか, Yoko Arisaka as pronounced in this MP3 audio file]): She applies existential philosophy to critical theory while focusing on technology.
          “… the existential content of what it would mean for one to have a political identity at all— be it gender based, race based, or otherwise— cannot be fully addressed without paying attention to the technological milieu that is fundamentally a part of one’s cultural identity and meaning. Obviously, the more variables one adds, the more complicated the analysis becomes, but no matter how complex, one cannot avoid the issue of the most basic existential constituent of our lives: how we live through engaging with the ‘stuff’ that shapes our existence and survival.…
          “… a truly existential Critical Theory must be antipatriarchal, anti-racist, and anti-colonial to be concretized, [so] the very conception of Critical Theory itself may have to be questioned from the bottom up. Critical Theory, if understood in terms of identity formation and political theorizing, is much too deeply rooted in the post-Enlightenment western European political tradition and much too abstractly formulated.”
          [Yoko Arisaka, “Women Carrying Water: At the Crossroads of Technology and Critical Theory.” New Critical Theory: Essays on Liberation. William S. Wilkerson and Jeffrey Paris, editors. Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers. 2001. Pages 155-174.]
      21. human self-realization (Nilou Mobasser [Persian, نِيلُو مُبَصِّر, Nīlū Mubaṣṣir]): Despite the vaguenes of Karl Marx’s description of the communist future, Mobasser discusses one concept, human self-realization, which is not in doubt.
          “[Karl] Marx was notoriously vague about future society. It is ironic, then, that in the minds of most laymen he is often associated with a very specific utopian vision. As anyone familiar with Marx’s works will know, no blueprint for this vision actually exists. Nevertheless, it would be very misleading indeed to suggest that Marx left us no clues as to his thought on the future. The clues are there in much of what he wrote about the past and the present, in his analysis and criticism of class society, in his exposure and condemnation of exploitation. And the evidence is such that, despite all the feuds, debates and discussions about what Marx did or did not say or did or did not mean, there is almost universal agreement as to the value he hoped future society would promote: human self-realization. It is therefore important that advocates of Marx’s vision should take seriously and respond to criticism of this ideal.” [Nilou Mobasser, “Marx and Self-Realization.” New Left Review. Series I, number 161, January–February 1987. Pages 119-128.]
      22. self-realization and changing the world (Assen Ignatow [Bulgarian Cyrillic, Асен Игнатов, Asen Ignatov]) Ignatow distinguishes between Marxist-Leninist and neo-Marxist approaches to this subject.
          “The notion ‘Self-realization’ (Selbstverwirklichung) presupposes that the human individual creates itself. Precisely this means we possess a certain variety of intrinsic possibilities that we can actualize. The problem of self-realization is conceived in very different ways.…
          “Orthodox Marxist-Leninists regard self-realization as quite identical with the ‘social tasks’ of man.…
          “… level. For neo-Marxists, changing the world means humanization of the world and, consequently, realization of the human essence, i.e. self-realization. Changing the world and self-realization are to a certain degree identical but not in the Marxist-Leninist sense.”
          [Assen Ignatow, “Self-Realization and Changing the World.” Studies in Soviet Thought. Volume 30, number 4, November 1985. Pages 387-395.]
      23. Freudo-Marxist critique of social domination (Leonidas K. Cheliotis [Greek/Hellēniká, Λεωνίδας Κ Χελιώτης, Leōnídas K Cheliṓtēs as pronounced in this MP3 audio file]): He utilizes elements from the theories of Erich Fromm and Pierre Bourdieu.
          “This article aims to make a case and set the foundations for retrieving Erich Fromm’s Freudo-Marxist theory of action and his approach to social domination in particular. To this end, Frommian psychoanalysis is compared with the ‘socio-analysis’ of Pierre Bourdieu.…
          “When Bourdieu was beginning his studies in philosophy and sociology, Fromm’s career as a Freudo-Marxist scholar was already at its apogee (sociological journals, for example, were rife with citations to his work in the 1950s). Bourdieu also maintained a long interest in the so-called ‘Frankfurt School,’ of which Fromm was a core member throughout the 1930s. Indeed, given his critical stance towards the Frankfurt School, Bourdieu could not have missed the heated debate between Fromm and Marcuse in the mid-1950s, where Fromm was denigrated by his former colleague partly for reasons that should have brought him closer to sociology and Bourdieu at that (e.g. Fromm repudiated Freudian theory of human behaviour for biological fixity and insufficient attention to social influences …).”
          [Leonidas K. Cheliotis, “For a Freudo-Marxist critique of social domination: Rediscovering Erich Fromm through the mirror of Pierre Bourdieu.” Journal of Classical Sociology. Volume 11, number 4, November 2011. Pages 438-461.]
      24. dialectic paradigm (Robert W. Friedrichs): He argues that American sociologists should return to a dialectical approach which was rejected a long time ago.
          “The sociological paradigm I would offer … is ‘dialectic.’ It does not depreciate the constructive role the sociologist has to play in mapping the dimensions of order in social space; it simply insists that such order, if truly social in root and not simply a social manifestation of fundamentally biological, chemical, or physical responses or limitations, is relatively short-lived: that the apprehension of that order—magnified by the communication that defines the empirical—serves to free man from its compulsive repetition in the longer run. Such ‘feedback’ cannot be programmed in principle, for the knowledge that it has been programmed will in turn act as a new liberating factor, ad infinitum.
          “What are the prospects for such an image? Surprisingly good. It steps on the sociological stage when the actors are sharply divided over whether the script should ring of ‘system’ or ‘conflict,’ offering scenes to both. The election of a Pole to the presidency of the International Sociological Association symbolizes the cross-fertilization in theoretical perspective that is beginning to take place between Marxist and non-Marxist social theorists; this in turn should guarantee serious attention to the dialectical mode on the part of an American sociology which had rejected it long ago when it discovered that its status models within the natural sciences had found [Friedrich] Engel’s extension of the dialectic to physical and biological phenomena of little utility.”
          [Robert W. Friedrichs, “Sociological Paradigms: Analogies of Teleology, Apocalypse and Prophecy.” Sociological Analysis. Volume 32, number 1, spring 1971. Pages 1-6.]
      25. critical humanism (Kevin Magill, Arturo Rodriguez, Ken Plummer, Jeff Noonan, Norman Denzin, and others): Applies humanism and critical social theory to issues of injustice and capitalist oppression.
          “… the critical humanist acknowledges the inevitable political and ethical role of all inquiry. As he or she develops a naturalistic ‘intimate familiarity’ with the lived experiences they study, they also recognize their own (self-reflexive) part in such study. There must be a reflexive self-awareness, part of which will entail their sense of an ultimate moral and political role in moving towards a social structure in which there is less exploitation, oppression and injustice and more creativity, diversity and equality. Embracing both a situated ethics of care (recognition, tolerance, respects for persons, love) and a situated ethics of justice (redistribution, equality) they recognize that research can never be wholly neutral or value free, since the core of inquiry is value driven: for a better world for all. Indeed impartiality may even be suspect; a rigorous sense of the ethical and political sphere is a necessity. Just why would one even bother to do research were it not for a wider concern or value?” [Ken Plummer, “A Manifesto for a Critical Humanism in Sociology: on Questioning the Human Social World.” Sociology: An Introductory Textbook and Reader. Daniel Nehring, editor. London and New York: Routledge imprint of Taylor & Francis Group, an Informa PLC business. 2014. Google Play edition.]
          “This essay is a critical humanist discussion of curriculum; a departure from the technicist view of education [education meant to support a global capitalist economy] and an analysis of curriculum considering critical humanism, political economy and critical race theory among other modes of critical analysis and inquiry. Our discussion supports a revolutionary curriculum: the turn from a static coercive system of domination where the everyday lives of students are controlled to a dynamic liberatory education where education supports a student’s imaginary …, creativity and their everyday practice of freedom ….…
          “… socio-historical considerations, critiquing society, of critical humanism lie in both its ties and break from humanism.”
          [Kevin Magill and Arturo Rodriguez, “A Critical Humanist Curriculum.” Journal for Critical Education Policy Studies. Volume 12, number 3, December 2014/January 2015. Pages 205-227.]
      26. radical humanist paradigm (Gareth Morgan, Mary Ann Hazen, and others): Applies humanism and critical social theory within organizational analysis, organizational theory, and, later, additional subject areas. The other “paradigms” are the functionalist, the interpretivist, and the radical structuralist (discussed in the chapter, Structuralism and Poststructuralism).
          “A radical humanist perspection [a rarely used term for “perspective”] … frames a case that describes the formation of a countrywide, interorganizational service delivery system for psychiatric emergencies. Critical incidents demonstrate the use of dialogue as a method of change and inquiry within this perspective. The project was initiated and sponsored by the Mental Health Center in cooperation with the County Mental Health Board in response to complaints by the families of psychiatric patients that their needs in emergency situations were not being met. The project involved identifying relevant people, groups, and agencies; convening all parties involved; organizing members to complete a plan that would be presented to the board; and ending. The results suggest that dialogue is: 1. a metaphor for organization; 2. a clinical, collaborative method of inquiry in interorganizational fields; 3. a method of both inquiry and change in interorganizational fields; 4. a liberating process that leads to human development; and 5. rooted in radical humanism.” [Mary Ann Hazen, “A radical humanist perspective of interorganizational relationships.” Human Relations. Volume 47, number 4, April 1994. Page 393.]
          “The radical humanist paradigm assumes that reality is socially created and sustained. It provides critiques of the status quo. It tends to view society as anti-human. It views the process of reality creation as feeding back on itself; such that individuals and society are prevented from reaching their highest possible potential. That is, the consciousness of human beings is dominated by the ideological superstructures of the social system, which results in their alienation or false consciousness. This, in turn, prevents true human fulfillment. The social theorist regards the orders that prevail in the society as instruments of ideological domination. The major concern for theorists is with the way such ideological domination occurs and finding ways in which human beings can release themselves. They seek to change the social world through a change in consciousness.” [Kavous Ardalan, “Globalization and Global Governance: Four Paradigmatic Views.” American Review of Political Economy. Volume 8, number 1, June 2010. Pages 6-43.]
          “The radical humanist paradigm is defined by its concern to develop a sociology of radical change from a subjectivist standpoint. Its approach to social science has much in common with that of the interpretive paradigm, in that it views the social world from a perspective which tends to be nominalist, anti-positivist, voluntarist and ideographic. However, its frame of reference is committed to a view of society which emphasises the importance of overthrowing or transcending the limitations of existing social arrangements.
          “One of the most basic notions underlying the whole of this paradigm is that the consciousness of man is dominated by the ideological superstructures with which he interacts, and that these drive a cognitive wedge between himself and his true consciousness. This wedge is the wedge of ‘alienation’ or ‘false consciousness,’ which inhibits or prevents true human fulfilment. The major concern for theorists approaching the human predicament in these terms is with release from the constraints which existing social arrangements place upon human development. It is a brand of social theorising designed to provide a critique of the status quo. It tends to view society as anti-human and it is concerned to articulate ways in which human beings can transcend the spiritual bonds and fetters which tie them into existing social patterns and thus realise their full potential.”
          [Gibson Burrell and Gareth Morgan. Sociological Paradigms and Organisational Analysis: Elements of the Sociology of Corporate Life. Burlington, Vermont: Ashgate Publishing Company. 1992. Page 32.]
          “The radical humanist paradigm … emphasizes how reality is socially created and sustained but ties analysis to an interest in what may be described as the pathology of consciousness. Here, people become members of an habitual domain that lies within the bounds of the reality they create. This perspective is based on the view that the reality creation is influenced by psychic and social processes which channel, constrain, and control the minds of human beings, in ways which tie them only to their created interests. Capitalism, for example, is viewed as essentially totalitarian ….” [Douglas K. Peterson, “Paradigms Found: Phronesis and Pragmatic Humanism for International and Domestic NGOs.” International Business Research. Volume 3, number 4, October 2010. Pages 36-42.]
          “Theory building in radical humanism [takes] a … critical or evaluative stance. The goal of theory is to free organization members from sources of domination, alienation, exploitation, and repression by critiquing the existing social structure with the intent of changing it. Critical theory … is a prototypical example that demonstrates the paradigm’s theory-building characteristics. Critical theorists focus on two levels of understanding: a surface level and a deep-structure level, wherein the underlying sources of a given reality are presumed to reside. Major attention is given to the ways that power-holders (e.g., management) influence structuring processes that become part of a reified, taken-for-granted way of seeing. Critical theorists look at the ways that reified deep structures embedded in the status quo affect human action ….” [Dennis A. Gioia and Evelyn Pitre, “Multiparadigm Perspectives on Theory Building.” Academy of Management Review. Volume 15, number 4, 1990. Pages 584-602.]
          “… the radical humanist paradigm puts emphasis on radical change, on the modes of domination, emancipation, potentiality and deprivation.” [Cibeli Borba Machado and Nathália Helena Fernandes Laffin, “The Theory of Formal Organization from the Perspective of Burrell and Morgan’s Paradigms.” International Journal of Advances in Management and Economics. Volume 3, issue 1, January–February 2014. Pages 200-207.]
          “Only a brief expose of the radical humanist paradigm is offered at this point to highlight the assumptions on which this critique is premised. The focus here is on the alienation that characterises industrial societies …. Individuals are endowed with unique self-consciousness, judgement, and free will, which enable them to create and interpret the essence of their existence …
          “The radical humanist, in seeking to free human consciousness from universal alienation, notes that everything exists in an antagonistic relationship to itself, and that analysing this dialectic tension will lead to a state of ‘absolute knowledge’ in which the human spirit achieves its ultimate freedom …. In this mission, the radical humanist researcher can call on critical theory, among others, to ‘recognise, anticipate, and counter those systematic, socially unnecessary distortions of communicative interaction that reproduce domination and so hold us subtly captive’ ….”
          [Ed Chung, Iris Jenkel, and Carolan McLarney, “Deconstructing paradise: Beneath the hegemonic illusions of harmony.” The International Journal of Sociology and Social Policy. Volume 21, number 7, 2001. Pages 9-25.]
          
          
          Diagram B
      27. culture industry (Theodor Adorno as pronounced in this MP3 audio file): The mass media (including capitalist advertisements and commercials) create a culture industry (popular culture or mass culture) of “false needs.”
          “The culture industry fuses the old and familiar into a new quality. In all its branches, products which are tailored for consumption by masses, and which to a great extent determine the nature of that consumption, are manufactured more or less according to plan. The individual branches are similar in structure or at least fit into each other, ordering themselves into a system almost without a gap. This is made possible by contemporary technical capabilities as well as by economic and administrative concentration. The culture industry intentionally integrates its consumers from above. To the detriment of both it forces together the spheres of high and low art, separated for thousands of years. The seriousness of high art is destroyed in speculation about its efficacy; the seriousness of the lower perishes with the civilizational constraints imposed on the rebellious resistance inherent within it as long as social control was not yet total. Thus, although the culture industry undeniably speculates on the conscious and unconscious state of the millions towards which it is directed, the masses are not primary, but secondary, they are an object of calculation; an appendage of the machinery. The customer is not king, as the culture industry would have us believe, not its subject but its object.” [Theodor Adorno. The Culture Industry: Selected essays on mass culture. J. M. Bernstein, editor. London and New York: Routledge imprint of Taylor & Francis Group, an Informa PLC business. 2005. Pages 98-99.]
          “In its inevitably globalized forms, the US culture industry continues to produce the deep divisions between local resistance and subaltern imitation so characteristic of colonial conflicts from the age of traditional imperialism to the neo-imperialisms of our postindustrial era. And the culture industry today does its work in ways that encompass a wide range of nominally different political positions, so that in many respects left, liberal, and conservative cultural works often achieve complementary, rather than contested, ends. In this respect, little has changed since [Max] Horkheimer and [Theodor] Adorno argued in 1944: ‘Even the aesthetic activities of political opposites are one in their enthusiastic obedience to the rhythm of the iron system’ ….” [John Carlos Rowe, “Culture, US Imperialism, and Globalization.” A Concise Companion to American Studies. John Carlos Rowe, editor. Malden, Massachusetts: Wiley-Blackwell. 2010. Pages 284-302.]
      28. dialectic of enlightenment (Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer): Conforming to that culture, by purchasing advertised products, supports capitalism. Enlightenment can free people from “false needs” of the culture industry.
          “The first essay, the theoretical basis of those which follow, seeks to gain greater understanding of the intertwinement of rationality and social reality, as well as of the intertwinement, inseparable from the former, of nature and the mastery of nature. The critique of enlightenment given in this section is intended to prepare a positive concept of enlightenment which liberates it from its entanglement in blind domination.” [Max Horkheimer and Theodor W. Adorno. Dialectic of Enlightenment: Philosophical Fragments. Edmund Jephcott, translator. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press. 2002. Page xviii.]
          “Since the Communist Party already exists within society, this means renouncing what we mean by practice. By practice we really mean that we’re serious about the idea that the world needs fundamental change. This has to show itself in both thought and action. The practical aspect lies in the notion of difference; the world has to become different. It is not as if we should do something other than thinking, but rather that we should think differently and act differently. Perhaps this practice really just expects us to kill ourselves? We probably have to start from the position of saying to ourselves that even if the party no longer exists, the fact that we are here still has a certain value.” [Max Horkheimer in Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer. Towards a New Manifesto. Rodney Livingstone, translator. London and New York: Verso imprint of New Left Books. 2011. Pages 78-79.]
          “[Theodor] Adorno develops his position … in The Dialectic of the Enlightenment, which serves an excellent introduction to Adorno’s work. Drawing on the work of Friedrich Nietzsche and Marxist thinkers such as Georg Lukács, Adorno promotes a critique of Marxism, which analyzes the relationship between enlightenment, myth, and the domination of nature. In responding to what he calls ‘the darkening of the world’ brought about by fascism, Stalinism, and the Holocaust, Adorno argues that the world has retreated into myth and barbarism, which is dialectically present in the ‘origin’ of modern society that begins with the Enlightenment. Here, it is the control and mastery of nature as part of the Enlightenment project that drives history rather than class conflict.” [Louise A. Hitchcock. Theory for Classics: A student’s guide. London and New York: Routledge imprint of Taylor & Francis Group, an Informa PLC business. 2007. Page 39.]
      29. negative dialectics (Theodor Adorno): Although the dialectic (contradiction) will always produce something (a synthesis), we need to be open to a variety of possibilities. In other words, the product (or synthesis) of the dialectic can sometimes be unfavorable or negative and not, as commonly understood, an improvement over previous conditions.
          “Negative Dialectics is a phrase that flouts tradition. As early as Plato, dialectics meant to achieve something positive by means of negation; the thought figure of a ‘negation of negation’ later became the succinct term. This book seeks to free dialectics from such affirmative traits without reducing its determinacy. The unfoldment of the paradoxical title is one of its aims.” [Theodor W. Adorno. Negative Dialectics. E. B. Ashton, translator. London and New York: Routledge imprint of Taylor & Francis Group, an Informa PLC business. 2004. Page xix.]
          “When [Theodor] Adorno decries that ‘Whoever believes in God, therefore cannot believe in God,’ the thinker is confronting the reality that after Auschwitz, any pretense at continuing the same metaphysical speculations removed from experience is inauthentic.… By daring to proffer a metaphysical atheism after such deicide [the killing of God], Adorno is opening a negative dialectic par excellence to explore anew the possibility of thinking, saying, and even praying after Auschwitz. Just as negative dialectics demands a deeper self-reflection through a thinking against thought, so too must there be a praying against prayer.” [Rabbi Aubrey L. Glazer. A New Physiognomy of Jewish Thinking: Critical Theory After Adorno as Applied to Jewish Thought. New York: Continuum International Publishing Group. 2011. Kindle edition.]
      30. aesthetic theory (Theodor Adorno): He develops a critical theory of art and aesthetics.
          “Immersion in art’s origins tantalizes aesthetic theory with various apparently typical procedures, but just as quickly they escape the firm grip that modem interpretational consciousness imagines it possesses. Art anterior to the Paleolithic period is not known. But it is doubtless that art did not begin with works, whether they were primarily magical or already aesthetic. The cave drawings are stages of a process and in no way an early one. The first images must have been preceded by a mimetic comportment—the assimilation of the self to its other—that does not fully coincide with the superstition of direct magical influence; if in fact no differentiation between magic and mimesis had been prepared over a long period of time, the striking traces of autonomous elaboration in the cave paintings would be inexplicable.” [Theodor Adorno. Aesthetic Theory. Robert Hullot-Kentor, translator. Gretel Adorno and Rolf Tiedemann, editors. London and New York: Continuum. 2002. Page 329.]
          “… what I would postulate is more dialectics. On the one hand, dialectical penetration of the ‘autonomous’ work of art which is transcended by its own technology into a planned work; on the other, an even stronger dialecticization of utilitarian art in its negativity, which indeed you [Walter Benjamin] do not mistake but which you designate by relatively abstract categories like ‘film capital’, without tracking it down to its ultimate lair, as immanent irrationality.” [Theodor Adorno, “Correspondence with Benjamin.” New Left Review. Series I, number 81, September–October 1973. Pages 55-80.]
          “In Aesthetic Theory, [Theodor] Adorno famously argues that contemporary artworks must negate their immediate sensuous tendencies in order to hold out the prospect of a utopia that resists pandering to the ‘system of illusions’ of capitalist consumerism and lapsing into premature reconciliation with the status quo. This entailed a special necessity to think art’s relation to critique and cognition, and to philosophy in particular. Thus Adorno defines the truth-content of artworks in terms of an ‘enigma’ awaiting resolution by philosophy.” [Austin Harrington, “New German aesthetic theory: Martin Seel’s art of diremption.” Radical Philosophy: Philosophical Journal of the Independent Left. Number 109, September/October 2001. Pages 6-13.]
          “Attempts by scholars of popular music and jazz to find fruitful ways to apply [Theodor] Adorno’s aesthetic theory to the most prominent forms of twentieth-century music now form a well-worn path. It is perhaps the case that his specific critiques of jazz and popular music are less of a stumbling block for attempting to find a redeeming aspect of the chord symbol than is a reading of his musical aesthetics which focuses on his espousal of atonality and harmonic dissonance as central to any kind of authentic musical experience in the era of the culture industry. Here I intend to contribute to that debate by interrogating the extent to which the central categories of Adorno’s modernism do in fact depend on such a focus, and hence to offer a rethinking of the chord symbol’s significance on this basis.” [Mark Abel, “Radical openness: Chord symbols, musical abstraction and modernism.” Radical Philosophy: Philosophical Journal of the Independent Left. Number 195, January/February 2016. Pages 25-37.]
          “It is arguably Aesthetic Theory, as the philosophical summation of [Theodor] Adorno’s writings on art, that remains his most living text. Its power lies not only in its theoretical generalization of the arts into a concept of art that is historically dynamic; its list of dialectical pairs is still useful for thinking about art today. Categories deployed in the ‘Adorno and Contemporary Art’ panel, with reference to experimental film and performance art, for instance, included technique/technology and construction/expression.” [Sebastian Truskolaski, Rose-Anne Gush, and Alex Fletcher, “From Berg to Beyoncé: Adorno and Politics: 1ˢᵗ Istanbul Critical Theory Conference, Boğaziçi University.” Radical Philosophy: Philosophical Journal of the Independent Left. Number 199, September/October 2016. Pages 65-67.]
      31. social function of philosophy (Max Horkheimer): To Horkheimer, philosophy reveals the contradictions embedded in human life.
          “The real social function of philosophy lies in its criticism of what is prevalent. That does not mean superficial fault-finding with individual ideas or conditions, as though a philosopher were a crank. Nor does it mean that the philosopher complains about this or that isolated condition and suggests remedies. The chief aim of such criticism is to prevent mankind from losing itself in those ideas and activities which the existing organization of society instills into its members. Man must be made to see the relationship between his activities and what is achieved thereby, between his particular existence and the general life of society, between his everyday projects and the great ideas which he acknowledges. Philosophy exposes the contradiction in which man is entangled in so far as he must attach himself to isolated ideas and concepts in everyday life.” [Max Horkheimer. Critical Theory: Selected Essays. Matthew J. O’Connell and others, translators. New York: The Continuum Publishing Company. 2002. Page 264-265.]
      32. ontogenetic machinery (Lorenz Engell as pronounced in this MP3 audio file): The article develops a theory of media and materiality.
          “Since reference and translation are in their turn based on material media, we might say that through media things cooperate in the production and reproduction of things. Specific media then could be seen as specific sets of material operations by which the things involved in one medium produce things, reflect and represent things, and reproduce themselves as material collectives. Hence, media function as operators by which the material world which surrounds us is generated in the first place. Media are ontogenetic machines. To put it simply, they are operative things that produce and assemble and reproduce things, including themselves.” [Lorenz Engell, “Ontogenetic machinery.” Radical Philosophy: Philosophical Journal of the Independent Left. Number 169, September/October 2011. Pages 10-12.]
      33. theory of cultural hegemony (Antonio Gramsci as pronounced in this MP3 audio file): Gramsci, though his examination of cultural hegemony (MP3 audio file), wanted to know why the revolutions Marx predicted never occurred. His conclusion was that the ruling class manipulates the culture, such as the mass media, in order to maintain their domination over society. As shown in the first quotation below, Italian Fascist dictator Benito Mussolini (MP3 audio file), 1883-1945—by imprisoning Antonio Gramsci—has continued to be respected by a number of far-right-wing intellectuals.
          “… Gramsci went home to lead the Italian Communist Party. Mussolini had another idea. He locked Gramsci up and lost the key. … Gramsci was finally freed, but died in 1937 at forty-six. But in his Prison Notebooks he left behind the blueprints for a successful Marxist revolution in the West. Our own cultural revolution could have come straight from its pages.” [Patrick J. Buchanan. The Death of the West: How Dying Populations and Immigrant Invasions Imperil Our Country and Civilization. New York: Thomas Dunne Books imprint of St. Martin’s Press, LLC. 2002. Page 76.]
          “At his [Antonio Gramsci’s] trial [in Fascist Italy], prosecutor Michele Isgrò [MP3 audio file] reportedly declared: ‘We must prevent this brain from functioning for 20 years.’” [Aurolyn Luykx, “Gramsci, Antonio (1891-1937).” Encyclopedia of Anthropology. H. James Birx, editor. Thousand Oaks, California: SAGE Publications, Inc. 2006. Pages 1108-1109.]
          “… it is incongruous that the concrete posing of the problem of hegemony should be interpreted as a fact subordinating the group seeking hegemony. Undoubtedly the fact of hegemony presupposes that account be taken of the interests and the tendencies of the groups over which hegemony is to be exercised, and that a certain compromise equilibrium should be formed—in other words, that the leading group should make sacrifices of an economic-corporate kind.” [Antonio Gramsci. Selections from the Prison Notebooks. Quintin Hoare and Geoffrey Nowell Smith, editors and translators. New York: International Publishers. 1971. Page 161.]
          “Comrades, history has never seen a dominant class, in its entirety, experiencing conditions of living inferior to those of certain elements and strata of the dominated and subjected class. This unprecedented contradiction has been reserved by history as the destiny of the proletariat. In this contradiction lie the greatest dangers for the dictatorship of the proletariat, especially in those countries where capitalism has not had any great development or succeeded in unifying the productive forces.…
          “Yet the proletariat cannot become the dominant class if it does not overcome this contradiction through the sacrifice of its corporate interests. It cannot maintain its hegemony and its dictatorship if, even when it has become dominant, it does not sacrifice these immediate interests for the general and permanent interests of the class. Certainly, it is easy to be demagogic in this sphere.… It is easy to be demagogic in this sphere, and it is hard not to be when the question has been posed in terms of corporate spirit and not in those of Leninism, the doctrine of the hegemony of the proletariat, which historically finds itself in one particular position and not in another.”
          [Antonio Gramsci. The Gramsci Reader: Selected Writings 1916-1935. New York: New York University Press. 2000. Pages 169-170.]
          “We are … dealing with an ideology, that is, with a practical instrument of government, and it will be necessary to make a study of the practical nexus upon which it is based. ‘Liberty’ as an historic concept is the very dialectic of history and has no practicing ‘representatives,’ distinct and individuated. History was liberty even under the oriental satrapies, since even there, there was historic ‘movement’ and those satrapies crumbled. In short, it appears to me that words change, the words are better put, but the surface of things has not been scratched.” [Antonio Gramsci, “Benedetto Croce and His Concept of Liberty.” Science & Society. Volume 10, number 3, summer 1946. Pages 283-292.]
          “Philosophers, political scientists, and sociologists have suggested that people with higher social class status dictate the normative way of being and thinking in a given culture. For instance, the influential theory of cultural hegemony proposed by Gramsci suggests that the ideas and practices of the middle class are seen by the working class as general cultural norms, thus maintaining the existing social order ….” [Igor Grossmann and Michael E. W. Varnum, “Social Class, Culture, and Cognition.” Social Psychological and Personality Science. Volume 2, number 1, 2011. Pages 81-89.]
          “Much of the research on the commercialization of hip-hop culture … draws insights from [Antonio] Gramsci’s … theory of cultural hegemony. Gramsci argues that class dominance is maintained through coercion, but also through consent of the masses. He thus acknowledges the active role of the subordinate group in the operation of power …. According to Gramsci, hegemony often exists because ‘those with power and wealth promote hegemonic ideologies that normalize the status quo’ …. Second, those in the subordinate class also promote the status quo by adhering willingly to the practices of the dominant group.” [Christopher Vito, “Who said hip-hop was dead? The politics of hip-hop culture in Immortal Technique’s lyrics.” International Journal of Cultural Studies. Volume 18, number 4, 2015. Pages 395-411.]
          “If [Antonio] Gramsci continuously stresses that the conception of the world which the majority of the population now have must be a starting point for the organic intellectuals of the working class, it is because the effect of its fragmentation, of its incoherence, of a whole list of negative characteristics, is to maintain the ‘simple’ in their subordinate position and to protect the dominance of the present ruling groups who have a hegemonic world view. This ideology is not accepted wholesale but is filtered down from on high through intermediaries to combine with a variety of elements to make up a common sense which holds the potential of the population in check. Thus the function of the present hegemony is to keep the ‘simple’ ignorant of their historical role, to maintain the split between leaders and led.” [Anne Showstack Sassoon. Gramsci and Contemporary Politics: Beyond pessimism of the intellect. London and New York: Routledge imprint of Taylor & Francis Group, an Informa PLC business. 2004. Page 40.]
          “[Antonio] Gramsci … reflects in his Prison Notebooks on the way in which ideology governs and controls political processes and thus, ultimately, also the organization of economic processes. Hegemony is the term Gramsci is best known for in the context of a critique of traditional, scientific, or orthodox Marxism. It is a concept which attempts to capture the complex nature of authority, which according to Gramsci is both coercive and dependent on the consent of those who are coerced into submission. Gramsci examines on many pages of his Prison Notebooks the way in which political society, or the realm of state power and authority, creates and maintains as well as manipulates systems of beliefs and attitudes in civil society; how the predominant class not only creates hegemony, but can also depend in its quest for power on the ‘spontaneous’ consent arising from the masses of the people.” [Renate Holub. Antonio Gramsci: Beyond Marxism and Postmodernism. London and New York: Routledge imprint of Taylor & Francis Group, an Informa PLC business. 2005. Page 43.]
          “We can now revert to [Antonio] Gramsci’s texts themselves. Throughout the Prison Notebooks, the term ‘hegemony’ recurs in a multitude of different contexts. Yet there is no doubt that Gramsci started from certain constant connotations of the concept, which he derived from the Comintern tradition.… Reflecting the experience of NEP [New Economic Policy], he laid a somewhat greater emphasis on the need for ‘concessions’ and ‘sacrifices’ by the proletariat to its allies for it to win hegemony over them, thereby extending the notion of ‘corporatism’ from a mere confinement to guild horizons or economic struggles, to any kind of ouvrierist isolation from the other exploited masses.” [Perry Anderson, “The Antinomies of Antonio Gramsci.” New Left Review. Series I, number 100, November–December 1976. Pages 5-78.]
          “No italian thinker enjoys a greater fame today than [Antonio] Gramsci. Alike, academic citations and internet references place him above Machiavelli. The bibliography of articles and books about him now runs to some 20,000 items. Amid this avalanche, is any compass possible? … The scale of this appropriation, in an epoch so unlike that in which Gramsci lived and thought, has owed much to two features of his legacy that set it apart from that of any other revolutionary of his time.
          “The first was its multi-dimensionality.…
          “The second magnetic attraction of this writing lay in its fragmentation. In prison, Gramsci’s notes were laconic, exploratory jottings for works he was never able to compose in freedom.”
          [Perry Anderson, “The Heirs of Gramsci.” New Left Review. Series II, number 100, July–August 2016. Pages 71-97.]
          “Two of [Antonio] Gramsci’s most relevant concepts—‘transformism’ and ‘Southernism’—have not attained the same currency as others. Both develop out of his theory of intellectuals, and therefore his commentary is, as it were, not only proleptically about the field of postcolonial studies but about the very process by which he has been assimilated into it. The terms refer, on the one hand, to a political syncretism—the joining of formerly hostile constituencies in which the left, in effect, becomes the right; on the other, to a political quietism purveyed by intellectuals whose authority is enhanced by claims to foreignness—to ‘transnational’ credentials that validate their consultative capacities in the imperial centers where they constitute an intellectual diaspora.” [Timothy Brennan, “Antonio Gramsci and Postcolonial Theory: ‘Southernism.’” Diaspora. Volume 10, issue 2, 2001. Pages 143-187.]
          “[Antonio] Gramsci’s approach to marxism was so novel that he has been called a neo-marxist. The novelty starts with his extremely rigorous methodological approach to the content of marxism, and not with the conclusions he reaches. Obviously, one of the greatest dangers in drawing inspiration or creed from a collection of writings is eclecticism. Marx’s writings as with those of the Bible, provide ammunition for God and the devil or, at least, have done so for a myriad of mutually contradictory schools of marxism, each claiming to find authority for its propositions in the work of the master. Such a situation immediately raises the question: What is marxism anyway? Gramsci’s method of deciding this question must be the starting point in any examination of his marxism. Without understanding his methodological approach to marxism we cannot understand fully some of his conclusions about what marxism is. Furthermore, if we do not agree with his methology then we cannot of course, agree with his conclusions.” [Alastair Davidson, “Gramsci’s Marxism.” Australian Left Review. Volume 1, issue 13, June–July 1968. Pages 42-51.]
          “[Antonio] Gramsci is certainly one of the most controversial authors of the politico-cultural tradition initiated by Marx. This mainly owes to the very nature of his written work as an early publicist and organiser of working-class culture. It is a work that encompasses newspaper articles and party documents and that was always open to debate, to discussion with the other side, to polemics. Even a considerable number of his letters were aimed at the goals of politico-cultural action, including his private correspondence. Gramsci thus always bore the profile of a politically revolutionary agent, the ‘communist man’ of the philosophy of praxis.” [Marcos Del Roio. The Prisms of Gramsci: The Political Formula of the United Front. Pedro Sette-Câmara, translator. Leiden, the Netherlands, and Boston, Massachusetts: Brill. 2016. Page 1.]
          “… [Antonio] Gramsci rejects the notion that power is something that can be achieved once and for all. Instead he conceives of it as an ongoing process, operative even at those moments when a ruling class or group can no longer generate consent. In the process, society becomes saturated with attempts to police the boundary between the desires of the dominant and the demands of the subjugated. Gramsci’s highly original understanding of power sees it as something actively lived by the oppressed as a form of common sense (hence my suggestion that you look at a discussion programme, a broadcast form in which common sense is central). As the British cultural theorist Raymond Williams notes, this was a huge advance on those critical positions that assumed that ideologies were simply false ideas imposed upon people.” [Steve Jones. Antonio Gramsci. London and New York: Routledge imprint of Taylor & Francis Group, an Informa PLC business. 2006. Page 4.]
      34. neo–Gramscianism as pronounced in this MP3 audio file (Robert W. Cox, Watcharabon Buddharaksa [Thai, วัชรพล พุทธรักษา, Wạchrphl Phuthṭhrạks̄ʹā as pronounced in this MP3 audio file], Christoph Scherrer as pronounced in this MP3 audio file, and others): Applies Antonio Gramsci’s critical theory to international relations.
          “There is a close connection between institutionalization and what [Antonio] Gramsci called hegemony. Institutions provide ways of dealing with conflicts so as to minimize the use of force. There is an enforcement potention in the material power relations underlying any structure, in that the strong can clobber the weak if they think it is necessary. But force will not have to be used in order to ensure the dominance of the strong to the extent that the weak accept the prevailing power relations as legitimate.” [Robert W. Cox, “Social Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond International Relations Theory.” Millennium – Journal of International Studies. Volume 10, June 1981. Pages 126-155.]
          “… this paper attempts to offer one of the fascinating approaches to contemporary political economy as an anti-Positivism that is a Neo-Gramscianism approach. This approach is a critical international relations and international political economy approach which based on the political theories of Antonio Gramsci, Italian political theorist and journalist. Gramscian approach to the study of social and political phenomena is widely use in various fields of study, for example, political theory, sociology, anthropology and philosophy. However, Neo-Gramscianism leading by [Robert W.] Cox is special reference to the field of International Relations and International Political Economy ….” [Watcharabon Buddharaksa. Positivism, Anti-Positivism and Neo-Gramscianism: RCAPS Working Paper No. 10-4. December, 2010. Page 4. Retrieved on September 7th, 2015.]
          “The paper introduces research on transatlantic relations done by neo-Gramscian authors. This research is distinctive by focusing on class in international relations and by using the concept of hegemony in a relational sense. Hegemony is leadership through the active consent of other classes and groups. A central question of this neo-Gramscian research is whether an international class of capitalists has emerged. Some authors have answered in the positive. This paper, however, maintains that hegemony in the international realm is still exercised by the American state, though its foreign economic policies have been greatly influenced by internationally-oriented corporations and that these actors have increasingly found allies among economic elites in other countries. The paper explores the relationship between hegemony by the American state and by internationally-oriented capital groups against the backdrop of transatlantic relations in the post-war period and the current debate on labor rights in international trade agreements.” [Christoph Scherrer. “‘Double Hegemony’? State and Class in American Foreign Economic Policymaking.” Amerikastudien. Volume 46, number 4, 2001. Pages 573-591.]
          “This chapter addresses how critical international theory has evolved over the years. By first assessing the ideas of Frankfurt School theorists, it critically examines how the School’s critiques of authoritarianism and repression have influenced the thinking of early and later critical International Relations (IR) theorists. In doing so, it maps the emergence and the features of the various strands of critical international theory, including normative and political economy theory. The former strand encompasses the many implications of developing and applying Habermas’s communicative action theory to IR. More importantly, it underscores an important distinction between critical international theory—which integrates and extends Frankfurt School critical theory concepts and ideas to the international level—and a critical theory of international relations that adopts a core set of themes and concepts derived from international institutional processes such as law, economy, and politics, to produce empirical knowledge of these processes. I shall argue that critical IR theorists have made important strides towards realizing and formulating the requirements for a critical theory of international relations.” [International Relations Theories: Discipline and Diversity. Third edition. Tim Dunne, Milja Kurki, and Steve Smith, editors. Oxford, England, and New York: Oxford University Press. 2010. Page 171.]
          “The neo-Gramscian approach in International Relations (IR) is one of the most interesting and challenging we have in IR theory. The (maybe provoking) hypothesis of this article is, that neo-Gramscian theorists have so far failed in developing an appropriate theoretical and ontological framework, which could be applied for empirical research. Influential neo-Gramscian thinkers like Robert W. Cox and Susan Strange, do not show their readers a way to apply their highly interesting work to empirical oriented research. To come up with a framework that could be applied to empirical research is the goal of this article.” [Ulrich Hamenstädt, “In the shadows of the dialectic method: Building a framework upon the thoughts of Adorno and Gramsci.” Spectrum Journal of Global Studies. Volume 6, number 1, May 2014. Pages 1-17.]
          “… I identify where and how giving in general and international aid in particular can be understood as both a mechanism of consent, compelling acquiescence of recipients to a material order of things, and a means of forging common identity and ideals among donors. This summarizes arguments that I have developed elsewhere at length and follows a ‘retroductive’ method of inquiry that is broadly consistent with a neo-Gramscian approach.” [Tomohisa Hattori, “Giving as a Mechanism of Consent: International Aid Organizations and the Ethical Hegemony of Capitalism.” International Relations. Volume 17, number 2, 2003. Pages 153-173.]
      35. neo–Gramscian theory of European integration (Henk Overbeek as pronounced in this MP3 audio file): He applies neo–Gramscianism (or transnational historical materialism) to European integration.
          “There is no comprehensive theory of European integration from the perspective of transnational historical materialism or ‘neo-Gramscianism.’ …
          “From a broadly conceived ‘neo-Gramscian’ perspective, countless contributions to an understanding of European integration in the 1980s and 1990s have appeared in the form of articles and conference papers.…
          “… the process of European integration must be situated in the context of transatlantic and transnational class formation, not as an autonomous process (as is so often the case in ‘mainstream’ theories of European integration). The foundation, development, and periodic extension of European integration are fundamentally moments of the expansion of the Lockean heartland. This process itself, although its rhythm is dictated up to a point by the dynamic of American capital, is contradictory. The transatlantic linkage therefore fundamentally influences European integration, but it is not simply subject to or deterrrlined by American control.”
          [Henk Overbeek, “Towards a Neo-Gramscian Theory of European Integration – The Example of the Tax Harmonisation Question.” Dimensions of a Critical Theory of European Integration. Hans-Jürgen Bieling and Jochen Steinhilber, editors. Marburg, Germany: Forschungsgruppe Europäische Gemeinschaften. 2000. Pages 59-81.]
      36. mechanisms of class accommodation (Luis M. Pozo as pronounced in this MP3 audio file): He develops an expansion of Antonio Gramsci’s theory of cultural hegemony.
          “This study is an investigation of the foundations of hegemony, drawing and expanding on [Antonio] Gramsci’s insight about the need for an ‘ethico-political’ principle such as the nation, linking dominant and subordinate to attain hegemony.…
          “… In this study, I undertake an investigation of the political/cultural foundations of hegemony—of the ideological and institutional preconditions for the legitimation of class rule. For that purpose, I introduce the notion of ‘mechanisms of class accommodation,’ which refers to the myths of community and inclusive (id)entities shaped by the systemic power of ruling classes. Aimed at de-classing social consciousness, preventing class unity and obscuring subordinate classes’ interest in an independent politics, the effect of these identities is to render the reality of class divisions politically irrelevant by stressing the allegedly fundamental, ‘organic’ unity of dominant and dominated.”
          [Luis M. Pozo, “The roots of hegemony: The mechanisms of class accommodation and the emergence of the nation-people.” Capital & Class. Volume 31, number 1, spring 2007. Pages 55-88.]
      37. critical international political economy or critical global political economy (Owen Worth, Ian Bruff, Daniela Tepe, Claes Axel Belfrage as pronounced in this MP3 audio file, and many others): This school of political science applies critical social theory to international political economy.
          “… we hope to make it clear that ‘critical IPE [international political economy]’ ‘should be viewed not as a singular but a collective and thus plural term, for although broadly committed to certain modes of [enquiring] into the world in which we live, [it] is defined by open and reflexive research’ …. Therefore, we seek to highlight the unifying moment among critical researchers, as well as the complex and diverse nature of such scholarship.” [Ian Bruff and Daniela Tepe, “What is critical IPE?” Journal of International Relations and Development. Volume 14, 2011. Pages 354-358.]
          “… in the light of recent debates on the validity of the ‘transnational divide’ within the wider IPE [international political economy] community …, we demonstrate through these contributions that the distinction between the ‘critical’ and the ‘orthodox’ (or ‘empirical’) is only significant if the ‘critical’ is geared towards a larger, more substantial body of critical social enquiry and engages with what it means to conduct such enquiry.” [Claes Belfrage and Owen Worth, “Introduction – Critical international political economy: Renewing critique and ontologies.” International Politics. Volume 49, number 2, March 2012. Pages 131-135.]
          “This article introduces Rosa Luxemburg’s work on dialectics and the international and argues that its ontological foundations have been neglected within critical International Political Economy (IPE). Whereas other critical Marxists such as [Antonio] Gramsci have played key roles in instigating critical enquiry, Luxemburg’s work has largely gone neglected. Although this article acknowledges some serious shortcomings in some of the ‘left infantilism’ inherent within her work, it nevertheless argues that Luxemburg’s dialectical ontology significantly contrasted with the orthodoxy that was emerging from Marxist circles at the time. This article explores some of these and argues that the dialectical method that Luxemburg employed to understanding the international provides us with a new avenue for critical IPE to pursue. In particular, it suggests that Luxemburg’s articulation of critique provides us with fresh openings that both compliment and add to neo-Gramscian and neo-Polanyian accounts, and allows us to understand trends and practices within the global political economy in new critical ways.” [Owen Worth, “Accumulating the critical spirit: Rosa Luxemburg and critical IPE.” Abstract. International Politics. Volume 49, number 2, March 2012. Pages 136-153.]
      38. aesthetic international political economy (Claes Axel Belfrage): He develops an aesthetic approach to international relations grounded in critical social theory.
          “Despite its epistemological roots in the work of [Karl] Marx and the Frankfurt School, critical IPE [international political economy] shuns taking an interest in aesthetics, too. It does so in two ways. First, in a gradual dilution of the core principles of Critical Theory, it has come to struggle to perform its nominal critical functions of critique, critical knowledge and emancipation implicit in the writings of Kant and Marx and central to the Frankfurt School of Critical Theory.…
          “Second, there is a widespread aversion within critical IPE, and critical scholarship more generally, to the aestheticisation of politics and political economy.…
          “… I want to outline briefly what engaging with the aesthetic in IPE, indeed an Aesthetic IPE, can bring and should involve at this historical conjuncture of deep capitalist ‘cultification.’ To pursue such a programme, aesthetics must be approached differently than in the orthodoxy’s Kantian imaginary, and accept a greater degree of aestheticisation of IPE itself than what critical IPE has tended to allow for. And, it starts with ontology.”
          [Claes Belfrage, “Facing up to financialisation and the aesthetic economy: high time for aesthetics in international political economy!” Journal of International Relations and Development. Volume 14, number 3, July 2011. Pages 383-391.]
      39. dialectics of rape (Angela Y. Davis): The ideological support for rapes of Black women is associated with the portrayal of Black men as the rapists of white women.
          “The rape of the black woman and its ideological justification are integrally linked to the portrayal of the black man as a bestial rapist of white women—and, of course, the castration and lynching of black men on the basis of such accusations. Struggle against the sexual abuse of black women has demanded at the same time struggle against the cruel manipulation of sexual accusations against black men. Black women, therefore, have played a vanguard role, not only in the fight against rape, but also in the movement to end lynching.
          “For black women, rape perpetrated by white men, like the social stereotype of black men as rapists, must be classed among the brutal paraphernalia of racism.
          “Whenever a campaign is erected around a black woman who has been raped by a white man, therefore, the content of the campaign must be explicitly antiracist. And, as incorrect as it would be to fail to attack racism, it would be equally incorrect to make light of the antisexist content of the movement. Racism and male supremacy have to be projected in their dialectical unity. In the case of the raped black woman, they are mutually reinforcive.”
          [Angela Davis, “Joan Little: The Dialectics of Rape.” Ms. Magazine. Volume 12, number 2, spring 2002 (reprinted from 1975). Pages 37-40.]
      40. prison industrial complex (Angela Y. Davis): The examines the complex set of relations which link together various social institutions.
          “The exploitation of prison labor by private corporations is one aspect among an array of relationships linking corporations, government, correctional communities, and media. These relationships constitute what we now call a prison industrial complex. The term ‘prison industrial complex’ was introduced by activists and scholars to contest prevailing beliefs that increased levels of crime were the root cause of mounting prison populations. Instead, they argued, prison construction and the attendant drive to fi ll these new structures with human bodies have been driven by ideologies of racism and the pursuit of profit. Social historian Mike Davis first used the term in relation to California’s penal system, which, he observed, already had begun in the 1990s to rival agribusiness and land development as a major economic and political force.” [Angela Y. Davis, “The Prison Industrial Complex.” The Feminist Philosophy Reader. Alison Bailey and Chris Cuomo, editors. New York: McGraw-Hill imprint of The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc. 2008. Pages 412-421.]
      41. mechanical reproduction (Walter Bendix Schönflies Benjamin as pronounced in this MP3 audio file): Benjamin’s critical social theory, which included an approach to art, was influenced by the Jewish Kabbalah (Hebrew/ʿIḇəriyṯ, הָקַבָּלָה, hā-Qạbbālāh, “the receiving”).
          “Even the most perfect reproduction of a work of art is lacking in one element: its presence in time and space, its unique existence at the place where it happens to be. This unique existence of the work of art determined the history to which it was subject throughout the time of its existence. This includes the changes which it may have suffered in physical condition over the years as well as the various changes in its ownership.” [Walter Benjamin. Illuminations. Harry Zohn, translator. New York: Schoken Books. 1968. Page 220.]
          “Since you [Gerhard/Gershom Scholem] are finally attempting to clarify the relationship between your graduation and the Kabbalah, I will make the following pronouncement: I will claim to be a great kabbalist if you do not get your doctorate summa cum laude.” [Walter Benjamin. The Correspondence of Walter Benjamin: 1910-1940. Gershom Sholem and Theodor W. Adorno, translators and annotators. Chicago, Illinois: The University of Chicago Press. 1994. Page 166.]
          “What impressed [Walter] Benjamin about the Kabbalah was that all creation is a variation of … [the] primordial Torah, i.e., divine language. According to this conception, language is the ‘mental entity’ of not only human beings but all creation.” [James McBride, “Marooned in the Realm of the Profane: Walter Benjamin’s Synthesis of Kabbalah and Communism.” Journal of the American Academy of Religion. Volume 57, number 2, summer 1989. Pages 241-266.]
          “The critical theorist Walter Benjamin once noted that ‘the past can be seized only as an image which flashes up at the instant when it can be recognized and is never seen again’ …. The past, in other words, is not accessible to us as stories with their meanings already intact but as fleeting ‘images’ to be deciphered. Benjamin reminds us that meaning doesn’t simply emanate from random events; rather, it is the historian who not only assigns order and coherence to events but also renders them significant, or not. Because the meaning of these images from the past is not transparent or selfevident, reading history, then, requires something extra-historical: a politics or an ethics. But Benjamin’s insight suggests something else at least as important: We have no access to the past that is unmediated.” [Jeffrey Nealon and Susan Searls Giroux. The Theory Toolbox: Critical Concepts for the Humanities, Arts, and Social Sciences. Second edition. Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc. 2012. Page 108.]
      42. surrealism as pronounced in this MP3 audio file (André Breton as pronounced in this MP3 audio file and many others): A Marxian-inspired artform.
          “The case against the realistic attitude demands to be examined, following the case against the materialistic attitude. The latter, more poetic in fact than the former, admittedly implies on the part of man a kind of monstrous pride which, admittedly, is monstrous, but not a new and more complete decay. It should above all be viewed as a welcome reaction against certain ridiculous tendencies of spiritualism. Finally, it is not incompatible with a certain nobility of thought.” [André Breton. First Manifesto of Surrealism. 1924.]
          “We … dwelt at some length on this matter [communist opposition] in order to demonstrate that, if Surrealism considers itself ineluctably linked, because of certain affinities I have indicated, to the movement of Marxist thought and to that movement alone, it refuses and will no doubt long refuse to choose between the two very broad currents which, at the present time, pit against one another men who, although they may differ as to tactics, have nonetheless proved themselves to be out and out revolutionaries.” [André Breton, “Second Manifesto of Surrealism (1930).” Manifestos of Surrealism. Richard Seaver and Helen R. Lane, translators. Ann Arbor, Michigan: Ann Arbor Paperbacks imprint of University of Michigan Press. 1969. Pages 149-150.]
          “We are the revolt of the spirit; we believe that bloody revolution is the inevitable vengeance of a spirit humiliated by your doings. We are not utopians; we can conceive this revolution only as a social form. If anywhere there are men who have seen a coalition form against them (traitors to everything that is not freedom, rebels of every sort, prisoners of common law), let them never forget that the idea of revolution is the best and most effective safeguard of the individual.” [The Surrealist Group. “Revolution Now and Forever! (1925)” Art and Social Change: A Critical Reader. Will Bradley and Charles Esche, editors. London: Tate Publishing. 2007. Page 93.]
          “Revolutionary aspiration is at the very source of Surrealism—it is not by accident that one of the movement’s first collective texts, written in 1925, is called ‘Revolution Now and Forever.’ In that same year the desire to break with Western civilization led [André] Breton to investigate the ideas of the October Revolution, especially Trotsky’s essay on Lenin. Though he joined the French Communist Party in 1927, he refused to give up, as he explains in Daybreak, his ’critical faculties.’
          “In the Second Manifesto of Surrealism of 1930, Andre Breton summed up all the conclusions of that action, affirming ‘totally, unreservedly, our adhesion to the principle of historical materialism.’”
          [Michael Löwy. Morning Star: surrealism, marxism, anarchism, situationism, utopia. Austin, Texas: University of Texas Press. 2009. Kindle edition.]
          “Surrealism adapted [Sigmund] Freud’s therapeutic technique of free association to develop its two signature artistic procedures: automatic writing (a stream of consciousness flow of words, thoughts, and ideas written down without regard for syntax or sense) and collage (random combinations of images and materials). German cultural critic, Walter Benjamin, writing in 1929, described the often quite provocative results of these techniques as inspiring a ‘profane illumination.’ Virtually every medium of art experimented with Surrealist techniques during the movement’s heyday, leading to the production of several memorable works, with the exception of music which never found a way of accommodating itself to its emphasis on chance and randomness.
          “In literature, Surrealism yielded Louis Aragon’s Paris Peasant … and André Breton’s Nadja …; in cinema it was … [Luis] Buñuel who led the way, but even Alfred Hitchcock experimented with Surrealism (he hired [Salvador] Dalí to design a dream sequence for his 1945 Ingrid Bergman and Gregory Peck feature, Spellbound); in photography it was Man Ray, Lee Miller (Man Ray’s model and muse), Eugène Atget, and Max Ernst who set the standard; in the visual arts it was undoubtedly Dalí who captured the limelight, but no less important were René Magritte, André Masson, Joan Miró, and Yves Tanguy; in the plastic arts, it was Marcel Duchamp who created the best-known works; while in theatre it was undoubtedly Antonin Artaud who was the most notorious, though he later denounced Surrealism (itself a very Surrealist thing to do, judging by the frequency of the denunciations and expulsions the group experienced).
          “Surrealism was a direct influence on three major figures in critical theory: Georges Bataille, Henri Lefebvre, and Jacques Lacan; and a distant, but not insignificant influence on Jean Baudrillard and Guy Debord.”
          [Ian Buchanan. A Dictionary of Critical Theory. Oxford, England, and New York: Oxford University Press. 2010. Pages 259-260.]
          “… [Walter] Benjamin appropriates the vocabulary from surrealism’s utopian representations of individual and social transfiguration, and we will soon explore their details. For the moment, however, I am rather interested in a second issues informing Benjamin’s interest in awakening. Benjamin’s suggestion of critique as awakening is a consequence of his representation of the products of the superstructure as dream: awakening is the dream’s binary opposition within traditional epistemological discourse.” [Margaret Cohen. Profane Illumination: Walter Benjamin and the Paris of Surrealist Revolution. Berkeley, California: University of California Press. 1993. Page 52.]
          “Surrealism was a literary and artistic movement originating in Paris in the early 1920s. It rejected social, moral, and logical conventions and sought to revolutionize art, literature, and life in the name of freedom, desire, and revolt. It emerged from the social upheaval of post–First World War Europe (the term was invented by [Guillaume] Apollinaire in 1917) and more especially from Dadaism, founded in Zurich in 1915, which rejected traditional Western values and promoted the irrational and the absurd through a series of ‘antiartistic’ events based on provocation and profanation.…
          “Surrealist theoretical declarations can appear paradoxical, contradictory, and diverse. The surrealists rejected the notion of a school with a fixed body of doctrine. Surrealism was considered as an open quest continuously redefining itself in terms of a project ….”
          [Elza Adamowicz, “Surrealism.” Encyclopedia of Modern French Thought. Christopher John Murray, editor. London and New York: Fitzroy Dearborn imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an Informa PLC business. 2005. Pages 612-615.]
          “Publishing this Surrealist address, neither the editorial team nor the revolutionaries imagined that a much more important confrontation was approaching. The roots of this new conflict were to be found beyond the walls of the strike. The causes of these further events lay, perhaps, beyond Poland’s borders. At the time Solidarity was founded, Poland was still Communist, still part of a great empire, where words like ‘strike’ didn’t even exist in a practical sense.” Lives of the Orange Men: A Biographical History of the Polish Orange Alternative Movement. Creative Commons. Brooklyn, New York: Minor Compositions imprint of Autonomedia. 2014. Page 75.]
      43. critical pragmatism (Allison Kadlec, Clancy Smith, Werner Ulrich as pronounced in this MP3 audio file, and others): This perspective combines critical social theory with the philosophy of pragmatism (that the value of an idea or a proposition is based upon its practical, real-life consequences).
          “This paper joins a broad discussion of the relationship between John Dewey’s pragmatism and the tradition of critical theory. In general terms, the historical relationship between pragmatism and critical theory is one in which the antifoundational and practice-oriented dimensions of pragmatism appear to exist in tension, if not outright conflict, with the emancipatory commitments of critical theory’s neo-Marxist legacy While Deweyan pragmatism is most often understood in its deliberative, experimental, open-ended, and contextual dimensions, little attention has been paid to the critical dimensions of Dewey’s thought. In what follows, I take initial steps in recovering the critical features of Dewey’s pragmatism by developing an analysis along two lines. First, I sketch the general contours of the relationship between pragmatism and critical theory in order to account for and unpack the long-standing hostility of critical theorists toward pragmatism. Second, I argue that these hostilities are unwarranted, and that they have been passed to us in the form of a persistent inability of critical theorists to appreciate the more radical features of Dewey’s pragmatism. In contrast to the prevailing characterizations of pragmatism, I argue that the philosophical underpinnings of Dewey’s pragmatism form the core of an enterprise which is both antifoundational and critical. Moreover, I hope that this effort will open avenues of inquiry into what might be called a model of ‘critical pragmatism.’” [Allison Kadlec, “Reconstructing Dewey: the philosophy of critical pragmatism.” Polity. Volume 38, number 4 October 2006. Pages 519-542.]
          “In my view, ‘critical pragmatism’ shares with other critical theories the belief that genuine critical reflection and action must be morally calibrated and that we must appeal to principles of justice that can inform our critical capacities. Further, … I contend that Deweyan pragmatism is both ‘hermeneutically suspicious’ and geared toward viewing social inequalities as manifestations of power. While I believe that Deweyan pragmatism is up to the challenges that attend this definition of ‘critical,’ I eschew the idea that normative principles must be timeless truths anchored by a fixed Archimedean point or foundation. In contrast to mainstream views of critical theory, critical pragmatism insists that normative principles need not, in fact must not, be static entities or things of any kind.” [Allison Kadlec, “Critical Pragmatism and Deliberative Democracy.” Theoria: A Journal of Social and Political Theory. Number 117, December 2008. Pages 43-80.]
          “… after having enumerated the basic methods by which advanced industrial societies effectively control and stagnate individual human development in Marcuse, and some moral implications of this stagnation in [Theodor] Adorno, I suggest that a certain type of critical pragmatism (a distinction rarely, if ever, made within the tradition itself) can be seen to reflect the type of unconstrained, free, open-ended development that the critical theorists would champion. Left uncriticized, however, pragmatic social development, like the one-dimensional citizens in [Herbert] Marcuse’s one-dimensional society, are left unaware that what appears to be free, open-ended development is actually only ever within the constraints of a totalitarian system of domination. Thus, as much as pragmatism might be able to help articulate the social psychology of human development that critical theorists would champion, it can only do so after that very critical theory is applied to their methodology of development to begin with, effectively purifying it from its naïveté.” [Clancy Smith, “A Critical Pragmatism: Marcuse, Adorno, and Peirce on the Artificial Stagnation of Individual and Social Development in Advanced Industrial Societies.” Kritike. Volume 3, number 2, December 2009. Pages 30-52.]
          “Critical pragmatism as I understand it combines classical pragmatist conceptions of inquiry, meaning, and truth with the critical turn of our notions of rational discourse and professional competence that is at the heart of my work on critical systems heuristics and boundary critique.” [W. Ulrich, “Philosophy for professionals: towards critical pragmatism.” The Journal of the Operational Research Society. Volume 58, number 8, August 2007. Pages 1109-1113.]
      44. neopragmatism (Richard Rorty): He develops a anti-essentialist approach to the philosophy of pragmatism.
          “There is the Wittgensteinian way which I think is continued in [Donald] Davidson and [Robert] Brandom and, to some extent, [Hilary] Putnam—the people I like to lump Together as Neopragmatists. That way of thinking about language doesn’t treat language as anything special, or as a new topic for philosophical inquiry.” [Richard Rorty, “Worlds or Words Apart? The Consequences of Pragmatism for Literary Studies: An Interview with Richard Rorty.” Philosophy and Literature. Supplement 1, volume 26, number 2, October 2002. Pages 369-398.]
          “To my pragmatic mind, part of … the disposable residue is the Socratic habit of asking ‘in virtue of what is a particular instance an example of piety, justice, etc.?’ I had thought [John] Dewey taught us to reject such essentialist questions, and to replace them with questions about what concrete alternatives to a putative instance of piety or justice are available in the situation at hand.” [Richard Rorty, “Thugs and Theorists: A Reply to Bernstein.” Political Theory. Volume 15, number 4, November 1987. Pages 564-580.]
          “My first characterization of pragmatism is that it is simply anti-essentialism applied to notions like ‘truth,’ ‘knowledge,’ ‘language,’ ‘morality,’ and similar objects of philosophical theorizing. Let me illustrate this by [William] James’ definition of ‘the true’ as ‘what is good in the way of belief.’ This has struck his critics as not to the point, as unphilosophical, as like the suggestion that the essence of aspirin is that it is good for headaches. James’ point, however, was that there is nothing deeper to be said: truth is not the sort of thing which has an essence. More specifically, his point was that it is no use being told that truth is ‘correspondence to reality.’” [Richard Rorty, “Pragmatism, Relativism, and Irrationalism.” Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association. Volume 53, number 6, August 1980. Pages 719-738.]
      45. pragmatist feminism (Richard Rorty): He proposes a neopragmatist approach to feminism.
          “I want now to enlarge on my claim that a pragmatist feminist will see herself as helping to create women rather than attempting to describe them more accurately. I shall do so by taking up two objections which might be made to what I have been saying. The first is the familiar charge that pragmatism is inherently conservative, biased in favour of the status quo. The second objection arises from the fact that if you say that women need to be created rather than simply freed, you seem to be saying that in some sense women do not now fully exist. But then there seems no basis for saying that men have done women wrong, since you cannot wrong the nonexistent.” [Richard Rorty, “Feminism and Pragmatism.” Radical Philosophy. Number 59, autumn 1991. Pages 3-14.]
      46. radical pragmatism (Jessica T. Wahman): She examines a pragmatic approach to education dedicated to challenging and combatting existing oppressive structures.
          “There have been rumblings of late that the pragmatic method, despite its many benefits, is not capable of effecting truly radical social change. We hear that pragmatism’s emphases on deliberation and problem solving render it too inefficient to combat existing and concrete structures of oppression.…
          “… It is a direct challenge to the existing system that relegates the technologically uninitiated poor to a condition of serfdom, and as such it is a both radical and ameliorative activity. Radical pragmatism gets at the root cause, and it devises means of changing an oppressive system for the better.”
          [Jessica T. Wahman, “‘Fleshing Out Consensus’: Radical Pragmatism, Civil Rights, and the Algebra Project.” Education and Culture. Volume 25, number 1, spring 2009. Pages 7-16.]
      47. revolutionary pragmatism (Harry Harding and Maxine Molyneux): They explore pragmatic approaches in, respectively, Mainland China and Nicaragua.
          “To see 1970 as the ‘end’ of the Cultural Revolution, or as a repudiation of it, would be a seri- ous exaggeration. 1970 was not 1967, but neither was it 1962. It represented, instead, an emerging synthesis of idealism and realism—the creation of a revolutionary pragmatism ….
          “The reopening of Tsinghua University—China’s leading institution of science and technology—also reflected revolutionary pragmatism, by combining relative lenience toward intellectuals, a fairly strict policy toward Red Guards and students, and continued insistence on a more egalitarian and politicized program of education.…
          “… As in the other policy areas, revolutionary pragmatism in education has created serious social tensions.…
          “In this discussion of the major trends of 1970, we have argued that China has embarked on a series of policies which, collectively, can be labelled ‘revolutionary pragmatism.’”
          [Harry Harding, “China: Toward Revolutionary Pragmatism.” Asian Survey. Volume 11, number 1, January 1971. Pages 51-67.]
          “[Nicaraguan President Daniel] Ortega is a man who lives the war every day, and his off-the-cuff remarks reflect a pragmatic, political attitude towards what he sees, above all, as an issue of national interest.…
          “It is therefore to under-estimate the entrenched nature of women’s subordination to suggest that a programme of emancipation can be decreed and implemented immediately in any society. Revolutions can accelerate the rate of change and strike at established practices. All such changes involve struggle but they still take place within the constraints of opposition and support existing in their societies.”
          [Maxine Molyneux, “The Politics of Abortion in Nicaragua: Revolutionary Pragmatism, or Feminism in the Realm of Necessity?” Feminist Review. Number 29, summer 1988. Pages 114-132.]
      48. critical ethnomethodology (Alec McHoul): Applies critical social theory to ethnomethodology.
          “Even within ethnomethodology, a field allied with conversation analysis, scholars have realized the shortcomings of analyzing the lifeworld and conversations and neglecting to attend to the long-range effects. Some of these therefore called for a critical ethnomethodology, that is, a marriage between the field and (neo-) Marxist approaches …. The German critical psychologist Klaus Holzkamp … also made salient the problems inherent in analyzing the lifeworld alone.…
          “I want to propose a slight shift in the paradigm of ethnomethodology (EM) towards an area which is often referred to as ‘critique.’
          “For now, the term ‘critique’ is, in [Harold] Garfinkel’s technical sense, tendentious. That is: its ‘meaning’ cannot be stipulated in advance of the work it does within the paper. ‘Tendentiousness’ implies that you/I find out (and can only find out) what it means as you/I go along.”
          [Alec McHoul, “Towards a Critical Ethnomethodology.” Theory, Culture & Society. Volume 11, number 4, November 1994. Pages 105-126.]
          “Ethnomethodological studies analyze everyday activities as members’ methods of making those same activities visibly-rational-and-reportable-for-all-practical-purposes, i.e., ‘accountable,’ as organizations of commonplace everyday activities. The reflexivity of that phenomenon is a singular feature of practical actions, of practical circumstances, of common sense knowledge of social structures, and of practical sociological reasoning. By permitting us to. locate and examine their occurrence the reflexivity of that phenomenon establishes their study.” [Harold Garfinkel. Studies in Ethnomethodology. Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc. 1967. Page vii.]
          “… Garfinkel was intolerant of pseudo-studies, studies that just detail generalities. That is when one has a favorite generality and examines some ‘data’ in order to collect everything that demonstrates the veracity of the generality, ignoring (or never noticing) the rest. When it is done properly, social phenomenological analysis does not proceed by imagining illustrations, but by abandoning one’s truth habits and letting the local affairs carry oneself away with its own temporality. This is truly the phenomenological way to undertake research. Studies of jazz musicians that include no jazz music, studies of jurors where no legal matters are being addressed, and studies of science whose principal investigators never enter an operating laboratory are all varieties of pseudo-studies.” [Kenneth Liberman. More Studies in Ethnomethodology. Albany, New York: State University of New York Press. 2013. Pages 6-7.]
      49. dialectical evolutionism (Göran Therborn as pronounced in this MP3 audio file): He discusses the “transformation to post-capitalism.”
          “For those of us interested in, and committed to, radical social transformations, systemic evolutionism is a very important strategic as well as analytical instrument. It lifts our eyes from the outrageousness of the situation and the evil of the enemy to the bases of his power. Dialectical evolutionism is not liberal progressivism turned upside down, interested only in swelling indignation at human misery. The possibilities of social transformation are not decided only—or even primarily—by indignation, but by a successful handling of the available levers of change and an effective neutralization of its obstacles.… A transformation to post-capitalism will require a systemic weakening of the power of financial and computer-guided capital—from algorithmic stock trading to Uber capitalism, in which the producers are turned into self-employed ‘entrepreneurs’—and the coalescence of new as well as old forces of opposition.” [Göran Therborn, “An Age of Progress?” New Left Review. Series II, number 99, May–June 2016. Pages 27-37.]
      50. Grand Dialectic and Little Dialectic (Göran Therborn): He considers these twin dialectics of the twentieth century.
          “There are, then, lasting progressive achievements from the 20ᵗʰ century. But the defeats of the left as that century drew to a close must also be understood. The dominant Euro-American school of thought cannot explain why this capitalist counter-revolution proved to be so successful. Marx had predicted a clash between forces and relations of production—one increasingly social in character, the other private and capitalist—that would sharpen over time. This was the Marxian Grand Dialectic and, shorn of its apocalyptic trappings, it was vindicated by the passage of time.…
          “The Grand Dialectic had been suspended, even reversed. The triumph of neoliberalism was not simply a question of ideology; as Marxists should anticipate, it had a firm material basis.…
          “Alongside the Grand Dialectic we can speak of a Little Dialectic, which envisaged capitalist development generating working-class strength and opposition to capital. This, too, went into retreat as the rich countries began to de-industrialize. Here we must recognize a structural transformation of epochal importance, reducing the weight of industry in developed capitalism, which began just before the peak of working-class power.”
          [Göran Therborn, “Class in the 21ˢᵗ Century.” New Left Review. Series II, number 78, November–December 2012. Pages 5-29.]
      51. moral materialism (Ashish Dalela [Hindī, आशीष दलेला, Āśīṣa Dalelā as pronounced in this MP3 audio file): Dalela presents an approach which, he says, can be used to develop “a mathematical theory of ethical naturalism.”
          “… there is a true theory that governs nature, and there are observer specific theories of nature which materially exist although they may be false. The evolution of nature is governed by the true theory of nature and the evolution of the observer depends on their individual theories about nature. In effect, different initial conditions for observers create different trajectories. These observer trajectories are different from object trajectories; both object and observer trajectories are determined but they require different kinds of descriptions. In particular, the observer trajectory is a moral theory of the observer while the object trajectory is the material theory of objects. Objects and observers both exist in nature, but they are different kinds of matter: the observer is the theory about objects, which can potentially be incorrect. Questions of morality can thus be tackled in science by bringing theories which are presently in the Platonic world into the real world. The evolution of observers (as different from the evolution of objects) can thus be viewed as the theory of moral consequence and responsibility that arises from the discrepancy between reality and its theories. Morally correct action is that which follows a true theory of nature.
          “While a mathematical theory of ethical naturalism is outside the scope of the current work, Moral Materialism sets up insights that can be used to develop such a theory in the future. This allows us to see how ideas about morality could be understood in a scientific theory that describes material objects as symbols of meaning.”
          [Ashish Dalela. Moral Materialism: A Semantic Theory of Ethical Naturalism. Bangalore, India: Shabda Press. 2015. Kindle edition.]
      52. semantic interpretation of quantum theory (Ashish Dalela): Dalela explores a symbolic approach to quantum theory.
          “If reality is symbolic, then the space in which it exists is semantic. That is, different locations in space represent different meanings. In a semantic space, all changes must be discrete because knowledge always evolves discretely. If the space-time in which matter exists and evolves is semantic, then change must be described as the evolution of knowledge. Particles in classical physics are physically distinct and this distinctness is known by their unique locations, although they are of the same type— i.e. they are all particles. In a semantic space, distinct locations in space don’t just indicate a physically distinct object but also a conceptually distinct type of object. Thus, there are many identical particles in classical space, but no particle or symbol can be identical in semantic space because all locations identify different types of meanings.” [Ashish Dalela. Quantum Meaning: A Semantic Interpretation of Quantum Theory. Bangalore, India: Shabda Press. 2014. Pages 26.]
      53. dialectics of modernity (Göran Therborn): He examines the complex relations between Marxism and modernity.
          “Marxism is nevertheless the major manifestation of the dialectics of modernity, in a sociological as well as theoretical sense. As a social force, Marxism was a legitimate offspring of modern capitalism and Enlightenment culture.…
          “… The Marxist tradition has therefore tended to drift from one characterisation to another in its practice of the dialectics of modernity.…
          “While twentieth-century Marxism is infinitely richer and broader than the tiny Western intellectual coterie of critical theory, it might be argued that, for all its limitations, critical theory has been the grandchild of [Karl] Marx that most explicitly, and persistently expressed an aspect of the historical quintessence of Marxism—its reflection on the dialectics of modernity.…
          “… Marxism acquired its very special historical importance by becoming, from the 1880s till the 1970s, the main intellectual culture of two major social movements of the dialectics of modernity: the labour movement and the anti-colonial movement.…
          “… The whole issue of the dialectics of modernity, and its class dialectic in particular, was less significant in the Americas and in Oceania.”
          [Göran Therborn, “Dialectics of Modernity: On Critical Theory and the Legacy of Twentieth-Century Marxism.” New Left Review. Series I, number 215, January–February 1996. Pages 59-81.]
          “… it [Marxism] was a dialectical conception of modernity, seen as inherently contradictory. The modernity of capitalism and of the bourgeoisie was hailed, but at the same time attacked as exploitative and alienating. This dialectical understanding of modernity was, in a sense, the very core of Marxian thought. It affirmed the progressive nature of capitalism, of the bourgeoisie, even of capitalist imperialist rule (in ways that many would now find insensitive to the victims of colonialism), while at the same time not only denouncing them, but organizing the resistance against them.” [Göran Therborn, “After Dialectics.” New Left Review. Series II, number 43, January–February 2007. Pages 63-114.]
      54. radical Bohmian dialogue (Chris Francovich): He develops an approach to dialogue informed by philosopher and sociologist George Herbert Mead and by physicist and philosopher David Bohm.
          “My argument, building on the work of George Herbert Mead, and then extending Mead’s work to the dialogic thinking of David Bohm, is that selves are themselves a dialogic tangle of perspectives emerging from a pluralistic universe of perspectives.…
          “My general theoretical claim is that much as it is believed that reflective thought arises through the inhibition of unproblematic activity …, a technique such as this variation of Bohmian dialogue is an ‘inhibition of the inhibition’ effected through proprioceptive suspension. These built up inhibitions are understood here as habitual and patterned modes of knowing and thinking that are normatively sensible (even required) and always retrospectively unproblematic. [David] Bohm sees this field or domain of the social self and its knowledge of the world as quite problematic.… Thought has become uncoupled from the body and we tend to live almost wholly within the flow of its representations (the Kantian imaginizing of perception …) with our bodies’ behaving unconsciously according to the social forces at play.… It is disturbing and/or it can open us up to a different way of experiencing the other through a re-patterning of thinking (i.e., changing neurological structures) that may be associated with the breakdown of prejudicial and overlearned perceptions and judgments.…
          “David Bohm (1917-1992) was a theoretical physicist and philosopher who argued for an alternative view of the cosmos predicated on a non-canonical view of quantum physics insisting on an unbroken wholeness, or an ‘implicate order,’ that subtends manifestation and the ‘explicate order’ ….”
          [Chris Francovich, “A Meadian Approach to Radical Bohmian Dialogue.” Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour. Early–view edition. June, 2016. Pages 1-31.]
          “As a practice dialogue is meant to cultivate communication skills based initially on enhanced awareness of one’s own behavior and effect on others. This type of self-awareness is, following [David] Bohm, primarily cultivated through the dialogic principle of ‘suspension.’ Suspension involves the intentional bracketing of affective responses to verbal/social stimulus in a dialogue group setting.…
          “Suspension is understood here as a self-reflective technique used to isolate and identify habitual responses to ordinary speech. The question to answer in terms of using this technique in dialogue is: Why do I need to not present to the ‘other’ in the dialogue circle my natural or habitual responses?”
          [Chris Francovich, “Developing Proprioceptive Body Awareness in a Dialogue Circle.” The International Journal of Interdisciplinary Social and Community Studies. Volume 7, issue 1, 2013. Pages 13-23.]
          “The power of the organizational culture model is its ability to make cultural differences explicit, show opportunities for better information exchange and feedback, and open a dialogue between and among the members of different cultures.” [C. Scott Smith, Chris Francovich, and Janet Gieselman, “Pilot Test of an Organizational Culture Model in a Medical Setting.” Health Care Manager. Volume 19, number 2, December 2000. Pages 68-77.]
          “Language is part of social behavior. There is an indefinite number of signs or symbols which may serve the purpose of what we term ‘language.’ We are reading the meaning of the conduct of other people when, perhaps, they are not aware of it. There is something that reveals to us what the purpose is—just the glance of an eye, the attitude of the body which leads to the response. The communication set up in this way between individuals may be very perfect. Conversation in gestures may be carried on which cannot be translated into articulate speech. This is also true of the lower animals. Dogs approaching each other in hostile attitude carry on such a language of gestures. They walk around each other, growling and snapping, and waiting for the opportunity to attack. Here is a process out of which language might arise, that is, a certain attitude of one individual that calls out a response in the other, which in turn calls out a different approach and a different response, and so on indefinitely. In fact, as we shall see, language does arise in just such a process as that. We are too prone, however, to approach language as the philologist does, from the standpoint of the symbol that is used. We analyze that symbol and find out what is the intent in the mind of the individual in using that symbol, and then attempt to discover whether this symbol calls out this intent in the mind of the other. We assume that there are sets of ideas in persons’ minds and that these individuals make use of certain arbitrary symbols which answer to the intent which the individuals had. But if we are going to broaden the concept of language in the sense I have spoken of, so that it takes in the underlying attitudes, we can see that the so-called intent, the idea we are talking about, is one that is involved in the gesture or attitudes which we are using. The offering of a chair to a person who comes into the room is in itself a courteous act. We do not have to assume that a person says to himself that this person wants a chair. The offering of a chair by a person of good manners is something which is almost instinctive. This is the very attitude of the individual. From the point of view of the observer it is a gesture. Such early stages of social acts precede the symbol proper, and deliberate communication.” [George Herbert Mead. Mind, Self, and Society: From the Standpoint of a Social Behaviorist. Charles W. Morris, editor. Chicago, Illinois: Phoenix Books imprint of The University of Chicago Press. 1967. Pages 13-14.]
          “In a dialogue, … nobody is trying to win. Everybody wins if anybody wins. There is a different sort of spirit to it. In a dialogue, there is no attempt to gain points, or to make your particular view prevail. Rather, whenever any mistake is discovered on the part of anybody, everybody gains. It’s a situation called win-win, whereas the other game is win-lose – if I win, you lose. But a dialogue is something more of a common participation, in which we are not playing a game against each other, but with each other. In a dialogue, everybody wins.
          “Clearly, a lot of what is called ‘dialogue’ is not dialogue in the way that I am using the word. For example, people at the United Nations have been having what are often considered to be dialogues, but these are very limited. They are more like discussions – or perhaps trade-offs or negotiations – than dialogues. The people who take part are not really open to questioning their fundamental assumptions. They are trading off minor points, like negotiating whether we have more or fewer nuclear weapons. But the whole question of two different systems is not being seriously discussed.”
          [David Bohm. On Dialogue. Lee Nichol, editor. London and New York: Routledge Classics imprint of Taylor & Francis Group, an Informa PLC business. 2004. Pages 7-8.]
          “In order that the general language and its mathematization shall be able to work together coherently and harmoniously, these two aspects have to be similar to each other in certain key ways, though they will, of course, be different in other ways (notably in that the mathematical aspect has greater possibilities for precision of inferences). Through a consideration of these similarities and differences, there can arise what may be called a sort of ‘dialogue’ in which new meanings common to both aspects are created. It is in this ‘dialogue’ that the wholeness of the general language and its mathematics is to be seen.” [David Bohm. Wholeness and the Implicate Order. London and New York: Routledge Classics imprint of Taylor & Francis Group, an Informa PLC business. 2002. Pages 188-189.]
          “A … striking example of implicate order can be demonstrated in the laboratory, with a transparent container full of a very viscous fluid, such as treacle, and equipped with a mechanical rotator that can ‘stir’ the fluid very slowly but very thoroughly. If an insoluble droplet of ink is placed in the fluid and the stirring device is set in motion, the ink drop is gradually transformed into a thread that extends over the whole fluid. The latter now appears to be distributed more or less at ‘random’ so that it is seen as some shade of grey.” [David Bohm. Wholeness and the Implicate Order. London and New York: Routledge Classics imprint of Taylor & Francis Group, an Informa PLC business. 2002. Pages 199-200.]
      55. production of popular culture (Shelley Streeby): He studies the nineteenth-century United States.
          “The conjunction of the terms ‘sensation’ and ‘mass culture’ might misleadingly suggest, moreover, that I am about to make a Frankfurt School–style argument about the always mesmerizing and pernicious effects of the new mid-nineteenth-century culture industries; it should be clear by now that I am not going to do that. This does not mean, however, that I will simply celebrate sensational popular cultures as sites of resistance and discount the effects of industrialized and commodified modes of cultural production and reception, as cultural studies scholars have sometimes been accused of doing. The culture of sensation does indeed bear some of the responsibility for the long U.S. history of nativism, empire-building, and white egalitarianism. Although I argue that the responses to these issues among the producers and consumers of the culture of sensation were diverse rather than routinized and utterly predictable, it nonetheless remains generally true that … early forms of U.S. popular culture ‘created national identity from the subjugation of its [nonwhite] folk.’” [Shelley Streeby. American Sensations: Class, Empire, and the Production of Popular Culture. Berkeley, California: University of California Press. 2002. Page 28.]
      56. critical theory of collective memory (David Michael Levin): To be responsive, collectively, people need to remember.
          “Only when philosophy discovers in the dialectical course of history the traces of violence that deform repeated attempts at dialogue and recurrently close off the path to unconstrained communication does it further the process whose suspension it otherwise legitimates: mankind’s evolution toward autonomy and responsibility. My … thesis is thus that the unity of knowledge and interest proves itself in a dialectic that takes the historical traces of suppressed dialogue and reconstructs what has been suppressed.
          “In a sense, this is a task that calls for a critical theory of collective memory, a re-collection (anamnesis) of what our culture has refused to recognize and to see. With nature’s gift of sight comes a certain calling—and the pressure of a normativity grounded only in the gift of nature itself. Through this calling, we are enjoined to take historical responsibility for our ability to be responsive.”
          [David Michael Levin. The Philosopher’s Gaze: Modernity in the Shadows of Enlightenment. Berkeley, California: University of California Press. 1999. Page 17.]
      57. Enlightenment self (Jane Flax): He examines the peristence of a view of the self in spite of feminist critiques.
          “Although feminist theorists seem to undermine essential properties of the Enlightenment self, they are also unable to abandon it fully. The relations of feminist theorizing to the postmodernist project of deconstructing the self and the Enlightenment are necessarily ambivalent. In many ways women never ‘had’ an Enlightenment. Enlightenment discourse was not meant to include women, and its coherence depends partially on our continuing exclusion. Concepts such as the autonomy of reason, objective truth, and universally beneficial progress through scientific discovery are very appealing, especially to those who have been defined as incapable or merely the objects of such feats. Furthermore it is comforting to believe that Reason can and will triumph—that those who proclaim such ideals as objectivity and truth will respond to rational arguments. If there is no objective basis for distinguishing between truth and false beliefs, then it seems that power alone may determine the outcome of competing truth claims. This is a frightening prospect to those who lack or are oppressed by the power of others.” [Jane Flax. Thinking Fragments: Psychoanalysis, Feminism, and Postmodernism in the Contemporary West. Berkeley, California: University of California Press. 1990. Page 230.]
      58. critical communism (Antonio Labriola as pronounced in this MP3 audio file): In work conducted well before the Frankfurt School, this Italian communist intellectual applied his own early version of critical social theory, critical communism (Italian, «comunismo critico» as pronounced in this MP3 audio file), to Marxism and historical materialism.
          “It is not proper to give the name of our precursors to those who followed ways which they later had to abandon, or to those who, to speak without metaphor, formulated doctrines and started movements, doubtless explicable by the times and circumstances of their birth, but which were later outgrown by the doctrine of critical communism, which is the theory of the proletarian revolution.” [Antonio Labriola. Essays on the Materialistic Conception of History. Charles H. Kerr, translator. Chicago, Illinois: Charles H. Kerr & Company. 1908. Page 24.]
          “Critical communism dates from the moment when the proletarian movement is not merely a result of social conditions, but when it has already strength enough to understand that these conditions can be changed and to discern what means can modify them and in what direction.” [Antonio Labriola. Essays on the Materialistic Conception of History. Charles H. Kerr, translator. Chicago, Illinois: Charles H. Kerr & Company. 1908. Page 27.]
          “It is not in the name of a school, but as the promise, the threat, and the desire of a party that the new doctrine of critical communism presented itself. Its authors and its adherents did not feed upon the utopian manufacture of the future but their minds were full of the experience and the necessity of the present. They united with the proletarians whom instinct, not as yet fortified by experience, impelled to overthrow, at Paris and in England, the rule of the bourgeois class with a rapidity of movement not guided by well-considered tactics.” [Antonio Labriola. Essays on the Materialistic Conception of History. Charles H. Kerr, translator. Chicago, Illinois: Charles H. Kerr & Company. 1908. Page 37.]
          “Critical communism, in reality, scarcely begun with the [Communist] Manifesto it needed to develop and it has developed effectively.” [Antonio Labriola. Essays on the Materialistic Conception of History. Charles H. Kerr, translator. Chicago, Illinois: Charles H. Kerr & Company. 1908. Page 40.]
          “… in the doctrine of critical communism, it is society as a whole which at a moment of its general process discovers the cause of its destined course and at a critical point asserts itself to proclaim the laws of its movement. The foresight indicated by the [Communist] Manifesto was not chronological, it was not a prophecy nor a promise, but a morphological prevision.” [Antonio Labriola. Essays on the Materialistic Conception of History. Charles H. Kerr, translator. Chicago, Illinois: Charles H. Kerr & Company. 1908. Page 45.]
          “Critical communism does not manufacture revolutions, it does not prepare insurrections, it does not furnish arms for revolts. It mingles itself with the proletarian movement, but it sees and supports that movement in the full intelligence of the connection which it has, which it can have, and which it must have, with all the relations of social life as a whole. In a word it is not a seminary in which superior officers of the proletarian revolution are trained, but it is neither more nor less than the consciousness of this revolution and especially the consciousness of its difficulties.” [Antonio Labriola. Essays on the Materialistic Conception of History. Charles H. Kerr, translator. Chicago, Illinois: Charles H. Kerr & Company. 1908. Page 53.]
          “It is certain that social democracy can signify, has signified and signifies many things which have not been, are not, and never will be, either critical communism or the conscious march toward the proletarian revolution.” [Antonio Labriola. Essays on the Materialistic Conception of History. Charles H. Kerr, translator. Chicago, Illinois: Charles H. Kerr & Company. 1908. Page 62.]
          “Critical communism has never refused, and it does not refuse, to welcome the multiple and valuable suggestions, ideological, ethical, psychologic and pedagogic which may come from the knowledge and from the study of all forms of communism from Phales of Chalcedon down to Cabet. More than this, it is by the study and the knowledge of these forms that the consciousness of the separateness of scientific socialism from all the rest becomes developed and fixed.” [Antonio Labriola. Essays on the Materialistic Conception of History. Charles H. Kerr, translator. Chicago, Illinois: Charles H. Kerr & Company. 1908. Pages 71-72.]
          “The theory of the class struggle was found. It was seen to appear both in the origins of the bourgeoisie (whose intrinsic processus was already illustrated by the science of economics), and in this new appearance of the proletariat. The relativity of economic laws was discovered, but at the same time their relative necessity was understood. Herein lies the whole method and justification of the new. materialistic conception of history. Those deceive themselves who, calling it the economic interpretation of history, think they understand it completely. That designation is better suited, and is only suited, to certain analytic attempts, which, taking separately and in a distinct fashion on the one side the economic forms and categories, and on the other, for example, law, legislation, politics, customs,—proceed to study the reciprocal influences of the different sides of life considered in an abstract fashion. Quite different is our position. Ours is the organic conception of history. The totality of the unity of For example social life is the subject matter present to our minds, It is economics itself which dissolves in the course of one process, to reappear in as many morphological stages, in each of which it serves as a substructure for all the rest. Finally, it is not our method to extend the so-called economic factor isolated in an abstract fashion over all the rest, as our adversaries imagine, but it is, before everything else, to form an historic conception of economics and to explain the other changes by means of its changes. Therein lies our answer to all the criticisms which come to us from all the domains of learned ignorance, not excepting the socialists who are insufficiently grounded and who are sentimental or hysterical. And we explain our position thus as Marx has done in his Capital, not the first book of critical communism, but the last great book of bourgeois economics.” [Antonio Labriola. Essays on the Materialistic Conception of History. Charles H. Kerr, translator. Chicago, Illinois: Charles H. Kerr & Company. 1908. Pages 85-86.]
          “And as men, not by free choice, but because they could not act otherwise, satisfy first certain elementary needs, which, in their turn, give rise to others in their upward development, and as for the satisfaction of their needs, whatever they may be, they invent and employ certain means and certain tools and associate themselves in certain definite fashions, the materialism of historical interpretation is nothing else than an attempt to reconstruct by thought with method the genesis and the complexity of the social life which develops through the ages. The novelty of this doctrine does not differ from that of all the other doctrines which after many excursions through the domains of the imagination have finally arrived, very painfully, at reaching the prose of reality and halting there.” [Antonio Labriola. Essays on the Materialistic Conception of History. Charles H. Kerr, translator. Chicago, Illinois: Charles H. Kerr & Company. 1908. Page 99.]
          “… critical communism, which has been admitted so tardily to the honor of discussion in the circles of official science, met in its own camp with the very worst of adversities, the enmity of its own friends.” [Antonio Labriola. Socialism and Philosophy. Ernest Untermann, translator. Chicago, Illinois: Charles H. Kerr & Company. 1907. Page 39.]
          “Critical communism – that is its true name, and there is none more exact for this doctrine – did not take its stand with the feudalists in regretting the old society for the sake of criticising by contrast the contemporary society: – it had an eye only to the future.…
          “… by the doctrine of critical communism … is the theory of the proletarian revolution.… superfluous. We cannot even to-day arrive at a perfect understanding of critical communism, without mentally retracing these doctrines and following the processes of their appearance disappearance.…
          “… Critical communism dates when the proletarian movement is not merely conditions, but when it has already strength enough that these conditions can be changed and to discern modify them and in what direction.…
          “It is not in the name of a school, but as the promise, and the desire of a party that the new doctrine of critical communism presented itself.…
          “… Critical communism, in reality, scarcely begun with the Manifesto it needed to develop and it developed effectively.…
          “In this broad development of Marxism and in this proletarian movement in the limited forms of political there not been, as some assert, an alteration from the of the original form of critical communism? Has there not been a passing from revolution to the self-styled evolution? …
          “Critical communism does not manufacture revolutions, it does not prepare insurrections, it does not furnish arms for revolts. It mingles itself with the proletarian movement, but it sees and supports that movement in the full intelligence of the connection which it has, which it can have, and which it must have, with all the relations of social life as a whole.…
          “… Thus critical communism is neither moralizer, nor nor herald, nor utopian – it already holds the thing itself in its and into the thing itself it has put its ethics and its idealism.”
          [Antonio Labriola, “In Memory of the Communist Manifesto.” Social Scientist. Volume 27, number 1/4, January–April 1999. Pages 3-48.]
          “… [We] see how seriously [Antonio] Labriola (who may himself be considered in certain respects a too impatient adversary of ‘vulgar materialism’) took certain of the demands of the positivism he was concerned to combat.” [Sebastiano Timpanaro, “Considerations on Materialism.” New Left Review. Series I, number 85, May–June 1974. Pages 3-22.]
          “Antonio Labriola used to say that the formation of socialist consciousness is a difficult process, requiring time—decades.” [Giorgio Amendola, “The Italian Road to Socialism.” Interview. New Left Review. Series I, number 106, November–December 1977. Pages 39-50.]
      59. critical systems theory or critical social systems theory (Sunnie Lee Watson, William R. Watson, Christian Fuchs, and Wolfgang Hofkirchner): Applies critical social theory to systems theory.
          “A focus on critical analysis of [social] systems, particularly in regard to issues of power, oppression, and emancipation, became highlighted as a requirement in using systems approaches…. Furthermore, beyond the issues of power and emancipation, which became a defining characteristic of CST [critical systems theory], the strengths and weaknesses of different systems methods led to a focus on pluralism of methodologies, recognizing these strengths and weaknesses and using approaches in combination for different contexts and purposes. Accordingly, the commitment to critique, emancipation, and pluralism form the three core values and philosophy of CST.” [Sunnie Lee Watson and William R. Watson. Critical Systems Theory for Qualitative Research Methodology. Pages 6-7.]
          “A critical social systems theory is a critical theory of social systems. It combines the stance of critical theory as represented by, e.g., [Jürgen] Habermas and Herbert Marcuse and the Frankfurt School philosophers like Ernst Bloch – a theory which has its roots in the weltanschauung of Karl Marx – and a system theoretical view, in particular, science of complexity insights provided by Evolutionary Systems Theory (EST) applied to the domain of social systems and going back to General System Theory (GST) as inaugurated by Ludwig von Bertalanffy among others.” [Christian Fuchs and Wolfgang Hofkirchner, “Autopoiesis and Critical Social Systems Theory.” Autopoiesis in Organization Theory and Practice. Rodrigo Magalhães and Ron Sanchez, editors. Bingley, England: Emerald Group Publishing. 2009. Pages 111-129.]
      60. critical structuration theory (Norman Ginsburg and Rosemary Fincham): They apply critical social theory to Anthony Giddens’ structuration theory (MP3 audio file), a perspective named by Giddens.
          “‘Structured diversity’ is merely a term to encapsulate the notion of critical compassion of welfare states …. ‘Diversity’ here indicates the particularities of different welfare states ‘structured’ by (or shaped by) path dependency, notably by their social movements, but ‘structured’ also refers to the power structures behind the key social divisions of ‘race,’ class and gender …. The idea of ‘structured diversity’ derives from sociological ‘structuration’ theory and from neo-Marxian understanding of the dialectical relationship between structure and agency, or between capitalism and the working class movement. Critical structuration theory has not, as yet, been applied explicitly to analysing the historical sociology of social policy and welfare activism, because ‘agency’ has been predominantly conceptualized as the individual human subject, rather than humans acting collectively,” [Norman Ginsburg, “Structured diversity: a framework for comparing welfare states?” A Handbook of Comparative Social Policy. Second edition. Patricia Kennett, editor. Northampton, Massachusetts: Edward Elgar Publishing, Inc. 2013. Page 163.]
          “In Marxian terms, … the stratification of the working class … means that some workers are better protected against the basic risks of commodification (loss of income due to sickness, old age, unemployment, caring etc., plus homelessness, inadequate education/training etc.) than others.” [Norman Ginsburg, “Structured diversity: a framework for comparing welfare states?” A Handbook of Comparative Social Policy. Second edition. Patricia Kennett, editor. Northampton, Massachusetts: Edward Elgar Publishing, Inc. 2013. Page 165.]
          “While its preoccupation with class leads structuration theory to neglect other forces which contriiute to the structuration of society, critical structurationists are attempting to rethis oversight through the inclusion of gender and ‘race’ in their analyses and discussions. In recognition of time-geography’s inability to convey the emotional components of life-worlds, additional methodologies may be used to compliment the time-space mapping of structuration. In particular, an ethoographic account that is seositive to the principles of structuration theory and time-geography may be used to tease out the emotional life-worlds which escape graphical representation.
          “The 1990s have witnessed the merging of structuration theory with critical theory, resulting in a series of studies focusing on the rmqmbtion and isolation of sub-populations defined by their ‘Otherness.’”
          [Rosemary Fincham. Sensitizing Structuration Theory: A Literature Review and Proposal for Further Studies. M.A. thesis. Queen’s University. Kingston, Ontario. January, 1997. Page 32.]
      61. new critical theory (Martin Beck Matuštík as pronounced in this MP3 audio file and others): This approach combines critical social theory with postmodernism. From a postmodern perspective, all truths, including scientific truths, are subjective or socially constructed.
          “I claim that the path back to [Herbert] Marcuse leads to a new critical theory. The new critical theorists speak about liberation in plural and multidimensional voices and yet do so while being historically and materially linked to ongoing struggles.” [Martin Beck Matuštík, “Back to the Future: Marcuse and New Critical Theory.” New Critical Theory: Essays on Liberation. William S. Wilkerson and Jeffrey Paris, editors. Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers. 2001. Kindle edition.]
      62. new critical theory of multiculturalism (Martin Beck Matuštík, Drucilla Cornell, and Sara Murphy): They develop applications of critical theory to multiculturalism. Matuštík references Cornell and Murphy in the first article below.
          “I would like to characterize Drucilla Cornell and Sara Murphy’s essay ‘Anti-racism, multiculturalism, and the ethics of identification’ as a rearticulation of the aims of the politics of identity and difference in terms of a radical existential ethics of freedom.… I can highlight how their work develops a new critical theory of multiculturalism.…
          “… By situating Cornell and Murphy’s work on the trajectory between existential variants of critical theory and a new critical theory of multiculturalism, I am able to distinguish the ways in which their work intervenes in several current multicultural debates.”
          [Martin Beck Matuštík, “Contribution to a new critical theory of multiculturalism: A response to ‘Anti-racism, multiculturalism and the ethics of identification.’” Philosophy & Social Criticism. Volume 28, number 1, 2002. Pages 473-482.]
          “Humanity … is just one example of the postulation of free creatures with the capacity of shaping their own moral destiny. Our argument is that the demand for multiculturalism is the freedom to struggle for a different humanity, for the possibility of living otherwise than through the cultural hierarchies imposed by colonialism.
          “… in a multicultural curriculum designed to meet what we mean by fairness students should be exposed not only to different languages but to the history of those languages within our country. Take Spanish to illustrate our point: the United States has the fifth-biggest Spanish-speaking population in the world so there are obviously practical reasons why US students should study the Spanish language.”
          [Drucilla Cornell and Sara Murphy, “Anti-racism, multiculturalism and the ethics of identification.” Philosophy & Social Criticism. Volume 28, number 1, 2002. Pages 419-449.]
      63. critical postmodern theory (Christine Morley): She develops an approach to critical reflection.
          “The participants’ accounts indicate that critical reflection, informed by critical postmodern analysis, enabled them to achieve the emancipatory aims of feminist practice in a number of ways.…
          “Drawing on Foucauldian notions of power, which construct power as exercised or enacted, … enabled practitioners to recognise that power is also inscribed within discourse, rather than exclusively residing in social structure …. Power in this sense is also the capacity to influence, manipulate or re-author discourse …. For some participants, this reconstruction of power occurred through the rejection of the implicit assumption that egalitarianism means a reduction of power for someone else. As acknowledged elsewhere …, practitioners’ accounts revealed that power may operate differently and be used in various ways indifferent contexts, and in relation to different people. Participants’ reconstructed accounts additionally rejected initial assumptions about power from being an unequivocally negative force, to recognise that it can also be productive. Critical postmodern thinking also enabled practitioners to reconstruct power in more fluid and contextual terms, which allowed them to understand that they could assist services users to exercise power through influencing the discourse surrounding their situations. In this way, critical postmodern theory contributed to practitioners understanding power as being embedded in social interactions and contexts, not just in social structures, and that what is important about power is how it is used and expressed ….”
          [Christine Morley. Practising Critical Reflection to Develop Emancipatory Change. London and New York: Routledge imprint of Taylor & Francis Group, an Informa PLC business. 2014. Page 194.]
      64. critical reflection (Jan Fook and Fiona Gardner): They focus on the process of uncovering personal assumptions about the social world in order to change relational agency in different contexts.
          “We start with a broad-brushstroke picture of our approach to critical reflection …. Overall our approach is founded on an understanding of the individual in society, and how the surfacing of assumptions held by individual people about their social worlds may ultimately lead to a capacity to change the ways people act in relation to their social contexts. Critical reflection, from our perspective, is therefore a process (and theory) for unearthing individually held social assumptions in order to make changes in the social world. In our approach, then, reflection is more than simply thinking about experience. It involves a deeper look at the premises on which thinking, actions and emotions are based. It is critical when connections are made between these assumptions and the social world as a basis for changed actions.
          “Let us look at the three main features of this approach:
          1. “the understanding of the individual in a social context
          2. “the linking of the theory and practice of critical reflection in the model
          3. “the importance of linking changed awareness with changed actions.”
          [Jan Fook and Fiona Gardner. Practising Critical Reflection: A Resource Handbook. New York: Open University Press imprint of McGraw Hill Education. 2007. Page 14.]
      65. perspective transformation (Jane E. Glaze): She examines the liberating results of reflective practice by students in an advanced nurse practitioner program.
          “This study has thrown new light on students’ experiences of developing reflective skills. They described changes in their behaviour resulting from perspective transformation. Whilst the degree of transformation varied, for all but one of these students this was described as a liberating process.… They found that previous education, socialization and the culture of the organization were all influential in determining students’ responses to learning from experience ….
          “The findings from this study suggest that the integration of reflection within the ANP [advanced nurse practitioners] Master’s degree programme was beneficial for the majority of students. They have painted a picture of personal and professional development. They viewed reflection as now part of their lives, assisting them with the implementation of their roles as ANPs and leading them to more astute political behaviour.”
          [Jane E. Glaze, “Reflection as a transforming process: student advanced nurse practitioners’ experiences of developing reflective skills as part of an MSc programme.” Journal of Advanced Nursing. Volume 34, number 5, June 2001. Pages 639-647.]
      66. chaotics (Judy Lochhead and Kenneth McLeod): They discuss an application of chaos theory and new critical theory to music.
          “If … the evidence of musical production during the 1950s and 1960s testifies that musicians were in the cultural vanguard, why has there been so little discussion of their role?
          “While recognizing that several factors no doubt contribute to this absence, I sketch briefly a partial explanation that locates one source within the broader paradigm of chaotics itself. My argument is this: the concept of information that has developed from the scientific and technological domains of this paradigm and that has significantly and generally filtered into modes of thought at the millennial divide has inhibited writing about music.”
          [Judy Lochhead, “Hearing chaos.” American Music. Volume 19, number 2, summer 2001. Pages 210-246.]
          “[Judy] Lochhead’s study, in particular, centers on the previously overlooked role played by musicians, particularly composers, during the 1950s and 1960s in ‘disclosing the new paradigm of “chaotics.”’ Less well recognized, however, is the important role of chaos theory in recent critical interpretations of music. My aim in this article is thus to examine some of the manifestations of chaos in music overlooked in recent scholarship and also to examine the relationship of chaos theory to various aspects of critical theory.” [Kenneth McLeod, “Interpreting Chaos: The Paradigm of Chaotics and New Critical Theory.” College Music Symposium. Volume 45, 2005. Pages 42-56.]
      67. critical race theory (Angela Harris, Derrick Bell, and many others): It applies critical social theory to issues related to race and racism. In Foster’s view, race is a social construct. Racism, however, is an instance of the forces, or dialectical mechanisms, of capitalist domination.
          “CRT [critical race theory] recognizes that racism is engrained in the fabric and system of the American society. The individual racist need not exist to note that institutional racism is pervasive in the dominant culture. This is the analytical lens that CRT uses in examining existing power structures. CRT identifies that these power structures are based on white privilege and white supremacy, which perpetuates the marginalization of people of color. CRT also rejects the traditions of liberalism and meritocracy. Legal discourse says that the law is neutral and colorblind, however, CRT challenges this legal ‘truth’ by examining liberalism and meritocracy as a vehicle for self-interest, power, and privilege. CRT also recognizes that liberalism and meritocracy are often stories heard from those with wealth, power, and privilege. These stories paint a false picture of meritocracy; everyone who works hard can attain wealth, power, and privilege while ignoring the systemic inequalities that institutional racism provides.
          “Intersectionality within CRT points to the multidimensionality of oppressions and recognizes that race alone cannot account for disempowerment.”
          [“What is Critical Race Theory?” University of California at Los Angeles (UCLA) School of Public Affairs. Undated. Retrieved on September 27th, 2015.]
          “I provide theoretical foundations for these two views of a post-racial era, in terms of the eliminativist theories of race and the behavioral theory of racism, and critically examine them. The eliminativist theories of race seek to eliminate the concept of ‘race’ from general discourse because we do not have adequate criteria for race that can adequately categorize any groups of people as distinct races. Such elimination of ‘race’ from general discourse may be said to indicate an idea of a post-racial era in a nominalist sense. The behavioral theory of racism argues that racism must be manifested in obviously harmful actions.” [Polycarp Ikuenobe, “Conceptualizing and Theorizing About the Idea of a “Post-Racial” Era.” Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour. Volume 43, issue 4, December 2013. Pages 446-468.]
          “I approach the concept of ‘race’ in two ways. First, it is a way of life, a fundamental product of Western cultures, deeply embedded in the European colonial past, lived out in the present as a taken-for-granted reality. Secondly, it is an analytical concept that has conditioned both academic and everyday ways of interpreting the world around us. For cultural geographers, it is important that ‘race’ was part of our earliest efforts, rooted in the geographical lore that accompanied the first European voyages of exploration that brought knowledge, riches, and power to the imperial/colonial dynasties. It was developed as a fully fledged theoretical system by Enlightenment thinkers whose treatises on such far-fetched theories as environmental determinism fit so neatly with the purposes of expanding European powers and with the by then highly developed sense of European cultural superiority and civilization.” [Audrey Kobayashi, “Critical ‘Race’ Approaches to Cultural Geography.” A Companion to Cultural Geography. James S. Duncan, Nuala C. Johnson, and Richard H. Schein, editors. Malden, Massachusetts: Blackwell Publishing Ltd. 2004. Pages 238-249.]
      68. Marx’s solid and melting visions of modern life (Marshall Berman): Focusing on a precise definition of “modernism,” Berman examines human attempts to become both subjects and objects of modernization.
          “The central drama for which the [Communist] Manifesto is famous is the development of the modern bourgeoisie and proletariat, and the struggle between them. But we can find a play going on within this play, a struggle inside the author’s [Karl Marx’s] consciousness over what is really going on and what the larger struggle means. We might describe this conflict as a tension between Marx’s ‘solid’ and his ‘melting’ visions of modern life.
          “… [Marx] sets out to present an overview of what is now caned the process of modernization, and sets the stage for what Marx believes will be its revolutionary climax. Here Marx describes the solid institutional core of modernity. First of all, there is the emergence of a world market. As it spreads, it absorbs and destroys whatever local and regional markets it touches. Production and consumption – and human needs – become increasingly international and cosmopolitan. The scope of human desires and demands is enlarged far beyond the capacities of local industries, which consequently collapse. The scale of communications becomes worldwide, and technologically sophisticated mass media emerge. Capital is concentrated increasingly in a few hands. Independent peasants and artisans cannot compete with capitalist mass production, and they are forced to leave the land and close their workshops. Production is increasingly centralized and rationalized in highly automated factories.”
          [Marshall Berman. Adventures in Marxism. London and New York: Verso imprint of New Left Books. 1999. Pages 100-101.]
          “In All That Is Solid Melts Into Air, I define modernism as any attempt by modern men and women to become subjects as well as objects of modernization, to get a grip on the modern world and make themselves at home in it. This is a broader and more inclusive idea of modernism than those generally found in scholarly books. It implies an open and expansive way of understanding culture; very different from the curatorial approach that breaks up human activity into fragments and locks the fragments into separate cases, labeled by time, place, language, genre and academic discipline.…
          “If we think of modernism as a struggle to make ourselves at home in a constantly changing world, we will realize that no mode of modernism can ever be definitive. Our most creative constructions and achievements are bound to turn into prisons and whited sepulchres that we or our children, will have to escape or transform if life is to go on.”
          [Marshall Berman. All That Is Solid Melts Into Air: The Experience of Modernity. New York: Penguin Books USA, Inc. 1988. Pages 5-6.]
          “All that is Solid Melts into Air unfolds a dialectic of modernization and modernism. ‘To be modern,’ as I define it at the book’s beginning and end, ‘is to experience personal and social life as a maelstrom, to find one’s world in perpetual disintegration and renewal, trouble and anguish, ambiguity and contradiction: to be part of a universe in which all that is solid melts into air. To be a modernist is to make oneself somehow at home in this maelstrom, … to grasp and confront the world that modernization makes, and to strive to make it our own.’ Modernism aims ‘to give modern men and women the power to change the world that is changing them, to make them the subjects as well as the objects of modernization.’” [Marshall Berman, “The Signs in the Street: a response to Perry Anderson.” New Left Review. Series I, number 144, March–April 1984. Pages 114-123.]
      69. the spectacle (Guy Debord as pronounced in this MP3 audio file): He defines it as “both the outcome and the goal of the dominant mode of production.”
          “The spectacle cannot be understood either as a deliberate distortion of the visual world or as a product of the technology of the mass dissemination of images. It is far better viewed as a weltanschauung [worldview] that has been actualized, translated into the material realm – a world view transformed into an objective force.…
          “Understood in its totality, the spectacle is both the outcome and the goal of the dominant mode of production. It is not something added to the real world – not a decorative element, so to speak. On the contrary, it is the very heart of society’s real unreality. In all its specific manifestations news or propaganda, advertising or the actual consumption of entertainment the spectacle epitomizes the prevailing model of social life. It is the omnipresent celebration of a choice already made in the sphere of production, and the consummate result of that choice. In form as in content the spectacle serves as total justification for the conditions and aims of the existing system. It further ensures the permanent presence of that justification, for it governs almost all time spent outside the production process itself.”
          [Guy Debord. The Society of the Spectacle. Donald Nicholson Smith, translator. New York: Zone Books. 1994. Ebook edition.]
          “Among political scientists, and particularly in the US, this last sentence is scandalous. Indeed, most of the social sciences have long since abandoned serious consideration of socialism, at least for the last twenty years, and many in the US have a difficult time imagining the existence of other people elsewhere. However, while it is perhaps impossible to measure the position of capitalism in the world, especially using a mechanism like survey data, it seems that global public opinion is not nearly as overtaken by the society of the spectacle as one might think.” [Richard Gilman-Opalsky. Spectacular Capitalism: Guy Debord and the Practice of Radical Philosophy. Creative Commons. Brooklyn, New York: Minor Compositions imprint of Autonomedia. 2011. Page 20.]
      70. strong and weak critical conceptions of ideology (Tommie Shelby): He discusses two approaches to ideology, siding with one over the other, in critical social theory.
          “To claim that a particular belief system is ideological, in the evaluative sense, is to impute to the system of belief some negative characteristic(s) that provides a reason to reject it (or at least some significant part of it) in its present form. I will refer to such an evaluative conception of ideology as a critical conception.
          “There are strong and weak critical conceptions of ideology. On a strong conception, the fact that a system of thought is ideological is a sufficient reason to reject it (or some significant part of it). Whereas on a weak conception, the fact that a belief system is ideological is, in some sense, an unfortunate fact about it, but it is not a sufficient reason to reject it as such. In the sections below, I develop a strong critical conception of ideology. I will treat that conception as my general account and will understand weak senses in terms of how they are related to, but deviate from, that account.”
          [Tommie Shelby, “Ideology, Racism, and Critical Social Theory.” The Philosophical Forum. Volume XXXIV, number 2, summer 2003. Pages 153-188.[
      71. internationality (Jonathan Rée): He develops a framework for considering individual nations.
          “… [Regarding] the word internationality: … the coinage was not a success and seems to have lain unused since the middle of the last century. By way of a conclusion, I propose to rehabilitate the word, in order to indicate the basis upon which I think the theory of nationhood ought now to develop. I shall use it to express a concept which, although it is implicit in much recent work on nationhood, perhaps deserves to be spelt out and discussed more clearly.…
          “… My proposal is that, in the same way that … individual texts can function only within a field of general intertextuality, so individual nations arise only within a field of general internationality; or, in other words, that the logic of internationality precedes the formation of nations.”
          [Jonathan Rée, “Internationality.” Radical Philosophy: Philosophical Journal of the Independent Left. Number 60, spring 1992. Pages 3-11.]
      72. dissonances of the Arab Left (Hisham Bustani [Arabic/ʿArabiyyaẗ, هِشَام البُسْتَانِيّ, Hišām ʾal-Bustāniyy]): He discusses various unresolved projects for national liberation.
          “The Arab Left emerged in the context of anti-colonial struggles. Its discourse was formed in the era of Third World national liberation movements in the wake of World War II and the ascendance of the Soviet Union as a second world power on a par with the United States. Its discourse has hardly evolved since that era, for many reasons. First, there is the incompletion to this day of national liberation projects, arising from the objective impossibility of achieving their goals within the borders set up by colonialists for the purpose of holding the territories they mark at bay: dependent, socially distorted and devoid of emancipatory potential. Second, there is the lack of significant intellectuals – with the exception of Mahdi Amel [Arabic/ʿArabiyyaẗ, مَهْدِيّ عَامِل, Mahdiyy ʿĀmil], Samir Amin [Arabic/ʿArabiyyaẗ, سَمِير أَمِين, Samīr ꞌAmīn] and a few others – who are capable of delving into the social and economic structures and formations in order to demarcate those segments of society that have the most interest in progressive change. Third, there is the authoritarian and Stalinist structures of most Arab leftist parties, which disable critical thinking and theoretical argumentation. Party education, at best, has been limited to echoing the opinions of the political bureau and chairman of the party, while indoctrinating party members to view their decisions in the same way that the adherents of religious currents view the scriptural interpretations of their leaders.” [Hisham Bustani, “Dissonances of the Arab Left.” Radical Philosophy: Philosophical Journal of the Independent Left. Number 184, March/April 2014. Pages 35-41.]
      73. eupsychian impulse (Barry Richards): He considers the “political appropriation of psychoanalysis.”
          “… [The] political appropriation of psychoanalysis cannot accurately be called utopian, since those who advanced it were generally Marxists for whom the idea of utopia was, at least in theory, impermissible. But to borrow—with due irony—a term from the humanist psychologist Abraham Maslow …, it might well be called ‘eupsychian,’ since the transcendent condition to which it aspires, though not necessarily one of social perfection, is one of intrapsychic ease, release and satisfaction.” [Barry Richards, “The Eupsychian Impulse: Psychoanalysis and Left politics since ’68.” Radical Philosophy: Philosophical Journal of the Independent Left. Number 48, spring 1988. Pages 3-13.]
      74. politics of fulfillment and transfiguration (J. M. Bernstein): The article considers “the philosophy of the subject.”
          “Roughly, in accordance with the model of the philosophy of the subject, emancipation amounts to the fulfIllment of the possibilities and potentialities of the present. However, in accordance with the model of interpersonal, communicative relations, emancipation involves the qualitative transformation of our needs, pleasures, and self-understanding; in short, it conceives of emancipation as transfiguration.…
          “… As figures of non-identity autonomous art and feminism critically install the remembrance and anticipation of an other reason, of reason as for the other, of reason transfigured.”
          [J. M. Bernstein, “The Politics of Fulfilment and Transfiguration.” Radical Philosophy: Philosophical Journal of the Independent Left. Number 47, autumn 1987. Pages 21-29.]
      75. Critical Theory–Green Theory and Climate Change (W. Lawrence S. Prabhakar): He develops an approach to climate change informed by critical theory and green theory.
          “… [One] construct is the Critical Theory–Green Theory and Climate Change. Critical Theory has an ambient platform that helped to formulate a Green Theory in International Relations and provides a rationale on climate change and sustainable development. Critical Theory rejects the piecemeal, ‘problem-solving’ approaches that fail to address the social and economic structures of domination perpetuated by global hegemony. Green Theory focuses on the critical issues of environmental domination and marginalization--domination of a non-human nature, neglect of future generational needs, and the skewed distribution of ecological risks among different social classes, states and regions. Green Theory repudiates the lopsided frames of causes and consequences of climate change with an advocacy of equity and sustainability. Green Theory is premised on the quest to reduce ecological risks across the board and preventing unfair externalization and displacement through space and time onto innocent third parties.” [W. Lawrence S. Prabhakar, “Climate Change and National Security: Issues, Linkages and the Indian Context.” Energy Security Challenges: Non Traditional Security Planning in India. Elamkulam, Kochi, India: CPPR-Centre for Strategic Studies, Kochi Centre for Public Policy Research (CPPR). 2015. Pages 28-34.]
      76. ecosocialism (Tim Hayward and many others): He establishes the ultimate choice: ecosocialism or ecofascism. Sadly, it now seems that, in the U.S., the second option is gaining the most traction.
          “From the premise of ecological scarcity follows the conclusion that we are ultimately faced with a stark choice between ecosocialism and ecofascism. For either society can be democratically self-disciplined to work within the limits of ecological scarcity; or else those limits will divide society from within, pushing to even further extremes the present relationships of inequality between those who gain economic benefit from the exploitation of human resources and those onto whom their costs are ‘externalised’ (both directly and indirectly through environmental degradation).” [Tim Hayward, “Ecosocialism—Utopian and Scientific.” Radical Philosophy: Philosophical Journal of the Independent Left. Number 56, autumn 1990. Pages 2-14.]
          “The title of this article refers to ‘eco-socialist transition.’ I shall therefore also have to justify why special significance is attached to the societal contradiction which is now reproducing itself—albeit on the brink of catastrophe—in the form of an extended ecological crisis. The argument will begin with the ‘underdetermination’ of socialism in the present constellation of crises, and end by proposing a concept of ‘eco-socialist transition’ that does justice both to the ‘extrinsic plurality’ of socialism (in relation to other diverse ‘forms of transition’) and to the ‘intrinsic plurality’ of concrete processes of transition (in relation to concrete socio-historical formations).” [Frieder Otto Wolf, “Eco-Socialist Transition on the Threshold of the Twenty-First Century.” New Left Review. Series I, number 158, July–August 1986. Pages 32-42.]
          “… it is necessary to turn to [Karl] Marx’s ecology itself, in which the materialist conception of history and the materialist conception of nature formed a dialectical unity. By excavating the ecological foundations of classical historical materialism, second-stage ecosocialist theorists since the late 1990s have moved well beyond earlier misconceptions, creating the basis for a wider ecological synthesis. Here the analysis has pivoted on the dialectical approach implicit in Marx’s triadic scheme of ‘the universal metabolism of nature,’ the ‘social metabolism,’ and the metabolic rift.” [John Bellamy Foster and Brett Clark, “Marx’s Ecology and the Left.” Monthly Review: An Independent Socialist Magazine. Volume 68, issue 2, June 2016. Pages 1-25.]
      77. contemporary transcultural values (José A. Lindgren Alves as pronounced in this MP3 audio file): He examines the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in the context of postmodernity.
          “Whereas human rights can now be envisaged as officially ‘universalized’ by the consensus of all states at the Vienna Conference, they look even more like contemporary transcultural values in the behavior or nongovernmental organizations. It is on the basis of the Universal Declaration and of the treaties and declarations that stem therefrom that all of these non-profit private entities with diverse origins—and they are also a worldwide phenomenon of our times—pursue their public aims, both in the area of individual rights and in defense of collective rights of specific groups and communities.” [José A. Lindgren Alves, “The Declaration of Human Rights in Postmodernity.” Human Rights Quarterly. Volume 22, number 2, May 2000. Pages 478-500.]
      78. ecologically reconstructed Marxism (Tim Hayward): According to Hayward, culture is intrinsically involved with human nature.
          “In this article I focus on a tension which has emerged from recent attempts to theorize the meaning of human emancipation from the perspective of an ecologically reconstructed Marxism.…
          “Culture … is an intrinsic component of human nature as such; and it is not possible to specify human nature in purely biological terms even in principle, for the human biological organism itself did not reach its final evolutionary form before the introduction of culture. The self-transformations made possible for humans in society, therefore, cannot be treated as derivations of underlying biological or psychological determinants, of an innate human nature ….”
          [Tim Hayward, “Ecology and Human Emancipation.” Radical Philosophy: Philosophical Journal of the Independent Left. Number 62, autumn 1992. Pages 3-13.]
      79. deep green theory (Richard Sylvan): He arrives at this position through a critique of deep ecology.
          “Deep ecology appears to be some elaboration of the position that natural things other than humans have value in themselves, value sometimes perhaps exceeding that of or had by humans.” [Richard Sylvan, “A Critique of Deep Ecology.” Radical Philosophy: Philosophical Journal of the Independent Left. Number 40, summer 1985. Pages 2-12.]
          “The critique of deep ecology has led to a different sort of position, tentatively entitled ‘deep-green theory.’ …
          “A major difference between the theories lies in the distribution of values. Deep ecology, like simpler utilitarianism, offers a unique 1nitial distribution: each living thing is assigned equal value and nothing else has intrinsic value. Deep-green theory, whlle rejecting both the themes upon which this simplistic assignment depends, is much less specific as to how value is distributed.”
          [Richard Sylvan, “A Critique of Deep Ecology.” Part II.” Radical Philosophy: Philosophical Journal of the Independent Left. Number 41, autumn 1985. Pages 10-22.]
      80. Geo-Justice (James Conlon): He expands the concept of “justice-making” to include the planet Earth.
          “Geo-Justice re-visions justice-making. In our time, cultural and ecclesial organizations strive to bring about justice for whales, for forests, for battered wives and abused children, for the poor, the victims of oppression… All these causes are worthy. Yet most of these efforts remain fragmented, isolated from each other.
          “Liberation theology has helped us to recognize the poor and oppressed as a primary source of divine presence and revelation. Expanding that recognition, we can also begin to see in our new present history of cultural collapse and ecological devastation the oppressed Earth itself as a source of divine wisdom for our actions.…
          “Justice with the earth will be a work of the heart—a falling in love with the divine source that summons us to become one with the beautiful and oppressed Earth.
          “Geo-Justice will be more a participation than an obligation—more about love than laws, more about harmony than have-to’s. Geo-Justice extends the compassion of the heart into the psychic, society, and Earth. It is about healing ourselves, our systems, and our planet.
          “Geo-Justice will liberate the poor, and liberate our poor Earth. It is a preferential option for the Earth.…
          “Geo-Justice is an operative myth for our time.”
          [James Conlon. Geo-Justice: A preferential option for the Earth. San Jose, California: Resource Publications, Inc. 1990. Pages 17-18.]
      81. critical understandings of race (Robert M. Anthony): He uses this term as a rubric for various critical perspectives which have focused on race.
          “In recent years, critical understandings of race have garnished greater acceptance within the social sciences.…
          “In this article, the term critical understandings of race (CUR) is used to denote the broad intellectual movement that applies critical approaches to issues of race and racial inequality. CUR are rooted in legal storytelling and borrow heavily from the critical theories developed in radical feminism; they also rely on the critical perspectives found in the writings of Antonio Gramsci, Jaques Derrida, and W.E.B. Du Bois …. Critical race theory and critical white studies are the most formalized versions of the perspective ….
          “Critical understandings of race value activist research and share a progressive political ideology rooted in radical multiculturalism …. They seek ‘not only to ascertain how society organizes itself along racial lines and hierarchies, but to transform it for the better’ ….”
          [Robert M. Anthony, “A Challenge to Critical Understandings of Race.” Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour. Volume 42, issue 3, 2012. Pages 260-281.]
      82. social theory of critique (Robin Celikates as pronounced in this MP3 audio file): He examines the “normative distinctions” made by critiques of ideology.
          “I want to argue here for a two-fold claim: although the interpretive and pragmatic turn is right in criticizing the idea of a break between the objective standpoint of critique and the deluded perspective of the agents, it does not follow that we have to abandon the project of a critique of ideology. However, the status of that critique will change significantly in the new picture, since the social theory of critique I outline here reconstructs the normative distinctions and theorems of the critique of ideology as constantly being invoked and interpreted, made and remade by agents themselves in the realm of social practice.…
          “The aim of this social theory of critique, as I am presenting it here, is not a dismissal of the critique of ideology as in the hermeneutic and ethnological cases, but a reconstruction of its distinctions and theorems as constantly being invoked and interpreted, made and remade in the realm of social practices.”
          [Robin Celikates, “From Critical Social Theory to a Social Theory of Critique: On the Critique of Ideology after the Pragmatic Turn.” Constellations. Volume 13, number 1, 2006. Pages 21-40.]
      83. social work practice (Patricia Fronek and Marilyn Crawshaw): They consider the application of this practice—with its focus on competing power relations—to assisted reproduction.
          “Social work practice is distinguished by its attention to social and economic power relations and the resulting competing ‘rights’ that impact at personal, cultural and institutional levels …. As such, it is well placed to cut across any tendency for reproductive practice to operate in disciplinary silos with restricted regard to political and social awareness and the interconnectedness of interests and rights. Social work’s contextual understanding can deepen knowledge of the experiences of those affected by adoption, donor conception and surrogacy (including in private and public law) and the development of policies that shape associated practices in the commercial sphere ….
          “However, social work practice in this area [assisted reproduction] is patchy both within and across countries. The social work literature often skirts around contentious issues, perhaps impeded by the multiple perspectives located in work with families and the well-being of children, the impact on their disciplinary confidence and status from being singled out for severe public criticism when child protection goes wrong and when their ‘intrusion’ into the private realm of the family is challenged. Social work has long been affected by the political environment in which it operates and the time when its influence wanes is arguably when it is most needed …. The increasing dominance of ideological and commercial positions that reflect a global shift towards prioritising the right to parent by the relatively affluent may be such a time ….”
          [Patricia Fronek and Marilyn Crawshaw, “The ‘New Family’ as an Emerging Norm: A Commentary on the Position of Social Work in Assisted Reproduction.” British Journal of Social Work. Volume 45, number 2, 2015. Pages 737-746.]
      84. lifeworld orientation (Hans Thiersch as pronounced in this MP3 audio file, Klaus Grunwald as pronounced in this MP3 audio file, and others): They discuss a German critical approach to social work and pedagogy.
          “… we started to be influenced by the Frankfurt School, not so much with the earlier generation of people like [Theodor] Adorno or [Max] Horkheimer, but with the new generation of the Frankfurt School like [Jürgen] Habermas.…
          “I was more in the reformist tradition but had some connections to people in the radical camp. We regarded social work as a human rights tradition, and therefore we emphasized social help and social support. In this context, the lifeworld orientation was very important because it argued that we need to start with the problems and the needs of the people and their own interpretation of their situation in their own situation. We were influenced by people like Siegfried Bernfeld, Ivan Illich and Paulo Freire, and by theories about everyday life like the ones proposed by Erving Goffman, Alfred Schütz, [Peter] Berger and [Thomas] Luckmann, Habermas and [Karel] Kosík.…
          [Hans Thiersch in Daniel Schugurensky, “Social Pedagogy and Critical Theory: A Conversation with Hans Thiersch.” The International Journal of Social Pedagogy. Volume 3, number 4, 2014. Pages 4-14.]
          “The term ‘lifeworld orientation’, here used as a synonym for ‘everyday orientation,’ describes a conceptual framework for … social work and social care. The concept of the lifeworld orientation was established in the 1970s, and can currently be seen as one of the dominant practice and theory models in Germany.…
          “The concept of the lifeworld orientation for social work and social care developed at the intersection of these trends [radical social criticism and a focus on everyday experiences]. It assimilated these critiques, and addressed them with the medium of the lifeworld experience of both service users and practitioners. The concept may be defined politically, but stops short of being a totalising social critique. It is located in the space defined by the conflicts between coercion and freedom, between oppression and emancipation, and by the corresponding contradiction between criticism and action, in the knowledge that these conflicts cannot simply be resolved. The concept presupposes that there is a societal need for professional social work and social care. It applies lifeworld experience, and takes account of what support is required, to develop practice concepts — concepts reflecting a permanently awkward tension between the dangers of organisational self-referential arrogance and the benefits of specific opportunities for methodologically transparent and reliable work ….”
          [Klaus Grunwald and Hans Thiersch, “The Concept of the ‘Lifeworld Orientation’ for Social Work and Social Care.” Journal of Social Work Practice. Volume 23, number 2, June 2009. Pages 131-146.]
      85. re-theorizing ethical practices in service learning (Joe Blosser): He proposes an ethical approach to this form of radical pedagogy.
          “Over the past two decades perhaps no pedagogical practice has so quickly and broadly changed the dynamics of the US college classroom as service learning. Also known as service-learning (there’s much debate about the hyphen), community service learning, academic service learning, or sometimes more broadly as civic engagement, college educators—and now even many high school teachers feel the pressure to engage their students in the life of the community. The service learning movement has pushed colleges out of their ivory towers and into the community, but the insertion of power, money, and often well-to-do students into community life raises a number of ethical challenges.…
          “I want to know how professors who engage in radical pedagogies, like service learning, can prepare themselves and their students for the ethical challenges such pedagogies introduce into the classroom. How do we think through, for example, the shift in power dynamics between professors and students, the paternalistic overtones often carried by students out into the community, or the brief nature of semester-based service efforts? Like most service learning practitioners, I first turned to John Dewey for answers because he is the recognized intellectual father of the service learning tradition.”
          [Joe Blosser, “Beyond Moral Development: Re-theorizing Ethical Practices in Service Learning.” Journal for Cultural and Religious Theory. Volume 12, number 2, spring 2012. Open access. Pages 196-214.]
      86. existential archeology of contemporary workplace spirituality (George González as pronounced in this MP3 audio file): He develops a critical theoretical approach to capitalist workplace spirituality.
          “Turning to work in contemporary critical theory, which associates strident anti-humanism in social theory with the rise of neoliberal discourse, I argue that sustained attention to the ways in which personal and social history always entail one another and are mutually arising makes not only for better phenomenology but makes for better critical scholarship as well.…
          “… An existential archeology of contemporary postindustrial ‘workplace spirituality’ will track the contours of the neo-hegemonic discourse, on the one hand, and will also exploit the spaces of contradiction wherein biographical history simultaneously reproduces and resists—both as a voluntary matter or not—identification with this discourse, on the other hand. As a type of practice theory which self-reflexively aims to bridge existentialist and poststructuralist insights, it specializes in the investigation of the ways in which the discursive rules that constitute knowledge across multiple social institutions are reproduced at the level of intersubjective history.…
          “In contrast to the Foucauldian collapse of the distinction between technologies of self and domination occasioned by the artificial removal of the ‘contradictions of socialization under the antagonistic conditions of neoliberal capitalism,’ … an existential archeology of contemporary ‘workplace spirituality’ gives voice to these tensions and gains critical leverage in doing so.”
          [George González, “Towards an Existential Archeology of Capitalist Spirituality.” Religions. Volume 7, issue 7, June 2016. Pages 1-22.]
      87. neurodiversity (M. Ariel Cascio): She examines this common designation, a portmanteau for neurological diversity, which is used as a call for tolerance and respect of the community of Autistics.
          “… the advocacy of neurodiversity … [is] a type of autism pride that posits ASD [Autism spectrum disorder] as naturally occurring, and even positive, neuro-variations in human cognitive wiring that should be celebrated rather than eliminated. The neurodiversity approach sees ASD as a disabilitand accordingly takes a disability rights approach. Neurodiversity advocates explain that ‘supports for autistic people should be aimed at helping them to compensate, navigate, and function in the world, not at changing them into non-autistic people or isolating them from the world ….
          “Although coinage of the term neurodiversity has been credited to Judy Singer …, others point to Jim Sinclair’s 1993 speech ‘‘Don’t Mourn for Us’’— which addresses parents of autistic children and expresses hurt at attempts to change individuals with ASD—as the starting point of the ‘‘movement’’ ….”
          [M. Ariel Cascio, “Neurodiversity: Autism Pride Among Mothers of Children with Autism Spectrum Disorders.” Intellectual and Developmental Disabilities. Volume 50, number 3, June 2012. Pages 273-283.]
          “You didn’t lose a child to autism. You lost a child because the child you waited for never came into existence. That isn’t the fault of the autistic child who does exist, and it shouldn’t be our burden. We need and deserve families who can see us and value us for ourselves, not families whose vision of us is obscured by the ghosts of children who never lived. Grieve if you must, for your own lost dreams. But don’t mourn for us. We are alive. We are real. And we’re here waiting for you.” [Jim Sinclair, “Don’t Mourn for Us.” Autonomy: The Critical Journal of Interdisciplinary Autism Studies. Volume 1, number 1, October 2012. Pages 1-4.]
      88. critical technocultural discourse analysis (André Brock): He develops an approach to discourse analysis with interrogates power relations.
          “… [The] critical cultural approach, which I am calling ‘Critical Technocultural Discourse Analysis’ (CTDA), combines analyses of information technology material and virtual design with an inquiry into the production of meaning through information technology practice and the articulations of information technology users in situ. CTDA offers the opportunity to think about all three in parallel, using a conceptual framework interrogating power relations, in order to tease out the connections between them. This approach provides a holistic analysis of the interactions between technology, cultural ideology, and technology practice.
          “CTDA is designed to be open to any critical cultural theoretical framework, as long as the same critical cultural approach is applied to the semiotics of the information and communication technology (ICT) hardware and software under examination and the discourses of its users.”
          [André Brock, “Critical technocultural discourse analysis.” New Media & Society. OnlineFirst edition. November, 2016. Pages 1-19.]
      89. integrationist and separatist discourse (Hanna Bertilsdotter Rosqvist as pronounced in this MP3 audio file, Charlotte Brownlow, and Lindsay O’Dell): They conduct a discourse analysis of the Swedish Autism community.
          “… the discourse analysis explores two competing discourses: a reformist and a radical. The reformist discourse underlines a goal of (political) representation expressed in Empowerment. It may be understood as an important part of producing a legitimate autistic political subject–positioned as a full member, with a full membership–within a parent-dominated autistic advocacy movement. The reformist discourse can be viewed as a result of a negotiation, where full membership is conditioned on the parents’ terms and granted on specific terms. These include working together (neuro-inclusively), advocacy based on interest rather than identity/position as a specific target/member group, agreement upon a definition of autism as a disability (a deficit) a person has rather than an identity. In relation to this, an alternative legitimate autistic subject is produced through invoking the counter-hegemonic radical discourse. Such a narrative produces the ‘Asperger’ or ‘Aspie.’ Here, the ‘full membership’ refers to a sense of identification with sense of belonging to and being at home with other people with autism. It contains a certain amount of autistic solidarity within the group of adults with autism.…
          “The analysis reports two competing discourses: an integrationist (or reformist) and a separatist discourse. They are producing two quite different subject positions and by implication different forms of collective action/activity. Through the more integrationist discourse a subject position as a person with autism is produced and through a counterhegemonic radical discourse a subject position of the ‘Aspie’ is produced. The integrationist discourse underlines a goal of incorporating people with autism into the social/NT world. Hence action is focused on (political) representation through activities such as increased influence and involvement in the association through board representation and formal representation on boards.”
          [Hanna Bertilsdotter Rosqvist, Charlotte Brownlow, and Lindsay O’Dell, “‘An Association for All’—Notions of the Meaning of Autistic Self-Advocacy Politics within a Parent-Dominated Autistic Movement.” Journal of Community & Applied Social Psychology. Volume 25, number 3, May 2015. Pages 219-231.]
      90. relational approach to access and accommodation for autism (Joyce Davidson): She argues for an approach to Autism spectrum disorder which respects differences.
          “… it is not sufficient to merely assist or more passively ‘allow’ the person who is challenged to identify, design, construct and maintain their own means – mechanical or otherwise – of managing disabling space. A responsible, relational approach to accommodating complex sensory impairments takes steps to bring about change, steps that begin with a geographical imagination.…
          “Space for genuine difference and diversity is crucial for those on the spectrum, and future research is required to advance the project ASD [Autism spectrum disorder] authors themselves have begun. Such studies might further imagine what relational approaches respectful of difference might look like. They might also explore how mutually ‘inclusive’ societies could re-conceptualize real difference in terms other than deviancy or deficit ….”
          [Joyce Davidson, “‘It cuts both ways’: A relational approach to access and accommodation for autism.” Social Science & Medicine. Volume 70, issue 2, January 2010. Pages 305-312.]
      91. transformative knowledge (Zeus Leonardo as pronounced in this MP3 audio file): He focuses upon critical social theory and pedagogy.
          “If oppression and emancipation are the two main concerns of CST [critical social theory], then its transformative knowledge base should also reflect their full and lived complexity. For answers are only as deep as the questions that educators and students are able to pose. In this sense, quality education is not something that teachers provide through CST. Rather, quality education is the product of a struggle during the pedagogical interaction where both teacher and student play the role of critic. If criticism is done appropriately and authentically, then educators put theory in its proper place within the process of education.” [Zeus Leonardo, “Critical Social Theory and Transformative Knowledge: The Functions of Criticism in Quality Education.” Educational Researcher Volume 33, number 6. Pages 11-18.]
      92. ideological instruments of a post-Enlightenment state (Michael Payne): He considers the role of critical social theory in avoiding this form of instrumentality.
          “The project of critical theory rests on the conviction that the humanities and human sciences must be emancipatory in order to resist becoming ideological instruments of a post-Enlightenment state. Whether or not they give any overt recognition to the work of the Frankfurt school, such movements within cultural theory as feminism, postcolonialism, multiculturalism, and studies of racism share its epistemological politics. However, as these various longitudinal movements within cultural studies proceed to demonstrate a presiding sexism, colonialism, enthnocentrism, or racism within the various disciplines in the humanities and social sciences, each in turn promotes its critical project as the most effective or legitimately universal means of exposing a methodological Eurocentrism at work in the production of knowledge.” [Michael Payne, “Introduction: Some Versions of Cultural and Critical Theory (1996).” A Dictionary of Cultural and Critical Theory. Second edition. Michael Payne and Jessica Rae Barbera, editors. Malden, Massachusetts: John Wiley & Sons Ltd. 2010. Pages 1-11.]
      93. critical linguistic analysis (Patricia L. Dunmire, Peter Teo, and others): Dunmire, for instance, focuses on “linguistic transformations” and “constructed politically situated assertions.” Teo considers “the centrality of language as a means of sustaining and reproducing power structures in society.”
          “This article examines the linguistic processes through which a projected event (that is, an event that a group of spokespersons alleges will occur in the future) is constructed within factual discourse. Critical linguistic analysis is used to examine the New York Times and Washington Post coverage of the 1990 Persian Gulf conflict. This study makes two contributions. First, it expands on work in critical linguistics by explicating how a projected event is constructed as a discrete and autonomous event unfolding in the social world. Second, this study demonstrates how the political interests underlying the newspaper accounts were ‘naturalized’ through linguistic transformations that constructed politically situated assertions as unmediated and presupposed information. This study is important for understanding the constructive nature of language practices because it demonstrates how seemingly arhetorical linguistic constructions can be examined for their rhetorical features, features that play an important role in actively constructing representations of the social world.” [Patricia L. Dunmire, “Naturalizing the Future in Factual Discourse: A Critical Linguistic Analysis of a Projected Event.” Written Communication. volume 14, number 2, April 1997. Pages 221-264.]
          “What … researchers working within the critical linguistic paradigm share is a common vision of the centrality of language as a means of sustaining and reproducing power structures in society. One fundamental theoretical idea that informs ‘critical linguistics’ is the belief that social relations of power are discursively enacted and reproduced …, and therefore by analysing discursive structures, social processes and structures can be uncovered and elucidated to reveal the ideologies that may be at work beneath language. Ideology, in this context, can be defined as ‘particular ways of representing and constructing society which reproduce unequal relations of power, relations of domination and exploitation’ ….” [Peter Teo, “Mandarinising Singapore: a Critical Analysis of Slogans in Singapore’s ‘Speak Mandarin Campaign.’” Working paper number 120. Centre for Language in Social Life of Lancaster University. Bailrigg, England. Pages i-ii and 1-37.]
          “Approaches to critical linguistics have identified several dimensions of relationships among language, ideology, and power. Critical linguistic analysis aims at uncovering the role of language in constructing social identities, relationships, issues, and events. Its central concern has been to examine the socio-political nature of the texts and discourses through which social reality is constituted and investigate how these discourses maintain power through their ideological properties ….” [Su Jung Min, “Constructing Ideology: A Critical Linguistic Analysis.” Studies in the Linguistic Sciences. Volume 27, number 2, fall 1997. Pages 147-164.]
          “Just as everyday discussions and debates shift constantly between different levels of abstraction, legal discourse also shifts constantly between different levels of abstraction. A critical linguistic analysis of law is an analysis that focuses on being conscious of how courts and lawyers uses linguistic techniques to subtly change the subject matter of a legal discussion, and of how such linguistic moves have both substantive and rhetorical effect on shaping legal discourse.” [Reginald C. Oh, “Vision and Revision: Exploring the History, Evolution, and Future of the Fourteenth Amendment: A Critical Linguistic Analysis of Equal Protection Doctrine: Are Whites a Suspect Class?” Temple Political and Civil Rights Law Review. Volume 13, 2004. Pages 583-610.]
          “The linguistic features and the correlated function mappings used in the analysis are established in the literature of functional/critical linguistics. In particular, I included linguistic forms which signal the different kinds of meaning carried by the ideational, interpersonal, and textual semantic components.” [Sevasti Kessapidu, “A critical linguistic approach to a corpus of business letters in Greek.” Discourse & Society. Volume 8, number 4, 1997. Pages 479-500.]
          “In critical linguistics and critical discourse analysis, focus is put on often detailed linguistic characteristics, which are assumed to reflect or reproduce the social context in which they were produced. A common critique within critical discourse analysis is, however, that research in the field often lacks focus on either the language or the social context ….” [Elin Lövestam. Dietetic documentation: Content, language and the meaning of standardization in Swedish dietitians’ patient record notes. Ph.D. dissertation. Uppsala University. Uppsala, Sweden. 2015. Page 67.]
          “Discourse analysis may take many forms, and there are no agreed analytic procedures, although guidelines are available.…
          “… [These include] critical discourse analysis, interpretive structurism, critical linguistic analysis, and social linguistic analysis ….”
          [Margaret O’Connor, “Discourse analysis: examining the potential for research in palliative care.” Palliative Medicine. Volume 20, number 8, December 2006. Pages 829-834.]
      94. critical applied linguistics (Alan Davies, Alastair Pennycook, Joseph Ernest Mambu, Graham Crookes, and others): They apply critical social theory and critical pedagogy to linguistics.
          “The case study, ‘critical pedagogy’, … it represents an alternative applied linguistics, known as critical applied linguistics (CAL). It does this in two ways, first by offering a critique of traditional applied linguistics …; and second, by exemplifying one way of doing CAL, namely critical pedagogy. I shall suggest … that CAL may represent an ethical response to traditional applied linguistics; then … I look more closely at the origins of CAL and the claims it makes.” [Alan Davies. An Introduction to Applied Linguistics: From Practice to Theory. Second edition. Edinburgh, Scotland: Edinburgh University Press. 2007. Page 17.]
          “Critical applied linguistics (CAL) brings into applied linguistics a postmodern view of knowledge and of the ways in which it is socially constructed …. CAL rejects all grand theories of language in use such as the inevitability of English as a world language, proffering ‘scepticism towards all metanarratives’ …. It outs traditional applied linguistics as an enterprise which is hegemonic and has never been neutral ….” [Alan Davies. An Introduction to Applied Linguistics: From Practice to Theory. Second edition. Edinburgh, Scotland: Edinburgh University Press. 2007. Page 128.]
          “… CAL [critical applied linguistics] would offer what might be regarded as an idealistic ethical view, taking no account either of the availability of resources or of the social facts of for example the position in the world (in India, or in Australia) of English. And so in spite of its claims to be socially concerned, CAL appears to be individually oriented. This puts a question mark against its role within applied linguistics as it has been practised, since that practice has always been socially aware, context sensitive, attempting to bring together what is known about language and local realities. CAL looks much more like the abstraction we expect in theoretical linguistics. But of course the bottom line of CAL is that it does raise the fundamental question within applied linguistics, which is whether its traditional practice has in fact been misguided.” [Alan Davies. An Introduction to Applied Linguistics: From Practice to Theory. Second edition. Edinburgh, Scotland: Edinburgh University Press. 2007. Page 130.]
          “It might be tempting to consider critical applied linguistics as an amalgam of related critical domains. From this point of view, critical applied linguistics would either be made up of, or constitute the intersection of, areas such as critical linguistics, critical discourse analysis, critical language awareness, critical pedagogy, critical sociolinguistics, and critical literacy. But such a formulation is unsatisfactory for several reasons. First, the coverage of such domains is rather different from that of critical applied linguistics; critical pedagogy, for example, is used broadly across many areas of education. Second, there are many other domains – feminism, queer theory, postcolonialism, to name but a few – that do not operate under an explicit critical label but which clearly have a great deal of importance for the area. Third, it seems more constructive to view critical applied linguistics not merely as an amalgam of different parts, a piece of bricolage, or a meta-category of critical work, but rather in more dynamic and productive terms. And finally, crucially, part of developing critical applied linguistics is developing a critical stance toward other areas of work, including other critical domains. Critical applied linguistics may borrow and use work from these other areas, but it should certainly only do so critically.” [Alastair Pennycook, “Critical Applied Linguistics.” The Handbook of Applied Linguistics. Alan Davies and Catherine Elder, editors. Malden, Massachusetts: Blackwell Publishing Ltd. 2004. Pages 784-807.]
          “Drawing on work in areas such as feminism, antiracism, postcolonialism, postmodernism, or queer theory, this approach to the critical seeks not so much the stable ground of an alternative truth but rather the constant questioning of all categories. From this point of view, critical applied linguistics is not only about relating micro relations of applied linguistics to macro relations of social and political power; neither is it only concerned with relating such questions to a prior critical analysis of inequality; rather, it is also concerned with questioning what is meant by and what is maintained by many of the everyday categories of applied linguistics: language, learning, communication, difference, context, text, culture, meaning, translation, writing, literacy, assessment, and so on.” [Alastair Pennycook. Critical Applied Linguistics: A Critical Introduction. London and New York: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc., imprint of Taylor & Francis Group, an Informa PLC business. 2009. Page 21.]
          “I agree with [Alastair] Pennycook who suggests that critical applied linguists need to be aware of their limits of knowing. Despite the limits, in order that CAL is more down-to-earth to EFL [English as a foreign language] pedagogy in Indonesia, I propose a working model (the “discursive mapping”) with these purposes.… [I]t is to engage teachers and students with difference. That is, they need to acknowledge that language teaching and learning does not exist in social vacuum and hence different voices that contribute to confusion syndrome Discourses should be addressed. By so doing, it is hoped that both teachers and students learn to suspend judgment to politicians. Teachers and students may critique politicians’ language use but at least by being engaged with difference (e.g. putting oneself in someone’s shoes), they become more aware of the complexity politicians have to deal with, e.g. conflicts of interests, clashes of worldviews, and ignorance about a certain law that leads them to produce regulations that are not only against the law but make people confused.” [Joseph Ernest Mambu, “Addressing Political ‘Confusion Syndrome’ Discourses: A Critical Applied Linguistics Perspective.” K@ta. Volume 10, number 1, June 2008. Pages 14-35.]
          “The article … discusses FL [foreign language] teacher education and research in light of various criticisms that have been levelled at it and introduces the additional perspective of critical applied linguistics, which, I argue, may help to rectify some of the problems.…
          “… I join many others in both applied linguistics and mainstream education, particularly those engaged in forms of critical pedagogy, who believe that there are grounds for grave concern when we consider the factors influencing S/FL [second and foreign language] teachers and teaching in many parts of the world.”
          [Graham Crookes, “What Influences What and How Second and Foreign Language Teachers Teach?” The Modern Language Journal. Volume 81, number 1, spring 1997. Pages 67-79.]
          “… [There] was a movement across structuralism (in the sense of a correction and modernization of the ideas of the Enlightenment), rejecting the subjective existentialism and psychoanalysis in favor of a quest for the objective in the patterning of social life …, to poststructuralism, rejecting the scientific aspirations of structuralism, and asserting that there is no truth and so there can be no appropriate methodology, and so demonstrating the ancient clash between nominalism and realism. The result of this intellectual shift lies in the identification of the political, but with the following problem: Does the shift reveal the quest of a just politics or the quest for just a politics? This question resulted in a development that led to what might be termed critical applied linguistics.” [Robert Kaplan, “Practice without Theory and Theory without Practice.” TESOL Quarterly. Volume 42, number 2, June 2008. Pages 294-296.]
      95. social psychology of language perspective (Sik Hung Ng [Vietnamese, Sik Hưng Ng as pronounced in this MP3 audio file]): The article considers both subtle and blatant varieties of language–based discrimination—including “the use and abuse of power.”
          “… a broad definition of language has been adopted to refer to not only language per se but also its performance (competence) and strategic manipulation and tacit ground rules in social communication. This broad working definition, unconventional as it may seem to linguists, will provide a useful conceptual framework for articulating the multilayered power dynamics of language and its use. Because discrimination heavily implicates the use and abuse of power, research in this area will benefit from a critical appreciation of language power in both its banal and hidden forms. Toward this end, we will adopt a social psychology of language perspective … informed by works on the relationships between language and power … and between language and cognition ….” [Sik Hung Ng, “Language-Based Discrimination: Blatant and Subtle Forms.” Journal of Language and Social Psychology. Volume 26, number 2, June 2007. Pages 106-122.]
      96. culture clash (Simon Bromley): He brilliantly critiques Samuel P. Huffington’s “clash of civilizations” hypothesis.
          “[Samuel P.] Huntington’s diagnosis has given as much comfort to conservatives at home as it has to those proclaiming their cultural peculiarity abroad. For all its resonance, however, the argument is not only false, but also ugly and pernicious. As his liberal critics have noted, Huntington’s argument is false because cultures are not unified, closed totalities centred upon univocal religious doctrines, but are rather multiform, open and contested – subject to interpretation and contestation in relation to different interests and contexts.…
          “More importantly, however, Huntington’s schema of a bipolar world characterized by ideological division being replaced by a multi-polar civilizational order is radically insufficient to make sense of the contours of contemporary global politics.…
          “… Huntington presents multiculturalism within the West (particularly in the United States) as an attempt to reject the West’s cultural heritage and to overthrow its liberal political arrangements. A more convincing interpretation, one more ready to engage with these new voices in the spirit of liberal tolerance and negotiation, would see them as attempts to expand and develop the freedoms of Western societies to incorporate all, and not just their White, people.”
          [Simon Bromley, “Culture clash.” Radical Philosophy: Philosophical Journal of the Independent Left. Number 85, September/October 1997. Pages 2-6.]
          “It is my hypothesis that the fundamental source of conflict in this new world will not be primarily ideological or primarily economic. The great divisions among humankind and the dominating source of conflict will be cultural. Nation states will remain the most powerful actors in world affairs, but the principal conflicts of global politics will occur between nations and groups of different civilizations. The clash of civilizations will dominate global politics. The fault lines between civilizations will be the battle lines of the future.” [Samuel P. Huntington, “The Clash of Civilizations?” Foreign Affairs. Volume 72, number 3, summer 1993. Pages 22-49.]
          “Civilizations are the ultimate human tribes, and the clash of civilizations is tribal conflict on a global scale. In the emerging world, states i and groups from two different civilizations may form limited, ad hoc, tactical connections and coalitions to advance their interests against entities from a third civilization or for other shared purposes. Relations between groups from different civilizations however will be almost never close, usually cool, and often hostile. Connections between states of different civilizations inherited from the past, such as Cold War military alliances, are likely to attenuate or evaporate. Hopes for close intercivilizational ‘partnerships,’ such as were once articulated by their leaders for Russia and America, will not be realized. Emerging intercivilizational relations will normally vary from distant to violent, with most falling somewhere in between.” [Samuel P. Huntington. The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order. New York: Simon & Schuster. 1996. Page 207.]
      97. critique of the clash of civilizations (Mian Muhammad Tahir Ashraf Arabic/ʿArabiyyaẗ, مِيَان مُحَمَّد طَاهِر أَشْرَف, Miyān Muḥammad Ṭāhir ꞌAšraf]): He offers a threefold critique of Samuel P. Huntington’s proposal.
          “‘The Clash of Civilizations’ has it weakness in three methodological dimensions, discipline, approach and correlative propositions. Discipline-wise, ‘The Clash of Civilizations’ delineates a confusional mode of analysis ….
          “Approach-wise, the article has two weaknesses. The first one is confusion in dealing with realist theory of international relations. [Samuel P.] Huntington’s aim is to produce a piece of international politics but he is inconsistent with the realist approach when he deals with world power politics. However, he does not stay in this line of thought when he identifies civilizational affinity as the base for alliances rather than national interest.
          “The second deficiency with respect to approach in Huntington’s article relates to the unmanageability to its unit of analysis. Civilization as a unit of analysis is a big entity.…
          “The third methodological weak point needs to be examined the correlative propositions. The key point in his analysis is that the future conflicts are keenly correlated with civilizational differences.”
          [Mian Muhammad Tahir Ashraf, “The Clash of Civilizations? A Critique.” Pakistan Journal of Social Sciences (PJSS). Volume 32, number 2, 2012. Pages 521-527.]
      98. affect–spectrum theory (Warren D. TenHouten as pronounced in this MP3 audio file): He develops a self-described “general theory of emotions.”
          “… emotions exist on the levels of brain and body, mind, and society. This book presents such a three-level theory, affect-spectrum theory, which makes possible prediction of the entire spectrum of the emotions – ranging from eight primary emotions, to 28 secondary emotions, to a potential 56 tertiary emotions. This theory will be developed as far as space allows, and it will, at least for its first eight propositions – in which eight primary emotions are predicted from each of the eight elementary social relations – be tested empirically using textual data in two radically different cultures, Australian Aborigines and Euro-Australians.” [Warren D. TenHouten. A General Theory of Emotions and Social Life. London and New York: Routledge imprint of Taylor & Francis Group, an Informa PLC business. 2007. Page xii.]
          “The results of the study are strongly supportive of affect-spectrum theory with one problematic result: the negative experience of marketbased social relationships predicted Surprise significantly for Aborigines, but only directionally for Euro-Australians. The impossibility of estimating inter-indicator reliability for the six measures of MP [market pricing]—suggest it is not a unitary concept, and in fact it was determined that its six items are of two different kinds. Four of the items – measures of ejection, relinquishment, dislocation, and circumscription – get at the shared cultural experience of Aborigines, who have historically had the collective experience of having been conquered and disposed; forcibly taken off their lands, rounded up, and placed in reserves, mission, other institutions, and private homes; ejected from their sacred lands, thereby losing their nomadic way of life with its hunting-and-gathering mode of economic production; experienced having their families broken up and their children taken away; and in countless other ways have had their lives and identities circumscribed ….” [Warren D. TenHouten. A General Theory of Emotions and Social Life. London and New York: Routledge imprint of Taylor & Francis Group, an Informa PLC business. 2007. Page 253.]
      99. racial reconstructionism (Joshua Glasgow): He proposes a new theory of race.
          “There is a … position, which … I will … call ‘racial reconstructionism,’ that is … tenable. As understood here, reconstructionism is a substitutionist view, not an eliminativist view, and according to substitutionism we should replace racial discourse with a nearby discourse, with attendant proximate concepts and conceptions. According to my particular reconstructionist brand of substitutionism, that replacement should go as follows.
          “First, we should keep the word ‘race’ and cognate and related terms. It might be less misleading if we used some other terms, like ‘shmace,’ but the best part of conservationism cautions us against making less than maximally efficient modifications to our language. Second, we should, at least for the time being, keep the exact racial groupings we have now, and if we have good reason perhaps eventually move to some other (possibly more coherent) set of groupings. So we will still talk about things we call ‘races,’ and we’ll have groups whose members we call ‘black people,’ ‘white people,’ ‘Asian people,’ and so on. Third, however, there will be one key difference that separates current racial discourse from post-reconstruction discourse: by ‘race’ we will, postreconstruction, intend only to refer to social kinds, and we will get rid of any conceptual implication that there are even partially biological races. That is racial reconstructionism ….”
          [Joshua Glasgow. A Theory of Race. London and New York: Routledge imprint of Taylor & Francis Group, an Informa PLC business. 2009. Page 139.]
      100. Awareness-in-Action (Daniel J. O’Connor): Utilizes aspects of critical social theory, Ken Wilber’s integral theory, and action science to develop a type of critical integralism.
           “Granted, in my preliminary effort to articulate a form of integral philosophy that is as realistic as it is idealistic and as fallibilistic as it is humanistic, with a pragmatic focus on the way people can, should, and already do act in the world, my contribution may be little more than a clarification of my own novel vision of the nexus between [Jürgen] Habermas’s critical theory, [Ken] Wilber’s integral theory, and [Chris] Argyris’s action science. Nevertheless, the logic of this vision and its demonstrated capacity to reconstruct established views within these fields should justify the effort required of you, the reader. More to the point, the real promise of the critical integralism I call Awareness-in-Action is in its potential to (re)define the common core of all the various forms and fields of human action, so that those of us concerned with such matters might learn how to respond more effectively to the interdependent political, economic, social, and ecological challenges of our time.” [Daniel J. O’Connor. Awareness-in-Action: A Critical Integralism for the Challenges of Our Time. Bainbridge Island, Washington: Reconstructive Realizations. 2015. Pages 2-3.]
      101. integral critical theory (Martin Beck Matuštík as pronounced in this MP3 audio file): Matuštík applies Ken Wilber’s integral theory to various critical theoretical approaches.
           “The precursors to what I call integral critical theory are found much closer to our times. In his early essays from the 1930s, Herbert Marcuse attempted to integrate the existential ontology of Martin Heidegger with the newly discovered humanistic perspective of the young Karl Marx. That attempt, initiated while Marcuse was writing his second doctorate under Heidegger, was cut short by the rise of Nazism. Marcuse joined the Frankfurt Institute of Social Research on its flight into exile and never resumed the project of phenomenological Marxism. It was not until the mid-twentieth century that Jean-Paul Sartre embarked upon a major effort to link in a single philosophical space of theory the existential (personal) together with the sociopolitical (public) perspectives on human development.…
           “One field of ICT [integral critical theory] pertains to material needs and resources for their satisfaction. Its corresponding dimension encompasses critique of political economy, whereby it articulates vehicles for just economic distribution of material resources for the satisfaction of bodily needs. Another field concerns social and cultural needs for recognition and institutions for their expression. This dimension of ICT develops critique of society, whereby it seeks political vehicles for social integration, democratic participation, and cultural reproduction. The third field articulates ultimate concerns or hope—spiritual needs for the self-transformation. The dimension of spiritual critique in this field is to unmask not only the secular but also the religious idolatry of finite absolutes. In this triple approach, an ICT would promote ways of human self-transformation, practices aiming at spiritual liberation, and communicative channels to redemptive hope.…
           “There is one astonishing implication of taking steps in the direction of ICT [integral critical theory]: What we are suffering in the twenty-first century is neither solely an economic class war, nor Samuel Huntington’s clash of civilizations, e.g., between modern West and traditionalist Islam, nor simply religious wars. The revolutionary subject of true human needs, critique, and hoped-for ideals is not to be sought along one single trajectory: either economic or political class or orthodox religious brand-names. ICT requires us to rethink the fault lines of conflict as collisions of frameworks among material, political, and spiritual levels of development. Such collisions arise both from disturbances within the frameworks and in hegemonic struggles among them. The economic analysts need to focus on models best suited to local and global justice.”
           [Martin Beck Matuštík, “Towards an Integral Critical Theory of the Present Age.” Integral Review. Creative Commons. Volume 5, December 2007. Pages 227-239.]
      102. dialectics of the concrete (Karel Kosík as pronounced in this MP3 audio file, Benno Teschke as pronounced in this MP3 audio file, and Can Cemgil as pronounced in this MP3 audio file]): Kosík develops a methodology—focusing on the dialectical basis of concrete phenomena—which, he says, can be adapted for the examination of a variety of subject matter. As an illustration, Teschk and Cemgil apply Kosík’s dialectic to international relations and foreign policy analysis.
           “The dialectics of the concrete totality is not a method that would naively aspire to know all aspects of reality exhaustively and to present a ‘total’ image of reality, with all its infinite aspects and properties. Concrete totality is not a method for capturing and describing all aspects, features, properties, relations and processes of reality. Rather, it is a theory of reality as a concrete totality. This conception of reality, of reality as concreteness, as a whole that is structured (and thus is not chaotic), that evolves (and this is not immutable and given once and for all), and that is in the process of forming (and thus is not ready-made in its whole, with only its parts, or their ordering, subject to change), has certain methodological implications that will become a heuristic guide and an epistemological principle for the study, description, comprehension, interpretation and evaluation of certain thematic sections of reality, be it physics or literary criticism, biology or political economy, theoretical problems of mathematics or practical issues of organizing human life and social conditions.” [Karel Kosík. Dialectics of the Concrete: A Study on Problems of Man and World. Karel Kovanda with James Schmidt, translators. Dordrecht, the Netherlands, and Boston, Massachusetts: D. Reidel Publishing Company. 1976. Page 19.]
           “The term pseudo-concrete is used by Karel Kosík in his Dialectics of the Concrete, originally published in Czech in 1963.” [Sven Lütticken, “Attending to Abstract Things.” New Left Review. Series 2, number 54, November–December 2008. Pages 101-122.]
           “By exploring the nature of this IR [international relations] theory–FPA [foreign policy analysis] divide and by proceeding through a critique of the understandings of dialectics in mainstream Marxism, the objective of this paper is to clarify how a specific understanding of dialectics—the dialectics of the concrete—may help to provide the missing epistemological foundations for bridging this gap [‘between general Marxist theories of IR and the analysis of foreign policy-making’] within mainstream and Marxist IR approaches.…
           “‘Dialectics is after the “thing itself”’ ([according to Karel] Kosík …) much like any other view of the world.…
           “… dialectics sees contradictions as constitutive of the concrete existence of any phenomenon.”
           [Benno Teschke and Can Cemgil, “The Dialectic of the Concrete: Reconsidering Dialectic for IR and Foreign Policy Analysis.” Globalizations. Volume 11, number 5, 2014. Pages 605-625.]
           “Much of the praxis of everyday life relates to concrete relations and, as has been shown by Karel Kosík, life takes place within what appears as a consummate world of things, institutions and contexts in which the individual’s activities are expressed as a form of routine performance ….
           “… There is a risk that lived experience becomes no more than a discourse on perceived personal spatiality or a representation and thereby increasingly loses sight of one of the constituent elements of the dialectic of the concrete.”
           [Jan Öhman, “Towards a Digital (Societal) Infrastructure?” Urban Studies. Volume 47, number 1, January 2010. Pages 183-195.]
      103. integral macropolitics (Daniel Gustav Anderson): He proposes a critical approach to macropolitics informed by Ken Wilber’s integral theory.
           “This treatise proposes the practice of becoming-responsible as a basis for integral micropolitics, defined as taking active responsibility for the well-being of the totality of living beings without exception, for the sake of that well-being alone.…
           “… For the purposes of macropolitics or politics as such, a subject is tasked with responsibility for the development and potential transformation of an object of public concern such as a ‘public’ as such (as a tyrant, an oligarch, or in a participatory way as a citizen in a democracy)—or is excluded from that responsibility, becoming a responsibility of another, ‘handing over’ by virtue of life circumstance any control over the terms of one’s future, or the future of one’s community or nation in relation to others. Because this is an unjust relation—some, by accident of birth or life chances, have control over the lives of others who themselves have no control over the terms by which they must live—I assume it is better to ensure that all who are capable of becoming-responsible for themselves and for others find the opportunity to do so, which is to say, I assume the present regime of ‘uneven geographical development’ … to be unsatisfactory and in need of transformation. Specifically, I do not object to ‘hierarchy’ as such or differentiation as such, nor do I assume unity or totality to be necessarily oppressive; I do have reason to object to the terms and conditions of the present order, the kinds and qualities of hierarchy and differentiation prevalent and possible now.”
           [Daniel Gustav Anderson, “‘Sweet Science’: A Proposal for Integral Macropolitics.” Integral Review. Creative Commons. Volume 6, number 1, March 2010. Pages 10-62.]
           “In the present inquiry I propose two related interventions, one into integral theory and culture, and another implementing the theoretical positions I take into praxis in the world at large, with the theory intended to make transformative praxis possible, and the conditions of praxis intended to make the theory useful and responsible for building a life worth living for all. I argue eight separate theses (listed below), which either follow from each other logically, or recontextualize extant integral models into the framework I construct, or both. Holding all eight together is the conviction that humanity is confronting an apparently fragmented but in reality integrated set of problems, many of them violent—social, ecological, economic, legal, political, subjective—that are best addressed by an integrated set of solutions, such that transformation of the holy, horrible mess we inhabit into a sane, nonviolent, and democratic order becomes possible. This is, obviously, a utopian ambition.
           “I mean something very specific by integral theory. Broadly speaking, the integral part of integral theory seeks to address the problem of everything ([Ken] Wilber …), and to propose means of transforming it: first to grasp this puzzling, preposterous world for what it is, with our confused and problematic selves, in order to then help solve the problem, thus giving two interventions.”
           [Daniel Gustav Anderson, “‘Such a Body We Must Create:’ New Theses on Integral Micropolitics.” Integral Review. Creative Commons. Volume 4, number 2, December 2008. Pages 4-70.]
      104. integrative social contracts theory (Thomas Donaldson and Thomas W. Dunfee): They develop “a contractarian process of making normative judgments” regarding business ethics.
           “In this article, we seek to advance the interconnection between empirical and normative research in business ethics by presenting a normative theory, called integrative social contracts theory (ISCT), which incorporates empirical findings as part of a contractarian process of making normative judgments. Derived from roots in classical and social contract theory, this integrative theory recognizes ethical obligations based upon two levels of consent: first, to a theoretical ‘macrosocial’ contract appealing to all rational contractors and second, to real ‘microsocial’ contracts by members of numerous localized communities. Through this process, we seek to put the ‘is’ and the ‘ought’ in symbiotic harmony, requiring the cooperation of both empirical and normative research in rendering ultimate value judgments. In order to render normative judgments under the contractarian framework presented, it is necessary first to make accurate empirical findings concerning the ethical attitudes and behaviors of members of relevant communities. The emphasis on the role of communities in generating moral norms characterizes this approach as communitarian.” [Thomas Donaldson and Thomas W. Dunfee, “Toward a Unified Conception of Business Ethics: Integrative Social Contracts Theory.” The Academy of Management Review. Volume 19, number 2, April 1994. Pages 252-284.]
           “[Thomas] Donaldson and [Thomas W.] Dunfee … advanced earlier work on the social contract for business by developing integrative social contracts theory. Consistent with earlier social contract theory, this theory holds that the content of community social contracts must be informed by broader social principles, or hypernorms, and based on the consent of participants. The notion of micro social contracts, as Donaldson and Dunfee … call them, defines the content and application of normative principles for a community. Translated to the organizational level, our idea of a micro-economic social contract, which is distinct from but related to Donaldson and Dunfee’s term, specifies the obligations that people hold for enterprises, as opposed to an entire economic system.” [George W. Watson, Jon M. Shepard, and Carroll U. Stephens, “Fairness and Ideology: An Empirical Test of Social Contracts Theory.” Business & Society. Volume 38, number 1, March 1999. Pages 83-108.]
      105. philosophy of praxis (John Roberts): He cites “the three founding texts” of that philosophy. They are all referenced and quoted throughout this article.
           “… the ‘everyday’ signifies a kind of a generalized point of attraction for the critique of prewar Marxist orthodoxy and bourgeois science. In this, the formation of the term in Europe is inseparable from the euphoric reinterpretation of Marxism as a theory of praxis in the early 1920s in Europe: the origins of Marxism as cultural critique. Thus, in the three founding texts of the philosophy of praxis, Karl Korsch’s Marxism and Philosophy (1923), [Georg] Lukács’s History and Class Consciousness (1923) – his farewell to a Romantic naturalization of the everyday as ‘inauthentic’ – and Lukács’s Lenin (1924), the term der Alltag [the everyday] is rarely used and is never a focus for the discussion of political practice ….” [John Roberts, “Philosophizing the everyday: The philosophy of praxis and the fate of cultural studies.” Radical Philosophy: Philosophical Journal of the Independent Left. Number 98, November/December 1999. Pages 16-29.]
      106. economic theology (Samuel Weber): He develops an approach to theology informed by Walter Benjamin’s critical social theory.
           “… I have come to the conclusion that the questions posed by ‘political theology’ benefit by being connected with what I, and many others, have called ‘economic theology.’ … The notion of ‘economic theology’ strikes me as useful in developing [Walter] Benjamin’s suggestive but unelaborated insight (although all of his later work can be seen as an implicit elaboration and exploration of the connection between Capitalism and Christian Theology). The ‘cares and troubles’ addressed by traditional religions Benjamin associated with ‘guilt’: Capitalism, he argued, was the first religion that did not seek to provide a solution to the problem of guilt, to de-culpabilize, but rather to universalize it.… This I think is important: it is the Logic of a Universal and self-identical theos, a Creator God, that is the origin of Guilt, and hence at the origin of Economic Theology and the political (but also cultural) tradition it informs. The problem is quite simply this: if God is One and the Same, Self-Identical, and above all, immortal—or rather beyond Life and Death—then mortality, which characterizes all living beings qua living, and finitude, which characterizes all beings qua singular, whether animate or inanimate, has to be explained in a way that does not call into question the unity, unicity and self-identity of their divine origin.” [Samuel Weber, “Theology, Economy and Critique (Interviewed by Diego Rossello).” Revista Pléyade. Number 8, July–December 2011. Pages 199-2011.]
           “Since I will be discussing texts and attitudes not usually associated with economics or politics, let me begin by stating my conviction that modern economic policies, attitudes and behaviors are decisively informed by factors that derive from the Judeo-Christian theological tradition—and that this holds true for an age that prides itself on being secular. I will argue that discussions of debt, and of the present crisis to which it contributes, can benefit from taking into account a dimension of the problem that is usually ignored or minimized, and that could be designated ‘economic theology’—a term meant to call attention to its relation to the notion of political theology, dating from the eighteenth century but today largely associated with the writings of Carl Schmitt. I do not present either of these perspectives as definitive or exhaustive, but I do want to suggest that they can provide insights into an economic and political situation that seems ever more irrational and dysfunctional—possibly even suicidal—with every passing day. It is a situation in which members of ‘democratic’ societies—not just policy-makers and representatives but also substantial segments of those victimized by these designated ‘decision-makers’—continue to endorse the parties, policies and institutions directly and indirectly responsible for the deterioration of their living conditions. My hope is that by contributing to our understanding of how such behavior can persist in the face of what should be the dissuasive effect of the policies it endorses, an economic-theological analysis of political behavior and attitudes can perhaps prepare the way for modifying these dominant tendencies—although I harbor no illusions about the power of discursive analyses to translate directly into critical transformative action.” [Samuel Weber, “The Debt of the Living.” Postmodern Culture. Volume 23, number 3, May 2013. Pagination unknown.]
      107. critical rational choice theory (Kay Peggs): Applies critical social theory to rational-choice theory (akin to George Homans’ exchange theory).
           “I ground my theoretical approach in critical rational choice theory because this facilitates reflection upon the complex character of choice discourses connected with the EC [European Community] Proposal. Consequently, I aim to explore constructions of, and assumptions about, human and nonhuman animal liberties (and associated moral positions on these) and investigate how the language in the texts constructs and reconstructs human choices about nonhuman animal experiments.” [Kay Peggs, “Nonhuman Animal Experiments in the European Community: Human Values and Rational Choice.” Society and Animals. Volume 18, 2010. Pages 1-20.]
           “An incidental advantage of an exchange theory is that it might bring sociology closer to economics—that science of man most advanced, most capable of application, and, intellectually, most isolated.…
           “… For a person engaged in exchange, what he gives may be a cost to him, just as what he gets may be a reward, and his behavior changes less as profit, that is, reward less cost, tends to a maximum. Not only does he seek a maximum for himself, but he tries to see to it that no one in his group makes more profit than he does. The cost and the value of what he gives and of what he gets vary with the quantity of what he gives and gets.…
           “In our unguarded moments we sociologists find words like ‘reward’ and ‘cost’ slipping into what we say. Human nature will break in upon even our most elaborate theories. But we seldom let it have its way with us and follow up systematically what these words imply. Of all our many ‘approaches’ to social behavior, the one that sees it as an economy is the most neglected, and yet it is the one we use every moment of our lives—except when we write sociology.”
           [George C. Homans, “Social Behavior as Exchange.” American Journal of Sociology. Volume 63, number 6, May 1958. Pages 597-606.]
           “The results of my efforts at showing that many of the findings of the more social parts of social psychology follow from the propositions of behavioral psychology appeared first in my paper ‘Social Behavior as Exchange’ ….” [George Casper Homans, “A Life of Synthesis.” The American Behavioral Scientist. Volume 12, number 1, September/October 1968.]
           “I shall argue that despite all its limitations, rational action or choice theory (RAT) is what we are after. At least, it is where we should start. I am well aware that this is regarded in many circles as heterodox in the sense that sociological theory often is interpreted as an attempt to transcend rational choice. Two remarks: First, I think it would be unfortunate to set up stark oppositions. In adopting a RAT perspective, we must guard against throwing out all that has been achieved by way of criticism of RAT. The last thing sociological theory needs is an intellectual balkanization. The challenges are complex and technically demanding well beyond our present capabilities, and a certain mutual goodwill and tolerance is needed. Second, it is important to recognize that in choosing a theoretical way of looking at things, one is not going to entirely secure oneself against conceptual and epistemological criticism. Theoretical conjecture is usually a matter of choosing the least worst among a set of competing possibilities.” [Peter Abell, “Is Rational Choice Theory a Rational Choice of Theory?” Rational Choice Theory: Advocacy and Critique. James S. Coleman and Thomas J. Fararo, editors. Newbury Park, California: SAGE Publications, Inc. 1992. Pages 183-206.]
           “Sociological rational choice is an inherently multilevel enterprise. It seeks to account for social outcomes on the basis of both social context and individual action. In this respect it often differs, at least in emphasis, from other (thin) versions of rational choice theory that are employed in much economic analysis and game theory. Sociological rational choice is beginning to make empirical contributions to a broad range of substantive topics in the discipline. While applications of rational choice in subfields like politics, labor markets, formal organizations, and criminology by now are traditional, the approach has also begun to make empirical advances in areas formerly regarded as inhospitable, such as the family, gender, and religion.” [Michael Hechter and Satoshi Kanazawa, “Sociological Rational Choice Theory.” Annual Review of Sociology. Volume 23, 1997. Pages 191-214.]
           “The utility premise of rational choice theory has an obvious affinity for the deterrence doctrine in criminology. Deterrence and the utilitarian view of rational human nature have been with us since at least the eighteenth century. The deterrence doctrine, which was at the heart of classical criminology, arguably has been the most researched topic in criminology since the latter part of the 1960s.” [Ronald L. Akers, “Rational Choice, Deterrence, and Social Learning Theory in Criminology: The Path Not Taken.” Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology. Volume 81, issue 3, fall 1990, article 6. Pages 653-676.]
      108. thing–power materialism (Jane Bennett): She develops “an ecology of matter,” including humans as well as nonhumans.
           “Ecology can be defined as the study or story (logos) of the place where we live (oikos), or better, the place that we live. For a thing-power materialist, that place is a dynamic flow of matter-energy that tends to settle into various bodies, bodies that often join forces, make connections, form alliances.… For a thing-power materialist, humans are always in composition with nonhumanity, never outside of a sticky web of connections or an ecology.
           “Thing-power is the lively energy and/or resistant pressure that issues from one material assemblage and is received by others. Thing-power, in other words, is immanent in collectives that include humans, the beings best able to recount the experience of the force of things. Thing-power materialism emphasizes the closeness, the intimacy, of humans and nonhumans.”
           [Jane Bennett, “The Force of Things: Steps toward an Ecology of Matter.” Political Theory. Volume 32, number 3, June 2004. Pages 347-372.]
      109. global ecology (David Mowbray): He discusses the necessity of coming to terms with “human ecological problems.”
           “… human ecological problems … are ones socialists and marxists must come to grips with. Any solution to global ecological problems is of course complex. However, such a solution must be global and holistic taking into account all factors — biological, political, economic, social and cultural — interacting together ….
           “I believe that any solution must entail an end to the capitalist economy and to growth orientated socialism and imperialism, and an equitable distribution of the world’s resources. As has been stated elsewhere, ‘economics plus ecology equals socialism.’ Any solution would mean the creation of a global and ecologically-based socialist order.”
           [David Mowbray, “Global Ecology.” Australian Left Review. Volume 1, issue 36, July 1972. Pages 14-20.]
      110. ramification of the concept of freedom (Graham Woods): He considers the intersection of ecology and freedom.
           “Each of these ramifications of the concept of freedom is connected with the ecological crisis that now faces mankind. First, man as a bio-sociotechnical creature is not free of the ecological consequences of his actions. Second, the ecological crisis has already diminished the actual freedom of millions of the Earth’s inhabitants. Third, we must now ask what freedoms must we give up if we are to resolve the ecological crisis.…
           “The ecological crisis has already diminished the freedom of millions of the world’s people. For example, a vast increase in population which has out-stripped the world’s capacity to feed it has condemned over one half of the Earth’s peoples to a life and death of semi-starvation.”
           [Graham Woods, “Ecology and Freedom.” Australian Left Review. Volume 1, issue 36, July 1972. Pages 21-26.]
      111. politics of ecology (Malcolm Caldwell): He examines “the political possibilities” available through various ecological movements.
           “1 am frequently asked during discussion of the kinds of question raised in this paper what we can do about changing the direction of those ponderously charging run-away dinosaurs, the over-developed countries. (Needless to say, the destinies of the so-called underdeveloped countries may safely be trusted to their own peoples, and our role as regards them is primarily one of hindering and finally helping to halt imperialism from inside, in co-ordination with the liberation struggles outside, the metropolitan walls.) This brings us to the most direct application of the term ‘the politics of ecology’ — namely the actual political possibilities opened up to us by the variety of ecological movements sprouting left, right and centre.” [Malcolm Caldwell, “The Politics of Ecology.” Australian Left Review. Volume 1, issue 36, July 1972. Pages 27-29.]
      112. ecologically informed revolutionary movement (Brian Aarons): He examines the importance a political approach to ecological problems.
           “This brings us to the revolutionary position. While … revolutionary thought and perspectives must change in the light of ecological knowledge, an ecologically informed revolutionary movement is the only force capable of dealing satisfactorily with the crisis. There are many ways one could state the need for a revolutionary solution; an apt one here would be in terms of the scientific models which ecologists themselves propose.…
           “… Political struggle and revolutionary change to create a self-managed socialism free from bureaucratic distortions is the only final answer. Otherwise destruction or the permanent possibility of destruction in a permanently polluted world face us.”
           [Brian Aarons, “Ecology and Revolution.” Australian Left Review. Volume 1, issue 36, July 1972. Pages 33-39.]
      113. ecological imperialism (Alfred W. Crosby): He examines the dominance of Western economies over the environment.
           “The Neo-Europes collectively and singly are important, more important than their sizes and populations and even wealth indicate. They are enormously productive agriculturally, and with the world’s population thrusting toward 5 billion and beyond, they are vital to the survival of many hundreds of millions. The reasons for this productivity include the undeniable virtuosity of their farmers and agricultural scientists and, in addition, several fortuitous circumstances that require explanation. The Neo-Europes all include large areas of very high photosynthetic potential, areas in which the amount of solar energy, the sunlight, available for the transformation of water and inorganic matter into food is very high. The quantity of light in the tropics is, of course, enormous, but less than one might think, because of the cloudiness and haziness of the wet tropics and the unvarying length of the day year-round.” [Alfred W. Crosby, “Ecological Imperialism.” The Post-colonial Studies Reader. London and New York: Routledge imprint of Taylor & Francis Group, an Informa PLC business. 2003. Pages 418-422.]
      114. three–dimensional discursive space (Risto Heiskala as pronounced in this MP3 audio file): He develops a model of sociology.
           “The field of sociology can be described as a triangle, the apexes of which are represented by the structure of social organisation ([Herbert] Spencer’s theory of the division of labour), the structure of cultural codes ([Ferdinand de] Saussure’s theory of language and semiology) and social action ([Max] Weber’s methodological individualism). This becomes a three-dimensional discursive space when underneath it we place, as the fourth apex, nature. Consequently we have a triangular pyramid standing on its head (nature): its four plans are represented by the field of sociology (the structure of social organisation, the structure of cultural codes, action), structuralist social anthropology (the structure of social organisation, the structure of cultural codes, nature), cultural anthropology (the structure of cultural codes, action, nature) and historical materialism (the structure of social organisation, action, nature).…
           “With the conditions of discourse, I mean the set of those more or less conscious ways of questioning, setting rules, and structuring which make us recognise a certain speech on society as sociology and which we also have to lean on when producing sociological speech ourselves. These conditions of discourse say nothing about the contents of different sociological interpretations; the only thing they do is determine which interpretation is sociology and which is not. In other words, they tell us what type of literature sociology is but not what this literature says.”
           [Risto Heiskala, “Sociology as a Discursive Space: The Coming Age of a New Orthodoxy?” Acta Sociologica. Volume 33, number 4, 1990. Pages 305-320.]
      115. dialectical anthropology (Stanley Diamond, Caleb Basnett, Winnie Lem, Anthony Marcus, and others): They develop various Marxist approaches to anthropology.
           “This journal [Dialectical Anthropology] is a significant episode in a wider effort to resurrect and redefine the Marxist tradition, and constitutes the beginning of a comprehensive critique of the anthropological aspect of academic social science. But it is neither difficult nor particularly courageous to destroy the pretensions of academic social science. There is more at issue here than that. The goal is to re-evaluate the whole tradition – and here I must speak for myself, in the hope that I express the common sense of the endeavor – of which [Karl] Marx became the critical cutting edge. That tradition gathers social force in the eighteenth century, in the paradigmatic and wide-ranging work of [Jean-Jacques] Rousseau, pauses among the Utopian socialists in bourgeois post-revolutionary Europe, and is transformed into a conscious revolutionary undertaking by Marx several decades later with the inception of industrial capitalism. The undertaking is critical and dialectical, both with reference to method and praxis. Its purpose is the revolutionary reconstruction of contemporary Western civilization in all its basic, related aspects; the dialectical method and the deep historical perspective illuminate the need for, while contributing to, that end.” [Stanley Diamond, “The Marxist Tradition as a Dialectical Anthropology.” Dialectical Anthropology. Volume 1, number 1, November 1975. Pages 1-5.]
           “… Dialectical Anthropology [the journal] orients itself toward ‘the transformation of class society through internationalizing conversations about the stakes of contemporary crises and the means for social change.’ However, the environment in which we work as well as the tasks and perspectives that guide our work have changed over the years. It is for this reason that we use this fortieth year reflection to consider what has changed and where weare going both as a journal and a species living on this planet. For this reason, we have included not only the interventions of many scholars on the contemporary dynamics and historical transformations of capitalism.” [Winnie Lem and Anthony Marcus, “The Marxist tradition as a dialectical anthropology: 40 years on.” Dialectical Anthropology. Volume 40, issue 2, June 2016. Pages 57-58.]
           “… I … [present] a kind of ‘dialectical anthropology’ – a theory of human being that attempts to follow its repressed potentials – that might be seen to respond to the conception of human being frequently advanced in the history of political thought. Insofar as it is addressed to a particular relation between philosophical conceptions of ‘human being’ and ‘state,’ this ‘dialectical anthropology’ is already in some sense a philosophical anthropology. That is to say, it is an immanent critique of ‘man’ through his philosophical conception – not a criticism or even discussion of the empirical study of human beings, their origins, or development from the perspective of the discipline ‘anthropology.’” [Caleb Basnett, “Toward a Dialectical Anthropology: Rethinking the Concept of ‘Human Being’ with Herbert Marcuse.” Problématique. Issue 13, 2011. Pages 45-70.]
      116. critique of critique (Jacques Rancière as pronounced in this MP3 audio file): Rancière, the one-time friend of Louis Althusser, presents a sympathetic critique of critical social theory.
           “I am certainly not the first to challenge the tradition of social and cultural critique my generation grew up in. Many authors have declared that it day are gone. Once we could have fun denoundng the dark, solid reality concealed behind the brilliance of appearances. But today there is allegedly no longer any solid reality to counter-pose to the reign of appearances, nor any dark reverse side to be opposed to the triumph of consumer society. Let me say at the outset: I do not intend to add my voice to this discourse. On the contrary, I would like to show how that the concepts and procedures of the critical tradition are by no mean obsolete. They still function very well, precisely in the discourse of those who proclaim their extinction. But their current usage witnesses a complete reversal of their orientation and supposed ends. We must therefore take account of the persistence of a model of interpretation and the inversion of its sense, if we wish to engage in a genuine critique of critique.” [Jacques Rancière. The Emancipated Spectator. Gregory Elliott, translator. London and New York: Verso imprint of New Left Books. 2009. Page 25.]
           “Emancipation entails an idea of distance opposed to the stultifying one. Speaking animals are distant animals who try to communicate through the forest of signs. It is this sense of distance that the ‘ignorant master’—the master who ignores inequality—is teaching. Distance is not an evil that should be abolished. It is the normal condition of communication. It is not a gap that calls for an expert in the art of suppressing it. The distance that the ‘ignorant’ person has to cover is not the gap between his ignorance and the knowledge of his master; it is the distance between what he already knows and what he still doesn’t know hut can learn by the same process. To help his pupil cover that distance, the ‘ignorant master’ need not be ignorant. He need only dissociate his knowledge from his mastery.” [Jacques Rancière, “The Emancipated Spectator.” Artform. March 2007. Pages 270-281.]
      117. aestheticization (Jacques Rancière): He develops aesthetics as an alternative to politics.
           “Aesthetics promises a non-polemical, consensual framing of the common world. Ultimately the alternative to politics turns out to be aestheticization, viewed as the constitution of a new collective ethos.… The scenario makes politics vanish in the sheer opposition between the dead mechanism of the State and the living power of the community, framed by the power of living thought. The vocation of poetry—the task of ‘aesthetic education’—is to render ideas sensible by turning them into living images, creating an equivalent of ancient mythology, as the fabric of a common experience shared by the elite and by the common people. In their words: ‘mythology must become philosophy to make common people reasonable and philosophy must become mythology to make philosophers sensible.’” [Jacques Rancière, “The Aesthetic Revolution and its Outcomes: Emplotments of Autonomy and Heteronomy.” New Left Review. Series II, number 14, March–April 2002. Pages 133-151.]
      118. politics of aesthetics (Jacques Rancière): He examines the reciprocal relationship between the political and the aesthetic.
           “Commitment is not a category of art. This does not mean that art is apolitical. It means that aesthetics has its own politics, or its own meta-politics.… There are politics of aesthetics, forms of community laid out by the very regime of identification in which we perceive art (hence pure art as well as committed art).” [Jacques Rancière. The Politics of Aesthetics: The Distribution of the Sensible. Gabriel Rockhill, translator. London and New York: Continuum International Publishing Group. 2004. Page 60.]
           “… there is no criterion for establishing an appropriate correlation between the politics of aesthetics and the aesthetics of politics. This has nothing to do with the claim made by some people that art and politics should not be mixed. They intermix in any case; politics has its aesthetics, and aesthetics has its politics. But there is no formula for an appropriate correlation.” [Jacques Rancière. The Politics of Aesthetics: The Distribution of the Sensible. Gabriel Rockhill, translator. London and New York: Continuum International Publishing Group. 2004. Page 62.]
      119. counter-history (Domenico Losurdo as pronounced in this MP3 audio file): He develops a leftist critique of liberalism.
           “… the countries that were the protagonists of three major liberal revolutions were simultaneously the authors of two tragic chapters in modern (and contemporary) history. If that is so, however, can the habitual representation of the liberal tradition namely, that it is characterized by the love of liberty as such be regarded as valid? Let us return to our initial question: What is liberalism? As we register the disappearance of the old certainties, a great saying comes to mind: ‘What is well known, precisely because it is well known, is not known. In the knowledge process, the commonest way to mislead oneself and others is to assume that something is well known and to accept it as such.’” [Domenico Losurdo. Liberalism: A Counter-History. Gregory Elliott, translator. London and New York: Verso imprint of New Left Books. 2011. Page 27.]
      120. new spirit of capitalism (Luc Boltanski as pronounced in this MP3 audio file and Ève Chiapello as pronounced in this MP3 audio file): Boltanski and Chiapello, two French sociologists, develop a sociology of critique.
           “To reconstruct a critical sociology on the basis of the sociology of critique by hybridizing it with the old thematic of capitalism: such was our ambition. So what analytical objects did we select to pursue this project? Starting out from the question posed by the lack of social critique that seemed to us to be characteristic of the 1980s and the begin,ning of the 1990s, we developed a dual analysis. In the first instance, we analysed the role of critique in the changes in historical capitalism, basing this work on a more general model of normative change whose construction was one of the main theoretical objectives of our work Second, we sought to deepen … the role played by the coexistence of comparatively incompatible forms of critique in the dynamic relationship between capitalism and critique.” [Luc Boltanski and Ève Chiapello. The New Spirit of Capitalism. Gregory Elliott, translator. London and New York: Verso imprint of New Left Books. 2007. Page xiii.]
           “We shall … have to demonstrate how the new spirit of capitalism arises on hitherto unused principles of equivalence. We shall also have to indicate the process of cultural assimilation of themes and constructs already present in the ideological environment, deriving in particular from the critical discourses addressed to capitalism, through which this spirit was structured and progressively became more fumly entrenched, to the point of forming a novel ideological configuration.” [Luc Boltanski and Ève Chiapello. The New Spirit of Capitalism. Gregory Elliott, translator. London and New York: Verso imprint of New Left Books. 2007. Page 24.]
           “When the original French edition of The New Spirit of Capitalism was published in 1999 it immediately established a reputation as a centrally important contribution to recent anti-capitalist literature. For this reason alone, both Verso [imprint of New Left Books] and Gregory Elliott, its translator, are to be congratulated for producing such a fine edition in English.” [Paul Blackledge,“The New Spirit of Capitalism.” Review article. Capital & Class. Volume 31, number 2, summer 2007. Pages 198-201.]
      121. endlessness of the struggle for communism (John Holloway): He examines the Marxian dialectic.
           “There is indeed an endlessness in negation, but it is not the endlessness of a circle. It is rather the endlessness of the struggle for communism: even when the conditions for a power-free society are created, it will always be necessary to struggle against the recrudescence of power-over. There can be no positive dialectic, no final synthesis in which all contradictions are resolved. If capitalism is to be understood as a process rather than as a state of being, even when human potential is so clogged up, how much more must this be true of a society in which human power-to is liberated.
           “But there is more to be said than that. We are not caught in an endlessly recursive circle simply because our existence is not recursive or circular. Our scream-against is a scream-against-oppression, and in that sense it is shaped by oppression; but there is more than that, for the scream-against-oppression is a scream against the negation of ourselves, of our humanity, of our power-to create. Non-identity is the core of our scream, but to say ‘we are not’ is not just a dark void. To negate Is-ness is to assert becoming, movement, creation, the emancipation of power-to. We are not, we do not be, we become.”
           [John Holloway. Change the World Without Taking Power: The Meaning of Revolution Today. New York: Palgrave Macmillan imprint of St. Martin’s Press LLC. 2010. Ebook edition.]
           “The state (or any fetishised form) involves a particular way of organising social relations, of subordinating relations between people to relations between things—a way that impedes the recognition and assumption of social human subjectivity. It would be lovely to turn our backs completely on the state and money, but generally we cannot do that …. Most of us have to engage with the state and other capitalist forms in some way; but the question is, how do we do it? We recognise their specifically capitalist character; we criticise their form. We struggle in-and-against-and-beyond those forms; we try to see our own struggle as asymmetrical to the forms of capitalism; we try to establish other forms of organisation, forms that subordinate relations between things to relations between people.” [John Holloway, “Change the World Without Taking Power.” Capital & Class. Volume 29, number 1, spring 2005. Pages 39-42.]
           “As a continuation of his previous work, Holloway invites us to reflect on the weakness of what is conceived of as inalterably powerful, i.e. capital. He suggests that, in this world, it is only humans (rather than the fetishised forms of their work) who retain the capacity to create and change the world: ‘It is labour alone which constitutes social reality. There is no external force; our own power is confronted by nothing but our own power, albeit in alienated form’ ‘. Capitalist contradictions are in no way external, but are in fact inhabited subjectivity.” [Ana C. Dinerstein, “On John Holloway’s Change the World Without Taking Power: The Meaning of Revolution Today.” Review article. Capital & Class. Volume 29, number 1, spring 2005. Pages 13-17.]
      122. economy of enrichment (Luc Boltanski and Ève Chiapello): They discuss the process through which the beneficiaries of historical economic inequality create new wealth.
           “The preoccupation with value is also prompted, we believe, by the recognition of the epochal shift to an ‘economy of enrichment,’ which is the term we suggest in order to refer to the forms of wealth creation that are based on an economic exploitation of the past, in the form of craft, heritage, tradition, identity or, more largely, culture. The idea of enrichment refers to the act of improving the value of something, but we should also understand it in its material connotation, as when we speak of the enrichment of mineral ore. France is an excellent example of an economy almost entirely oriented towards this model of worth, based on the enrichment of legacy and uniqueness.” [Luc Boltanski and Ève Chiapello, “Grappling with the Economy of Enrichment.” Valuation Studies. Volume 3, number 1, 2015. Pages 75-83.]
           “The social logic of ‘enriched objects’ is quite distinct from that of the industrial world, to the extent that we can sketch out two ideal-types of economy in schematic form. In this context, the term ‘enrichment’ does not refer to the growth of private fortunes, but rather to the processes that increase the value of objects. The two kinds of economy assess value on the basis of different conventional forms, whose nature will be our principal concern. Any object can be enriched, however ancient or modern it is, and the enrichment can be physical—for example, exposing beams in an old house—or cultural, through the use of a narrative device that highlights certain of the object’s qualities, thereby producing and formatting differences and identities, which are primary resources of enrichment economies.” [Luc Boltanski and Ève Chiapello, “The Economic Life of Things: Commodities, Collectibles, Assets.” New Left Review. Series II, number 98, March–April 2016.]
      123. critical theories of domination (Luc Boltanski): He develops a sociology of emancipation.
           “… however, critical theories of domination are not abstract organums suspended in the heaven of metaphysics. The existence of a concrete relationship with a set of people (defined as public, class, group, sex or whatever) forms part of their self-definition. Unlike ‘traditional theory,’ ‘critical theory’ possesses the objective of reflexivity. It can or even must … grasp the discontents of actors, explicitly consider them in the very labour of theorization, in such a way as to alter their relationship to social reality and, thereby, that social reality itself, in the direction of emancipation. As a consequence, the kind of critique they make possible must enable the disclosure of aspects of reality in an immediate relationship with the preoccupations of actors – that is, also with ordinary critiques.” [Luc Boltanski. On Critique: A Sociology of Emancipation. Gregory Elliott, translator. Malden, Massachusetts: Polity Press. 2011. Pages 4-5.]
           “In the case of theories of domination, the exteriority on which critique is based can be called complex, in the sense that it is established at two different levels. It must first of all be based on an exteriority of the first kind to equip itself with the requisite data to create the picture of the social order that will be submitted to critique. A metacritical theory is in fact necessarily reliant on a descriptive sociology or anthropology. But to be critical, such a theory also needs to furnish itself, in ways that can be explicit to very different degrees, with the means of passing a judgement on the value of the social order being described.” [Luc Boltanski. On Critique: A Sociology of Emancipation. Gregory Elliott, translator. Malden, Massachusetts: Polity Press. 2011. Page 8.]
      124. reflexivity of crises (Rodrigo Cordero as pronounced in this MP3 audio file, Aldo Mascareño as pronounced in this MP3 audio file, and Daniel Chernilo as pronounced in this MP3 audio file): They examine the two complementary reflexive social mechanisms for confronting crises.
           “… we argue that both human reflexivity and systemic reflexivity can be understood as complementary social mechanisms of dealing with crises in a dual sense: on the one hand, they are a means to account for the self-destructive tendencies of social dynamics; on the other, they are a strategy for designing responses that seek to set limits on autonomized social processes. The notion of crisis here depends on a conceptualization of society as a domain of relations whose unity is never achieved through a coherent or stable principle. Instead, contradictory imperatives and structural inconsistencies remain in a state of latency in the working of social institutions: differently put, social life reproduces itself on the condition of the impossibility of achieving a definite state of perfect harmony ….” [Rodrigo Cordero, Aldo Mascareño, and Daniel Chernilo, “On the reflexivity of crises: Lessons from critical theory and systems theory.” European Journal of Social Theory. OnlineFirst edition. September, 2016. Pages 1-20.]
      125. Husserlian phenomenology or transcendental phenomenology (Edmund Husserl as pronounced in this MP3 audio file and many others): Husserl developed a reflective methodology for approaching the objective world.
           “… [The] universal depriving of acceptance, this ‘inhibiting’ or ‘putting out of play’ of all positions taken toward the already—given Objective world and, in the first place, all existential positions (those concerning being, illusion, possible being, being likely, probable, etc.), or, as it is also called, this ‘phenomenological epoché’ and ‘parenthesizing’ of the Objective world therefore does not leave us confronting nothing. On the contrary we gain possession of something by it; and what we (or, to speak more precisely, what I, the one who is meditating) acquire by it is my pure living, with all the pure subjective processes making this up, and everything meant in them, purely as meant in them: the universe of ‘phenomena’ in the (particular and also the wider) phenomenological sense. The epoche can also be said to be the radical and universal method by which I apprehend myself purely: as Ego, and with my own pure conscious life, in and by which the entire Objective world exists for me and is precisely as it is for me. Anything belonging to the world, any spatlotemporal being, exists for me that is to say, is accepted by me in that I experience it, perceive it, remember it, think of it somehow, judge about it, value it, desire it, or the like.” [Edmund Husserl. Cartesian Meditations: An Introduction to Phenomenology. Dorion Cairns, translator. The Hague, the Netherlands, Boston, Massachusetts, and London: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers. 1960. Pages 20-21.]
           “… phenomenology will become a science.… Phenomenology … will not try to give a causal account of knowledge and its connection to the world; it will not seek to explain knowledge as a ‘natural fact’; it will not engage in theoretical constructions of the hypothetical-deductive sort. It cannot borrow from the results of empirical disciplines; more pointedly, it cannot be based upon the deliverances of psychology, either explanatory (as in [Wilhelm] Wundt), or descriptive (as in [Franz] Brentano). Nor can it make use of the speculations of evolutionary biology. Rather, its task is to exhibit the essence of knowing within the framework of the phenomenological reduction …. Thus it must remain entirely a matter of reflection, direct intuition, analysis, and description.” [Edmund Husserl. The Idea of Phenomenology. Lee Hardy, translator. Dordrecht, the Netherlands, Boston, Massachusetts, and London: Kluwer Academic Publishers. 1999. Page 6.]
           “Empiricism altogether misunderstands the relation between the ideal and the real: it likewise misunderstands the relation between truth and inner evidence. Inner evidence is no accessory feeling, either casually attached, or attached by natural necessity, to certain judgements. It is not the sort of mental character that simply lets itself be attached to any and every judgement of a certain class, i.e. the so-called ‘true’ judgements, so that the phenomenological content of such a judgement, considered in and for itself, would be the same whether or not it had this character. The situation is not at all like the way in which we like to conceive of the connection between sensations and the feelings which relate to them: two persons, we think, have the same sensations, but are differently affected in their feelings. Inner evidence is rather nothing but the ‘experience’ of truth. Truth is of course only experienced in the sense in which something ideal can be an experience in a real act. Otherwise put: Truth is an Idea, whose particular case is an actual experience in the inwardly evident judgement.” [Edmund Husserl. The Shorter Logical Investigations. London and New York: Routledge imprint of Taylor & Francis Group, an Informa PLC business. 2002. Pages 64-65.]
           “When the new phenomenology introduced itself at one and the same time as a beginning and as a universal methodology for a phenomenological philosophy, that amounted to saying that any philosophy whatsoever, taken as a systematic whole, can assume the form of an ultimately rigorous science only as a universal transcendental philosophy, but also only on the basis of phenomenology and in the specifically phenomenological method.” [Edmund Husserl, “Kant and the Idea of Transcendental Philosophy.” Ted E. Klein, Jr. and William E. Pohl, translators. The Southwestern Journal of Philosophy. Volume 5, number 3, fall 1974. Pages 9-56.]
           “Radical science demands the most radical rigor, which for its part demands the most complete illumination in the method of clarińcation. With this remark we dropped the word which is to form the theme of the following investigations. For what has been presented best prepared us for it. We have mentioned in the theory of the reductions also the reduction to the greatest possible clarity, which was spoken of as a special case of a universally important method of clarification in every scientific sphere. It is due to the peculiar position of phenomenology in relation to all other sciences that clarification in general, at whatever it is directed, and phenomenological clarification stand in a close relationship.” [Edmund Husserl, “The Method of Clarification.” Ted E. Klein, Jr. and William E. Pohl, translators. The Southwestern Journal of Philosophy. Volume 5, number 3, fall 1974. Pages 57-67.]
           “The only relativism [Edmund] Husserl acknowledges as valid is that attached to historico-anthropological ‘facts’ as such and in their factuality.… Husserl undoubtedly thought that all of history’s determined possibles had to conform to the apriori essences of historicity concerning every possible culture, every possible language, every possible tradition. But never did he dream to foresee, by some eidetic deduction, all the facts, all the particular possibles which must conform to these a priori of universal historicity.” [Jacques Derrida. Edmund Husserl’s Origin of Geometry: An Introduction. Lincoln, Nebraska: Bison Book imprint of University of Nebraska Press. 1989. Page 112.]
           “Edmund Husserl’s entire life project, as he himself emphasised over and over, was to live the philosophical life, understood in the Socratic sense as a life of self-critical understanding and rational self-responsibility. He saw his duty as identifying the truly rational life and then living it.” [Dermot Moran. Introduction to Phenomenology. London and New York: Routledge imprint of Taylor & Francis Group, an Informa PLC business. 2002. Page 187.]
           “That Edmund Husserl (1859–1938), with his phenomenology, revolutionized the way philosophy was practised in the twentieth century is well known. It is less well known that his overall approach to the analysis of philosophical problems had much in common with practices associated with the then emerging ‘analytic’ philosophy. Both advocate rigorous method, abandoning speculation, solving problems rather than tracking themes through the history of philosophy, pursuing analyses through carefully drawn distinctions, and so on.” [Dermot Moran, “Edmund Husserl’s methodology of concept clarification.” The Analytic Turn: Analysis in Early Analytic Philosophy and Phenomenology. Michael Beaney, editor. London and New York: Routledge imprint of Taylor & Francis Group, an Informa PLC business. 2007. Pages 235-256.]
           “In this paper, as an initial attempt to explicate the complexity of phenomenological treatments of habit, I want to trace [Edmund] Husserl’s conception of habit as it emerged in his mature genetic phenomenology, in order to highlight his enormous and neglected original contribution in this area. I shall show that Husserl was by no means limited to a Cartesian intellectualist explication of habitual action (as commentators such as [Pierre] Bourdieu and [Hubert] Dreyfus have claimed), but attempted to characterize its complexity across the range of human individual, sub-personal, personal, social and collective experience.” [Dermot Moran, “Edmund Husserl’s Phenomenology of Habituality and Habitus.” Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology. Volume 42, number 1, January 2011. Pages 53-77.]
           “Phenomenology, understood as the philosophical approach originated by Edmund Husserl in the early years of the twentieth century, has a complex history. In part it is the basis for what has become known as continental philosophy, where ‘continental’ means the European continent, despite the fact that much of continental philosophy since 1960 has been done in America. Within this designation one finds a number of philosophical approaches, some building on the insights of phenomenology, such as existentialism and hermeneutics (theory of interpretation), and others reacting critically against phenomenology, including certain post-structuralist or postmodernist ideas. There is, however, a line of major philosophical thinkers, including [Martin] Heidegger, [Jean-Paul] Sartre, and [Maurice] Merleau-Ponty, who extend phenomenological philosophy from its origins in Husserl. Following this lineage means that we understand phenomenology to include a somewhat diverse set of approaches. To provide a basic idea of phenomenology, however, we will here focus on what these approaches have in common.” [Shaun Gallagher and Dan Zahavi. The Phenomenological Mind: An Introduction to Philosophy of Mind and Cognitive Science. London and New York: Routledge imprint of Taylor & Francis Group, an Informa PLC business. 2008. Pages 5-6.]
           “A key, if often neglected aspect of the heritage of classical phenomenology, as it is encountered in the writings of the philosophers such as Edmund Husserl, Max Scheler, Martin Heidegger, Jean-Paul Sartre, and Maurice Merleau-Ponty, is a deep engagement with the question of the spiritual significance of the two world wars of the twentieth century and their aftermath. I would argue that the question of the meaning of the wars of the past century was not a mere occasional problem, but was in fact of decisive importance for classical phenomenological philosophy, even if there are relatively few specific texts that deal directly with the war itself. This engagement with the problem of war reflects the Platonic moment sketched above, insofar as the spiritual signifi cance of war is understood in terms of the manner in which selfhood (in authors such as Husserl and [Jan] Patočka, the selfhood represented by the very idea of ‘Europe’ and European culture itself) is put into question, and with that the very possibility of philosophy.” [James Dodd. Violence and Phenomenology. London and New York: Routledge imprint of Taylor & Francis Group, an Informa PLC business. 2009. Page 14.]
           “Whether my experience and that of another person can be linked in a single system of intersubjective experience? There may well be, either in each sensory experience or in each consciousness, ‘phantoms’ which no rational approach can account for. The whole Transcendental Deduction hangs on the affirmation of a complete system of truth. It is precisely to the sources of this affirmation that we must revert if we wish to adopt a reflective method. In this connection we may hold with [Edmund] Husserl that [David] Hume went, in intention, further than anyone in radical reflection, since he genuinely tried to take us back to those phenomena of which we have experience, on the hither side of any formation of ideas,—even though he went on to dissect and emasculate this experience.” [Maurice Merleau-Ponty. Phenomenology of Perception. London and New York: Routledge imprint of Taylor & Francis Group, an Informa PLC business. 2005. Pages 255-256.]
           “… ‘phenomenology’ is typically understood as ‘the what’ that is studied or investigated in the philosophy of mind: it is ‘the passing show,’ ‘the flux of experience,’ ‘experience as it is undergone,’ it is ‘the what’ that makes it so that there is a ‘what it is like’ to subjective experience. While we will see in all the texts explored in this book a distinctive commitment to something like an ‘insider standpoint,’ phenomenology is definitely not philosophy which has a special interest in this conception of subjective experience. Indeed, phenomenologists – even the most Cartesian among them – are not, in general, warm to this conception at all. Edmund Husserl stresses that ‘in its proper sense’ the word ‘phenomenon’ relates to ‘that which appears’ and not the subjective phenomenon, ‘the appearance.’ [Martin] Heidegger is even more insistent: the term phenomenon as it shows up in the title phenomenology has, he states, ‘nothing at all to do with what is called an “appearance,” still less a “mere appearance.”’” [Simon Glendinning. In the Name of Phenomenology. London and New York: Routledge imprint of Taylor & Francis Group, an Informa PLC business. 2007. Page 7.]
           “Though [Edmund] Husserl saw himself a new Moses [Hebrew/ʿIḇəriyṯ, מֹשֶׁה, Mōšẹh], he seems to us rather a new Odysseus [Greek/Hellēniká, Οδυσσέας, Odysséas], this polymechanos [Greek/Hellēniká, πολυμήχανος, polymḗchanos, ‘resourceful one,’ ‘ingenious one,’ or, literally, ‘very competent one’] of old, constantly struggling in his many homeward travels homeward with an ingenuity we can only marvel at. Too many scholars of Husserl’s philosophy seek less to take up the beginnings he laid out and to carry these forward with the tenacity and philosophical cunning exemplified by the old master. Too many remain content simply to interpret Husserl, where the true task is to go beyond him. This is indeed Husserl’s own hope. To go beyond him means, however, that we must understand his work rightly. This study is the first step in this direction … to understand his work rightly so that we can go beyond him.” [Bob Sandmeyer. Husserl’s Constitutive Phenomenology: Its Problem and Promise. London and New York: Routledge imprint of Taylor & Francis Group, an Informa PLC business. 2009. Page 151.]
           “Born in Moravia [present-day Czech Republic], educated in Vienna [Austria] and Berlin [Germany], first in mathematics and later in philosophy, Edmund Husserl (1859–1938) taught and wrote philosophy at a succession of German universities. He is best known as the founder of phenomenology, defined as the study of the essence of consciousness as experienced from the first-person point of view. Husserl’s phenomenology launched a philosophical program that changed the course of European thought. Not only the preeminent phenomenologist, Husserl was also one of the great systematic philosophers, akin to Aristotle and [Immanuel] Kant. It is time for Husserl to take his rightful place in this pantheon. Accordingly, this study of Husserl will focus on his overall system of philosophy, in which phenomenology plays its special role.” [David Woodruff Smith. Husserl. London and New York: Routledge imprint of Taylor & Francis Group, an Informa PLC business. 2007. Page 1.]
           “[Edmund] Husserl reserved the notion of ‘natural attitude’ not just to point at the taken-for-grantedness of everyday thinking and acting. For him, the natural attitude is manifested in our natural inclination to believe that the world exists out there, independent of our personal human existence. The challenge for phenomenology is not to deny the external existence of the world, but to substitute the phenomenological attitude for the natural attitude in order to be able to return to the beginnings, to the things themselves as they give themselves in lived through experience— not as externally real or eternally existent, but as an openness that invites us to see them as if for the first time.” [Max van Manen. Phenomenology of Practice: Meaning-Giving Methods in Phenomenological Research and Writing. Walnut Creek, California: Left Coast Press. 2014. Kindle edition.]
           “One prominent concern of phenomenology has been to provide an account of the structures that make a shared, objective world intelligible. This account recognizes that bodies and skills are fundamental for this intelligibility. We consider this to be the most important and most productive strain of phenomenology, and this book is intended to give a clear introduction to it and its implications for contemporary work on perception, action, and cognition.
           “Another strain of phenomenology, which we can only explore briefly in this book, gives a description of subjective experiences, especially of experiences that are unusual and hard to explain. So, for example, phenomenology might provide an analysis of what it is like to experience religious faith, overpowering sentiments such as love or anxiety, aesthetic highs, inescapable ambiguities and paradoxes, and so forth.”
           [Stephen Käufer and Anthony Chemero. Phenomenology: An Introduction. Cambridge, England, and Malden, Massachusetts: Polity Press. 2015. Pages 2.]
           “Although phenomenology is concerned with ideas and essences, there is no denial of the world of nature, the so-called real world. The concept of realism became a major focus of transcendental phenomenology. Realism and objectivity presumably were the province of the natural sciences, yet ultimately the natural sciences operate from ideal principles in that they presuppose that objects that exist in time and space are real, that they actually exist, yet there is no evidence that objects are real, apart from our subjective experience of them. [Edmund] Husserl … observed that, ‘Naturalism recognizes the need of a scientific philosophy, but it is the greatest obstacle because it recognizes as real only the physical. The objectivity which it presupposes is essentially ideal and therefore a contradiction to naturalism’s own principles.’ Husserl concluded that ‘phenomenology is the “science of science” since it alone investigates that which all other sciences simply take for granted (or ignore), the very essence of their own objects.’” [Clark Moustakas. Phenomenological Research Methods. Thousand Oaks, California: SAGE Publications, Inc. 1994. Page 46.]
           “The following questions are appropriate in evaluating research projects and reports of phenomenological psychology. Does the research address a significant topic and research problem that require qualitative knowledge of lived experience? Did the data collection provide genuine and adequate access to sufficiently varied lifeworld examples of the phenomena under investigation? Were all relevant data reflected upon with conceptual fidelity to participants’ experiential processes and meanings? Do the findings conceptually clarify the essence(s) of the research phenomena, including all constituents and themes in their holistic, structural relationships with each other? Are all knowledge claims supported by and illustrated with concrete evidence? Are the levels and kinds of generality achieved, the contextual limitations of the study, and the remaining open issues and questions transparently articulated? Do the eidetic descriptions intelligibly illuminate and ring true of all examples of the research phenomena both in the study’s data and in the literature, in the lifeworld, and in the reader’s experience and free imaginative variation? Are the contributions of the phenomenological findings to the theory and practice literature made explicit?” [Frederick J. Wertz, “A Phenomenological Psychological Approach to Trauma and Resilience,” in Frederick J. Wertz, Kathy Charmaz, Linda M. McMullen, Ruthellen Josselson, Rosemarie Anderson, and Emalinda McSpadden. Five Ways of Doing Qualitative Analysis: Phenomenological Psychology, Grounded Theory, Discourse Analysis, Narrative Research, and Intuitive Inquiry. New York and London: The Guilford Press imprint of Gulford Publications, Inc. 2011. Pages 124-164.]
           “… [Phenomenological questions of the first order] are concerned with the systematic characterization of the phenomenology of the Ayahuasca experience. Essentially, these questions all pertain to one arch-question, namely—what is being experienced with Ayahuasca? What kinds of visions does Ayahuasca induce? What are the contents of these visions? What other kinds of experience are generated by the brew? These other kinds include non-visual perceptual effects, ideas and insights, and emotional and bodily effects. Note that some of these questions pertain to form whereas others pertain to content.…
           “The phenomenological issues of the second order are concerned with lawful patterns revealed by relations between the elementary phenomena pertaining to the questions of the first order. Is there an order in what one experiences? Are there regularities in the progression of the visions and other experiences that Ayahuasca induces? Can distinct stages be defined? What are the patterns associated with moves between stages of visions? Also to be investigated are the progressions of experiences across sessions and their change over the course of long-term usage of Ayahuasca.
           “Third are the questions of dynamics. These are concerned with how the Ayahuasca huasca experience unfolds in time. Closely related to the dynamic questions are the contextual ones. How are the various facets of the intoxication affected by the context in which one is situated—by the place, the social milieu, the interpersonal relationship at hand, the ritual being employed?”
           [Benny Shanon. The Antipodes of the Mind: Charting the Phenomenology of the Ayahuasca Experience. Oxford, England, and New York: Oxford University Press. 2002. Kindle edition.]
           “The undisputed founder of the phenomenological movement was Edmund Husserl, a German of Jewish descent (converted to Lutheranism in his twenties) who lived from 1859 to 1938. 1 He was very much the German professor: almost his whole adult life was bounded by the walls (and the attitudes) of ancient universities. Only the rampant antisemitism of the Nazis in his later years forced him reluctantly out of his political naivety. Like [Bertrand] Russell, and roughly at the same time, he came to philosophy out of mathematics by way of logic, and was similarly engrossed by problems of truth, meaning and knowledge. Like [Sigmund] Freud, and at roughly the same time, he self-consciously founded a school, and gathered around himself an everexpanding band of disciples. Like Freud also he was betrayed by his chosen St. Peter: for [Martin] Heidegger retained his master’s support not only for succession to his chair, but for publication of a work theoretically devastating Husserl’s position, and he eventually joined the Nazi Party.” [Roger Waterhouse, “Husserl and Phenomenology.” Radical Philosophy: Philosophical Journal of the Independent Left. Number 16, spring 1977. Pages 27-38.]
      126. phenomenological sociology (Alfred Schutz as pronounced in this MP3 audio file, Peter L. Berger, Thomas Luckmann, and others): They apply Husserlian phenomenology to the social world and to its construction.
           “As we proceed to our study of the social world, we abandon the strictly phenomenological method. We shall start out by simply accepting the existence of the social world as it is always accepted in the attitude of the natural standpoint, whether in everyday life or in sociological observation. In so doing, we shall avoid any attempt to deal with the problem from the point of view of transcendental phenomenology. We shall, therefore, be bypassing a whole nest of problems whose significance and difficulty were pointed out by [Edmund] Husserl in his Formal and Transcendental Logic, although he did not there deal with these problems specifically. The question of the ‘meaning’ of the ‘Thou’ can only be answered by carrying out the analysis which he posited in that work. Even now, however, it can be stated with certainty that the concept of the world in general must be based on the concept of ‘everyone’ and therefore also of ‘the other.’” [Alfred Schutz. Phenomenology of the Social World. George Walsh and Frederick Lehnert, translators. Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern University Press. 1967. Kindle edition.]
           “The sociology of knowledge … must concern itself with the social construction of reality. The analysis of the theoretical articulation of this reality will certainly continue to be a part of this concern, but not the most important part. It will be clear that, despite the exclusion of the epistemological/ methodological problem, what we are suggesting here is a far-reaching redefinition of the scope of the sociology of knowledge, much wider than what has hitherto been understood as this discipline.
           “The question arises as to what theoretical ingredients ought to be added to the sociology of knowledge to permit its redefinition in the above sense. We owe the fundamental insight into the necessity for this redefinition to Alfred Schutz. Throughout his work, both as philosopher and as sociologist, Schutz concentrated on the structure of the common-sense world of everyday life.”
           [Peter L. Berger and Thomas Luckmann. The Social Construction of Reality: A Treatise in the Sociology of Knowledge. London and New York: Penguin Books imprint of the Penguin Group. 1991. Page 27.[
           “[Peter L.] Berger and [Thomas] Luckmann, and this thesis itself, begin with the granting of this radical revision. What must now be done is to look at some of the reasons why such a revision has seemed necessary. We may start by considering the work of Alfred Schutz, whose phenomenological inquiries into the philosophical foundations of the social sciences have pointed out several important reasons why these ‘sciences’ must especially be concerned with the epistemological complications of considering reality as socially constructed.” [Burke Curtis Thomason. Sociology and Existentialism: A Comparison of Perspectives with an emphasis on the work of Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann. Ph.D. dissertation. Simon Fraser University. Burnaby, British Columbia. July, 1970. Page 132.]
      127. relational phenomenology of violence (Michael Staudigl as pronounced in this MP3 audio file): He applies Husserlian phenomenology to violence.
           “This article provides a first sketch of … a relational phenomenology of violence. In order to do this, I shall first outline the basic structure of the phenomenological method I deem most adequate to tackle phenomena of violence. Given that violence exists (but not violence tout court) and that it must always be considered within the horizon of its particular orders, I shall then analyze the double ‘fact of violence,’ its affective and symbolic dimensions and their inextricable interlacement. In a third part I shall address the consequences of these reflections, thereby identifying the main characteristics of the relational phenomenology of violence that is to result therefrom. Finally, I will close with a reflection concerning possible applications of the outlined conception and some future lines of argumentation.” [Michael Staudigl, “Towards a Relational Phenomenology of Violence.” Human Studies. Volume 36, number 1, 2013. Pages 43-66.]
      128. critical phenomenology (Jérôme Melançon as pronounced in this MP3 audio file, Herbert G. Reid, James Aho, George Revill, Bradley King, Kirsten Simonsen as pronounced in this MP3 audio file, and others): They develop applications of critical social theory to phenomenology.
           “Thinking is always embodied, as a result it is also social and, as such, it also has political consequences. This thesis implies that it is not sufficient to describe embodiment to account for thought, as the body is inscribed in society and in political processes, which affect thinking just as much as the corporeal character of existence. In order to defend this thesis, I will develop the beginnings of a critical phenomenology that is already present in the work of Maurice Merleau-Ponty and Pierre Bourdieu, specifically in the reflection they developed on thinking and on the relationship between two modes of thinking about social life: philosophy and the social sciences.
           “A first theme to be explored in the texts where Bourdieu and Merleau-Ponty describe thinking as an activity that is embodied, as well as socially and politically situated, is their refusal of the ontological difference.”
           [Jérôme Melançon, “Thinking Corporeally, Socially, and Politically: Critical Phenomenology after Merleau-Ponty and Bourdieu.” Bulletin d’analyse phénoménologique. Volume X, number 8, 2014. Pages 1-28.]
           “My point is that critical phenomenology, by illuminating [Theodor] Adorno’s ‘element of otherness’ in the dialectic between the mode of the real and the mode of the possible, can serve as the means for a concrete theory of the reappropriation of history by the subjects.…
           “… The critical phenomenology of the life-world and its social, economic, and political infrastructures … resituates the problem of reification thus disclosing, better than Frankfurt theory does, the historical possibilities of liberating praxis.”
           [Herbert G. Reid, “Critical Phenomenology and the Dialectical Foundations of Social Change.” Dialectical Anthropology. Volume 2, number 2, May 1977. Pages 107-130.]
           “Ignoring the handful of neo-Nazi Odinists and the large number of devotees of the decidedly atheistic Ayn Rand, America’s contemporary right-wing extremists are almost exclusively white, middle-aged Baptists, Pentecostals, Presbyterians, Catholics, and Mormons animated by a doctrine known as ‘Dominionism.’ …
           “What follows is a critical phenomenology of Dominionism: a detailed description of how movement activists see, think, remember, and feel about reality and their place in it. The method of phenomenology is to allow subjects to reveal themselves, to speak for themselves in their own words instead of imposing on them an explanatory model from the ‘outside’ …. The words I attend to here are derived from Dominionism’s on-line and paper communications: its books and pamphlets.”
           [James Aho, “Christian Heroism and the Reconstruction of America.” Critical Sociology. Volume 39, issue 4, July 2013. Pages 545-560.]
           “… a critical phenomenology is one which recognizes the spatio-temporal specificity of experience, the ontologically generative qualities of theorizing that experience, and the politics animated and articulated by particular distributions of the sensible.…
           “… Drawing on the lessons of critical phenomenology by considering the socio-material relationality of sonic making by thinking of mediation as multiple registers which situate and shape existence and experience can simultaneously help open up the black boxes of both affective and representational political processes.”
           [George Revill, “How is space made in sound? Spatial mediation, critical phenomenology and the political agency of sound.” Progress in Human Geography. Volume 40, number 2, April 2016. Pages 240-256.]
           “The defect of modern liberalism is its desire to forget this totality but it is the task of a truly critical phenomenology, and a rational society in general, to remember it. If social relations only happen as political-economic relations the result is a perverted individuality in which we labor with and alongside others and yet are totally estranged from them. The problem of labor not only manifests itself within its political and economic expression, but also with the ontological institution in which it exists.” [Bradley King, “Putting Critical Theory to Work: Labor, Subjectivity and the Debts of the Frankfurt School.” Critical Sociology. Volume 36, number 6, November 2010. Pages 869-889.]
           “I have here emphasized the achievements of such a critical phenomenology as regards the experiential dimension of social life, the acknowledgement of the other and the significance of human agency, all qualities of utmost importance to the kind of work from which I started this discussion. More generally, humanism can be seen as a practice, an interrogative orientation as integral to modes of both co-existence and critical intellectual engagement.” [Kirsten Simonsen, “In quest of a new humanism: Embodiment, experience and phenomenology as critical geography.” Progress in Human Geography. Volume 37, number 1, 2012. Pages 10-26.]
      129. feminist phenomenology (Simone de Beauvoir as pronounced in this MP3 audio file and others): Informed by phenomenology, they develop a feminism of lived experience.
           “I hesitated a long time before writing a book on woman. The subject is irritating, especially for women; and it is not new. Enough ink has flowed over the quarrel about feminism; it is now almost over: let’s not talk about it anymore. Yet it is still being talked about. And the volumes of idiocies churned out over this past century do not seem to have clarified the problem. Besides, is there a problem? And what is it? Are there even women? True, the theory of the eternal feminine still has its followers; they whisper, ‘Even in Russia, women are still very much women’; but other well-informed people—and also at times those same ones—lament, ‘Woman is losing herself, woman is lost.’ It is hard to know any longer if women still exist, if they will always exist, if there should be women at all, what place they hold in this world, what place they should hold. ‘Where are the women?’ asked a short-lived magazine recently.” [Simone de Beauvoir. The Second Sex. Constance Borde and Sheila Malovany-Chevallier, translators. New York: Vintage Books imprint of Random House, Inc. 2010. Page 23.]
           “The Second Sex shows that difference(s) need to be acknowledged since difference is the basis of both unfreedom and emancipation. The subordinating effects of diverse forms of oppressive power (sexism, racism, capitalism, colonialism, heteronormativity, etc.) hinge upon the repression of difference; the recognition of difference holds the possibility of an emancipatory effect. This anticipates feminisms that focus on difference such as cultural feminism, maternal feminism, French feminism, postcolonial feminism, black feminism, mestizo feminism and queer feminism. All concentrate on aspects of difference in resistance to patriarchal, white, Eurocentric, middle-class, heteronormative and able-bodied norms and argue for the deconstruction, revaluation and incorporation of ideas and practices into the body politic for meaningful social and political systems and participation.” [Nadine Changfoot, “The Second Sex’s Continued Relevance for Equality and Difference Feminisms.” European Journal of Women’s Studies. Volume 16, number 1, 2009. Pages 11-31.]
           “Feminist phenomenology has developed out of the reconsideration and expansion of the work of some classical phenomenologists namely Edmund Husserl …, Martin Heidegger … and Maurice Merleau-Ponty …. Additionally, Simone de Beauvoir …, Judith Butler …, Iris Marion Young … and Sandra Lee Bartky … have all combined phenomenology with feminist theory (Schües et al, 2011) where their particular interest was to relate interpretive phenomenology to the issue of gender. While each method has its own identity, both phenomenology and feminism can be integrated in order to strengthen the overall philosophical foundation in an attempt to gain a deeper understanding of the experience of living with domestic violence and abuse ….” [Kathleen M. Baird, “Using feminist phenomenology to explore women’s experiences of domestic violence in pregnancy.” British Journal of Midwifery. Volume 22, number 6, June 2014. Pages 418-426.]
           “What does it mean to pose the question of sexual difference as a philosophical question? Minimally, for both Beauvoir and Irigaray, to take up this question in these terms is to investigate the constitution of sexual difference rather than proceeding from the givenness of this difference. Feminist philosophy begins, in other words, by questioning the status of the object and the givenness of the very thing that is at the center of its inquiry. In this sense, the possibility of broaching sexual difference as a philosophical question is, for Beauvoir and Irigaray, identical with the possibility of feminist phenomenology.” [Anne van Leeuwen, “Beauvoir, Irigaray, and the Possibility of Feminist Phenomenology.” The Journal of Speculative Philosophy. Volume 26, number 2, 2012. Pages 474-484.]
           “If women do ‘pursue their ascent’ as Simone de Beauvoir proposed …, then what better approach to take account of it than feminist phenomenology, which Beauvoir herself pioneered? Yet, feminist philosophy is slow to assimilate phenomenology to its methodology. It regards phenomenology’s nongendered frame of analysis with oft-repeated skepticism, while it continues to speculate upon phenomenology’s potential usefulness for investigating women’s lived body experience.” [Dianne Chisholm, “Climbing like a Girl: An Exemplary Adventure in Feminist Phenomenology.” Hypatia. Volume 23, number 1, January–March 2008. Pages 9-40.]
           “[Simone de] Beauvoir does not view masochism as an inevitable outcome of female devotion and self-abandonment, inasmuch as it is not a natural tendency of woman or of resignation and self-forgetfulness (SS, 398, 652). But women are more prone to it than men, she thinks, and it is a ‘bypath’ that is frequently taken by the unsatisfied woman if the gift of herself is not wholeheartedly accepted and/or reciprocated by the beloved …. Young girls in particular are inclined toward masochism because they are often narcissistic or alienated from themselves in an alter ego that is dependent upon the will of others …. ‘Masochism exists,’ Beauvoir explains, ‘when the individual chooses to be made purely a thing under the conscious will of others, to see herself as a thing, to play at being a thing’ …. Blaming herself for submitting her ego to others, the young girl feels guilty and punishes herself by ‘voluntarily redoubling her humiliation and slavishness’ in a ‘sham abandon’ or masochistic play-acting that is ‘no true solution of the conflict created by woman’s sexual destiny, but a mode of escaping from it by wallowing in it’ …. For [Søren] Kierkegaard, too, feminine devotion and self-abandonment are potentially problematic for woman in that her natural tendency to give herself in devotion to others may result in negative consequences with both personal and religious implications.” [Sylvia Walsh, “Feminine Devotion and Self-Abandonment—Simone de Beauvoir and Søren Kierkegaard: On the Woman in Love.” Philosophy Today. Volume 42, 1998. Pages 35-40.]
      130. ecophenomenology (David Wood): He develops a naturalistic and causal version of phenomenology.
           “What is eco-phenomenology? This paper argues that eco-phenomenology, in which are folded both an ecological phenomenology and a phenomenological ecology, offers us a way of developing a middle ground between phenomenology and naturalism, between intentionality and causality.…
           “… four strands — the invisibility of time, the celebration of finitude, the coordination of rhythms, and the interruption and breakdown of temporal horizons — offer us, I am suggesting, not just analytical pointers as to how we might think about time, but ways of enriching our temporal experience. This account occupies what I have called a middle ground overlapping the space of intentionality, avoiding both the language of causality and that of ecstatic intentionality. I am sure that an ecophenomenology could profitably pursue the theoretical elaborations that each of them would make explicit, but I will not do this here. The fundamental focus of these remarks has been on their contribution to an enhanced attentiveness to the complexity of natural phenomena and on the ease with which that is hidden from view by our ordinary experience.”
           [David Wood, “What is Ecophenomenology?” Research in Phenomenology. Volume 31, 2001. Pages 78-95.]
      131. embodied mind (Francisco J. Varela as pronounced in this MP3 audio file, Evan Thompson, and Eleanor Rosch): They develop an approach informed by Buddhist mindfulness techniques.
           “Considerable evidence gathered in many contexts throughout human history indicates both that experience itself can be examined in a disciplined manner and that skill in such an examination can be considerably refined over time. We refer to the experience accumulated in a tradition that is not familiar to most Westerners but that the West can hardly continue to ignore—the Buddhist tradition of meditative practice—and pragmatic, philosophical exploration. Though considerably less familiar than other pragmatic investigations of human experience, such as psychoanalysis, the Buddhist tradition is especially relevant to our concerns, for, as we shall see, the concept of a nonunified or decentered (the usual terms are egoless or selfless) cognitive being is the cornerstone of the entire Buddhist tradition. Furthermore, this concept—although it certainly entered into philosophical debate in the Buddhist tradition—is fundamentally a firsthand experiential account by those who attain a degree of mindfulness of their experience in daily life. For these reasons, then, we propose to build a bridge between mind in science and mind in experience by articulating a dialogue between these two traditions of Western cognitive science and Buddhist meditative psychology.” [Francisco J. Varella, Evan Thompson, and Eleanor Rosch. Embodied Mind: Cognitive Science and Human Experience. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press. 1993. Page xviii.]
           “What we are suggesting is a change in the nature of reflection from an abstract, disembodied activity to an embodied (mindful), open-ended reflection. By embodied, we mean reflection in which body and mind have been brought together. What this formulation intends to convey is that reflection is not just on experience, but reflection is a form of experience itself—and that reflective form of experience can be performed with mindfulness/awareness. When reflection is done in that way, it can cut the chain of habitual thought patterns and preconceptions such that it can be an open-ended reflection, open to possibilities other than those contained in one's current representations of the life space. We call this form of reflection mindful, open-ended reflection.
           “… By not including ourselves in the reflection, we pursue only a partial reflection, and our question becomes disembodied; it attempts to express, in the words of the philosopher Thomas Nagel, a ‘view from nowhere.’ It is ironic that it is just this attempt to have a disembodied view from nowhere that leads to having a view from a very specific, theoretically confined, preconceptually entrapped somewhere.”
           [Francisco J. Varela, Evan Thompson, and Eleanor Rosch. The Embodied Mind: Cognitive Science and Human Experience. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press. 1993. Page 27.]
           “Francisco Varela, an immunologist-turned-neuroscientist, Evan Thompson, a philosopher, and Eleanor Rosch, a psychologist, are radical critics of cognitive science, calling for what they consider to be more of a revolution than a set of reforms, and they have pooled their skills to execute what is surely the best informed, best balanced radical critique to date. Just how radical? Their heroes are the Buddha and the French phenomenologist Maurice Merleau-Ponty. They argue that Buddhist meditative traditions offer not just a wealth of important phenomena of human consciousness, but otherwise unobtainable insights into the relations of embodiment that permit us to understand how the inner and the outer, the first-person point of view and the objective point of view of science, can coexist.” [Daniel C. Dennett, “The Embodied Mind: Cognitive Science and Human Experience.” Review article. American Journal of Psychology. Volume 106, number 1, spring 1993. Pages 121-126.]
      132. neurophenomenology (Francisco J. Varela and many others): They develop approaches which combine phenomenology, particularly Husserlian phenomenology, with neuroscience.
           “… my claim is that neurophenomenology is a natural solution that can allow us to move beyond the hard problem in the study of consciousness. It has little to do with some theoretical or conceptual ‘extra ingredient’ …. Instead, it acknowledges a realm of practical ignorance that can be remedied. It is also clear that — like all solutions in science which radically reframe an outstanding problem rather than trying to solve it within its original setting — it has a revolutionary potential, a point to which I shall turn at the end of this article. In other words, instead of finding ‘extra ingredients’ to account for how consciousness emerges from matter and brain, my proposal reframes the question to that of finding meaningful bridges between two irreducible phenomenal domains. In this specific sense neurophenomenology is a potential solution to the hard problem by casting in an entirely different light on what ‘hard’ means.” [Francisco J. Varela, “Neurophenomenology: A Methodological Remedy for the Hard Problem.” Journal of Consciousness Studies. Volume 3, number 4, 1996. Pages 330-349.]
           “The moniker ‘neurophenomenology’ hints at its interdisciplinary nature. As the name implies, the approach merges aspects of phenomenology in the tradition of [Edmund] Husserl, [Martin[ Heidegger and [Maurice] Merleau-Ponty with the empirically supported data-collection techniques of neuroscience. The neurophenomenology described herein is a specific methodology, drawing from a history of successful and innovative studies. It derives from a scientific direction indicated by Francisco Varela … and aims to bridge neurophysiological data and accounts of first-person experience.” [Lauren Reinerman-Jones, Brandon Sollins, Shaun Gallagher, and Bruce Janz, “Neurophenomenology: an integrated approach to exploring awe and wonder.” South African Journal of Philosophy. Volume 32, number 4, 2013. Pages 295-309.]
           “Francisco Varela’s advocacy of a neurophenomenological approach in the dialogue between science and religion has served as a reference point for many researchers in this area. This approach emphasizes that contemplative traditions have given us valuable techniques for training individuals to introspect on their own mental processes, and that the resulting insights have the potential to partner cognitive neuroscience in its quest to understand features of consciousness and the mind.… [P]rior to the introduction of neurophenomenology by Varela the established approaches that had largely defined the dialogue between psychology and religion effectively disregarded teachings from contemplative traditions about the processes of the mind.” [Brian L. Lancaster, “Hermeneutic Neurophenomenology in the Science-Religion Dialogue: Analysis of States of Consciousness in the Zohar.” Religions. Volume 6, number 1, 2005. Pages 146-171.]
           “Our neurophenomenological evidence regarding the operational/preparational structuring of the brain’s representational output and the functioning of the three categorical lenses, indicates that this proposal (the essence of religion is power) ignores two of the three forms we would expect the supernatural sense to adopt, and the discussion above has reviewed historical instances of religious supernaturalism envisaged in terms of all three optics: dynamistic, vitalistic, and moralistic. We have what could be termed ‘dynamistic monotheism,’ ‘ritualistic monotheism,’ and ‘rationalistic monotheism.’ In each case, the ‘monotheism’ is at the level of worldview, more a matter of the hegemony of one of our three neurophenomenal optics, rather than its singularity.” [Frederic H. Peters, “Neurophenomenology of the Supernatural Sense in Religion.” Method & Theory in the Study of Religion. Volume 16, number 2, 2004. Pages 122-148.]
           “Neurophenomenology is a perspective that is grounded first and foremost in the trained introspection of the structures of one’s own experience. We emphasize ‘trained’ here because of the oft-touted perils of naive introspection. Neurophenomenology requires more of phenomenological enquiry than mere careful introspection; it requires mature contemplation—the ability of the researcher to (1) slow her mental functions so that fine structural elements in experience can be more easily discerned; (2) eliminate the illusion of the ego; and (3) attenuate the conceptual, ideological, and cultural baggage from the contemplation of the structures of consciousness. The types of phenomenology most useful to us are those, like Edmund Husserl’s ‘transcendental phenomenology’ and certain types of Buddhist psychology, that provide methods and training for attaining skill in mature contemplation.” [Charles D. Laughlin and C. Jason Throop, “Continuity, Causation And Cyclicity: A Cultural Neurophenomenology Of Time-Consciousness.” Time and Mind: The Journal of Archaeology, Consciousness and Culture. Volume 1, number 2, July 2008. Pages 159-186.]
           “Central to neurophenomenology is the combination of quantitative measures of large-scale neural activity with detailed first-person descriptions of the categorical features of experience. Accordingly, as a guide for their neurodynamic analysis, the authors focus on the role of integrative neural mechanisms such as neural phase synchrony in epileptic seizures, and on the collection of refined first-person descriptions of preictal states.” [Antoine Lutz, “Neurophenomenology and the study of self-consciousness.” Consciousness and Cognition. Volume 16, issue 34, September 2007. Pages 765-767.]
      133. existential sociology (Clovis E. Semmes, Peter K. Manning, Joseph A. Kotarba, and others): They develop approaches, sometimes grounded in critical social theory, to the subjectivity and relativity of social existence.
           “In the late 1960s, the struggle for human freedom by African Americans gave rise to the call for black sociology. This intellectual movement was an effort to redirect the production of sociological knowledge toward elevating the group status of African Americans. The intent was to rescue sociology in particular and social science in general from their complicity in the construction and reproduction of systemic white supremacy racism. Despite these early efforts, black sociology has not realized its potential. This arrested development is largely the result of the societal conditions that initially made the call for black sociology historically necessary. The racism of systemic white supremacy—particularly its normative manifestations—routinely subverts countervailing social formations. This process for African Americans and other groups (for example, Native Americans …) who have similar historical experiences is related to the metaproblem of cultural hegemony, or the systemic negation of one culture by another …. Sociologically, the historical imperative that emerges from this relationship is the need to address processes of institutional destabilization that constrain group survival, elevation, and liberation. For Africa Americans and other African-descent populations, circumstances have made group existence a fundamental epistemological concern. Thus, this paper argues that black sociology is fundamentally existential sociology.” [Clovis E. Semmes, “Existential Sociology or the Sociology of Group Survival, Elevation, and Liberation.” Journal of African American Studies. Volume 7, number 4, March 2004. Pages 3-18.]
           “The last ten years show signs indicative of the beginnings of a new creative epoch in sociology. A body of criticism directed toward the absolutistic sociologies has become increasingly focused and sharpened in its critical concerns; it is accompanied by a substantial corpus of empirical research and now is in the process of becoming more visible and available to the professional audience in monographs, edited collections and journal articles. Although a number of labels have been applied to this developing set of ideas, e.g., micro-organization, phenomenological sociology, ethnomethodology, it will be referred to tentatively in this essay as ‘existential sociology.’ It characteristically is concerned with the position of man in the social world and in social theory; it considers theory and life to have an intimate and unavoidable connection; it sees the reality of human social life as situational; and it espouses a methodology that is grounded in the understandings of everyday life, rather than presupposed a priori. Existential sociology thus contains a specific perspective on man which is both implicit and explicit, a set of methodological presuppositions, and it manifests a view of social reality which specifically challenges the dominant views of sociology.” [Peter K. Manning, “Existential Sociology.” The Sociological Quarterly. Volume 14, number 2, spring 1973. Pages 200-225.]
           “All told, rock ’n’ roll music and its derivatives arguably comprise the preeminent form of popular music in our society. The popular music industry that markets rock ’n’ roll continues to expand dramatically if not always economically—beyond multi-billion dollar annual sales, globalization, CDs, MP3 technology, and the Internet. The original generation of rock ’n’ rollers—the baby boomers—are now parents and, in increasing numbers, grandparents. The music and musical culture they grew up with has stayed with them, becoming the soundtrack of American culture. It is this context that provides the cultural and societal background for my analysis, which utilizes two related conceptual frameworks: phenomenology and existentialism. Phenomenology directs us to examine the situations in which authenticity in its various forms and iterations becomes relevant to the popular music fan in everyday life. Existential social thought directs us to examine the effects of these situations on the experience of self.” [Joseph A. Kotarba, “Pop Music as a Resource for Assembling an Authentic Self: A Phenomenological-Existential Perspective.” Authenticity in Culture, Self, and Society. Phillip Vannini and Patrick Williams, editors. Burlington, Vermont; Ashgate Publishing Company. 2009. Pages 153-168.]
           “Thinking of myself as a corpse created sadness, intrigue, and perplexity. But was this a truthful response? Could it have simply been the presentation of self-identity based in social construction and knowledge that other people would review it? Maybe a more honest response would have been less appropriate for this setting and too detrimental to my sense of self for consideration. Could it have been the response of an individual thinking about death from the safe confines of his home well away from the sight, smell, taste, touch, and sound or more concrete aspects of it? Possibly it was more representative of observations conducted from personal experience and the reading of published literature. How would an individual even know she or he was being deceitful about the self? These were the tasks of an existential sociology. Perhaps taking a job as an embalmer’s apprentice without experience in death related occupations might reveal substantive information about the thoughts, feelings, and emotions that occurred while working in contact with the dead, or it might reveal reasons why the public finds discussions of death, funeral directors, and the thought of being dead as morbid rather than as a natural process and necessary component of being human. The possibilities of this study were yet to be known.” [Meghan Daniel Probstfield. Becoming an Embalmer’s Apprentice: An Assessment and Application of Existential Sociology. Ph.D. dissertation. Oklahoma State University. Stillwater, Oklahoma. May, 2006. Page 11.]
           “… a renewed interest in existential sociology owes itself to the Postmodern notion that as we realize our world, we realize ourselves. They would also question [George Herbert] Mead’s confidence that people will come together and labor effectively to solve social problems. Critiques of Mead’s theories often converge on his ideological presuppositions. Among suspicion is the manner in which he teleologically privileges his theories by looking solely at the end results. The contradiction is this: if all ideas evolve in a process, then how can the consequences of a theoiy be definitely predicted?” [Chris L. Jakway. A Kierkegaardian Understanding of Self and Society: An Existential Sociology. Ph.D. dissertation. Western Michigan University. Kalamazoo, Michigan. June, 1998. Page 15.]
           “Existential sociology emerged in the late 1970s as the most recent version of everyday life sociology. Writers in this perspective have attempted to integrate symbolic interaction ism’s powerful concepts of the self and the situation, phenomenological sociology’s emphasis on the social construction of reality, and ethnomethodology’s telling critique of conventional sociological theory and methods, with an innovative argument for the centrality of embodiment and feelings to human agency. Thus, existential sociology can be defined descriptively as the study of human experience in the world (or existence) in all its forms. A key feature of experience in the (contemporary) world is change.” [Joseph A. Kotarba, “existential sociology.” The Blackwell Encyclopedia of Sociology. George Ritzer, editor. Malden, Massachusetts: Blackwell Publishing Ltd. 2007. Pages 1519-1524.]
           “Existential sociology has posed what is said to be a radical alternative to present-day theory, and it has done so with the added claim that the theoretical alternative which it represents is, without question, the only viable one with which sociologists should be properly concerned. Proponents of the new sociology assert that it is engaged in an effort to explicate the most fundamental features of social life, and that until such time as this foundational analysis is completed ‘all further sociological inquiry will be useless.’ …
           “Existential sociology has emerged out of the presumed disjunction between the prevailing modes of cognizing social reality and the sensibilities of those to whom the experience of that reality is no longer synchronized with the ‘offical interpretation.’ It is, in this regard, thoroughly invested with a rebel vision and thus demonstrates a close association with the motives of ‘radical sociology.’ …
           “… existential sociology has formulated a vision of conventional theory which is both thoroughly totalistic and unimaginably inaccurate. Contemporary sociological theory is, in fact, neither uniform in its assumptions nor dominated by any single prevailing paradigm. The failure of existential sociology to recognize this, although undoubtedly motivated by the need of those who are engaged in elaborating any new and relatively novel theoretical approach to legitimate and make explicit their enterprise, has eventuated in a large and seemingly unbridge- able gulf between existential and conventional sociology.”
           [Robert W. Bogart, “A Critique of Existential Sociology.” Social Research. Volume 44, number 3, autumn 1977. Pages 502-528.]
      134. existential phenomenology (Martin Heidegger as pronounced in this MP3 audio file): Although Heidegger has a shameful biography as a Nazi sympathizer, aspects of his work have been taken up by many critical scholars.
           “Because phenomena, as understood phenomenologically, are never anything but what goes to make up Being, while Being is in every case the Being of some entity, we must first bring forward the entities themselves if it is our aim that Being should be laid bare; and we must do this in the right way. These entities must likewise show themselves with the kind of access which genuinely belongs to them. And in this way the ordinary conception of phenomenon becomes phenomenologically relevant. If our analysis is to be authentic, its aim is such that the prior task of assuring ourselves ‘phenomenologically’ of that entity which is to serve as our example, has already been prescribed as our point of departure.” [Martin Heidegger. Being and Time. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson, tranlators. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Blackwell Publishers Ltd. 1962. Page 61.]
           “I remained so fascinated by [Edmund] Husserl’s work that I read in it again and again in the years to follow without gaining sufficient insight into what fascinated me. The spell emanating from the work extended to the outer appearance of the sentence structure and the title page.…
           “… circumstances forced me to delve into Husserl’s work anew. However, my repeated beginning also remained unsatisfactory, because I couldn't get over a main difficulty. It concerned the simple question how thinking’s manner of procedure which called itself ‘phenomenology’ was to be carried out. What worried me about this question came from the ambiguity which Husserl’s work showed at first glance.”
           [Martin Heidegger. On Being and Time. Joan Stambaugh, translator. New York: Harper Torchbooks imprint of Harper & Row, Publishers. 1972. Pages 75-76.]
           “This article is to be considered not as an apologetics of Heidegger and even analysis of his ideas. This is more the sketches of a regionalistics following from, firstly, existential phenomenology, secondly, ethical considerations, thirdly, cultural philosophy, fourthly, existential historics.” [Tomas Kačerauskas, “Death in the perspective of existential phenomenology.” Coactivity: Philosophy, Communication. Volume 17, number 3, 2009. Pages 83-91.]
           “Traditional solutions to the problem of other minds, like the argument from analogy, get entangled in the conceptual problem of other minds because they naively presuppose that others, whose mental states one cannot access, can at least be understood as others like oneself. The varieties of existential phenomenology considered so far get entangled in a comparable conceptual problem. This is not because they naively assume that others are others like oneself. In making situatedness and embodiment central for their understanding of subjects, they argue explicitly that self and other are not isolated from each other in the first place. Rather, they get caught up in this problem because they assume without further argument that situated or embodied subjects are individuated as self and other.” [Christian Skirke, “Existential Phenomenology and the Conceptual Problem of Other Minds.” The Southern Journal of Philosophy. Volume 52, issue, 2 June 2014. Pages 227-249.]
           “The vitalizing connection between mindfulness meditation and sociocultural contexts has yet to be articulated in a practically and philosophically grounded manner across the rich landscape of contemporary humanistic and existential phenomenological psychotherapy approaches. In this article, we begin to explore how and why an emerging mindful and multicultural humanistic-existential psychotherapy (MMHEP) approach can serve as a clearing for boundless mindful awareness that can open onto meaningful meditation upon multifaceted cultural and contextual horizons—revelatory edge horizons that speak to the poignant significance of culturally situated experiences carried forward in the life-giving breath of countless present moments. By reuniting the landscape of ‘inward’ possibilities for bare and present moment mindfulness with the meditative awareness of ‘outer’ sociocultural realms, a client may integratively connect with a greater sense of wholeness as a sociocultural-being-in-the-world. In addition, for the MMHEP psychotherapist, this article’s examination of an existential phenomenological and humanistic canon of primary texts can open the way for freely grounding MMHEP in writings that prefigured the cognitive–behavioral therapy (CBT) mindfulness-based third wave.” [Andrew J. Felder and Brent Dean Robbins, “The Integrated Heart of Cultural and Mindfulness Meditation Practice in Existential Phenomenology and Humanistic Psychotherapy.” The Humanistic Psychologist. Volume 44, number 2, June 2016. Pages 105-126.]
           “This article develops an existential-phenomenological critique of the social constructionist movement in psychology, taking its lead from what Kenneth Gergen calls “the most pressing question”: What happens to us when we begin to employ constructionist ideas in our lives? It is suggested that contemporary consumer societies already work according to the logic of social construction and that constructionism already has become many people’s philosophy.…
           “… my argument has not been that we should abandon social constructionism completely but rather that it stands in need of being supplemented with the insights into human existential facticity and finitude that we have found in existential-phenomenological descriptions.”
           [Svend Brinkmann, “Questioning Constuctionism: Toward an Ethics of Finitude.” Journal of Humanistic Psychology. Volume 46, number 1, January 2006. Pages 92-111.]
           “… [Martin] Heidegger has enormous difficulty in deciding just what these decisive stages are. The problem is how there can be a definitive account of such a history, rather than several competing ones, depending on the stance from which the history is constructed. The account offered of the ‘end of philosophy’ also becomes important here; for one interpretation of that end would license a definitive history of philosophy, as cumulatively leading to that end. This would be a Hegelian account, retaining uncritically an Aristotelian notion of essence as given at the beginning of time and realised at the end of a given process of development. While this conception maps closely onto the dynamics of natural growth, as in plants and even human beings, it does not capture the processes at work in technologically constructed processes. Heidegger’s use of Husserlian phenomenological reduction and of the Husserlian conception of essence as that which is constructed through phenomenological and eidetic reduction releases his thinking about history from such Aristotelian and Hegelian essentialism. It permits Heidegger to sidestep [Georg Wilhelm Friedrich] Hegel’s monumental struggle to demonstrate a contiguity between events and conceptual structure, such that systematic connections between all things can be posited and observed.” [Joanna Hodge. Heidegger and ethics. London and New York: Routledge imprint of Taylor & Francis Group, an Informa PLC business. 2001. Page 147.]
           “[Martin] Heidegger’s existential ontology has greatly influenced existential psychiatry and psychotherapy, yet opinions about the psychotherapeutic utility of an ontological perspective remain divided, especially in light of Heidegger’s negative reactions to misappropriation of his ontological analysis.…
           “Within the existential movement, the primary philosophical source for understanding human lives has always been Martin Heidegger’s fundamental ontological analysis of human existence, which he characterizes as temporal, historical, thoroughly relational Being-in-the-world and Being-with as Being-with-one-another. To give this relational Being-in-the-world a proper name, Heidegger adopted the German term Dasein (existence, being-there, presence).”
           [Angela M. D. Tratter, “A Place for Existential Ontology?: Emblems of Being and Implicit World-Projection.” Philosophy, Psychiatry & Psychology. Volume 22, number 2, June 2015. Pages 133-146.]
           “The phenomenological part of [Martin] Heidegger’s corpus—as opposed to his ‘postmetaphysical’ musings—argued that the metaphysical tradition had diverted thought from the everyday richness of primordial spatiality and primordial ecstatic temporality into a primary concern for an unspatial, nontemporal abstract eternity. In the process, the metaphysical tradition lowered the truth status of poetry, religion, statesmanship, art, and thinking vis à vis metaphysical thinking and logic, and ultimately vis à vis modern mathematical, technological science.” [Gregory Bruce Smith, “What Is Political Philosophy? A Phenomenological View.” Perspectives on Political Science. Volume 36, number 2, spring 2007. Pages 91-102.]
      135. existential spatiality (Dimitri Ginev [Bulgarian, Дмитрий Гинев, Dmitrij Ginev]): He develops a spatial approach to the work of Martin Heidegger.
           “They [left and right] are directions of the directedness into a world that because of its horizonality is always already transcendent. Thus considered, left and right are directions of the spatiality that belongs to the ‘transcendence of the world.’ …
           “The difference between both types of spatiality reflects to a certain extent the onticoontological difference since the spatiality of the ready-to-hand within-the-world can be established by a purely ‘ontic observation’ whereas the spatiality of being-in-the-world requires an ontological reflection upon the transcendence of the world. In this regard, [Martin] Heidegger goes on to lay the claim that the spatiality of being-in-the-world (as related to the transcendence of the world) provides the ontic possibility of Dasein’s [existence’s] environmental encountering of the readiness-to-hand. (This spatiality is generated by the ‘ worldhood of the world.’ … But there is a worldhood because the world is transcendent.) I will use the expression of ‘ existential spatiality’ for designating in the first place the dynamic unity of both types of spatiality in the process of meaning constitution.”
           [Dimitri Ginev, “The Scope of Existential Spatiality.” Santalka. Volume 18, number 3, September 2010. Pages 18-30.]
      136. ontological hermeneutics (Hans-Georg Gadamer as pronounced in this MP3 audio file, Henri Bergson as pronounced in this MP3 audio file, Martin Heidegger, and others): They develop various interpretive approaches to existence.
           “With the ontological turn that our hermeneutical inquiry has taken, we are moving toward a metaphysical idea whose significance we can show by going back to its origins. The concept of the beautiful—which shared the central place in eighteenth-century aesthetics with the sublime, and which was to be entirely eliminated in the course of the nineteenth century by the aesthetic critique of classicism—was once a universal metaphysical concept and had a function in metaphysics, the universal doctrine of being, that was by no means limited to the aesthetic in the narrower sense. We will see that this ancient conception of the beautiful can also be of service to the comprehensive hermeneutics that has emerged from the critique of the methodologism of the human sciences.” [Hans-Georg Gadamer. Truth and Method. Second, revised edition. Joel Weinsheimer and Donald G. Marshall, translators. London and New York: Continuum. 2004. Page 472.]
           “… the metaphysics of the beautiful has implications for our inquiry. Now it is no longer a question, as it seemed in the nineteenth century, of justifying the truth claim of art and the artistic, or even that of history and the methodology of the human sciences, in terms of theory of science. Now we are concerned, rather, with the much more general task of establishing the ontological background of the hermeneutical experience of the world.” [Hans-Georg Gadamer. Truth and Method. Second, revised edition. Joel Weinsheimer and Donald G. Marshall, translators. London and New York: Continuum. 2004. Pages 478-479.]
           “If we start from the basic ontological view that being is language—i.e., self-presentation—as revealed to us by the hermeneutical experience of being, then there follows not only the event-character of the beautiful and the event-structure of all understanding. Just as the mode of being of the beautiful proved to be characteristic of being in general, so the same thing can be shown to be true of the concept of truth. We can start from the metaphysical tradition, but here too we must ask what aspects of it apply to hermeneutical experience.” [Hans-Georg Gadamer. Truth and Method. Second, revised edition. Joel Weinsheimer and Donald G. Marshall, translators. London and New York: Continuum. 2004. Page 481.]
           “… the science of hermeneutics would have us believe that the opinion we have to understand is something alien that seeks to lure us into misunderstanding, and our task is to exclude every element through which a misunderstanding can creep in. We accomplish this task by a controlled procedure of historical training, by historical criticism, and by a controllable method in connection with powers of psychological empathy. It seems to me that this description is valid in one respect, but yet it is only a partial description of a comprehensive life-phenomenon that c onstitutes the ‘we’ that we all are. Our task, it seems to me, is to transcend the prejudices that underlie the aesthetic consciousness, the historical consciousness, and the hermeneutical consciousness that has been restricted to a technique for avoiding misunderstandings and to overcome the alienations present in them all.” [Hans-Georg Gadamer. Philosophical Hermeneutics. David E. Linge, translator and editor. Berkeley, California: University of California Press. 1976. Page 8.]
           “… [Based upon] the way in which the themes of circularity, temporality, and fore-meaning underlie the Heideggerian/Gadamerian response to traditional dualistic epistemological approaches, I an now in a position to focus my explication of the unique claims of [Hans-Georg] Gadamer’s ontological hermeneutics. In this first section, I detail Gadamer’s ontology of reason, and how this drives his resuscitation of prejudice, tradition, and authority as necessary components within the hermeneutic process. Gadamer’s hermeneutics stands in contrast with the Enlightenment view which considered these as impediments to true understanding. While Gadamer does not deny that a particular prejudice, tradition, or authority may play a distorting role, he aims to show how, in general, the process of understanding relies on prejudice, tradition, and authority—that these concepts are not inherently distorting. Although ‘prejudice’ is commonly used to refer to a belief that is unfounded, Gadamer wants to change the negative connotations we attach to the word. His ontological emphasis maintains there can be no understanding without prejudices.” [Lauren Swayne Barthold. Prejudice and Understanding: Gadamer’s Ontological Hermeneutics. M.A. thesis. Simon Fraser University. Burnaby, British Columbia. August, 1996. Pages 37-38.]
           “It was Hans-Georg Gadamer’s Truth and Method that brings hermeneutics into the heart of philosophy.…
           “Love itself is a life-giving activity. It is in this sense that Cheng Yi [Chinese, 程颐, Chéng-Yí] claims that ‘there is no difference between sages and Dao [Chinese, 道, dào, “way” or “path”],’ because a sage is but the person of Dao and ‘whoever follows Dao thoroughly is a sage.’ So ultimately, the Dao carried by the classics is the Dao, the ultimate reality of the universe. It is in this sense that Cheng Yi’s claim that the classics are carriers of Dao is not merely a hermeneutic claim but also an ontological claim; more appropriately, it is an ontological–hermeneutic claim.”
           [Yong Huang, “Cheng Yi’ Neo-Confucian Ontological Hermeneutics of Dao.” Journal of Chinese Philosophy. Volume 27, number 1, March 2000. Pages 69-92.]
           “[The] work of interpretation is too rapid, when we hear our own language, to allow us time to decompose it into its different phases. But we have the clear consciousness of it when we converse in a foreign language which we know only imperfectly. We realize, then, that the sounds distinctly heard are being used by us as guiding marks, that we jump at once to a certain class of abstract ideas, and that, when we have adopted this intellectual tone, we advance with the conceived meaning, to meet the perceived sound. If the interpretation is to be exact, the one must be able to join the other.
           “Indeed, would interpretation be possible if we had to go from words to ideas? The words of a sentence have not an absolute meaning. Each of them borrows a special import from what precedes it and from what follows it. Nor are all the words of a sentence capable of evoking an independent image or idea. Many of them express relations, and express them only by their place in the whole and by their connexion with the other words of the sentence. Had the mind con stantly to go from the word to the idea, it would be always perplexed and, so to say, wandering. Intellection can only be straight and sure if we set out from the supposed meaning, constructed by us hypothetically, then descend from the meaning to the fragments of words really perceived, and then make use of these as simple stakes to peg out in all its sinuosities the special curve of the road which the mind is to follow.…
           “The intellectual effort to interpret, to comprehend, to pay attention, is then a movement of the ‘dynamic scheme’ in the direction of the image which develops it. It is a continuous transformation of abstract relations, suggested by the objects perceived, into concrete images capable of recovering those objects. No doubt a feeling of effort does not always intervene during this operation. We shall see presently in what particular circumstances the operation takes place whenever an effort is to be found accompanying it. But it is only during such an operation that we can become conscious of an intellectual effort.”
           [Henri Bergson, “Intellectual Effort,” in Henri Bergson. Mind-Energy: Lectures and Essays. H. Wildon Carr, translator. New York: Henry Holt and Company. 1920. Pages 186-230.]
           “… [There was] the 1902 article which first presents [Henri] Bergson’s ontological hermeneutics. Entitled ‘Intellectual Effort,‘ the article starts as a fairly pedestrian scrutiny of the then-current notion of the association of ideas, and more ‘active’ methods of cognition, such as ‘invention.’ Bergson uses the term ‘image’ to indicate an immediate, direct ‘finding’ which is more ‘mental’ than raw sensation, but less than an ‘act’ of cognitive apprehension. Roughly, ‘images’ are the ‘raw material’ of ‘intellectual effort.’ Being ‘raw material,’ the incipient ‘parts,’ the images need to be shaped, organized. To be ‘fitted’ and ‘placed,’ the images require a ‘scheme,’ or an abstract framework. Bergson’s article appears to grant a quasi-Kantian preeminence to the scheme – at least, at first. But as the article proceeds, he veers toward the realization that both ‘poles’ of the ‘effort’ – the concrete content of the images and the initial framing concept – must reciprocally adjust to each other. Bergson seemingly walked into the middle of the hermeneutic circle.” [Richard L. Brougham, “Ontological Hermeneutics: An Overlooked Bergsonian Perspective.” Process Studies. Volume 22, number 1, spring 1993. Pages 37-41.]
           “At the beginning of our investigation it is not possible to give a detailed account of the presuppositions and prejudices which are constantly reimplanting and fostering the belief that an inquiry into Being is unnecessary. They are rooted in ancient ontology itself, and it will not be possible to interpret that ontology adequately until the question of Being has been clarified and answered and taken as a clue—at least, if we are to have regard for the soil from which the basic ontological concepts developed, and if we are to see whether the categories have been demonstrated in a way that is appropriate and complete. We shall therefore carry the discussion of these presuppositions only to the point at which the necessity for restating the question about the meaning of Being become plain.” [Martin Heidegger. Being and Time. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson, tranlators. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Blackwell Publishers Ltd. 1962. Pages 21-22.]
           “… the word ‘hermeneutics,’ broadened in the appropriate sense, can mean the theory and methodology for every kind of interpretation, including, for example, that of works of the visual arts.…
           “… In Being and Time, the term ‘hermeneutics’ is used in a still broader sense, ‘broader’ here meaning, however, not the mere extension of the same meaning over a still larger area of appplication. ‘Broader’ is to say: in keeping with that vastness which springs from originary being. In Being and Time, hermeneutics means neither the theory of the art of interpretation nor interpretation itself, but rather the attempt first of all to define the nature of interpretation on hermeneutic grounds.…
           [Martin Heidegger. On the Way to Language. Peter D. Hertz, translator. New York: Perennial Library imprint of Harper & Row, Publishers. 1971. Page 11.]
           “The study attempted to clarify the concept of care in male nurse work within the acute hospital setting. It consisted of semi-structured interviews with eight participants from a range of acute general hospital areas. A qualitative research process using ontological hermeneutics was selected as it provided a means through which the experiences of these men could be described and interpreted. The hermeneutic circle of fore-understanding, coconstitution and interpretation was followed ….
           “… In ontological hermeneutics, sometimes referred to as Heideggerian or hermeneutic phenomenology …, a circle is followed to facilitate analysis that acknowledges what is known as the ontological shift as described by [Martin] Heidegger ….”
           [Frank Milligan, “The concept of care in male nurse work: an ontological hermeneutic study in acute hospitals.” Journal of Advanced Nursing. Volume 35, number 1, July 2001. Pages 7-16.]
           “The collection and analysis of data in the Heideggerian hermeneutic study that was conducted are informed by the philosophies of Heidegger, which presupposed that people are subjective and ‘self-interpreting’ beings and human experience is essentially meaningful in terms of the context in which people find themselves.…
           “Ontological hermeneutics certainly merit being in the heart of mental-health nursing research because of it’s strong philosophical assumption that in order to bring in what is unintelligible to understanding, the non-cognitive precondition of all understanding and the shared primordial understanding of the being of people needs to kick in before rational thinking.”
           [Kam Hock Chang and Stephen Horrocks, “Is there a place for ontological hermeneutics in mental-health nursing research? A review of a hermeneutic study” International Journal of Nursing Practice. Volume 15, number 5, October 2008. Pages 383-390.]
      137. critical qualitative research (Gaile S. Cannella and others): Cannella describes a “postimperialist” approach to qualitative research.
           “Although the term critical most often evokes thoughts of neo Marxist ‘critical theory,’ critical qualitative research is actually a hybrid and emergent form of inquiry. Calls for a critical social science …, a postimperialist science …, and indigenous research agendas … are attended to as research is constructed that would uncover the ways that social relations are shaped by ideology and such research explores how these relations can be altered. This type of research is embedded within the history of qualitative research that has resulted in a scholarly environment in which diverse voices and ways of living in the world have been heard and respected. Additionally, critical qualitative research draws from the range of theoretical perspectives that have challenged notions of universalist truth, have acknowledged the political and power orientations of human knowledge(s), and have fostered emer gent, activist orientations.” [Gaile S. Cannella, “critical qualitative research.” The Blackwell Encyclopedia of Sociology. George Ritzer, editor. Malden, Massachusetts: Blackwell Publishing Ltd. 2007. Pages 867-870.]
      138. crisis of the Keynesian–Fordist model (Shawn Nichols): He examines “the material and ideological determinants of historical change” which have resulted in the “existing configuration of social forces.”
           “The existing configuration of social forces under consideration must be understood in terms of the material and ideological determinants of historical change that effectuated them. The most recent epochal shift from which transnational class formation emerged was driven by the restructuring and stabilization of capitalist fractions in the wake of the crisis of the Keynesian-Fordist model, which had guided global economic policy in the post-war capitalist world …. Unable to maintain capitalist growth in the winding down of the post-war boom, the crisis of accumulation opened the door for structural transformation ….” [Shawn Nichols, “Transnational Capital and the Transformation of the State: Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS) in the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP).” Critical Sociology. OnlineFirst edition. November, 2016. Pages 1-21.]
      139. two areas of struggle (Harry Cleaver): He considers the factory and the community as dual arenas for the struggle against capitalism.
           “… [An] organizational implication of the way the working class is divided between waged and unwaged — factory workers and community workers — includes the fact that the autonomous organizations I have mentioned exist within and between both the factory and the community. Their coordination means the coming together of the two areas of struggle. This means that the site of working class struggle and action and the site of an ‘issue’ may be geographically different but united by that action. Examples of this are community struggles in the Appalachian area over coal mine issues and the strikes by Italian factory workers over community issues. In this way, working class power is exerted at the level of the social factory, politically recomposing the division between factory and community.” [Harry Cleaver. Reading Capital Politically. Oakland, California: AK Press. 2000. Page 161.]
      140. theory of authority (Alexandre Kojève as pronounced in this MP3 audio file [Russian Cyrillic, Алекса́ндр Влади́мирович Коже́вников, Aleksándr Vladímirovič Kožévnikov as pronounced in this MP3 audio file): This Russian-born French philosopher examines and critiques several views of authority.
           “A Power founded on Authority can, of course, use force; but if Authority engenders force, the latter can never, by definition, engender a political Authority.
           “A theory of ‘political Power’ is therefore nothing other than a theory of Authority (that manifests itself in the political ‘sphere’) – more precisely, a (theoretical) application of the theory of Authority to Politics (that is to say, to the State). Also, in order to avoid any ambiguity, we shall replace the phrase ‘political Power’ with that of ‘political Authority.’
           “By definition, every political Authority belongs en bloc to the State as such. But the State is a ‘conceptual’ entity that needs a (material) ‘concrete support’ in order to exist in the spatiotemporal world. This is how problems of the division and transmission of Authority emerge.”
           [Alexandre Kojève. The Notion of Authority. Hager Weslati, translator. London and New York: Verso imprint of New Left Books. 2014. Verso ebook edition.]
           “The original French edition carries the title La notion de l’autorité. Though the English adaptation of the title conveys most of the title’s commonsensical meanings, several other interpretations might be given, most remarkable among which would be a sense of authority’s possession over its notion. Even if it is unclear whether this was Kojève’s intention, it provides one explanation as to why the chosen title wasn’t simply La notion d’autorité (a title that nonetheless mistakenly appears on several French-language websites). Moreover, the possibility of such an interpretation is quite significant, since authority would, in this case, be that which would have authority over its signifier, whether that means to author or to authorize it.” [Jorge Varela, “The Notion of Authority (A Brief Presentation).” Review article. Radical Philosophy: Philosophical Journal of the Independent Left. Number 199, September/October 2016. Pages 46-48.]
      141. journeys into transformation (Alun David Morgan): He considers the “the transformative potential of travel.”
           “Over time, I have noted an increasing shift in my motivation for travel from seeking superficial to more profound engagements with destinations. I now actively seek out dialogic experiences in the natural landscape and among the host culture in the places I visit. I am also drawn to sites—built and natural—which are associated with sacredness in the vernacular tradition (such as temples, mountains, and springs) where I seek to imaginatively enter ‘sacred space.’ For these personal and professional reasons, I have sought explanations for the transformative potential of travel with a view to using such insight more deliberatively in the practice of transformative education. Yet I am also aware that such efforts must be handled with caution, sensitivity and wisdom since the potential for negative unintentional consequences is significant.” [Alun David Morgan, “Journeys Into Transformation: Travel to An ‘Other’ Place as a Vehicle for Transformative Learning.” Journal of Transformative Education. Volume 8, number 4, October 2010. Pages 246-268.]
      142. critical criminology (Gresham M. Sykes, Michael J. Lynch, and many others): Applies critical social theory to criminology.
           “… what I have called ‘critical criminology’ is marked by a profound shift in the interpretation of motives behind the actions of the agencies that deal with crime. Many writers, of course, had long been pointing out that the ‘criminal-processing system’ was often harsh and unfair, and, more specifically, that the poor and members of minority groups suffered from an acute disadvantage. Few criminologists, however, were willing to go so far as to claim that the system was inherently unjust.” [Gresham M. Sykes, “Criminology: The Rise of Critical Criminology.” Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology. Volume 65, issue 2, 1974. Pages 206-213.]
      143. social epistemology of the new atheism (William A. Stahl): Critically examines the new atheism.
           “Atheism is on the march—or so one might think from the mass media. Books by prominent atheists, led by Richard Dawkins, Sam Harris and Christopher Hitchens, have been on best-seller lists for months. Yet as soon as one examines it, the so-called New Atheism appears to be a good deal less than it seems. Atheism should not be confused with secularism—it represents the extreme edge of a wide range of secular thinking and the numbers of atheists is not, nor ever has been, very large ….” [William A. Stahl. “One-Dimensional Rage: The Social Epistemology of the New Atheism and Fundamentalism.” Religion and the New Atheism: A Critical Appraisal. Amarnath Amarasingam, editor. Boston, Massachusetts: Brill. 2010. Page 97.]
           “Amarnath Amarasingam’s edited collection of essays, Religion and the New Atheism, reflects a general concern among many within the academic world not only that new atheism offers unsophisticated and uninformed analysis of religion but that there is a distinct lack of rigorous academic treatment of their ideas ….” [Jolyon Charles Leslie Agar, “Raging Against God: Examining the Radical Secularism and Humanism of ‘New Atheism.’” Journal of Critical Realism. Volume 11, issue 2, March 2012. Pages 225-246.]
           “Any scientist who insists on imposing metaphysical naturalism is guilty of scientism. This involves usurping the boundary between science and religion and claiming all of reality for science. In essence, this would be a form of atheism imposed by fiat and a reconciliation of science ence and religion by eliminating religion as it is known by most people.” [William A. Stahl, Gary Diver, Yvonne Petry, and Gary Diver. Webs of Reality: Social Perspectives on Science and Religion. New Brunswick, New Jersey: Rutgers University Press. 2002. Page 180.]
           “New Atheism emerged in 2004 as a kind of literary and social movement. Led by such luminaries as Richard Dawkins, Sam Harris and Christopher Hitchens, New Atheism became part of the zeitgeist, a well-timed reaction against religious fundamentalism. The New Atheists are notoriously pugilistic. In print or on stage, they never run from a fight.…
           “But there’s something missing in their critiques, something fundamental. For all their eloquence, their arguments are often banal. Regrettably, they’ve shown little interest in understanding the religious compulsion. They talk incessantly about the untruth of religion because they assume truth is what matters most to religious people.… Religious convictions, in many cases, are held not because they’re true but because they’re meaningful, because they’re personally transformative. New Atheists are blind to this brand of belief.”
           [Sean Illing, “New Atheism’s fatal arrogance: The glaring intellectual laziness of Bill Maher & Richard Dawkins.” Salon.com. May 9th, 2015. Retrieved on January 9th, 2016.]
      144. critical ethnography (Jim Thomas, Kay E. Cook, and many others): Applies critical social theory to ethnographic field research.
           “Critical ethnography is a relatively new mode of qualitative investigation and one in need of further elaboration, discussion, and debate. Critical ethnography shares the methods of traditional ethnography, such as by seeking the emic perspective gained through intense fieldwork, but it adds an explicit political focus. This focus places critical ethnography in a unique position to examine power-laden social and cultural processes within particular social sites. More specifically, critical ethnography can be defined as a research methodology through which social, cultural, political, and economic issues can be interpreted and represented to illustrate the processes of oppression and engage people in addressing them.” [Kay E. Cook, Critical Ethnography.” The SAGE Encyclopedia of Qualitative Research Methods. Lisa M. Given, editor. Thousand Oaks, California. SAGE Publications, 2008.]
      145. critical education theory (Tony Ward and others): Applies critical social theory to education.
           “Critical Education Theory evolves from the wider discipline of Critical (Social) Theory, and looks at the ways in which political ideology shapes Education as a way of maintaining existing regimes of privilege and social control. It casts a critical eye upon the history, the development and practice of education and educational theorising. It holds that education in the modern western world is shaped by the ideologies and power structures that devolve from Capitalism, and that it’s purpose is to reproduce these conditions in ways which benefit the already-powerful. Instead, Critical Education Theory promotes an ideology of education as an instrument of social transformation and as a means of attaining social, cultural, and economic equity. Initially, it did this from an orthodox (economic) Marxist point of view, but increasingly has adopted many of the tenets and theories of Cultural Studies to demonstrate how cultural codes play a fundamental part in both curriculum construction and classroom practice.” [Tony Ward, “Critical Education Theory.” Tony Edward Education: Education for Critical Times. No date. Retrieved on August 25th, 2015.]
      146. radical interactionism (Lonnie Athens): He substitutes “domination” for “sociality” in the interactionist tradition.
           “… the new form of interactionism, which I … have … labeled as ‘radical ineractionism,’ is needed. Unlike [Herbert] Blumer’s … ‘symbolic interactionism,’ radical interactionism gives more gravity to [Robert] Park’s than to [George Herbert] Mead’s ideas and, in the process, makes domination rather than sociality the foundation of human social existence. Although my hope is that my colleagues will consider radical interactionism as a viable alternative to symbolic interactionism, I am pessimistic about the chances of this happening any time soon because intellectual pursuits are no less subject to the operation of dominance orders than any other kind of human social endeavor ….” [Lonnie Athens, “The Roots of ‘Radical Interactionism.’” Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour. Volume 39, issue 4, 2009. Pages 387-414.]
           “In my paper on human subordination, I hope to increase our present understanding of it by not only drawing on the insights of [George Herbert] Mead and [Herbert] Blumer, but also, more importantly, those of [Robert] Park. By building directly on their thoughts, I will seek to explain how subordination operates in human group life from the interactionist’s perspective, which I have elsewhere labeled ‘radical interactionism‘ …. My view of subordination is commensurate with present-day common usage. According to the 4th edition of Webster’s New World College Dictionary, the word ‘subordination’ means ‘subordinating or being subordinated’ and its derivative, ‘subordinate,’ means ‘inferior to or placed below another in rank.’ Since the placement of people or groups into subordinate roles requires domination and since domination requires, in turn, the exercise of power and sometimes even force, subordination is broadly conceived from this perspective as encompassing not only the operation of domination, but also both power and force.” [Lonnie Athens, “Human Subordination from a Radical Interactionist’s Perspective.” Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour. Volume 40, issue 3, 2010. Pages 339-368.]
           “[George Herbert] Mead blundered when he failed to develop a radical interactionist’s perspective and make domination the key to our understanding of social conflict. Despite this blunder, we owe him a great debt for forcing us to consider adopting a new more radical interactionism as replacement for his much older and more conventional counterpart, symbolic interactionism, if we wish to increase our understanding not only social conflict, but also social existence ….” [Lonnie Athens, “Mead’s Analysis of Social Conflict: A Radical Interactionist’s Critique.” The American Sociologist. Volume 43, number 4, December 2012. Pages 428-447.]
           “… I hope to accomplish my ultimate goal of laying the foundation for a new form of interactionism: radical interactionism. In trying to achieve these three goals, I will proceed as follows. First, I will try to demonstrate how his shortchanging of domination thwarts his answering of these four vital questions that he poses about society: (1) What is the nature of the master principle on which institutions and, in turn, societies operate? (2) How did human institutions and, in turn, human societies originally arise? (3) How do human societies change through the modification of their basic institutions? (4) How do institutions operate in everyday life to organize human communal existence? Next, I will seek to demonstrate … [the substitution of] my notion of the principle of domination for [George Herbert] Mead’s principle of sociality ….” [Lonnie Athens, “Radical Interactionism: Going Beyond Mead.” Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour. Volume 37, issue 2, 2007. Pages 137-165.]
           “He [Herbert Blumer] wrongly infers the absence of dominance in a social act on the basis of whether the participants acquiesce to it. According to this reasoning, if no one openly challenges another’s domination of an unfolding social act, then dominance cannot be said to be an effective factor in its construction. However, during the construction of any complex social act, different people must perform different roles to ensure its completion, so a division of labor invariably emerges. The emergence of a division of labor requires that superordinate roles become differentiated from subordinate ones, and thereby, the need for dominance always emerges.” [Lonnie Athens, “‘Domination’: The Blind Spot in Mead’s Analysis of the Social Act.” Journal of Classical Sociology. Volume 2, number 1, 2002. Pages 25-42.]
           “Although contemporary interactionists have generally overlooked the notion of dominance, [Robert E.] Park … emphasized it. In fact, dominance should play the same critical part in symbolic interactionist’s thought that ‘social class’ and ‘social status’ play, respectively, in Marxism and functionalism.” [Lonnie Athens, “Dominance, Ghettos, and Violent Crime.” The Sociological Quarterly. Volume 39, number 4, autumn 1998. Pages 673-691.]
           “To his credit, [Herbert] Blumer … makes society one of the fundamental categories, or what he calls ‘root images’ of ‘symbolic interactionism,’ the theoretical perspective that he developed primarily from his study of [George Herbert] Mead’s thought.” [Lonnie Athens, “Mead’s Lost Conception of Society.” Symbolic Interaction. Volume 28, number 3, summer 2005. Pages 305-325.]
           “… [The] narrowing of the focus of public attention tends to increase the influence of the dominant person or persons in the community. But the existence of this dominance depends upon the ability of the community, or its leaders, to maintain tension. It is in this way that dictators arise and maintain themselves in power. It is this that explains likewise the necessity to a dictatorship of some sort of censorship.
           “News circulates, it seems, only in a society where there is a certain degree of rapport and a certain degree of tension. But the effect of news from outside the circle of public interest is to disperse attention and, by so doing, to encourage individuals to act on their own initia- tive rather than on that of a dominant party or personality.”
           [Robert E. Park, “News as a Form of Knowledge: A Chapter in the Sociology of Knowledge.” American Journal of Sociology. Volume 45, number 5 March 1940. Pages 669-686.]
           “Human ecology, as sociologists conceive it, seeks to emphasize not so much geography as space. In society we not only live together but at the same time we live apart, and human relations can always be reckoned, with more or less accuracy, in terms of distance. In so far as social structure can be defined in terms of position, social changes may be described in terms of movement; and society exhibits, in one of its aspects, characters that can be measured and described in mathematical formulas.
           “Local communities may be compared with reference to the areas which they occupy and with reference to the relative density of population distribution within those areas. Communities are not, however, mere population aggregates. Cities, particularly great cities, where the selection and segregation of the population has gone farthest, display certain morphological characteristics which are not found in smaller population aggregates.”
           [Robert Ezra Park. Human Communities: The City and Human Ecology. Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press. 1952. Page 166.]
           “The thing which distinguishes an organism from a mere aggregation of individuals, or of parts, is the capacity for concerted action—the disposition of the parts, under certain conditions, to act as a unit. The structure of an organism, inherited or acquired, serves to facilitate this concerted action. This is as true of a social as of a biological organism. The fundamental differences between organisms, the character which permits us to arrange them in a progressive series, are the different degrees to which the different parts of which they are composed have been integrated and organized for the purpose of corporate action.” [Robert E. Park, “Human Nature and Collective Behavior.” American Journal of Sociology. Volume 32, number 5, March 1927. Pages 733-741.]
           “[George Herbert] Mead’s concern was predominatly with symbolic interaction. Symbolic interaction involves interpretation, or ascertaining the meaning of the actions or remarks of the other person, and definition, or conveying indications to another person as to how he is to act. Human association consists of a process of such interpretation and definition. Through this process the participants fit their own acts to the ongoing acts of one another and guide others in doing so.” [Herbert Blumer, “Sociological Implications of the Thought of George Herbert Mead.” American Journal of Sociology. Volume 71, number 5, March 1966. Pages 535-544.]
           “Henceforth, we shall use the label ‘symbolic interaction’ to refer to the type of interaction that makes use of significant gestures or symbols. We shall use the term ‘nonsymbolic interaction’ to cover the type of interaction [George Herbert] Mead treats as the ‘conversation of gestures.’ Several matters pertaining to the distinction between these two types of interaction may be inserted at this point. First, one should keep in mind the fact that nonsymbolic interaction, while typical of animal societies, also takes place in the association of human beings.…
           “Second, it should be borne in mind that nonsymbolic interaction is not restricted to human behavior.…
           “Third, in line with this discussion, it should be noted that the process of ‘learning’ through nonsymbolic interaction is very different indeed from the process of learning through symbolic interaction.”
           [Herbert Blumer. George Herbert Mead and Human Conduct. Thomas J. Morrione, editor. Lanham, Maryland: AltaMira Press imprint of Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc. 2004. Pages 22-23.]
           “Methodologically, the interactionist approach forces the sociologist out of the armchair; no theory can be based upon universal principles of human nature derived from a philosophy of history. All concrete and social facts must be comprehended as manufacturing the drama of human interactions in a particular human setting. Because the actor’s personal motives and intentions are central to understanding the social action, the method [from Charles Horton Cooley] of ‘sympathetic introspection’ becomes an indispensible tool for the sociologist.…
           “The movement toward psychological sociology, while still nominalistic, marked a monumental advance in Americal social theory. The social forces school died and was buried unceremoniously along with its proponents. Today the names of [Lester Frank] Ward, [Edward A.] Ross, [Franklin Henry] Giddings, and [Albion] Small are little more than historical footnotes. By contrast, not only has the interactionist school survived, but new strains have also appeared under such names as ‘existential’ sociology, ‘phenomenological’ sociology, ‘humanistic’ sociology, and ‘dramaturgical’ sociology. Moreover, some early proponents, such as Cooley and [Herbert] Blumer, are still widely read.”
           [J. David Lewis and Richard L. Smith. American Sociology and Pragmatism: Mead, Chicago Sociology, and Symbolic Interaction. Chicago, Illinois: The University of Chicago Press. 1980. Pages 158.]
           “The ‘Social Forces’ School. The first approach, though mainly of historic interest, is still followed by certain sociologists. This is the view that all social phenomena can be regarded as manifestations of some homogeneous force or forces. The imitation theory, developed principally by [Gabriel] Tarde and [Edward A.] Ross, is an illustration which is too well known to require discussion. A number of writers have taken certain alleged ‘instincts’ as forces universally operative in society; for example, fear, hate, gregariousness, suggestibility, and parental love. We are not here referring to the instinct school of social psychologists who trace the basis of social facts in the specific instinctive behavior of individuals. We mean rather those sociologists who abstract, the categories of instinct from specific individuals and consider them upon the generalized plane of a ‘social force.’” [Floyd H. Allport, “The Present Status of Social Psychology.” The Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology. Volume 21, Issue 4, 1927. Pages 372-383.]
      147. critical interactionism (Wayne Martin Mellinger): Combines critical social theory with symbolic interactionism, ethnomethodology, and Erving Goffman’s dramaturgy among other approaches.
           “Critical interactionism (CI), as I conceive it, focuses primarily on understanding social activity—what people do in concrete instances of social life….
           “I use the term ‘interactionism’ to refer to the wide diversity of analytic approaches which have developed to examine social activity, particularly in the last 50 years, including symbolic interactionism, ethnomethodology, conversation analysis, Goffman’s dramaturgy and frame analysis, discursive psychology, interpretive interactionism, institutional ethnography.
           “Interactionisms typically focus on the nature of social interaction, interpretive procedures, and use of language. They also tend to examine people interacting together to organize their lives and assemble society, what symbolic interactionists call ‘joint actions.’”
           [Wayne Martin Mellinger, “Critical Interactionism: The Microsociology of Domination.” Doing Modernity (blog). May 26th, 2008. Retrieved on August 14th, 2015.
      148. critical dramaturgy (David M. Boje, Paul Paolucci, Margaret Richardson, and others): Applies critical social theory to Erving Goffman’s dramaturgy (dramaturgical analysis).
           “A critical dramaturgical analysis of humor … can demonstrate the incongruity between logic, official norms, and forms of behavior by showing how ‘in jokes people frequently play with meanings in order to create humor [… and] to change the normalcy of the situation.’ … When a comic discourse pokes through the thin sleeve of institutionalized reality and focuses on the incongruities between official rules and actual behavior, the basis for social critique is laid.’ [Paul Paolucci with Margaret Richardson, “Dramaturgy, humor, and criticism: How Goffman reveais Seinfeld’s critique of American culture.” Humor. Volume 19, number 1, 2006. Pages 27-52.]
           “It seems to me that the dramaturgical approach may constitute a fifth perspective, to be added to the technical, political, structural, and cultural perspectives. The dramaturgical perspective, like each of the other four, can be employed as the end-point of analysis, as a final way of ordering facts. This would lead us to describe the techniques of impression management employed in a given establishment, the principal problems of impression management in the establishment, and the identity and interrelationships of the several performance teams which operate in the establishment. But, as with the facts utilized in each of the other perspectives, the facts specifically pertaining to impression management also play a part in the matters that are a concern in all the other perspectives. It may be useful to illustrate this briefly.” [Erving Goffman. The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life. Garden City, New York: Doubleday Anchor Books imprint of Doubleday & Company, Inc. 1959. Pages 240-241.]
      149. critical frame analysis (Angela O’Hagan and others): They apply critical social theory to frame analysis (a term coined by Erving Goffman).
           “The opportunity for political change presented by the independence referendum and the surrounding debate opened up political and policy space to explore and bring forward alternative approaches to social security for a future Scotland and as a response to the ‘welfare reform’ actions of the UK government. Using evidence from a range of sources produced during and since the Scottish independence referendum in 2014, this article draws on concepts from feminist critical frame analysis … in discussing the extent to which there was any ‘grand vision for gender equality’ ….” [Angela O’Hagan, “Redefining welfare in Scotland – with or without women?” Critical Social Policy. Volume 36, number 4, November 2016. Pages 649-671.]
           “One of the potentials of critical frame analysis is that it exposes the ‘conceptual prejudices’ that unintentionally may shape policy discourses; consequently, it can reveal latent inconsistencies, or even gender bias, embedded in the design of public policies.” [Mieke Verloo and Emanuela Lombardo. Contested Gender Equality and Policy Variety in Europe: Introducing a Critical Frame Analysis Approach. No date. Retrieved on August 23rd, 2015.
           “The frame analysis approach adopted in this study is both constructionist and deconstructionist …. It is rooted in an understanding of policy problems as being constructed, as based upon competing interpretations of what is the problem, and on the recognition that policy solutions are in-built in the representation of the problem …. In its methodology for mapping the different representations of gender in/equality as a policy problem, it adopts a deconstructionist approach. First of all, it treats ‘gender equality’ and ‘gender inequality’ as an empty signifier, studying it as an open concept that can be filled with a multitude of meanings. Also, its ‘sensitising questions’ do not present an absolute norm against which policies are measured, but it allows for a ‘relative’ norm ….” [María Bustelo and Mieke Verloo. Exploring the possibilities of Critical Frame Analysis for evaluating policies. A paper to be delivered at the International Political Science Association World Congress, Fukuoka, 2006. Page 16. Retrieved on August 23rd, 2015.]
           “… the first step of frame analysis has to be the identification/construction of issue frames. The framing of policy issues by particular policy actors or in particular policy documents can be analyzed with reference to how it combines various issues frames. Metaframes can be analyzed by finding common normative claims in issue frames belonging to different policy issues. Thus finding issue frames is a crucial intermediary step both for the analysis of metaframes and for the analysis of framing processes in specific documents.” [Tamas Dombos. “Critical Frame Analysis: A Comparative Methodology for the ‘Quality in Gender+ Equality Policies’ (QUING) project.” Center for Policy Studies. January, 2009. Page 6. Retrieved on August 23rd, 2015.]
           “My aim is to try to isolate some of the basic frameworks of understanding available in our society for making sense out of events and to analyze the special vulnerabilities to which these frames of reference are subject. I start with the fact that from an individual’s particular point of view, while one thing may momentarily appear to be what is really going on, in fact what is actually happening is plainly a joke, or a dream, or an accident, or a mistake, or a misunderstanding, or a deception, or a theatrical performance, and so forth. And attention will be directed to what it is about our sense of what is going on that makes it so vulnerable to the need for these various rereadings.…
           “And of course much use will be made of [Gregory] Bateson’s use of the term ‘frame.’ I assume that definitions of a situation are built up in accordance with principles of organization which govern events—at least social ones—and our subjective involvement in them; frame is the word I use to refer to such of these basic elements as I am able to identify. That is my definition of frame. My phrase ‘frame analysis’ is a slogan to refer to the examination in these terms of the organization of experience.”
           [Erving Goffman. Frame Analysis: An Essay on the Organization of Experience. Boston, Massachusetts: Northeastern University Press. 1986. Pages 10-11.]
           “Psychological frames are inclusive, i.e., by excluding certain messages certain others are included. From the point of view of set theory these two functions are synonymous, but from the point of view of psychology it is necessary to list them separately. The frame around a picture, if we consider this frame as a message intended to order or organize the perception of the viewer, says, ‘Attend to what is within and do not attend to what is outside.’ Figure and ground, as these terms are used by gestalt psychologists, are not symmetrically related as are the set and nonset of set theory. Perception of the ground must be positively inhibited and perception of the figure (in this case the picture) must be positively enhanced.” [Gregory Bateson. Steps to an Ecology of Mind: Collected Essays in Anthropology, Psychiatry, Evolution, and Epistemology. Northvale, New Jersey: Jason Aronson Inc. 1987. Page 193.]
      150. presentation of self in virtual life (Zizi Papacharissi [Greek/Hellēniká, Ζιζή Παπαχαρίση, Zizḗ Papacharísē as pronounced in this MP3 audio file]): See applies Erving Goffman’s dramaturgical analysis to the Internet.
           “Self-presentation is not a new topic for researchers. [Erving] Goffman’s remarks in the seminal The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life remain refreshingly current and lucid. He conceptualized the presentation of self in evervday life as an ongoing process of information management and distinguished between the expressions one gives and the expressions given off, specifying that expressions given off are more theatrical and contextual, usually nonverbal, and presumably unintentional. Expressions one gives are easier to manipulate than expressions one gives off. A person stages a daily ‘information game,’ whereby the impressions formed of him/her become a result of his/her expertise in controlling the information given and given off. Goffman referred to this game as a ‘performance.’
           “A Web page provides the ideal setting for this type of information game, allowing maximum control over the information disclosed. The absence of nonverbal or other social cues restricts the information exchanged to the specific facts the Weh page creator wants to communicate. Personal Web pages, lacking in media richness and social presence, restrain nonverbal communication. The expressions given off are either minimal, or carefully controlled, or both.”
           [Zizi Papacharissi, “The Presentation of Self in Virtual Life: Characteristics of Personal Home Pages.” Journalism and Mass Communication Quarterly. Volume 79, number 3, autumn 2002. Pages 643-660.]
      151. free culture (Lawrence Lessig): Lessig examines the public domain.
           “This is the ways things always were—until quite recently. For most of our history, the public domain was just over the horizon. From 1790 until 1978, the average copyright term was never more than thirty-two years, meaning that most culture just a generation and a half old was free for anyone to build upon without the permission of anyone else. Today’s equivalent would be for creative work from the 1960s and 1970s to now be free for the next Walt Disney to build upon without permission. Yet today, the public domain is presumptive only for content from before the Great Depression.
           “Of course, Walt Disney had no monopoly on ‘Walt Disney creativity.’ Nor does America. The norm of free culture has, until recently, and except within totalitarian nations, been broadly exploited and quite universal.”
           [Lawrence Lessig. Free Culture: How Big Media Uses Technology and the Law to Lock Down Culture and Control Creativity. New York: The Penguin Press imprint of Penguin Group (USA) Inc. 2004. Pages 24-25.]
      152. global homocapitalism (Rahul Rao [Bengali/Bāṅāli, রাহুল রাও, Rāhula Rāꞌō as pronounced in this MP3 audio file]): He develops a critique of homophobia in the context of modern global capitalism and its “international financial institutions.”
           “Revisiting debates over recognition and redistribution politics, I argue that viewing homophobia as ‘merely cultural’ enables international financial institutions (IFIs) to obscure the material conditions that incubate homophobic moral panics, and their own culpability in co-producing those conditions. Positioning themselves as external to the problem they seek to alleviate, IFIs are able to cast themselves as progressive forces in a greater moral struggle at precisely the historical moment in which austerity and capitalist crisis threaten to bring them into ever-greater disrepute. In sum, through a critical survey of recent IFI initiatives on homophobia, I attempt to delineate the emerging contours of what I call ‘global homocapitalism.’” [Rahul Rao, “Global homocapitalism.” Radical Philosophy: Philosophical Journal of the Independent Left. Number 194, November/December 2015. Pages 38-49.]
      153. Marxist theory of art (Roger Taylor): He specifies the categories which would be included in such a theory.
           “In trying to construct a Marxist theory of art (in the methodological sense indicated previously), we might start by attending to the distinction between the category of art and what might appear to be another category with which it could be confused. This second category is indicated in saying it includes music, dancing, poetry, sculpture, painting, drama, ballet, opera, novels, architecture, and at this point it makes sense to say etc. Thus if you were asked to extend the list you would be unlikely to say ‘petrol’ or ‘shears.’ Now this category is not the category of art, though it includes it. Thus, for instance, the category includes contemporary low culture which is excluded from the catetory of art.” [Roger Taylor, “The Marxist Theory of Art.” Radical Philosophy: Philosophical Journal of the Independent Left. Number 5, summer 1973. Pages 29-34.]
      154. critical journalism and creative publishing (James Miller, Rachel Rosenfelt, Juliette Cezzar, and others): “This program trains students not only in the traditions of criticism, critical theory, and fine writing – but also offers students a variety of studio courses and working experiences that teach them how to design, edit, and distribute journals and books containing intellectually serious written work aimed at a general reader. In addition to surveying more traditional forms of book and magazine publishing, the program will explore the possibilities opened up by new media, such as the internet, tablet applications, and the rise of print-on-demand small batch publications.” [“MA Creative Publishing & Critical Journalism.” New School for Social Research. 2015. Retrieved on October 10th, 2015.]
      155. critical approach to journalism education (David Skinner, Mike J. Gasher, and James Compton): They discuss journalism as a practice of representation.
           “The point of a critical approach to journalism education is to redefine the object of study, to move away from ‘journalism as it is practiced’ to the framing of journalism as an institutional practice of representation with its own historical, political, economic and cultural conditions of existence. While this reformulation of journalism school remains contentious, and the steps involved in its actualization are complex, the introduction of critical communication studies to the journalism curriculum offers students a means of bridging the practical and abstract components of course work and provides journalism as a method with a sound epistemological basis.” [David Skinner, Mike J. Gasher, and James Compton, “Putting theory to practice: A critical approach to journalism studies.” Journalism. Volume 2, number 3, 2001. Pages 341-360.]
      156. critical autism studies (Michael Orsini, Joyce Davidson, Katherine Runswick-Cole, Rebecca Mallett, and Sami Timimi [Arabic/ʿArabiyyaẗ, سَامِي التَمِيمِيّ Sāmī ʾal-Tamīmiyy], and others): These two founding texts of this emerging discipline present critical approaches to Autism Spectrum Disorder.
           “Although we coined the phrase “critical autism studies” as a title for our workshop, we view the contours of this field as emergent and in flux. Indeed, our goal in assembling this international, interdisciplinary group of scholars was in part to interrogate rather than define or delimit the boundaries of this emerging field of study. Of course, Worlds of Autism cannot contain the depth or diversity of current work; for example, with the exception of Francisco Ortega’s chapter, it does not engage, to any significant extent, with the work of critical neuroscientists &8230;. Despite inevitable shortcomings and omissions in our various discussions and writings since this collaborative project began, we continue to question what exactly is “critical” about critical autism studies, and attempt to keep the space open and accessible for new and emerging scholars. Our collective response to date is far from exhaustive, yet we have identified three main elements of a critical approach to the study of autism that shape the form and content of this collection:
           1. “Careful attention to the ways in which power relations shape the field of autism
           2. “Concern to advance new, enabling narratives of autism that challenge the predominant (deficit-focused and degrading) constructions that influence public opinion, policy, and popular culture
           3. “Commitment to develop new analytical frameworks using inclusive and nonreductive methodological and theoretical approaches to study the nature and culture of autism. The interdisciplinary research required (particularly in the social sciences and humanities) demands sensitivity to the kaleidoscopic complexity of this highly individualized, relational (dis)order.
           [Michael Orsini and Joyce Davidson, “Critical Autism Studies: Notes on an Emerging Field.” Worlds of Autism: Across the Spectrum of Neurological Difference. Joyce Davidson and Michael Orsini, editors. Minneapolis, Minnesota: University of Minnesota Press. 2013. Kindle edition.]
           “This book is the first edited collection that is firmly located within the previously non-existent field of critical autism studies.…
           “We see critical autism studies as a cross-disciplinary endeavour bringing together ideas from a variety of perspectives such as critical psychiatry, critical and community psychology, social sciences, disability studies, education, cultural studies, and ‘experts by experience.’ The different disciplinary locations of the authors within this book means different discourses are encountered. However, all the authors share a commitment to challenging non-critical approaches to autism that limit, and sometimes damage, people who attract and receive the label.
           “The broad aim of this book is to unsettle any of the current accepted understandings that view autism as a biologically based biomedical disorder or brain difference. The authors in this text seek to examine the pseudo-scientific claims upon which autism as biological disorder and difference are premised as well as to explore how autism is produced, consumed and commodified, and for what purposes, in the twenty-first century, while being mindful of the impact of these debates in the lives of people labelled with autism. The book is radical in calling for a move away from diagnosing autism as the starting point for improving service provision for those who experience the type of difficulties that could lead to such a diagnosis.”
           [Katherine Runswick-Cole, Rebecca Mallett, and Sami Timimi, “Introduction.” Re-Thinking Autism: Diagnosis, Identity and Equality. Katherine Runswick-Cole, Rebecca Mallett, and Sami Timimi, editors. London and Philadelphia, Pennsylvania: Jessica Kingsley Publishers. 2016. Kindle edition.]
      157. Deaf theory (Kendra L. Smith and M. J. Bienvenu): By analogy to feminist theory, critical race theory, queer theory, and other approaches, the authors propose theoretical development in the study of Deaf culture.
           “While there are, as yet, no formal ‘Deaf theories,’ Deaf peoples’ efforts to name and describe themselves and, in so doing, to end their oppression, while unique, are also akin to parallel efforts made by members of other subordinated groups. (… [There are] the relatively recent academic pursuits of ‘subordinate’ groups, such as feminist theory, critical race theory, queer theory, and so forth, as ‘emancipatory knowledges.’) In fact, the similarities can be striking.…
           “Defining ‘Deaf theory’ holds the promise of breaking the long tradition of the Deaf/hearing dichotomous position, and, in so doing, allows the cultural signifier ‘Deaf’ to be self-defined and self-valued without relation to a ‘hearing’ one. Ultimately, in approaching ‘Deaf theory’ academic credibility and the power of social capital accrues to Deaf Studies and, by association, to Deaf scholars, and to scholarship on Deaf culture. Over time, the production of knowledge that more richly and accurately names and describes Deafhood will, we believe, improve the overall conditions of existence for Deaf people the world over. It is toward these ends that this article is dedicated.”
           [Kendra L. Smith and M. J. Bienvenu, “‘Deaf theory’: what can we learn from feminist theory?” Multicultural Education. Volume 15, number 1, fall 2007. Pages 58-63.]
      158. critical journalism studies (Karin Wahl-Jorgensen): The article proposes critical and an empirical approach to journalism studies.
           “To attain an understanding of the cultural specificities of journalism, and of what journalism could and ought to do in particular contexts, critical journalism studies must be empirical. It must seek to understand more fully the conditions under which journalists do their work. Empirical work tells us that journalists in Uganda and the United States share a concern over the low pay and low status of the profession …. Whether it [empirical work] is quantitative or qualitative, in the form of surveys, interviews, historical accounts, ethnographies, or focus groups, journalism studies must continue to add to our knowledge of cultural specifi city. It can be a useful corrective to the determinism of political economy and propaganda approaches, but also remind us of the very real constraints and dangers for journalists.” [Karin Wahl-Jorgensen, “Wanted: Critical journalism studies to embrace its critical potential.” Ecquid Novi: African Journalism Studies. Volume 25, issue 2, 2004. Pages 350-353.]
      159. instruments of empire (Peter Gowan): Using Andrew Bacevich’s American Empire: The Realities and Consequences of U.S. Diplomacy, Gowan develops an approach to American empire.
           “American Empire is a tonic to read: crisp, vivid, pungent, with a dry sense of humour and sharp sense of hypocrisies. [Andrew] Bacevich is a conservative, who explains that he believed in the justice of America’s war against Communism, and continues to do so, but once it was over came to the conclusion that us expansionism both preceded and exceeded the logic of the Cold War, and needed to be understood in a longer, more continuous historical durée.…
           “Bacevich … focuses … on the ideology and instruments of the new, post-Cold War imperialism.… Bacevich insists that the empire did not just grow like Topsy: it was the outcome of a particular world view and was built by a coherent strategy, which gained support from the American people.”
           [Peter Gowan, “Instruments of Empire.” New Left Review. Series II, number 21, May–June 2003. Pages 147-153.]
           “… as a result of the [Bill] Clinton administration’s penchant for relying on missiles to spank and to scold, Americans became inured to the use of air power as an instrument of so-called coercive diplomacy. As bombing became routine, it also became noncontroversial. With the United States conferring upon itself wide latitude to wield its preferred military instrument, the American people and even American elites gave their tacit assent to a new Clinton doctrine governing the use of force. By the end of the decade the air weapon, as one senior military officer proclaimed, had ‘become the instrument of choice in America’s foreign policy.’ None questioned the truth of that assertion.” [Andrew Bacevich. American Empire: The Realities and Consequences of U.S. Diplomacy. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press. 2002. Page 203.]
      160. historical and ethical materialism (Samir Amin [Arabic/ʿArabiyyaẗ, سَمِير أَمِين, Samīr ꞌAmīn]): He develops an ethical approach based upon historical materialism.
           “[Karl] Marx sought to tear away the veil that covers social reality and to show under what conditions and by what mechanisms the laws of economy impose themselves as though they were like the laws of nature, that is to say like forces external to society, even though these economic laws are nothing but the expression of forces internal to it. The project of Marx remains totally incomprehensible to all those—and they are legion—who do not see that in this project the theory of value fulfills a central function (whose import they ignore) in assimilating an empirical reality of the highest degree, of phenomenal status. The concept of alienation is therefore at the center of the question here, and defines exactly the specific object domain of the study, social reality, different from and not analogous to that which is the object of the sciences of nature. I shall therefore … center my reflections on this concept of alienation, which alone permits us to define the object of the project of historical materialism, its specificity, its frontiers. In doing so I shall articulate the question of ethical values in the analysis of the functioning of society and by that discover the laws that regulate it.” [Samir Amin, “Historical and ethical materialism.” Monthly Review: An Independent Socialist Magazine. Volume 45, issue 2, June 1993. Pages 44-56.]
      161. popular movements toward socialism (Samir Amin): He considers two types of these movements.
           “The following reflections deal with a permanent and fundamental challenge that has confronted, and continues to confront, all popular movements struggling against capitalism. By this I mean both those of movements whose explicit radical aim is to abolish the system based on private proprietorship over the modern means of production (capital) in order to replace it with a system based on workers’ social proprietorship, and those of movements which, without going so far, involve mobilization aimed at real and significant transformation of the relations between labor (‘employed by capital’) and capital (‘which employs the workers’). Both sorts of movements can contribute, in varying degree, to calling capitalism into question; but they also might merely create the illusion of movement in that direction, although in fact only forcing capital to make the transformations it would need to co-opt a given set of working-class demands. We are well aware that it is not always easy to draw the boundary between efficacy and impotence in regard to the strategies resorted to by these movements, no more so than to determine whether their strategic aims are clashing with their tactical situation.” [Samir Amin, “Popular Movements Toward Socialism.” Monthly Review: An Independent Socialist Magazine. Volume 66, issue 2, June 2014. Pages 1-32.]
      162. quantitative reduction of nature (Joel Kovel): He examines capitalism as “the enemy of nature.”
           “Capitalism, and the ruthlessness of its quantitative reduction of nature, depends on the domination of labor, and so does the imperative of self-expansion which makes it necessary and possible for capitalism to drive out all other social forms. If capital is to be overcome, therefore, the domination of labor must be overcome. This tells us that the search for an ecologically sustainable society and the search for a just society are fundamentally the same. Both point toward a socialism predicated on the overcoming of capital and its domination of labor—a socialism which it is our obligation to create.” [Joel Kovel, “The enemy of nature.” Monthly Review: An Independent Socialist Magazine. Volume 49, issue 6, November 1997. Pages 6-14.]
      163. progressive globalism (William K. Tabb): He discusses the importance of workers’ struggles in progressive movement.
           “If concern for the social conditions of workers were driving goverment policies, we would be seeing something very different from the subsidies that favor capital, tax write-offs for machinery, and favorable tax treatment for industry when plants are closed (but nothing for the stranded workers), and the reduction of already inadequate spending on job creation, health and education for working-class families. A socially conscious government would focus on the taxation and regulation of capital, not immigration and allegedly unfair labor advantages of other countries.
           “These remarks are not made to suggest that the struggle for labor standards cannot be an important way to place some limits on capital in industrializing countries, and to raise consciousness concerning the extent of exploitation and oppression, but to underline that the struggle must be for working-class power. This requires workers’ rights achieved in struggle by workers themselves, with as much support as possible from other progressive movements, and not simply the adoption of standards rendered ineffectual by the absence of enforcement mechanisms.”
           [William K. Tabb, “Progressive Globalism: Challenging the Audacity of Capital.” Monthly Review: An Independent Socialist Magazine. Volume 50, issue 9, February 1999. Pages 1-10.]
      164. new theology of the First Amendment (Robert W. McChesney): He examines the use of the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution as a means of maintaining class privilege.
           “I argue in this article that the ACLU [American Civil Liberties Union] and progressives who might be persuaded by the ACLU’s logic are making a terrible mistake, and one that cannot be justified if one maintains a commitment to political democracy. This error is part and parcel of a broader process whereby the First Amendment has become more a mechanism for protecting class privilege than for protecting and promoting freedom and democracy. In my view, progressives need to stake out a democratic interpretation of the First Amendment and do direct battle with the Orwellian implications of the ACLU’s commercialized First Amendment. And, as should be clear, this is far more than an academic battle: the manner in which the First Amendment is interpreted has a direct beating on our politics, media, and culture. That is why the political right and business community have devoted so much attention to converting it into their own possession.” [Robert W. McChesney, “The new theology of the First Amendment: Class privilege over democracy.” Monthly Review: An Independent Socialist Magazine. Volume 49, issue 10, March 1998. Pages 17-35.]
      165. human rights imperialism (Uwe-Jens Heuer as pronounced in this MP3 audio file and Gregor Schirmer as pronounced in this MP3 audio file): He considers imperialist violations of human rights in Third World countries.
           “… the question of human rights was abused by the United States and NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization] as a tool aimed at the destruction of what had been achieved in the socialist countries, is still abused as a vehicle for the assertion of hegemonic interests against the independence of states of the third world, and is ever more frequently accompanied by the use of military power. This is a dangerous development which can properly be designated human rights imperialism.” [Uwe-Jens Heuer and Gregor Schirmer, “Human rights imperialism.” Monthly Review: An Independent Socialist Magazine. Volume 49, issue 10, March 1998. Pages 5-16.]
      166. capitalist dynamic (Marta Harnecker as pronounced in this MP3 audio file): She critiques the alleged laws of capitalism.
           “The capitalist dynamic is explained by the hunger for profit and the associated exploitation of wage labor, generating the economic laws that govern this process. The state only intervenes to create the two basic conditions for the existence of the capitalist mode of production: (1) the complete separation of the producer from his/her means of production; and (2) the primitive accumulation of money capital. Then, once this mode of production has established itself, the state intervenes to facilitate or favor the logic of how it functions.” [Marta Harnecker, “Latin America & Twenty-First Century Socialism: Inventing to Avoid Mistakes.” Monthly Review: An Independent Socialist Magazine. Volume 62, issue 3, July–August 2010. Pages 1-83.]
      167. critical globalization studies (Gabriela Kutting, Mark Graham, and others): They apply critical social theory to globalization.
           “This article is concerned with the similarities and differences between two critical discourses: the environmental/ecological and human security literature, and the critical globalization literature. These approaches have differing concepts of nature-society relations and different understandings of nature. Especially in the field of development, the interplay of nature and society is crucially important. These two bodies of literature do not ‘speak’ to each other and are rarely cross-referenced in the literature. Nevertheless, they make substantively similar arguments and draw similar conclusions as to the structural origins and effects of poverty and environmental degradation.” [Gabriela Kutting, “Environment, Development, and the Global Perspective: From Critical Security to Critical Globalization.” Nature and Culture. Volume 2, number 1, spring 2007. Pages 49-66.]
           “A central paradox of contemporary capitalism is the fact that while the production of commodities has been globalized at a staggering pace, our knowledge about the production of those same commodities has shrunk. Consumers are usually only able to see commodities in the here and now of time and space, and rarely have any opportunities to gaze backwards through the chains of production in order to gain knowledge about the sites of production, transformation, and distribution.” [Mark Graham, “Web 2.0 and Critical Globalization Studies.” The Radical Teacher. Number 87, spring 2010. Pages 70-71.]
           “While we recognize a role for policy and professional approaches to globalization research (e.g., demographic analysis, statistical accounts of global financial flows), our focus here is publicly engaged, critical globalization scholarship—an academic enterprise that takes on issues of public relevance to communities in the Global South, and adopts a critical perspective challenging the defeatist tone of neo-liberal orthodoxy (known in activist circles as the ideology of TINA: there is no alternative).
           “This begs the question of what values could, or should guide critical globalization scholarship. We argue that a key source of intellectual inspiration can be found in thewritings of Paulo Freire (1921–1997), a Brazilian thinker famous for his theories of popular education, and often described as one of the most influential educational theorists of the twenty-first century”
           [Josée Johnston and James Goodman, “Hope and Activism in the Ivory Tower: Freirean Lessons for Critical Globalization Research.” Globalizations. Volume 3, number 1, March 2006. Pages 9-30.]
      168. whiteness studies (Melissa Steyn, Daniel Conway, and others): They present an intersectional approach to the category of “whiteness.”
           “As an emergent field which announced itself as a ‘new’ approach to studying race and racialization in the early 1990s, Whiteness Studies has been tracking its own development in the last two decades with some interest. The earliest debates centered on what it was that the emergent field in fact studied – trying to get to grips with what this ‘whiteness’ being invoked actually was – an identity? an ideology? a social positioning? – and articulating how this conceptual site was related to actual racialized white bodies, and to the mainstream traditions of studying racism, anti-racism and race relations ….” [Melissa Steyn and Daniel Conway, “Introduction: Intersecting whiteness, interdisciplinary debates.” Ethnicities. Volume 10, number 3, 2010. Pages 283-291.]
      169. imperium and consilium (Perry Anderson): These articles constitute a two-part study in New Left Review. The imperium refers to the objectives and outcomes of U.S. global power. The consilium is the thinking of the elites who shape American foreign policy.
           “The US imperium that came into being after 1945 had a long prehistory. In North America, uniquely, the originating coordinates of empire were coeval with the nation. These lay in the combination of a settler economy free of any of the feudal residues or impediments of the Old World, and a continental territory protected by two oceans: producing the purest form of nascent capitalism, in the largest nation-state, anywhere on earth. That remained the enduring material matrix of the country’s ascent in the century after independence. To the objective privileges of an economy and geography without parallel were added two potent subjective legacies, of culture and politics: the idea—derived from initial Puritan settlement—of a nation enjoying divine favour, imbued with a sacred calling; and the belief—derived from the War of Independence—that a republic endowed with a constitution of liberty for all times had arisen in the New World.” [Perry Anderson, “Imperium.” New Left Review. Series II, number 83, September–October 2013. Pages 4-111.]
           “In the American intellectual landscape, the literature of grand strategy forms a domain of its own, distinct from diplomatic history or political science, though it may occasionally draw on these. Its sources lie in the country’s security elite, which extends across the bureaucracy and the academy to foundations, think-tanks and the media. In this milieu, with its emplacements in the Council on Foreign Relations, the Kennedy School in Harvard, the Woodrow Wilson Center in Princeton, the Nitze School at Johns Hopkins, the Naval War College, Georgetown University, the Brookings and Carnegie Foundations, the Departments of State and of Defense, not to speak of the National Security Council and the cia, positions are readily interchangeable, individuals moving seamlessly back and forth between university chairs or think-tanks and government offices, in general regardless of the party in control of the Administration.” [Perry Anderson, “Consilium.” New Left Review. Series II, number 83, September–October 2013. Pages 112-167.]
      170. dynamic disequilibrium (Perry Anderson): He concludes a discussion of the history of Western Europe.
           “Neither the internal nor external direction of the [European] Community is yet quite settled. Without clarity of means or ends, the [European] Union seems to many adrift. Yet its apparent lack of any further coherent finality, deplored on all sides, might on one kind of reckoning be counted a saving grace, permitting the unintended consequences th at h ave tracked integration from the start to yield further, possibly better, surprises. In principle, dynamic disequilibrium allows for that. In due course, a prolonged economic recession might reignite the engines of political conflict and ideological division th at gave the continent its impetus in the past. So far, in today’s Europe, there is little sign of either. But it remains unlikely that time and contradiction have come to a halt.” [Perry Anderson. The New Old World. London and New York: Verso imprint of New Left Books. 2009. Page 547.]
      171. generalized crisis (Perry Anderson): He concludes a discussion of the Middle Ages.
           “The mediaeval world … ended in generalized crisis. Both the homelands of feudalism in the West, and the territories of the East to which it had extended or where it failed to develop, were the scene of deep processes of socio-economic dissolution and mutation by the early 15ᵗʰ century. At the threshold of the early modern epoch, as the ramparts of Constantinople fell to Turkish cannon, the consequences of these changes for the political order of Europe still lay largely hidden. The denouement of the State system that was to come into being from them, remains to be explored.” [Perry Anderson. Passages from Antiquity to Feudalism. London and New York: Verso imprint of New Left Books. 1996. Page 293.]
      172. role of ideas in the construction of alternatives (Perry Anderson): He considers the possibilities for social change in an oligarchy.
           “My subject tonight is centrally the role of ideas in the construction of alternatives. Well, if [Karl] Marx was right, saying that the dominant ideas in the world are always the ideas of the dominant classes, it is very clear that these classes—in themselves—haven’t changed at all over the last hundred years. In other words, the owners of the world continue to be the owners of the materials means of production, at a national and international level.
           “Nevertheless, it is equally obvious that the forms of their ideological dominance have indeed changed, and significantly so. I wish to begin my paper, then, with some observations regarding this point.…
           “… The UN [United Nations] was built up in the days of F. D. [U.S. President Franklin Delano] Roosevelt and [U.S. President Harry] Truman as a machine for the dominance of the big powers over of the other countries of the world, with a façade of equality and democracy in the [United Nations] General Assembly, and an iron-fisted concentration of power in the hands of the five permanent members of the Security Council, arbitrarily chosen among the victors of a war that has no relevance today. This deeply oligarchic structure lends itself to any kind of diplomatic command and manipulation.”
           [Perry Anderson, “The Role of Ideas in the Construction of Alternatives.” The New Worldwide Social Hegemony: Alternatives for Change and Social Movements. Atilio Borón, editor. Buenos Aires, Argentina: El Consejo Latinoamericano de Ciencias Sociales (CLACSO). 2004. Pages 35-50.]
      173. critique of Wilsonism (Perry Anderson): Anderson presents a socialist critique of British Prime Minister Harold Wilson (1916–1995). He served as that capacity during 1964–1970 and, again, 1974–1976.
           “… how should the Labour programme be judged as a whole? What does Wilsonism represent politically? An answer is now possible. Wilsonism is a precise translation of the dual impact of the semi-successes of the Left in the fifties and the crisis of British capitalism in the sixties on traditional Labourism. No more and no less. Neither pure platform of modernization nor all-out attack on social poverty, its ambiguities and evasions all stem from these origins. In every field at home Labour’s present programme is radical, within limits which are always short of a serious confrontation of the power structure of British society. This is the secret of Wilson’s success as a party leader and a national politician. It is also the reason why socialists must take their distances from the Labour programme and criticize if from a fully independent perspective. Anything less is an abandonment of autonomy and principle.” [Perry Anderson, “Critique of Wilsonism.” New Left Review. Series I, number 27, September–October 1964. Pages 3-27.]
      174. set of four determinants (Perry Anderson): He examines the parameters of U.S. politics.
           “For a steadier view of US politics, line is more reliable than colour. It is the parameters of the system of which its episodes are features that require consideration. These compose a set of four determinants. The first, and far the most fundamental, of these, is the historical regime of accumulation in question, governing the returns on capital and rate of growth of the economy. The second are structural shifts in the sociology of the electorate distributed between the two political parties. The third are cultural mutations in the value-system at large within the society. Fourth and last—the residual—are the aims of the active minorities in the voter-base of each party. The political upshot at any given point of time can be described, short-hand, as a resultant of this unequal quartet of forces in motion.” [Perry Anderson, “Homeland.” New Left Review. Series II, number 81, May–June 2013. Pages 5-32.]
      175. cumulative constellation (Perry Anderson): He examines the British crisis of the 1960s.
           “Two commanding facts confront socialists in Britain today, dominating this moment of our history. British society is in the throes of a profound, pervasive but cryptic crisis, undramatic in appearance, but ubiquitous in its reverberations. As its immediate result, a Labour government seems imminent.…
           “Capitalist hegemony in England has been the most powerful, the most durable and the most continuous anywhere in the world. The reasons for this lie in the cumulative constellation of the fundamental moments of modern English history.”
           [Perry Anderson, “Origins of the present crisis.” New Left Review. Series I, number 23, January–February 1964. Pages 26-53.]
      176. radical internationalization of the forces of production (Perry Anderson): He examines the capitalist system at the end of the twentieth century.
           “Britain … not only witnesses the probable early beginnings in America of something like a vaster repetition of the same historical process it has undergone, in the absence of the same gyroscopes it has lacked, but also perhaps the signs of its ultimate generalization throughout the advanced capitalist world. For the radical internationalization of the forces of production—not to speak of circulation—that defines the spearhead forms of capital in the final years of the 20ᵗʰ century promises to render all national correctors, whatever their efficacy to date, increasingly tenuous in the future.” [Perry Anderson, “The Figures of Descent.” New Left Review. Series I, number 161, January–February 1987. Pages 20-77.]
      177. culture in contraflow (Perry Anderson): He presents a sweeping historical survey and examination of culture change.
           “Few subjects can be so elusive as a national culture. The term lends itself to any number of meanings, each presenting its own difficulties of definition or application.…
           “… Conventional stage theories of history, most of them Eurocentric in bias, typically impose artificial demarcations on the societal forms of the past—as if they were homogeneous units whose transformation could only occur through inner contradiction and scission. But in reality, empirical societies are nearly always a mixture of forms, and change in them is more usually the result of an expansion of one of them at the expense of others, so that historical development proceeds not by stages but by overlaps.” [Perry Anderson, “A Culture in Contraflow—I.” New Left Review. Series I, number 180, March–April 1990. Pages 41-80.]
           “By the early [nineteen-]eighties the radical Right had come to power [in the UK], and the [Prime Minister Margaret] Thatcher government was pursuing a course avowedly inspired by monetarist doctrines. At the depth of the recession, the budget of 1981 imposed the tightest fiscal squeeze since the war. Reaction among British economists showed that a decade after the end of the boom, the dominant outlook in the discipline had not substantially altered. A public letter strongly attacking the regime’s policy was signed by some 360 economists, including virtually the whole faculty at Cambridge [University], forcing the Treasury to a rare official reply.” [Perry Anderson, “A Culture in Contraflow—II.” New Left Review. Series I, number 182, July–August 1990. Pages 85-138.]
      178. actual empirical reality (Perry Anderson): He challenges pseudo-empiricism.
           “We have tried to link history bindingly to the present, and to reconstruct the continuity between the two. This has meant, inevitably, an attempt to ‘totalize’ where academic historiography has compartmentalized. Conversely, it has meant a structural analysis of the present—not a journalistic evocation of it.… For the real justification of the theory is that it has yielded concepts that can be cashed empirically—that is, which explain a wide range of facts which have hitherto hardly been noticed on the Left. The old melange contained few facts at all—only personifications like Apathy, Smoke and Squalor, Natopolis, or New Community. We have tried to move beyond this pseudo-empiricism, by looking at actual empirical reality—and reinterpreting it through concepts. There is no other way to advance social science, or socialist thought.” [Perry Anderson, “Socialism and Pseudo-Empiricism.” New Left Review. Series I, number 35, January–February 1966. Pages 2-42.]
      179. failure of the neo-conservative imperial project (Giovanni Arrighi as pronounced in this MP3 audio file): He presents a comprehensive and an informed critique of U.S. hegemony.
           “… far from laying the foundations of a second American Century, the occupation of Iraq has jeopardized the credibility of us military might, further undermined the centrality of the us and its currency within the global political economy, and strengthened the tendency towards the emergence of China as an alternative to us leadership in East Asia and beyond. It would have been hard to imagine a more rapid and complete failure of the neo-conservative imperial project. But if the current [George W. Bush] Administration’s bid for global supremacy is most likely to go down in history as one of the several ‘bubbles’ to have punctuated the terminal crisis of us hegemony, its bursting does not mean that the world-historical circumstances that generated the Project for a New American Century will evaporate—or that Washington will not remain a dominant player in world affairs.” [Giovanni Arrighi, “Hegemony Unravelling—1.” New Left Review. Series II, number 32, March–April 2005. Pages 23-80.]
           “The neo-conservatives in the Bush administration … did not initiate the transformation of the us from legitimate protector into racketeer. When they came to power it was already at an advanced stage. But by pushing it too far, they unwittingly ended up exposing its limits, both military and economic. As we saw in the first part of this essay, their attempt to demonstrate that American military might could effectively police the world and at the same time ensure the continuing centrality of the United States in the global political economy failed in both respects.” [Giovanni Arrighi, “Hegemony Unravelling—2.” New Left Review. Series II, number 33, May–June 2005. Pages 83-116.]
      180. realization crises (Giovanni Arrighi): He moves toward a theory of capitalist crisis.
           “Commodities produced using the means of production in which capital has been invested are thus always in danger of remaining unsold because of the restricted base of consumption under capitalism. From this spring what are called realization crises. The surplus-value which labour produces and incorporates in commodities is not realized—in other words, it does not form profit—because part of the commodities in question either remain unsold or can only be sold at such low prices that potential profit is reduced or nullified. In this case, the crisis occurs because the rate of exploitation (the relation between the portion of social product which is appropriated by capital and the portion retained by the workers) is ‘too high’ to allow the realization of surplus-value.” [Giovanni Arrighi, “Towards a Theory of Capitalist Crisis.” New Left Review. Series I, number 111, September–October 1978. Pages 3-24.]
      181. destruction of corporate and organicist ideologies in the political sphere (Terry Eagleton): He considers “a central task for revolutionaries.”
           “In the English literary culture of the past century, the ideological basis of organic form is peculiarly visible, as a progressively impoverished bourgeois liberalism attempts to integrate more ambitious, affective ideological modes, thereby entering into conflicts which its artistic forms betray in the act of attempted resolution. The destruction of corporate and organicist ideologies in the political sphere has always been a central task for revolutionaries. The destruction of such ideologies in the aesthetic region is essential not only for a scientific knowledge of the literary past, but for laying the foundation on which the Marxist aesthetics and artistic practice of the future can be built.” [Terry Eagleton, “Ideology and Literary Form.” New Left Review. Series I, number 90, March–April 1975. Pages 81-109.]
      182. takfīr (Caleb D. McCarthy): The Islamic concept of takfīr (Arabic/ʿArabiyyaẗ, تَكْفِير)—which can be translated as “atonement” or “penance”—has been used to justify state-mandated killings of Muslims who do not conform to the U.S. (imperialist) definition.
           “By drawing upon Muslim voices condemning terrorists as non-Muslim, the U.S. state is able to legitimize their killing in both religious and political terms. This liberal takfīr has been subverted and used widely to justify the power of the secular sovereign state. And it is notable that the United States is so concerned with religious identity. The United States’ consistent appellation of terrorist to certain types of self-proclaimed Muslims functions only alongside the rejection of their Muslimness. Without takfīr, the United States would be undermining its stated secular-pluralist commitment to protecting religious freedom. This has placed the U.S. government as a strange authority on ‘true’ Islam, but through the conscription of Muslim voices also decrying groups like al-Qāʻida [Arabic/ʿArabiyyaẗ, القَاعِدَة, ʾal-Qāʿidaẗ, ‘the base’] and ISIS [Arabic/ʿArabiyyaẗ, دإِعِش, DꞌIʿIŠ] through liberal takfīr, the state is able to maintain its position as arbiter of Islam (and proper religiosity more generally).” [Caleb D. McCarthy, “‘The Islamic State is not Islamic:’ Terrorism, Sovereignty and Declarations of Unbelief.” Critical Research on Religion. Volume 4, number 2, 2016. Pages 156-170.]
      183. critical theory of Internetworked Social Movements (Lauren Langman): Grounded in the critical social theory of the Frankfurt School, Langman develops an approach to social justice.
           “… while social movements in earlier periods have depended on media such as the printing press, the telegraph, the radio, and even the television, the Internet has certain emergent qualities. Information can now flow across communication networks to allow broad exchanges between large numbers of actors, creating rich possibilities for democratic interaction …. The various alternative globalization/global justice movements (AGM/AJMs) are Internetworked Social Movements (ISMs) that owe their very existence to the Internet. Information technology thus enables new forms of online social movement actions, cyberactivism, and cyberpolitics ….
           “… NSM [new social movement] theory speaks to the cultural critique of the Frankfurt School.”
           [Lauren Langman, “From Virtual Public Spheres to Global Justice: A Critical Theory of Internetworked Social Movements.” Sociological Theory. Volume 23, number 1, March 2005. Pages 42-74.]
      184. New Sociology of Education (Richard A. Bates): He describes a post-positivist, emancipatory approach to educational theory and practice.
           “The New Sociology of Education is … part of the wider movement in social theory which rejects the pursuit of value-free explanations of social structure, demanding instead a new focus for theory which relates understanding to action.…
           “In essence, the new sociology reintroduced an ethical dimension to social theory which had been largely exclued by positivistic social science. To this end the New Sociology of Education in particuiar, the development of an epistemology that takes account of, focusses on: the development of an epistemology that takes account of the social bases of understanding; a systematic analysis of relationships between social, cultural, epistemological and educational domination; the ways in which such structures of domination control the practices of teachers; and the improvement of practice through processes of critical refIection on the relation between practice and the potential for human emancipation.”
           [Richard A. Bates, “Towards a Critical Practice of Educational Administration.” Presented at Annual Conference of the American Educational Research Associate. New York, New York. March, 1982. Pages 1-27. Retrieved on August 31st, 2016.]
      185. personification (Sven Lütticken as pronounced in this MP3 audio file): The article considers various implications of personhood.
           “As refugees from civil war enter the EU [European Union] on an unprecedented scale, … personifications of ‘Christian Europe,’ of a splendidly isolated Albion or a purely German Germany return to the surface.…
           “At present, the Christian Right asserts the personhood of fetuses while the animal rights movement attempts to claim personhood for primates, or for animals in general. A court case about the personal rights of two lab chimpanzees at Stony Brook University has been widely reported on.…
           “… the ‘nonhuman rights’ movement can reach a tipping point where personhood is clearly redefined beyond and against the prevailing paradigm.”
           [Sven Lütticken, “Personification: Performing the Persona in Art and Activism.” New Left Review. Series II, number 96, November–December 2015.]
      186. poetics of suspense and surprise (Sven Lütticken): Lütticken uses this term to describe the works of Alfred Hitchcock.
           “In various texts and interviews, published over the course of several decades, Alfred Hitchcock developed what might be called a poetics of suspense and surprise. In his conversations with François Truffaut, Hitchcock illustrated this opposition in graphic terms:
           “We are having a very innocent little chat. Let us suppose that there is a bomb underneath this table between us. Nothing happens, and then all of a sudden, ‘Boom!’ There is an explosion. The public is surprised, but prior to this surprise, it has to be an absolutely ordinary scene, of no special consequence. Now, let us take a suspense situation. The bomb is underneath the table and the public knows it, probably because they have seen the anarchist place it there.
           “Hitchcock always insisted that the latter situation was preferable. ‘In the first case we have given the public fifteen seconds of surprise at the moment of the explosion. In the second case we have given them fifteen minutes of suspense.’ Suspense, then, is more value for money, more time for money: it stretches time. Contrary to many suspense situations that involve real danger, the suspense experienced in the context of a film is usually a pleasurable one, the time-stretching desirable.”
           [Sven Lütticken, “Suspense and … Surprise.” New Left Review. Series II, number 40, July–August 2006. Pages 95-109.]
      187. clinical practice for school renewal (Jeannie Oakes and Kenneth A. Sirotnik): They develop an approach to practice grounded in critical social theory.
           “For school people, … participation in this process [self-reflection and critical inquiry] would mean the involvement of the school staff in communication characterized by free exploration, honest exchange, and non-manipulative discussion of exisiing and deliberately generated knowledge in light of these critical issues: What goes on in this school? Who benefits from the way things are? How might educational practice work toward liberation from exploitive relationships and the domination of social, political, and economic interests? How can schools help develop the capacity to make free and responsible choices about the direction of individual lives and the evolution of society? The potential contribution of this third phase of inquiry to significant educational change is promising,for the kind of emancipatory understanding that can come from critical reflection about the school within its society seems necessary to build a responsive, renewing climate in schools.” [Jeannie Oakes and Kenneth A. Sirotnik, “An Immodest Proposal: From Critical Theory to Critical Practice for School Renewal.” Los Angeles, California: Center for the Study of Evaluation. 1983. Pages 1-50.]
      188. alienation from nature (Steven Vogel): He examines Karl Marx’s perspective on the relationship between alienation and nature.
           “The account of alienation in Marx thus directs us to the realm of ‘produced objects.’ By making labor into the central category of both his epistemology and his social theory, Marx draws our at tention to the fact that most of what we call the ‘objective world,’ the world of objects, is in fact a world of human objects, objects produced by humans through labor. We are alienated from this world when we fail to recognize its humanity, when we are unable to see it as our world, our product, and when it accordingly begins to appear as an alien power over and against us.” [Steven Vogel, “Marx and Alienation From Nature.” Social Theory and Practice. Volume 14, number 3, fall 1988. Pages 367-387.]
      189. moral atrophy (Michael J. Thompson): He develops a political approach to alienation.
           “Moral atrophy constitutes a specific form of alienation because it fits within the general approach of alienation as a removal of one’s authentic self from its relations and the broader world of which it is a part. The theorists of alienation who saw it as a historical phenomenon did so because they saw its roots in modern forms of industrialized, rationalized forms of production that removed the artisanal modes of production as well as the Gemeinschaftlich [communal or collective] forms of social relations that were predominant before the modern period. However, this phase of alienation can be seen to be supplanted or at least augmented by the pathology of moral atrophy. On this view, alienation becomes the elimination of the faculty of independent moral judgment to such an extent that it becomes difficult to reconstruct (i) that specific moral-cognitive style of thinking and (ii) to confront the anxiety experienced by alienated subjects when challenging the value systems that constitute their lives.” [Michael J. Thompson, “Alienation as Atrophied Moral Cognition and Its Implications for Political Behavior.” Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour. Volume 43, issue 3, Septembe 2013. Pages 301-321.]
      190. a critical theory of medical discourse (Howard Waitzkin): Develops a critical social theory informed by C. Wright Mills, Louis Althusser, and others.
           “The personal troubles that patients bring to doctors often have roots in social issues beyond medicine. While medical encounters involve ‘micro-level’ interactions between individuals, these interpersonal processes occur in a social context shaped by ‘macro-level’ structures in society. Examining prior theories pertinent to medical discourse leads to the propositions: (a) that medical encounters tend to convey ideologic messages supportive of the current social order; (b) that these encounters have repercussions for social control; and (c) that medical language generally excludes a critical appraisal of the social context. The technical structure of the medical encounter, as traditionally seen by health professionals, masks a deeper structure that may have little to do with the conscious thoughts of professionals about what they are saying and doing. Similar patterns may appear in encounters between clients and members of other ‘helping’ professions. Expressed marginally or conveyed by absence of criticism about contextual issues, ideology and social cantrol in medical discourse remain largely unintentional mechanisms for achieving consent.” [Howard Waitzkin, “A Critical Theory of Medical Discourse: Ideology, Social Control, and the Processing of Social Context in Medical Encounters.” Journal of Health and Social Behavior. Volume 30, June 1989. Pages 220-239.]
      191. ontology of number (Elizabeth de Freitas as pronounced in this MP3 audio file, Ezekiel Dixon-Román as pronounced in this MP3 audio file, and Patti Lather): The examine the computational practices which permeate everyday life.
           “We focus on ontologies of number as a means of interrogating the kinds of computational practices that saturate everyday life.… Many of these projects inherit insights from philosopher Gilles Deleuze, who shows up in most if not all of these articles, tapping his counter-history of mathematics and his philosophy of immanence.…
           “Although the deconstructive workings of the discursive turn in the social sciences put into question the epistemological foundations of number, there was little to no interrogation of the ontology of number beyond its refusal.…
           “… Whereas the discursive turn emphasized how sociocultural and historical conditions shape and form our embodied experiences, the computational turn better attends to the agencies and materialities of algorithmic acts and software practices that are operating within digital architectures.”
           [Elizabeth de Freitas, Ezekiel Dixon-Román, and Patti Lather, “Alternative Ontologies of Number: Rethinking the Quantitative in Computational Culture.” Cultural Studies ↔ Critical Methodologies. Volume 16, number 5, October 2016. Pages 431-434.]
      192. identity politics (Frances Fox Piven): They critically examine the subject of identity politics. Foster agrees with the writer.
           “A good deal of the recent discussion of identity politics takes the form of arguments about whether to be for it, or against it. The dispute is in one sense pointless. Identity politics is almost surely inevitable, because it is a way of thinking that reflects something very elemental about human experience. Identity politics seems to be rooted quite simply in attachments to the group, attachments that are common to humankind, and that probably reflect primordial needs that are satisfied by the group, for material survival in a predatory world, as well as for recognition, community, security, and perhaps also a yearning for immortality. Hence people construct the ‘collective identities’ which define the common traits and common interests of the group, and inherit and invent shared traditions and rituals which bind them together. The mirror image of this collective identity is the invention of the Other, whoever that may be, and however many they may be. And as is often pointed out, it is partly through the construction of the Other, the naming of its traits, the demarcation of its locality, and the construction of a myth-like history of struggle between the group and the Other, that the group recognizes itself. All of this seems natural enough.” [Frances Fox Piven, “Globalizing Capitalism and the Rise of Identity Politics.” Socialist Register. Volume 31, 1995. Pages 102-116.]
      193. framework for Chicano studies (Richard F. Lowry and David V. Baker): They develop a Habermasian approach to Chicano studies.
           “Rather than relying upon the Kuhnian paradigmatic orientation …, we have developed the more encompassing critical framework of Jürgen Habermas by bridging the gap between contemporary Marxist theory, the internal colonial model, and the Chicano world view. The study of Chicanos can be undertaken within the prevailing critical theory framework because it provides a means of incorporating the emancipatory theme proposed by the Chicano culture within the Chicano experience.” [Richard F. Lowry and David V. Baker, “Transcendence, Critical Theory and Emancipation: Reconceptualizing the Framework for Chicano Studies.” The Journal of Ethnic Studies. Volume 15, number 4, winter 1988. Pages 57-68.]
      194. critical management studies (Alain Badiou as pronounced in this MP3 audio file, Max Visser, Paul S. Adler, Linda C. Forbes, Hugh Willmott, and many others): Applies critical social theory to management.
           “Ultimately, the ideals of CMS [critical management studies] are human emancipation and enlightenment ….” [Max Visser, “Critical management studies and ‘mainstream’ organization science: A proposal for a rapprochement.” International Journal of Organizational Analysis. Volume 18, number 4. Pages 466-478. Retrieved on August 25th, 2015.]
           “Critical management studies (CMS) offers a range of alternatives to mainstream management theory with a view to radically transforming management practice. The common core is deep skepticism regarding the moral defensibility and the social and ecological sustainability of the prevailing forms of management and organization.” [Paul S. Adler, Linda C. Forbes, and Hugh Willmott, Critical Management Studies. Retrieved on August 25th, 2015.]
      195. two names of communism (John Roberts): He critically examines “communism” in the post-Soviet era.
           “One of the consequences of this [the collapse of the Soviet Union] is a split … between communism as a name in politics and communism as a name in philosophy; communism as a (failed) political tradition and set of strategies, and communism as an (emergent) emancipatory theory. The current re-engagement with and re-theorization of the communist idea and legacy are hyperconscious of this split as a condition of political renewal. Thus, if the limited communization of the early Soviet Union remains a source of invaluable political knowledge in the making of a revolution, the legacy of ‘actually existing Communism’ as a depoliticized state form cannot be deflected or suppressed in the renaming of communism as an emancipatory politics in the present. The failure of this state form and its reification of the name ‘communism’ have to be brought to bear on the political uses of the name ‘communism’ now.” [John Roberts, “The two names of communism.” Radical Philosophy: Philosophical Journal of the Independent Left. Number 177, January/February 2013. Pages 9-18.]
      196. politics of dirt (Peter Nyers): He critically examines borders, including the one between Mexico and the U.S.
           “How does something such as dirt move from the banal to the exceptional, and back again? This question can be addressed empirically by investigating the securitization of dirt in border zones. Dirt is an evocative descriptor for border politics, partaking of the classical image of the border as the so-called ‘line in the sand.’ But it is also something quite literal: omnipresent, it covers the boots and clothing of unauthorized migrants and the border patrol alike. In comparison to the vast literature on the movement of people across borders, there is relatively little analysis of the movement of the physical terrain – acts of moving dirt – in border crossings. If objects can have a force or direction that is not always controlled, directed or predictable by human beings, can dirt have a force or direction of its own?” [Peter Nyers, “Moving borders: The politics of dirt.” Radical Philosophy: Philosophical Journal of the Independent Left. Number 174, July/August 2012. Pages 2-6.]
      197. autonomy of the aesthetic process (Alain Badiou): He critically distinguishes art from science.
           “Art is not ideology. It is completely impossible to explain art on the basis of the homological relation that it is supposed to maintain to the real of history. The aesthetic process decentres the specular relation with which ideology perpetuates its closed infinity. The aesthetic effect is certainly imaginary; but this imaginary is not the reflection of the real, since it is the real of this reflection.…
           “Art is not science. The aesthetic effect is not an effect of knowledge. However, as differentiating realization and denunciation of ideology, art is closer to science than to ideology. It produces the imaginary reality of that which science appropriates in its real reality.
           “In the Marxist tradition, art is classified among the ‘ideological forms.’ And yet, in the same tradition, the evaluation of certain artworks involves criteria derived from the concept of truth (the work is a ‘real reflection of life’), the use of which implicitly assimilates certain levels of the work to the functioning of a theoretical knowledge.”
           [Alain Badiou, “The autonomy of the aesthetic process (1965).” Radical Philosophy: Philosophical Journal of the Independent Left. Number 178, March/April 2013. Pages 32-39.]
      198. Marxist theory of schooling (Michael R. Matthews): A Marxist philosophy of education.
           “All great philosophers in the Western tradition have recognized that an epistemology, or a theory of knowledge, is of crucial importance for the elaboration of coherent world views, and for intelligent and reflective action in the world…. This book is a contribution to philosophy of education; its epistemology is in the Marxist tradition; it will underpin the analyses and proposals of the now mushrooming radical sociological and historical studies of schooling.” [Michael R. Matthews. The Marxist Theory of Schooling: A Study of Epistemology and Education. Atlantic Highlands, New Jersey: Humanities Press Inc. 1980. Page 1.]
           “Education is an important arena for people concerned with establishing a socialist society. Socialism is not achieved by simply changing economic relations; it requires the changing of hearts and minds, the development of an informed and critical consciousness among people…. The epistemology and theory of ideology advanced in this book is meant as a contribution to the task of a socialist pedagogy. A central element of this task is class theory, and the identification of the inroads of class interest into the corpus of knowledge, culture and ideology in which we move and have our being.” [Michael R. Matthews. The Marxist Theory of Schooling: A Study of Epistemology and Education. Atlantic Highlands, New Jersey: Humanities Press Inc. 1980. Page 199.]
      199. principle of non-contradiction (Lucio Colletti as pronounced in this MP3 audio file): He proposes a scientific and Aristotelian approach to Marxism.
           “… [There needs to be a] reaffirmation of the objective, ontic (or, as [Georg] Klaus says, ‘ontological’) application of the Aristotelian principle of non-contradiction …
           “… there was a problem of great urgency and of vital importance at stake— in other words, the relationship between Marxism and science. In this connection the restoration of the principle of non-contradiction was the vital step.…
           “The fundamental principle of materialism and of science, as we have seen, is the principle of non-contradiction. Reality cannot contain dialectical contradictions but only real oppositions, conflicts between forces, relations of contrariety.…
           “… For Marx, capitalism is contradictory not because it is a reality and all realities are contradictory, but because it is an upside-down, inverted reality (alienation, fetishism).”
           [Lucio Colletti, “Marxism and the Dialectic.” New Left Review. Series I, number 93, September–October 1975. Pages 3-29.]
      200. critique of taste (Galvano Della Volpe as pronounced in this MP3 audio file): Della Volpe (1895-1952) developed a critical analysis of aesthetic taste.
           “My aim in the present book is to present a systematic exposition of an historical-materialist aesthetic, and by extension, an orderly sociological reading of poetry and art in general. This entails in the first place a radical critique of established aesthetic conceptions, principally if not exclusively those of romanticism and idealism….
           “This book must thus be seen as an attempt at a rationalist and materialist emendatio [Latin, ēmendātiō, emendation, correction, or improvement] of traditional (bourgeois) taste.”
           [Galvano Della Volpe. Critique of Taste. London and New York: Verso imprint of New Left Books. 1991. Pages 11-12.]
      201. Marxist critique of Rousseau (Galvano Della Volpe): He develops a Marxist approach to the work of Jean-Jacques Rousseau (MP3 audio file).
           “… we can … conclude:
           1. “That scientific socialism with its materialist method of class struggle, solves this problem, which we can call the problem of an equality which is universal and yet mediates persons. This problem was discovered and posed by [Jean-Jacques] Rousseau, with his moralistic (humanitarian) method, in the egalitarian and anti-levelling democratic conception of the person: i.e. of the social recognition of the merits and abilities of all men without distinction;
           2. “That this final focus of interest on to the human person reveals the Christian heritage Rousseau transmitted to scientific socialism; the difference between the heir and the testator consisting, on the other hand, in the fact that the former entrusts the value of the person and his fate to history, to an institution such as a society sufficiently unified to prevent any centrifugal movement of parasistic individuals or classes exploiting men, whereas the latter, Rousseau, entrusted the person’s value and fate to an extra-historic, theological investiture.”
           [Galvano Della Volpe, “The Marxist Critique of Rousseau.” New Left Review. Series I, number 59, January–February 1970. Pages 101-109.]
      202. progressive awareness (Norman D. Livergood): Livergood synthesizes his understanding of the perennial philosophy (Latin, philosophia perennis), or the perennial tradition, with a version of critical social theory.
           “Progressive awareness is a new concept, perspective, and procedure which the author developed through his study of philosophy, religion, psychology, political-economic dynamics, artificial intelligence, and in his pursuit of discernment through assimilation of the Perennial Tradition.” [Norman D. Livergood. Progressive Awareness: Critical Thinking, Self-Awareness & Critical Consciousness. Tempe, Arizona: A Dandelion Books Publication imprint of Dandelion Books, LLC. 2005. Page vii.]
           “As the Perennial Tradition points out, even what we imagine to be our ‘self’ is concocted from beliefs put into us by others. Our ‘self’ is not our real Self at all.
           “Progressive awareness involves the careful consideration of multiple points of view and keeping our minds open to alternative sources of information. Unless we work at gaining progressive awareness, the natural tendency is to limit our ideas to only those that are easily available, never really discovering or considering alternative sources of information.”
           [Norman D. Livergood. Progressive Awareness: Critical Thinking, Self-Awareness & Critical Consciousness. Tempe, Arizona: A Dandelion Books Publication imprint of Dandelion Books, LLC. 2005. Page 15.]
           “Critical consciousness is the ability to perceive social, political, and economic oppression and to take action against the oppressive elements of society.…
           “The tactics of critical consciousness and a pedagogy of the oppressed were first developed by [Paulo] Freire in his work with third-world people, helping them gain an awareness of world conditions while teaching them to read.”
           [Norman D. Livergood. Progressive Awareness: Critical Thinking, Self-Awareness & Critical Consciousness. Tempe, Arizona: A Dandelion Books Publication imprint of Dandelion Books, LLC. 2005. Page 191.]
           “In this book, we’ll examine the precise nature of capitalism as it has become ingrained in American society: a militaristic, imperialistic, dictatorial, fascist, police state. We’ll also study how we can overcome the onslaughts of capitalism through understanding the perennial wisdom of Plato, through understanding progressivism and progressives, and through building cooperative commonwealth communities.
           “We will analyze how the minds of Americans have been systematically taken over by capitalist propaganda and brainwashing, until today most Americans are unable to realize that the United States has become identical in essence to Nazi Germany in 1933.”
           [Norman D. Livergood. We Must Replace Capitalism with Commonwealth. Tempe, Arizona: A Dandelion Books Publication imprint of Dandelion Books, LLC. 2014. Kindle edition.]
      203. ideology of consumer capitalism (David Hawkes): He critiques postmodernism.
           “My main argument in this book is that the postmodern sign, whether financial or linguistic, is epistemologically false and ethically degenerate. Postmodernism is thus the veritable apotheosis of ideology. I ended the Introduction to Ideology’s first edition with the contention that ‘postmodernism is nothing more than the ideology of consumer capitalism.’ Many postmodernists consider themselves to be political radicals, and my statement provoked howls of protest. Today, however, a burgeoning awareness of the repressive political power of financial representation, and of its kinship with the modes of autonomous linguistic and semiotic representation that postmodernism promotes, has provoked many investigations of the complicity between global capitalism and postmodernist philosophy.” [David Hawkes. Ideology. Second edition. London and New York: Routledge imprint of Taylor & Francis Group, an Informa PLC business. 2003. Page 10.]
      204. contingency (Quentin Meillassoux as pronounced in this MP3 audio file): He critically examines “the possibility whereby something can either persist or perish.”
           “Contingency designates the possibility whereby something can either persist or perish, without either option contravening the invariants that govern the world. Thus, contingency is an instance of knowledge; the knowledge I have of the actual perishability of a determinate thing. I know for example that this book could be destroyed, even if I do not know when or where this destruction will occur – whether it will soon be torn up by my little girl, or rotted away decades from now by mould. But this is to know something positive about this book, viz., its actual fragility, the possibility of its not-being. However, facticity can no more be identified with contingency than with necessity, since it designates our essential ignorance about either the contingency or the necessity of our world and its invariants. By turning facticity into a property of things themselves – a property which I am alleged to know – I turn facticity from something that applies only to what is in the world into a form of contingency capable of being applied to the invariants that govern the world (i.e. its physical and logical laws).” [Quentin Meillassoux. After Finitude: An Essay on the Necessity of Contingency. Ray Brassier, translator. London and New York: Continuum International Publishing Group. 2008. Pages 53-54.]
      205. cautious naturalism and realist ethnography (Gary Alan Fine): He develops a realist and naturalist approach to ethnography.
           “… I incorporate Neil Smelser’s … value-added model into an approach based on cautious naturalism.…
           “For sociologists to ignore the effects of social structure is to deny their birthright. An approach, grounded in a cautious naturalism, that incorporates both structure and interpretation permits obdurate reality to be recognized as being as real as the constructions that social actors make of it. If Hollywood is tinsel and illusion, it is, for its audiences and workers, not only tinsel and illusion.”
           [Gary Alan Fine, “Scandal, Social Conditions, and the Creation of Public Attention: Fatty Arbuckle and the ‘Problem of Hollywood.’” Social Problems. Volume 44, number 3, August 1997. Pages 297-323.]
           “In place of the billiard-ball causality of behaviorism, [George Herbert] Mead offers what, today, we might call a ‘fuzzy’ determinism …. From his standpoint, the past confronts the present with an array of facts, but the effects of these facts are mediated by attention and interpretation, which render their actual impact uncertain. Therefore, ‘rigorous thinking does not necessarily imply that conditioning of the present by the past carries with it the complete determinism of the present by the past’ …. This recognition of the interpretation and construction of an obdurate reality of facts has been labeled ‘cautious naturalism’ …. Mead’s fuzzy determinism makes room for the improvisational character of social interaction – a quintessential attribute, but one that is neglected or denied by other students of human nature.” [Gary Alan Fine, “Present, Past, and Future: Conjugating George Herbert Mead’s perspective on time.” Time & Society. Volume 2, number 2/3, 2001. Pages 147-161.]
           “In light of the distinction that John Van Maanen … proposed in his influential Tales of the Field between realist, confessional, and impressionist ‘tales’ or representations, I was operating generally within the context of realist ethnography (or … ‘naturalism’).… These accounts assume the experiential authority of the author, a documentary text, asserting transparency, claims about the ‘native’s point of view,’ and the validity of the author’s interpretations.” [Gary Alan Fine, “Towards a peopled ethnography: Developing theory from group life.” Ethnography. Volume 4, number 1, March 2003. Pages 41-60.]
           “Realist ethnography has been placed on the defensive, charged withbeingnaive, old-fashioned, and quaint.…
           “The ethnographical work that I call for in the twenty-first century is linked to are invigoration of the justifications of realist (or naturalist) ethnography …. Despite the claims that have been made suggesting that realist accounts are not possible, it is important to recognize that in a particular sense, all accounts are realist. In practice, all empirical work is grounded in the assertion that readers canrely on the claims of the writer. Accounts represent truth claims, after all. Whether the claims are about the transparency of the social world or about the transparency of the author’s view of the world, the argumentis functionally identical.”
           [Gary Alan Fine, “Field Labor and Ethnographic Reality.” Journal of Contemporary Ethnography. Volume 28, number 5, October 1999. Pages 532-539.]
           “… I explore the creation of the idea of personal legitimacy as part of the market for self-taught art as a means of valorizing aesthetic authenticity, sponsored by the cultural authority of elites. This is done by situating the artists within a set of social positions that come to define their identity within this art world. Their social positions – their identities – naturalize the production of their art, separating them from groupings based on similarities of form, content, or intention. These artists are categorized by means of the definition of their identities as authentic in the production of objects, unburdened by assumptions of strategic careerism or lofty intellectualizing.” [Gary Alan Fine, “Crafting Authenticity: The Validation of Identity in Self-Taught Art.” Theory and Society. Volume 32, number 2, April 2003. Pages 153-180.]
           “Readers should also be alert to some of the odd textual practices I adopt in this book. Each major chapter … highlights a generic form of ethnograhic representation and provides an example or two from my own writings. These illustrations are then critiqued as the writing rolls on. There are thus realist accounts of realist writing; confessionals tucked inside and alongside other confessionals; and impressionistic interpretations of impressionistic tales. The dog doth chase his tail. And despite my concluding protest on the folly of the abstract, the astute reader will detect a degree of formalism and generalizable narrative theory supporting the entire venture. This is a representation of writing in writing. Fair warning.” [John Van Maanen. Tales of the Field: On Writing Ethnography. Second edition. Chicago, Illinois: The University of Chicago Press. 2011. Page xix.]
           “By far the most prominent, familiar, prevalent, popular, and recognized form of ethnographic writing is the realist account of a culture—be it a society, an occupation, a community, an ethnic enclave, an organization, or a small group with common interests.1 Published as a set of volumes, a scholarly monograph, an article, or even a subsection of an article (or book), a single author typically narrates the realist tale in a dispassionate, third-person voice. On display are the comings and goings of members of the culture, theoretical coverage of certain features of the culture, and usually a hesitant account of why the work was undertaken in the first place. The result is an authorproclaimed description and something of an explanation for certain specific, bounded, observed (or nearly observed) cultural practices. Of all the ethnographic forms discussed in this book, realist tales push most firmly for the authenticity of the cultural representations conveyed by the text.” [John Van Maanen. Tales of the Field: On Writing Ethnography. Second edition. Chicago, Illinois: The University of Chicago Press. 2011. Page 45.]
      206. critical identity theory (Laura Morgan Roberts, Stephanie J. Creary, Mats Alvesson as pronounced in this MP3 audio file, Karen Lee Ashcraft, and Robyn Thomas): They apply critical social theory to issues of identity.
           “Critical identity theorists treat identities as multiple, shifting, competing, temporary, context-sensitive, and evolving manifestations of subjective meanings and experiences in the social world ([see Mats] Alvesson, [Karen Lee] Ashcraft, & [Robyn] Thomas, … [‘Identity Matters: Reflections on the Construction of Identity Scholarship in Organization Studies’]). Critical identity theory is largely concerned with issues of power that constrain individuals’ abilities to freely construct and negotiate identities in work organizations. It challenges social identity theorists’ assertion that individuals freely undertake processes of self-categorization and identification. Rather, critical identity theory purports that socioeconomic, institutional, cultural, and historical boundaries between identity groups in society are reflected in organizational boundaries; lower-status groups occupy lower-level positions and identity groups are formally segregated from one another …. Identity research from this perspective often locates the root causes of stigmatization and discrimination in intergroup interaction patterns that activate social categorization processes …. Scholars in this tradition devote less attention to individual differences in personality and behavioral style. They view identities as more than just a collection of personality traits or individualized differences; they are informed by institutional, political, and societal structures …. They also emphasize how context, social meanings, power disparities, and historical intergroup conflict affect current diversity dynamics in work organizations. In contrast to social identity researchers, critical identity researchers rarely examine how threat and conflict emerge from difference in and of itself. Rather, in this tradition, difference is always contextualized in power relations.” [Laura Morgan Roberts and Stephanie J. Creary, “Navigating the Self in Diverse Work Contexts.” The Oxford Handbook of Diversity and Work. Quinetta M. Roberson, editor. Oxford, England, and New York: Oxford University Press. Pages 73-97.]
           “Although we retain an interest in identity regularities and patterns, we also wish to stress the dynamic character of the social world, joining those who treat identity as a temporary, context-sensitive and evolving set of constructions, rather than a fixed and abiding essence …. Identity studies often reflect a range of tacit and explicit positions on this matter, for example, depicting identity as hierarchically integrated into dominant notions of self or, conversely, as fragmented into manifold, simultaneous and shifting notions of self. Our work here assumes the presence of multiple, shifting and competing identities, even as we also question how identities may appear orderly and integrated in particular situations.” [Mats Alvesson, Karen Lee Ashcraft, and Robyn Thomas, “Identity Matters: Reflections on the Construction of Identity Scholarship in Organization Studies.” Organization. Volume 15, number 1, 2008. Pages 5-28.]
      207. microemancipation (Mats Alvesson and Hugh Willmott): They develop a critical approach to emancipation in organization studies.
           “In a space between Critical Theorists’ commitment to critical reason and radical change, the skepticism of poststructuralists about metanarratives and efforts to separate power and knowledge, and humanistic ideas for reducing the gap between human needs and corporate objectives, we locate an agenda for microemancipation. This agenda favors incremental change but, because it has open boundaries to more utopian ideas, it does not take as given the contemporary social relations, corporate ends, and the constraints associated with a particular macro-order. The preservation of the concept of emancipation (including microemancipation) from dilution or submersion by approaches that aim at other ideals and are often antiemancipatory in their effect is of vital importance. A healthy interest in avoiding grandiosity in terms of the scope of the critique must not lead to a phobia about conceptualizing the significance and influence of the wider historical context of organizational thought and action. Otherwise, the microemancipation project becomes conflated with the task of social engineering.” [Mats Alvesson and Hugh Willmott, “On the Idea of Emancipation in Management and Organization Studies.” The Academy of Management Review. Volume 17, number 3, July 1992. Pages 432-464.]
      208. a critical theory of organization science (Brian D. Steffy and Andrew J. Grimes): “Critical theory is presented as a general method for analyzing an organization science based on either a natural science or interpretive paradigm. This is accomplished by introducing epistemic inquiry into organization science methodology. Specifically, critical theory provides a means of examining the socio-political interplay among the researcher, the research enterprise, the practitioner, and the organization members. Such an analysis requires the examination of ideology, technology, and praxis.” [Brian D. Steffy and Andrew J. Grimes, “A Critical Theory of Organization Science.” Abstract. Academy of Management Review. Volume 11, number 2, 1986. Page 322-336.]
      209. critical religious studies (Gerald James Larson and Phillip Chong Ho Shon): They proposes a critical approach to religious studies and, in the case of Larson, to Indian philosophy.
           “Here, it seems to me, is a promising new task for a critical religious studies, what might be called a revitalized neophilosophy of religion, which takes on the job of rethinking ‘person’ theory and ‘folk psychology’ in a sophisticated cross-cultural framework. Here is also a promising new task, it seems to me, for Indian philosophy – not the sort of Indian philosophy that translates and comments on one more ancient Sanskrit text but, rather, the kind of Indian philosophizing that takes the insights of Indian philosophy and utilizes them in thinking creatively about contemporary issues in the philosophy of mind and cognitive science.” [Gerald James Larson, “‘A Beautiful Sunset … Mistaken for a Dawn’: Some Reflections on Religious Studies, India Studies, and the Modern University.” Journal of the American Academy of Religion. Volume 72, number 4, December 2004. Pages 1003-1019.]
           “In this paper, I provide an alternative account of lust murder using critical religious studies grounded in the principles of phenomenology along with Jack Katz’s theory of sacrificial violence. I examine how the act of murder is actively constructed out of the subject's desire to transcend hisher profane situation: emergence of the homo religiosus.…
           “Although some approaches hint at the phenomenological value of the murderous act itself, no single model explicitly addresses it with a critical religious framework.…
           “… the narrow scope of this paper … [is] to reconstruct the behavior of the lust murderer with a critical religious framework, and to examine how the act functions to construct the subjectivity of the killer viewed from a postmodern perspective.”
           [Phillip Chong Ho Shon, “The Sacred and the Profane: The Transcendental Significance of Erotophonophilia in the Construction of Subjectivity.” Humanity and Society. Volume 23, number 1, February 1999. Pages 10-31.]
      210. genetic fundamentalism (Joseph Schwartz): He critiques an exaggerated emphasis on genetic explanations for human behavior.
           “Psychologically, … genetic fundamentalism has been too powerful to be dispelled by mere historical analysis. Part of this reflects our incomplete understanding of what makes us human. We know that gender – ‘Is it a boy or a girl?’ – is a critically important category. Parental expectations, unconscious identifications, and ensuing behaviour are such that we know without a doubt that girl children and boy children receive very different parenting. Such early differences create psychologies that feel so personal, fixed and immutable that it is as though they are as good as genetic as regards their permanence and lack of plasticity. In many respects we are as good as genetically formed, and we accurately sense the depth of experience that forms us, which is what the genetic metaphor expresses.” [Joseph Schwartz, “The soul of soulless conditions?: Accounting for genetic fundamentalism.” Radical Philosophy: Philosophical Journal of the Independent Left. Number 86, November/December 1997. Pages 2-6.]
      211. anthropontology (Betül Çotuksöken as pronounced in this MP3 audio file): This ontology, anthropontology (MP3 audio file), focuses on the creation of reality through human language utterances.
           “Anthropontology is a perspective, an approach and an essential philosophical discipline. Besides, the philosophical discourse has a wholeness and it is supradisciplinary through this essential discipline. In order to justify these theses, we will here claim that the human being is social, historical and cultural being.…
           “… At this point, we can enumerate our claims as follows:
           1. “The human being only thinks and utters.
           2. “The thing which makes the entity as an actual entity is the thinking and uttering of the human being.
           3. “Clearly, the concepts and conceptual frames make the entity as an actual entity.
           4. “What makes the entity an actual entity is the terms, words, utterances and the discourse in language.
           5. “The concepts and terms are the essential elements to create knowledge.
           6. “Anthropontology is an essential discipline of philosophy, which takes these propositions into consideration and connects the thinking and using the language to be social situation of human being.”
           [Betül Çotuksöken, “Anthropontology as a New Kind of Ontology.” Synthesis Philosophica. Volume 54, February 2012. Pages 237-244.]
      212. cult of subjectivity (Russell Jacoby): He examines the political nature of subjectivity.
           “If the intensification of subjectivity is a direct response to its actual decline, it ultimately works to further this demise. It accepts the damaged subject as its own doing, and proposes more of the same. The objective loss of human relationships and experience is eased by their endless pursuit. A cult of subjectivity—complete with drugs—dopes the discontented into taking their own death—figuratively and in fact—for life itself. The immediacy of it all drives out mediacy of any of it. Sustained political and theoretical thought is not simply rejected, but forgotten. The slogans and rhetoric that replace it are necessarily abstract and formal, like the society that tossed them up.” [Russell Jacoby, “The Politics of Subjectivity Slogans of the American New Left” New Left Review. Series I, number 79, May–June 1973. Pages 37-49.]
      213. materialist and dialectical analyses of literature (Lucien Goldmann): He applies dialectical materialism to literary history.
           “We can now understand the dangers, but also the potential superiority of materialist and dialectical analyses of literature. Sociological explanation is one of the most important elements of the analyses of a work of art, and to the extent that dialectical materialism allows a better understanding of the totality of the historical and social processes of an epoch, it also makes it possible to disengage the relations between these processes and the works of art which have been influenced by them. But sociological analysis does not exhaust the work of art and sometimes does not even succeed in touching it. It is no more than an essential first step on the path which leads towards the work. The main task is to retrace in each literary or artistic work the path taken by historical and social reality itself to find expression through the individual sensibility of the creator.” [Lucien Goldmann, “Dialectical Materialism and Literary History.” New Left Review. Series I, number 92, July–August 1975. Pages 39-51.]
           “In this essay [‘Dialectical Materialism and Literary History.’], [Lucien] Goldmann enunciates the constitutive theoretical and methodological principles of his dialectical sociology of literature. All social practices form significant wholes, each with its own logic and coherence, and these practices compose an ensemble that is itself a significant whole. It is therefore necessary, in literary criticism, to make a primary methodological distinction between explanation and comprehension: the elucidation of the ‘objective significance’ of a literary text demands both a sociological account of its relations with the social totality that it inhabits, and an ‘immanent aesthetic analysis’ of its own peculiar structure.” [Francis Mulhern, “Introduction to Goldmann.” New Left Review. Series I, number 92, July–August 1975. Pages 34-38.]
      214. science of contradictions (Joe McCarney): He critically examines contradictions in the context of “our bourgeois society.”
           “… [We can have] a discussion of the practical implications of a science of contradictions.… [A] social scientist may consciously practice a mode of inquiry that involves the exposure of contradictions without thinking of it as being critical in any sense relevant to the present discussion. This result should in itself give us pause in asserting necessary conceptual links here. But it may well be that the issues can only be decisively pursued in relation to problems posed by our own bourgeois society. To begin with we need to expose ourselves to the variety of the ideological possibilities it affords.” [Joe McCarney, “The Trouble with Contradictions.” Radical Philosophy: Philosophical Journal of the Independent Left. Number 23, winter 1979. Pages 24-30.]
      215. common sense (G. Nowell Smith): He argues that it should not be overlooked.
           “… the lesson of [Karl] Marx’s critique of religion should not be overlooked. Nor should the connection between religion and common sense as it was implied by Marx and more explicitly developed by the Italian marxist, Antonio Gramsci. Common sense is so often invoked as being the ultimate no-nonsense conception of things, alien to all forms of religious and metaphysical speculation, that the association may at first sight appear surprising. But in fact not only does religious thinking have its origins in the common sense of a particular world, but it has in turn acted on common sense, so that our present everyday conceptions contain all sorts of elements which are in fact speculative and mystical rather than realistic and scientific.” [G. Nowell Smith, “Common sense.” Radical Philosophy: Philosophical Journal of the Independent Left. Number 7, spring 1974. Pages 15-16.]
      216. project of sacrificial violence (Jack Katz): He critically examines the evil of “righteous slaughter.”
           “Sacrificial violence does not particularly seek the neat end of death; rather, it attempts to achieve the existentially impossible goal of obliteration, of annihilating or wiping out the victim.” [Jack Katz. Seductions of Crime: Moral and Sensual Attractions in Doing Evil. 1988. Page 22.]
           “In the details of the assault, the project of sacrificial violence recreates the truth of the offense received. Sometimes the correspondence is drawn in exquisite detail; more often, it is crudely accomplished.…
           “… Like wiping out, a stomping is an action peculiar to sacrificial violence. Kicking occurs by accident, in sports or in joking behavior. But to attempt to stomp someone specifically seeks to leave the normal universe of routine behavior, with its multiple, morally inconsequential motives, and to enter a battlefield, where the stakes are incomparably higher—where Good and Evil fight for a final victory with a passion that understands the nature of the stakes.…
           “If sacrificial violence is not exactly a practiced art, it is often a recurrent practice over careers of violent acts. The attackers, however wild and impassioned they appear at the moment, know deeply and in some detail just what they are doing. The typical killer is familiar with the victim, feels at home in the setting, and has often practiced variations on the themes of sacrificial violence.…
           “Physical involvement in the style of sacrificial violence commonly precedes the height of rage.…
           “Notice how each of the three conditions of righteous slaughter was dismantled in that situation. First, the attacker suddenly realized the practical project of sacrificial violence could not be successfully organized …. His rage then quickly faded, threatening to turn back into humiliation.…
           “Even when the parties are enraged and are familiar with the ways of sacrificial violence, the interactive character of the relationship with the victim builds a further dimension of uncertainty into the event.…
           “… Ultimately, the open character of sacrificial violence is due not to failings of evidence or to features of interaction, but to the phenomenological fact that its final seduction is the unknown.”
           [Jack Katz. Seductions of Crime: Moral and Sensual Attractions in Doing Evil. New York: Basic Books imprint of Perseus Books Group. 1988. Pages 25-32.]
      217. Blockadia (Naomi Klein): She examines and critiques the global resistance movement against fossil fuel companies.
           “What’s up is that this area is no longer a Greek vacationland, though the tourists still crowd the white-washed resorts and oceanfront tavernas, with their blue-checked tablecloths and floors sticky with ouzo. This is an outpost of a territory some have taken to calling ‘Blockadia.’ Blockadia is not a specific location on a map but rather a roving transnational conflict zone that is cropping up with increasing frequency and intensity wherever extractive projects are attempting to dig and drill, whether for open-pit mines, or gas fracking, or tar sands oil pipelines.…
           “What unites these increasingly interconnected pockets of resistance is the sheer ambition of the mining and fossil fuel companies: the fact that in their quest for high-priced commodities and higher-risk ‘unconventional’ fuels, they are pushing relentlessly into countless new territories, regardless of the impact on the local ecology (in particular, local water systems), as well as the fact that many of the industrial activities in question have neither been adequately tested nor regulated, yet have already shown themselves to be extraordinarily accident-prone.
           “What unites Blockadia too is the fact the people at the forefront—packing local council meetings, marching in capital cities, being hauled off in police vans, even putting their bodies between the earth-movers and earth—do not look much like your typical activist, nor do the people in one Blockadia site resemble those in another. Rather, they each look like the places where they live, and they look like everyone: the local shop owners, the university professors, the high school students, the grandmothers.”
           [Naomi Klein. This Changes Everything: Capitalism vs. The Climate. New York: Simon & Schuster. 2014. Page 305.]
           “Welcome to the front lines of the climate movement—the ‘roving transnational conflict zone’ Naomi Klein calls Blockadia. Blockadia takes many forms. In its most successful incarnations, it becomes law: France, Bulgaria, and (tentatively, as of this writing) Germany; three U.S. states (New York, Vermont, and Maryland); and dozens of municipalities across the United States have responded to activists’ calls by banning fracking outright.” [Colin Kinniburgh, ”The Fracktivists.” Dissent. Online magazine. Summer, 2015.]
      218. spiritual activism (Jesse Maceo Vega-Frey and many others): Spiritual practice is incorporated into “social justice work.”
           “Over the past few years, the conversations about ‘spirituality and social change’ that I have been a part of have revolved largely around the integration of spiritual practice into activism and social justice work. The resulting lines of inquiry are vital to our understanding of how sustainable change happens, and should be pursued to their fullest ends. Yet I also believe that the way in which we’ve defined the discussion has pushed some important aspects of the conversation to the margins that are in some ways the essence of what is really radical about committing to a spiritual activist path.
           “I have begun to feel more confident in the notion that considering the role of love in social justice work or activism is actually secondary to an understanding of the relationship between love and a revolutionary way of being. A revolutionary way of being should certainly include activism as a fundamental pillar. But it also seems important to offer the possibility that activism as a way in itself actually avoids challenging some of the fundamental unhealthy assumptions that underlie the prevailing order we are trying to change. In fact, spirituality’s gift to activism is to provide an understanding that it is within the realm of love that we may most clearly evolve our understanding of what functional and radical ways of being in the world can really look and feel like.”
           [Jesse Maceo Vega-Frey, “Jesse Maceo Vega-Frey.” The Love That Does Justice, Spiritual Activism in Dialogue with Social Science. Cleveland, Ohio: Unlimited Love Press. 2008. Pages 67-70.]
      219. radical approach to the climate crisis (Christian Parenti): He proposes taking immediate action on the ecological crisis.
           “It may well be true that capitalism is incapable of accommodating itself to the limits of the natural world. But that is not the same question as whether or not capitalism can solve the climate crisis. Climate mitigation and adaptation are merely an effort to buy time to address the other larger set of problems that is the whole ecological crisis.
           “This is both a pessimistic and an optimistic view. Although capitalism has not overcome the fundamental conflict between its infinite growth potential and the finite parameters of the planet’s pollution sinks, it has, in the past, addressed specific environmental crises.
           “Anyone who thinks the existing economic system must be totally transformed before we can deal with the impending climate crisis is delusional or in willful denial of the very clear findings of climate science. If the climate system unravels, all bets are off.”
           [Christian Parenti, “A Radical Approach to the Climate Crisis.” Dissent. Online magazine. Summer, 2013.]
      220. evolutionary reconstruction (Gar Alperovitz as pronounced in this MP3 audio file): He proposes a left alternative to both revolution and reform.
           “… what happens if a system neither reforms nor collapses in crisis?
           “Quietly, a different kind of progressive change is emerging, one that involves a transformation in institutional structures and power, a process one could call ‘evolutionary reconstruction.’ …
           “When the next financial crisis occurs, and it will, a different political opportunity may be possible. One option has already been put on the table: in 2010, thirty-three senators voted to break up large Wall Street investment banks that were ‘too big to fail.’ Such a policy would not only reduce financial vulnerability; it would alter the structure of institutional power.”
           [Gar Alperovitz, “Neither Revolution Nor Reform: A New Strategy for the Left.” Dissent. Online magazine. Summer, 2016.]
      221. critical sociology of dominant ideologies (Simon Susen): He argues that sociology needs to take account for “misrepresentations of reality.”
           “In brief, the attempt to deconstruct the production of the dominant ideology is inextricably linked to the challenge of creating counter-hegemonic imaginaries, capable of challenging both the epistemic validity and the social legitimacy of established orthodoxies and thereby contributing to the construction of emancipatory realities.…
           “If ‘sociology is critical by vocation,’ then it needs to take issue with the misrepresentations of reality that are produced by dominant ideologies, which are designed to conceal the material and symbolic divisions within vertically structured societies.”
           [Simon Susen, “Towards a Critical Sociology of Dominant Ideologies: An Unexpected Reunion between Pierre Bourdieu and Luc Boltanski.” Cultural Sociology. Volume 10, number 2, 2016. Pages 195-246.]
      222. rule utilitarian theory (Dean Ritz): He develops an approach to corporate social responsibility.
           “The rule utilitarian analysis of corporate personhood is equally succinct. Rule utilitarian theory first requires that actions comply with the community’s moral code. It is quite reasonable to see inalienable rights as the preeminent value in this moral code. To violate the preeminent value is to violate the moral code. Actions violating the code are actions judged as wrong by rule utilitarian theory and thus socially irresponsible. Corporate personhood violates the moral code and so is socially irresponsible. Lastly, failure to comply with the moral code obviates the need to perform a quantitative calculation of utility.” [Dean Ritz, “Can Corporate Personhood Be Socially Responsible?” The Debate Over Corporate Social Responsibility. Steve May, George Cheney, and Juliet Roper, editors. Oxford, England, and New York: Oxford University Press. 2007. Pages 190-204.]
      223. politically attentive relational constructionism (Stanley Deetz): He develops this perspective for communication research.
           “In this chapter I wish to show that the world community is experiencing a set of new situations and problems for which particular communication theories provide useful conceptions and responses. Members of the field of communication have developed fairly sophisticated communication theories that can be very valuable in addressing them. I will describe these generally as based on a kind of politically attentive relational constructionism (PARC). But we have to move these theories in from the margins if we are to provide our critical social contribution.…
           “… I use relational rather than social constructionism to avoid connection to a commonly misunderstood position and to draw attention to more fundamental relational processes of the person-in-the-world-with-others-moving-toward-a-future/past. Studying the hyphens and hyphenated is central. Experience, meaning, the very objects of our world arise out of relations and lose sense outside them …. And these relational formations are deeply political.
           “I believe that PARC theories do not provide simply more perspectives for the field, they provide a way to rethink people, interaction, and social life in a distinctly communicative way. As part of a paradigmatic shift they offer new possibilities in rethinking everything from public relations and campaigns to families and intimate relationships. Some of these areas have been developed more than others. And the number of developing communication theories within this larger paradigm is fairly large.”
           [Stanley Deetz, “Politically Attentive Relational Constructionism.” Distinctive Qualities in Communication Research. London and New York: Routledge imprint of Taylor & Francis Group, an Informa PLC business. 2009. Pages 64-89.]
           “The ‘linguistic turn’ became conceptualized in the 1930s as one possible way to continue the initiation by phenomenologists to undermine subject/object dualism and the assumption of a psychological foundation of experience. The ‘turn’ as a possibility grows out of the birth of social constructionism and ‘perspectivalism’—the recognition of the constitutive conditions of experience and the de-centering of the human subject as the center or origin of perspective. [Edmund] Husserl’s formulation was an important early move in this rethinking …. In his treatment, specific personal experiences and objects of the world are not given in a constant way but are outcomes of a presubjective, preobjective inseparable relationship between constitutive activities and the ‘stuff’ being constituted.” [Stanley Deetz, “Reclaiming the Legacy of the Linguistic Turn.” Organization. Volume 10, number 3, August 2003. Pages 421-429.]
           “The postmodernist is not concerned with the relation of the constituted subject and constituted world, but with the constituting activity, the original codeterminative contact from which subjects and objects are abstracted and treated as natural. All seeing, including that of science, is a seeing as; the important questions are what one is seeing as, and how that seeing is possible …. This space of indeterminacy before either subjects or objects are made determinate is a space of openness and mutuality—co-construction—which gets lost when the ‘present object’ is treated as naturally occurring in both science and everyday life. Postmodernists are less interested in advocating values and preferences than in reopening this space of object construction against the various ways it is closed, a reclaiming of indeterminacy for new determination.” [Stanley Deetz, “Putting the community into organizational science: exploring the construction of knowledge claims.” Organization Science. volume 11, number 6, 2000. Pages 732-738.]
           “… the implementation of the PARC [politically attentive relational constructionism] approach is undermined by hidden forms of strategic control, especially the distorted communication and discursive closure. Briefly, we can affirm that the first is a form of strategic interaction, different from persuasion and manipulation, in which strategic intention is hidden. ‘It becomes possible through the absence of analysis about systemic and structural limits of reciprocity of interaction by interlocutors’ …. The closure of discourse concerns the techniques used in conversation, seeking only to eliminate possible conflicts of meaning and contradictions, what results in difficulties to express challenging ideas to the existing meanings.” [Raquel Lobão Evangelista and Teresa Augusta Ruão, “Organizational Communication and Sustainability, studying European public campaigns.” Observatorio (OBS*) Journal. Volume 5, number 3, 2011. Pages 265-288.]
      224. diatextual analysis (Manuti Amelia as pronounced in this MP3 audio file, Rosa Traversa as pronounced in this MP3 audio file, and Giuseppe Mininni as pronounced in this MP3 audio file): They develop an approach to Stanley Deetz’s politically attentive relational constructionism.
           “… the last decades have shown an increased interest in qualitative, applied, and critical research. Examples of this are widespread in different fields of social science, including communication, education, sociology, management, gender, and ethnic studies …. These research programs relied upon a range of theoretical approaches such as post-structuralism …, structuration …, participatory action …, and discourse studies … The ovementioned perspectives share the idea that perception comes from a specific subject position; the social and historical precedes the personal; communication produces identity and knowledge in particular ways — a paradigm that has been collectively characterized by [Stanley] Deetz … as ‘politically attentive relational constructionism.’
           “Such analyses deal with a social problem or dilemma, focused on power relations as shaped by macro-structures as well as micro and meso levels of discourse and interaction. The aim of such an analysis is to provide insights regarding transformation and change. In short, a great deal of scientific inquiry makes use of critical-interpretive and applied research on issues of language, power, discourse, and context for the purpose of providing grounded, practical insight.
           “In line with such assumptions, the present paper aims at outlining a qualitative practice of research called ‘diatextual analysis’ … that is specifically suited for such studies. Complementary with the perspective already started by critical discourse analysis …, which is focused on semiosis as an irreducible element of all material social processes …, the diatextual approach enables scholars to critically explore power relations associated with change and continues with a systematic data analysis that is accessible.”
           [Manuti Amelia, Rosa Traversa, and Giuseppe Mininni, “The dynamics of sense making: a diatextual approach to the intersubjectivity of discourse.” Talk & Text: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Language, Discourse & Communication Studies. Volume 32, number 1, January–February 2012. Pages 39-61.]
      225. critical relational constructionism (Dian Marie Hosking and others): This social constructionist approach is explained on Hosking’s website.
           “The term critical relational constructionism (CRC) will here be used to refer to an interrelated set of assumptions and interests that differ from postpositivism and constructivist thinking. Instead of centring mind and ‘real’ reality, CRC centres language and discursive practices – and these are seen as constructing relational realities – including what is thought to be a person. This means that CRC is not talking about subjective interpretations and is not adopting idealism in place of realism. Rather, this is another ‘map’ about another ‘territory’ … – where the objective-subjective, real-relativist dualisms are no longer relevant.
           “This discourse centres construction not discovery. CRC centres the construction of (what might be thought of as) objects – including the Self, including CRC, and including Science and its meta-theory. So, for example, the positioning of post positivism as a special scientific way of knowing can be treated as a particular language game with its related ‘form of life’ …. The discourse of independently existing ‘beings’ can be set aside in favour of a discourse that centres language based relational processes. Language and ‘real’ reality may be discoursed as inseparable by seeing ‘textuality’ as a defining characteristic of all phenomena and not just of written and spoken ‘texts’ ….”
           [Dian Marie Hosking, “Bounded entities, constructivist revisions and radical re-constructions.” Cognitie, Creier, Comportament / Cognition, Brain, Behavior. Volume IX, number 4, 2005. Pages 609-622.]
           “In relational constructionism, talk of the individual as possessing a self, a mind and individual knowledge gives way to talk of relational processes. Language is viewed, not as a way of representing some independently existing reality but, as a key medium in which inter-acting ‘goes on.’ In this view, language derives its significance from the ways it is used in human relationships and the particular forms of life it supports …, e.g. doing science and scientific rationality, in doing leadership, organizing or organization development. The focus on relational processes avoids the dualistic lines of distinction that discourse mind independent of body, construction as ‘just’ a mind operation, language as different from action and relating as individual action in the context of and about external, independently existing realities.” [Dian Marie Hosking, “Telling Tales of Relations: Appreciating Relational Constructionism.” Organization Studies. Volume 21, number 1, 2011. Pages 47-65.]
           “In this article, we set out a relational version of social constructionism in which relational processes are the focus of our interest.… In our view, the discourse of ‘product evaluation’ assumes a singular reality that can be known (more or less imperfectly) ‘as it really is.’ This differs from the current relational constructionist discourse and assumptions, and our purpose here has been to open up to other possible approaches to evaluation. One such is ‘responsive evaluation’ – at least when it ‘puts to work’ a relational constructionist thought style.” [Dorieke van der Haar and Dian Marie Hosking, “Evaluating appreciative inquiry: A relational constructionist perspective.” Human Relations. Volume 57, number 8. August 2008. Pages 1017-1036.]
           “… social constructionist arguments are not easily expressed in conceptual language. The latter is not the best medium in which to express the multiple, simultaneous, and equivocal nature of social construction processes. This article endeavours to provide an approachable introduction to what we call ‘relational constructionism’ in the context of organisational development and consulting work. It is only one view, though one that we feel ‘fits’ with the thinking and practices of many of our fellow consultants.” [Dian Marie Hosking, “Constructing changes in relational processes: introducing a social constructionist approach to change work.” Career Development International. Volume 6, issue 7, December 2001. Pages 238-360.]
           “Our relational constructionist premises invite a view of research processes as ongoing processes of (re)constructing self (perhaps as a researcher), other (perhaps as the researched) and relationships …. We can now shift from the positive science interest … in finding out about how things really or probably are to reflecting on the kinds of people and worlds that are under construction or ‘becoming.’ This shift makes space for quality criteria that positive science positions as outside its scope including, for example, ethical and aesthetic considerations and local (perhaps multiple and differing) criteria of local usefulness (perhaps for all participants …). Further, given the always ongoing quality of processes, these considerations apply to all aspects of the research process including what positive science would call ‘design and planning,’ research procedures, report writing and presentation.” [Dian Marie Hosking and Bettine Pluut, “(Re)constructing Reflexivity: A Relational Constructionist Approach.” The Qualitative Report. Volume 15, number 1, January 2010. Pages 59-75.]
      226. reconstructed social constructionism (Martin Aranguren as pronounced in this MP3 audio file): He develops an social constructionist approach to emotions.
           “I conclude that a reconstructed social constructionism should be regarded not as inimical to, but as part and parcel of, a nonreductive biology of emotions.…
           “In this article I have attempted to make a constructive revision of some aspects of the social constructionist view of emotions. I distinguished the methodology from the ontology of social constructionism to suggest that the methods should be held while the ontological background should be reconsidered. This ontological basis binds social construction and language together in such a way that important areas of social construction cannot be adequately dealt with.…
           “If even the emotions of nonhuman primates are susceptible of cultural analysis, maybe it is time to revise the dichotomy of nature and culture on which classical social constructionism is predicated. The paradoxical conclusion is that in this broader framework the social constructionist problématique is not the opposite, but actually part and parcel of a nonreductive biology of emotions.”
           [Martin Aranguren, “Reconstructing the social constructionist view of emotions: from language to culture, including nonhuman culture.” Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour. Early View edition. November, 2016. Pages 1-17.]
      227. causal and constitutive social constructionism (Teresa Marques): Examining issues of discrimination, Marques argues that causal constructionism is not less important than constitutive social constructionism.
           “Social constructionist claims are surprising and interesting when they entail that presumably natural kinds are in fact socially constructed. The claims are interesting because of their theoretical and political importance. Authors like [Esa] Díaz-León argue that constitutive social construction is more relevant for achieving social justice than causal social construction. This paper challenges this claim. Assuming there are socially salient groups that are discriminated against, the paper presents a dilemma: if there were no constitutively constructed social kinds, the causes of the discrimination of existing social groups would have to be addressed, and understanding causal social construction would be relevant to achieve social justice. On the other hand, not all possible constitutively socially constructed kinds are actual social kinds. If an existing social group is constitutively constructed as a social kind K, the fact that it actually exists as a K has social causes. Again, causal social construction is relevant. The paper argues that (i) for any actual social kind X, if X is constitutively socially constructed as K, then it is also causally socially constructed; and (ii) causal social construction is at least as relevant as constitutive social construction for concerns of social justice. For illustration, I draw upon two phenomena that are presumed to contribute towards the discrimination of women: (i) the poor performance effects of stereotype threat, and (ii) the silencing effects of gendered language use.…
           “If gender were not constitutively socially constructed, there could still be social causes for the harms and disadvantages that women suffer through discrimination. An effort to rectify injustice would require addressing those social causes, finding other means to rectify their effects, or adopting preventative measures to avoid further discrimination in the future.…
           “If race, gender, disability, sexual orientation, etc., are constitutively constructed kinds, then (as I have argued) we need to understand not just what they are constitutively, but how social causes contribute to their continued existence. Stereotype threat presumably contributes to perpetuating unfair differences (depending on the final verdict about its effects on poor performance). If it does affect performance, we may seek ways to counteract or neutralize its consequences. The use of gendered language appears to have silencing effects. The occurrence of silencing requires measures to either monitor or prevent the use of gendered language, or alternative forms of sidestepping the resulting illocutionary disablement. The proposal to monitor and prevent inflammatory speech, probably a precursor or contributing cause to mass violence, illustrates one way of addressing social causes of harm or injustice.
           “I conclude, thus, that the above is reason enough for causal social construction to be at least as relevant as constitutive social construction. They are both useful theoretically and politically, and neither seems to offer a more feasible path for achieving social change through social or political action.”
           [Teresa Marques, “The Relevance of Causal Social Construction.” Journal of Social Ontology. Ahead–of–print edition. October, 2016. Creative Commons. Pages 1-25.]
           “The distinction here should be clear: An object or kind is causally socially constructed when social factors or social agents are causally responsible for the existence of the object or the instantiation of the corresponding properties. On the other hand, an individual or property F is constitutively socially constructed when it is part of the definition of what it is for someone to be an F, or part of the nature of being an F (i.e. what makes someone an F), that Fs stand in some relation to social agents or social factors.…
           “The distinction between causal and constitutive social construction is extremely important in order to make sense of the different social constructionist projects that have been pursued and their different aims. In the remaining of this paper, I want to point out three important consequences of this distinction. First, I will argue that it makes a significant difference with respect to the project of arguing against the inevitability of a trait; second, I will argue that it also makes a crucial difference with respect to the project of arguing that a certain trait is relational rather than intrinsic; and finally, I will argue it makes a difference regarding the project of arguing that a certain trait is not biologically real.”
           [E. Diaz-Leon, “What Is Social Construction?” European Journal of Philosophy. Volume 23, issue 4, December 2015. Pages 1137–1152.]
      228. socio-cognitive approach to argumentation (Susana Martínez Guillem as pronounced in this MP3 audio file): She develops an approach to the social organization of knowledge in political communication.
           “The present socio-cognitive approach to argumentation is anchored in two different traditions – rhetoric and social psychology – in order to relate individual mental processes to other types of contextual knowledge.… Briefly summarized, … [one can] focus on ‘the cognitive dimension of argument – the mental processes by which arguments occur within people.’ A cognitive approach to argumentation … allows us to analyze the ‘mental processes [that] encompass everything involved in “thinking out” an argument,’ as well as ‘the creative processes by which people invent arguments.’ This alternative perspective, therefore, does not concentrate on the argument, but on the arguers, on how people’s cognitive systems process a particular stimulus (the message), whether this stimulus triggers an argument in someone else’s head and, if it does, how the process of arguing takes place and what specific elements it responds to ….” [Susana Martínez Guillem, “Argumentation, metadiscourse and social cognition: organizing knowledge in political communication.” Discourse & Society. Volume 20, number 6, November 2009. Pages 727-746.]
      229. emancipatory naturalism (Keith R. Peterson): He develops a “pluralist realism” with a critical and stratified naturalistic ontology. This approach is informed by the new ontology of Nicolai Hartmann (MP3 audio file).
           “If we are taken as ensouled responsible stewards of nature—or worse, postmodern loci of subjugation—then we may forget that we too are products of and embedded in the natural world, and not above it. Here these incomplete and incompatible positions dissolve into a stratified, pluralist realism which can account both for our need for criticism of the current order and our embeddedness in a natural one. It is a human ecology in the broadest meaning of the phrase.
           “I argued that it is important to distinguish between two forms of naturalism, conservative and emancipatory, but that this distinction relies upon a dualism which must be critically examined. The same dualisms recur in ecophilosophical interpretations of the place of the human in nature as well as in classical theories of human nature. I presented a resource in the tradition of philosophical anthropology which enables us to avoid dualistic thinking and espouse an emancipatory naturalism by resisting reductionism and acknowledging the diffuse dependence of human being on natural processes. In order to fully illuminate the biological prerequisites of the existentialia it became necessary to define an appropriate approach to ontology. This critical ontology facilitates a stratified understanding of the place of humans in nature without lapsing into reductivism or post-Kantian constructivism. It provides a sounder basis than either alternative for motivating an ecophilosophical perspective on human being.”
           [Keith R. Peterson, “All That We Are: Philosophical Anthropology and Ecophilosophy.” Cosmos and History: The Journal of Natural and Social Philosophy. Volume 6, number 1, June, 2010. Pages 1-19.]
           “Here is a new, as yet completely fallow field for research, undoubtedly rich with consequences, with whose disclosure and fruitful treatment the task of a critical ontology can first genuinely begin. The comprehensive view that is needed here cannot be achieved through a deduction from universal standpoints, but can only be won by detailed phenomenological-analytical study of the individual categories. It is self-evident that from here on out the problem of knowledge must undergo a rebirth that would allow a deeper penetration into its substantive details than ever allowed by any type of procedure that drifts about in the universal.” [Nicolai Hartmann and Keith R. Peterson, “How Is Critical Ontology Possible? Toward the Foundation of the General Theory of the Categories, Part One (1923).” Axiomathes. Volume 22, 2012. Pages 315-354.]
           “The centerpiece of ‘How is Critical Ontology Possible?’ is the treatment of the major errors of the old ontology, to which we now turn. [Nicolai] Hartmann’s answer to the title’s question becomes clear in the course of his examination of these errors: critical ontology is possible by correcting or avoiding these pervasive and often hard-to-detect mistakes.” [Keith R. Peterson, “An Introduction to Nicolai Hartmann’s Critical Ontology.” Axiomathes. Volume 22, 2012. Pages 291-314.]
           “… humans may be dependent on nature at the level of the biophysical causal nexus, as one species of biological creature and energy-consuming physical being among others. In order to acknowledge and deal with this fact we do not need to modify our understanding of natural agencies in profound ways. The ontology of scientific materialism does not need to be expanded or otherwise modified to include this characterization of dependence. Analogously, a slaveowner may recognize his dependence on the services provided by the slave without needing to see the slave as a full-blown moral agent or person. For the slaveowner, slaves are fundamentally substitutable and their agency limited.” [Keith R. Peterson, “Ecosystem Services, Nonhuman Agencies, and Diffuse Dependence.” Environmental Philosophy. Volume 9, issue 2, fall 2012. Pages 1-19.]
           “By ‘environmental philosophy’ I mean research of the last four decades or so which explicitly examines the human relationships to and impacts upon the natural world against the horizon of acknowledged environmental crisis. This is broader than and includes ‘environmental ethics,’ a field defined by its attempt to construct an ethical theory which regards living beings and nature generally as morally considerable entities. Initially virtually synonymous, environmental philosophy has grown to include all sorts of investigations into the ontological, scientific, political, historical, economic and social dimensions of the environmental crisis.” [Keith Peterson, “Bringing Values Down to Earth: Max Scheler and Environmental Philosophy.” Appraisal. Volume 8, number 4, October 2011. Pages 3-12.]
           “Values exist neither simply objectively in things nor subjectively as secondary qualities. Two sides of value must be distinguished. What is ontologically or constitutionally relative but invariable about them is that values are the kinds of things that are always ‘for someone,’ in precisely the same invariable way that geometrical categories apply to geometrical figures qua geometrical, and physiological categories apply to organisms qua organisms. Their existence is ‘relative’ to beings such as ourselves. On the other hand, for every human being striving to achieve personhood in the context of a culture, they also have a‘absolute’ sort of existence.” [Keith R. Peterson, “From Ecological Politics to Intrinsic Value: An Examination of Kovel’s Value Theory.” Capitalism Nature Socialism. Volume 21, number 3, September 2010. Pages 81-101.]
           “Critical ontology … can be distinguished from dogmatic metaphysics or ontology, and defines its stance ‘this side’ of all metaphysical ‘standpoints’ (including classical realism and contemporary forms of idealism).” [Keith R. Peterson, “Nicolai Hartmann’s Philosophy of Nature: Realist Ontology and Philosophical Anthropology.” Scripta Philosophiæ Naturalis. Volume 2, 2012. Pages 143-179.]
           “It [the old ontology] was fundamentally oriented toward the being of material things and, in addition, toward the organism. It interpreted psychic life organologically, and it assigned the spirit to the kingdom of essences. Therefore it could not place the spirit within the world of reality. Its reality seemed to be of an altogether different type from that of things, a timeless being without change or individuality. However, the new ontology is distinguished from the old in that it removes all such limitations. It starts from the level of the given upon which it bases itself, and which embraces psychic and spiritual being just as much as the being of nature. For the spirit does not stand outside the world of reality. It belongs completely to it, has the same temporality, the same coming into being and passing away as material things and living beings. In short, it has the same reality. For this reason alone can it have an effect in this world and experience the effects of the world upon it, have its own fate and its own field of action within this world.” [Nicolai Hartmann. New Ways of Ontology. Reinhard C. Kuhn, translator. Chicago, Illinois: Henry Regnery Company. 1953. Page 24.]
           “Nicolai Hartmann might be described as a philosopher who, like many of his contemporaries, joined the movement ‘back to [Immanuel] Kant.’ Unlike many of these contemporaries, however, Hartmann did not remain within the confines of critical philosophy but kept right on the road leading back until he reached Aristotle with his view of the world as a vast structure of levels related to each other in various ways.… More specifically, he sought to challenge the primacy of the episte mological standpoint; and in its place he put a type of realism, in accordance with which, knowledge is first and foremost knowledge of a world of concrete things and not knowledge of the conditions of knowing or of the structure of the knowledge process.” [John E. Smith, “Hartmann’s New Ontology.” The Review of Metaphysics. Volume 7, number 4, June 1954. Pages 583-601.]
      230. ontological policy reconstruction (Marc Pauly): He develops an ontological approach to analyzing refugee policy.
           “Ontological policy reconstruction: analyzing and/or constructing a policy’s main concepts, their meanings and interrelations (ontology), as well as the power structure associated with these (deontology), and describing the development of these, ontology and deontology, over time (dynamics).…
           “When it comes to applying ontological policy analysis in practice, we are faced with the question of what to include in our ontology and what to exclude. For an extreme example, consider an ontological analysis of refugee policy that involves analyzing a form that refugees need to fill in. Suppose this form includes the line ‘Please use a pencil to fill in this form.’ Does this mean that the refugee policy ontology has to include pencils? There is no general answer to this question. Just as the scientist has to choose what aspects of reality to include in her model, a person analyzing policy similarly has to choose which aspects of the policy domain to include in her analysis, how to (re-)construct the policy domain. This is part of the creative and open-ended character of science, policy making and policy analysis.”
           [Marc Pauly, “A Framework for Ontological Policy Reconstruction: Academic Knowledge Transfer in the Netherlands as a Case Study.” Journal of Social Ontology. Volume 2, issue 2, August 2016. Creative Commons. Pages 303-323.]
      231. CPC theory (Rico Hauswald as pronounced in this MP3 audio file): He develops an ontological theory of “causal property clusters.”
           “In my view, neither constructing interactive kinds as a conceptual counterpart of natural kinds, nor excluding natural kinds – or ‘real kinds,‘ as I prefer to call them – from our philosophical terminology are good ideas. As I shall argue in this paper, interactive kinds are best analyzed as a special case of causal property clusters (CPCs). CPC theory provides an accurate metaphysical conception of real kinds that allows us to conceive of them in a realist manner without succumbing to the pitfalls of essentialism as well as a suitable framework for integrating interactive kinds.…
           “This paper is based on the observation that the discussion about interactive kinds suffers from the … [lack of] a tenable ontology of interactive kinds. The purpose of the paper is to provide just such an ontology. I shall argue that … it is possible to maintain the notion of an interactive kind and to develop it in a way that withstands the criticisms raised by other authors. The way to achieve this, however, is to … draw a decidedly realist picture of interactive kinds.…
           “… I adopt a causal property cluster (CPC) view about real kinds, which has proven to be a promising middle ground between essentialism and eliminativism that avoids the pitfalls of both these extreme positions.…
           “For any form of realism about kinds (and the CPC view is realist in the sense that is relevant here), it is crucial to distinguish between kinds, on the one hand, and classifications and classificatory categories, on the other.…
           “… Having explored how changing kinds can be modeled within the CPC framework, I then go on to interpret interactive kinds as a special case of changing CPC kinds – namely, those kinds that change as a result of reactions of the people who come to believe that they are instances of them.…
           “… Here is the basic model. Imagine a multidimensional space of properties (MSP) in which every dimension represents a property and in which all existing individuals are located. The nearer two individuals are in this MSP, the more properties they share, that is, the more similar they are. In the MSP, individuals are neither homogeneously nor randomly distributed. Instead, their distribution is structured. In some areas there are many individuals; other areas are empty. I call the latter areas ‘realization gaps’ …, the former ones ‘realization accumulations’. The accumulations can be identified with real kinds. Moreover, the co-occurrence of properties in the individuals belonging to the kinds is not due to mere definition, but due to causal mechanisms. Consider biological species as an example. The individuals that instantiate a particular species differ in many ways – no cat perfectly resembles any other cat. Thus, no two cats occupy the very same location in the MSP. At the same time, due to causal mechanisms such as heredity, all cats share a great many properties with many other cats. This means that even though no two cats occupy perfectly identical locations, there is a relatively small region in the MSP where all cats are located. Other species occupy other regions in the MSP. In between these regions there are realization gaps, which are not occupied by any individuals.”
           [Rico Hauswald, “The Ontology of Interactive Kinds.” Journal of Social Ontology. Volume 2, issue 2, August 2016. Creative Commons. Pages 203-221.]
      232. dual aspect theory of shared intention (Facundo M. Alonso as pronounced in this MP3 audio file): He examines the relationship between the “structure of attitudes” and “shared intention.”
           “… I argue that … [the] structure [of attitudes] is also responsible, given the psychological features it possesses, for the practical thought and action of individuals in joint action. Further reflection on such a structure of attitudes thus tells us that shared intention presents, in contrast to what the two aforementioned views suggest, not just one but two main aspects: a psychological aspect and a normative one. In arguing that shared intention presents these two aspects, in this article I will be proposing what might be called a ‘dual aspect’ theory of shared intention.…
           “… In general, we do not see the connection between an interpersonal transaction and the responsibility practices it supports as speaking primarily to what such a transaction is for, psychologically speaking. We see it, rather, as speaking primarily to the transaction’s intrinsic normative significance. Thus, as indicated earlier, we see the connection between shared intention and responsibility practices as speaking primarily to the normative significance of the former phenomenon. At the same time, the fact that we do not see the support of responsibility practices as a defining functional role of shared intention should not prevent us from seeing it as a defining feature of this phenomenon. Indeed, the dual aspect theory suggests that we see it in this latter way.”
           [Facundo M. Alonso, “A Dual Aspect Theory of Shared Intention.” Journal of Social Ontology. Volume 2, issue 2, August 2016. Creative Commons. Pages 271-302.]
      233. #YoSoy132 (Mariana Favela as pronounced in this MP3 audio file): She examines #YoSoy132—an Occupy–like movement (and Twitter hashtag) among Mexican university students. In Spanish, “yo soy 132” (MP3 audio file) is “I am 132.”
           “I call the insurgence a ‘generation’ and not a ‘youth’ movement because generations give birth to something intimate and original, whereas youth is a mere temporal coincidence. The insurgence of a generation is not a matter of age, but of giving birth to new shared conceptions. The shared age range of most participants is not enough to consider the events as a youth movement, because it hides the huge diversity of people that got together as #YoSoy132. Calling #YoSoy132 a youth movement ignores the fact that many young people were never with or against the generational insurgence. How much of the inclination to categorize #YoSoy132 as a youth phenomenon comes from romanticized ideas of a modern youth and its naturalized stereotype of critical, groundbreaking, revolutionary, and transformational youngsters? The use of ‘youth’ as a category is a clear example of epistemological approaches that foster essentialist conceptions of those who participate in the uprising.” [Mariana Favela, “Redrawing Power: #YoSoy132 and Overflowing Insurgencies.” Social Justice. Volume 42, numbers 3–4, fall–winter 2016. Pages 222-236.]
      234. systematic model of mediated recognition (Heikki J. Koskinen as pronounced in this MP3 audio file): He develops an approach which can be applied to addressing the issues living in a multicultural world.
           “In this paper, I articulate a systematic model of mediated recognition based on the notion of the categorial stance. Mediated recognition is understood as a trilateral form of recognition, while the categorial stance is conceived as an epistemic position operating with the most general ontological categories and relations. The central thesis argued for is that the categorial stance can be used as a rational resource for conceptually mediated recognition. I begin with tools found in earlier research literature, then characterize the idea of conceptual rationality, consider contexts of mediated recognition, and finally, integrate the categorial stance into the model.…
           “We live today in a globalized and multicultural world where the flourishing of societies requires that we have efficient ways of accepting and constructively dealing with all kinds of disagreeing parties and actors. Both as individuals and as societies, we need to be able to cope and co-operate with an encountered variety of cultural traditions, ethnic backgrounds, religious doctrines, political views, and so on. This multicultural reality also presents us with multidimensional psychological and societal challenges …. Consequently, rational ways of approaching such cultural encounters are urgently needed. In the following, my aim is to articulate some suggestions for a systematic model towards this end. The attempt is based on the debatable idea that reason and rationality have a positive contribution to make, and my specific focus will be on a conceptual form of rationality.…
           “… Mediated recognition can … establish a higher-order recognitive context in which the initial disagreement at the level of direct or unmediated recognition may continue to exist, but its potential for creating social conflict is mitigated. For rather obvious reasons, the general conceptual framework-level accessible from the epistemic position of the categorial stance could be called the ontological platform.…
           “… Mediated recognition based on the categorial stance can thus function as a theoretical instrument that is potentially useful in explaining, reconstructing and understanding certain recognitive phenomena.”
           [Heikki J. Koskinen, “Mediated Recognition and the Categorial Stance.” Journal of Social Ontology. Ahead–of–print edition. October 2016. Creative Commons. Pages 1-21.]
      235. emancipatory naturalism in ethics (Margaret Urban Walker): This feminist approach to ethics is grounded in naturalism.
           “There is an alternative to the idealism of a transcendent view, on the one hand, and on the other, the normative emptiness of a view that rejects morality wholesale in favor of ‘amoral contests about the just and the good in which truth is always grasped as coterminous with power, always already power, as the voice of power.’ I cannot defend an entire view of morality here, but I make a proposal for an empirically obligated and politically emancipatory naturalism in ethics that sees the ineliminable roles of power in morality ‘itself.’” [Margaret Urban Walker. Moral Contexts. Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc. 2003. Page 104.]
           “With or without special emphasis on scientific theories, more approaches to moral theory and moral epistemology now take one or another kind of naturalistic or naturalizing view, with varied approaches that defend fallibilist, contextualist, and piecemeal pictures of moral justification ….
           “Overlapping the turn toward a more empirically nourished ethics is a turn toward moral psychology as a proper part of ethics. As already mentioned, some of the zest for empirical input into ethics has taken the form of mining results of experimental psychology.”
           [Margaret Urban Walker. Moral Understandings: A Feminist Study in Ethics. Second edition. Oxford, England, and New York: Oxford University Press. 2007. Pages 31-32.]
           “A naturalized view of moral knowledge provides an explanation of the gender bias – explicit or covert – that feminist critiques have invariably uncovered. Whatever theorists have claimed about the non-empirical provenance of some ingredients of their moral theories, the truth is that their theories about how to live cannot help but be rooted in the lives they in fact live. Moral knowledge, like other knowledge, is situated. Moral theories will bear the marks not only of culture and history, but of the ways that the cultural and historical situation presents itself to those who make theory from particular social positions within specific social worlds.” [Margaret Urban Walker, “Feminist Ethics and Human Conditions.” Tijdschrift voor Filosofie. Volume 64, number 3, third quarter. Pages 433-450.]
           “Moral Understandings is a work in metaethics. Its critique of the ‘theoretical-juridical’ model of moral philosophy is meant to clear space for an “expressive collaborative” one. The expressive-collaborative model isn’t another normative moral theory—it’s a guiding picture of how we could look at morality in order to better serve two goals of moral inquiry that I assume many moral philosophers share: giving adequate description and illuminating analysis of what morality is, and serves to do, among human beings; and engaging in normative reflection on the worthiness of actual and imagined moral ideals and practices.” [Margaret Urban Walker, “Morality in Practice: A Response to Claudia Card and Lorraine Code.” Hypatia. Volume 17, number 1, winter 2002. Pages 174-182.]
           “Many of the reasons for finding current moral theories inadequate should lead, I claim, not only to the rejection of those theories but to a rejection of a certain entrenched conception of moral theory familiar in twentieth-century Anglo-American moral philosophy. I don’t think, though, that giving up moral theory (in the quite specific sense of this entrenched model) as the project of ethics means giving up ethics as a descriptive and critical understanding of how moral life does and can go on. Yet the recent feminist challenge to the legitimacy of moral philosophizing itself is a deep one. It requires that any ethics done must become politically self-conscious and reflexively critical, and that the impetus to this must be right in the kind of ethics any of us do, not an addendum or a postscript to it.” [Margaret Urban Walker, “Feminism, Ethics, and the Question of Theory.” Hypatia. Volume 7, number 3, summer 1992. Pages 23-38.]
           “In ‘Feminism, Ethics, and the Question of Theory’ …, I claimed that diverse feminist criticisms of mainstream ethics (in still dominant Anglo-American academic and institutional discourses) were resisting a particular underlying picture of morality and its allied ‘model’ of a moral theory. The picture is one of morality as a compact, impersonally action-guiding code within an (individual) agent. The model of moral theory that conforms to this picture is that of a codifiable (and usually compact) set of moral formulas (or procedures for selecting formulas) that can be applied by any agent to a situation to yield a justified and determinate action-guiding judgment.” [Margaret Urban Walker, “Thinking Morality Interpersonally: A Reply to Burgess-Jackson.” Hypatia. Volume 8, number 3, summer 1993. Pages 167-173.]
      236. hierarchy of values (Agnes Heller [Hungarian, Ágnes Heller as pronounced in this MP3 audio file]): She considers a distinguishing characteristic of great artists.
           “A great artist is always distinguished by a clear hierarchy of values. This is especially true of [William] Shakespeare, whose whole dramatic composition is, indeed, based on this hierarchy. Shakespeare operates with three sets of values, which interpenetrate and collide with each other in the plays: they allow him to make homogeneous art from the infinitely heterogeneous values experienced in real life. These three sets of values are: greatness—that is, the ‘weight’ of human substance displayed in intellect, in passion and in the ability to take the consequence of one’s actions; freedom, in the choice of one’s destiny, in knowledge of the world and man, and in the capacity to accept action or to renounce it; and, last but not least, morality. The heroes of Shakespeare’s tragedies invariably occupy the first place in the hierarchy of greatness.” [Agnes Heller, “Shakespeare and History.” New Left Review. Series I, 32, July–August 1965. Pages 16-23.]
           “… since I wrote my first book on ethics, which was based on my lectures in Hungary in 1958, I have always spoken about ʻrelative autonomy’. I have always said that there is no absolute autonomy. Absolute autonomy even in [Immaneul] Kant is an idea, an idea of acting absolutely under the guidance of the moral law – but Kant adds that we can never know whether there was anyone, any time who ever acted only exclusively under the moral law. So absolute autonomy is the centre, but we approximate the centre. We never arrive at the centre, which means that our autonomy is always relative.” [Agnes Heller, “Post-Marxism and the ethics of modernity.” Radical Philosophy: Philosophical Journal of the Independent Left. Number 94, March/April 1999. Pages 29-39.]
      237. combinations of Can and Should (Agnes Heller): She enumerates six moral standpoints.
           “All of the combinations of ‘Can’ and ‘Should’ represent a moral standpoint. But for the most part, it is the political considerations and the personal life-histories that make people inclined to adopt one of them rather than the other. Here I can address only the merits or demerits of the arguments or refer to some general intuitions.
           “There are six combinations: (a) There should be no prosecution at all, nor can there be; (b) there should be no prosecution at all, although there can be; (c) the perpetrators should be prosecuted, but they cannot be; (d) they should be prosecuted and indeed they can be; (e) they should be prosecuted in order for historical justice to be done; (f) they should pay for their crimes, they should be prosecuted, yet they should not be prosecuted at the same time.”
           [Agnes Heller, “The Limits to Natural Law and the Paradox of Evil.” IHS: Reihe Politikwissenschaft. Number 6, April 1993. Pages 1-13.]
      238. ontology of human constitutive power (Kenneth Surin): He develops a Marxist ontology informed by the philosophy of Baruch Spinoza (Hebrew/ʿIḇəriyṯ, בָּרוּךְ שְׂפִּינוֹזָה, Bārūḵə Śəpiynōzāh). As is evident from some of the quotations in this listing, Surin also has a background in theology.
           “… the production of the world can begin only with desire requires marxism to acknowledge that the cornerstone of the project of liberation is a prior ontology of human constitutive power or desire.
           “This ontology of constitutive power charts the various trajectories of human desire, and in so doing allows the project of liberation to have as its ‘knowledge’ the theorems delivered by this ontological charting of the lineaments of desire (this in a nutshell being [Baruch] Spinoza’s own program). The ontology of human constitutive power will delineate what it is that the ensembles of desire going by the name ‘human’ are capable of, and what their aversions and attractions are. The ontology of human constitutive power is thus a necessary prolepsis to any specification of the theoretical core of the project of liberation.
           “This ontology has to be accorded priority in a marxist marking out of liberation as a concept, if only because a project of liberation is above all a system of truth-effects, and any truth-effect (or fusion of truth-effects) can, depending on historical and social circumstances (and the rudiments of these are always political), be prevented from displaying itself. A truth-effect does not produce automatically, and hence cannot guarantee, its own processes of actualization; it cannot of itself banish the material conditions, whatever they may be, that could in principle disrupt its realization as a truth-effect.”
           [Kenneth Surin. Freedom Not Yet: Liberation and the Next World Order. Durham, North Carolina: Duke University Press. 2009. Page 54.]
           “When I started Modern Theology in England 27 years ago (a couple of years of planning and article solicitation had to precede the appearance of the journal in 1984), the context for its emergence can be described, in ways unavoidably partial and incomplete, in the following terms. Modern Theology quickly became an international journal, but at the time of its conception there was no immediate expectation that it would succeed in this way, so Modern Theology was very much a response to a quite specific intellectual and theological situation in the Britain of the early 1980s.” [Kenneth Surin, “‘Retrospect/prospect’: Notes on modern theology after twenty-five years.” Modern Theology. Volume 26, number 1, January 2010. Pages 4-11.]
           “… if one stands within the circle of faith, primacy is necessarily accorded to the theological, if one is a political materialist (for me the ‘good Marxists’) it is necessarily assigned to the political, and if one is a reductionist Marxist primacy is assigned exclusively to the economic (for me this is ‘bad Marxism’).” [Kenneth Surin, “Can a ‘Chosen’ People have a ‘True’ Politics.” Angelaki: journal of the theoretical humanities. Volume, 12, number 1, April 2007. Pages 145-150.]
           “… societal regulation operates in tandem with its concomitant mode of economic production. Here of course the unavoidable fact is the US’s abandonment of the postwar ‘compromise’ between labor and capital, reflected in such programs as Lyndon Johnson’s ‘Great Society,’ but swiftly abandoned when the implicit or explicit Keynesianism underpinning that ‘compromise’ unraveled in the early 1970s, as the US then made a rapid transition from Keynesianism to neoliberalism in accordance with the American ruling élite’s preferred way of dealing with the ‘stagflation’ that ensued from the termination of this historic ‘compromise.’” [Kenneth Surin, “The Society of Control and the Managed Citizen.” Junctures. Volume 8, June 2007. Pages 11-25.]
           “If Marxism and Christianity are superior to other formations because they are capable of accommodating a properly tragic vision, what then, in more general terms, are the marks of an adequate conception of the tragic? In dealing with this question, [Terry] Eagleton makes an important reference to [Jacques] Lacan, and argues that ‘tragedy portrays conflicts in the symbolic order—political strife, sexual betrayal and the like—with which we are invited, not least through pity, to make an imaginary identification; but this imaginary identi fication is disrupted by fear, which is to say by the intrusion of the Real.’ Eagleton also says that only ‘relationships based on a mutual recognition of the Real—of the terrifyingly inhuman installed at the core of the other and oneself, for which one name is the death drive—will be able to prosper,’ so that ‘we encounter each other on the ground of trauma, impasse, an ultimate dissolution of meaning, and seek to begin again laboriously from here.’” [Kenneth Surin, “Theology and Marxism: The Tragic and the Tragi-comic.” Literature and Theology. Volume 19, number 2, June 2005. Pages 112-131.]
           “It is virtuality axiomatic for many schools of thought—not all of which are readily to be identified with the marxist tradition—that a project of liberation or emancipation can be advanced only if and when certain substantive forms of social solidarity are able to take root in the society in question. Making this axiomatic claim is easy; what is more difficult is ascertaining how these forms of social solidarity are to be generated and sustained, and, as the corollary of this question, how such forms can be protected in situations in which they are likely to be thwarted or threatened. In dealing with this question we confront (among other things) the well-known dialectic between structure and agency, or being and act.” [Kenneth Surin, “On Producing (the Concept of) Solidarity.” Rethinking Marxism. Volume 22, number 3, July 2010. Pages 446-457.]
           “A theory of subalternity is thus the outcome of a productive process, no more or no less than the putative object of this process, the condition of being a subaltern. This theory, the theory of being a subaltern, is a practice, just as the condition of subalternity is a multilinear assemblage of practices structured by distributions of income, assets, power, and status. A theory, this theory, any theory, is in short a practice of concepts.” [Kenneth Surin, “The Sovereign Individual, ‘Subalternity,’ and Becoming-Other,” Angelaki: journal of the theoretical humanities. Volume 6, number 1, April 2001. Pages 47-63.]
           “Capitalism is inaugurated in the violence of a primitive accumulation (‘sovereign violence’), and from this primal violence law and the state eventually ensue as the basis of cooperation, so that sovereign violence gives way in time to the violence of a state-maintained discipline. With the institution of law and the state, capitalism, having already been launched by the event of primary accumulation, can further evolve and expand. Law and the state allow the mode of production to be organized, thoroughly and comprehensively, according to the principles of capitalist accumulation, and law and right in turn function at the behest of these principles, in a mutually reinforcing symbiosis.” [Kenneth Surin, “‘Now Everything Must Be Reinvented’: Negri and Revolution.” Resistance in Practice: The Philosophy of Antonio Negri. London and Ann Arbor, Michigan: Pluto Press. 2005. Pages 205-242.]
           “… mystical or negative theologies, since they do not require the category of ‘presence,’ have an undeniable ontological affinity with the space (in this epoch of ours this may indeed be the only sustainable space) of non-relation.” [Kenneth Surin, “The Dark Gaze: Maurice Blanchot and the Sacred.” Review article. Modern Theology. Volume 23, issue 1, January 2007. Pages 152–154.]
           “Many commentators on the resurrection accounts of John and Luke have noted that these accounts place a quite significant stress on the otherness of the risen Jesus.” [Kenneth Surin, “The Trinity and Philosophical Reflection: A Study of David Brown’s The Divine Trinity.” Modern Theology. Volume 2, number 3, 1986. Pages 235-256.]
      239. corporatization of higher education (Nicolaus Mills): He critiques the exorbitant cost of higher education in the U.S.
           “According to a 2011 Pew Research Survey, 75 percent of Americans believe college is too expensive. There has never been a better time for proposing major reform in higher education. Allowing students to pay for their college educations by having a small percentage of what they earn following graduation deducted from their income tax could make a difference in reducing the burden of student debt, and so could a loan-forgiveness system that allowed students to write off their government loans in exchange for working at a public service job, such as high school teaching, at subsistence wages for the same number of years they were in college.” [Nicolaus Mills, “The Corporatization of Higher Education.” Dissent. Online magazine. Fall, 2012.]
      240. course of history (Ellen Meiksins Wood): She distinguishes between Marxism and “Stalinist dogma” regarding the supposedly inevitable trajectory of history.
           “There was a time, not very long ago, when one of the most serious and frequent criticisms levelled against Marxism was that it subscribed to a mechanical and simplistic view of history according to which all societies were predestined to go through a single, inexorable sequence of stages from primitive communism to slavery to feudalism, and finally to capitalism which would inevitably give way to socialism.…
           “Now that this view of history has been widely disowned by Marxists, not only in the West but even in the East, now that it has been acknowledged by many Marxists as an aberration, which had less to do with Marxist theory than with Stalinist dogma and was always incompatible not only with Marx’s own understanding of history but with the fundamental principles of historical materialism and its conception of class struggle, the ground of criticism has shifted.”
           [Ellen Meiksins Wood, “Marxism and the Course of History.” New Left Review. Series I, number 147, September–October 1984. Pages 95-107.]
      241. human rights perspective (Eric Bonds): Informed by Allan Schnaiberg’s treadmill theory of production, Immanuel Wallerstein’s world-systems analysis, G. William Domhoff’s power-elite (power-structure) research, social constructionism, institutional theory, and the thinking of eminent sociologist Bryan S. Turner, Bonds develops an intriguing version of moral realism. It focuses upon the reality of “human suffering” and challenges moral relativism. Bonds also considers human-rights violations related to the specific social problems of state power and environmental degradation.
           “Injustices and suffering are real ….
           “My primary goal in this book is to provide a new definition for what constitutes a social problem. I define it as the violation of a group’s human rights, which I describe as commonly upheld standards about what people deserve and should be protected from in life that have been codified by some widely recognized international body. I use the Universal Declaration of Human Rights … as a paradigmatic expression of shared standards about the treatment of persons in the contemporary world. I will argue that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights can be used as a tool to evaluate U.S. society.…
           “… are we really comfortable with … [the] position of moral relativism, which holds that no condition is inherently problematic? … So how can we reconcile the academic perspective of social constructionism—which holds that nothing is inherently problematic—along with an acknowledgment that human suffering is real, and has an objective reality? Social theorist Bryan Turner [in Vulnerability and Human Rights] … argues that this might be done through human rights. …
           “Suffering, in other words, is real. Human rights, according to Turner …, are the means by which contemporary societies acknowledge our shared vulnerability to pain and suffering and act to ameliorate it.…
           [Eric Bonds. Social Problems: A Human Rights Perspective. London and New York: Routledge imprint of Taylor & Francis Group, an Informa PLC business. 2015. Google Play edition.]
           “The goal of a human rights perspective is to provide an explicitly moral approach to the study of social problems, based upon widely-shared values expressed in well-recognized human rights agreements. But the point is not, of course, to impose one single interpretation of such agreements, or to argue that the norms expressed therein are in some way immutable and not subject to ongoing development and controversy. This approach, I argue, can enrich the study of social problems by allowing students to grapple with both the social nature of rights and the very nature of society itself.…
           “In closing, I would like to acknowledge that, as anyone taking up the approach will find, a human rights orientation to social problems instruction is not without its troubles and limitations. Nevertheless, I think it provides a viable means of accomplishing what all the best classes in social problems do.”
           [Eric Bonds, “Grappling with Structure, Social Construction, and Morality: Towards a Human Rights Approach to Social Problems Instruction.” Societies Without Borders. Volume 8, number 1, 2013. Pages 137-162.]
           “Vulnerability defines our humanity and is presented here as the common basis of human rights. The idea of our vulnerable human nature is closely associated with certain fundamental rights, such as the right to life. Indeed, the rights that support life, health, and reproduction are crucial to human rights as such. It is, however, difficult to enforce human rights, and hence we must explore the complex relationships among the state, the social rights of citizens, and the human rights of persons. Social institutions necessary for our survival are themselves fragile and precarious, and there is a complex interaction between our human frailty, institution building, and political or state power.” [Bryan S. Turner. Vulnerability and Human Rights. University Park, Pennsylvania: The Pennsylvania State University Press. 2006. Page 1.]
           “There is a major disagreement between theorists of the international order about the extent to which global humanitarian and human rights norms influence state behavior. On one hand, theorists can point to the emergence, development, and institutionalization of international human rights law and can show that egregious violations can result in prosecutions and other negative outcomes for the officials that authorized them …. From this perspective, human rights and humanitarian norms are part of a global political culture—comprised of shared principles, norms, and legal codes—and as such have the capacity to shape the policies of nation-states (… [see John W.] Meyer[, ‘World Society, Institutional Theories, and the Actor‘] …). A world-systems framework, however, offers divergent theoretical expectations because it takes for granted a globe that is divided into rival nation-states more than willing to employ violence in order to promote capital accumulation and maximize territorial influence or control. From this perspective, states are much less restrained by the potential humanitarian consequences of their actions. There is, of course, the strong likelihood that aspects of both perspectives are correct in varying degrees.” [Eric Bonds, “Terrorizing Violence and the Iraq War: Civilian Victimization, Humanitarian Norms, and Social Science.” Humanity & Society. Volume 38, number 4, November 2014. Pages 365-387.]
           “… [Some] peace activists in Iraq documented human rights abuses committed in U.S. prisons; Christian Peacemaker Teams was, in fact, the first Western group to break the story of the torture and systematic abuse of prisoners at Abu Ghraib. All of the activists interviewed had one other reason to go to Iraq: all believed that by living in Iraq, they could increase antiwar activism at home, first by reframing the war in the mainstream media.” [Eric Bonds, “Strategic Role Taking and Political Struggle: Bearing Witness to the Iraq War.” Symbolic Interaction. Volume 32, issue 1, winter 2009. Pages 1–20.]
           “… power structure research can make an important contribution to environmental sociology. For instance, the treadmill of production model … acknowledges the importance of policy and argues that policy generally benefits the corporate wealthy, but has little to say about the particular ways elites organize themselves to exert power and achieve their interests …. Power structure research can benefit treadmill theorists by providing a more fine-grain analysis of the ways the corporate wealthy organize themselves and exercise power to secure governmental policies that promote or protect environmentally harmful, but profitable, business activities. Indeed, such policies may result in much higher rates of environmental degradation than that which is structurally necessitated for the reproduction of capitalism.“
           “Power structure research is a sociological perspective holding that the corporate wealthy exercise a disproportionate influence in public policy-making; in other words they constitute a power elite …
           “[G. William] Domhoff … argues that elites organize … different power networks in order to influence state policy-making ….
           [Eric Bonds, “The Knowledge-Shaping Process: Elite Mobilization and Environmental Policy.” Critical Sociology. Volume 37, number 4, 2010. Pages 429-446.]
           “… nations and societies are not monolithic entities, and regardless of whether a government willingly or unwillingly engages in specific resource extraction activities, whether these activities are organized by local or foreign companies, or whether they occur in developed or developing nations or in nations with strong or weak legal and property rights regimes, it is likely that in many cases individuals and groups will protest, resist, or rebel against these activities. For example, protestors might be worried about local environmental degradation or health problems that result from resource extraction activities, they might be aggrieved by any loss of livelihood that they and their community may experience as a result of these activities, or they may be forced to relocate in order to make way for resource extraction ….” [Liam Downey, Eric Bonds, and Katherine Clark, “Natural Resource Extraction, Armed Violence, and Environmental Degradation.” Organization & Environment. Volume 23, number 4, 2010. Pages 417-445.]
           “The Treadmill of Production Model calls our attention to the environmental costs of social inequality …. It does so in two important ways. First, the treadmill of production, or the expansionary logic of capitalism, is inherently environmentally destructive and increasingly so. This destruction, however, is not shared evenly. Owners and managers of capital have some ability to spare themselves from its worst effects, which often disproportionately affect the poor. Second, the treadmill of production creates increasing inequality—because of, for example, corporate consolidation, the increasing (global) flexibility of production, and the upward distribution of wealth—such that everyday people have a diminished ability to exert control over production as it expands. Taken together, this means that as the treadmill becomes more and more destructive, we have less and less ability to do anything about it. This is a significant economic, social, and environmental problem.” [Eric Bonds, “Environmental Review as Battleground: Corporate Power, Government Collusion, and Citizen Opposition to a Tire-Burning Power Plant in Rural Minnesota, U.S.A.” Organization & Environment. Volume 20, number 2, June 2007. Pages 157-176.]
           “Despite the fact that post-invasion Iraq has not been the oil bonanza for U.S. and other foreign companies that many expected, it does not necessarily mean that oil was not at the heart of the decision to go to war. It does mean, however, that we must keep in mind that natural resource wars can take many different forms. They are not necessarily about a nation’s attempt to gain exclusive access to a foreign resource. In the case of Iraq, it appears that the United States was motivated to remove an impediment to the increased flow of oil onto world markets in order to fuel global economic growth.” [Eric Bonds, “Assessing the Oil Motive After the U.S. War in Iraq.” Peace Review: A Journal of Social Justice. Volume 25, issue 2, April 2013. Pages 291-298.]
           “The world economic and political system has long been uneasily saddled with the ideology of centrist liberalism, a ‘geoculture’ that promises incremental and moderate reforms to guarantee political and social rights ([see Immanuel] Wallerstein …). One important component of global liberalism has been the century-old effort to reform and humanize war, in which state govermnents and civil society actors have sought to promote humanitarian norms, formalized through international treaty-making, as a means of prohibiting certain forms of state violence that have been identified as especially indiscriminate or inhumane. But like the political ideology of liberalism as a whole, this is often irreconcilable with the realities of the world-system, which is premised upon the threat and actual use of mass violence between states as they vie with one another over territory and as they work to promote the continuous accumulation of capital ….” [Eric Bonds, “Hegemony and Humanitarian Norms: The US Legitimation of Toxic Violence.” Journal of World-Systems Research. Volume 19, number 1, winter 2013. Pages 82-107.]
           “… from a world-systems perspective, because ‘green’ technologies are commodities, they imply relations of inequality and exploitation …. The social relations of particular concern here are of those between the comparatively wealthy core and the comparatively poorer periphery and the semi-periphery. To world-systems analysts, the economic development of the core came at the cost of the underdevelopment, social disruption, and environmental degradation of the periphery …. Taken together, this means that while the widespread development of ‘green’ technologies may create real benefits in core nations, it may also produce further environmental degradation, violence, and social disruption in peripheral zones. In other words, ‘green’ technologies, like other commodities whose production and consumption spans the globe, are part and parcel to processes of ecologically unequal exchange ….” [Eric Bonds, “‘Green’ Technology and Ecologically Unequal Exchange: The Environmental and Social Consequences of Ecological Modernization in the World-System.” Journal of World-Systems Research. Volume 18, number 2, summer 2012. Pages 167-186.]
           “Contemporary phenomenological institutional theories recover the old institutionalist conceptions of people and groups as highly embedded in wider cultural material. The important change is that contemporary institutional schemes operate by building their cultural material into the roles and identities of persons and groups now conceived as highly legitimated and agentic actors.…
           “The individuals and organizations so created now with the standing of agentic actors, commonly act on behalf of the great principles that empower their agency. Far from ordinary self-interest, they often act as mobilized Others, creating expanded versions of actorhood.… The injustices, in a stateless world, call for further expansions in the imagined capacities and responsibilities of the human and organizational actors.”
           [John W. Meyer, “World Society, Institutional Theories, and the Actor.” Annual Review of Sociology. Volume 36, 2010. Pages 1-20.]
           “A striking feature of societies around the world in recent decades has been the rapid growth of formal organization in all social sectors. In state, market, and public good arenas alike, new forms arise, and older social forms—traditional bureaucracies, family firms, professional and charitable associations—are transformed into managed and agentic formal organizations. Explanations stressing the causal role of increased functional interdependence or concentrated forces of standardizing power … are less useful in a world where organizational expansion is ubiquitous. We develop an institutional account of organizational expansion and elaboration, emphasizing its roots in cultural and environmental rationalization …. We argue that rationalization creates a framework that encourages organizing in a wide range of societies and domains …. The cultural roots of expansion produce contemporary structures that are, dialectically, built less around functional interdependence and more around the construction of organizations as purposive social ‘actors.’” [John W. Meyer and Patricia Bromley, “The Worldwide Expansion of ‘Organization.’” Sociological Theory. Volume 31, number 4, December 2013. Pages 366-389.]
           “… the most important factor in Mennonite survival is obviously the rise to complete world dominance of the institution of the nation-state. This structure, combining a monopoly over secular power with spiritual (religious and nationalist) claims, rose in its modern form in the sixteenth century and expanded greatly in the centuries since. It now covers the globe and claims penetrative authority over and responsibility for the details of social life (family relationships, education, medicine, economic organization and so on). It has a murderous history of internal and external violence, in part because it combines great secular power with psychological and transcendental motives and legitimations.” [John W. Meyer, “Reflections on a Half-Century of Mennonite Change.” Mennonite Quarterly Review. Volume 77, number 2, April 2003. Pages 257-276.]
      242. developmentalization of human rights (C. Raj Kumar [Hindī, च राज कुमार, Ca Rāja Kumāra as pronounced in this MP3 audio file]): He focuses on the role of National Human Rights Institutions.
           “… this article examines the need for the developmentalization of human rights and what role NHRIs [National Human Rights Institutions] ought to play in this process. In particular, it will address the importance of ESCRs in the general development of the human rights discourse and the need for NHRIs to change their approach so that both ESCRs [economic, social, and cultural rights] and CPRs [civil and political rights] are given equal importance.…
           “The developmentalization of human rights, which insists on a rights-based approach to development, requires a deep understanding of both CPRs and ESCRs.… Domestically, NHRIs should be key players in the process of developmentalization of human rights. The 1986 Declaration on the Right to Development is a first step in linking a human rights-based approach to development to the governance agenda.”
           [C. Raj Kumar, “National Human Rights Institutions and Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights: Toward the Institutionalization and Developmentalization of Human Rights.” Human Rights Quarterly. Volume 28, number 3, August 2006. Pages 755-779.]
           “The right to development is an inalienable human right by virtue of which every human person and all peoples are entitled to participate in, contribute to, and enjoy economic, social, cultural and political development, in which all human rights and fundamental freedoms can be fully realized.…
           “Steps should be taken to ensure the full exercise and progressive enhancement of the right to development, including the formulation, adoption and implementation of policy, legislative and other measures at the national and international levels.”
           [United Nations General Assembly, “Declaration on the Right to Development.” December 4th, 1986. Retrieved on September 19th, 2016.]
      243. treadmill theory of production (Allan Schnaiberg and others): It is a pragmatic approach to Marxian environmentalism.
           “My personal synthesis reflects the emergent school of pragmatism, which eschews reliance solely on more conventional methods of sampling and observation. Instead, I have expanded the empirical inputs from historical and other archival sources.…
           “With the framework of the treadmill of production, how does the current recycling policy withstand distributive scrutiny? Are there alternatives that might fare better, i.e., be somewhat more socially progressive in dealing with access to material resources? I have argued that the core of contemporary recycling is its remanufacturing element, which accelerates the growth of the treadmill of production. Large-scale centralized remanufacturing is far more energy and capital-intensive, and far less labor-intensive, than is the re-use of materials, without remanufacturing. In the latter route, materials are collected and re-used with substantial amounts of human labor (e.g., in flea markets), and far lower levels of capital.”
           [Allan Schnaiberg, “Paradoxes and Contradictions: A Contextual Framework for ‘How I Learned to Suspect Recycling.’” Humanity & Society. Volume 21, number 3, August 1997. Pages 223-239.]
           “My major synthesis—the treadmill of production—drew together a number of theories and empirical trends. In some ways, this was the equivalent of my doctoral thesis work on modernization. I integrated data from a variety of fields: industrial sociology, world-systemic work, stratification research, sociology of science, and macroeconomic theory and analyses. Now I sought to explain why and how environmental problems seemed to have increased so rapidly in the post–World War II period in industrial societies. The concept of the treadmill visualized a political economy driven by several core factors.” [Allan Schnaiberg, “Reflections on My 25 Years Before the Mast of the Environment and Technology Section.” Organization & Environment. Volume 15 number 1, March 2002. Pages 30-41.]
           “Treadmill theory focused on the social, economic, and environmental conditions for stakeholders (workers and community residents). Simultaneously, expansion of the treadmill structure enhanced the economic and political power of shareholders (investors and managers). Political gains for shareholders included a growing capacity to induce both government and labor unions to support still more investment of this sort, to employ displaced and newworkers, and to augment state tax revenues. Over time, this increased political power of shareholders was enhanced by their capacity to obtain still more political support for treadmill expansion through an expanded use of profits for direct campaign contributions.” [Kenneth A. Gould, David N. Pellow, and Allan Schnaiberg, “Interrogating the Treadmill of Production: Everything You Wanted to Know About the Treadmill but Were Afraid to Ask.” Organization & Environment. Volume 17, number 3, September 2004. Pages 296-316.]
           “The treadmill of production model thus raises the most crucial questions that have to be addressed if the environmental crisis is to be recognized for what it is. Interestingly enough, ecological modernization theorists caught up in this debate have come to see the theoretical developments in environmental sociology arising from the reawakening of Marxist environmentalism to be add-ons to the treadmill perspective. I was surprised, therefore, to see some of my ownwork on Marx’s theory of metabolic rift classified in discussions as belonging to the treadmill of production perspective. This shows how central this tradition has become in certain debates—in that Marxist environmentalism is ironically seen as reinforcing the treadmill of production model, rather than the reverse.” [John Bellamy Foster, “The Treadmill of Accumulation: Schnaiberg’s Environment and Marxian Political Economy.” Organization & Environment. Volume 18, number 1, March 2005. Pages 7-18.]
           “Treadmill of production theory argues that environmental degradation is a direct consequence of economic development. Since the economy is predicated on never-ending expansion and the pursuit of profit, economic functioning has ‘direct implications for natural resource extraction,’ the generation of pollution, and the overall state of ecological systems. The economy generates environmental problems since it continually withdraws natural resources to produce commodities and fuel machinery, and such activities also generate waste. Technological developments expand and intensify production, so the volume of energy consumed and materials used increases.” [Andrew K. Jorgenson, “Environment, Development, and Ecologically Unequal Exchange.” Sustainability. Volume 8, issue 3, 2016. Pages 1-15.]
           “The implications of this economic logic [keeping all the factories busy] is described in environmental sociology by the Treadmill of Production (ToP) theory. The ‘treadmill’ is a metaphor for the values and practices of contemporary capitalist economies that drive the economy to ever-increasing expansion, the idea being that economic activity moves faster and faster but social welfare does not improve proportionately, and can even decrease as pollutants destroy the environment and threaten public health. Thus, economic growth pursued strictly for its own sake produces diminishing returns, and even threatens the environmental base of all economic activity. ‘The key claim [of ToP] remains that capital-intensive economic expansion is intrinsic to capitalist-market societies, due to the structure of the economy and the role of the state, and involves an intrinsic tendency toward environmental degradation’ …. ToP theory states that increasing generation of waste is an inherent, unchangeable characteristic of modern capitalism and therefore the system must be radically restructured in order to protect the environment.” [Benjamin J. Vail. Litter on the Shores of Bohemia: Environmental Justice, European Enlargement, and Illegal Waste Dumping in the Czech Republic. Brno, Czech Republic: MUNI Press imprint of Masaryk University Press. 2011. Page 24.]
           “… the most sceptical, individual asceticism will not substantially change the structural causes of environmental degradation just because the roots of the problem are to be found in a treadmill of corporations which seldom can be changed through personal actions …. From this point of view, the ritual of recycling can be seen more as one of many individual communion activities that relieves one’s soul from cornucopian and non-sustainable sins, but does not effectively transform social structures and adapt them to the requirements of global environmental change (and in this sense, less rational in relation to goals than to values).” [Salvador Giner and David Tábara, “Cosmic Piety and Ecological Rationality.” International Sociology. Volume 14, number 1, March 1999. Pages 59-82.]
      244. appreciative inquiry (David L. Cooperrider, Suresh Srivastva [Hindī सुरेश श्रीवास्तव, Sureśa Śrīvāstava as pronounced in this MP3 audio file], Ronald E. Fry, Jacqueline “Jackie” Kelm, and many others): This social constructionist approach to action–research was originally developed by Cooperrider and Srivastva in the first article (from 1987) quoted below.
           “Appreciative inquiry is presented here as a mode of action-research that meets the criteria of science as spelled out in generative-theoretical terms. Going beyond questions of epistemology, appreciative inquiry has as its basis a metaphysical concern: it posits that social existence as such is a miracle that can never be fully comprehended …. Proceeding from this level of understanding we begin to explore the uniqueness of the appreciative mode. More than a method or technique, the appreciative mode of inquiry is a way of living with, being with, and directly participating in the varieties of social organization we are compelled to study. Serious consideration and reflection on the ultimate mystery of being engenders a reverence for life that draws the researcher to inquire beyond superficial appearances to deeper levels of the life-generating essentials and potentials of social existence. That is, the action-researcher is drawn to affirm, and thereby illuminate, the factors and forces involved in organizing that serve to nourish the human spirit.” [David L. Cooperrider and Suresh Srivastva, “Appreciative Inquiry in Organizational Life.” Research in Organizational Change and Development. Volume 1, 1987. pages 129-169.]
           “Imagine settings – organizations, communities, businesses – designed not only to obsessively notice and employ each partner’s most valued strengths every day, but settings that are also designed to connect and magnify the reverberating strengths of the whole, much like a terrific fusion-energy explosion that leads to the birth of new stars.” [David L. Cooperrider, “The 3-Circles of the Strengths Revolution.” AI Practitioner. November, 2008. Pages 8-11.]
           “… [There are] three circles of the strengths revolution. They are: 1. The elevation of strengths. 2. Become a multiplier of strengths, from elevation to configurations. 3. Positive institutions bringing human strengths to society.…
           “Millions of managers have been introduced to strengths-based approaches, Appréciative Inquiry (AI), and the positive psychology of human strengths. For example, more than two million people have taken the Values in Action Inventory of Strengths (VIA-IS), while more than two million managers have used the assessment tool StrengthsFinder for their leadership development.”
           [David L. Cooperrider, “Three Circles of the Strengths Revolution.” Leadership Excellence. Volume 29, number 3, March 2012. Pages 3-4.]
           “Talking about ‘positive strengths’ gets people excited. It’s thrilling to think that a new wave of management innovation and positive organizational scholarship might revolutionize the way we engage the workforce, transform business strategy, and prepare our organizations for a world of open innovation with customers, suppliers, and other key stakeholders. It’s more that just talk. Millions of managers have been introduced to principles of appreciative inquiry and the positive psychology of human strengths. Nearly two million people have taken, for example, the VIA survey of human strengths, while another several million managers have leveraged strengths-finder tools for their own and others’ leadership development.” [David L. Cooperrider, “The concentration effect of strengths: How the whole system ‘AI’ summit brings out the best in human enterprise.” Organizational Dynamics. Volume 41, issue 2, April–June 2012. Pages 106-117.]
           “In Al [Appreciative Inquiry], the effects of appreciation are invoked through inquiry. As understood from a dialogic perspective, the intention of inquiry is to learn, explore, discover, and authentically understand other perspectives and to create the momentum for change …. When an investigator assumes an inquisitive stance, he or she tacitly enters a moment of suspended judgment … and is thereby cognitively positioned to be a learner, open to new possibilities, opportunities, or potential …. Inquiry through dialogue also directs the focus of discovery: A question asked in conversation brings precision and power to the process of exploration. Questions influence what people attend to …, which, in turn, influences the repertoire of actions they will take …. What we discover and live as reality in the socially constructed world of organizations is framed by the questions we pose and the way we choose to pose them ….” [David S. Bright, David L. Cooperrider and Walter B. Galloway, “Appreciative Inquiry in the Office of Research and Development: Improving the Collaborative Capacity of Organization.” Public Performance & Management Review. Volume 29, number 3, March 2006. Pages 285-306.]
           “The use of large group methods such as Appreciative Inquiry (AI) for doing the work of management, once a rare practice, is soaring in business and society efforts around the world. While at first it seems incomprehensible that large groups of hundreds and sometimes thousands in the room can be effective in unleashing coherent system-wide strategies, designing rapid prototypes and taking action, this is exactly what is happening, especially in the sustainability domain. Part of the reason is that the AI process is profoundly strengths-based in its assumptions. It is founded on the premise that we excel only by amplifying strengths, never by simply fixing weaknesses. But the other half of the equation is the underestimated power of wholeness: the best in human systems comes about most naturally, even easily, when people collectively experience the wholeness of their system, when strength ignites strength, across complete configurations of relevant and engaged stakeholders, internal and external, and top to bottom.” [David L. Cooperrider and Michelle McQuaid, “The positive arc of systemic strengths: how appreciative inquiry and sustainable designing can bring out the best in human systems.” The Journal of Corporate Citizenship. Summer 2012. Pages 71+.]
           “The practice of AI [Appreciative Inquiry] is in its infancy. Like the curious child standing in wonder at the surrounding world, a widening net of scholars and practitioners are experimenting with the principles, discovering new questions and documenting their stories daily. What’s emerging is a thesis that asserts ‘We have reached the limits of problem-solving as a mode of inquiry capable of inspiring, mobilising and sustaining human system change; the future of organisational development belongs to methods that affirm, compel, and accelerate anticipatory learning involving larger and larger levels of collectivity.’” [Ronald Fry, “Umlimited cooperation.” New Zealand Management. Volume 47, number 1, February 2000. Pages 46-47.]
           “Appreciative Inquiry begins when the organization consciously chooses to focus on the positive as the basis for learning and change. The first step includes educating key stakeholders—such as senior management, unit leaders, union leaders, and employee groups—about the AI [Appreciative Inquiry] process, philosophy, and supporting research; providing an opportunity for them to collectively decide whether AI is applicable to their organization; and, if they choose to implement the AI process, identifying a core team to develop a customized interview guide and oversee the interview process.” [Bernard J. Mohr and Jane Magruder Watkins. The Essentials of Appreciative Inquiry: A Roadmap for Creating Positive Futures. Aracadia, California: Pegasus Communications, LLC. 2002. Page 5.]
           “This book is dedicated to Dr David Cooperrider and Dr Ronald Fry, the co-creators of Appreciative Inquiry, and my first teachers and mentors in AI [Appreciative Inquiry].” [Neena Verma. Appreciative Inquiry: Practitioners’ Guide for Generative Change and Development. New Delhi, India: Dr Neena Verma. 2014. Kindle edition.]
           “Appreciative Inquiry (AI) is a collaborative and highly participative, system-wide approach to seeking, identifying, and enhancing the ‘life-giving forces’ that are present when a system is performing optimally in human, economic, and organizational terms. AI is both a concept, a methodology for systemic change as well as a phenomenon and philosophy of life. It empowers its practitioners with a practical process of change, learning and development, apart from gifting them a worldview, when they congruently adapt it at a deeper, personal level.” [Neena Verma. Appreciative Inquiry: Practitioners’ Guide for Generative Change and Development. New Delhi, India: Dr Neena Verma. 2014. Kindle edition.]
           “The Constructionist Principle conceptually underlies … Appreciative Inquiry (AI). The essential premise is that life doesn’t just happen to us, we actually create it together.“ [Jackie Kelm. Appreciative Living: The Principles of Appreciative Inquiry in Personal Life. Second edition. Wake Forest, North Carolina: Venet Publishers. 2005. Page 9.]
           “Because social constructionism suggests there is no absolute truth or objective reality, we all create our sense about ‘what’s really going on’ in a way that is unique to us.” [Jackie Kelm. Appreciative Living: The Principles of Appreciative Inquiry in Personal Life. Second edition. Wake Forest, North Carolina: Venet Publishers. 2005. Page 14.]
           “What does it mean to ‘live’ Appreciative Inquiry? What does it really mean to ‘walk the talk?’ I have spent the last several years exploring this topic at a deep level and my life has transformed in ways beyond description. I believe the possibilities for personal change and growth with Appreciative Inquiry are equal to – even greater than – those in organizations. This article presents a simple three-step model I created to help apply AI [Appreciative Inquiry] in everyday situations.” [Jackie Kelm, “Walking the Talk: The Principles of AI in Daily Living.” AI Practitioner. February, 2006. Pages 5-8.]
           “Appreciative Inquiry is a bold shift in the way we think about and approach organizational change. The ultimate paradox of Appreciative Inquiry is that it does not aim to change anything. It aims to uncover and bring forth additional strengths, hopes, and dreams: to identity and amplify the positive core of the organization. In so doing, it transforms people and organizations. With Appreciative Inquiry, the focus of attention is on positive potential—the best of what has been, what is, and what might be. It is a process of positive change.” [Diana Kaplin Whitney and Amanda Trosten-Bloom. The Power of Appreciative Inquiry: A Practical Guide to Positive Change. San Francisco, California: Berrett-Koehler Publishers, Inc. 2003. Page 15.]
      245. appreciative coaching (Sara L. Orem, Jacqueline Binkert, and Ann L. Clancy): They apply and supplement the principles of Appreciative Inquiry with regard to coaching.
           “The appreciative approach to coaching expands on the meaning and significance of the five core principles underlying Appreciative Inquiry (Constructionist Principle, Positive Principle, Simultaneity Principle, Poetic Principle, and Anticipatory Principle) and creates a new foundation for enabling positive, transformative change in individuals.” [Sara L. Orem, Jacqueline Binkert, and Ann L. Clancy. Appreciative Coaching: A Positive Process for Change. San Francisco, California: Jossey-Bass imprint of John Wiley & Sons, Inc. 2007. Page viii.]
           “We believe that it is important for future practitioners of Appreciative Coaching to understand the theoretical underpinnings of the practice and to be able to see how appreciative processes and tools relate to the theory. In this chapter, we present the theoretical foundation on which Appreciative Coaching is based, including certain powerful assumptions about human change. Appreciative Coaching uses AI [Appreciative Inquiry] as the basis of its methodology; however, it also draws from the advances made in the arenas of organizational behavior, psychology, and psychotherapy.” [Sara L. Orem, Jacqueline Binkert, and Ann L. Clancy. Appreciative Coaching: A Positive Process for Change. San Francisco, California: Jossey-Bass imprint of John Wiley & Sons, Inc. 2007. Page 21.]
           “We found an underlying theme among the Simultaneity, Poetic, and Anticipatory Principles as we applied them to Appreciative Coaching. Although they function similarly to the principles in AI [Appreciative Inquiry], they bring an added dimension to individual change through their present and future orientation to time. In other words, we have observed that a coach’s own perspective of the role time plays in individual change can have an impact on the direction of the coaching strategy. For example, if the coach believes that the pace and scope of individual change is determined primarily by past experiences, she will focus attention on the past and its effect on the client’s present and future. If the coach considers the client’s beliefs and expectations about his present and future to be as significant as those of the past in the impact on his individual change, she will focus more attention on the possibilities inherent in these beliefs and expectations.” [Sara L. Orem, Jacqueline Binkert, and Ann L. Clancy. Appreciative Coaching: A Positive Process for Change. San Francisco, California: Jossey-Bass imprint of John Wiley & Sons, Inc. 2007. Page 39.]
      246. integrated inquiry (Marcus T. Anthony): He develops a methodological approach to “personal and planetary transformation.”
           “My own research is related to the discipline of Postconventional Futures Studies. Futurist Richard Slaughter writes that it is the duty of futurists to offer dissent to mainstream discourses. Readers might like to view this article in that light. If the reader decides to employ integrated intelligence during research, he/she might also consider it a silent act of dissent; a deliberate provocation to inspire the researcher to greater heights of creativity and insight. Integrated inquiry can also be viewed as a personal experiment with genuine cognitive capacities.
           “The entire experience also requires a complete inversion of the self’s relationship with the world. Personal and planetary transformation is a core outcome of the development of integrated intelligence. The researcher employing integrated inquiry is engaging the world in an act of spiritual intimacy. Even if he/she is doing so as an act of provocation, the successful application of the cognitive skills involved is likely to transform the way he/she sits with the world.”
           [Marcus T. Anthony, “Integrated Inquiry: Mystical Intuition and Research.” The Open Information Science Journal. Volume 3, 2010. Pages 1-9.]
      247. ontology of pure dispositions (William A. Baur): He distinguishes between the power of properties and pure dispositional properties.
           “A hammer possesses the power to break a vase. This power depends on the hammer’s property of hardness. But some powers do not so depend on any further properties to display their effects. That is, some powers are pure powers, or pure dispositional properties. Such is the central contention of this dissertation.
           “Powers, or dispositions, pervade the world. A helium atom is disposed to rise in Earth’s atmosphere. A diamond’s hardness disposes it to scratch all other minerals. A vase is fragile or disposed to break. An animal is disposed to seek shelter. However, dispositions need not manifest their effects – the helium atom may not rise, the diamond need not scratch anything, the vase may not break, the animal may not seek shelter – though they typically do manifest when something triggers the causal basis of the disposition. The causal basis consists of some set of properties underlying the disposition that enables it to manifest. So a vase is fragile because it is disposed to break when a hammer or other suitable object strikes it, where the causal basis for fragility consists of the underlying micro-structural properties of the vase. Moreover, the micro-structural properties seem to anchor the being or continued existence of the vase’s fragility when the vase is not actually breaking.
           “In contrast to this intuitive example, the Pure Dispositions Thesis claims that some dispositions do not require causal bases in any categorical or dispositional properties.”
           [William A. Bauer. The Ontology of Pure Dispositions. Ph.D. dissertation. University of Nebraska. Lincoln, Nebraska. August, 2010. Page 1.]
      248. dialogic democracy (Edward H. Powley, Ronald E. Fry, Frank J. Barrett, and David S. Bright): They develop an approach to democracy using Appreciative Inquiry.
           “This article provides managers and executives with an illustration of a whole system change process that specifically engages multiple stakeholder groups in creating policies and programs that directly affect an organization's strategy and cooperative capacity. To illustrate this process of democratic organizing, we provide a case study of the Appreciative Inquiry (AI) Summit, a large-system change intervention that uses deliberate and dialogic democratic processes to ignite rapid organizational change. Next, we offer processes to promote the development of stronger, highly interconnected, and information-rich organizations, coupled with examples and key questions for implementation.” [Edward H. Powley, Ronald E. Fry, Frank J. Barrett, and David S. Bright, “Dialogic Democracy Meets Command and Control: Transformation through the Appreciative Inquiry Summit.” The Academy of Management Executive. Volume 18, number 3, August 2004. Pages 67-80.]
      249. human consciousness (Franz Jakubowski as pronounced in German in this MP3 audio file or as pronounced in Polish in this MP3 audio file): He turned historical materialism into something like objective idealism.
           “The dialectical unity of consciousness and being, of subject and object, must be based on the reality of both elements …; these elements are distinct but are also in unity with each other.…
           “Our description of [Karl] Marx’s theory as ‘humanist’ accords with his own description in his early writings. I have shown in detail how Marx differed both from idealism and from abstract, metaphysical materialism. While it is true that he differed from them, he also represented their synthesis. But in making the synthesis he avoided the one-sidedness of each of them and brought consciousness and being into a real unity, that of living man. In his own words, ‘we see here how consistent naturalism or humanism distinguishes itself both from idealism and from materialism, constituting at the same time the unifying truth of both.’ …
           “… Consciousness is conscious being, a constituent part of being. We can only understand the interaction among the various elements correctly if we first recognise their unity. I shall therefore attempt to ascertain this correlative unity between legal and political relations and the ideas which correspond to them.…
           “… There is no social being without consciousness and, conversely, consciousness is nothing but conscious being.…
           “… The unity of being and consciousness now shows itself to be not a merely external relationship but an inseparable association.…
           “Only revolution, the actual removal of reification, can make the communist consciousness general. Once this happens, it is no longer class consciousness but human consciousness.”
           [Franz Jakubowski. Ideology and Superstructure in Historical Materialism. Pacifica, California: Marxists Internet Archive (Marxists.org) ebook edition. 1936.]
           “Ideology and Superstructure was first published in Danzig in 1936 as the outcome of a doctoral thesis.…
           “So strongly anti-economistic and anti-naturalistic is [Franz] Jakubowski’s conception that he practically abandons historical materialism altogether in favour of a theory in which subjective consciousness plays the determining role in historical development. In his concern to stress that consciousness is a part of social being, social being is all but dissolved into human consciousness, and we are offered, for example, a somewhat Sartrean conception of the economy ….”
           [Kate Soper, “Ideology and Superstructure in Historical Materialism.” Review article. Radical Philosophy: Philosophical Journal of the Independent Left. Number 17, summer 1977. Pages 46-47.]
      250. homosociality (Nils Hammarén as pronounced in this MP3 audio file and Thomas Johansson as pronounced in this MP3 audio file): They examine intimacy and power in male same–sex friendships.
           “The concept of homosociality describes and defines social bonds between persons of the same sex. It is, for example, frequently used in studies on men and masculinities, there defined as a mechanism and social dynamic that explains the maintenance of hegemonic masculinity. A popular use of the concept is found in studies on male friendship, male bonding, and fraternity orders. It is also frequently applied to explain how men, through their friendships and intimate collaborations with other men, maintain and defend the gender order and patriarchy …. However, this common and somewhat overexploited use of the concept referring to how men, through their relations to other men, uphold patriarchy tends to simplify and reduce homosociality to an almost descriptive term that is used to show how men bond, build closed teams, and defend their privileges and positions.” [Nils Hammarén and Thomas Johansson, “Homosociality: In Between Power and Intimacy.” SAGE Open. January–March 2014. Pages 1-11.]
      251. social-relational dialectics (Shannon Brincat): The article develops a dialectical approach to international relations.
           “… social-relational dialectics can help answer the question of change in world politics precisely because of its focus on the principles of interconnectivity and mediation within the social realm. Of analytic importance are the social relations within world politics and what their immanent tendencies portend for future developments.…
           “… As suggested at the beginning of this article, the unique contribution of social-relational dialectics is that it offers an alternate social ontology, one which centres on social relations as being generative of change, thus allowing IR [international relations] to explore more adequately the dynamic processes at work within world politics.”
           [Shannon Brincat, “Towards a social-relational dialectic for world politics.” European Journal of International Relations. Volume 17, number 4, 2010. Pages 679-703.]
      252. automation (Friedrich Pollock as pronounced in this MP3 audio file): He critically examines the implications of automation.
           “‘AUTOMATION’ is a new word in the English language. It originated in the United States and has recently been widely used but it has not as yet found its way into the current books of reference. Indeed it has a number of different meanings, ranging from conveyor-belt production to highly complicated forms of automatic machinery. The word has various synonyms such as ‘cybernetics,’ ‘automatic control,’ ‘control engineering,’ ‘automisation’ and many more. It appears, however, that ‘automation’ is now ousting the other words as an expression denoting a technical development which is replacing human labour by machinery in factories and workshops in a way that would have been thought impossible only ten years ago.” [Frederick Pollock. Automation: A Study of its Economic and Social Consequences. W. O. Henderson and W. H. Chaloner, translators. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Publishers. 1957. Page 3.]
      253. project of autonomy (Cornelius Castoriadis [Greek/Hellēniká, Κορνήλιος Καστοριάδης, Kornḗlios Kastoriádēs as pronounced in this MP3 audio file]): He critiques various obstacles which prevent the realization of personal autonomy.
           “Politics is a project of autonomy. Politics is the reflective and lucid collective activity that aims at the overall institution of society. It pertains to everything in society that is participable and shareable. De jure, this self-instituting activity does not take into account and does not recognize any limit (physical and biological laws are not of concern to us here). Nothing can escape its interrogation, nothing, in and of itself, stands outside its province.
           “But can we stop at that? …
           “The answer is in the negative, both from the ontological point of view—before any de jure consideration—and from the political point of view—after all such considerations.
           “The ontological point of view leads to the most weighty reflections, ones which, however, are almost totally irrelevant from the political point of view. In all cases, the explicit self-institution of society will always encounter the bounds I have already mentioned. However lucid, reflective, willed it may be, the instituting activity of society and individuals springs from the instituting imaginary, which is neither locatable nor formalizable.”
           [Cornelius Castoriadis. Philosophy, Politics, Autonomy. David Ames Curtis, editor. New York and Oxford, England: Oxford University Press. 1991. Pages 169-170.]
           “One can ask, parenthetically, what an autonomous society—namely, a society capable of calling its own institutions, explicitly and lucidly, back into question—will be like in this regard. In a sense, it, too, obviously will not be able to exit from this circle. It will affirm that social and collective autonomy ‘is valid and worthwhile.’ Certainly, it will be able, downstream, to justify its existence through its works—among which will be the anthropological type of autonomous individual it will create. But the positive evaluation of these works will still depend upon criteria—more generally, social imaginary significations—it will have itself instituted. I say all this in order to recall that, when all is said and done, no sort of society can find its justification outside itself. One cannot exit the circle, and it is not here that we would have something that can constitute the grounding for a critique of capitalism.” [Cornelius Castoriadis. Figures of the Unthinkable: Including Passion and Knowledge. Anonymous translator. No publisher or date of publication provided. Page 85.]
           “… the idea that the autonomous action of the masses can constitute the central element of the socialist revolution, whether admitted or not, will always remain of secondary importance to a coherent Marxist, for it is without any genuine interest and even without any theoretical or philosophical status. The Marxist knows where history must go. If the autonomous action of the masses does go in this direction, it teaches the Marxist nothing; if it goes somewhere else, it is a bad autonomy, or rather it is not an autonomy at all, since if the masses are not directed towards the correct aims, this is because they still remain under the influence of capitalism. When the truth is given, all the rest is error, but error means nothing in a determinist universe: error is only the product or enemy class action and of the system of exploitation.” [Cornelius Castoriadis. The Imaginary Institution of Society. Kathleen Blarney, translator. Malden, Massachusetts: Polity Press. 1997. Page 31.]
           “Tradition and authority gradually ceased to be sacred and innovation stopped being a disparaging word (as it typically was during the ‘true’ Middle Ages). Even though it appeared only in embryonic form—and in perpetual accommodation with the powers that be (Church and monarchy)—the project of political and intellectual autonomy actually did reemerge after a 15-century eclipse. An uneasy compromise between this social–historical movement and the (more or less reformed) traditional order was reached in the ‘classical’ 17ᵗʰ century.” [Cornelius Castoriadis, “The Retreat from Autonomy: Post-modernism as Generalised Conformism.” Democracy & Nature. Volume 7, number 1, March 2001. Pages 17-26.]
           “Contrary to a confused prejudice still dominant today—which is at the basis of the contemporary version of classical ‘liberalism’—the capitalist imaginary stands in direct contradiction to the of emancipation and autonomy. Back in 1906 Max Weber derided that capitalism might have anything at all to do with democracy, can still share a laugh with him when thinking of South Africa, Taiwan, Japan from 1870 to 1945 and even today. Capitalism subordinates everything to the ‘development of the forces of production’; producers, and then as consumers, are to be made completely subordinate to it.” [Cornelius Castoriadis and David Ames Curtis, “The Pulverization of Marxism-Leninism.” Salmagundi. Number 88/89, fall 1990–winter 1991. Pages 371-384.]
           “The era that is just now particularly grievous instances of this of Stalinism of course, but also, in an empirically different but philosophically equivalent fashion, with [Martin] Heidegger and Nazism. I will conclude on a … point: the question raised by the relationship between, on the one hand, the criticism and the vision of the philosopher-citizen and, on the other, the fact that, from the standpoint of the project of autonomy and democracy, the great majority of men and women living in society are the source of creation, the principal bearers of the instituting imaginary, and that they should become active subjects of an explicit politics.” [Cornelius Castoriadis and David Ames Curtis, “Intellectuals and History.” Salmagundi. Number 80, fall 1988. Pages 161-169.]
           “Behind this sumbebekos [Greek/Hellēniká, συμβεβηκός, symbebēkós], this ‘happening’ [an evolution in Soviet society] … stands another factor: the emergence of the military sub-society as an increasingly autonomous agent, and the dominant position it acquired regarding the ultimate orientation of the regime.” [Cornelius Castoriadis, “The Destinies of Totalitarianism.” Salmagundi. Number 60, spring–summer 1983. Pages 107-122.]
           “Philosophy is a central element of the Greek-Western project of individual and social autonomy; the end of philosophy would mean no more and no less than the end of freedom. Freedom is threatened not only by totalitarian or authoritarian regimes, but also, in a more hidden but no less deep fashion, by the waning of conflict and critique, the spreading of amnesia and irrelevance, the growing inability to put into question the present and the existing institutions, be they strictly ‘political’ or weltanschaulich [ideological].” [Cornelius Castoriadis, “The ‘end of philosophy’?” Salmagundi. Number 82/83, spring–summer 1989. Pages 3-23.]
           “In a democracy, the people are sovereign, that is to say, they make laws and the Law. Or, put in another way, society makes its institutions and institutes itself. It is autonomous, it is self-instituted obviously and explicitly, it works on itself its own rules, values and meanings. Autonomy or freedom entails and presupposes the autonomy, the freedom of the individuals, and is at the same time impossible without the latter. This very autonomy comprises the core target of our political project. But autonomy, which is, at least in appearance, guaranteed by law, by the constitutions, by declarations of human and civil rights, is based, all things considered, both de jure and de facto, on the collective law, the Law in the formal, as well as in the informal sense.” [Cornelius Castoriadis, “‘Paideia’ and Democracy.” Counterpoints. Volume 422, 2012. Pages 71-80.]
           “… one would be autonomous if one were absolutely outside any external influence and fully spontaneous. Now, this is just nonsense. This is a philosophical phantasy. Philosophy has put up this phantasy, and it judges reality against this phantasy. It doesn’t exist. Autonomy, as I understand it in the field of the individual, is not a watertight frontier against everything else, a well out of which spring absolutely spontaneously, absolutely original contents. Autonomy is an on-going process, whereby you always have contents which are given, borrowed – you are in the world, you are in society, you have inherited a language, you live in a certain history.” [Cornelius Castoriadis, “Cornelius Castoriadis: An Interview.” Radical Philosophy: Philosophical Journal of the Independent Left. Number 56, autumn 1990. Pages 35-43.]
           “Cornelius Castoriadis, the French philosopher and psychoanalyst of Greek origin, was the last great representative of the tradition of Western Marxism which tried to save the practical-political intuitions of [Karl] Marx’s work through a resolute abandonment of its dogmatic kernel. In Castoriadis’s theory this effort reached new levels of originality and intensity, comparable only with the major achievements of a Maurice Merleau-Ponty or a Herbert Marcuse.
           “It was not primarily theoretical considerations which awoke Castoriadis’s doubts concerning the traditional assumptions of Marxism, but the experience of political practice. He was born in Athens in 1922, and joined the Trotskyist Fourth International during the Second World War, having directly experienced the dictatorial policy of the Stalinist Greek Communist Party. However, he almost immediately came into conflict with his own organization, with whose stance towards the Soviet Union and analysis of advanced capitalism he was unable to concur, while still a philosophy student in France.”
           [Axel Honneth, “Cornelius Castoriadis, 1922–1997: Last of the Western Marxists.” Radical Philosophy: Philosophical Journal of the Independent Left. Number 90, July/August 1998. Pages 2-8.]
           “Imaginary significations are constitutive then of all societies. An autonomous society by contrast is one that is ‘origin of the significations it creates – of its institution – and it knows itself as such’ (my emphasis). Similarly, an autonomous subject is one who ‘posit[s] one’s own law for oneself’ …. Consequently for Castoriadis religion par excellence is the imaginary institution that precludes society’s knowledge of itself as self-creation. This is because religion posits an extra-social source for its organization of society that occludes its own work.” [Chistopher Houston, “Islamism, Castoriadis and Autonomy.” Thesis Eleven. Number 76, February 2004. Pages 49-69.]
           “… the constraints which the Marxist framework placed on a satisfactory theorization of autonomy were to be felt by [Cornelius] Castoriadis and, from 1965 onwards, he explicitly abandoned it. Rejecting both the determinant role of the economic and the privileged position of the working class, Castoriadis sought to provide a theory of history as intrinsically open and non-determinable coupled with a theory of the subject that could support the potential for individual autonomy while recognizing that each individual is inescapably a social construct. Both aims have been central directions which social theory has followed in the last 30 years or so and Castoriadis was one of the first to formulate and pursue them.” [Kanakis Leledakis, “An Appreciation of Cornelius Castoriadis (1922-1997): Theorist of Autonomy and Openness.” European Journal of Social Theory. Volume 2, number 1, 1999. Pages 95-98.]
           “Despite [Cornelius] Castoriadis’s repeated insistence on the obsolescence of the Marxian philosophical problematic, manifesting itself, for example, in his declaration of the exclusivity of Marxian and revolutionary theory, it is nevertheless true that he himself remains committed to a certain element of the Marxian ontology, and that his various theoretical formulations can only be evaluated in the context of this enduring commitment. In Axel Honneth’s words, ‘Castoriadis’s work is firstly and above all Marxist self-criticism,’ the revolutionary core of Marxism that Castoriadis seeks to preserve being found in the concept of creative praxis aiming at social transformation, although of course a creative praxis freed from its teleological subordination to an economic logic of development.” [Christopher Holman, “Autonomy and Psychic Socialization: From Non-Alienated Labour to Non Surplus Repressive Sublimation.” Critical Horizons. Volume 12, issue 2, 2011. Pages 136-162.]
      254. dialectical theory of knowledge (Sean Sayers): Develops a Marxian, dialectical materialist, and naïve-realist theory of knowledge informed by Hegelian thought.
           “Dialectical materialism is, of course, the philosophy of Marxism, and, as such, is well known. However, the account of this philosophy to be found here will differ fundamentally from many of the accounts which are currently fashionable. In the first place, it is genuinely materialist; and in the second place, it takes dialectic seriously. Beyond insisting on these points, however, I do not spend much time trying to prove the Marxist credentials of my views. My concern is with the philosophical issues involved in the ideas that I discuss, rather than with their pedigree. My aim is to show that the approach I am defending, however it is labelled, is capable of providing a satisfactory and illuminating account of knowledge….
           “In this book I deal with some of the central problems in the theory of knowledge. I cover the sort of ground that a student would encounter in an introductory epistemology course. Moreover, I argue for a view of knowledge – namely realism – which is a familiar, even a common sense one. However, in the course of pursuing these arguments, I have been obliged to explore ideas and to put forward theories which will, most likely, be novel and unfamiliar to many readers. For my aim is to develop and defend a dialectical and materialist account of knowledge.
           “I, too, will draw substantially on [Georg Wilhelm Friedrich] Hegel’s philosophy in what follows, with the aim of extending and deepening the realist and reflectionist theory of knowledge. For Hegel’s work constitutes by far the most profound and far-reaching development of the philosophy of dialectic, and it provides particularly important ideas for the defence of realism. Despite the much talked-about revival of interest in Hegel which is supposed to have occurred among English-speaking philosophers in recent times, his theories are still not well understood. In particular, his ideas on the theory of knowledge are among the least discussed and least known aspects of his thought. It is even claimed that Hegel repudiated epistemology, and that he was merely sceptical in his views; but there is no basis for such assertions. There is nothing of the sceptic in Hegel.… [H]e repudiates epistemology only in its traditional form, as the search for absolute and immutable foundations upon which knowledge can be securely based. In place of this, however, he develops a historical account of knowledge, a dialectical epistemology.
           “This contains lessons of the greatest importance for realism. For the dialectical approach offers the only framework within which it is possible to answer the arguments which are so regularly brought against realism. In particular, Hegel develops an important critique of Kant’s epistemology, which deserves to be much better known among philosophers than it is. I hope that my book will help to illuminate this aspect of Hegel’s work. For, in so far as Hegel’s ideas can be used to support a realist and materialist outlook, I have relied heavily upon them. In so doing, I have tried to make their meaning clear and available to an English-speaking audience. Indeed, I have gone out of my way, at times, to mention his views and to give some account of them.”
           [Sean Sayers. Reality and Reason: Dialectic and the Theory of Knowledge. New York: Basil Blackwell Inc. 1985. Pages x-xii.]
           “… the dialectical theory of knowledge also rejects the Kantian view that, in the process of knowledge, thought creates an ‘object of knowledge,’ which may or may not reflect objective reality, but whose relation to things-in-themselves remains essentially unknowable. The view that I have been presenting, by contrast, implies that the ‘object’ created by thought in the process of knowledge necessarily in some degree reflects the nature of the thing-in-itself. The patterns and categories of our thought, by means of which we attempt to understand the world, are never purely subjective; they always, in some measure, reflect objective reality. Thought, theory, ‘ways of seeing things’ – indeed, reason itself – as well as mere sensory awareness, are all reflections of reality.
           “Again, the relationship here is a necessary one. Our thought is always and necessarily a reflection of reality. False and mistaken ideas, as well as true ones, therefore, reflect reality. There are no mere appearances, no pure illusions, no sheer errors.”
           [Sean Sayers. Reality and Reason: Dialectic and the Theory of Knowledge. New York: Basil Blackwell Inc. 1985. Page 43.]
           “… the historical view of knowledge can accommodate and acknowledge the truth in both the absolute and the relative views, while avoiding the one-sidedness which characterizes them both. Ultimately, our beliefs and ideas are only partial and relative; and they are destined to be revealed as such by the future advance of knowledge. However, given our present experience and present level of theoretical understanding, some of these views, at least, are objective, rational, justified and true.” [Sean Sayers, “F. H. Bradley and the Concept of Relative Truth.” Radical Philosophy. Volume 59, autumn 1991. Pages 15-20.]
           “It [Marxism] claims to be both a social theory and an evaluative perspective, and to contain both of these within the unity of a single whole. It involves an immanent critical method which holds that existing conditions themselves contain the basis for a critical perspective. The existing social order is not simple and static it contains tensions and conflicts. It includes negative as well as positive aspects; tendencies which oppose and negate it, as well as forces supporting and sustaining it. That is to say, negative and critical tendencies are in the world. They do not have to be brought from outside, they are already contained immanently within existing conditions. This is the vital insight of the Hegelian dialectical approach.” [Sean Sayers. Marxism and Human Nature. London and New York: Routledge imprint of Taylor & Francis Group, an Informa PLC business. 1998. Page 18.]
      255. process of social and historical development (Sean Sayers): He develops a Marxian approach to human nature.
           “In much of the literature on alienation, Marxism is assumed to involve the notion of a universal ‘human essence’: an unchanging set of human potentialities, whose realization is denied in conditions of alienation.…
           “However, the view of human nature that I have just been describing points towards a different picture. According to it, not only needs but also powers and potentialities are in a process of social and historical development. When [Karl] Marx criticizes capitalism for preventing the realization of human powers and potentialities, these are ones which have been developed within capitalism itself. Here again the basis for Marx’s approach is historical and relative, not transhistorical and absolute. Moreover, understood in this way, alienation is not a purely negative and critical concept, the mere opposite of self-realization. On the contrary: it constitutes a stage in human self-development which is necessary and progressive relative to the stage it supersedes.”
           [Sean Sayers, “Moral Values and Progress.” New Left Review. Series I, number 204, March–April 1994. Pages 67-85.]
      256. analytical and dialectical rationality (David Cooper): He discusses these two, but inter-related, modes of rationality.
           “If repetition of life-historical situations is impossible, then natural scientific criteria of verifiability and falsifiability of hypotheses become irrelevant and we must find other criteria by which we may know that we are speaking ‘the truth.’ To do this we have to distinguish between two types of rationality which are each appropriate to a field of discourse different from but inter-related with that of the other. These types we call analytical and dialectical rationality.…
           “By analytical rationality we mean a logic of exteriority according to which truth lies, according to certain criteria, in propositions formed outside the reality with which they are concerned.…
           “Dialectical rationality is concrete in the sense that it is nothing more than its actual functioning in the world of actual entities. It is a method of knowing, where by knowing, we understand the grasping of intelligible structures in their intelligibility.”
           [David Cooper, “Two types of rationality.” New Left Review. Series I, number 29, January–February 1965. Pages 62-68.]
      257. critical social complexity theory (Steven Best and Douglas Kellner): They apply critical social theory to complexity theory.
           “Like any scientific theory (such as genetics), complexity theory can be deployed for different political purposes. We would distinguish between a conservative and ideological complexity theory that uses newscientific and technological insights to legitimate the system of global capitalism and a critical complexity theory that interprets bottom-up power and intelligence in terms of direct democracy and not a swarmlike hive. Such a critical theory, which we ourselves support, would emphasize the need for sustainability and the construction of an ecologically viable economy and just society while criticizing destructive aspects of the newtechnology and society.…
           “Changes from one social system to another are not a result of self-organization, critical thresholds, or evolutionary peaks, but rather they are determined by socioeconomic crisis, profound discontent, class struggle, and political upheaval.”
           [Steven Best and Douglas Kellner, “Kevin Kelly’s Complexity Theory.” Organization & Environment. Volume 12, number 2, June 1999. Pages 141-162.]
           “Complexity theory is a new way of looking at how complex structures form, adapt, and change. While it appears to have clear applicability to explaining natural phenomena such as the formation and properties of molecules and the creation of biological systems, it remains to be seen whether it can be successfully applied to organizations. While the literature is filled with calls for changing the paradigm of organization management from one of control to one of self-organizing, there is a paucity of empirical data confirming that organizations designed on this new model are more effective and efficient. There is a view that putting aside whether this results in more efficiency and effectiveness, self-design is more in line with emerging philosophical and ethical views about the workplace. In a normative sense, a complexity theory view can be considered more humanitarian and ethical. Writers in the field, in addition, suggest that organizational designs based on this new paradigm are likely to be more efficient and effective in turbulent environments.” [Gary M. Grobman, “Complexity Theory: A New Way to Look at Organizational Change.” Public Administration Quarterly. Volume 29, number 3/4, fall 2005–winter 2006. Pages 350-382.]
           “The invisible backhand that destroys the family and the invisible hand that creates the market are actually one.
           “Translated into the language of complexity theory, this is an example of a ‘dissipative structure’—a form of order that unexpectedly emerges as disorder increases. Were the equivalent to happen in the entropy of the state, the resulting dissipative structures would appear as unintended forms of social order. Whereas serialization and pluralism imply that the state is either reduced to a heap, or else consumed by pre-existing social formations, this model opens up a third possibility between atomization and absorption.”
           [Malcolm Bull, “States of Failure.” New Left Review. Series II, number 40, July–August 2006. Pages 5-25.]
      258. sexual harassment regime (Lua Kamál Yuille): She considers the scenario of “the sexy workplace.”
           “Though framed by controversial academic and political discourse, the sexual harassment regime develops in the lives of real people. This development is pushed, shaped, and highlighted by contentious cases making their way to courts. A cycle of emerging perplexing problems not satisfactorily resolvable by the suggestions offered in the last round of advancement is a salient feature of this development and is integral to the continual reframing of the debate. The quid pro quo form of harassment, once accepted, became fairly easy to understand and detect. Hostile environment sexual harassment has proven more difficult. Cases of bi-sexual harassment, equal opportunity harassment (i.e. targets both sexes with sexual behavior), intersectional harassment (i.e. is motivated by sex and some other characteristic), same sex harassment, non-sexualized harassment, and so forth represent significant challenges for the paradigm and are the factual pivots around which policy debates revolve. The sexy workplace scenario introduced here is an iteration of this cycle.” [Lua Kamál Yuille, “Sex in the Sexy Workplace.” Northwestern Journal of Law & Social Policy. Volume 9, issue 1, article 4, summer 2013. Pages 88-121.]
      259. pedagogy of the oppressor (Carol J. Adams): Taking Paulo Freire’s Pedagogy of the Oppressed—which was considered in an earlier chapter—as a starting point, Adams considers a Christian approach to veganism.
           “Paulo Freire’s Pedagogy of the Oppressed differentiates between the banking way of knowledge instruction (a pedagogy of lectures and expertise transmitted, i.e., ‘Open brain, deposit knowledge’) and conscientization that occurs through relationships, reflection, shared knowledge, and action.
           “But what about the pedagogy of the oppressor? How does conscientization occur when one is safe in the pew or the lecture hall, looking forward to a Sunday roast or hamburger at lunch? When it comes to the eating of other animals and the use of animal products, we each learned their legitimacy through the banking method of knowledge—someone else deposited into our minds (and stomachs) the ‘fact’ of the normativeness and naturalness of the edibility of the flesh of dead animals, their milk and eggs.…
           “… Christians are perfectly happy eating vegan food as long as they don’t know that is what they are doing.”
           [Carol J. Adams, “The Poetics of Christian Engagement: Living Compassionately in a Sexual Politics of Meat World.” Studies in Christian Ethics. OnlineFirst edition. November, 2016. Pages 1-15.]
      260. pedagogy of citizenship (Lua Kamál Yuille): She examines law as “an educative process.”
           “A definitive—indeed any—answer to this question is beyond the scope of this essay. Instead, the pages that follow suggest that insight can be found in the analysis of the pedagogy of citizenship law. At the core of this unique methodology for legal analysis is the conviction that law is an educative process aimed at and resulting shaping and managing behaviors to ends deemed best for society. From this perspective the inputs that constitute the market for citizenship are not merely accidents reflecting the ambivalence about citizenship. Instead, they have significant, tangible, and constitutive impacts on societal understanding and commitment to the ideals represented by citizenship.…
           “To suggest that law operates as a ‘societal pedagogy,’ as the pedagogy of law does, it serves to establish what is meant by the concept of pedagogy.… When that process has a purposeful outcome, education becomes pedagogy.”
           [Lua Kamál Yuille, “Individuals, Corporations and the Pedagogy of Citizenship.” Kansas Law Review. Volume 63, May 2015. Pages 903-915.]
      261. critical theory of class formation (Alberto Toscano as pronounced in this MP3 audio file): He focuses on “human conflict” and “dominating groups.”
           “There is no mediating logic between the anthropology of human conflict, stemming from [Baruch] Spinoza’s theory of the passions, and the genesis of dominating groups. Rather than a trans-historical notion of group formation, something like a class theory is needed; but Spinozism cannot provide it. A comparable ambiguity is generated when Lordon refers to capital as a ‘social group,’ that is to say as a fraction, or hostile part within the multitude itself. But if capital is a group within the multitude then it cannot be the product of imperium. Again, without a critical theory of class formation, we risk treating capital as either a species of state, or as an inexplicable excrescence of the multitude.” [Alberto Toscano, “A Structuralism of Feeling?” New Left Review. Series II, number 97, January–February 2016. Pages 73-93.]
      262. peace and power (Peggy L. Chinn and Adeline Falk-Rafael): They explore an emancipatory and dialectical group process for nursing.
           “‘Peace and Power’ is an emancipatory group process drawn from several traditions around the world for working together in cooperative and peaceful ways, and in ways that challenge the status quo and lead to social and political change in the direction of equality and justice for all.…
           “… [The] tension between the powers derived from public and private experience forms a dialectic, calling for a resolution in the form of a synthesis. As a group works within a ‘Peace and Power’ framework, they cannot set aside the learned power-over processes. Instead, the group continually examines what they do in light of what they know: they know both forms of power, and they work out as a group how they exercise both forms of power in the group. They act with awareness of the tensions between power-over power and peace power, and in practice might choose to use either of the forms of power but with full awareness. From that awareness (knowing) they create a mutually agreed path to shift and shape their actions based on the intention of peace.”
           [Peggy L. Chinn and Adeline Falk-Rafael, “Peace and Power: A Theory of Emancipatory Group Process.” Journal of Nursing Scholarship. Volume 47, issue 1, January 2015. Pages 62-69.]
      263. pre-terrorism (Alberto Toscano): He refers to a war against individuals who have been identified as dangerous.
           “The very notion of ‘pre-terrorism’ is deeply symptomatic: it makes patent the link between the obsessive identification of ‘dangerous individuals’ and the imagination of future revolts that call for repressive pre-emption.… Indeed, as an antiterrorist magistrate recently confessed: ‘There is a temptation during a time of crisis to consider any illegal manifestation of political expression to be of a terrorist nature.’ Reading the extracts from the secret service reports, the left pessimist might be heartened to see such confidence in the possibility of radical revolt being shown by the state and its agencies. Alternatively, she might muse that the logic of immunizing oneself against ‘terrorism’ by nipping pre-terrorism in the bud ….” [Alberto Toscano, “The war against pre-terrorism The Tarnac 9 and The Coming Insurrection.” Radical Philosophy. Number 154, March/April 2009. Pages 2-7.]
      264. managing the present (Kristin Ross): She discusses the “murky inverted present” in the radical French Left.
           “It is within … [the] murky inverted present and swamp of bad memory that the various social movements that make up the slow reassertion of the radical Left in France have had to find their way.” [Kristin Ross, “Managing the present.” Radical Philosophy. Number 149, May/June 2008. Pages 2-5.]
      265. critical theory of contemporary capitalist society (Nancy Fraser): She develops a “bivalent conception of justice.”
           “In this brief essay I cannot take up the important but difficult question of how the economic/cultural distinction is best applied to the critical theory of contemporary capitalist society. In ‘Social Justice in the Age of Identity Politics,’ however, I discuss this question at length. Rejecting the view of economy and culture as separate spheres, I propose a critical approach that reveals the hidden connections between them. The point, in other words, is to use the distinction against the grain, making visible, and subject to critique, both the cultural subtexts of apparently economic processes and the economic subtexts of apparently cultural processes. Such a ‘perspectival dualism’ is only possible, of course, once we have the economic/cultural distinction.” [Nancy Fraser, “Heterosexism, Misrecognition and Capitalism: A Response to Judith Butler.” New Left Review. Series I, number 228, March–April 1998. Pages 140-149.]
           “Given the hollowness of a purely verbal reduction and the present unavailability of a substantive reduction, what normative approach remains for those who seek to integrate distribution and recognition? For the present, I contend, one should refrain from endorsing either one of those paradigms of justice to the exclusion of the other. Instead, one should adopt what I shall call a ‘bivalent’ conception of justice. A bivalent conception of justice encompasses both distribution and recognition without reducing either one of them to the other. Thus, it does not treat recognition as a good to be distributed, nor distribution as an expression of recognition. Rather, a bivalent conception treats distribution and recognition as distinct perspectives on, and dimensions of, justice, while at the same time encompassing both of them within a broader, overarching framework.” [Nancy Fraser, “Social Justice in the Age of Identity Politics: Redistribution, Recognition, and Participation.” The Tanner Lectures on Human Values. Stanford University. Stanford, California. April 30th–May 2nd, 1996. Pages 1-67.]
      266. total bureaucratization (David Graeber): Graeber, a U.S. anthropologist, examines bureaucracy at the intersection of the Global Justice Movement.
           “I’m going to make up a name. I’m going to call this the age of ‘total bureaucratization.’ (I was tempted to call this the age of ‘predatory bureaucratization’ but it’s really the all-encompassing nature of the beast I want to highlight here.) It had its first stirrings, one might say, just at the point where public discussion of bureaucracy began to fall off in the late seventies, and it began to get seriously under way in the eighties. But it truly took off in the nineties.” [David Graeber. The Utopia of Rules: On Technology, Stupidity, and the Secret Joys of Bureaucracy. Brooklyn, New York: Melville House Publishing. Pages 18.]
           “The Global Justice Movement was, in its own way, the first major leftist antibureaucratic movement of the era of total bureaucratization. As such, I think it offers important lessons for anyone trying to develop a similar critique.” [David Graeber. The Utopia of Rules: On Technology, Stupidity, and the Secret Joys of Bureaucracy. Brooklyn, New York: Melville House Publishing. Pages 31.]
           “indeed, in this most recent phase of total bureaucratization, we’ve seen security cameras, police scooters, issuers of temporary ID cards, and men and women in a variety of uniforms acting in either public or private capacities, trained in tactics of menacing, intimidating, and ultimately deploying physical violence, appear just about everywhere—even in places such as playgrounds, primary schools, college campuses, hospitals, libraries, parks, or beach resorts, where fifty years ago their presence would have been considered scandalous, or simply weird.” [David Graeber. The Utopia of Rules: On Technology, Stupidity, and the Secret Joys of Bureaucracy. Brooklyn, New York: Melville House Publishing. Pages 32-33.]
           “In his latest book [The Utopia of Rules: On Technology, Stupidity, and the Secret Joys of Bureaucracy], the American anthropologist David Graeber argues that, with the capillary diffusion of bureaucratization under neoliberalism, we are more subject than ever to the rules of the state—yet, after a spate of imaginative writing on the subject in the 1960s and [19]70s, left analysis has largely abandoned this terrain. For Graeber, a radical critique of bureaucracy remains a political exigency, not least to combat the claims of the free-market right to a monopoly on the subject. A veteran of the late-[19]90s alter-globalization movement, Graeber was closely involved in planning the occupation of Zuccotti Park in 2011—he is purported to have coined the rallying cry, ‘We are the 99 per cent’ ….” [Emma Fajgenbaum, “Audit Culture.” New Left Review. Series II, number 100, July–August 2016. Pages 144-151.]
      267. anthropological theory of value (David Graeber): He develops an approach, informed by the views of Karl Marx, to value.
           “… [Karl] Marx’s theory of value was not meant to be a theory of prices. Marx was not particularly interested in coming up with a model that would predict price fluctuations, understand pricing mechanisms, and so on. Almost all other economists have been, since they are ultimately trying to write something that would be of use to those operating within a market system. Marx was writing something that would be of use for those trying to overthrow such a system. Therefore, he by no means assumed that price paid for something was an accurate reflection of its worth. It might be better, then, to think of the word ‘value’ as meaning something more like ‘importance.’ Imagine a pie chart, representing the U.S. economy. If one were to determine that the U.S. economy devotes, say, 19 percent of its GDP to health care, 16 percent to the auto industry, 7 percent to TV and Hollywood, and .2 percent to the fine arts, one can say this is a measure of how important these areas are to us as a society. Marx is proposing we simply substitute labor as a better measure: if Americans spend 7 percent of their creative energies in a given year producing automobiles, this is the ultimate measure of how important it is to us to have cars.” [David Graeber. Toward An Anthropological Theory of Value: The False Coin of Our Own Dreams. New York: Palgrave imprint of St. Martin’s Press LLC. 2001. Page 55.]
      268. identity transformation (Anthony Elliott): He considers early–modern industrial transformations of identity.
           “For those working in the social sciences and humanities – from social and political theorists to philosophers – identity is a topic that remains of fundamental significance and of enduring relevance to the world in which we live. The great foundational figures of philosophy and social thought – from Aristotle to [Immanuel] Kant to [Georg Wilhelm Friedrich] Hegel – all underscored the essential importance of identity to the attainment of human reflectiveness, personal autonomy and political freedom. Similarly, the great figures of classical social theory such as [Karl] Marx, [Max] Weber, [David ‘Émile’] Durkheim and [Sigmund] Freud all developed conceptual accounts of world affairs that underscored the centrality of identity – at once individual and collective – to social relations and cultural praxis. According to classical social theory, the conditions, contours and consequences of identity were to undergo radical transformation as a result of social forces like capitalism, rationalization, the growing complexity of cultural organization, and the redrafting of the human passions and repressed desire. Identity demanded analysis, so it was claimed, because it was at the core of how people experienced – reacted to, and coped with – the early modern industrial transformations sweeping the globe.” [Anthony Elliott. Identity Transformations: A compilation of chapters from works by Anthony Elliott. London and New York: Routledge imprint of Taylor & Francis Group, an Informa PLC business. 2015. Page 5.]
      269. postcapitalism (Paul Mason): He considers the “urgent” need to prepare for the end of capitalism and its contradictions.
           “In the transition to a postcapitalist economy, the work done at the design stage can reduce mistakes in the implementation stage. And the design of the postcapitalist world, as with software, can be modular. Different people can work on it in different places, at different speeds, with relative autonomy from each other. It is not any longer a plan we need – but a modular project design.
           “However, our need is urgent.
           “My aim here is not to provide an economic strategy or a guide to organization. It is to map the new contradictions of capitalism so that people, movements and parties can obtain more accurate coordinates for the journey they’re trying to make.
           “The main contradiction today is between the possibility of free, abundant goods and information and a system of monopolies, banks and governments trying to keep things private, scarce and commercial. Everything comes down to the struggle between the network and the hierarchy, between old forms of society moulded around capitalism and new forms of society that prefigure what comes next.”
           [Paul Mason. Postcapitalism: A Guide to Our Future. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux. 2015. Pages 21-22.]
           “It’s not clear at which point [Paul] Mason’s postcapitalist transition would definitively issue into a stable new mode of production. The logic of his argument suggests that this would be when the information-based exacerbation of falling profit rates had led to a world in which not just information, but everything had zero marginal cost. If labour is the measure of value, such a state would be a hi-tech Cockaigne of ‘full automation’, where everything from foodstuff production to infrastructure maintenance required no labour inputs at all. Could this be the economics of abundance that [John Maynard] Keynes and [Yevgeni] Preobrazhensky [Russian Cyrillic, Евге́ний Алексе́евич Преображе́нский, Evgénij Alekséevič Preobražénskij] alike looked forward to from the 1930s, and that some thought imminent in the 1960s? We might doubt whether there is really a determinate, achievable ‘everything’ here. Or, if a new mode of production could be fully actualized before such a point, what would be the deciding factor? And what, finally, might prevent related counter-tendencies, such as cheapening labour and materials costs, from stimulating capital anew?” [Rob Lucas, “The Free Machine.” New Left Review. Series II, number 100, July–August 2016. Pages 130-143.]
           “… [Here is my] conclusion, with which Paul Mason might not perhaps agree, namely that the PostCapitalist mode of production will turn out to be a form of socialism, but one which differs from the earlier forms of bureaucratic socialism by being more egalitarian and libertarian. This type of socialism I think could be called networked socialism. Paul Mason writes: ‘info-capitalism has created a new agent of change in history: the educated and connected human being.’ Of course the overwhelming majority of educated and connected human beings are white-collar workers. So networked socialism is based on white-collar workers in contrast to earlier forms of socialism, which were based on manual (blue-collar) workers.” [Donald Gillies, “Postcapitalism: A Guide to Our Future.” Review article. Real World Economics Review. Number 73, 2015. Pages 110-119.]
      270. contradictions of capital and care (Nancy Fraser): She examines the “crisis of care” in the capitalist system.
           “My claim is that every form of capitalist society harbours a deep-seated social-reproductive ‘crisis tendency’ or contradiction: on the one hand, social reproduction is a condition of possibility for sustained capital accumulation; on the other, capitalism’s orientation to unlimited accumulation tends to destabilize the very processes of social reproduction on which it relies. This social-reproductive contradiction of capitalism lies at the root of the so-called crisis of care. Although inherent in capitalism as such, it assumes a different and distinctive guise in every historically specific form of capitalist society—in the liberal, competitive capitalism of the 19ᵗʰ century; in the state-managed capitalism of the postwar era; and in the financialized neoliberal capitalism of our time. The care deficits we experience today are the form this contradiction takes in this third, most recent phase of capitalist development.” [Nancy Fraser, “Contradictions of Capital and Care.” New Left Review. Series II, number 100, July–August 2016. Pages 99-117.]
      271. post-Kleinian psychoanalysis (Michael Rustin): He develops a socialist perspective on the work of Austrian–British psychoanalyst Melanie Reizes Klein (MP3 audio file), 1882–1960, and British psychoanalyst Wilfred Ruprecht Bion, 1897–1979.
           “What I want to do in this article is to characterize the development of a ‘post-Kleinian’ body of psychoanalytic ideas, suggest some affinities this shares with the wider post-modernist climate of thought, and to raise some questions about its potential political and cultural linkages, these being still to a degree undetermined and dependent on choices yet to be made.…
           “… I argued in ‘A Socialist Consideration of Kleinian Psychoanalysis’ that Melanie Klein’s investigations of the mental states of infancy gave rise to an intensely social view of the origins of the self.…
           “A second characteristic of Kleinian analysis was its emphasis on the ethical. Kleinian theory makes the development of moral capacities in the infant a criterion of normal personality development.…
           “… A teleological vision was the common background assumption of a wide variety of more-or-less humanist theories, from the Kleinian view of individual development, to both liberal and socialist ideas of social improvement.…
           “The central figure in the development of ‘post-Kleinian’ psychoanalysis was Wilfred Bion, though his work forms part of a broader evolution to which many other analysts have contributed.…
           “… The imperative to nurture the capacities for expression, task-solving, and engagement with the new, follows from this, as do the institutions, roles and skills which make this possible. Post-Kleinian psychoanalysis has contributed an understanding of the roots of these capacities in infancy, and of the states of feeling and relationship which are their precondition. This is to define socialism as in part a cultural project.”
           [Michael Rustin, “Post-Kleinian Psychoanalysis and the Post-Modern.” New Left Review. Series I, number 173, January–February 1989. Pages 109-128.]
           “There is always a biological or natural substratum formed and structured by social arrangements, just as there are the properties of matter with which men must cope through their labour. The relevance of Kleinian ‘object-relations’ theory to socialists is, I shall argue, the contribution it makes to the understanding of these natural needs and capacities of men.…
           “… Kleinian theory is impregnated with moral categories, and its developmental concepts—especially those of paranoid-schizoid and depressive ‘positions’—incorporate moral capabilities (notably of concern for the well-being of other persons) into their theoretical definition.… [Sigmund] Freud’s superego is conceived as having a repressive and persecutory function, and Freudian analysis could therefore be understood as an emancipation from guilt, especially sexual guilt. In contrast, guilt in [Melanie] Klein’s ‘depressive position’ is understood to arise from the recognition of the pain suffered by or inflicted on others, and as an essential part of relatedness. Capacity for moral feeling, therefore, in its more and less benign forms, is seen as a definable attribute which links human beings, rather than as an unfortunate external constraint upon them.”
           [Michael Rustin, “A Socialist Consideration of Kleinian Psychoanalysis.” New Left Review. Series I, number 131, January–February 1982. Pages 71-96.]
           “A proposal to institutionalize a universal ‘right to work’ may have the merit of connecting with beliefs which enjoy wide support and not only on the political left. It is obvious that the absence of work represents a massive waste for society in the products and services not made or provided. It represents a loss for each individual deprived of work, and with the existing levels of unemployment in Britain there can be few without first-hand acquaintance with many people beset by this catastrophic experience. Reciprocity of giving and receiving is a natural social condition, and there is a need to contribute to the well-being of others as well as to be cared for by them.…
           “I have offered some theoretical justifications for this view in ‘A Socialist Consideration of Kleinian Psychoanalysis’ ….”
           [Michael Rustin, “A Statutory Right to Work.” New Left Review. Series I, number 1, January–February 1983. Pages 48-67.]
           “[Melanie] Klein added to [Sigmund] Freud’s view her idea that anxieties arose also, and especially strongly, from destructive impulses within the self, which she held were present from the very earliest days of life. She took up [Karl] Abraham’s idea of the infant’s phantasies of cannibalistic attacks on mother’s breast, and developed this in her account of infantile greed and aggression towards the mother. She also held that the infant’s phantasied oedipal attacks on the parents (and indeed siblings) occurred much earlier than Freud believed.” [Michael Rustin, “Anxieties and Defences: Normal and Abnormal.” Organisational & Social Dynamics. Volume 15, number 2, 2015. Pages 233-247.]
           “The post-Kleinian theory of narcissism … identifies an organisation of the personality through which the self is able to avoid the polar positions of depressive and paranoid-schizoid states, since each in its different way is liable to generate intolerable levels of anxiety. Instead, in this ‘borderline’ state, a posture of emotional neutrality or indifference is adopted. The self learns to survive and even prosper in a world in which relations with objects cannot be depended on, adopting strategies of prudent self-reliance to cope with what is felt to be at root an untrustworthy and unfriendly world.” [Michael Rustin, “Belonging to oneself alone: The spirit of neoliberalism.” Psychoanalysis, Culture & Society. Volume 19, issue 2, June 2014. Pages 145-160.]
           “Two of the contributors to this issue … have close links with feminist intellectual traditions, and the Tavistock tradition which is the topic of a third article owes much to the female-centred revision of [Sigmund] Freud’s psychoanalytic theory by Melanie Klein and her collaborators. Although this work did not define itself as feminist, it represented a different kind of gender challenge to patriarchal orthodoxies.” [Michael Rustin, “Emotional labour and learning about emotions.” European Journal of Psychotherapy & Counselling. Volume 6, issue 3, September 2003. Pages 167-174.]
           “Women’s increased involvement in the labour market may therefore increase moral resistance to the norms of economic calculation and punitive discipline, even though women will also pursue the opportunities for self-development and economic advancement which paid work provides. Clearly, new modes of consumption, and changed demands on social services (child-care for working mothers, paid or community care of the aged) are also bound up with these changes in forms of production.” [Michael Rustin, “The Politics of Post-Fordism: or, The Trouble with ‘New Times.’” New Left Review. Series I, number 275, May–June 1979. Pages 54-77.]
           “Where greed and envy are not excessive, even an ambitious person finds satisfaction in helping others to make their contribution. Here we have one of the attitudes underlying successful leadership. Again, to some extent, this is already observable in the nursery. An older child may take pride in the achievements of a younger brother or sister and do everything to help them. Some children even have an integrating effect on the whole family life; by being predominantly friendly and helpful they improve the family atmosphere. I have seen that mothers who were very impatient and intolerant of difficulties have improved through the influence of such a child. The same applies to school life where sometimes only as few as one or two children have a beneficial effect on the attitude of all the others by a kind of moral leadership which is based on a friendly and co-operative relation to the other children without any attempt to make them feel inferior.” [Melanie Klein. Envy And Gratitude And Other Works: 1946-1963. London: Vintage Books imprint of Random House. 1997. Page 261.]
           “… [The] view that the super-ego is more strongly operative in women than in men seems at first sight to be out of keeping with the fact that, compared to men, women are often more dependent upon their objects, more easily influenced by the outer world and more variable in their moral standards—that is, apparently less guided by the requirements of a super-ego. But I think that their greater dependence upon objects is actually closely related to a greater efficacy of the super-ego. Both characteristics have a common origin in the greater propensity women have to introject their object and set it up in themselves, so that they erect a more powerful super-ego there. This propensity, moreover, is increased precisely by their greater dependence upon their super-ego and their greater fear of it. The girl’s most profound anxiety, which is that some unascertainable damage has been done to her inside by her internalized objects, impels her, as we have already seen, to be continually testing her fears by means of her relations to real objects. It impels her, that is, to reinforce her introjective tendencies in a secondary way. Again, it would seem that her mechanisms of projection are stronger than the man’s, in conformity with her stronger sense of the omnipotence of her excrements and thoughts; and this is another factor which induces her to have stronger relations with the outer world and with objects in reality, partly for the purpose of controlling them by magical means.” [Melanie Klein. The Psychoanalysis of Children. Alix Strachey, translator. New York: Evergreen imprint of Grove Press, Inc. 1960. Pages 316-317.]
           “Working-through was one of the essential demands that [Sigmund] Freud made on an analysis. The necessity to work through is again and again proved in our day-to-day experience: for instance, we see that patients, who at some stage have gained insight, repudiate this very insight in the following sessions and sometimes even seem to have forgotten that they had ever accepted it. It is only by drawing our conclusions from the material as it reappears in different contexts, and is interpreted accordingly, that we gradually help the patient to acquire insight in a more lasting way. The process of adequately working-through includes bringing about changes in the character and strength of the manifold splitting processes which we meet with even in neurotic patients, as well as the consistent analysis of paranoid and depressive anxieties. Ultimately this leads to greater integration.” [Melanie Klein, “Narrative of a Child Analysis: The Conduct of the Psycho-Analysis of Children as seen in the Treatment of a Ten year old Boy.” The International Psycho-Analytical Library. Volume 55, 1961. Pages 1-536.]
           “I asked Dr. [Wilfred R.] Bion if he considered himself a ‘Kleinian’ and received the answer, ‘Not specifically in a way excepting this; that I feel extremely indebted to Melanie Klein, because I went to her for analysis … and I felt she opened up possibilities which seemed me to be very much to the point.’ In addition to gratitude to Melanie Klein he feels a strong admiration for her. ‘The extraordinary thing that an ordinary human being like that is able to have these intuitions and is able to maintain them in spite of a great deal of hostility. People don’t like this further expansion of knowledge or experience.’ Again saw the theme of expansion, growth, development, and the resistances, hostilities, and restrictions into which it runs.” [John S. Peck, “An Interview with Wilfred Bion.” Group. Volume 2, number 1, spring 1978. Pages 54-59.]
           “I owe my clarification of the obscurity that pervades the whole of a psychotic analysis mainly to three pieces of work. As they are crucial for understanding what follows I shall remind you of them. First: [Sigmund] Freud’s description, referred to by me in my paper to the London Congress of 1953, of the mental apparatus called intoactivity by the demands of the reality principle and in particular of that part of it which is concerned with the consciousness attached to the senseorgans. Second: Melanie Klein’s description of the phantasied sadistic attacks that the infant makes on the breast during the paranoid-schizoid phase, and third: her discovery of projective identification. By this mechanism the patient splits off a part of his personality and projects it into the object where it becomes installed, sometimes as a persecutor, leaving the psyche, from which it has been split off, correspondingly impoverished.” [W. R. Bion, “Differentiation of the Psychotic from the Non-Psychotic Personalities.” International Journal of Psycho-Analysis. Volume 38, 1957. Pages 266-275.]
           “I have found theories of acting-out enlightening, but not enlightening enough; none of the theories known to me ‘contains’ the ‘facts’ by which I seek to be enlightened. My ‘facts’ gird against the framework of definition and theory that I seek to erect around them. The patient who is acting out cannot be ‘contained’ within existing formulations.” [Wilfred Bion, “Container and Contained.” Group Relations Reader. A. D. Colman and W. H. Bexton, editors. Jupiter, Florida: A. K. Rice Institute. 1985. Pages 127-133.]
           “A Good place to start in the evolution of thought on autism and psychoanalysis is Melanie Klein’s first account of one of her cases, that of a child called Dick.… This essay is important from two points of view. In it she consolidates her understanding of the early development of the ego and she also opens up an area that was to become particularly fruitful for her followers; the study of psychosis.
           “This essay was presented prior to the publication of Kanner’s work on infantile autism, at a time, therefore, when the distinct clinical entity of autism had not yet been described. This accounts for Klein’s diagnosis of Dick as psychotic, probably schizophrenic. Nowadays he would probably be diagnosed as autistic.”
           [Caroline Noone, “Autism and Psychoanalysis: Strange Bedfellows?” The Letter: Irish Journal for Lacanian Psychoanalysis. Issue 28, summer 2003. Pages 47-79.]
           “The loyal disciples of Melanie Klein accept [Wilfred R.] Bion’s early work but are distrustful of his later work.… The question to which we now address ourselves is: why was the later Bion not acceptable to some Kleinians?
           “We believe the first reason was his introduction of ‘O’ ….
           “I shall use the sign O to denote that which is the ultimate reality represented by terms such as ultimate reality, absolute truth, the godhead, the infinite, the thing-in-itself. [quotation from Bion]
           “O, then, has a metaphysical and religious meaning. Melanie Klein was indifferent to religion and philosophy, though not opposed to them …. Certain of her close followers, however, have, like [Sigmund] Freud, been definitely anti-religious and almost fanatically opposed to any philosophical position which has any whiff of religion. They stand firmly in Freud’s atheistic shoes and are pledged with him to positivism.…
           “Bion was closer to the Klein school than any other and many of his key concepts have been directly assimilated from Klein – projective identification, splitting, death instinct, paranoidschizoid and depressive positions – but he used them in the service of a different outlook, a new metapsychology.…
           “… Klein was more focused on the process of mental development and its disruption by forces like greed and envy. Bion’s approach was more positive.”
           [Joan and Neville Symington. The Clinical Thinking of Wilfred Bion. London and New York: Routledge imprint of Taylor & Francis Group, an Informa PLC business. 2002. Pages 10-12.]
           “I have outlined what I believe to be a Kleinian psychoanalytic sociology of racism.… [Melanie] Klein makes a clear distinction between envy, jealousy and greed. Jealousy excludes another from good; destructiveness is a byproduct of exclusion and usually involves a second party. Greed operates similarly by taking the whole of the good, regardless of the consequences that others may suffer, again destructiveness is a by-product of the process. In other words, what makes envy so destructive or dangerous is that its attempts to destroy good rather than bad.…
           “In order to understand the role that depressive anxiety plays in the explanation of racism it is necessary to return to Klein’s notion of positions. The paranoid schizoid position is characterised by a splitting of difference. Good and bad objects are split, the good introjected, the bad projected outward into someone or something else. Think of this as a state of mind in which we perceive things to be very clear cut, good or bad.”
           [Simon Clarke, “Psychoanalytic Sociology and the Interpretation of Emotion.” Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour. Volume 33, issue 2, 2003. Pages 145-163.]
           “Starting from [Sigmund] Freud’s assumption that anxiety is the central point around which the psychic mind evolves, she [Melanie Klein] proposes the notions of projective identification, of unconscious fantasies and her viewpoints on the symbolic development of the mind, taking some of Freud’s ideas far ahead.…
           “As [Wilfred R.] Bion’s thinking evolved, he seemed to be able to create his own theoretical and clinical framework, where some of both Klein’s and Freud’s ideas are visible and identifiable, but in Bion’s own way. Bion is not a Freudian author, but neither is he a Kleinian; strictly speaking, Bion is Bion. His work is original, and I think that he is an author who clearly developed a truly psychoanalytic perspective.
           “For Bion, mental development is a complicated process which must be structured at each step. It cannot be compared to biological development. For Bion, the development of the mind is in a certain sense autonomous. The mind is constructed bit by bit by digesting experiences.”
           [Ana Maria Andrade de Azevedo, “Substantive unconscious and adjective unconscious: the contribution of Wilfred Dion.” Journal of Analytical Psychology. Volume 45, number 1, January 2000. Pages 75-91.]
      272. post-Westphalian democratic justice (Nancy Fraser): She critiques the social justice model based upon sovereign state actors.
           “Not so long ago, in the heyday of social democracy, disputes about justice presumed what I shall call a ‘Keynesian-Westphalian frame.’ …
           “The phrase ‘Keynesian-Westphalian frame’ is meant to signal the national-territorial underpinnings of justice disputes in the heyday of the postwar democratic welfare state, roughly 1945 to the 1970s. The term ‘Westphalian’ refers to the Treaty of 1648, which established some key features of the modern international state system. However, I am concerned neither with the actual achievements of the Treaty nor with the centuries-long process by which the system it inaugurated evolved. Rather, I invoke ‘Westphalia’ as a political imaginary that mapped the world as a system of mutually recognizing sovereign territorial states.…
           “… beyond those of the ‘what’ and the ‘who,’ which I shall call the question of the ‘how.’ That question, in turn, inaugurates a paradigm shift: what the Keynesian-Westphalian frame cast as the theory of social justice must now become a theory of post-Westphalian democratic justice.…
           “… Increasingly subject to contestation, the Keynesian-Westphalian frame is now considered by many to be a major vehicle of injustice, as it partitions political space in ways that block many who are poor and despised from challenging the forces that oppress them.”
           [Nancy Fraser, “Reframing Justice in a Globalizing World.” New Left Review. Series II, number 36, November–December 2005. Pages 69-88.]
      273. critical social network analysis (Manuel S. González Canché as pronounced in this MP3 audio file and Cecilia Rios-Aguilar as pronounced in this MP3 audio file): They develop a critical theoretical approach to social network analysis.
           “We believe the use of SNA [social network analysis] in higher education should become more systemic and holistic as its implementation in our field of study brings about many potential benefits.… However, if SNA is going to contribute to our field, it should also be conducted more carefully and from a critical perspective. Failing to do so will only exacerbate existing inequities by continuously blaming the oppressed for ‘lacking what it takes’ to succeed in college. In this spirit, we add a fourth benefit: sustaining a critical, multidisciplinary, and multimethod examination of inequities in higher education. We call this approach critical SNA (CSNA).…
           “Instead of focusing on a deficit perspective, using CSNA we found that male African American and male Latino students are benefiting from interacting with similar peers (i.e., peers from the same racial/ethnic group) in terms of the credits they complete and, most likely, in terms of the networks they form.”
           [Manuel S. González Canché and Cecilia Rios-Aguilar, “Critical Social Network Analysis in Community Colleges: Peer Effects and Credit Attainment.” New Directions for Institutional Research. Number 163, March 2015. Pages 75-91.]
           “… [Manuel S.] González Canché and [Cecilia] Rios-Aguilar inform us of ways to close this gap [in ‘the disparate impacts of increasing tuitions and debt loads for students of color and low-income students’] by using critical social network analysis (CSNA). They not only present a concrete example of how to use social network analysis in higher education but also demonstrate how it can be used in a critical manner to explore and reveal inequities, leading to recommendations for change in policies and structures.” [Ryan S. Wells and Frances K. Stage, “Past, Present, and Future of Critical Quantitative Research in Higher Education.” New Directions for Institutional Research. Number 163, March 2015. Pages 103-112.]
           “… networks have mathematical properties that, in some applications, have a sociological meaning and significance. They generate both constraints and opportunities for those involved in them, simultaneously exposing them to and insulating them from various influences. These properties may manifest at the level of the whole network, at the level of individual nodes, which have different positions within it, or at the level of identifiable clusters in the network. Networks can be ‘wired’ in different ways and their members, both individually and in clusters, can enjoy different positions within them. These variations often have considerable relational-sociological significance and SNA allows us to explore this.” [Nick Crossley, “Interactions, Juxtapositions, and Tastes: Conceptualizing ‘Relations’ in Relational Sociology.” Conceptualizing Relational Sociology: Ontological and Theoretical Issues. Christopher Powell and François Dépelteau, editors. New York: Palgrave Macmillan imprint of St. Martin’s Press LLC. 2013. Pages 123-143.]
      274. emergent paradigm (Gus Dizerega): He presents an organizational approach to democracy.
           “… the emergent paradigm helps clarify a series of confusions that have long plagued clarity of understanding in social science. Failing to distinguish spontaneous orders from organizations has been a source of confusion, because the same word has consistently been used to describe two fundamentally different kinds of order. Hayek emphasized the confusion arising over the term ‘economy,’ which refers to both the spontaneous order of a market economy and the economy of a corporation or a household. Science suffers the same ambiguity. Science is a spontaneous order and a scientist ‘does science’ by pursuing a research project. Democracy is a spontaneous order when there is no overarching purpose pursued by the polity, but a democracy in a major war possesses a national unity of priorities and acts like an organization. Significantly, it is when a democracy is most unified under a single hierarchy of goals (most ‘democratic’ from an organizational perspective) that it acts most undemocratically. The significance of this difference is often overlooked. This confusion runs throughout our language.
           “Social emergence takes three broad forms: spontaneous order, where all share equal status and the system generates a single or very narrow set of signals for systemic coordination; civil society, where status is equal and a great many and sometimes conflicting kinds of feedback provide a rich matrix of information allowing for a wide range of choice and creative response; and other social emergent systems, such as the evolution of customs, in which there need not be equal status among participants, but there is no single goal of the system of relationships thereby established.”
           [Gus Dizerega, “Outlining a New Paradigm.” Cosmos+Taxis. Volume 1, issue 1, 2013. Pages 3-20.]
      275. critical theory of captitalism (Moishe Postone): He develops an alternative to his self–defined “traditional Marxism.”
           “would maintain that an adequate understanding of any country or area in the world today must be framed with reference to the global historical developments of the modern world, and that those forms of development can best be illuminated by a theory of capitalism.
           “At the same time, I would argue that such a critical theory of capitalism must be rethought in ways that differ basically from what I call ‘traditional Marxism’ ….
           “… [My] approach … provides the basis for a critical analysis of the structure of social labor and the nature of production in capitalism. It indicates that the industrial process of production should not be grasped as a technical process that, although increasingly socialized, is used by private capitalists for their own needs. Rather, the approach I am outlining grasps that process as intrinsically capitalist. Capital’s drive for ongoing increases in productivity gives rise to a productive apparatus of considerable technological sophistication that renders the production of material wealth essentially independent of direct human labor time expenditure. This, in turn, opens the possibility of large-scale socially-general reductions in labor time and fundamental changes in the nature and social organization of labor.”
           [Moishe Postone, “The Critical Theory of Capitalism.” Presented at ¿Teoría Crítica del Capitalismo? SETC: Sociedad de Estudios de Teoría Crítica. November 23rd, 2012. Pages 1-11. Retrieved on November 30th, 2016.]
      276. dogmatomachy (David D. Corey): He examines various permutations of ideological warfare.
           “Dogmatomachy (ideological warfare) has infected contemporary liberal-democratic politics, and we need to understand it.…
           “People naturally want to fix the problems they see, and I confess to wondering if any remedy might be found for the predicament in which we find ourselves. Because human beings are not machines, or inanimate objects, the mere understanding of a problem can often contribute to its solution. Surely it is in our power to recognize the absurdity of the logical postulates behind dogmatomachy—the postulates of abstraction, absolutization and total victory. Surely we can, if we will, abandon them. But for various reasons such a change of heart and mind is not likely to occur anytime soon. Like a marriage that has turned sour, political associations that devolve into war are hard to put right again.”
           [David D. Corey, “Dogmatomachy: Ideological Warfare.” Cosmos+Taxis. Volume 1, issue 3, 2014. Pages 60-71.]
      277. reflection theory (Sean Sayers): He distinguishes between reflection theory, as developed by Friedrich Engels and Vladimir Lenin, and other reflection theories.
           “The reflection theory is no invention of Marxism. It is one of the traditional approaches in epistemology and has had a long history. During the course of this history, many different versions of the theory have been put forward, embodying virtually all the different main philosophical outlooks: there have been empiricist and rationalist versions, idealist and materialist ones. The first essential point to see, however, is that the Marxist theory of reflection is a distinctive, dialectical materialist, version, which does not merely repeat previous accounts. Failure to appreciate this has been at the basis of almost all the criticisms and objections which are aimed at [Friedrich] Engels’ and [Vladimir] Lenin’s work.” [Sean Sayers, “Materialism, Realism and the Reflection Theory.” Radical Philosophy: Philosophical Journal of the Independent Left. Number 33, spring 1983. Pages 16-26.]
      278. myth of preparedness (Claudia Aradau): She critiques the post–9/11 ritual on preparing for disaster.
           “Preparedness exercises do not create something new, they do not organize subjects with a view to radical change, but rehearse in a ritual play that which has already been set out as inevitable: the ‘next terrorist attack’ which will differ from previous ones only in the intensity and/or extensivity of destruction. Mythic time replaces the temporal indeterminacy of the unexpected future event. Exercises function in the modality of the future anterior, not as a wager made in the present for changing the future, but as the continuity of a pregiven future back into the present: the next terrorist attack will have been. The future anterior of preparedness allows exercises to function in a time of certainty, of tautology and of a ‘foregone conclusion’ in which the unexpected is always expected as it will already have been.” [Claudia Aradau, “The myth of preparedness.” Radical Philosophy: Philosophical Journal of the Independent Left. Number 161, May/June 2010. Pages 2-7.]
      279. critical theory of human resource development (Tara J. Fenwick): She discusses multiple ways in which this approach can contribute to human resource development.
           “The field of human resource development (HRD) practice and research describes itself as emphasizing three major areas in workplace organizations that arguably overlap adult education’s focus on learning : training and development, career development, and organizational development …. Indeed, schools of education are where HRD programs boast the fastest growing enrollment …. However, adult education theorists have taken up an antagonistic position to the HRD field through a sustained attack from diverse critical perspectives. But what if these energies were diverted to support a space within HRD to nurture critical questions about power, interests, and equity and to articulate critical challenges of oppressive organizational structures and knowledge legitimation? A critical HRD stream would not presume to supplant existing conceptions of HRD in a totalizing fashion but would develop as one among the multiple paradigms coexisting in this pluralistic field. A critical HRD might even open a middle space in schools of education—a site where those committed to critical perspectives in adult learning, workers’ lives, organization studies, leadership, and human development could inform and support one another’s research and practice. In this middle space, critical adult educators might find fruitful alliances with their HRD colleagues toward just, equitable, life-giving, and sustainable work.” [Tara J. Fenwick, “Toward a Critical HRD in Theory and Practice.” Adult Education Quarterly. Volume 54, number 3, May 2004. Pages 193-209.]
      280. materialist theory of ideology (Les Levidow): He discusses revolutionary theory.
           “For revolutionaries the task is to create practices which attempt to make our own constituent power relations historically self-conscious and transparent. Such a project develops methods of collective work which avoid reproducing professional or scientific ‘expertise’ in the social form of competitive private property. If it doesn’t, then our allegedly revolutionary theory becomes just another academic discipline or a ‘correct line’ about the objective world ‘out there,’ divorced from any struggle against our own material relation to capital. Revolutionary theory cannot imitate the virtues of capital’s science but must inform our struggle against the power relations that make that science ‘true.’ [Les Levidow, “Towards a Materialist Theory of Ideology: The IQ Debale as a Case Study.” Radical Philosophy: Philosophical Journal of the Independent Left. Number 22, summer 1979. Pages 15-29.]
      281. theory of ideology and ideology of ideology (John Mepham): He focuses upon Karl Marx’s Capital.
           “I think the difference between [Karl] Marx’s theory of ideology and the ideology of ideology is that whereas the latter thinks of it in terms of two elements and a relation between them (or one element, reality, and its property of creating another element, an idea) Marx’s theory is dialectical. It is a theory of a totality. Both the nature of the components and that of the relations between them are thus drastically different. It can be represented as below although it should be remembered that this is presented as merely a helpful graphical device and should not be taken too seriously especially in as much as it can give no account of the relations within the totality.” [John Mepham, “The Theory of Ideology in Capital.” Radical Philosophy: Philosophical Journal of the Independent Left. Number 2, summer 1972. Pages 12-19.]
           “John Mepham’s paper ‘The Theory of Ideology in Capital’ is an important contribution to the debate over [Karl] Marx’s theory of ideology. It would not be too much to say that it raises that debate to a new level, at which the real difficulties of the subject can be seen. It achieves this largely through the manner in which so many persuasive errors and half-truths are identified and rejected. The views Mepham castigates are commonplace in the literature, and the treatment of them is a substantial, if negative, achievement. In the light of it the inadequacy of his positive thesis has almost a tragic quality.” [Joe McCarney, “The Theory of Ideology: Some Comments on Mepham.” Review article. Radical Philosophy: Philosophical Journal of the Independent Left. Number 13, spring 1976. Pages 28-31.]
      282. Marxist theory of ideology (Nicholas Abercrombie, Stephen Hill, and Bryan S. Turner): They explore various implications of a theory of ideology, including its relationship with the sociology of knowledge.
           “The analysis of ideologies and forms of knowledge and belief is in a state of disorder. In contemporary Marxism, the autonomy and independent importance of ideology have been stressed at the expense of a discredited economic reductionism. In many ways this is a desirable development, although, as we have pointed out elsewhere, it also carries with it some very misleading consequences. However, the critical problem that contemporary Marxist theories of ideology have to face is: how is one to reconcile materialism with the autonomy of ideology? This implies a second difficulty: namely, how is one to reconcile the notion of ideology as critique with a general theory of ideology? In terms of disciplinary definitions, there is a parallel question about the relationship of the Marxist theory of ideology to the sociology of knowledge which developed in opposition to classical Marxism.” [Nicholas Abercrombie, Stephen Hill, and Bryan S. Turner, “Determinacy and Indeterminacy in the Theory of Ideology.” New Left Review. Series I, number 142, November–December 1983. Pages 55-66.]
      283. critical neuroscience (Suparna Choudhury [Bengali/Bāṅāli, সুপর্ণা চৌধুরী, Suparṇā Caudhurī as pronounced in this MP3 audio file], Jan Slaby, and others): Uses critical social theory to examine the social and cultural contexts of the neurosciences.
           “The story of critical neuroscience began on a bus in the outskirts of Berlin, where the editors first met. The spirit of excitement of the first discussion would soon be followed with frustration—not simply in response to the growing neuromania in the natural and human sciences, but also about the seemingly intractable differences between our disciplines and the difficulties in articulating how, and to what ends, to be “critical.”
           “These tensions gave rise to the growth of an energetic group of young scholars with backgrounds in neuroscience, philosophy, history of science, anthropology, sociology, and psychology …. What eventually followed, after months of wrestling with diverse concepts, vocabularies, and standpoints, was a consensus that what is needed is an understanding of how these neurophenomena are worked out, circulated, and applied; and to figure out how analyzing the social and cultural context of the neurosciences might help to push experimental work in alternative directions….
           “… The outcome of the debates has, however, been fruitful in numerous ways, for example in leading us to call for a ‘reality check’ on the neurosciences. In what ways are we witnessing insights that are entirely novel, potentials that are revolutionary, applications that are empowering or threatening to human beings?”
           [Suparna Choudhury and Jan Slaby in Critical Neuroscience: A Handbook of the Social and Cultural Contexts of Neuroscience. Suparna Choudhury and Jan Slaby, editors. Malden, Massachusetts: Blackwell Publishing imprint of Wiley-Blackwell. 2012. Google Play edition.]

           “Critical Neuroscience probes the extent to which discussion of neuroscience—in ethical debates, policy texts, commercial and clinical projects—matches the achievements and potential of neuroscience itself. It examines the ways in which the new sciences and technologies of the brain lead to classifying people in new ways, and the effects this can have on social and personal life. It studies both the methods used to gain new knowledge, and the ways in which the knowledge is interpreted and used. The project aims at finding or creating a shared vocabulary for neuroscientists and social scientists in which they can talk about the potential of the tools, the analytical methods, the interpretations of the data. We also need a shared way in which to think about the barrage of media reports of all this work. Critical Neuroscience aims, more over, at drawing attention to any social or political imperatives that make certain research programs in neuroscience more attractive and better funded than others. We hope to introduce our observations into brain research itself, and to integrate them into new experimental and interpretive directions.” [J. Slaby. Critical Neuroscience. University of Frankfurt. May 19th, 2014. Retrieved on August 25th, 2015.]
      284. critical architecture (Mies van der Rohe, K. Michael Hays, and others): Applies critical social theory to architecture.
           “In this essay I shall examine a critical architecture, one resistant to the self-confirming, conciliatory operations of a dominant culture and yet irreducible to a purely formal structure disengaged from the contingencies of place and time. A reinterpretation of a few projects by Mies van der Rohe will provide examples of a critical architecture that claims for itself a place between the efficient representation of preexisting cultural values and the wholly detached autonomy of an abstract formal system. The proposition of a critical realm between culture and form is not so much an extension of received views of interpretation as it is a challenge to those views that claim to exhaust architectural meaning in considerations of only one side or the other. It will be helpful, therefore, to begin with a brief review of two prevalent interpretive perspectives that make just such a claim.” [K. Michael Hays, “Critical Architecture: Between Culture and Form.” Perspecta. Volume 21, 1984. Pages 14-29.]
      285. socialist project of class emancipation (Ellen Meiksins Wood): Class emancipation is a means to acheving “the larger end of human emancipation.”
           “These issues are very much alive, especially because it is no longer taken for granted on the Left that the decisive battle for human emancipation will take place on the ‘economic’ terrain, the home ground of class struggle. For a great many people, the emphasis has shifted to struggles for what I shall call extra-economic goods—gender-emancipation, racial equality, peace, ecological health, democratic citizenship. Every socialist ought to be committed to these goals in themselves—in fact, the socialist project of class emancipation always has been, or should have been, a means to the larger end of human emancipation.” [Ellen Meiksins Wood, “Capitalism and Human Emancipation.” New Left Review. Series I, number 167, January–February 1988. Pages 3-20.]
      286. panopticon society (Guy Standing): Borrowing the utilitarian Jeremy Bentham’s term, “panopticon,” Standing, a British economist, critically (indeed, prophetically) describes the inadvertent creation of a new “precarious” social class, the global precariat. It appears to have resulted from the failures of neoliberalism for many average workers. Right now, in this writer’s view, we are witnessing the rise of this new class in both Europe and the United States and, with it, the threat and reality of considerable social disorganization.
           “In the 1970s, a group of ideologically inspired economists captured the ears and minds of politicians. The central plank of their ‘neo-liberal’ model was that growth and development depended on market competitiveness; everything should be done to maximise competition and competitiveness, and to allow market principles to permeate all aspects of life.
           “One theme was that countries should increase labour market flexibility, which came to mean an agenda for transferring risks and insecurity onto workers and their families. The result has been the creation of a global ‘precariat’, consisting of many millions around the world without an anchor of stability. They are becoming a new dangerous class. They are prone to listen to ugly voices, and to use their votes and money to give those voices a political platform of increasing influence. The very success of the ‘neo-liberal’ agenda, embraced to a greater or lesser extent by governments of all complexions, has created an incipient political monster. Action is needed before that monster comes to life.…
           “… Usually, the struggle has been about use and control over the key assets of the production and distribution system of the time. The precariat, for all its rich tapestry, seemed to lack a clear idea of what those assets were. Their intellectual heroes included Pierre Bourdieu …, who articulated precarity, Michel Foucault, Jürgen Habermas, and Michael Hardt and Tony Negri …, whose Empire was a seminal text, with Hannah Arendt … in the background. There were also shades of the upheavals of 1968, linking the precariat to the Frankfurt School of Herbert Marcuse’s … One Dimensional Man.”
           [Guy Standing. The Precariat: The New Dangerous Class. London and New York: Bloomsbury Academic imprint of Bloomsbury Publishing Plc. 2011. Page 1-2.]
           “While the ‘social factory’ is not right as an image of how life for the precariat is being constructed, a better image is a ‘panopticon society’, in which all social spheres are taking the shape envisaged by Jeremy Bentham’s panopticon papers of 1787 …. It is not just what is done by government but what is allowed by the state in an ostensibly ‘free market’ society.” [Guy Standing. The Precariat: The New Dangerous Class. London and New York: Bloomsbury Academic imprint of Bloomsbury Publishing Plc. 2011. Page 132.]
           “The ‘precariat’ … loses control not only over time but also over the reproduction of ‘skill’ and sense of personal occupation. Thus, for precarious workers it would be irrational to learn a deep body of techniques if faced by a constantly changing production system in which the division of labour is not slowly and predictably changing but is subject to radical uncertainty. The ‘flexibility’ implies more risk to labour learning. This has not been adequately incorporated in assessments of labour markets and inequality. If there is an increased probability of having to learn new skills to maintain a decent income, the rate of return to any job training is reduced. To compound the problem, by the nature of human physiology, it is harder with age to learn new skills. This must impart insecurity, since everybody ages.” [Guy Standing. Work After Globalization: Building Occupational Citizenship. Northampton, Massachusetts: Edward Elgar. 2009. Pages 77-78.]
           “His [Guy Standing’s] latest work, The Precariat, aims in part to rehearse … [certain] themes for what Standing calls ‘the lay reader.’ But it also introduces a new claim: that there is now a new class in the making, a ‘global precariat.’ Standing argues once again that the dynamics of globalization, along with concerted government drives for labour flexibility—a euphemism he abhors—have led to a fragmentation of older class divisions. He locates the ‘precariat’ in the bottom half of what is now a seven-class system.” [Jan Breman, “A Bogus Concept?” Review article. New Left Review. Series II, number 84, November–December 2003. Pages 130-138.]
           “For Guy Standing’s vision to come to fruition it certainly needs more than an intellectual war of position – intellectuals are also needed to build global strategies to inform and unite working people. The global war of movements is already going on worldwide. Intellectual guidance is needed to support the Global Justice and Solidarity Movement. Apart from theoretical analysis, intellectuals should take a side in this real world struggle.” [Mona Meurer, “Work After Globalization: Building Occupational Citizenship.” Review article. Global Labour Journal. Volume 2, number 2, 2011. Pages 68-70.]
           “… in a Panopticon what can be the necessity of curious locks? What are the prisoners to pick them with? By what means are they to come at any sort of pick-lock tools, or any other forbidden implements? and supposing the locks of these doors picked, and the locks of more than one other set of doors besides, what is the operator the better for it? Lock picking is an operation that requires time and experiment, and liberty to work at it unobserved.” [Jeremy Bentham. Panopticon of the Inspection House: Containing the Idea of a New Principle of Construction applicable to any Sort of Establishment, in which Persons of any Description are to be kept under Inspection. London: T. Payne. 1791. Page 108.]
           “[Guy] Standing’s new book-long essay seems to be the first one in whose title the latter noun appears. The allusion to proletariat is fully intended, as the subtitle ‘the new dangerous class’ suggests.…
           “Standing concludes his wide-ranging exploration of many aspects of the precariat and its political dynamics with some engaged proposals about what an imaginary post-laborist, post-social democratic political left can and should do in response to the plight of the precariat. For the time being, it remains an open question both whether the precariat is (in the process of becoming) a ‘class’ and, if so, whether it has the capacity of becoming dangerous, and to whom.”
           [Claus Offe, “The Vanishing Shadow of the Future.” Review article on “The Precariat: The New Dangerous Class.” Archives of European Sociology. Volume 52, number 3, December 2011. Pages 466-474.]
           “The precariat is now widely considered as the most underprivileged social class. This interpretation draws on Guy Standing’s well-known formulation of the concept. The British sociologist maintains that neoliberal emphasis on market competitiveness has enabled the ‘transfer of risks and insecurity onto workers and their families.’ Moreover, ‘the globalization era has resulted in a fragmentation of national class structures,’ and, while social classes have not disappeared, ‘a more fragmented global class structure emerged.’ As a consequence, Standing claims, ‘[t]he “working class,” “workers” and the “proletariat” … terms embedded in our culture for several centuries’, figure today as ‘little more than evocative labels.’” [Francesco Di Bernardo, “The impossibility of precarity.” Radical Philosophy: Philosophical Journal of the Independent Left. Number 198, July/August 2016. Pages 7-14.]
           “The role of migrants in the advanced capitalist economies defined by neoliberalism and increased flexibilization, globalization and mobility has gained attention in political economy, labour market studies, in sociological and ethnographic perspectives and more recently in (critical) border studies. The migrant is often described as the emblem of the precariat – the precarious figure per se. [Guy] Standing also situates migrants as a central group in the growing precariat but does not prescribe the group much potential for agency. Change is not bound to come from this part of the precariat.” [Martin Bak Jørgensen, “Precariat – What it Is and Isn’t – Towards an Understanding of What it Does.” Critical Sociology. Volume 42, numbers 7–8, November 2016. Pages 959-974.]
      287. critical nursing (Janice L. Thompson, Abram Oudshoorn, and others): Applies critical social theory to nursing.
           “Two key concepts in health promotion within the nurse-client relationship are power and empowerment. Theorists and researchers have not achieved consensus on how they are to be defined and addressed. However, both power and empowerment are recognized to occur at macro and micro levels, and as such need to be addressed at each level. Using a critical nursing perspective, this article explores these concepts–it identifies concerns that arise around power and risks that arise in empowerment practice. Nurses are challenged to develop a new way of seeing empowerment practice, and encouraged to focus on ‘being with’ clients, rather than ‘doing to’ them.
           “This manuscript will apply a critical theoretical perspective, and specifically a critical nursing perspective. This is informed by critical social theory, which holds to the following tenets: there is a possibility for a future free of domination, exploitation, and oppression; domination is structural; structures of domination are reproduced through a false-consciousness; social change begins at home; and people are responsible not to perpetuate domination themselves …. Within the critical perspective, taken-for-granted assumptions are challenged, as they may be oppressive to individuals and groups …. Additionally, it is recognized that we must move beyond the generation of knowledge to the creation and facilitation of change. This change should include the elimination of oppressive structures, and may be addressed by individuals empowering themselves and through the generation of knowledge. These critical theory goals coincide with many of the goals of empowerment practice that have been postulated.
           [Abram Oudshoorn, “Power and empowerment: critical concepts in the nurse-client relationship.” Contemporary Nurse. Volume 20, number 1, 2005. Page 57.]
      288. Marxist psychology (Ronald Mather, S. Cohen, R. Johnson, and R. West): Mather defends this approach. Cohen, Johnson, and West critique it.
           “In plain English, we need some concept of consciousness or the psyche as the seat or the origination of that rationality. Hegemony as a concrete form of social analysis must become a form of Marxist psychology that explains the pernicious success of the market penetration of the psyche itself. And this raises the vexed question, once more, of the mode and manner of ‘the reproduction of social practices’. By what mode and manner does the particularistic ‘logic of capital’ become perceived or experienced as ‘universal rationality’ (commodity fetishism) itself? The question is unanswerable without some model of human agency and its malleability.” [Ronald Mather, “Hegemony and Marxist Psychology.” Theory & Psychology. Volume 13, number 4. Pages 469-487.]
           “In this article we concentrate on the ways in which some American Marxists treat three basic issues in psychology; 1) Unconscious mental activity; 2) Emotion and thinking; 3) Reflection theory. In essence we try to show that the approach of these Marxists to psychology has been, in the main, insufficiently rooted in empirical data; that it onesidedly stresses the conscious, idea- tional, rational side of man and ignores unconscious psychological factors. If consciousness and unconscious mental activity are two aspects of a basic dialectical unity, a position held by many Marxists with which we agree, then in order to understand either aspect of the contradiction it is necessary to understand the other aspect; that is, in order to understand consciousness properly, it is essential to understand unconsciousness.” [S. Cohen, R. Johnson, and R. West, “Marxist Psychology in America: A Critique.” Science & Society. Volume 21, number 2, spring 1957. Pages 98-121.]
      289. critical social psychology (Philip Wexler): He proposes an agenda for this approach to social psychology.
           “… Marxist-Freudians remain at the periphery of American and English criticism of social psychology. This peripheral place, despite the accomplishments of the Marxist-Freudians, is, in part, justified (though they have probably been ignored by liberal social psychologists for different reasons). A critical social psychology should include a description and analysis of precisely that intermediate level of social processes which the Marxist-Freudians omit: how are the reproduction and transformation of social relations and the individual life processes which constitute them accomplished in social interaction? A critical social psychology is an attempt to include that mediating process.” [Philip Wexler, “Alternative viewpoints: foundations of a critical social psychology.” Counterpoints. Volume 16, 1996. Pages 55-76.]
      290. Third Force Psychology (Abraham H. Maslow): He examines humanistic psychology as an alternative to behaviorism, the first force, and Freudianism, the second force.
           “What is developing today is a third, more inclusive, image of man, which is now already in the process of generating great changes in all intellectual fields and in all social and human institutions ….
           “Third Force psychology, as some are calling it, is in large part a reaction to the gross inadequacies of behavioristic and Freudian psychologies in their treatment of the higher nature of man. Classical academic psychology has no systematic place for higher-order elements of the personality such as altruism and dignity, or the search for truth and beauty. You simply do not ask questions about ultimate human values if you are working in an animal lab.”
           [Abraham Maslow, “Some Educational Implications of the Humanistic Psychologies.” Harvard Educational Review. Volume 38, number 4, fall 1968. Pages 685-696.]
      291. transpersonal psychology (Abraham H. Maslow and others): He proposes a higher “Fourth Force” of psychology—beyond the transitional Third Force of humanistic psychology.
           “I should say … that I consider Humanistic, Third Force Psychology to be transitional, a preparation for a still ‘higher’ Fourth Psychology, transpersonal, transhuman, centered in the cosmos rather than in human needs and interest, going beyond humanness, identity, self-actualization, and the like. There will soon (1968) be a Journal of Transpersonal Psychology, organized by the same Tony Sutich who founded the Journal of Humanistic Psychology. These new developments may very well offer a tangible, usable, effective satisfaction of the ‘frustrated idealism’ of many quietly desperate people, especially young people. These psychologies give promise of developing into the life-philosophy, the religion-surrogate, the value-system, the life-program that these people have been missing. Without the transcendent and the transpersonal, we get sick, violent, and nihilistic, or else hopeless and apathetic. We need something ‘bigger than we are’ to be awed by and to commit ourselves to in a new, naturalistic, empirical, non-churchly sense, perhaps as [Henry David] Thoreau and [Walt] Whitman, William James and John Dewey did.” [Abraham Maslow. Toward a Psychology of Being. Second edition. New York: Van Nostrand Reinhold Company Inc. 1968. Pages iii-iv.]
           “I would expect … [a] paradox to be found in transcenders: namely, that they are more apt to regard themselves as carriers of talent, instruments of the transpersonal, temporary custodians so to speak of a greater intelligence or skill or leadership or efficiency. This means a certain peculiar kind of objectivity or detachment toward themselves that to nontranscenders might sound like arrogance, grandiosity, or even paranoia. The example I find most useful here is the attitude of the pregnant mother toward herself and her unborn child. What is self? What is not? How demanding, self-admiring, arrogant does she have a right to be?” [Abraham H. Maslow. The Farther Reaches of Human Nature. New York: A Viking Compass Edition imprint of The Viking Press, Inc. 1972. Page 291.]
           “[Abraham H.] Maslow did not mean to found ‘a psychology without people,’ but he did mean to help create a psychology based on the notion that people can transcend even their human needs for personal self-actualization and seek after "cosmic" values like the good, the true, and the beautiful. Maslow taught that in peak moments, people may be able to transcend personal identity while remaining essentially human.” [Mark E. Koltko-Rivera, “Maslow’s ‘Transhumanism’: Was Transpersonal Psychology Conceived as ‘A Psychology without People in it’?” The Journal of Humanistic Psychology. Volume 38, number 1, winter 1998. Pages 71-80.]
           “There have been, and continue to be, many psychological and philosphical traditions around the globe that are truly transpersonal in their orientation. These approaches are often grounded in the context of elegant and greatly detailed systems of thought, some with a rich history that literally spans thousands of years, that, as a whole, touch almost every culture on earth (in fact, transpersonal anthropology is also a young and growing field). These approaches include Vedanta, Zen and Tibetan Buddhism, Yoga and the Indian philosophies, Sufism, Christian mysticism, Taoism, Kabbalistic thought and mystic Judaism, the spiritual world-views of American Indian cultures, and the teachings of [George] Gurdjieff and his followers.” [Ronald S. Valle and Carmi Harari, “Current Developments in…Transpersonal Psychology. The Humanistic Psychologist. Volume 33, number 1, winter 1985. Pages 11-15.]
           “… transpersonal psychology does not have all of the answers. For this reason, it cannot work in isolation. Its lens of inclusiveness effectively welcomes the complementary strengths of humanistic and integral psychologies, as well as other similarly oriented disciplines, to the shared task of reshaping psychology and reconstructing the vision of what it is to be human.” [Glenn Hartelius, Mariana Caplan, and Mary Anne Rardin, “Transpersonal Psychology: Defining the Past, Divining the Future.” The Humanistic Psychologist. Volume 35, number 2, 2007. Pages 135-160.]
           “The reductionism produced by a narrow empiricism affected not only psychology. It has created a morass of confusion for all of the human enterprise of the twentieth century, from which we are just beginning to emerge. By ‘narrow empiricism,’ I mean the view that the only valid information that could be scientifically studied was that information externally observable by the senses. Of course, this left out of discourse all inherently subjective experience of the human psyche. Transpersonal psychology intentionally included this internal domain of experience in its field of inquiry.” [Dwight Judy, “Transpersonal Psychology: Mapping Spiritual Experience.” Religions. Volume 2, number 4, November 2011. Open access. Pages 649-658.]
           “Transpersonal Psychology has features of a faith-based belief system. However, to the extent that it is a faith-based belief system, it is one that has acquired professional and academic stature. In the San Francisco Bay area, transpersonal psychology is taught as an academic discipline at John F. Kennedy University in its Holistic Studies Program (http://www.jfku.edu). This school includes curricula that emphasize the more qualitative aspects of psychology, including parapsychology. It is feasible for a student to get a graduate degree Holistic Studies at this school at this school and be eligible to sit for clinical licensure in Califomia.” [Patrick O’Reilly, “Transpersonal Psychology.” The Scientific Review of Alternative Medicine. Volume 10, January 2006. Pages 16-20.]
           “Transpersonal psychology has concentrated on the inner development of the individual, as evidenced by its focus on meditation, spiritual aspects of psychosis, the phenomenology of higher states of consciousness, and the conjoining of these states with new paradigms in physics. Yet, for earlier generations of sociologists and anthropologists these same higher states were also understood as social and broadly shareable in a group context. Their inherent social function was seen as central to group cohesion and collective identity.” [Harry T. Hunt, “Consciousness and Society: Societal Aspects and Implications of Transpersonal Psychology.” International Journal of Transpersonal Studies. Volume 29, number 1, 2010. Pages 20-30.]
      292. Fifth Force Psychologies movement (R. Michael Fisher): He examines this movement using the Integral Theory of Ken Wilber.
           “The purpose here is to translate the Fifth Force Psychologies movement through an integral (Wilberian) lens.…
           “… For my focus of research, I’ll analyze another movement, the Fifth Force Psychology (really psychologies as there are many types) in this paper, from the perspective of integral philosophy and theory (a la Ken Wilber). This Wilberian integral approach is based (in part) on what various theorists have labeled ‘integral-aperspectival worldview’ (a la Jean Gebser)—a next step or level in the evolution of consciousness (thinking and values) beyond pluralism, humanism, and existentialism.…
           “… The First Force was Psychoanalysis, the Second was Behaviorism (with its Cognitivist spin-offs later on), and the third was Humanistic (with its Existentialist spin-offs). The Fourth was Transpersonal, and this was the category which Ken Wilber was situated. He was one of the ‘fathers’ of this Transpersonal Movement of scholarship and practices.”
           [R. Michael Fisher, “The Death of Psychology: Integral & Fifth Force Psychologies.” Technical Paper number 36. In Search of Fearlessness Research Institute. Carbondale, Illinois. 2010. Pages 1-31.]
      293. local domains of participation (Judith R. Blau and Richard D. Alba): They consider the mechanisms of power and the mechanisms of peer review.
           “… we find that a main mechanism that endows individuals with power is found in the local domains of participation, i.e., the organizational units of which they are members, and that the capacity of such a unit to empower its members depends on its integration in organization-wide communication networks. The basis of this integration is conceived as overlapping circles of weak ties that inhibit segmentation along occupational or organizational lines and sustain wide participation by rewarding those who participate.…
           “… patterns of working relations develop across the bureaucratic structure. This is clearly observable when we see a baseball game being coached by a recreation aide and psychiatrist. These relations are strengthened and legitimized through mechanisms of peer review that formally involve all programs and departments and through the decentralization of administrative work (planning, evaluation, program development), much of which is carried out in interdisciplinary committees. There are no fewer than fifty-one committees, with each staff member serving on an average of four of them.”
           [Judith R. Blau and Richard D. Alba, “Empowering Nets of Participation.” Administrative Science Quarterly. Volume 27, number 3, September 1982. Pages 363-379.]
      294. social justice counseling perspective (Manivong J. Ratts as pronounced by himself in this MP3 audio file and others): Ratts examines this approach—which includes a critique of capitalism—as a “fifth force” following psychodynamic, cognitive behavioral, existential–humanistic, and multicultural counseling.
           “The resurgence of a social justice counseling perspective … is the the [counseling] profession’s attempt to return to its roots as a fifth force in the field. Based on this perspective, social justice counseling follows the psychodynamic, cognitive behavioral, existential-humanistic, and multicultural counseling forces that exist in the profession. Other scholars have also followed suit indicating that social justice counseling is a reemerging force that is shaping how human behavior is explained and the ways in which counseling is currently being practiced ….
           “… classifying social justice as a fifth force is not suggesting that it is a new concept. Rather, it has more to do with acknowledging how the social justice perspective has matured since its infancy in the early 1900s. Moreover, it is about recognizing the depth, breadth, and widespread impact the social justice perspective is currently having on the counseling profession. Whether or not social justice counseling should be considered a fifth force is up for debate. What is perhaps not debatable is the growing impact of social justice, advocacy, and activism in the field.”
           [Manivong Ratts, “Social Justice Counseling: Toward the Development of a Fifth Force Among Counseling Paradigms.” Journal of Humanistic Counseling, Education and Development. Volume 48, issue 2, fall 2009. Pages 160-172.]
           “There is a seamless connection between multiculturalism and social justice counseling. Both the multicultural and social justice counseling perspectives acknowledge the importance of diversity and recognize that oppression has a debilitating effect on mental health. Together, both perspectives promote the need to develop multiculturally and advocacy competent helping professionals. The imprint of multiculturalism and social justice on the counseling field has also revolutionized the profession. To illustrate, the multicultural counseling perspective shifted the helping paradigm from one that ignored the sociopolitical context to one that recognizes the importance of cultural variables in the counseling relationship …. Similarly, the social justice counseling perspective has brought attention to the importance of using advocacy as a mechanism to address systemic barriers that hinder clients’ ability to achieve optimal psychological health and well-being … [Manivong J. Ratts, “Multiculturalism and Social Justice: Two Sides of the Same Coin.” Journal of Multicultural Counseling and Development. Volume 39, number 1, January 2011. Pages 24-37.]
           “The current trend toward increased multicultural counseling among counselors is critical and has been argued to be a fourth force in the helping professions with as profound an impact on counseling as the third force of humanism had on the prevailing psychodynamic (first force) and behavioral systems (second force) of that time …. Each force reflects a new movement in counseling and psychology. The multicultural dimension is not competing with other counseling theories. By making culture central to humanism, psychodynamism, and behavioral psychology, those perspectives are strengthened, not weakened.
           “Similar arguments have also been made to consider social justice as a fifth force in counseling …. Social justice is a paradigm unto itself distinct from all other helping models. Social justice counseling acknowledges that human development issues need to be understood within the context of living in an oppressive environment. Counseling is not office bound. The debilitating impact of oppression warrants the need for advocacy and activism in communities. Social justice counselors understand that counseling involves both individual and systems work.”
           [Manivong J. Ratts and Paul B. Pedersen. Counseling for Multiculturalism and Social Justice: Integration, Theory, and Application. Fourth edition. Alexandria, Virginia: American Counseling Association. 2014. Pages X.]
           “” [Manivong J. Ratts and Paul B. Pedersen. Counseling for Multiculturalism and Social Justice: Integration, Theory, and Application. Fourth edition. Alexandria, Virginia: American Counseling Association. 2014. Pages X.]
           “At the public policy level, multicultural and social justice counselors focus on the rules, laws and policies that impact clients and other members of their group. This work may involve altering oppressive laws and policies or helping to create more-inclusive policies. An example could include focusing on issues faced by a female transgender client who is forced by city or state laws to either use the public restroom of the gender recorded on their birth certificate or face legal consequences. The counselor might advocate with, or on behalf of, the client by using the counselor’s cisgender (person who is not transgender) privilege to work with city officials to alter policies and practices that are oppressive toward transgender people. Furthermore, counselors, along with their local counseling organizations and legislators, may help to create policies and laws that do not discriminate against the transgender population and other sexual and gender minorities who constantly feel the brunt of stigmatization.” [Manivong J. Ratts, Anneliese A. Singh, S. Kent Butler, Sylvia Nassar-McMillan, and Julian Rafferty McCullough, “Multicultural and Social Justice Counseling Competencies: Practical applications in counseling.” Counseling Today: A Publication of the American Counseling Association. January 27th, 2016. Website. Retrieved on October 29th, 2016.]
           “This article provides a pragmatic approach to how microlevel social justice advocacy strategies can be implemented into counseling practices. It provides an overview of oppression dynamics and its connection to mental health issues as a framework for understanding the importance of social justice advocacy in counseling. It considers social justice related concepts, assumptions, its application at the microlevel, as well as implications for the profession.…
           “… A social justice advocacy approach to counseling examines how issues of equity impact the fair distribution of resources such as education, healthcare, and employment. To this end, interventions are focused on ensuring that oppressive environmental barriers are not negatively impeding client well-being and mental health.”
           [Manivong Ratts, “A Pragmatic View of Social Justice Advocacy: Infusing Microlevel Social Justice Advocacy Strategies into Counseling Practices.” Counseling and Human Development. Volume 41, number 1, September 2008. Pages 1-8.]
           “There is a sense of urgency for counselor educators to incorporate a social justice counseling perspective into their programs. The problems clients bring to therapy are real and often rooted in social, political, and economic conditions …. The training of students in counselor education programs needs to reflect this reality if the profession is to arm emerging counselors with the skills they need to be successful. Preparing emerging counselors for the realities of the profession can be achieved through a social justice framework …. Social justice counseling acknowledges the interplay between clients and their environment …. Moreover, social justice counseling builds off feminist and multicultural therapy tenets of empowering and liberating clients from oppression by using advocacy as a means to address individual, social/cultural, and institutional forms of oppression ….” [Manivong J. Ratts and Chris Wood, “The Fierce Urgency of Now: Diffusion of Innovation as a Mechanism to Integrate Social Justice in Counselor Education.” Counselor Education and Supervision. Volume 50, issue 3, March 2011. Pages 207-223.]
           “Humanistic psychology’s silence on economic justice issues does not support its historical vision for self-actualization and human flourishing. The eudaimonic goal to see humankind optimize its potential requires that economic justice be realized. The purpose of this article is to bring classism to the forefront of humanistic psychology priorities again, together with other social justice concerns outlined in this seminal issue. We will begin with (a) a brief exploration of the impact of economic injustice on human well-being; (b) followed by an explanation of classism’s etiology within the economic structures of Capitalism; (c) finally, we will review implications for humanistic psychologists and counselors, offering suggestions for counseling practice, advocacy, and scholarship.” [Arie T. Greenleaf, Manivong J. Ratts, and and Samuel Y. Song, “Rediscovering Classism: The Humanist Vision for Economic Justice.” Journal of Humanistic Psychology. Volume 56, number 6, November 2016. Pages 646-664.]
           “… scholars have declared social justice action as a moral imperative of the [counseling] profession …. In the counseling psychology discipline, … a call [has been issued] for the profession to move forward in a more committed way to embrace social justice as a central tenet of our discipline. Counseling psychology has a longstanding identity as being strength-based and a history of providing vocational services for at-risk populations …. Counseling psychology has a longstanding identity as being strength-based and a history of providing vocational services for at-risk populations …. Currently, social justice is being heralded as the ‘fifth force’ in counseling psychology ….” [Stephanie Marie Hoover. Mental health counselor trainees’ social justice identity development due to social justice-oriented practicum training: possibilities for change in self and the world. Ph.D. dissertation. The University of Utah. Salt Lake City, Utah. August, 2013. Page 2.]
      295. queer humanism (Kristopher M. Goodrich, Melissa Luke, and and Aaron J. Smith): They integrate queer theory with humanistic psychology.
           “Queer theory is a postmodern critical theory that grew out of the women’s, gay, and queer studies’ movements of the 1990s. As a critical theory, queer theory explores the disconnect between biological sex, gender, desire, identity, and culture, and how discrepancies between each can speak to the multiple forms of reality present within the world, and instability of binary positions.… A pronounced focus of the article will center on the social justice implications of queer humanistic work, and the utility of the theory to promote self-exploration, holistic integration, and validation of all clients’ human potential.…
           “Queer theory is rooted in poststructuralism/postmodernism, and applies this paradigm to the constructs of sexualities, genders, and identities …. The goal of queer theory is to deconstruct binary societal understandings of sex, gender, and identity (and one would suspect the world itself) to expose the imbalance of power present in the world and how that is expressed through the language, labels, and identities we provide to these constructs ….
           “… The shared roots in postmodernism allows queer theory to be integrated and utilized in ways that remain philosophically consistent with the intentionality of humanism in psychology and counselor education: promoting self-exploration, holistic integration, and validation of all clients’ human potential.”
           [Kristopher M. Goodrich, Melissa Luke, and and Aaron J. Smith, “Queer Humanism: Toward an Epistemology of Socially Just, Culturally Responsive Change.” Journal of Humanistic Psychology. Volume 56, number 6, November 2016. Pages 612-623.]
      296. critical psychology (Thomas Teo, Lois Holzman, Tod Sloan, and others): They apply critical social theory to psychology.
           “Critical psychology (better: critical psychologies) has emerged using multifaceted approaches in theory and practice outside of the mainstream of psychology in many countries around the globe. Although critical-psychological ideas can befound prior to the 1960s, the most important developments were made since that period on the background of the rise of social epistemologies and social movements. A core goal of critical psychologists was to transform psychology into an emancipatory, radical, social-justice seeking, or status-quo-resisting approach that understands psychological issues as taking place in specific political-economic or cultural-historical contexts. The term critical psychology was originally claimed for a German school of thought, but was soon self-applied by psychologists from the English-speaking world and from other linguistic regions who gave the term their own meanings. Critical psychology has an even longer history if one considers critiques of mainstream psychology as belonging to critical psychology ….” [Thomas Teo. Critical Psychology. New York: SpringerReference imprint of Springer Science+Business Media. May 22nd, 2012. Pages 1-12.]
           “Critical psychologists differ in the particular theories of society they choose. For example, the concept of a capitalist society involves notions of social structure, economic power, inequality, and so on. Feminist psychologists may prefer the term patriarchy as a description and analytical tool for society. What unites all critical psychologists is an understanding of society based on intersectionalized societal power differentials with consequences for human subjectivity in the conduct of one’s life. Recent research on income inequality and its consequences for mental health supports empirically such an argument ….” [Thomas Teo, “Critical Psychology: A Geography of Intellectual Engagement and Resistance.” American Psychologist. Volume 70, number 3, April 2015. Pages 243-254.]
           “The approaches placed here universally support the empowerment and liberation of the above-mentioned identity groups. Yet, they do so more from an ideological than a circumscribed identity position. All anti-capitalist ideologies fall into this category. While Marxism is the most prominent, others of note, although little discussed in the US, are Marxist-feminist critique, postcolonial critique, and liberation psychology. In broad strokes, the anti-capitalist ideological critique of psychology that has arisen in the US and Europe is centered on how psychology supports the status quo by socializing its citizens to a capitalist ideology.” [Lois Holzman, “Critical Psychology, Philosophy, and Social Therapy.” Human Studies. Volume 36, number 4, December 2013. Pages 471-489.]
           “I continued to stay connected with Occupy at the grassroots level, attending occasional general assemblies and smaller strategy meetings, but also launched a Facebook group called ‘OccuPsy: Critical Psychology for Decolonization,’ with hopes of mobilizing my colleagues to contribute to the success of the movement. The reference to ‘critical psychology’ was to help people around the world find the group, given the work of critical psychologists over several decades to link psychological inquiry more directly to social transformation ….” [Tod Sloan, “OccuPsy: Critical psychology for decolonization.” Psychoanalysis, Culture & Society. Volume 18, number 4, December 2013. Pages 423-430.]
      297. liberation psychology (Mark Burton, Eduardo Duran, Judith Firehammer, John Gonzalez, M. Brinton Lykes, Erin Sibley, Roderick J. Watts, Constance Flanagan, Maritza Montero as pronounced in this MP3 audio file, Jo-Ann S. Finkelstein, Aoife L. Lyons, Geraldine Moane, Virginia Paloma, Vicente Manzano-Arrondo as pronounced in this MP3 audio file, Royal E. Alsup, and others): They propose approaches to psychology which focus on liberation.
           “I am going to talk about a Latin American critical psychology. Why might that be relevant? I am struck by the parallels. A middle income country on the periphery of the capitalist centre. A neoliberal regime. A history of military dictatorship. Repression on an ‘industrial scale’ with torture, imprisonment and extrajudicial killings. Persecution and exclusion of minorities. Social trauma. And a mainstream psychology that serves the system. Where am I? Honduras? Guatemala? Argentina? Honduras? Colombia? Chile?…
           “… There are parallel developments in several other places, some of which go under the name of liberation psychology and others which don’t.”
           [Mark Burton, “Liberation psychology: A constructive critical praxis.” Estudos de Psicologia. Volume 30, number 2, April-June 2013. Pages 249-259.]
           “The theory of liberation psychology is grounded in many tenets of liberation theology that have emerged from grassroots community struggles in other parts of the world where oppression reached an intolerable level. Providers of mental health and spiritual guidance in Latin American countries have been particularly vocal in bringing attention to the lamentation of the oppressed poor through the use of psychological liberation interventions in clinical practice as well as in theory development and critical pedagogy ….” [Eduardo Duran, Judith Firehammer, and John Gonzalez, “Liberation Psychology as the Path Toward Healing Cultural Soul Wounds.” Journal of Counseling & Development. Volume 86, number 3, summer 2008. Pages 288-295.]
           “… it [this article] documents how a small grantmaking organization, coordinated by volunteer psychologists and human rights activists from the United States, deliberately targeted community-based programs designed to respond to the effects of gross violations of human rights, improving the psychosocial well-being of survivors while addressing the root causes of these violations. The Fund serves as an example of North–South pragmatic solidarity …, a praxis that supports a distinctive set of human rights and mental health practices while fostering a theory–practice dialectic toward a 21ˢᵗ-century liberation psychology praxis.” [M. Brinton Lykes and Erin Sibley, “Liberation Psychology and Pragmatic Solidarity: North–South Collaborations Through The Ignacio Martín-Baró Fund.” Peace and Conflict: Journal of Peace Psychology. Volume 20, number 3, August 2014. Pages 209-226.]
           “Liberation psychology is not new, nor is it a U.S. invention. It is a significant part of of psychology, particularly in Latin America …. Nonetheless, psychologists of color, feminist psychologists, and community psychologists in the U.S. have made a number of significant contributions.… An analysis of power is essential for addressing impediments to wellness, and, once again, liberation psychology and developmental psychology are synergistic. Because social power operates through formative institutions such as schools, enhancing the well-being of young people must engage that power.” [Roderick J. Watts and Constance Flanagan, “Pushing the Envelope on Youth Civic Engagement: A Developmental and Liberation Psychology Perspective.” Journal of Community Psychology. Volume 35, number 6, August 2007. Pages 779-792.]
           “Examples illustrating how the liberation psychology is introduced in practice can be seen in papers concerning consciousness and human rights …; the dialectics of exclusion and inclusion … and community organization …; race relations and discrimination …; gender discrimination …; social movements …; community organization and development; and citizen empowerment ….” [Maritza Montero, “The Political Psychology of Liberation: From Politics to Ethics and Back.” Political Psychology. Volume 28, number 5, October 2007. Pages 517-533.]
           “… [A] focus has been gaining momentum: liberation psychology. Its proponents seek to revolutionize psychology through an integration of psychology’s core mission—the psychological wellbeing of people—with the stark reality of nationally based oppressive systems that undermine this mission ….” [Kathryn E. Grant, Jo-Ann S. Finkelstein, and Aoife L. Lyons, “Integrating Psychological Research on Girls With Feminist Activism: A Model for Building a Liberation Psychology in the United States.” American Journal of Community Psychology. Volume 31, numbers 1/2, March 2003. Pages 143-155.]
           “… [An] important element of liberation psychology is the understanding of internalized oppression as an important element in maintaining oppression, and of the essential interlinkage between the social conditions of oppression and the psychological patterns associated with oppression. Psychological patterns such as sense of inferiority or helplessness that are associated with oppression clearly have their origins in social conditions of powerlessness and degradation. Such psychological patterns act as a barrier to action and are part of what maintains oppression. Thus liberation must involve transformation of the psychological patterns as well as the social conditions associated with oppression.” [Geraldine Moane, “Bridging the Personal and the Political: Practices for a Liberation Psychology.” American Journal of Community Psychology. Volume 31, numbers 1/2, March 2003. Pages 91-101.]
           “Liberation Psychology analyzes migratory phenomena in terms of power and calls for the transformation of societies at all levels (structural, organizational and individual) as a means to create social justice and conditions of well-being for all social groups …. In this transformation process, the role that organizations can play in the promotion of a just multicultural society is considered to be essential.…
           “Oppression is a state of domination where the dominating group obtains privileges over others by restricting their access to resources and limiting their capacity to respond ….”
           [Virginia Paloma and Vicente Manzano-Arrondo, “The Role of Organizations in Liberation Psychology: Applications to the Study of Migrations.” Psychosocial Intervention. Volume 20, number 3, 2011. Pages 309-318.]
           “‘Liberation psychology’ is my attempt to systematize and synthesize a perspective that includes the best of humanistic, existential and transpersonal psychologies. The development of liberation psychology took shape through my dialogues with Native Americans of Northern California over a period of twenty-one years working as a psychotherapist and advocate for the rights of Native American children and their families. During this time the Indian Child Welfare Act and the law that guarantees Native American religious freedom were passed by Congress. A main concern was to make sure the psychological services looked at self-determination in light of these Native American laws and included necessary social activism because of the negative and often destructive influence of mainstream psychology in the lives of urban and tribal land-based Native Americans.” [Royal E. Alsup, “Liberation Psychology: A Visionary Mandate for Humanistic, Existential, and Transpersonal Psychologies.” Undated privately published online paper. No pagination. Retrieved on September 19th, 2016.]
      298. liberation philosophy (Joanne M. Hall, Stephen Burwood, and others): Hall ”challenges hegemonic metanarratives.” On the other hand, Burwood uses the same designation as a tongue–in–cheek reference to empowerment.
           “Liberation philosophy is postmodern in the sense that it challenges hegemonic metanarratives of ‘God’ and ‘the free market’ offered by ‘fetishized’ religion and faith in ‘global capitalism.’ Yet liberation philosophy is not postmodern if metanarratives of ‘revolution’ merely replace metanarratives of ‘oppression.’ Liberation philosophers deny that these are dichotomous, explaining that plurality can be affirmed without discarding empowering spirituality.” [Joanne M. Hall, “Marginalization Revisited: Critical, Postmodern, and Liberation Perspectives.” Advances in Nursing Science. Volume 22, number 2, December 1999. Pages 88-102.]
           “The adoption of discourses from corporate capitalism into an essentially liberal institution like a university is not innocent. We have to be careful how we describe the process in which we are engaged for such descriptions are not neutral nor do they leave what they describe untouched. I offer one familiar example, pertinent to our current discussion. Students, especially given changes in funding policy, are now often redescribed as ‘customers.’ There are many reasons why we should resist this dangerous fatuity; the most fundamental being that it undermines the traditional relationship between faculty, the student and her institution.…
           “… I believe that explicitness has politically positive possibilities in that its re-appropriation, as part of a general re-appropriation of the devalued currency of empowerment, can help in the construction of … what I, tongue in cheek, refer to as ‘liberation philosophy.’”
           [Stephen Burwood, “Liberation philosophy.” Teaching In Higher Education. Volume 4, number 4, October 1999. Pages 447-460.]
      299. critical theory of open access (Ajit Pyati [Russian Cyrillic, Ажит Пяти, Ažit Pâti as pronounced in this MP3 audio file]): The article uses critical social theory to critique the exorbitant prices of scholarly journals and to propose open-access journals as a solution.
           “I have argued in this article for critical theory as a useful construct to view emerging forms of library advocacy and activism against the encroachment of techno–capitalist logics, with the open access movement as an example. Critical theory consciously links open access advocacy in libraries to other movements which challenge restrictions on access to information. Most importantly, critical theory opens up a discursive space for libraries in the democratization of technological discourses in society. Technology, rather than being part of a determinist discourse that will lead to the “demise” or “irrelevance” of libraries, in fact can be a realm for increased democratic participation of libraries. Critical theory creates a wider space for a progressive re–envisioning of the roles of libraries in promoting enhanced and more democratic forms of information access.” [Ajit Pyati, “A critical theory of open access: Libraries and electronic publishing.” First Monday: Peer-Reviewed Journal on the Internet. Volume 12, number 10, October 2007. Online publication. No pagination.]
      300. dialectical ontology (Kristian Lasslett): He develops a Marxian approach to “social harm.”
           “This paper … will … offer a dialectical definition of social harm based upon classical Marxist strains of ontological thought.…
           “… Social harm will be dialectically viewed as socially constructed flows which disrupt and undermine the structures and processes of organic and inorganic being; in which humans, as natural beings, are entangled.…
           “… the process of analysis is guided, at least within the Marxist tradition, by a dialectical ontology and a corresponding epistemology and method, which assist the scientist to abstract and prioritise essential relations and processes in a way that facilitates the comprehension of reality as a dynamic whole.”
           [Kristian Lasslett, “Crime or social harm? A dialectical perspective.” Crime, Law and Social Change. Volume 54, number 1, August 2010. Pages 1-19.]
      301. dialectic of the Indian knowledge society (Ajit Pyati): He develops a Marxian critique of neoliberalism.
           “Despite the neoliberal impetus behind the knowledge society, potential also exists for defining an Indian knowledge society in terms of enhanced public institutions and infrastructure, as well as a greater commitment to the public good. Thus, while the knowledge society of the Indian elite imagination is certainly molded from the basic dominant ideological framework that I have just described, openings do exist for more progressive visions of an Indian knowledge society. In other words, contradictory tendencies exist in the Indian knowledge society, with the potential for either capitalist intensification or genuine public sector and community-based alternatives. I term this contradictory nature of India’s current development discourse as the dialectic of the Indian knowledge society. By dialectics, I am referring to the Marxist conception of social change in which the social totality is taken as a given and oppositional tendencies within this totality are studied to gain insight into potentially more emancipating socialist futures …. In this framework, the contradictions of the Indian knowledge society can give insights into the possibilities for more progressive alternatives.” [Ajit Pyati, “Re-envisioning the ‘knowledge society’ in India: Resisting neoliberalism and the case for the ‘public.’” Ephemera: Theory & Knowledge in Organization. Volume 10, number 3/4, 2010. Pages 406-420.]
      302. new oligarchy (Marco d’Eramo as pronounced in this MP3 audio file): He examines the increasing concentration of wealth in the hands of the few.
           “In sum, since the end of the Cold War an oligarchic regime has been consolidated throughout the West, in both the socio-economic and the political sense. The first has been more widely noted, as wealth distribution has become more skewed and veritable monied oligarchies have emerged. In the United States in 2007, 1 per cent of the population owned 35 per cent of total wealth and the next 19 per cent owned 51 per cent, meaning that the top fifth of the population cornered 85 per cent of wealth, while the remaining four-fifths were left with a mere 15 per cent. However, we are also dealing with oligarchy in a formal political sense, because increasingly the elites are not subject to the same legal regime as the rest of the population.” [Marco d’Eramo, “Populism and the New Oligarchy.” Gregory Elliott, translator. New Left Review. Series II, number 82, July–August 2013. Pages 5-28.]
      303. critical social psychology (Derek Hook, Caroline Howarth, Philip Wexler, and Jeff Lashbrook): They develop various applications of critical social theory to social psychology.
           “A critical social psychology of racism and antiracism then will never be complete, just as it will never be wholly singular, or cohesive, at least not in the sense of being impervious to argumentation and debate. It is in this spirit of camaraderie, debate, innovation and collaboration that we wish to offer some reflections on future possible directions for a critical social psychology of racism and antiracism that we hope will never attain a definitive or singular status.” [Derek Hook and Caroline Howarth, “Future Directions for a Critical Social Psychology of Racism/Antiracism.” Journal of Community & Applied Social Psychology. Volume 15, issue 6, November/December 2005. Pages 506-512.]
           “One of the questions that the papers here as a whole invite is what is or what should be the point of a critical social psychology of racism? What questions should such an approach propose? What this special issue contributes to the study of racism is a focus on disruption, resistance and transformative practices. While social psychology has often preferred approaches that account for the expression of racism (whether this is located in individual minds, social institutions or cultural practices) and/or the psychological consequences of racism (on attitudes, stereotypes, representations, identities and self-esteem), we have chosen empirical projects and theoretical discussions that focus on the moments in which racist and racialising practices are made visible, unsettled and so disrupted.” [Caroline Howarth and Derek Hook, “Towards a Critical Social Psychology of Racism: Points of Disruption.” Editorial. Journal of Community & Applied Social Psychology. Volume 15, issue 6, November/December 2005. Pages 425-431.]
           “The attempt to translate the dynamics of capitalist relations of production into individual character and pathology is then concretized by a specific analysis of the actual conditions of the labor process and its class differential effects on the lives of workers. [Michael] Schneider’s analysis indicated a willingness to: specify the meaning of the whole at the level of social organization; describe the dynamics of the individual in relation to a central category of Marxist social theory that has been systematically neglected by previous critical social psychologies – labor; and finally, describe the relation between personal life and the operation of a societal institution other than the family.” [Philip Wexler, “Alternative viewpoints: foundations of a critical social psychology.” Counterpoints. Volume 16, 1996. Pages 55-76.]
           “The need for a critical social psychology, now no less than before, is a response to social conditions that are perceived as problematic, threatening and undesirable. The twin classical problematic of the alternative social psychologies has been class consciousness and Fascism. Within this general social problematic, each theorist has had particular goals: sexual freedom, critical thought and aesthetic capacity; the removal of the conditions which induce developmental ‘stuntedness’; the realization of the possibilities of individual social autonomy; reduction of the repression of the concrete sensuous experience by the abstraction of exchange value and wage-labor; the transformation of socially reproductive neurosis into the freeing schizoid flow of psychosis; the disintegration of the normal ego; the emergence of a collective subject.” [Philip Wexler, “Dimensions of a critical social psychology: production, lived experience and class.” Counterpoints. Volume 16, 1996. Pages 77-93.]
           “… I wish to share some ideas for teaching an alternative social psychology—a critical social psychology …—that provides new ways of seeing some standard social psychological issues and that may help us to meet our goals more satisfactorily. I wish primarily to do two things here: first, to offer for consideration alternative conceptual material, and second, to show how I use such material in class to highlight its importance for an understanding of our everyday lives.” [Jeff Lashbrook, “Notes toward Teaching a Critical Social Psychology.” Teaching Sociology. Volume 19, number 2, April 1991. Pages 182-185.]
      304. critical community psychology (Caterina Arcidiacono as pronounced in this MP3 audio file, Salvatore Di Martino as pronounced in this MP3 audio file, Mohamed Seedat [Arabic/ʿArabiyyaẗ, مُحَمَّد سِيدَات, Muḥammad Sīdāt], Heather Davidson, Scot Evans, Cynthia Ganote, Jorie Henrickson, and others): They apply critical social theory to community psychology.
           “… CCP [critical community psychology] considers happiness as neither the result of personal achievements, nor the outcome of national policies aimed increasing GDP [gross domestic product] or improving the welfare system; rather, it is a constant relationship between the resources and the opportunities provided by context – together with the community to which people belong –, and the best use they decide to make of them.…
           “In fact, CCP studies the interactions between individual and contexts, specifically taking into account relational, organizational, cultural, economic and political domains, both taken independently and in their reciprocal interactions ….”
           [Caterina Arcidiacono and Salvatore Di Martino, “A Critical Analysis of Happiness and Well-being. Where We Stand, Where We Need to Go.” Community Psychology in Global Perspective. Volume 2, issue 1, 2016. Pages 6-35.]
           “… in the context of resistance to oppression and social transformation, critical community psychology-oriented work of recovery and memory, supporting the elicitation and articulation of individual and collective narratives, the assertion of inclusive collective agency, and the restoration of marginal communities’ own stories of historical and contemporary realities, people, and places, obtains liberatory significance …. I aim to critically describe a people’s history project, namely, The Eldorado Park Oral History Project, as an enactment of critical community psychology that focused on facilitating expressions of individual and collective narratives, the affirmation of social agency, and the restitution of a marginal community’s own generative narratives of past and contemporary realities.” [Mohamed Seedat, “Oral History as an Enactment of Critical Community Psychology.” Journal of Community Psychology. Volume 3, number 1, January 2015. Pages 22-35.]
           “The primary purpose of this paper was to inform a more critical community psychology using an interdisciplinary approach in both process and content to synthesizing concepts of power and action shared with other critical scholarship. Through an analysis of power and action we examined the extent to which seven leading ‘critical school’ journals offer a transformative and epistemic challenge to the status quo, a concern shared by many community psychologists.” [Heather Davidson, Scot Evans, Cynthia Ganote, Jorie Henrickson, Lynette Jacobs-Priebe, Diana L. Jones, Isaac Prilleltensky, Manuel Riemer, “Power and Action in Critical Theory Across Disciplines: Implications for Critical Community Psychology.” American Journal of Community Psychology. Volume 38, number 1–2, September 2006. Pages 35-49.]
           “… in this contribution we propose to integrate the approach of degrowth with that of Critical Community psychology (CCP). Community Psychology in its critical variant is an emerging approach particularly committed to promoting individual and social well-being through the adoption of an ecological, justice-oriented, and value-based perspective ….
           “… Critical Community psychologists work on promoting quality of life through the advancement of justice, democracy, environmental preservation, development of capabilities, and freedom of choice ….”
           [Alfredo Natale, Salvatore Di Martino, Fortuna Procentese, and Caterina Arcidiacono, “De-growth and critical community psychology: Contributions towards individual and social well-being.” Futures. Volume 78–79, April–May 2006. Pages 47-56.]
      305. Deweyan predictive mode of inquiry (Samuel Bagg): While defending critical theory, Bagg argues for an approach based upon John Dewey’s realism.
           “… I defend the necessity of substantive, constructive political theory in addition to theory that is primarily ‘critical’ in nature, yet validate realist complaints about the abstract ‘normative’ approach to it that currently predominates.…
           “The problem with a purely critical theory is that it does not address the concrete dilemmas we face, where there are always tradeoffs, complexities, and conflicting ideals.…
           “… [There is] ‘normative’ theory …. The term normative is often used within the community of political theorists to refer to … broadly analytic theory focused on consistent general principles, clear concepts, and abstract ideals ….
           “… The disciplinary community of ‘realist’ political theorists who are unsatisfied with critical and abstract normative approaches, I argue, ought to adopt a Deweyan ‘predictive’ method of inquiry ….”
           [Samuel Bagg, “Between Critical and Normative Theory: Predictive Political Theory as a Deweyan Realism.” Political Research Quarterly. Volume 69, number 2, 2016. Pages 233-244.]
           “For simplicity’s sake, I have written as if my main problem were to show how, in the face of a supposed difficulty, a strictly realistic theory of the perceptual event may be maintained. But my interest is primarily in the facts, and in the theory only because of the facts it formulates. The significance of the facts of the case may, perhaps, be indicated by a consideration which has thus far been ignored.” [John Dewey, “Brief Studies in Realism. I.” The Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods. Volume 8, number 15, July 1911. Pages 393-400.]
           “Until the epistemological realists have seriously considered the main propositions of the pragmatic realists, viz., that knowing is something that happens to things in the natural course of their career, not the sudden introduction of a ‘unique’ and non-natural type of relation—that to a mind or consciousness—they are hardly in a position to discuss the second and derived pragmatic proposition that, in this natural continuity, things in becoming known undergo a specific and detectable qualitative change.” [John Dewey, “Brief Studies in Realism. II.” The Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods. Volume 8, number 20, September 1911. Pages 546-554.]
           “Speaking of the matter only for myself, the presuppositions and tendencies of pragmatism are distinctly realistic; not idealistic in any sense in which idealism connotes or is connoted by the theory of knowledge. (Idealistic in the ethical sense is another matter, and one whose associations with epistemological idealism, aside from the accidents of history, are chiefly verbal.)” [John Dewey, “The Realism of Pragmatism.” The Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods. Volume 2, number 12, June 1905. Pages 324-327.]
      306. non-human animal liberation (Corinne Painter): Her contention is that, in order for that liberation to occur, capitalism must be radically disrupted.
           “… in addition to arguing that a proper understanding of some of [Karl] Marx’s most fundamental commitments requires us to fight not only for human but for non-human animal liberation, I also argue that genuine animal liberation requires the radical disruption of capitalism and that the more common, less radical animal liberation movements are insufficient for bringing about this end.…
           “… although I join other Marxists and Critical Theorists in arguing that neither traditional (liberal) rights-based nor utilitarian attempts to bring about animal liberation are sufficient for achieving this end and that genuine animal liberation requires the radical disruption of capitalism, my view rests, first and foremost, on my claim that we have a moral obligation to structure our communities so that the flourishing of animals, as individuals (not species groups), is truly respected. In this connection, I argue that individual animal flourishing is not considered less significant than the flourishing of humans, and I take care to show that the focus on individual animals need not succumb to the troublesome consequences of the traditional arguments for animal liberation, which claim that the actions of concerned individuals is sufficient to achieve justice for animals.”
           [Corinne Painter, “Non-human animals within contemporary capitalism: A Marxist account of non-human animal liberation.” Capital & Class. Volume 40, number 2, 2016. Pages 325-343.]
      307. living the eleventh thesis (Richard Levins): He focuses on personally applying Karl Marx’s eleventh thesis.
           “Philosophers have sought to understand the world. The point, however, is to change it.
           “—Karl Marx, Theses on Feuerbach, No. 11 …
           “These interests inform my political work: within the left, my task has been to argue that our relations with the rest of nature cannot be separated from a global struggle for human liberation, and within the ecology movement my task has been to challenge the ‘harmony of nature’ idealism of early environmentalism and to insist on identifying the social relations that lead to the present dysfunction. At the same time my politics have determined my scientific ethics. I believe that all theories are wrong that promote, justify, or tolerate injustice.”
           [Richard Levins, “Living the Eleventh Thesis.” Monthly Review: An Independent Socialist Magazine. Volume 67, issue 11, April 2016. Pages 47-54.]
      308. relational perspective (Mustafa Emirbayer [in Arabic/ʿArabiyyaẗ, مُصْطَفَى أِمِيرْبَايِر‎], Steven Vallas, Emily Cummins, Elizabeth Zelvin, and many others): These approaches to sociology, psychology, addictionology, human resource management, and other fields—representing a broad spectrum—focus on “the relationship” as the basic unit of analysis.
           “Relational theorists reject the notion that one can posit discrete, pre-given units such as the individual or society as ultimate starting points of sociological analysis (as in the self-actional perspective). Individual persons, whether strategic or norm following, are inseparable from the transactional contexts within which they are embedded ….
           “… Freedom … means nothing apart from the concrete transactions in which individuals engage, within cultural, social structural, and social psychological contexts of action; it derives its significance entirely from the ongoing interplay (akin to a game) of decision, consequence, and reaction.…
           “… the relational point of view sees agency as inseparable from the unfolding dynamics of situations, especially from the problematic features of those situations.…
           “… Paradoxically (for a mode of study so intently focused upon processuality), relational sociology has the greatest difficulty in analyzing, not the structural features of static networks, whether these be cultural, social structural, or social psychological, but rather, the dynamic processes that transform those matrices of transactions in some fashion. Even studies of ‘processes-in-relations,’ in other words, too often privilege spatiality (or topological location) over temporality and narrative unfolding.”
           [Mustafa Emirbayer, “Manifesto for a Relational Sociology.” American Journal of Sociology. Volume 103, number 2, September 1997. Pages 281-317.]
           “Two decades have passed since those days—approximately a decade and a half since I myself penned a ‘Manifesto for a Relational Sociology’ …. During that time, the discourse seems gradually, almost imperceptibly, to have shifted from an adversarial to a paradigm-building spirit, from negative to positive, from critical to affirmative. To be sure, there still are invocations of the old antagonists, usually portrayed as structure or action based; as holistic or individualistic. There also are allusions to rival stances that claim to be relational. But to a conspicuous degree, there is greater concern now to explore affiliations with friends … than there is to struggle intellectually against enemies. There also is greater attention paid to theory-building than there is to theoretical struggle.”
           [Mustafa Emirbayer, “Relational Sociology as Fighting Words.” Conceptualizing Relational Sociology: Ontological and Theoretical Issues. Christopher Powell and François Dépelteau, editors. New York: Palgrave Macmillan imprint of St. Martin’s Press LLC. 2013. Pages 209-211.]
           “Putting relational theory into practice entails challenging the validity of economistic perspectives toward inequality, chiefly by showing how social classifications and categories (e.g., gender, race, ethnicity, or nationality) exercise a determining influence over the distribution of wages, jobs, and economic opportunities over and above market variables.…
           “Yet important areas of ambiguity and uncertainty have accompanied this relational turn, threatening to derail much of the progress this movement has made. Focusing primarily on the study of workplace inequality, we provide in this article a critical reconnaissance of relational thinking, identifying what we find to be the major virtues and limitations evident within three distinct strands of social scientific thinking.”
           [Steven Vallas and Emily Cummins, “Relational Models of Organizational Inequalities: Emerging Approaches and Conceptual Dilemmas.” American Behavioral Scientist. Volume 58, number 2, February 2014. Pages 228-255.]
           “Besides asserting the value of women’s relational skills, the relational theorists contend that the autonomy and independence so admired in men are, to some extent, an illusion.…
           “… when codependency is reconsidered in the context of the relational model of women’s development, a much richer yet more subtle fabric of meaning is uncovered—one with significant implications for treatment.
           “At its most universal, codependency is the tendency to expect external sources of fulfillment and to seek identity and self-worth outside the self. It is evident how this society encourages unrealistic expectations of happiness and the inordinate valuing of external objects and achievements in both men and women.”
           [Elizabeth Zelvin, “Applying Relational Theory to the Treatment of Women’s Addictions.” Affilia. Volume 14, number 1, spring 1999. Pages 9-23.]
           “The very concept of a relational therapist that ‘holds’ is paradoxical. The therapist has the ability to hold and to contain his patient, but this patient is not a helpless baby and the therapist is not his mother. At the same time, the analyst himself is affected by the process that the patient is undergoing and reacts to this from a very personal place as well. The question remains whether the analyst knows exactly what the patient ‘needs,’ for at times, even the most empathic response could be experienced as intrusive.” [Herzel Yogev, “Holding in Relational Theory and Group Analysis.” Group Analysis. Volume 41, number 4, December 2008. Pages 373-390.]
           “Relational theory has developed a conception of dissociative self-state phenomena in its understanding of enactment. Yet the dissociative model of mind fails to provide a satisfactory framework for changes in the relational organization of the dyad. We present here an alternative conception that in emphasizing dyadic process shifts the therapeutic focus from what currently are understood to be memories from the past to the present interaction of analyst and patient. We will show how from this perspective the distinction begins to break down between enactment and the subtle back-and-forth in relation.” [The Boston Change Process Study Group, “Enactment and the Emergence of New Relational Organization.” Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association. Volume 61, number 4, August 2013. Pages 727-749.]
           “This article takes as its central task the development of a more sociological approach to earnings inequality. We focus on earnings since they are both central to the supply–demand framework and arguably the most broadly influential aspect of social stratification on individual and household well-being. We show that the favored supply and demand mechanism sociology has explicitly or implicitly adopted suffers from sufficient empirical anomalies that we should rethink our reliance on this borrowed conceptual apparatus. We develop an approach to that focuses on social relations within organizations as the central and most proximate causal field generating income distributions. The mechanism we propose that researchers adopt in place of supply and demand in labor markets is relational claims-making within organizations.…
           “What is most distinctive about this model is that in contrast to the entire supply–demand framework the basic unit of analysis is not the individual embedded in aggregate market structures, but the social relationship in its organizational context. We think this is consistent with the key sociological insight that social relations, not individual properties, generate social outcomes.”
           [Dustin Avent-Holt and Donald Tomaskovic-Devey, “A Relational Theory of Earnings Inequality.” American Behavioral Scientist. Volume 58, number 3, March 2014. Pages 379-399.]
           “Most sociological ethnographies are either of places (e.g., neighborhoods, workplaces) or groups (e.g., single mothers, political activists). This article presents an alternative to group- and place-based fieldwork: relational ethnography. Relational ethnography takes as its scientific object neither a bounded group defined by members’ shared social attributes nor a location delimited by the boundaries of a particular neighborhood or the walls of an organization but rather processes involving configurations of relations among different actors or institutions.” [Matthew Desmond, “Relational ethnography.” Theory and Society. Volume 43, number 5, September 2014. Pages 547-579.]
           “This paper argues that the given single-level conceptualisations of diversity management within the territory of legal or organisational policy fail to capture the relational interplay of structural- and agentic-level concerns of equality …. Departing from single-level conceptualisations, the paper proposes a relational framework that takes into consideration multilevel factors when developing a context-specific approach to diversity management.” [Jawad Syeda and Mustafa Özbilgin, “A relational framework for international transfer of diversity management practices.” The International Journal of Human Resource Management. Volume 20, number 12, December 2009. Pages 2435-2453.]
           “… relationalism is a theoretical perspective based in pragmatism that eschews Cartesian dualism, substantialism, and essentialism while embracing emergence, experience, practice, and creativity. It includes some but not all social network analysts, field theorists, actor-network researchers, economic sociologists, a number of comparative-historical researchers, and of course card-carrying relationalists ….” [Emily Erikson, “Relationalism Emergent.” Contemporary Sociology. Volume 44, number 1, 2014. Pages 3-7.]
           “… interpersonal or relational empowerment included belonging to a group and associated feelings such as confidence derived from group membership and solidarity. It also included a commitment to passing on the values associated with collective activity to future members. Finally, empowered youth expressed their desire to empower others in their organization.” [Brian D. Christens, “Toward Relational Empowerment.” American Journal of Community Psychology. Volume 50, numbers 1–2, September 2012. Pages 114-128.]
           “… I contend that there are two different understandings of the connection between the qualifier ‘relational’ and the concept of power. I refer to them as ‘Anglo-American’ and ‘Continental’ relationalism. The labels designate certain ideal types of arguments, not geographical locations (although the obvious connotation with a similar division in philosophy is intentional). With no intention to downplay either the contribution of SNA [social network analysis] or the importance of the symposium, I nevertheless argue that the participants presented only the Anglo-American perspective on relationalism and that introducing the Continental understanding would add value for political science.” [Peeter Selg, “Two Faces of the ‘Relational Turn.’” PS: Political Science & Politics. Volume 49, number 1, January 2016. Pages 27-31.]
           “A relational perspective leads to a reconstruction of our key concepts. These concepts are no longer conceived as a pre-defined entity.They must be redefined as relational concepts which imply that they are constituted in a process or in a process of ‘structuration’. In other words, a concept such as society is dissolved from being conceived as an ‘autonomous, internally organized, self-sustaining system with naturally bounded, integrated, sovereign entities as national states or countries’ … to ‘a diversity of intersecting networks of social interaction’ ….” [Lars Bo Kaspersen and Norman Gabriel, “The importance of survival units for Norbert Elias’s figurational perspective.” The Sociological Review. Volume 56, number 3, 2008. Pages 370-387.]
           “While a number of key figures in the history of sociological thought recognized the relationality inherent in human social life, that way of thinking did not get effectively translated into conventional sociological concepts as they were used in teaching and research. There are concerted efforts to change this; contemporary scholars across the continents have been picking up the diverse threads of a more relational sociology. A significant portion of contemporary theorizing revolves around efforts to push our thinking and our vocabulary more explicitly in the direction of dynamic relations and away from substances into which the notion of ‘action’ must somehow be integrated.” [Debbie Kasper, “Advancing Sociology through a Focus on Dynamic Relations.” Conceptualizing Relational Sociology: Ontological and Theoretical Issues. Christopher Powell and François Dépelteau, editors. New York: Palgrave Macmillan imprint of St. Martin’s Press LLC. 2013. Pages 67-86.]
      309. radical relationism (Christopher Powell): He proposes an irrealist, relativist approach to relational sociology.
           “From this starting point I propose that we treat levels of analysis or macro–micro distinctions as contingently useful heuristics rather than as essential features of phenomena. Likewise, I propose an irrealist stance based on the tendency of radical relationism to connect rather than separate subjects and objects of knowledge. This framework allows us to treat structure and agency as nonopposed on the grounds that we can parse the same phenomena in structural or agential terms depending on our epistemological objectives. Applied reflexively to social-scientific intellectual production, this framework implies a relational relativism that avoids both the solipsism of subjectivist or individualist relativism and the reifications of holist or functionalist relativisms. This relational relativism provides an intellectual justification for the provisional status of all scientific knowledge and makes explicit our own implication, as knowledge-producers, in the contents of scientific accounts of the world. Radical relationism also has implications for the justification and negotiation of ethical claims, without implying one particular ethics of its own.” [Christopher Powell, “Radical Relationism: A Proposal.” Conceptualizing Relational Sociology: Ontological and Theoretical Issues. Christopher Powell and François Dépelteau, editors. New York: Palgrave Macmillan imprint of St. Martin’s Press LLC. 2013. Pages 188-207.]
      310. process relationism (Timothy Morton): Morton has developed a non-materialistic—or object–oriented—ontology.
           “In this book the aesthetic just isn’t optional candy on top of objects, nor is it some dating service that bonds them together (since they are ontologically separated). As part of the project of object-oriented ontology (ooo), the philosophy whose first architect is Graham Harman, this book liberates the aesthetic from its ideological role as matchmaker between subject and object, a role it has played since the days of [Immanuel] Kant.…
           “This is a book about realism without matter. Matter, in current physics, is simply a state of information. Precisely: information is necessarily information-for (for some addressee). Matter requires at least one other entity in order to be itself.…
           “Nature likewise is ‘discovered in the use of useful things.’ I take use here to apply not only to humans, but also to bees with their flowers and hives, chimpanzees with their digging sticks, slime molds with their wet pavements. This is not an argument about how humans impose meaning on mute things. It’s an argument about the fact that what humans call matter and Nature are ontologically secondary to something else. A sort of backward glance confers the material status of matter and the natural status of Nature: the backward glance not of a cognizing being, necessarily, but of a task accomplished. The key turns in the lock: ‘Oh, that’s what the key was for.’ There must, then, be something ‘behind’ or ‘beyond’ matter—and object-oriented ontology (ooo) gives us a term for this: simply, what is behind matter is an object.…
           “… Relations thus contain a nullity that collapses forwards as more relations are built onto them. This tumbling nullity is what is called time. Because they are to-come, relations evoke a feeling of process: hence the illusion that things are processes, that process relationism is the most adequate description of how things are. Yet because time emerges from relations we can never specify in advance what they will be. Process relationism is an ontic or ontotheological attempt to pin down exactly what things are, by way of what ooo sees as an inevitable parody of what things are: causal events. Process relationism tries to reduce the intrinsic ambiguity of relations between things. These relations are inherently contradictory, like the relations you have with a Turner painting in the Tate Britain, versus the ones your friend has.…
           “Forget the valuation of the schizophrenic against the neurotic, and focus on the descriptive language. This is the pure poetry of process relationism. It’s perfect for evoking the persistence of objects, the way they stay themselves, for a time at any rate, before they break, before they die. ooo shouldn’t abandon processes. It should think them as part of a larger configuration space. Processes are wonderful metaphors for existence: existing, continuing, flourishing, living. The very failures of process relationism, as we shall see—its failure to account for time as an inherent feature of objects—turns out to be a virtue, insofar as the magical illusion of the present is a feeling of being ‘in’ time, just as one is immersed in the water of a swimming pool or the pulsing rhythms of a nightclub.”
           [Timothy Morton. Realist Magic: Objects, Ontology, Causality. Ann Arbor, Michigan: Open Humanities Press imprint of Michigan Publishing. 2013. Creative Commons. Pages 19, 42-43, 94, and 153.]
           “The existence of a text is its coexistence with at least one (1+n) withdrawn entity. This is far from the whole OOO [object-oriented ontology] truth, but from an OOO standpoint, it is the radar echo from the tip of an object-oriented iceberg. OOO is truly post-Derridean, rather than a regression from Derrida back into an affirmative or positivistic process relationism ([Alfred North] Whitehead, [Manuel] De Landa). Most materialisms are indeed forms of relationism, since they imagine things to be patterns of smaller things, or snapshots of larger things. This view is so entrenched that it is very difficult to think past it. We are too accustomed, argues OOO, to seeing things as patterns and not as objects.
           “Instead of materialism, OOO draws on the ugly duckling of Aristotle’s four causes, formal causation.”
           [Timothy Morton, “An Object-Oriented Defense of Poetry.” New Literary History. Volume 43, number 2, spring 2012. Pages 205-224.]
      311. relational being (Kenneth J. Gergen): He develops approaches to relational pedagogy, relational recovery, relational coordination (decision–making), relational leading, and relational responsibility.
           “Although the central challenge is that of bringing the reality of relationship into clear view, I do not intend this work as an exercise in theory. I am not interested in creating a work fit only for academic consumption. Rather, my attempt is to link this view of relationship to our daily lives. The concept of relational being should ultimately gain its meaning from our ways of going on together. By cementing the concept to forms of action, my hope is also to invite transformation in our institutions—in our classrooms, organizations, research laboratories, therapy offices, places of worship, and chambers of government. It is the future of our lives together that is at stake here, both locally and globally.
           “The reader must be warned. This proposal for a relation-centered alternative to the traditional view of self will be discomforting. A critical challenge to the self has broad ramifications. We commonly suppose, for example, that people have effects on each other. As we say, parents mold their children’s personality, schools have effects on students’ minds, and the mass media have an impact on the attitudes and values of the population. Yet, this common presumption of cause and effect is at one with the tradition of bounded being. That is, it relies on conception of fundamentally separate entities, related to each other like the collision of billiard balls. In the present work I will propose that we move beyond cause and effect in understanding relationships. Nor, by bracketing the presumption of cause and effect, do I mean to celebrate determinism’s alter, namely free will. The view of a freely choosing agent also sustains the tradition of bounded being. The vision of relational being will invite us, then, to set aside the freedom/determinism opposition, and to consider the world in terms of relational confluence.”
           [Kenneth J. Gergen. Relational Being: Beyond Self and Community. Oxford, England, and New York: Oxford University Press. 2009. Page xv-xvi.]
           “The book itself was born of passion. It begins with a critique of the longstanding Western tradition in which individual self has served as the fundamental atom of society. My concerns are with the ways in which this tradition lends itself to a ‘me-first’ mentality, in which individual control, self-perfection, dominance, and alienation are favored. Relationships, on this account, are secondary and largely instrumental. ‘What can he or she give me?How much will it cost me?’ Nor am I sanguine about the traditional alternative to individualism—namely, communalism. Here we simply replace one form of bounded and self-seeking entity with another. I am not opting for abandoning these longstanding conceptions; they are useful constructions for some purposes. However, it was my major purpose to add to our human potentials by articulating an alternative way of understanding ourselves, one in which relational process stands at the center of all intelligible action.” [Kenneth J. Gergen, “Relational Being: A Brief Introduction.” Journal of Constructivist Psychology. Volume 24, issue 4, October–December 2011. Pages 280-282.]
           “Relational being is offered as an augmentation—an addition to our potentials—as opposed to a denial. It is fruitless to debate whether we “really and truly” are free agents or not, but many of our ways of life do rely on such a discourse. The question for me is thus whether we wish to sustain all such ways of life and, if not, whether we must then capitulate to the deleterious implications of an otherwise hegemonic determinism.” [Kenneth J. Gergen, “Relational Being in Question: A Reply to My Colleagues.” Journal of Constructivist Psychology. Volume 24, issue 4, October–December 2011. Pages 314-320.]
           “No matter how we paint an ontologically uncommitted and pluralistic bricolage (to borrow [Kenneth J.] Gergen’s term), there must always be a bricoleur whose commitments and assumptions precede and found that synthesis. In this sense, constructionism is only ontologically mute in the way that agnosticism is theologically mute—that is, through the rather expressive discourse of a pointed silence. Just as agnosticism is not simply a reservation of theological judgment but the denial of any basis for such judgments, the constructionism underlying Relational Being is also a denial of the basis for ontological judgments.” [Joshua W. Clegg, “The Ontological Commitments of Relational Philosophy.” Journal of Constructivist Psychology. Volume 24, issue 4, October–December 2011. Pages 324-327.]
           “In ‘Relational Being,’ Gergen raises the issue of man as a bounded individual, versus man as created by his relationships. Compared to many of his predecessors, the way in which Gergen conducts his discourse has some important advantages. Among these, his use of examples is immediately outstanding. All major points in his argument are illustrated and backed not only by examples, but by examples drawn from real everyday situations and practices.” [Bjørn Gustavsen, “Relational Being: Beyond Self and Community.” Review article. International Journal of Action Research. Volume 6, number 1, 2010. Pages 139-146.]
           “The expanding global discourse on education is built on the concept of individualism. One emerging direction in educational theory that challenges this discourse is relational pedagogy.…
           “This article aims to discuss some characteristic aspects of relational pedagogy and thereby proposing a theoretical course in the field. By comparing Kenneth Gergen’s and Martin Buber’s relational conceptions, the article argues that relational pedagogy could or should be characterized by a distinction between two basic relational dimensions, tentatively labeled co-existence and co-operation.”
           [J. Aspelin, “Co-Existence and Co-Operation: The Two-Dimensional Conception of Education.” Education. Volume 1, number 1, 2011. Pages 6-11.]
      312. reflective pragmatism (Kenneth J. Gergen): He develops a critical approach which, he considers, has developed from an “emerging consensus.”
           “I would characterize … [the] emerging consensus as a reflective pragmatism ….
           “The two most widely shared assumptions lending themselves to a reflective pragmatism are as follows:
           “Whatever exists makes no necessary requirements on representation.…
           “What stands as objective truth can be established within a research tradition.…
           “Emerging in the 1930’s, the critical movement in the social sciences has now spawned multiple sites of activity across the disciplines.… As … reflected more fully in the liberatory movement more generally …, the attempt is to draw critical attention to existing ways of life, and to engender a critical consciousness from which social change might spring. The hope is that ‘seeing with new eyes’ can incite resistance to the status quo.”
           [Kenneth J. Gergen, “From Mirroring to World-Making: Research as Future Forming.” Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour. Volume 45, issue 3, 2014. Pages 287-310.]
      313. theory of social representations or social representation(s) theory (Serge Moscovici [in French, as pronounced in this MP3 audio file or, in the original Romanian, Srul Herş Moscovici as pronounced in this MP3 audio file]): The Romanian–born French social psychologist developed a theory of ideas, practices, and values.
           “I will not insist on the observational difficulties that it [my hypothesis] raises, which research should soon be able to resolve. I have indicated elsewhere … how it articulates with the theory of social representations, so that it is unnecessary to come back to this here. It will suffice to mention here the question to which it must answer, the principal fact to explain.… Furthermore, it would contradict itself, if we did so. It relies itself on a shared representation of man’s nature, and is culturally obliged to stick to it. As it is not proven that this representation is unique, one can raise the question: Is there another one which leads to using processes of inference forbidden by science, and for which presumed biases, shortcomings and illusions have an immediate legitimacy, as long as common sense prevails? Is it inadmissible, in fact, that this substantial part of psychic activity should needlessly take place in our society.…
           “According to the proposed hypothesis, the social representation centred on the individual would tend to favour the subjective anchorage. It imposes on everyone to define himself or herself, to be responsible for his or her choices, to behave under all circumstances like the author of his or her acts and to express a point of view to his or her own.”
           [Serge Moscovici, “The new magical thinking.” Public Understanding of Science. Volume 23, number 7, 2014. Pages 759-779.]
           “The main aim of the theory of social representations is clear. By focusing on everyday communication and thinking, it hopes to determine the link between human psychology and modern social and cultural trends. It has begun to arouse interest, stimulating research in a number of places, with the notorious exception of the United States. What explains this interest? The theory undoubtedly legitimates concern for social aspects and enriches the phenomenology of our discipline, which had become extremely meagre. It is better suited for dealing with specific situations than other theories that were conceived for more abstract and on the whole artificial set-ups. Because of this extension. in all likelihood. people are beginning to notice numerous points of convergence between this theory and various currents such as ethnomethodology, symbolic interactionism, etc.” [Serge Moscovici, “Notes towards a description of Social Representations.” European Journal of Social Psychology. Volume 18, number 3, July 1988. Pages 211-250.]
           “My purpose here is … present the findings of that research, but to outline a few thoughts about how our theory of social representations might be able to contribute to a study of the interaction between a minority that suffers discrimination and the majority that discriminates against it, or, in a word, of prejudices and relations between groups. This will also shed some new light on a very old phenomenon to which most research in social psychology has been devoted.
           “First, a social representation, like any human representation, is both intellectual and figurative; it is a network of concepts and symbols with an imaginary element …. Second, we cannot fail to be struck by the fact that common sense exists not only in all humans, but that it is also the sense on which the life of the community is based.”
           [Serge Moscovici, “An essay on social representations and ethnic minorities.” Social Science Information. Volume 50, numbers 3–4, 2011. Pages 442-461.]
           “The paradox of the theory of social representations, i.e. being both general and particular, is by no means the effect of chance. On the contrary, it is due to the profound nature of the theory and explains its power. But that is not really the point I want to make. The point is that during the last decade we have dedicated many efforts to highlighting the general aspect of social representations, so as to contrast our theory with the individualistic, non-social conception prevalent in our science.…
           “… What seems to me obvious, at least, is that communication so to speak secretes the structure of a representation by changing the potential content into an actual one and part of the ordinary beliefs into extraordinary beliefs, some notions or images into values. That is to say it generates our commonsense in which nothing is taken for granted, everything has to be reinvented and reconfirmed for people to reach a consensus and hold firmly to this consensus – until they suddenly waver in their consensus and try to change it as everyone knows.”
           [Serge Moscovici, “Introductory Address.” Papers on Social Representations – Textes sur les Représentations Sociales. Volume 2, number 3, 1993. Pages 1-11.]
           “… subjects haunting our laboratories episodically possess a coherent system not only of explanations but also of descriptions of the common situation. That is, to use language that should be familiar to us, they possess a social representation within which they observe things and observe themselves, account for their actions and give them a meaning. The reports they give are probably correct within the framework of that shared description and incorrect within the experimenter’s. One can safely speculate that this representation causes the limitation of the cognitive processes at the moment of introspection and also is responsible for the fact that the individuals are or are not conscious of what the experimenter wants them to be. This seems to me perfectly reasonable.” [Serge Moscovici, “The Return of the Unconscious.” Social Research. Volume 60, number 1, spring 1993. Pages 39-93.]
           “The effects of influence attempts by a majority and by a minority were examined on both a manifest response level and a latent perceptual level. Female subjects were exposed to a series of blue slides that were consistently labeled as green by a female confederate. The confederate was presented as a member of either a majority or a minority. On each trial, subjects were required to indicate the color of the slide presented and the color of the afterimage perceived on a white screen following removal of the slide. It was predicted that (a) the subject’s judgment of the chromatic afterimage would be modified when the influence agent represented a minority, and (b) this modification will be more pronounced when the source of influence is absent than when it is present. The results supported the prediction in both the main study and its replication.…
           “Taken together, our observations tend to show that the conflict of responses on a verbal-judgment level is transposed and may be resolved on a perceptual level. It remains, of course, to separate these different factors (social, cognitive, perceptual) and to obtain more conclusive evidence about their respective roles. To do this we do not need new experimental designs so much as new experimental techniques, enabling us to understand complex, multilevel behavior.”
           [Serge Moscovici and Bernard Personnaz, “Studies in Social Influence: V. Minority Influence and Conversion Behavior in a Perceptual Task.” Journal of Experimental Social Psychology. Volume 16, 1980. Pages 270-282.]
           “In Social Representation Theory it should be clear that ‘individuals or collectives to some extent see [social objects] as an extension of their behaviour and because, for them, it exists only because of the means and methods that allow them to understand [it]’ …. The construction of social objects by behaviour is an inherent part of Social Representation Theory: Behaviours define the social object relations, which are an inalienable part of the overarching representation, because ‘there is no definite break between the outside world and the world of the individual.’ Social objects exist by virtue of the concerted behaviour of subjects forming a social group, they are always located in the context of some activity and they are a part of action. Social Representation Theory’s insight into the meaning of cooperation among people and object relations has recently been taken up under the heading of ‘interobjectivity’ ….” [Wolfgang Wagner, “Commentary: Embodied Social Representation.” Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour. Early–view edition. June, 2016. Pages 1-7.]
           “The involvement of the social sciences in social and collective representations studies is today impressive, particularly in anthropology and history …. On the one hand, we can observe in this literature a generalized use of the term representation; when the term is not mentioned as such we find descriptive categories for systems and processes of meaning whose conceptual frames are similar to those proposed in social representation approaches. On the other hand, the social sciences confer to representations related to practices and discourses specific functions such as: constitution of social reality and social orders; operator of political and social transformations; symbolic mediation sustaining social identity and the social bond; and modelling of sensibilities and practices in mass culture.” [Denise Jodelet, “Social Representations: The Beautiful Invention.” Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour. Volume 38, issue 4, 2008. Pages 411-430.]
           “Social Representations Theory … has been recognised to be compatible with the aims and practical undertakings of critical discourse studies …, whilst at the same time, discursive research has been recognised to be well suited for engagement within a social representations framework …. The current work capitalises on this reciprocity by utilizing Social Representations Theory (SRT) to interpret how and why the term ‘9/11’ operates as a significant representational tool within the construction of contemporary terrorism. The concern of this paper is not with studying discursive representations of ‘9/11’ where ‘9/11’ might implicitly or explicitly be approached as having some accessible ‘out there’ qualities, rather it examines the term ‘9/11’ as an active social psychological tool of representation.” [Laura Kilby, “Symbols of Terror: ‘9/11’ as the Word of the Thing and the Thing of the Word.” Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour. Volume 46, issue 2, 2015. Pages 229-249.]
           “The theory of social representations, first formulated by Serge Moscovici, has influenced researchers from varying disciplines, but is still quite unknown to media researchers. The aim with this article is to introduce the theory and its communicative concepts and make them useful for media studies. The theory offers a new approach for studying how the media and citizens construct societal and political issues colouring our age, or some specific time period. Examples will be given from studies of climate change and the media ….” [Birgitta Höijer, “Social Representations Theory: A New Theory for Media Research.” Nordicom Review. Volume 32, number 2, 2011. Pages 3-16.]
           “Social representations are widely communicated bodies of knowledge that are shared to a greater or lesser extent among various subgroups in society …. They include (but are not limited to) publicly elaborated arguments concerning issues of central importance to society …. Social representations thus reflect socially elaborated ways of thinking about and discussing an issue. Moscovici (1984, 1988) refers to the way a society builds linguistic repertoires, customs, and thinking around issues (like affirmative action) as ‘objectification.’ Objectified social representations provide society with culturally sanctioned repertoires for managing debate and building consensus. They are used to anchor new information so that most unfamiliar developments are absorbed (anchored) within familiar frameworks provided by existing social representations …. Social representations are similar to schemas … in their effects at the individual level, but the theory emphasizes the societal origins and effects of shared bodies of organized knowledge ….” [Chris G. Sibley, James H. Liu, and Steve Kirkwood, “Toward a Social Representations Theory of Attitude Change: The Effect of Message Framing on General and Specific Attitudes Toward Equality and Entitlement.” New Zealand Journal of Psychology. Volume 35, number 1, March 2006. Pages 3-13.]
           “Social Representations order the material and social world—historically and symbolically significant—and provide individuals with a code for communicating with other individuals and groups.” [Annamaria Silvana de Rosa, “The ‘boomerang’ effect of radicalism in Discursive Psychology: A critical overview of the controversy with the Social Representations Theory.” Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour. Volume 36, issue 2, 2006. Pages 161-201.]
           “… my present position [is] of believing there is an epistemological incompatibility between social representations and attitudes.” [Robert Farr, “Attitudes, social representations and social attitudes.” Papers on Social Representations – Textes sur les Représentations Sociales. Volume 3, number 1, 1994. Pages 30-33.]
           “… if social representations are claimed to organise all our thinking, the concept will become vacuous, and, given what we know of the practices of mainstream experimental social psychologists, it will be rapidly trivialized. Widespread, socially significant systems of belief will be ignored in favour of laboratory studies of ‘dyadic social representations.’” [Colin Fraser, “Attitudes, Social Representations and Widespread Beliefs.” Papers on Social Representations – Textes sur les Représentations Sociales. Volume 3, number 1, 1994. Pages 1-13.]
           “… a representation can convey information about that which it represents, information which could perhaps with trouble have been obtained by actually consulting the original.” [Rom Harré, “Some Reflections on the Concept of ‘Social Representation.’” Social Research. Volume 51, number 4, winter 1984. Pages 927-938.]
           “This is the purpose of my paper: after giving a brief overview of the theory [of social representations], I shall discuss controversial aspects of the theory which should make it particularly appropriate for critical research. I shall illustrate this with examples from my own research on racialising representations in a stigmatised community … and racialising representations in the context of school exclusion … and some reference to central empirical work within the field …. While this demonstrates that social representations theory appears to have the conceptual tools to criticise the social order, there are few studies that have demonstrated this potential empirically.” [Caroline Howarth, “A social representation is not a quiet thing: exploring the critical potential of social representations theory.” British Journal of Social Psychology. Volume 45, number 1, 2006. Pages 65-86.]
           “One fundamental hypothesis of [Serge] Moscovici’s … Social Representation Theory (SRT) is that most of our cognitive representations are fashioned in the course of everyday communication and not shaped beforehand and then selected and diffused, as is sometimes conceived in human sciences …. On this constructivist basis, Moscovici assumed that ordinary communication leads to the emergence of social representations (SRs), that is, collectively shared patterns of beliefs, values, and practices which evolve continuously over time and space.” [Pascal Huguet, Bibb Latané, and Martin Bourgeois, “The emergence of a social representation of human rights via interpersonal communication: empirical evidence for the convergence of two theories.” European Journal of Social Psychology. Volume 28, 1998. Pages 831-846.]
           “… the issue for researchers working in the field of SR [social representations] was, from the outset, to create or adapt methodologies capable of revealing the structure and the internal organization of the representational field. With this objective, several methods and techniques have been developed. We will begin by presenting an overview of the different methods and discussing their advantages and limitations before concluding with an agenda for future research.” [Gregory Lo Monaco, Anthony Piermattéo, Patrick Rateau, and Jean Louis Tavani, “Methods for Studying the Structure of Social Representations: A Critical Review and Agenda for Future Research.” Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour. Early–view edition. October, 2016. Pages 1-26.]
           “Social values are conveyed through particular viewpoints and play a part in ordering the social sphere in terms of what can legitimise and sustain collective identities. As part of the family of social representations, social values can affect individual choices while also being contested and collectively transformed. Intersecting with identification, they are ongoing processes of meaning-making that guide presentations of the self and action. Social values are continuously reformulated as individuals move through various contexts formulating multiple identities. The authors suggest that a better understanding of social values could proceed from distinguishing between value conceptions and implementations, and by considering how social values might intersect with identities.” [Rusten Menard, “Analysing Social Values in Identification; A Framework for Research on the Representation and Implementation of Values.” Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour. Volume 46, issue 2, 2015. Pages 122-142.]
           “[Serge] Moscovici contributed greatly to the evolution of the theory of, and research in, social psychology. His work strongly supports the specific role of social psychology as a science, highlighting its links with other social science disciplines such as anthropology, sociology, history of science, and history of culture.
           “He was among the social psychologists who experienced personally the violence caused by the racial prejudice and the discrimination that characterised the twentieth century. While unique, his life has many points in common with the lives of European Jews during the Nazi nightmare that dominated Europe in the 1930s and 40s.”
           [Augusto Palmonari, “Serge Moscovici.” European Bulletin of Social Psychology (special issue in honour of Serge Moscovici). Volume 27, number 1, May 2015. Pages 15-22.]
           “Is the theory [of social representations] only appropriate for considering formerly scientific concepts that move into the realm of common sense? A review of studies using social representations theory proves that this is not the case, and that the theory can also be used to examine representations that do not necessarily stem from science, but do exist within common sense understanding ….” [Juliet L. H. Foster, “Representational Projects and Interacting Forms of Knowledge.” Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour. Volume 33, issue 3, 2003. Pages 231-244.]
           “The aim of the present research is to experimentally explore the impact of the invalidation of expectations on individuals’ commitment to a wastesorting program. In that perspective, we will also focus on the hierarchy that may exist among these expectations. Indeed, it is possible to consider that although some expectations could not be challenged without affecting individuals’ commitment, some other less essential expectations could be challenged without leading to such negative consequences. This question has important implications. Effectively, if transposed to other target behaviors such as waste reduction, energy saving, and water saving, it could be possible to identify the key expectations that a pro-environmental program must fulfill to avoid losing participants. It could also be possible to anticipate dropouts by identifying the factors that could impair individuals’ commitment. Nevertheless such a goal is based on the employment of a heuristic theoretical and methodological framework that can hierarchize expectations and draw hypotheses as to the impact of the invalidation of these expectations on participation. In that perspective, we will draw on the concept of social representation … and more precisely the structural approach to SRs [social representations] ….” [Anthony Piermattéo, Grégory Lo Monaco, and Fabien Girandola, “When Commitment Can Be Overturned: Anticipating Recycling Program Dropouts Through Social Representations.” Environment and Behavior. Volume 48, number 10, December 2016. Pages 1270-1291.]
           “… [We can consider Serge] Moscovici’s … representation of psychoanalysis in popular culture. To follow Moscovici’s own recommendation, we should seek to understand this representation historically. This means we should reflect upon the origins of psychoanalysis and, in particular, examine what representations of the world were involved in these origins. As will be suggested, it is possible to find processes, which Moscovici located in the passage of psychoanalysis into commonsense, occurring within psychoanalysis before it entered popular culture. This has significance for Moscovici’s thesis about the relations between science and commonsense in contemporary society.” [Michael Billig, “Social Representations and Repression: Examining the First Formulations of Freud and Moscovici.” Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour. Volume 38, issue 4, 2008. Pages 255-268.]
           “In this paper we discuss various considerations on the nature of representations. With the human potential for reflexivity the distinction between the representation and the object emerges. It is the circumstances of life that determine whether this distinction is made, and what is made of it. We present a specification of the basic unit of analysis of social representation.…
           “We propose an operational definition of a ‘social representation’ as the comparison of communication systems in four ways: the content structures, the typified processes of cultivation, the social-psychological functions, and the segmentation of social milieus.”
           [Martin W. Bauer and George Gaskell, “Towards a Paradigm for Research on Social Representations.” Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour. Volume 29, issue 2, 1999. Pages 163-186.]
           “We review relevant aspects of cognitive science of religion, social representations theory,and frame theory, applying them to the analysis of CT [conspiracy theory] features. This generates a set of propositions about CTs that can be used to develop further empirical investigations. In what follows, we use specific terminology: CTs are propagated by sponsors who seek to spread sticky representations of events to a larger audience, often with the intent to frame them into action.” [Bradley Franks, Adrian Bangerter, and Martin W. Bauer, “Conspiracy theories as quasi-religious mentality: an integrated account from cognitive science, social representations theory, and frame theory.” Frontiers in Psychology. Volume 4, article 424, July 2013. Pages 1-12.]
           “… the idea of social representation shows two things at the same time, it highlights the process of transformation as ideas move in society, and it also provides an integrative theory of communication for social psychology. The higher level of abstraction subsumes diffusion, vulgarisation, propagation, and propaganda as special case. This is a social psychological equivalent of relativity theory in physics which relegated traditional mechanics not to the dustbin of history, but as a special case of mass with low velocity and medium size.…
           “For us four elements of social representations theory stand out; its framing of diversified common sense as creative resistance; its analysis of communication processes; its concern with science in society, and its methodology implications. We are convinced that this continues to be a progressive programme of research for social psychology.”
           [Martin W. Bauer and George Gaskell, “Social Representations Theory: A Progressive Research Programme for Social Psychology.” Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour. Volume 38, issue 4, 2008. Pages 335-353.]
           “Conceptualised within the theory of social representations … the research presented here investigated what was understood by the social category of ‘Refugee’ and whether this understanding was mediated by the Refugee group’s place of origin.…
           “Social representations theory delineates how meaning systems are constructed and used in wider social networks for broad communication within groups. As a networked system of concepts, ideas, beliefs and images, the structure of these constituent elements needs to be analysed if the function of the social representation (SR) is to be understood.”
           [Scott Hanson-Easey and Gail Moloney, “Social representations of refugees: Place of origin as a delineating resource.” Journal of Community & Applied Social Psychology. Volume 19, issue 6, November/December 2009. Pages 506-514.]
           “… how do people think about their situation with regard to risk? What makes them take action towards risk, or, conversely, refrain from taking action towards it? Risk in general, and here seismic risk, cannot be reduced to a ‘situation’ to which individuals respond as information processing systems or as loci of emotions. The social representation of risk is inseparable to its elaboration as a social object through culture, communications of all kinds, and collective memory. The fact that the social representation of risk is anchored in a group’s culture and environment shows the necessity of the psychosocial approach in studies on collective risk.” [Andreea Gruev-Vintilaand Michel-Lois Rouquette, “Social Thinking about Collective Risk: How Do Risk-related Practice and Personal Involvement Impact Its Social Representations?” Journal of Risk Research. Volume 10, number 4, June 2007. Pages 55-581.]
           “The theory of social representation offers a new approach for studying the meaning of ill-defined concepts in food science such as the concept of minerality in wine.… We hypothesize that wine descriptions might reflect the implicit imaginary and beliefs about wine characteristics and that the social representation perspective might provide a framework for understanding the thinking of wine professionals and wine consumers.” [Heber Rodrigues, Jordi Ballester, Maria Pilar Saenz-Navajas, and Dominique Valentin, “Structural approach of social representation: Application to the concept of wine minerality in experts and consumers.” Food Quality and Preference. Volume 46, December 2015. Pages 166-172.]
           “… for a given stimulus to elicit a given response, a social representation must associate that particular stimulus with a particular response in an intelligible way for the human subject. To give an example, for somebody to call the police when hearing a gunshot, a social representation of law and order prohibiting the use of guns is required. In certain cultural contexts, or indeed in certain situations, a different social representation might be at play that would lead to a different behavioural outcome. For instance, one might respond very differently to hearing a gunshot at a military parade. The difference between the two situations that leads to an expected difference in behavioural responses is the intelligibility of the social situation from the respondent’s point of view. The social representations approach thus brings about a focus on meaning-making processes and the intelligibility of situations in understanding human psychological activity.” [Gordon Sammut, Eleni Andreouli, George Gaskell, and Jaan Valsiner, “Social representations: a revolutionary paradigm?” The Cambridge Handbook of Social Representations. Gordon Sammut, Eleni Andreouli, George Gaskell, and Jaan Valsiner, editors. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press. 2015. Pages 3-11.]
           “Social representations are conceived as residing across rather than within individual minds, inhabiting the ‘between-space’ where individual and society connect ….
           “The study of the body’s role in constituting psychological and social life has recently been revitalised by emerging research in the field of embodied cognition. SRT [social representations theory] dovetails with this literature in several conceptual and empirical preoccupations – for example, in the premise that affect and intergroup relations are formative influences on psychological life, and a concern with collapsing the duality of person/environment.… Expanding SRT’s field of analysis, such that it illuminates the interplay between embodied phenomenology and social communication in the development of common-sense knowledge, promises productive directions for empirical and theoretical advancement.”
           [Cliodhna O’Connor, “Embodiment and the Construction of Social Knowledge: Towards an Integration of Embodiment and Social Representations Theory.” Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour. Early–view edition. March, 2016. Pages 1-23.]
           “… we employ social representation theory (SRT) as the theoretical lens to gain a deep understanding on how citizens make sense of this new phenomenon of social media use in government (Moscovoci, 1981). Social representations are defined as the shared images and meanings through which people within a particular social group organize the world around them Thus, SRT should be a suitable theoretic lens to capture the nature of the phenomenon of social media use in government from the citizens’ perspective.
           “Via a structural content analysis over the collected in-depth interviewing data from a group of Chinese citizens, a social representation map is generated to reflect the participants’ collective views on a full range of concepts … constituting the government microblogs phenomenon in China.”
           [Baozhou Lu, Song Zhang, and Weiguo Fan, “Social Representations of Social Media Use in Government: An Analysis of Chinese Government Microblogging From Citizens’ Perspective.” Social Science Computer Review. Volume 34, number 4, August 2016. Pages 416-436.]
           “This study explores representations of alcohol consumption during study abroad experiences for both male and female students and uses Social Representation Theory (SRT), a framework that has been successfully used to contextualise socially constructed concepts related to health behaviours and illness, to inform analyses and guide discussion.” [Giovanni Aresi, Francesco Fattori, Maura Pozzi, and Simon C. Moore, “I am going to make the most out of it! Italian university Credit Mobility Students’ social representations of alcohol use during study abroad experiences.” Journal of Health Psychology. OnlineFirst edition. September, 2016. Pages 1-10.]
      314. IEMP model of organized power (Michael Mann): In Mann’s four–volume magnum opus—The Sources of Social Power—and in some of his other works, he develops an expansive historical sociology of power. IEPM—which refers to “ideological, economic, military, and political” power—is an elaborate framework of Weberian ideal types.
           “My approach can be summed up in two statements, from which a distinctive methodology flows. The first is: Societies are constituted of multiple overlapping and intersecting sociospatial networks of power.…
           “The second statement flows from the first. Conceiving of societies as multiple overlapping and intersecting power networks gives us the best available entry into the issue of what is ultimately ‘primary’ or ‘determining’ in societies. A general account of societies, their structure, and their history can best be given in terms of the interrelations of what I will call the four sources of social power: ideological, economic, military, and political (IEMP) relationships. These are (1) overlapping networks of social interaction, not dimensions, levels, or factors of a single social totality. This follows from my first statement. (2) They are also organizations, institutional means of attaining human goals. Their primacy comes not from the strength of human desires for ideological, economic, military, or political satisfaction but from the particular organizational means each possesses to attain human goals, whatever these may be. In this chapter I work gradually toward specifying the four organizational means and my IEMP model of organized power.”
           [Michael Mann. The Sources of Social Power: Volume I—A history of power from the beginning to A.D. 1760. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press. 1986. Pages 1-2.]
           “My IEMP model is not one of a social system, divided into four ‘subsystems,’ ‘levels,’ ‘dimensions,’ or any other of the geometric terms favored by social theorists. Rather, it forms an analytical point of entry for dealing with mess. The four power sources offer distinct, potentially powerful organizational means to humans pursuing their goals. But which means are chosen, and in which combinations, will depend on continuous interaction between what power configurations are historically given and what emerges within and among them. The sources of social power and the organizations embodying them are impure and ‘promiscuous.’ They weave in and out of one another in a complex interplay between institutionalized and emergent, interstitial forces.” [Michael Mann. The Sources of Social Power: Volume 2—The rise of classes and nation-states, 1760–1914. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press. 2012. Page 10.]
           “Societies are not composed of autonomous levels or subsystems of a given socio-spatial network of interaction. Each has different boundaries and develops according to its own core internal logic. In major transitions, however, the interrelationships and very identities of organizations such as economies or states, are metamorphosed. So my IEMP model is not a social system; rather, it forms an analytical point of entry for dealing with messy real societies. The four power sources offer distinct organizational networks and means to humans pursuing their goals. The means chosen, and in which combinations, depends on interaction between the power configurations historically given and institutionalized and those that emerge interstitially within and between them. This is the main mechanism of social change in human societies: preventing any single power elite from clinging indefinitely onto power. Institutionalized power relations are being constantly surprised by the emergence of new interstitial power configurations. The sources of social power and the organizations embodying them are promiscuous – they weave in and out of each other in a complex interplay between institutionalized and emergent, interstitial forces.” [Michael Mann. The Sources of Social Power: Volume 3—Global empires and revolution, 1890–1945. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press. 2012. Pages 15-16.]
           1. “Ideological power derives from the human need to find ultimate meaning in life, to share norms and values, and to participate in aesthetic and ritual practices with others. Ideologies change as the problems we face change. The power of ideological movements derives from our inability to attain certainty in our knowledge of the world. We fill in the gaps and the uncertainties with beliefs that are not in themselves scientifically testable but that embody our hopes and our fears. No one can prove the existence of a god or the viability of a socialist or an Islamist future. Ideologies become especially necessary in crises where the old institutionalized ideologies and practices no longer seem to work and where alternatives offered have as yet no track record. That is when we are most susceptible to the power of ideologists who offer us plausible but untestable theories of the world. Ideological power is generally a response to developments in the other three power sources, but it then develops an emergent power of its own. It tends to be very uneven, suddenly important when we have to grapple with unexpected crisis, much less so at other times. Revived religious meaning systems will figure in this period, as will secular ideologies like patriarchy, liberalism, socialism, nationalism, racism, and environmentalism.
           2. “Economic power derives from the human need to extract, transform, distribute, and consume the produce of nature. Economic relations are powerful because they combine the intensive mobilization of labor with more extensive networks of exchange. Contemporary capitalism has made global its circuits of capital, trade, and production chains, yet at the same time its power relations are those that penetrate most routinely into most peoples’ lives, taking up about one-half of our waking hours. The social change economies produce is rarely swift or dramatic, unlike military power. It is slow, cumulative, and eventually profound. The main organization of economic power in modern times has been industrial capitalism, whose global development is central to this volume. Capitalism treats all the means of production, including labor, as commodities. All four main forms of market – for capital, for labor, for production, and for consumption – are traded against each other. Capitalism has been the most consistently dynamic power organization in recent times, responsible for most technological innovation – and most environmental degradation.
           3. “Military power. I define military power as the social organization of concentrated and lethal violence. ‘Concentrated’ means mobilized and focused; ‘lethal’ means deadly. Webster’s Dictionary defines ‘violence’ as exertion of physical force so as to injure or abuse, or intense, turbulent, or furious and often destructive action or force. Thus military force is focused, physical, furious, and above all lethal. It kills. Military power holders say if you resist, you die. Since a lethal threat is terrifying, military power evokes distinctive psychological emotions and physiological symptoms of fear, as we confront the possibility of pain, dismemberment, or death. Military power is most lethally wielded by the armed forces of states in interstate wars, though paramilitaries, guerrillas, and terrorists will all figure in this volume. Here is an obvious overlap with political power, though militaries always remain separately organized, often as a distinct caste in society.
           4. “Political power is the centralized and territorial regulation of social life. The basic function of government is the provision of order over a given territory. Here I deviate not only from Max Weber, who located political power (or ‘parties’in any organization, not just states, but also from political scientists’ notion of governance administered by diverse entities, including corporations, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and social movements. I prefer to reserve the term ‘political’ for the state – including local and regional as well as national-level government. States and not NGOs or corporations have the centralized-territorial form, which makes their rule authoritative over persons residing in their territories. I can resign membership of an NGO or a corporation and so flaunt its rules. I must obey the rules of the state in whose territory I reside or suffer punishment. Networks of political power are routinely regulated and coordinated in a centralized and territorial fashion. So political power is more geographically bounded than the other three sources. States also normally cover smaller, tighter areas than do ideologies.”
           [Michael Mann. The Sources of Social Power: Volume 4—Globalizations, 1945–2011. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press. 2013. Pages 1-2.]
           “To explain murderous ethnic cleansing, we need an overall model of the power interactions involved. I employ the model of the four sources of social power used in my previous historical work …. I study ethnic cleansing as the outcome of four interrelated sets of power networks, all of which are necessary to its accomplishment, but one of which can be regarded as causally primary.
           “Ideological power refers to the mobilization of values, norms, and rituals in human societies.…
           “Economic power is also important. All cases of cleansing involve material interests. Usually, members of an ethnic group come to believe they have a collective economic interest against an out-group.…
           “Military power is socially organized, concentrated lethal violence. This proves decisive in the later stages of the worst cases of ethnic cleansing.
           “Political power is centralized, territorial regulation of social life. I argue that violence escalates most over rival claims to political sovereignty …. My theses find support from the quantitative data of the Minorities at Risk project. The variables best explaining ethnopolitical rebellion in the world in the late 1990s were political protest over the preceding five years, an unstable, divided, but repressive regime, territorial population concentration, extensive political organization, and support from foreign sympathizers.”
           [Michael Mann. The Dark Side of Democracy: Explaining Ethnic Cleansing. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press. 2005. Pages 30-33.]
           “I originally designed this study of fascism as a single chapter in a general book about the twentieth century, the third volume of my The Sources of Social Power.” [Michael Mann. Fascists. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press. 2004. Page vii.]
           “I have chosen not to here give the reader a heavy dose of sociological theory. But my own approach to fascism derives from a more general model of human societies that rejects the idealism-versus-materialism dualism. My earlier work identified four primary ‘sources of social power’ in human societies: ideological, economic, military, and political. Class theorists of fascism have tended to elevate economic power relations in their explanations, while nationalist theorists have emphasized ideology. Yet all four sources of social power are needed to explain most important social and historical outcomes. To attain their goals, social movements wield combinations of control over ultimate meaning systems (ideological), control over means of production and exchange (economic), control over organized physical violence (military), and control over centralized and territorial institutions of regulation (political). All four are necessary to explain fascism. Mass fascism was a response to the post–World War I ideological, economic, military, and political crises. Fascists proposed solutions to all four. Fascist organization also combined substantial ideological innovations (generally called ‘propaganda’), mass political electoralism, and paramilitary violence. All became highly ritualized so as to intensify emotional commitment. In attempting to seize power, fascist leaders also sought to neutralize economic, military, political, and ideological (especially church) elites. Thus any explanation of fascism must rest on the entwining of all four sources of social power, as my empirical case-study chapters demonstrate.” [Michael Mann. Fascists. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press. 2004. Page 5.]
           “My original goal on beginning to work the project that became The Sources of Social Power was very ambitious. I would return to the classic sociological tradition of [Karl] Marx and [Max] Weber, developing grand theory on human societies in general from a firm empirical base. Since I intended, like them, to write about long-term macro-social change, I knew I would rely mainly on historical data. By that stage I had become an empirical sociologist investigating workers, factories, and labor markets.” [Michael Mann, “The Sources of My Sources.” Contemporary Sociology. Volume 42, number 4, July 2013. Pages 499-502.]
           “I do not conceive of societies as systems but as multiple, overlapping networks of interaction, of which four networks – of ideological, economic, military and political power relations – are the most important. Geopolitical relations can be added to the four as a distinctive mix of military and political power, the mix varying between what are convention ally called ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ geopolitics. Each of these four or five sources of power may have an internal logic or tendency of development, so that it might be possible, for example, to identify tendencies toward equilibrium, cycles, or contradictions within capitalism, just as one might identify comparable ten dencies within the other sources of social power.” [Michael Mann, “The end of capitalism?” Análise Social. Volume 48, number 209, 2013. Pages 927-945.]
           “In the [first] two volumes of The Sources of Social Power, I argued that, in pursuit of their goals, human beings set up four main types of power organizations: ideological (or cultural, if you prefer); economic; military; and political. This model sees globalization as consisting of expansions of all four of these networks of interaction, each of which may have differing boundaries, rhythms and results, diffusing distinctive forms of integration and disintegration across the globe. Discussion of globalization should not neglect any of these. Recent events should bring this home, since they clearly involve a mixture of ideological, economic, military and political processes.” [Michael Mann, “Globalization and September 11.” New Left Review. Series II, number 12, November–December 2001. Pages 51-72.]
           “It is worth asking why Armenians, rather than Greeks, Jews or Kurds took the brunt of the Turkish fury. The answers seem to be that Greeks and Jews were protected by foreign states—especially by the powerful German ally—while Kurds were seen as too ‘primitive’ to be really threatening, candidates for coerced assimilation, not murderous cleansing. In these respects, therefore, the Jewish ‘Final Solution’ was not unique, but the worst case of the sequence of genocides committed by modern organic nation-statism—begun in 1915.” [Michael Mann, “The Dark Side of Democracy: The Modern Tradition of Ethnic and Political Cleansing.” New Left Review. Series I, number 235, May–June 1999. Pages 18-45.]
           “Luckily for socialists, religious conservatism had less power across northwest Europe. In Scandinavia, the more fervent Lutheran sects had tended to political liberalism, not conservatism. Britain was more agnostic, while in the Low Countries, Britain and the US, religious-political revivals would produce reaction amidst other faiths. Thus leftism stalled most across Catholic and Orthodox Europe.” [Michael Mann, “Sources of Variation in Working-Class Movements in Twentieth-Century Europe.” New Left Review. Series I, number 212, July–August 1995. Pages 14-54.]
           “I defy him [John Hobson] to find any empirical analyses in the two published volumes of The Sources of Social Power, or for that matter in Fascists or The Dark Side of Democracy, where I significantly embrace Realism. In these works most states (or at least the more modern states, where we have better evidence) are depicted as factionalised, subject to many social pressures, and inhabiting a broader space in which both economic and ideological relations transcend state boundaries.
           “Hobson is also wrong to say that in Sources my notion of a ‘multipower actor civilization’ (for example, Sumer or Christendom) merely concerns their ability to conduct diplomatic regulation among the constituent states. I deploy what I call the medieval ‘Christian ecumene’ mainly in its role of helping to regulate economic relations, reinforcing norms concerning market exchange and property rights and thus playing an important role in the development of capitalism. I also stress its role in legitimating peasant rebellions and generating heretical, socially rooted struggles.”
           [Michael Mann, “Explaining International Relations, Empires and European Miracles: A Response.” Millennium: Journal of International Studies. Volume 34, number 2, February 2006. Pages 541-550.]
           “By 1800 the principal absolutists were Russia, Prussia and Austria. Their monarch’s formal despotic powers were largely unlimited. Citizenship was unknown. The rule of law supposedly operated, but personal liberties,and freedom of the press and association could be suspended arbitrarily. Indeed, any conception of universal rights was restrained by the proliferation of particularistic statuses, possessed by corporate groups – estates of the realm, corporations of burghers, lawyers, merchants and artisan guilds yet the real, infrastructural powers of the monarchs were far from absolute.” [Michael Mann, “Ruling Class Strategies and Citizenship.” Sociology. Volume 21, number 3, August 1987. Pages 339-354.]
           “The near-simultaneous appearance of Volumes III and IV of Michael Mann’s The Sources of Social Power concludes a truly grand project of historical sociology. Along with the work of Anthony Giddens, W. G. Runciman, Ernest Gellner and Eric Hobsbawm, Mann’s project was one of the distinctive products of the intellectual conjuncture of 1970s Britain. A colleague of Gellner’s at the LSE [London School of Economics], Mann was, like Giddens and Runciman, in search of a constructive exit from the impasse of post-Marxian, post-Weberian sociology. But his original formation was that of a quintessential ‘history boy’—a product of the legendary Manchester Grammar School–Oxford pipeline. In the course of an itinerary that took him from social work to engaged labour research, the original idea for Sources of Social Power took shape in the mid-1970s. Conceived as a short book, it grew into a massive undertaking.” [Adam Tooze, “Empires at War.” New Left Review. Series II, number 79, January–February 2013. Pages 129-139.]
           “The cover of this fourth and (perhaps) final volume of Michael Mann’s vastly ambitious ‘history of power in human societies’ is a photograph of the earth taken from space. It is an obvious way of rendering pictorially the thematic of globalization, but oddly the image happens to feature the continent of Africa, about which there is next to nothing in the actual text. This absence is however not odd in Mann’s own terms. His historical sociology pursues not power in general but its ‘leading edge’ (he puts the term in quotation marks); and Africa is neither that edge nor a theatre where the leading edge, so to speak, stages its principal act. That part is played by the United States, the only world empire in history, and as such one of the globalizing forms, along with capitalism and the nation-state, into which power can be seen retrospectively to have crystallized during the period in question. ‘As it turned out’—the retrospective aspect—is essential to the proceedings.” [Anders Stephanson, “Empire Edgemanship.” New Left Review. Series II, number 91, January–February 2015. Pages 127-139.]
           “The Dark Side of Democracy’s mass of historical evidence is marshalled to test a strikingly bold central thesis: that ethnic cleansing is the dark side of democracy, in the sense that the latter is premised on the creation of an ethnic community that ‘trumps’ or ‘displaces’ class divisions.” [Dylan Riley, “Democracy’s Graveyards?” New Left Review. Series II, number 48, November–December 2007. Pages 125-136.]
           “His [Michael Mann’s] theory of societies as multiple, overlapping and intersecting power networks is too briefly and sketchily developed to stand up to close scrutiny. Concepts are developed as Weberian ‘ideal types’ and severely qualified and hedged, and this fits with the rejection of any attempt at general theory making the whole framework rather slippery and eclectic. The key theoretical ‘innovations’ that are claimed involve the identification of four sources of social power: ideological, economic, military and political which in good Weberian fashion interact through history in complex ways with no single one being dominant for too long.” [Paul Bagguley, “The Sources of Social Power (Vol. 1).” Review article. Radical Philosophy: Philosophical Journal of the Independent Left. Number 47, autumn 1987. Page 44.]
           “[Michael] Mann openly declares his intention to provide a ‘sociology of movements,’ which manages to substitute classification for analysis.” [Harry Harootunian, “The future of fascism.” Radical Philosophy: Philosophical Journal of the Independent Left. Number 136, March/April 2006. Pages 23-33.]
      315. socio–logic chain (Michael Mann): He proposes a single methodology for sociology.
           “There is only one sociological methodology. Its core is not technique nor is it epistemology, nor is it substantive theory. It is what I have chosen to call the socio-logic chain.…
           “Socio-logic is a habit of mind which pulls tightest the chain which links the two extremes of all research programmes an initial idea in the head and an eventual body of research data, created by the sociologist’s intervention in the world. It is a deliberately bastard term emphasizing the hybrid nature of sociology itself – a rigorous, ‘closed’ system of thought dealing with a messy ‘open’ society.…
           1. “An initial problem is formulated.
           2. “Its component terms are defined as concepts, and the dimensions of each are clearly specified.
           3. “The concepts are given a status as dependent, independent and intervening variables. Specific hypotheses are made concerning their inter-relations.
           4. “A sample of relevant persons, institutions and behaviour is drawn and controlled.
           5. “The concepts are operationalized through the selection of indicators of each of their specified dimensions.
           6. “Data are collected and coded so that the coding categories are commensurate with the initial dimensions of the concepts.
           7. “The hypotheses, as operationalized, are tested on the sample.
           8. “The conclusion (true or false) is brought to bear on the initial overall problem.”
           [Michael Mann, “Socio-Logic.” Sociology. Volume 15, number 4, November 1981. Pages 544-550.]
      316. theory of enterprise culture (Paul du Gay as pronounced in this MP3 audio file, Steven P. Vallas, Emily R. Cummins, and others): As explained by du Gay, attempts have been made, in the UK, to progressivly enlarge “the territory of the market.”
           “In Britain, attempts to construct a culture of enterprise have proceeded through the progressive enlargement of the territory of the market – the realm of private enterprise and economic rationality – by a series of redefinitions of its object. Thus, the task of creating an enterprise culture has involved the reconstruction of a wide range of institutions and activities along the lines of the commercial business organization, with attention focused, in particular, on its orientation towards ‘the sovereign consumer.’ At the same time, however, the market has also come to define the sort of relation an individual should have with him or herself, and the ‘habits of action’ he or she should acquire and exhibit. Enterprise refers here to the ‘kind of action or project’ that exhibits ‘enterprising’ qualities or characteristics on the part of individuals or groups. In this latter sense an enterprise culture is one in which certain enterprising qualities – such as self-reliance, personal responsibility, boldness and a willingness to take risks in the pursuit of goals – are regarded as human virtues and promoted as such.” [Paul du Gay. Consumption and Identity at Work. Thousand Oaks, California: SAGE Publications, Inc. 1996. Page 56.]
           “In this article we revisit [Paul du Gay’s] the theory of enterprise culture by exploring shifts in the popular business press and employee responses to them, in an effort to track the identity norms that have impinged on job seekers over time.…
           “… Following [Michel] Foucault, du Gay contends that the exercise of organizational power and control now operates by institutionalizing discourses and practices that gain purchase on the employee identity …. Driving this trend, according to du Gay, is a blurring of the boundaries between previously distinct institutional domains such as production and consumption, bureaucracies and markets, or the economy and culture writ large.…
           “… since there has been little effort to trace the broad trajectory of enterprise culture, we have no way of assessing its eventual capacity for predominance or hegemony.…
           “Previous efforts to judge the applicability of enterprise theory empirically have been hobbled by their static and narrow coordinates, and by their failure to link employment discourse to the wider context of precarity that many workers now confront. The contribution of the present study, then, stems from its effort to re-open the enterprise debate, using data that can capture a broad swath of employment discourse over time, the logic that such discourse implies, and the ways that workers respond to its central messages. Approached in this way, we do indeed find evidence that conforms to at least some of the claims that enterprise theorists have made.”
           [Steven P. Vallas and Emily R. Cummins, “Personal Branding and Identity Norms in the Popular Business Press: Enterprise Culture in an Age of Precarity.” Organization Studies. Volume 36, number 3, March 2015. Pages 293-319.]
      317. moral reasoning (Elliot Turiel): This perspective critiques and opposes moral relativism.
           “Unlike positions of moral relativism based on varying orientations in different cultures, it is proposed that moral development involves the construction of thinking in the moral domain through children’s reciprocal interactions with others. Along with the construction of moral reasoning based on understandings of welfare, justice, and rights, children construct judgments about conventions in the social system and areas of personal jurisdiction.…
           “… children construct moral judgments about fairness, justice, rights, the need to avoid harming people and to help others. They also develop, through their experiences, concerns witthe suffering of others and with the inequalities between groups (including concerns with dominance and subordination in social hierarchies). Moral reasoning, therefore, is central in people’s social relationships ….”
           [Elliot Turiel, “Moral reasoning, cultural practices, and social inequalities.” Innovación Educativa. Volume 12, number 59, May–August 2012. Pages 17-32.]
           “In the work on age-related patterns of moral reasoning, we have looked at how children and adolescents above the age of 7 years reason about situations involving human welfare that vary in terms of whether they involve a conflict between the goals and needs of the self and those of another person, and the nature of the relationship the primary actor has with that other person. In sum, we looked at the nature of age-related shifts in children’s and adolescents’ tendency to coordinate elements involving moral decisions.” [Elliot Turiel, “Capturing the Complexity of Moral Development and Education.” Mind, Brain, and Education. Volume 3, issue 3, September 2009. Pages 151-159.]
           “I wish to stress that it is not to argue for eclecticism or relativism. I do believe that researchers should take strong positions within a particular perspective, and that it is important to formulate coherent theoretical perspectives. These could emphasize evolution, culture, some coherent combination of the two, or other alternatives, such as a constructivism connected to the interaction of the individual with the environment. Nor do I mean to imply that researchers should not pursue topics that they deem important, such as those they label positive.” [Elliot Turiel, “Historical Lessons: The Value of Pluralism in Psychological Research.” Merrill-Palmer Quarterly. Volume 50, number 4, October 2004. Pages 535-545.]
           “Emotional appraisals are part of reasoning that involves taking into account the reactions of others and self …. The emotional reactions of people are a central part of moral judgments, and it is reciprocal interactions, along with reflections upon one’s own judgments and cultural practices or societal arrangements, that influence development …. Moral thinking is not a function of the internalization of social or cultural content.” [Elliot Turiel, “The Development of Children’s Orientations toward Moral, Social, and Personal Orders: More than a Sequence in Development.” Human Development. Volume 51, number 1, February 2008. Pages 21-39.]
           “… [I am] a social scientist conducting research on children’s moral development (and other related topics) and theorizing on topics like moral reasoning, moral conduct, culture, and education …. I consider myself a nonrelativist with regard to morality, but find that many laypersons take relativistic positions and frequently express surprise that I view it otherwise.” [Elliot Turiel, “Making Sense of Social Experiences and Moral Judgements.” Criminal Justice Ethics. Volume 13, issue 2, summer/fall 1994. Pages 69-76.]
           “The moral imperatives asserted by cultural relativists—that cultures should be accorded tolerance, freedom, and equality—become relevant here. It has been noted that … moral imperatives constitute an internal contradition within the relativistic position. Perhaps more important, if it is the case that within cultures not all is uniform, that greater rights and privileges are accorded to some groups than others, and that there are different perspectives, then it would follow that, at a minimum, the moral considerations said to apply to different cultural groups would also apply to different groups within cultures. Different groups of people, defined by social structural categories in the social hierarchy (for example, females and males, lower classes or castes and higher classes or castes) may represent different interests and goals. Insofar as conflicts and contested understandings exist, the issues of tolerance, freedom, and equality may be applicable.” [Elliot Turiel, “Conflict, Social Development, and Cultural Change.” New Directions for Child and Adolescent Development. Volume 61, issue 83, spring 1999. Pages 77-92.]
           “[Elliot] Turiel and I disagree about many things: about whether there is a single true natural moral law, or whether there are several; about whether natural law is epistemic (dependent on our conceptual choices); about whether moral law extends beyond issues of harm, rights, and justice. I subscribe to the view (and Turiel does not) that there is more than one true natural moral law, that natural law is ‘epistemic,’ and that moral law extends beyond issues of harm, rights, and justice.” [Richard A. Shweder, “In Defense of Moral Realism: Reply to Gabennesch.” Child Development. Volume 61, number 6, December 1990. Pages 2060-2067.]
      318. Moral Foundations Theory (Jonathan Haidt, Craig Joseph, Jesse Graham, Scott Clifford, Sharareh Noorbaloochi [Persian/Fārsī, شَرَارِه نُورْبَلُوچِی, Šarārih Nūrbalūčī], and others): A psychological theory is developed which examines both cross-cultural variety and consistency in moral systems. They maintain an informational website and a morality quiz. In addition, Jonathan Haidt operates a website for his book, The Righteous Mind: Why Good People Are Divided by Politics and Religion. See also this TED talk by Haidt and, again, Haidt’s presentation, Moral Foundations Theory, an Introduction. The theory might be legitimately critiqued for sacrificing an emancipatory ethics of dialectical unity or “copresence” for an, arguably, empty bipartisanship. Nevertheless, the perspective does make a valuable contribution to the dialogue on morality.
           “Republicans don’t just aim to cause fear, as some Democrats charge. They trigger the full range of intuitions described by Moral Foundations Theory. Like Democrats, they can talk about innocent victims (of harmful Democratic policies) and about fairness (particularly the unfairness of taking tax money from hardworking and prudent people to support cheaters, slackers, and irresponsible fools). But Republicans since [Richard] Nixon have had a near-monopoly on appeals to loyalty (particularly patriotism and military virtues) and authority (including respect for parents, teachers, elders, and the police, as well as for traditions). And after they embraced Christian conservatives during Ronald Reagan’s 1980 campaign and became the party of ‘family values,’ Republicans inherited a powerful network of Christian ideas about sanctity and sexuality that allowed them to portray Democrats as the party of Sodom and Gomorrah.” [Jonathan Haidt. The Righteous Mind: Why Good People Are Divided by Politics and Religion. New York: Pantheon Books imprint of Random House, Inc. 2012. Page 180.]
           “Moral Foundations Theory proposes that the human mind is organized in advance of experience so that it is prepared to learn values, norms, and behaviors related to a diverse set of recurrent adaptive social problems …. We think of this innate organization as being implemented by sets of related modules which work together to guide and constrain responses to each particular problem. But you don’t have to embrace modularity, or any particular view of the brain, to embrace MFT. You only need to accept that there is a first draft of the moral mind, organized in advance of experience by the adaptive pressures of our unique evolutionary history.” [Jesse Graham, Jonathan Haidt, Sena Koleva, Matt Motyl, Ravi Iyer, Sean P. Wojcik, and Peter H. Ditto, “Moral Foundations Theory: The Pragmatic Validity of Moral Pluralism.” Advances in Experimental Social Psychology. Volume 47. Patricia Devine and Ashby Plant, editors. San Diego, California: Academic Press imprint of Elsevier. 2013. Pages 55-130.]
           “According to the social intuitionism model, moral judgment is an intuitive process, characterized by automatic, affective reactions to stimuli. Moral foundations theory builds on this model, categorizing our moral intuitions into ‘foundations.’ … These foundations concern dislike for the suffering of others (Care/harm), proportional fairness (Fairness/cheating), group loyalty (Loyalty/betrayal), deference to authority and tradition (Authority/subversion), and concerns with purity and contamination (Sanctity/degradation). Researchers have recently proposed a sixth foundation (Liberty/oppression), focusing on concerns about domination and coercion ….” [Scott Clifford, Vijeth Iyengar, Roberto Cabeza, and Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, “Moral foundations vignettes: a standardized stimulus database of scenarios based on moral foundations theory Behavior Research Methods. Volume 47, issue 4, December 2015. Pages 1178-1198.]
           “… [One] key tenet of Moral Foundations Theory is that the postulated foundations have a universal evolutionary basis, forming a ‘first draft’ of a person’s moral ‘taste buds,’ which is organized prior to experience but also, to some extent, modifiable by experience; it was originally based partly upon reviews of research on morality across cultures, from an anthropological perspective, and on phylogenetic precursors of human morality in primates, from an evolutionary perspective …. The presumed universality of the moral foundations implies that it is crucial to investigate the extent to which the hypothesized factorial structure and relation to political ideology can be recovered in different cultures and languages.” [Artur Nilsson and Arvid Erlandsson, “The Moral Foundations taxonomy: Structural validity and relation to political ideology in Sweden.” Personality and Individual Differences. Volume 76, April 2015. Pages 28-32.]
           “[Jonathan] Haidt argues for five psychological foundations of morality: He includes harm and fairness and adds loyalty, respect for authority, and spiritual purity …. Other scholars have proposed lists of universal aspects of morality, and Haidt identified his five by trying to work out what they all had in common. He hypothesizes that all five exist in every culture but are emphasized to varying degrees.” [Greg Miller, “The Roots of Morality: Neurobiologists, philosophers, psychologists, and legal scholars are probing the nature of human morality using a variety of experimental techniques and moral challenges.” Science. Volume 320, May 9th, 2008. Pages 734-737.]
           “Briefly, intuitions based on the Harm [moral] foundation are activated by signs of pain and suffering and might lead us to condemn acts and individuals that cause suffering and to admire those who alleviate or prevent harm …. The Fairness foundation is activated by perceiving violations of reciprocity, equality, individual rights, and justice. The Ingroup foundation arises from our sense of attachment and obligation to groups that we identify with …—we approve of those who sacrifice for the group … or those who contribute to its cohesion and well-being. The Authority foundation stems from our long history of living within social hierarchies; it underlies intuitions that favor those who show leadership, wisdom, respect, or deference and to disapprove of those who fail to fulfill their duties. Finally, Purity foundation engenders concerns about sanctity and desecration and physical and spiritual corruption, such as the inability to control one’s base impulses. It also underlies our tendency to imbue entities (God, nature) with sacred meaning.” [Spassena Koleva, Dylan Selterman, Ravi Iyer, Peter Ditto, and Jesse Graham, “The Moral Compass of Insecurity: Anxious and Avoidant Attachment Predict Moral Judgment.” Social Psychological and Personality Science. Volume 5, number 2, 2014. Pages 185-194.]
           “According to the MFT [Moral Foundations Theory], the five foundations are universally present, and any combination of them can be used to support an ideological narrative, including those that motivate violence …. This allows subcultures within the same society to elaborate and emphasize different foundations to differing degrees. So, the connection between sacredness and IPV [intimate partner violence] could come down to a question of the intensity of some specific moral concerns.” [María L. Vecina, “The Five Moral Foundations Sacredness Scale in men in court-mandated treatment for violently abusing their partners.” Personality and Individual Differences. Volume 64, July 2014. Pages 46-51.]
           “Moral foundations theorists sometimes suggest that they are offering a purely descriptive theory about what people believe is moral (rather than what actually is moral), but their frequent use of terms such as ‘virtues,’ ‘moral truths,’ ‘moral worth,’ and ‘moral knowledge’ clearly implies normative, prescriptive conclusions …. Moral foundations theorists commonly chastise liberals for failing to understand or appreciate conservative moral motivations; there is even said to be a ‘‘moral color-blindedness’ of the left’ ….” Matthew Kugler, John T. Jost, and Sharareh Noorbaloochi, “Another Look at Moral Foundations Theory: Do Authoritarianism and Social Dominance Orientation Explain Liberal-Conservative Differences in ‘Moral’ Intuitions?” Social Justice Research. Volume 27, issue 4, December 2014. Pages 413-431.]
           “The Moral Foundations Questionnaire … uses abstract relevance assessments and more contextualized moral judgments to measure individual reliance on each of the foundations. The Moral Foundations Sacredness Scale … assesses how ‘sacred’ individuals find each of the domains by asking how much money it would take for them to commit an act that violates principles of the domain.” [Andrea L. Glenn, Ravi Iyer, Jesse Graham, Spassena Koleva, and Jonathan Haidt, “Are All Types of Morality Compromised in Psychopathy?” Journal of Personality Disorders. Volume 23, number 4, August 2009. Pages 384-398.]
           “Recent work using Jonathan Haidt’s moral foundations theory (MFT) offers … [a] perspective [on morality and politics]. [Spassena] Koleva et al. … argued that political differences could best be explained by attention to five innate psychological systems (or ‘foundations’) centered on harm/harm, fairness/reciprocity, ingroup/loyalty, authority/respect, and purity/sanctity. Although these systems are present in all individuals, different cultures emphasize different foundations, leading to a wide variety of moral systems. These systems, in turn, shape political views, with liberals primarily emphasizing harm and fairness, but conservatives valuing all five foundations more equally ….” [Andrew Miles and Stephen Vaisey, “Morality and politics: Comparing alternate theories.” Social Science Research. Volume 53, September 2015. Pages 252-269.]
           “… relative favorability toward [Barack] Obama was significantly related to endorsing the Fairness [moral] foundation, while relative favorability toward [Hillary] Clinton was significantly related to endorsing the moral values of Ingroup and Authority. While the effect sizes are small, they show that the moral foundations retain predictive validity for this candidate choice even when controlling for age, gender, education, and political orientation. Clinton supporters appear to be more morally conservative, showing greater endorsement of group-oriented moral concerns, though they identify themselves as being just as strongly liberal. Relative preference for Clinton appears to be related to being a good group member, favoring tradition, and supporting the social order, while relative preference for Obama appears to be related to endorsing moral foundations related to treating individuals well.” [Ravi Iyer, Jesse Graham, Spassena Koleva, Peter Ditto, and Jonathan Haidt, “Beyond Identity Politics: Moral Psychology and the 2008 Democratic Primary.” Analyses of Social Issues and Public Policy. Volume 10, number 1, December 2010. Pages 293-306.]
           “The MFQ [Moral Foundations Questionnaire] fills the need for a theoretically grounded scale covering the full range of human moral concerns. We found substantial evidence that the scale is reliable and valid. The scale is internally consistent (both within and between two question formats) while maintaining conceptual coverage of diverse manifestations of foundation-related concerns. Test–retest analyses showed stability of foundation subscale scores over time. External validations of the MFQ using widely used scales, as well as attitudes toward conceptually related social groups, showed convergent, discriminant, and predictive validity.” [Jesse Graham, Brian A. Nosek, Jonathan Haidt, Ravi Iyer, Spassena Koleva, and Peter H. Ditto, “Mapping the Moral Domain.” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology. Volume 101, number 2, August 2011. Pages 366-385.]
           “Western societies are growing more diverse, and with diversity comes differing ideals about how best to regulate selfishness and about how we ought to live together. Participants in political debates are motivated in part by moral convictions. Moral foundations theory offers a useful way to conceptualize and measure such convictions. As research on political psychology thrives …, we hope that it will clarify the role that morality plays in political thought and behavior.” [Jesse Graham, Jonathan Haidt, and Brian A. Nosek, “Liberals and Conservatives Rely on Different Sets of Moral Foundations.” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology. Volume 96, number 5, May 2009. Pages 1029-1046.]
           “MFT [moral foundations theory] was originally designed to analyze cultures, not individuals. It was not intended to be a trait theory, or a theory about political ideology. Rather, it was created by two psychologists … who had worked with the anthropologist Richard Shweder on questions of morality and culture …. We were … delighted by the variability of moral practices we read about in ethnographies.… [W]e … recognized that the psyche was not a blank slate; it contained certain tools or building blocks, provided by evolution, which constrained and enabled the two-way co-construction of culture and psyche.” [Jonathan Haidt, Jesse Graham, and Craig Joseph, “Above and Below Left–Right: Ideological Narratives and Moral Foundations.” Psychological Inquiry. Volume 20, issue 2, August 2009. Pages 110-119.]
           “Importantly, research using this model [Moral Foundations Theory] has demonstrated that the relative importance of these domains varies between liberals and conservatives. In particular, liberals tend to be more concerned about compassion and justice, whereas conservatives are more concerned about ingroup loyalty, respect for authority, and purity. Differences in the strength of these underlying motivational systems are thought to influence explicit political attitudes and ideologies.” [Jacob B. Hirsh, Colin G. DeYoung, Xiaowen Xu, and Jordan B. Peterson, “Compassionate Liberals and Polite Conservatives: Associations of Agreeableness With Political Ideology and Moral Values.” Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin. Volume 36, number 5, 2010. Pages 655-664.]
           “We propose that human beings come equipped with an intuitive ethics, an innate preparedness to feel flashes of approval or disapproval toward certain patterns of events involving other human beings. The four patterns for which we believe the evidence is best are those surrounding suffering, hierarchy, reciprocity, and purity. These intuitions under-gird the moral systems that cultures develop, including their understandings of virtues and character. By recognizing that cultures build incommensurable moralities on top of a foundation of shared intuitions, we can develop new approaches to moral education and to the moral conflicts that divide our diverse society.” [Jonathan Haidt and Craig Joseph, “Intuitive ethics: how innately prepared intuitions generate culturally variable virtues.” Dædalus. Volume 133, number 4, fall 2004. Pages 55-66.]
           “[Jonathan] Haidt’s aim is to suggest a model for understanding plurality. However, pluralism/plurality is a label that one can stick on diverse phenomena in the field of morality and ethics. First, there is the pluralism of moralities, moral systems or moral traditions——whatever term is preferred. Since moralities are a part of, and embedded in, more encompassing cultures, moral pluralism is connected to cultural pluralism. Most societies are multicultural and therefore also morally pluralist. Haidt is quite aware of such pluralism. Second, within the plurality of moralities he makes a distinction between different types of ethics: the ethic of autonomy, the ethic of community and the ethic of divinity …. Haidt also mentions a third type of pluralism: the plurality of moral foundations (or moral modules or moral sense receptors).” [Bert Musschenga, “The promises of moral foundations theory.” Journal of Moral Education. Volume 42, number 3, September 2013. Pages 330-345.]
      319. Circle of Trust® approach (Parker J. Palmer and others): This secularized adaptation of Quakerism—the Religious Society of Friends—is supported by the Center for Courage & Renewal. The Circle of Trust® approach was previously called “Formation.” Programs are presented to professional educators and others. Foster attended a series of Formation weekend workshops and additional daytime study groups through Reflection and Renewal at Johnson County Community College. See also the Formation Touchstones (now called the Circle of Trust® Touchstones). Palmer, earlier in his life, was the dean of Pendle Hill—a Quaker conference and retreat center in the suburban–Philadelphia community of Wallingford, Pennsylvania. He received his Ph.D. in sociology from the University of California at Berkeley.
           “Through the Center for Courage & Renewal we offer personal and professional retreats and programs designed to explore vocational and life questions, offer renewal and encouragement, and deepen engagement in professional practice. Using what we call the Circle of Trust® approach, we invite groups into a communal process based upon a set of principles and practices through which we engage our deepest questions in a way that welcomes our inwardness even as it connects us to the gifts and challenges of community and to the larger world.
           “To date the majority of our participants have come from K–12 and higher education settings. And although conducting our retreats is not the same as creating learning spaces for academic subjects, through these participants we have seen evidence of how elements of the Circle of Trust® approach have broad applicability to many kinds of pedagogical settings. Indeed, participants in our circles eagerly take these practices back into their classrooms and workplaces, having found them to be powerful in their own lives.”
           [Terry Chadsey and Marcy Jackson, “Principles and Practices of the Circle of Trust® Approach.” New Directions for Teaching and Learning. Volume 2012, issue 130, summer 2012. Pages 3-14.]
           “The Circle of Trust® Approach assumes that the exploration of any complex issue requires an inner examination of one’s values, beliefs, and ways of being in the world. A few key principles underlie this approach. They include that this inner journeying requires both solitude and community; that there is profound utility in exploring paradox; and that there is a hidden wholeness available despite the brokenness we experience in the world.
           “Inner Work Requires Solitude and Community. In Circles of Trust®, we make space for the solitude that allows us to learn from within, while supporting that solitude with the resources of community. Participants take an inner journey in community where we learn how to evoke and challenge each other without being judgmental, directive, or invasive.”
           [Sherry K. Watt, Margaret Golden, Lisa A. P. Schumacher, and Luis S. Moreno, “Courage in Multicultural Initiatives.” New Directions for Teaching and Learning. Volume 2013, issue 114, winter 2013. Pages 57-68.]
           “Educators based at the University of Mississippi, community-based educators, social justice advocates, and funders collaborated to provide the resources and opportunities for diverse groups of Mississippians to participate in the Circle of Trust® approach as a vehicle for community healing and transformation. Created by educator and public intellectual Parker J. Palmer and the Center for Courage & Renewal (www.couragerenewal.org), this approach is a retreat-based learning format founded on a set of principles and practices that honor the cultivation of one’s own wisdom and voice and evoke the courage to integrate the inner life with the active life of service and leadership. The theory of change behind the Circle of Trust® approach is that individual hearts and minds must open to new possibilities if external systems and structures are going to shift.” [Bonnie Allen and Estrus Tucker, “Circles of Learning in Mississippi: Community Recovery and Democracy Building.” New Directions for Teaching and Learning. Volume 2012, issue 130, summer 2012. Pages 89-100.]
           “Although the questionnaire revealed that respondents are overwhelmingly positive about their Circle of Trust experience, it is important to note that some also mentioned minor ways in which their experience could be improved (the most common suggestion was to make the retreats longer!). The majority of respondents, though, said that they could not think of anything that could be done to improve their Circle of Trust experience.” [Janet Smith, “Measuring the Impact of the Circle of Trust® Approach.” New Directions for Teaching and Learning. Volume 2012, issue 130, summer 2012. Pages 101-111.]
           “Circles of Trust offer ample opportunity for facilitators to model and teach honest open questions—and for participants to practice this form of questioning that intentionally goes against the grain of advice giving. These questions inform the participants’ discussion of how ‘third things’—typically poems, other short pieces of literature, music, or visual art—intersect with their personal and professional lives. Journaling prompts or suggestions are also typically honest open questions, and participants learn to use their own gentle questions to invite small-group partners into deeper sharing— not to satisfy the asker’s curiosity but to serve the answerer’s further inner exploration. In clearness committees, the heart of every retreat, the honest open questions of a small group also invite a focus person to think deeply into a concern shared in the strictest confidence.” [Christine T. Love, “Dialing In to a Circle of Trust: A ‘Medium’ Tech Experiment and Poetic Evaluation.” New Directions for Teaching and Learning. Volume 2012, issue 130, summer 2012. Pages 37-52.]
           “This section describes ways in which I have actively incorporated the Circle of Trust® approach into five classes I currently teach in the counseling psychology program.
           “The strategies I identify are not new. New applications invite old practices forward to assist budding counselors in reconnecting with their own developmental story, their hopes, dreams, and fears. The Circle of Trust® approach facilitates reflection of the self and the self in relationship to others. There is invitation to the counselor to integrate soul and new role.”
           [Judith A. Goodell, “The Circle of Trust® Approach and a Counselor Training Program: A Hand in Glove Fit.” New Directions for Teaching and Learning. Volume 2012, issue 130, summer 2012. Pages 27-35.]
           “A key aspect of any Courage & Renewal program is the use of the Circle of Trust approach. Core to this approach is the use of a number of ‘Touchstones’ that help to define clear boundaries that help create safe space for the soul.
           “While these touchstones define how we relate to each other in a circle of trust, they can also be adapted to define how you work together in your organisation, community or network with integrity and trust — inviting the best of each person to show up and contribute.”
           [Editor, “Circle of Trust Touchstones.” Courage & Renewal Australasia: eNews. Number 2, 2016. Pages 1-2.]
           “Fortunately, [Alexis de] Tocqueville had a positive experience with … [a] religious group whose mode of worship was quite different from both evangelicals and Catholics: the Quakers of Philadelphia. The Religious Society of Friends, as Quakers are formally known, ‘had long encouraged cooperation in public affairs as well as toleration in religion” and were actively involved in various forms of relief work and associational life. Tocqueville’s appreciation of Quakerism—perhaps because the gravitas of the Quaker silent meeting for worship met his standards of religious formality—gave him his first insight into what would become a major theme of his work: the importance of voluntary associations in forming democratic habits of the heart.” [Parker J. Palmer. Healing the Heart of Democracy: The Courage to Create a Politics Worthy of the Human Spirit. San Francisco, California: Jossey-Bass imprint of John Wiley & Sons Publishers. 2011. Page 121.]
           “This Leader’s Guide has been created as a resource to provide all you need for reflecting on The Active Life in a group study context. However, this doesn’t mean that you and the group must accomplish or discuss everything it suggests. You may find that you don’t have time for all the questions listed. Use your judgment, and the group’s expressed preferences, to select those questions you want to focus on—perhaps at the opening of each session, as this Guide occasionally prompts you to do.” [Parker Palmer. The Active Life Leader’s Guide: A Spirituality of Work, Creativity, and Caring. New York: HarperCollins Publishers. 2011. Kindle Edition.]
           “I ran across the old Quaker saying, ‘Let your life speak.’ I found those words encouraging, and I thought I understood what they meant: ‘Let the highest truths and values ues guide you. Live up to those demanding standards in everything thing you do.’ Because I had heroes at the time who seemed to be doing exactly that, this exhortation had incarnate meaning ing for me-it meant living a life like that of Martin Luther King Jr. or Rosa Parks or Mahatma Gandhi or Dorothy Day, a life of high purpose.
           “So I lined up the loftiest ideals I could find and set out to achieve them. The results were rarely admirable, often laughable, able, and sometimes grotesque. But always they were unreal, a distortion of my true self—as must be the case when one lives from the outside in, not the inside out. I had simply found a ‘noble’ way to live a life that was not my own, a life spent imitating heroes instead of listening to my heart.”
           [Parker J. Palmer. Let Your Life Speak: Listening for the Voice of Vocation. San Francisco, California: Jossey-Bass imprint of John Wiley & Sons Publishers. 2000. Kindle edition.]
           “Spaces designed to welcome the soul and support the inner journey ney are rare. But the principles and practices that shape such spaces are neither new nor untested. Some are embedded in monastic tradition, for the monastery is the archetypal ‘community of solitudes.’
           “Some emerged over four hundred years of Quaker faith and practice. Some were revived in the transpersonal psychology movement of the mid-twentieth century. And some are embodied in the processes of spiritual formation that can be found at the heart of most of the world’s great wisdom traditions.
           “Formation may be the best name for what happens in a circle of trust, because the word refers, historically, to soul work done in community. But a quick disclaimer is in order, since formation sometimes means a process quite contrary to the one described in this book-a process in which the pressure of orthodox doctrine, sacred text, and institutional authority is applied to the misshapen soul in order to conform it to the shape dictated by some theology. This approach is rooted in the idea that we are born with souls deformed by sin, and our situation is hopeless until the authorities ‘form’ us properly.”
           [Parker J. Palmer. A Hidden Wholeness: The Journey Toward an Undivided Life. San Francisco, California: Jossey-Bass imprint of John Wiley & Sons Publishers. 2004. Page 57.]
           “Spiritual communities have long recognized how difficult it is to affirm the reality of love when history and our own biographies offer so much evidence of division, destruction, and death. So they have developed spiritual disciplines, daily practices by which we can resist these deformations of self and world, recalling and recovering that image of love which seems hidden or beyond reach. Through the disciplines of spiritual formation we seek to be re-formed in our original, created image.
           “These disciplines have been especially emphasized in the monastery, that ancient form of spiritual community in which our schools have one historic taproot, and from which we can recover a sense of education as a process of spiritual formation. From monastic tradition I have learned three spiritual disciplines, three ways of maintaining contact with love’s reality in the midst of misleading appearances: the study of sacred texts, the practice of prayer and contemplation, and the gathered life of the community itself.
           “Through the study of sacred texts, I maintain contact with the spiritual tradition, with the seeking and finding of those who have gone before. These texts allow me to return to times of deeper spiritual insight than my own, to recollect truths that my culture obscures, to have companions on the spiritual journey who, though long dead, may be more alive spiritually than many who are with me now. In such study my heart and mind are reformed by the steady press of tradition against the distortions of my day.”
           [Parker J. Palmer. To Know as We Are Known: A Spirituality of Education. San Francisco, California: Jossey-Bass imprint of John Wiley & Sons Publishers. 2010. Pages 17-18.]
           “Communities of shared inquiry and discovery, particularly those that are sustained over a significant period of time, play a key role in transformational learning throughout adulthood. Most recently, I have witnessed the power of ‘a learning community’ while teaching both in a nine-month cohort-based executive leadership program for mid-career business executives at Seattle University and in a leadership retreat cycle at the Whidbey Institute in which professionals from across sectors gather as a cohort once each season for an entire year. But it must be observed that especially in the twenty-something years of emerging adulthood, while access to a good mentor can be valuable, participation in ‘a mentoring community’ serves a yet more profound formation of orienting lifelong commitments. Young adults are given access to ‘dreams’ by intention or default—and the value assumptions that shape those dreams will be determined by the socialities that undergird them. Higher education at its best provides access to mentoring communities—whether they are formed in a classroom, seminar, chemistry lab, residence hall, or on the soccer field—in which young, emerging adults can engage the big questions of our time and experience worthy ways of thinking and being, becoming adept in practices of mind, heart, and hand that serve the common good.” [Parker J. Palmer and Arthur Zajonc. The Heart of Higher Education: A Call to Renewal. San Francisco, California: Jossey-Bass imprint of John Wiley & Sons Publishers. 2010. Pages 177-178.]
           “In contrast to these hard questions, the popular image of community is distressingly sentimental. We—especially white, middle-class folk—value community for the personal nurture it promises but ignore its challenges of political and economic justice. We speak of ‘life together’ in romantic terms that bear little resemblance to the difficult discipline of a common life.
           “But the problems of our age will yield neither to personalism nor to romance. If the idea of community is to speak to our condition, we must change the terms of the discussion. So I write about community partly to correct the romantic fallacy: if we seek a dream community, reality will quickly defeat us, and the struggle for community cannot afford such losses.
           “I write, too, because the religious basis of community is so often ignored—and I believe that religion points not toward fantasy but toward ultimate reality. The idea of community is at the heart of every great religious tradition. The Hebrew Bible is primarily the narrative of a community making and breaking its covenant with God. The New Testament affirms that the capacity to join with others in a life of prayer and service is one test of receiving God’s spirit. Acts of the Apostles, for example, reports that the formation of a community of shared goods was among the first fruits of Pentecost: ‘All whose faith had drawn them together held everything in common: they would sell their property and possessions and make a general distribution as the need of each required’ (Acts 2:44-45).…
           “And from the heart of my own spiritual experience, I know that God is constantly moving within and among us, calling us back to that unity, that wholeness, in which we were created. If we will respond to that call, we can make a critical witness to the possibility of a future both human and divine.…
           “Much has been said and written about the quest for community in our time, but the rhetoric is not reflected in our actions. We may honor community with our words, but the history of the twentieth century has been a determined movement away from life together.”
           [Parker J. Palmer. The Promise of Paradox: A Celebration of Contradictions in the Christian Life. San Francisco, California: Jossey-Bass imprint of John Wiley & Sons Publishers. 2008. Pages 66-67.]
           “From 1994 to 1996, I led the first Teacher Formation group. My gratitude goes to the inspiring Michigan public school teachers who made that experiment so successful: Maggie Adams, Jack Bender, Mark Bond, Lauri Bowersox, Margaret Ells, Richard Fowler, Linda Hamel, Eleanor Hayward, Marianne Houston, Katherine Kennedy, Cheri McLoughan, Michael Perry, Linda Powell, Toni Rostami, Rick Serafini, Gerald Thompson, and Marcia Weinhold.
           “I am grateful, too, for the people who are giving the Teacher Formation Program a larger and continuing life. They include Judy Brown, Tony Chambers, Charlie Glasser, Eleanor Greenslade, Sally Hare, Marianne Houston, Marcy Jackson, Rick Jackson, Mickey Olivanti, Megan Scribner, David Sluyter, and Penny Williamson, my friends and gifted partners in program development; the staff of the Fetzer Institute, whose devotion and hard work-answering calls, writing ing memos, issuing checks, cleaning rooms, caring for the grounds, and putting food on the table-has kept the program afloat; and the trustees of the institute who believe in this work and have backed it: Janis Claflin, Bruce Fetzer, Wink Franklin, Lynne Twist, Frances Vaughan, Jeremy Waletzky, and Judith Skutch Whitson (trustee emerita).
           [Parker J. Palmer. The Courage to Teach: Exploring the Inner Landscape of a Teacher’s Life. San Francisco, California: Jossey-Bass imprint of John Wiley & Sons Publishers. 1998. Kindle edition.]
           “In addition to discernment, there is another reason to teach our students how to cultivate community. Every serious effort at social change requires organized groups of people who can support each other when the demands of being a change agent threaten to overwhelm them and can generate the collective power necessary to make a difference. Without communities that encourage us to assert core professional values in settings where we may well suffer for doing so, most of us will revert to conventional ‘wisdom’ and refuse to wear our hearts on our sleeves. Which brings me to my fifth and final immodest proposal for the education of the new professional.” [Parker J. Palmer, “A New Professional: The Aims of Higher Education Revisited.” Change. Volume 39, number 6, November/December 2007. Pages 7-12.]
           “The root fallacy in the pedagogy of most of our institutions is that the individual is the agent of knowing and therefore the focus for teaching and learning. We all know that if we draw the lines of instruction in most classrooms, they run singularly from teacher to each individual student. These lines are there for the conve- nience of the instructor, not for their corporate reality. They do not reveal a complex web of relationships between teacher and students and subject that would look like true community.” [Parker J. Palmer, “Community, Conflict, and Ways of Knowing: Ways to Deepen Our Educational Agenda.” Change. Volume 26, number 3, May/June 1994. Page 40.]
           “The black liberation movement and the women’s movement would have died aborning if racist and sexist organizations had been allowed to define the rules of engagement. But for some blacks, and for some women, that resistance affirmed and energized the struggle. In both movements, advocates of change found sources of countervailing power outside of organizational structures, and they nurtured that power in ways that eventually gave them immense leverage on organizations.” [Parker J. Palmer, “Divided No More: A Movement Approach to Educational Reform.” Change. Volume 24, number 2, March/April 1992. Pages 10-17.]
           “Spiritual communities have long recognized how difficult it is to affirm the reality of love when history and our own biographies offer so much evidence of division, destruction, and death. So they have developed spiritual disciplines, daily practices by which we can resist these deformations of self and world, recalling and recovering that image of love which seems hidden or beyond reach. Through the disciplines of spiritual formation we seek to be re-formed in our original, created image.” [Parker J. Palmer, “Education as Spiritual Formation.” Educational Horizons. Volume 82, number 1, fall 2003. Pages 55-67.]
           “Experience tells me not only that there is a deep reservoir of insight about teaching among faculty, but also that faculty have a deep need to draw upon that life-giving source. The reservoir waits to be tapped by leaders who perceive its presence, who expect and invite people to draw upon it, who offer excuses and permissions for the dialogue to happen—and who can help make that dialogue less woeful than it sometimes is and as winsome as it can easily be.” [Parker J. Palmer, “Good Talk about Good Teaching: Improving Teaching through Conversation and Community.” Change. Volume 25, number 6, November/December 1993. Pages 8-13.]
           “Good teachers dwell in the mystery of good teaching until it dwells in them. As they explore it alone and with others, the insight and energy of mystery begins to inform and animate their work. They discover and develop methods of teaching that emerge from their own integrity—but they never reduce their teaching to technique.” [Parker J. Palmer, “Good Teaching: A Matter of Living the Mystery.” Change. Volume 22, number 1, January/February 1990. Pages 10-16.]
           “After three decades of trying to learn my craft [teaching], every class comes down to this: my students and I, face to face, engaged in an ancient and exacting exchange called education. The techniques I have mastered do not disappear, but neither do they suffice. Face to face with my students, only one resource is at my immediate command: my identity, my selfhood, my sense of this ‘I’ who teaches—without which I have no sense of the ‘Thou’ who learns.” [Parker J. Palmer, “The Heart of a Teacher: Identity and Integrity in Teaching.” Change. Volume 29, number 6, November/December 1997. Pages 14-21.]
           “The presuppositions of religion are essentially objective; they are held to correspond to something objectively true in human experience. The presuppositions of science are essentially pragmatic; they are held simply to be usable vehicles in ordering chaotic sense data. To claim any basic continuity between the two is to do violence to both.” [Parker J. Palmer, “Objectivism and Pragmatism in Religion, Science, and Society.” The Christian Scholar. Volume 49, number 1, spring 1966. Pages 17-23.]
           “From my mid-thirties through my mid-forties, I served as dean of studies at Pendle Hill, a Quaker living-learning community near Philadelphia. My students were adults, ages 18 to 88, who were not looking for grades or credits or credentials, none of which Pendle Hill offered; they were looking for meaning in life. In the spring of 1977 I taught a class on Thomas Merton, whose work has been a source of great meaning for me. For our final session, I planned to show a film of [Thomas] Merton’s last talk, given just an hour or two before a freak accident took his life.” [Parker J. Palmer, “Taking pen in hand: A writer’s life and faith.” Christian Century. Volume 127, number 18, September 2010. Pages 22-25.]
           “Engaging students in the community of truth does not require that we put the chairs in a circle and have a conversation. A sense of connectedness can also be generated through lectures, lab exercises, fieldwork, service learning, electronic media, and many other pedagogies, both traditional and experimental. Like teaching itself, creating educational community can never be reduced to technique. It emerges from a principle that can express itself in endless varieties, depending on the identity and integrity of the teacher.” [Parker J. Palmer, “Teaching & Learning in Community.” About Campus. Volume 2, number 5, November–December 1997. Pages 4-13.]
           “… the models of reality we have in higher education have a tremendous impact on the structures and practices of the educational enterprise. I think the models of reality we had previously were atomistic and Darwinian in a competitive sense. But today we increasingly have models of reality which are essentially communal in nature. They come out of systems theory and out of ecological studies (for example, the hypothesis that the earth is a living organism). So right at the heart of the academic enterprise the word community turns out to have a rich and resonant meaning.” [Parker J. Palmer, “Teaching, Learning, and Community: An Interview with Parker J. Palmer.” Charles S. Claxton, interviewer. Journal of Developmental Education. Volume 15, number 2, winter 1991. Pages 22-25 and 33.]
           “… the core human reality that ‘heart and soul’ language points to has been given many names by diverse traditions. Hasidic Jews call it the spark of the divine in every being. Christians may call it spirit, though some (e.g., the Quakers) call it the inner teacher, and Thomas Merton (a Trappist monk) called it true self. Secular humanists call it identity and integrity. Depth psychologists call it the outcome of individuation. And there are common idioms for it in everyday speech, as when we say of someone we know and care about, ‘He just isn’t himself these days,’ or, ’She seems to have found herself.’” [Parker J. Palmer, “Teaching with Heart and Soul: Reflections on Spirituality in Teacher Education.” Journal of Teacher Education. Volume 54, number 5, November–December 2003. Pages 376-385.]
           “Listening for the inner teacher has nothing to do with ‘navel-gazing’ or narcissism. It has everything to do with reclaiming our own inner truth and our right relation to the world—the world for which we all bear such deep responsibility.” [Parker J. Palmer, “To whom do you report?” The Journal for Quality and Participation. Volume 24, number 3, fall 2001. Pages 19-20.]
           “In the broadest sense of the word, contemplation means creating sacred space to be still, to rest in God, to reflect, to look inward, to attend to the inner life, and simply to be with God in solitude, silence, and stillness. Solitude, silence, and stillness are in fact the qualities of contemplative prayer. Contemplation in its broad sense can also be understood, as Parker Palmer describes, as ‘anything that dismantles our illusions.’” [Phileena Heuertz, “Contemplative Activism: A Transformative Way.” Conversations: A Forum for Authentic Transformation. Volume 8, issue 2, fall/winter 2010. Pages 46-51.]
           “From 1998 to 2008, the Dallas County Community College District (DCCCD) offered its employees a variety of options for formation, a type of reflective practice. The district encompasses ten locations, seven of them independently accredited colleges. Formation is based primarily on Parker Palmer’s model for Circles of Trust as described in A Hidden Wholeness …. Palmer is a writer on issues of education, community, and spirituality who was a consultant to the DCCCD, visiting twice during each academic year from 1998 to 2003. During that time, formation was introduced through short retreats called samplers and took root as longer retreats as a form of staff development offered to employees by the district’s office of staff and organizational development and as a campus-based activity supported by local staff development funds.” [Ann Faulkner and Guy Gooding, “Offering Reflection to an Organization.” New Directions for Community Colleges. Volume 2010, number 151, fall 2010. Pages 91-100.]
      320. epistemologies of action (Tanja Winkler and James Duminy): They examine how “epistemological standpoints” both shape, and are also shaped by, ethics.
           “We begin with the assertion that epistemological standpoints shape – and are shaped by – ethical principles and that epistemologies of action are constantly evolving. Yet, while many contemporary planning theories are influenced by post-structural and postcolonial epistemologies that recognise the value of subjective and situated knowledge, work on planning ethics tends to retain a focus on normative ethical theories. This focus precludes further explorations of the nature and meaning of adopted ethical values. By means of a case example, we suggest that some engagement with metaethical questions might offer scholars of the global South-East an alternative basis for developing knowledge.…
           “… as we already know, epistemologies of action undergo periodic shifts in accordance with ever-changing philosophical understandings of the world.…
           “Granted, epistemology and ethics are usually considered as two distinct philosophical domains. However, when epistemology appeals to the character traits of an epistemic agent as a condition for the formation of knowledge, it may then be argued that ethical commitments function as a productive component of the epistemic process ….”
           [Tanja Winkler and James Duminy, “Planning to change the world? Questioning the normative ethics of planning theories.” Planning Theory. Volume 15, number 2, May 2016. Pages 111-129.]
      321. republican consequentialism (Philip Pettit): Pettit develops a “consequentialist” alternative to ethical naturalism.
           “First I show why freedom as non-domination is a personal good that practically everyone has reason to want and, more generally, to value. Then I argue that it is something which inherently concerns political institutions, not something that can just be left to individuals to further by other means. And third, I maintain that non-domination is a goal which such institutions should seek to promote, not a constraint that they have to honour in the pursuit of other goals; I defend a consequentialist version of republicanism. This republican doctrine, as we shall see, is a consequentialism with a difference: it allows us to say that the institutions which promote people’s freedom as non-domination go to constitute that freedom, not to cause it; the doctrine does not countenance any temporal or causal gulf between civic institutions and the freedom of citizens.” [Philip Pettit. Republicanism: A Theory of Freedom and Government. Oxford, England: Clarendon Press imprint of Oxford University Press. 1997. Pages 80-81.]
           “I shall argue that a republican regime which seeks to maximize nondomination is bound to avoid initiatives that leave the intensity of non-domination unequal, but that no such stricture applies to its leaving the extent of non-domination—in effect, leaving material resources—unequal. Without necessarily having to embrace a material egalitarianism, then, republican consequentialism is required to support what we can describe as structural egalitarianism. There may be many reasons why republicanism should seek to reduce material inequalities, of course, as we shall see in the next chapter; but the connection with material egalitarianism is not as tight—not as independent of empirical contingencies—as the connection with structural egalitarianism.” [Philip Pettit. Republicanism: A Theory of Freedom and Government. Oxford, England: Clarendon Press imprint of Oxford University Press. 1997. Page 113.]
           “… I argue that under the older, republican way of construing freedom—under a construal of freedom as nondomination rather than noninterference—the ideal is not consistent in this way with humiliation and a lack of honor; some plausible assumptions ensure that if people enjoy freedom as nondomination, then they will also enjoy honor. At least so far as its citizens are concerned—and that will be my focus here—the free republic is bound to be a decent society.… I offer some historical reflections on the shift from the republican way of thinking about freedom and politics to the classical liberal approach and I speculate about a connection between that shift and a diminished concern with honor and decency.” [Philip Pettit, “Freedom with Honor: A Republican Ideal.” Social Research. Volume 64, number 1, spring 1997. Pages 52-76.]
           “The republican conception of freedom was certainly negative, … but it did not represent liberty as noninterference in the manner that [Thomas] Hobbes inaugurated and that came to prominence among nineteenth-century liberal writers. It was, rather, a conception of liberty in which the antonym is not interference as such but rather dominatio or domination. Domination is subjection to an arbitrary power of interference on the part of another—a dominus or master—even another who chooses not actually to exercise that power. Republican freedom, … should be defined as nondomination, not noninterference.” [Philip Pettit, “Keeping Republican Freedom Simple: On a Difference with Quentin Skinner.” Political Theory. Volume 30, number 3, June 2002. Pages 339-356.]
           “On the republican conception, freedom is a matter of enjoying a suitable civic status. Spelled out in greater detail, it requires, first, a freedom in the exercise of certain choices; second, a freedom in the exercise of those choices that is secured on a certain basis; and third, a freedom that is understood in a distinctive manner, requiring non-domination rather than non-interference.” [Philip Pettit, “Legitimacy and Justice in Republican Perspective.” Current Legal Problems. Volume 65, number 1, 2012. Pages 59-82.]
           “Republican philosophy identifies a complaint that is meant to be at once personally motivating and politically feasible. It indicts the evil of subjection to another’s will—particularly in important areas of personal choice—as an ill that we all recognise and recoil from and at the same time as an ill that the state is well placed to deal with. I believe that such subjection can be effectively corralled and reduced, though certainly not wholly eliminated, by means of political initiative. And yet it takes only a little imagination to realise just how repellent this subjection can be.” [Philip Pettit, “The republic, old and new.” Renewal. Volume 20, number 2/3, fall 2012. Pages 47-60.]
           “Whatever nonarbitrary government decides to allow in the zone or reasonable disagreement is bound to count as nonarbitrary and nondominating; so long as government follows a suitable procedure in reaching its decision, it cannot get things wrong. As the toss of a fair coin may determine, as a matter of pure procedure, that the selected outcome is fair, so government fiat in the zone of reasonable disagreement will determine as a matter of pure procedure that a favored practice or policy is nonarbitrary. The goal of promoting nondomination cannot be invoked, then, to give advice to government on what policy it should adopt in the area, or to provide a basis for complaint about what government does: ‘any actions, and therefore any interference, licensed by its decision will not be arbitrary.’ Republican theory will be reduced, by its own strictures, to silence; it will be self-stultifying, if not self-defeating.” [Philip Pettit, “The Determinacy of Republican Policy: A Reply to McMahon.” Philosophy & Public Affairs. Volume 34, number 3, summer 2006. Pages 275-283.]
           “Some of the main distinctions that have been offered in the literature—freedom ‘to’ versus freedom ‘from,’ freedom as an ‘opportunity concept’ versus freedom as an ‘exercise concept,’ or naturalism versus ‘ethical naturalism’—have been difficult to sustain. This difficulty is one of the reasons why some have now started to speak about ‘republican freedom’: a theory of freedom that attempts to combine elements of positive and negative freedoms into a single concept. In other words, the failure to offer a sustainable distinction has resulted in a weakening of the dichotomy in principle, as well as of the concepts of positive and negative freedom independently of each other.” [Maria Dimova Cookson, “A New Scheme of Positive and Negative Freedom: Reconstructing T. H. Green on Freedom.” Political Theory. Volume 31, number 4, August 2003. Pages 508-532.]
      322. Aristotelian ethical naturalism (John Hacker-Wright): He refers to tackling “practical wisdom” and its relations with “moral virtues.”
           “My aim has been to show that Aristotelian naturalism can vindicate the distinctive value of practical wisdom through demonstrating its essential connection to the moral virtues. It is often alleged that such an approach is a non-starter because it requires human nature to take on an ‘unconvincing speaking part’ in David Wiggins’ memorable phrase …. The assumption behind this charge is that Aristotelian ethical naturalism somehow takes human nature to be intrinsically normative.…
           “… Achieving insight into what it is to live well, in the way that is necessary for achieving practical wisdom is therefore a distinctive epistemic achievement and one that requires us to tackle the issue of what makes practical wisdom itself good through understanding its connection with moral virtues. I have argued for what seems to me the most promising way of doing that in Aristotelian ethical naturalism.”
           [John Hacker-Wright, “Skill, Practical Wisdom, and Ethical Naturalism.” Ethical Theory and Moral Practice. Volume 18, number 5, November 2005. Pages 983-993.]
      323. naturalized virtue ethics (Stephen R. Brown): Brown’s perspective is a version of ethical naturalism.
           “Throughout this book I have been defending an ethical naturalism wherein what makes someone a good human being is having those traits, called ‘virtues,’ that reliably enable the realization of our natural human ends. I have argued against various metaphysical, metaethical, and biological challenges. In these final sections I raise my own challenge to the theory, a challenge … inspired by evolutionary biology. While a challenge to naturalized virtue ethics, it also brings to light a deep challenge to the very project of ethical naturalism. Naturalized virtue ethics meets this challenge by, in effect, provisionally acquiescing to it. I argue that, if naturalized virtue ethics, as I have presented it, is to be theoretically unified from a naturalistic perspective, it amounts to a kind of evolutionary ethics. It then must face the same questions as that controversial theory. First, why should we accept reproductive success, or anything else, as our natural end? And, second, why should we think that the telos involved, reproductive success, is good? One might avoid dealing with such issues by resisting the lure of theoretical unification, or even of ethical theory itself. However, with certain caveats, I am not sure those lures should be resisted.” [Stephen R. Brown. Moral Virtue and Nature: A Defense of Ethical Naturalism. London and New York: Continuum International Publishing Group. 2008. Page 113]
           “‘[Stephen R.] Brown concludes his book with the frank admission that the positing of reproductive success as our ultimate end makes his ethical theory purely ‘explanatory’ and ‘descriptive’, rather than vindicatory’ or ‘normative.’ …. But one wonders, at this point, whether Brown has articulated a moral theory at all. Certainly he has failed to provide one that is constrained by his oft-repeated claim … that moral theory must be able to appeal to commonsense moral intuitions, in order both to explain and to justify our commonsense moral beliefs. It is hard then to see how Brown hasn’t run foul of his own conception of moral theory, as we do not normally consider the content of our most deeply held moral beliefs to be justified on the grounds of the contribution it makes to the reproduction of certain genetic traits. And hence it is even harder to see why we should accept the theory that he has provided.” [Jennifer Frey, “Moral Virtue and Nature: A Defense of Ethical Naturalism.” Review article. International Journal of Philosophical Studies. Volume 17, issue 5, December 2009. Pages 758-762.]
      324. moral thinking (Francis Snare): He develops an approach to moral philosophy.
           “Because of the past influence of religion in our culture, many people (even some atheists) find it plausible to suppose that moral philosophy will have to be based on religious or theistic propositions. (It is worth noticing, though, that the ancient Greek philosophers never saw much need to base moral philosophy on religious beliefs, and most modern moral philosophers have not done so.)
           “How could morality be ‘based on’ religion? Not every way in which religious or theistic propositions might be relevant to moral thinking amounts to basing moral philosophy on such propositions. In particular, the following three claims, even if true, would not show that moral philosophy has to be based on religion.…
           “We sometimes refer to a motive for doing something as a ‘reason’ for doing it, but this is not to be confused with a justifying reason. The threat of a fine, for example, does much to motivate people not to park in certain areas, but the fine is not the reason that parking there is wrong, it’s not what makes it wrong. Likewise, God’s threats may merely motivate people to do what is already right, for justifying reasons having nothing to do with the threat.”
           [Francis Snare. The Nature of Moral Thinking. London and New York: Routledge imprint of Taylor & Francis Group, an Informa PLC business. 2002. Page 13.]
      325. ethics of water governance (Neelke Doorn as pronounced in this MP3 audio file): He proposes a just and democratic approach to water governance.
           “The current debate on water ethics is obscured by unclear conceptions, and consequently false oppositions (for example between commodification and human rights). Here I see a clear role for philosophers. If the ethical aspects of water governance are to be adequately addressed, profound knowledge of water, including partly technical (hydrological) knowledge, knowledge of the prevailing legal constraints and insights from policy sciences and institutional economics, should be applied with philosophical rigor. The fact that this will be a multidisciplinary enterprise does mean that it will be superficial. Addressing the water crisis requires that debate is conducted at various levels of generality and specificity and so must a proper account of water ethics contain various levels of abstraction. At the most abstract level, basic moral concepts, such as justice, autonomy, and democracy need to be developed, which requires the involvement of political philosophers and applied ethicists and scholars of other disciplines with a strong conceptual method (like legal and political theorists). At the mid-level, principles of equity and efficacy need to be taken into account.” [Neelke Doorn, “Water and Justice: Towards an Ethics of Water Governance.” Public Reason. Volume 5, number 1, 2013. Pages 97-114.]
      326. contingency model for ethical decision-making by educators (James Green and Keith Walker): They develop a five–step approach.
           “… [What was] clear from the analysis of the data was the deliberate use of a decision-making model as participants sought to resolve their ethical dilemmas. Although, the participants’ use of a model can be attributed to instructions they were given before they wrote their case studies. The model I had devised for the case study assignment consisted of five steps:
           1. “Acknowledge the ethical dilemma;
           2. “Assess values and beliefs of everyone involved; assess organizational, social, and cultural norms that are pertinent; identify rules, policies, and laws that are pertinent;
           3. “Analyze the conflict
           4. “Make the decision;
           5. “State the ethical claim for the decision (i.e., what makes the decision ethical).
           “I am calling the model that emerged from the data analysis a ‘contingency model’ because the ethical theory that participants chose to use to frame their analysis of their dilemmas appeared to be contingent upon the kind of dilemma and the moral intensity of the dilemma.…
           “This investigation builds upon work of ethicists and researchers in ethical decision-making. While ndings are limited to the participants only, they underscore previous theory on contingency models in ethical decision-making. Further, they suggest that the type of ethical dilemma and the level of moral intensity of the ethical dilemma can inuence the decision-making process. In addition, a contingency model for ethical decision-making by educators is proposed for further study and possible use in professional education programs. It is expected that ndings will help inform planning courses in ethics education and add a new dimension to the discussion of ethical dilemmas in school communities.”
           [James Green and Keith Walker, “A Contingency Model for Ethical Decision-making by Educational Leaders.” International Journal of Educational Leadership Preparation. Volume 4, number 4, October–December 2009. Creative Commons. Pages 1-10.]
      327. situation ethics (Joseph Fletcher): He proposes an ethical system between legalism, on the one hand, and antinomianism, on the other.
           “… [An] approach, in between legalism [letter of the law] and antinomian [lawless] unprincipledness, is situation ethics. (To jump from one polarity to the other would be only to go from the frying pan to the fire.) The situationist enters into every decision-making situation fully armed with the ethical maxims of his community and its heritage, and he treats them with respect as illuminators of his problems. Just the same he is prepared in any situation to compromise them or set them aside in the situation if love seems better served by doing so.
           “Situation ethics goes part of the way with natural law, by accepting reason as the instrument of moral judgment, while rejecting the notion that the good is ‘given’ in the nature of things, objectively. It goes part of the way with Scriptural law by accepting revelation as the source of the norm while rejecting all ‘revealed’ norms or laws but the one command—to love God in the neighbor. The situationist follows a moral law or violates it according to love’s need. For example, ‘Almsgiving is a good thing if …’ The situationist never says, ‘Almsgiving is a good thing. Period!’ His decisions are hypothetical, not categorical. Only the commandment to love is categorically good. ‘Owe no one anything, except to love one another.‚ (Rom. 13:8.) If help to an indigent only pauperizes and degrades him, the situationist refuses a handout and finds some other way. He makes no law out of Jesus’ ‘Give to every one who begs from you.’ It is only one step from that kind of Biblicist literalism to the kind that causes women in certain sects to refuse blood transfusions even if death results—even if they are carrying a quckened fetus that will be lost too. The legalist says that even if he tells a man escaped from an asylum where his intended victim is, if he finds and murders him, at least only one sin has been committed (murder), not two (lying as well)!”
           [Joseph Fletcher. Situation Ethics: The New Morality. Philadelphia, Pennsylvania: The Westminster Press. 1966. Page 18.]
           “What [Joseph] Fletcher accomplished was the complete reorientation of ethics away from the concepts of right and wrong, substituting for these the single consideration of what is most likely (even if seldom certain) to advance human well-being. This he never defines, correctly so. It cannot be defined, nor can any rule of morality – even the utilitarian rule of promoting human well-being – be derived from it.” [Richard Taylor, “Joseph Fletcher’s Situation Ethics, Once Again.” Free Inquiry. Volume 15, number 4, fall 1995. Pages 47-49.]
      328. evolutionary ethics (John E. Hare): He develops an approach to ethics informed by the work of Donald Campbell.
           “It may seem strange to describe evolutionary ethics as looking for a substitute for divine assistance, since the workings of genetic mutation and natural selection would seem to belong to the category of our natural capacities. This would make evolutionary ethics a proposal that our capacities are in fact equal to the moral demand. But it is helpful to see evolution as a substitute for divine assistance, because it is proposed as operating beyond our conscious control. This gives us not a deus ex machina [Latin, deus ex māchina, ‘god from the machine’], but just a machina [Latin, ‘machine’]. Nevertheless, it is proposed as something external to the conscious life of practical agency, and as something which saves us from the otherwise tragic and irresoluble tension between duty and inclination. In fact some proponents of evolutionary ethics have been quite explicit about the idea that evolution functions as a replacement for God in solving the problem of the moral gap. Thus Donald Campbell proposes an account of social evolution that gives us a solution to what he sees as a biological bias that humans have towards egoism. Social evolution, he says, counteracts this bias at the level of social system preaching, which produces the demand for altruism.” [John E. Hare, “Naturalism and morality.” Naturalism: A critical analysis. London and New York: Routledge imprint of Taylor & Francis Group, an Informa PLC business. 2001. Pages 189-211.]
      329. Ethical Culture (Felix Adler): Adler’s approach, continued through the work of the American Ethical Union, pioneered the development of ethical humanism. Ethical Culture is based upon ethical naturalism. The perspective also incorporates a critique of Immanuel Kant’s ethics. Atheism—while not uncommon in the contemporary Ethical Culture movement—was strongly rejected by Adler. The movement is, however, nontheistic. Given that Adler was born into and raised in a Jewish family, his Ethical Culture is, in effect, ethical monotheism without monotheism.
           “… his [Immanuel Kant’s] ethics is individualistic and cannot serve us in our most pressing need at the present day. And yet, despite these shortcomings, Kant’s ethics has sounded through the world with a clear, clarion note, has had a mighty awakening influence, and something like the flashes of the lightning that played on Sinai have played about it. It has had this influence because it emphasises the fundamental fact that the moral law is imperative, not subject to the peradventure of inclination, of temperament, or circumstance, an emphasis to which every moral being, at least in his higher moments, responds. It has had this influence because of the sublimity of the origin which he assigns to the moral law, because he translates it from the sphere of ephemeral utilities, whether individualistic or racial, into the region of eternal being, comparable with nothing in the physical universe except only the starry firmament. And last, and not least, because his own lofty personality shines through his written words. A man may be bigger than his creed, and, in the same way, he may tower above his philosophy.” [Felix Adler, “A Critique of Kant’s Ethics.” Mind. Volume 11, number 42, April 1902. Pages 162-195.]
           “Why should we hesitate to acknowledge in the domain of ethics, what we concede in the realm of art and science? To say that unselfishness itself is only the more refined expression of a selfish instinct, is to use the term selfish with a double meaning, is a mere empty play on words. We have the innate need of harmony in the moral relations; this is our glory, and the stamp of the Divine upon our nature. We cannot demonstrate the existence of disinterested motives, any more than we can demonstrate that there is joy in the sunlight and freedom in the mountain breeze. The fact that we demand unselfishness in action alone assures us that the standard of enlightened self-interest is false.
           “And indeed if we consult the opinions of men, where they are least likely to be warped by sophistry, we shall find that disinterestedness is the universal criterion by which moral worth is measured.”
           [Felix Adler. Creed And Deed: A Series of Discourses. New York: G. P. Putnam’s Sons. 1880. Pages 15-16.]
           “… a willingness to advance the interests of a class or of a people is often no more than an enlarged egotism, with most of the defects of the narrower egotism, and must be regulated by a moral principle, if it is to attain to the dignity of a moral attribute. It is only by the conformity of our thoughts, our feelings, and our acts to principle, that morality is achieved. It is only by such means that the genial and attractive tendencies of our nature are converted into genuine virtues, and the way of escape from the double life is along the line of the moral transformation of our seeming virtues. Mend your virtues, and your vices will take care of themselves.” [Felix Adler. The Essentials of Spirituality. New York: James Pott & Co. 1905. Pages 139-140).]
           “… morality ought to cover the whole of conduct. The definition of ethics as a science of relations or limits removes this stumbling-block. Ethics stands at the frontier.” [Felix Adler. The Moral Instruction of Children. New York. D. Appleton and Company. 1892. Pages 23-24.]
           “It is the aim of the Ethical Societies to extend the area of moral co-operation, so as to include a part, at least, of the inner moral life; to unite men of diverse opinions and beliefs in the common endeavor to explore the field of duty; to gain clearer perceptions of right and wrong; to study with thorough-going zeal the practical problems of social, political, and individual ethics, and to embody the new insight in manners and institutions.” [Felix Adler, “The Freedom of Ethical Fellowship.” International Journal of Ethics. Volume 1, number 1, October 1890. Pages 16-30.]
           “No single supreme individual … can … embody the moral ideal. The Godhead conceived of as a single being may be designated as infinite, but infinite in such connection means a certain type, or, as we shall now say, the discharge of a certain social function raised to the nth degree. The bearer of that function is represented as performing it in the most perfect manner possible. But he cannot be the true embodiment of perfection, because other functions, equally indispensable, are excluded from the conception of him. It may be that he is represented as the divine father. In that case, the function of fatherhood is idealized or raised to the nth degree; but motherhood, sisterhood, brotherhood, etc., are omitted.” [Felix Adler, “The Moral Ideal.” International Journal of Ethics. Volume 20, number 4, July 1910. Pages 387-394.]
           “Let us consider … the silence of privacy; the law of silence that protects whatever specifically concerns ourselves from the prying curiosity of others. There are certain intimate thoughts which we express only to our intimate friends; nay, certain thoughts which perhaps we do not divulge even to these, which even our nearest ones must content themselves to guess at, to divine. There is, or ought to be, for every one, a certain territory which he may properly fence in against all comers. The right to be uncommunicative, with regard to certain matters, has been slowly acquired, and the extent to which it is conceded may be regarded as a measure of civilization. Children, among themselves, do not tolerate incommunicativeness at all.” [Felix Adler, “The Moral Value of Silence” International Journal of Ethics. Volume 8, number 3, April 1898. Pages 345-357.]
           “Whatever differences of view might arise between a Positivist and an Ethical movement would be found—not in the common ground which would extend over the entire programme of an Ethical Association—but in the further aim of the Positivist movement to add to ethical culture Philosophy and Religion. It would serve little purpose to enlarge on the ground which is common to both Positivist and Ethical movements. It will be more useful to state the grounds which, in the former point of view, make the ultimate extension of the ethical culture to Philosophy and Religion not only legitimate, but indispensable. Right conduct is the true end of a worthy human life. But our conduct is ultimately determined—not by what we are taught to do, or by what we should like to do—but by what we believe and what we revere.” [Felix Adler, “The Relation of Ethical Culture to Religion and Philosophy.” International Journal of Ethics. Volume 8, number 3, April 1894. Pages 335-347.]
           “… Atheism —well, truly, if that means the denial of a being conceived by superstitious mortals in the image of themselves, a ‘big man’ above the clouds, then the sooner we accept Atheism the better. But then some of the greatest and truest teachers of religion whom mankind to-day honors and loves, yea, celebrates in admiration and in pride, have been Atheists ; and we should esteem it no mean privilege to be numbered among the least of their disciples. But if Atheism means —and this, in any proper definition of the word, alone it does mean—the assertion of the rule of chance, the denial of the transcendent importance of morality, the blasphemy against the Ideal, then is there no system from which we so deeply, so utterly revolt as this.
           “Long enough now have we kept silence; long enough have we allowed the charge of Atheism to be brought against ue with indifference hecause we believed it to he dictated by personal motives. But there comes a time for breaking silence. The work which this Society has begun is growing. I cannot bear the thought that any of those who are really at heart with us should be separated from us by an odious name, an untrue alarm. I say, then, that the charge of Atheism as directed against this Society is false, and I am compelled to fling back the charge upon the very head of those who most persistently urge it.…
           “The people want a confession of faith, I am told. Hear, then, mine—a simple one. I believe in the supreme excellence of righteousness; I believe that the law of righteousness will triumph in the universe over all evil; I believe that in the law of righteousness is the sanctitication of human life, and I believe that in furthering and fulfilling that law I also am hallowed in the service of the unknown God.”
           [Felix Adler. Atheism: A Lecture by Felix Adler, Ph.D., Before the Society of Ethical Culture, Sunday, October 6ᵗʰ, 1879. New York: Co-operative Printers’ Association. 1879. Pages 17-19.]
           “The world is in such a situation that we can say to the nations, Let us cease accretion. The present situation is the result of accretion, the result of wrongs—recent or very recent, or at least not so far distant in the past—wrongs that still rancor in the conscience of the present generation. Our friends, the Poles, would not be very happy in studying the geographical distribution or dismemberment of the country for which they have not yet, after all these years, lost their patriotic resentment. Then there is the fact that England has taken possession of all the corner lots on the globe, and that there are nations that once were great mercantile powers before England had achieved its power on the waters who seek their right to live and to grow and to expand. I call your attention sharply to these points.” [Felix Adler, “Justice the Basis of International Peace.” The Advocate of Peace (1894-1920). Volume 75, number 8, August and September 1913. Pages 179-180.]
           “It is the ethical element of religion which lends such sublime majesty to the language of the prophets. It is this which gives so sweet and fascinating a power to the loving words of Jesus. It is this which became a mighty lever in [Martin] Luther’s hands, where with he lifted the Mediæval Church off its foundations. Has this ethical element become less important in the modern age? Is there a less imperative need of developing it? Men follow the pursuits of science and art, as if these could replace the direct study of ethics, the direct tutoring of the will. Men labor for wealth and creature comforts as if ethical considerations did not exist. But does science, in the ordinary acceptation of the word, indeed suffice for the building up of our humanity? Does the cultus of the beautiful satisfy all our spiritual needs? Does the tremendous progress of the industrial arts tend to exalt, or does it not often lower the true standard of manhood among those who are engaged in the race for wealth? Is not righteousness as important as knowledge and beauty? Does not morality, apart from science and art, apart from mythological religion, require to be cultivated for its own sake and by its own methods? Is there no need of a special ethical culture at the present day?” [Felix Adler, “A Secular View of Moral Training.” The North American Review. Volume 136, number 318, May 1883. Pages 446-453.]
           “It is the business of the moral instructor in the school to deliver to his pupil the subject-matter of morality, but not to deal with the sanctions of it; to give his pupils a clear understanding of what is right and what is wrong, but not to enter into the question why the right should be done and the wrong avoided. Let us suppose that the teacher is dealing with veracity. He says to his pupil: Thou shalt not lie. He takes it for granted that the pupil feels the force of this commandment, and ought to yield obedience to it. A young child that should ask me, Why ought I not to lie? I should suspect of quibbling and dishonest intentions. I would hold up to the child the ought in all its awful majesty. The right to reason about these matters cannot be considered until after the mind has attained a certain maturity. And, as a matter of fact, every good child agrees with me unhesitatingly when I say, It is wrong to lie. There is an answering echo in its heart that confirms my words. But what, then, is my business as a moral instructor? In the first place, to deepen the impression of the wrongfulness of a lie and the sacredness of truth, by the very solemnity with which I speak the words, by the spirit in which I approach the subject. My first business is to convey the spirit of moral reverence to my pupils. In the next place, I ought to quicken the pupils’ perceptions as to what is right and wrong; in this case, as to what is a lie and what is not.” [Felix Adler, “The Problem of Unsectarian Moral Instruction.” International Journal of Ethics. Volume 2, number 1, Octoer 1891. Pages 11-19.]
           “Our worldview [i.e., among members of the American Ethical Union] rests on a natural interpretation of reality. As philosophic naturalists it follows that we place ethical proprieties, thought, and considerations likewise in the natural world. In philosophic-speak that’s ethical naturalism. Meaning we turn to each other, in mutual respect, rather than to any higher or external power for our understandings of right and wrong. And we derive our sense of duty and obligation from within that same natural realm. Thus our ethics underlie our concern for others.” [Tony Hileman, “The Ethical Center of Social Action.” Platform address to the New York Society for Ethical Culture. September 9th, 2007. Pages 1-6. Retrieved on July 3rd, 2016.]
      330. metaculture (Francis Mulhern): He examines reflexivity and the conditions for the existence of discourse.
           “Metaculture is discourse in the strong sense of that versatile term: a historically formed set of topics and procedures that both drives and regulates the utterance of the individuals who inhabit it, and assigns them definite positions in the field of meaning it delimits. The position of seeing and speaking and writing in metacultural discourse, the kind of subject any individual ‘becomes’ in practising it, is culture itself.… For now, let me stress that no one, to my knowledge, has ever described themselves as a practitioner of ‘metacultural discourse.’ The term and the concept have emerged from the critical work of writing this book. If any one term or reference or affiliation might be said to link all the writers discussed here – and in bare truth there is none – it would be the more familiar culture.” [Francis Mulhern. Culture/Metaculture. London and New York: Routledge imprint of Taylor & Francis Group, an Informa PLC business. 2001. Page xiv.]
           “‘Metaculture’ names a modern discursive formation in which ‘culture,’ however understood, speaks of its own generality and historical conditions of existence. Its inherent strategic impulse—failing which it would be no more than descriptive anthropology—is to mobilize ‘culture’ as a principle against the prevailing generality of ‘politics’ in the disputed plane of social authority. What speaks in metacultural discourse is the cultural principle itself, as it strives to dissolve the political as locus of general arbitration in social relations.” [Francis Mulhern, “Beyond Metaculture.” New Left Review. Series II, number 16, July–August 2002. Pages 86-104.]
           “Summarily defined, metacultural discourse is discourse in which culture addresses its own generality and conditions of existence. It is the generality of social sense-making that is put in question, not merely this or that cultural form or practice. That is one indication of the prefix meta-. The other is reflexivity – and not in the truistic sense that no discourse on culture can itself be anything other than an instance of culture. Metaculture is reflexive in the strong sense that the subject-position of the discourse is itself a normative intuition of the cultural.” [Francis Mulhern, “The end of politics: Culture, nation and other fundamentalisms.” Radical Philosophy: Philosophical Journal of the Independent Left. Number 112, March/April 2002. Pages 25-30.]
      331. culture circle (Louise Bennett, Michael Bergin, and John S. G. Wells): The article develops critical social theory as an pedagogical framework for persons with epilepsy.
           “The culture circle links the following three dialectical and interdisciplinary phases: (1) thematic investigation, (2) encoding/decoding, and (3) critical probing. The thematic investigation phase seeks to detect the generative topics with regard to interactions between people and society, within a given culture context. Generative themes are the topics or issues that are raised through the process of dialog. The presence of a code allows the representation to be converted into signals (encoded) that can be transformed into representations (decoded).” [Louise Bennett, Michael Bergin, and John S. G. Wells, “The potential of critical social theory as an educational framework for people with epilepsy.” Epilepsy & Behavior. Volume 54, January 2016. Pages 80-87.]
      332. critical social theory approach to disclosure of genomic incidental findings (Jeffrey L. Bevan, Julia N. Senn-Reeves, Ben R. Inventor, and Shawna M. Greiner and Karen M. Mayer): They apply critical social theory to research in genetics.
           “Genomic research has seen significant growth in the United States and, while genomics is still a relatively young endeavor, the technology exists to approach a variety of questions, such as the association between genetics and disease, genotypic and phenotypic expressions of certain disease states, and genetic variations across populations. A significant benefit of genomic research is the identification of opportunities to improve health, prevent disease, and appropriately treat the population as a whole. When incidental findings (IFs) of genomic research are uncovered by the researcher, significant ethical implications exist with disclosure of the IFs to research participants. Incidental findings in genomic research are an emerging concern as genome-wide research expands, introducing complex ethical issues for researchers. The ethical principles of autonomy, beneficence, and maleficence must be considered when addressing disclosure of IFs from genomic research. The purpose of this article is to explore the ethical implications of the disclosure of IFs to genomic research participants. Utilizing critical social theory (CST) as a guide, we will discuss and critique the ethical principles associated with disclosure of IFs and examine the implications for nursing.” [Jeffrey L. Bevan, Julia N. Senn-Reeves, Ben R. Inventor, and Shawna M. Greiner and Karen M. Mayer, “Critical social theory approach to disclosure of genomic incidental findings.” Nursing Ethics. Volume 19, number 6, November 2012. Pages 819-828.]
      333. anti–imperialism after empire (Peter Frase): He explores the U.S. response to the Arab spring during the presidency of Barack Obama.
           “American leftists and liberals have a familiar script to read from in times like these, and initially many of us returned to it in reaction to [U.S. President Barack] Obama’s vacillation. In one respect, both left antiimperialists and liberal humanitarian interventionists have a similar critique of American foreign policy, as it is traditionally practiced: democracy and human rights abroad are perpetually sacrificed in the service of the “national interest.” Liberal interventionists tend to believe that narrow calculations of American interest should be supplemented with a more idealistic commitment to universal humanitarian norms, while anti-imperialists argue that such idealism is itself typically a cover for the projection of imperial power, and that the best thing America can do for the countries of the periphery is to stop meddling in their affairs. Either way, Obama’s response failed to measure up and both critiques could be heard in the midst of events in Egypt.” [Peter Frase, “The Superman Conditional: anti-imperialism after empire ….” Jacobin. Issue 2, spring 2011. Pages 3-5.]
      334. spectacle of beings and things (Jacques Camatte as pronounced in this MP3 audio file): He argues that we must abandon the world which is dominated by capital.
           “We must abandon this world dominated by capital which has become a spectacle of beings and things. A spectacle in the sense that [Jean] Pic de la Mirandole meant when he said that man was the spectacle of the world and its mirror as well. In fact man would have no special gift, all talents being distributed to all living creatures, man, who came last, would be left totally unprovided. Luckily God had pity on him and gave him some qualities of all the creatures and thus he became the spectacle of the world. In him all living creatures could somehow recognise themselves and see themselves act. As a result of the process of anthropomorphosis, capital becomes in turn a spectacle. It assimilates to itself and incorporates in itself all the qualities of men, all their activities, without ever being one of them, otherwise it would deny itself by substantialisation, inhibition of its life process.
           “In accepting this representation of capital, men see a spectacle which is their mutilated redundancy because in general they only perceive one part. They have long since lost the meaning of totality.
           “One must reject the presuppositions of capital, which immerse in a distant past, to escape the grip of capital (moment of the dissolution of the primitive communities) and, simultaneously, one can supersede [Karl] Marx’s work which is the finished expression of the arrival at totality, the accom polished structure of value, which, with its mutation of capital, has set itself up as the material community. One must envisage a new dynamic, for the CMP [capitalist mode of production] will not disappear following a frontal struggle of people against their present domination, but by a huge renunciation which implies the rejection of a path used for millenia. The CMP does not decay but has a downfall.”
           [Jacques Camatte. This World We Must Leave. Sydney, Australia: Jura Books. 1976. Pages 20-21.]
           “… there is a direct production of revolutionaries who supersede almost immediately the point we were at when we had to make our break. Thus, there is a potential ‘union’ that would be considered if we were not to carry the break with the political point of view to the depths of our individual consciousnesses. Since the essence of politics is fundamentally representation, each group is forever trying to project an impressive image on the social screen. The groups are always explaining how they represent themselves in order to be recognized by certain people as the vanguard for representing others, the class. This is revealed in the famous ‘what distinguishes us’ of various small groups in search of recognition. All delimitation is limitation and often leads rather rapidly to reducing the delimitation to some representative slogans for racketeerist marketing. All political representation is a screen and therefore an obstacle to a fusion of forces. Since representation can occur on the individual as well as the group level, recourse to the former level would be, for us, a repetition of the past.” [Jacques Camatte, “On Organisation.” Privately published letter. 1972. No pagination.]
           “[Jacques] Camatte’s work during the majority of the 1960s is … firmly placed within the Bordigist current.” [Chamsy el-Ojeili, “‘Communism … is the affirmation of a new community’: Notes on Jacques Camatte.” Capital & Class. Volume 38, number 2, 2014. Pages 345-364.]
      335. cultural criticism (Stefan Collini): He develops a definition and defense of cultural criticism.
           “‘Politics’ here means all that bears on the attempt to order social relations in the light of conceptions of human possibility: it is the continuing activity of trying to refine and give practical effect to such conceptions within a field of conflict. ‘Politics is the struggle to determine the totality of social relations in a given space.’ Cultural criticism’s complaints against current versions of politics in the narrower sense are then held to be part of a broader ‘logic’ wherein it is attempting to displace politics in the second, larger sense.…
           “Most of everyday social activity is necessarily and rightly ‘instrumental’ and ‘partial’ in these senses. Their opposites, various forms of nonpractical creative and reflective activity which, in turn, enable a degree of ‘standing back’ from instrumentality, are exceptional; and such standing back is, I argue, one of the defining marks of what is usually termed ‘cultural criticism.’”
           [Stefan Collini, “Defending Cultural Criticism.” New Left Review. Series II, number 18, November–December 2002. Pages 73-97.]
           “The semantic field encompassed by the single term ‘culture’ is now so large and so complex, and possessed of such a tangled history, that it may no longer be really practicable to attempt to treat it as a single topic. The very existence of the plural, ‘cultures,’ signifies a radically different subject-matter from that designated by what some, often defensively, always self-consciously, call ‘Culture with a capital C.’ The adjectival forms throw further fat on the fire: the business of a cultural attaché may have nothing in common with that of a professor of Cultural Studies; ‘cultural criticism’ as practised by a descendant of the Frankfurt School will bear little resemblance to that carried on by a broadsheet theatre-reviewer.” [Stefan Collini, “Culture Talk.” New Left Review. Series II, number 7, January–February 2001. Pages 43-53.]
           “[Stefan] Collini begins by relieving the phrase ‘cultural criticism’ of its everyday ambiguity. It is not, or not only, criticism of culture. Culture is what animates and orients the critical practice, whose object is society or, better, ‘prevailing public discourse.’ This is culture as ‘artistic and intellectual activities’—not the only meaning of the term, he agrees, but, as Raymond Williams recognized, the ‘primary’ one. The criticism it underwrites is politically modest in ambition and effect, not driven as metacultural discourse supposedly is, and certainly not fated to reactionary conclusions. ‘Distance,’ ‘reflectiveness’ and generality are its defining critical qualities.” [Francis Mulhern, “What is Cultural Criticism?” New Left Review. Series II, number 23, September–October 2003. Pages 35-49.]
      336. new world disorder (Benedict Anderson): He examines the disintegration which occurred at the end of the twentieth century (and which, arguably, has since multiplied many times over).
           “It is quite possible that historians of the 2050s, looking back into our now closing [twentieth] century, will pick out, as one deep tectonic movement stretching across more than two centuries, the disintegration of the great polyethnic, polyglot, and often polyreligious monarchical empires built up so painfully in mediaeval and early modern times.…
           “… [One] way in which the market is making a special contribution to the new world disorder, and it intersects frequently with the upheavals sketched out above.… The great munitions industries were now in the business of supplying their core customers with the most advanced and expensive war machinery possible, but also selling off obsolescent, cheaper lines of goods on the world market.…
           “… despite the end of the Cold War, dangerous convergences that were already born in the last century show every sign of continuing to develop: market-led proliferation of weapons-systems, mythologization of militaries as sine qua non symbols and guarantors of national sovereignty, and ethnicization of officer corps.”
           [Benedict Anderson, “The New World Disorder.” New Left Review. Series I, number 193, May–June 1992. Pages 3-13.]
      337. social mechanism approach (Roland Pierik as pronounced in this MP3 audio file, Kalle Pajunen as pronounced in this MP3 audio file, and others): This perspective examines the categorization by self and by others as well as other focuses.
           “The aim of this article is to present a conceptualization of cultural groups and cultural difference that provides a middle course between the Scylla of essentialism and the Charybdis of reductionism. The method I employ is the social mechanism approach. I argue that cultural groups and cultural difference should be understood as the result of cognitive and social processes of categorization. I describe two such processes in particular: categorization by others and self-categorization. Categorization by others is caused by processes of ascription: the attribution by outsiders of certain characteristics, beliefs, and practices to individuals who share a specific attribute. Self-categorization is caused by processes of inscription and community-building: the adoption of certain beliefs and practices as a result of socialization and enculturation.” [Roland Pierik, “Conceptualizing cultural groups and cultural difference: The social mechanism approach.” Ethnicities. Volume 4, number 4, 2004. Pages 523-544.]
           “ … in order to develop the mechanisms approach beyond the mere mechanisms talk, there is a need for explicit consideration of what organizational mechanisms actually are, how they work, and what it means to explain by mechanisms.…
           “Since the prospects for the mechanisms approach in the social sciences are thought to be promising, researchers have also started to consider how we could actually identify and examine mechanisms.”
           [Kalle Pajunen, “The Nature of Organizational Mechanisms.” Organization Studies. Volume 29, number 11, 2008. Pages 1449-1468.]
      338. conceptual framework of socio-ecological mechanisms for organization studies (Frank Boons): This approach examines the mechanisms of dynamic ecosystems.
           “In this article, my aim is to provide conceptual guidelines for a thoughtful incorporation of direct ecological impact, alongside socially constructed nature, into research on organizations and the natural environment. For this I first need to establish that a distinction between direct and indirect ecological impact can be made.… Next, I build on the social mechanism approach from analytical sociology … to provide a conceptual framework of socio-ecological mechanisms for organization studies. I conclude this article with reflections on the relative importance of direct ecological impact and consequences for organization studies. Throughout, my main ambition is to provide food for thought for scholars interested in the ways in which organizations are embedded in natural ecosystems.” [Frank Boons, “Organizing Within Dynamic Ecosystems: Conceptualizing Socio-Ecological Mechanisms.” Organization & Environment. Volume 26, number 3, 2013. Pages 281–297.]
      339. causal/mechanical approach (Wesley C. Salmon): This causal/mechanical and unification conceptions are considered to be complementary.
           “I prefer to think of the conception of explanation that emerges from these considerations as causal/mechanical. The aim of explanations of this sort is to exhibit the ways in which nature operates; it is an effort to lay bare the mechanisms that underlie the phenomena we observe and wish to explain.…
           “… We can explain why metals are conductors in terms of the behavior of their electrons. And so it goes from the particular fact to the more general laws until we finally reach the most comprehensive available theory. The causal/mechanical approach has the same sort of bottom-up quality. From relatively superficial causal explanations of particular facts we appeal to ever more general types of mechanisms until we reach the most ubiquitous mechanisms that operate in the universe.”
           [Wesley C. Salmon. Causality and Explanation. Oxford, England, and New York: Oxford University Press. 1998. Pages 71-72.]
           “I believe that it is important to look for mechanisms, but I am convinced that the mechanisms of the quantum domain—which may well be noncausal—are very different from those that operate on a macroscopic scale. Given that I now believe that the causal/mechanical and unification conceptions are complementary, I certainly do not maintain that ‘we should abandon epistemic conceptions.’” [Wesley C. Salmon. Four Decades of Scientific Explanation. Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania: University of Pittsburgh Press. 2006. Kindle edition.]
           “I have frequently used the example of a rotating spotlight in the center of a circular building to illustrate the difference between causal processes and pseudo processes. A brief pulse of light traveling from the beacon to the wall is a causal process. If you place a red filter in its path the light pulse becomes red and remains red from the point of insertion to the wall without any further intervention. The spot of light that travels around the wall is a pseudo process. You can make the white spot red by intervening at the wall where the light strikes it, but without further local intervention it will not remain red as it passes beyond the point of intervention. Thus, causal processes transmit marks but pseudo processes do not.” [Wesley C. Salmon, “Causality without Counterfactuals.” Philosophy of Science. Volume 61, number 2, June 1994. Pages 297-312.]
           “I realize, of course, that problem-solving can have great practical value in many cases; obviously we are rightly concerned to solve puzzles concerning the causes of airplane crashes in order to try to prevent future accidents. My interest in this paper is, however, mainly in pure rather thad applied science; the aim is to characterize the kind of intellectual understanding we can achieve, for example, from knowledge of basic aerodynamic principles.” [Wesley C. Salmon, “The Value of Scientific Understanding.” Philosophica. Volume 51, number 1, 1993. Pages 9-19.]
           “One of the fundamental changes which I propose in approaching causality is to take processes rather than events as basic entities. I shall not attempt any rigorous definition of processes; rather, I shall cite examples and make some very informal remarks. The main difference between events and processes is that events are relatively localized in space and time, while processes have much greater temporal duration, and in many cases, much greater spatial extent. In spacetime diagrams, events are represented by points, while processes are represented by lines.” [Wesley C. Salmon, “Causality: Production and Propagation.” PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association. Volume 1980, 1980. Pages 49-69.]
           “Non-causal regularities, instead of having explanatory force which enables them to provide understanding of events in the world, cry out to be explained. Mariners, long before [Isaac] Newton, were fully aware of the correlation between the behavior of the tides and the position and phase of the moon. But inasmuch as they were totally ignorant of the causal relations involved, they rightly believed that they did not understand why the tides ebb and flow. When Newton provided the gravi- tational links, understanding was achieved.” [Wesley C. Salmon, “Why Ask, ‘Why?’? An Inquiry concerning Scientific Explanation.” Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association. Volume 51, number 6, August 1978. Pages 683-705.]
           “The essential ingredients in a satisfactory qualitative theory of probabilistic causality are, it seems to me: (1) a fundamental distinction between causal processes and causal interactions, (2) an account of the propagation of causal influence via causal processes, (3) an account of causal interactions in terms of interactive forks, (4) an account of causal directionality in terms of conjunctive forks, and (5) an account of causal betweenness in terms of causal processes and causal directionality.” [Wesley C. Salmon, “Probabilistic Causality.” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly. Volume 61, 1980. Pages 50-74.]
           “There is a fundamental intuition—shared, I believe, by almost everyone who thinks seriously about the matter—according to which causality is intimately involved in explanation. Those who are familiar with [David] Hume’s critique of causality may deny the validity of that intuition by constructing noncausal theories of scientific explanation. Others may skirt the issue by claiming that the concept of causality is clear enough already, and that further analysis is unnecessary. My own view is (1) that the intuition is valid—scientific explanation does involve causality in an extremely fundamental fashion—and (2) that causal concepts do stand in serious need of further analysis.” [Wesley C. Salmon, “Scientific Explanation: Three Basic Conceptions.” PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association. Volume 1984, 1984. Pages 293-305.]
           “The aim is to distinguish between processes that are causal and those that are not (causal processes vs. pseudo-processes) and to distinguish those intersections of processes (whether causal or pseudo) that are genuine causal interactions and those that are not.” [Wesley C. Salmon, “Scientific Explanation: Causation and Unification.” Crítica, Revista Hispanoamericana de Filosofia. Volume XXII, number 66, December 1990. Pages 3-23.]
           “If we are going to talk about preference among generalisations, then we have to be quite explicit about the purpose for which the generalisation is to be used. In this context, we are discussing prediction, so the preference must be in relation to predictive capability. As [Karl] Popper rightly insists, any generalisation we choose will have predictive import in the sense that it will make statements about future events—more precisely, in a predictive argument as characterised above, it yields conclusions about future occurrences.” [Wesley C. Salmon, “Rational Prediction.” The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science. Volume 32, number 2, June 1981. Pages 115-125.]
           “It seems to me that causal processes can do the needed job without attributing time asymmetry to them. Basically, I believe, we can use symmetric causal processes to distinguish conjunctive forks representing genuine common cause configurations from those that do not.” [Wesley C. Salmon, “The Causal Structure of the World.” Metatheoria: Revista de Filosofía e Historia de la Ciencia. Volume 1, number 1, 2011. Pages 1-13.]
           “The at-at theory of mark transmission provides, I believe, an acceptable basis for the mark method, which can in turn serve as the means to distinguish causal processes from pseudo-processes. Causal processes play a fundamental role in physical theory, and as [Bertrand] Russell correctly observed, their existence has profound epistemological significance. Causal processes are, of course, governed by natural laws; these laws constitute regularities whose presence can be empirically confirmed.” [Wesley C. Salmon, “An ‘At-At’ Theory of Causal Influence.” Philosophy of Science. Volume 44, number 2, June 1977. Pages 215-224.]
           “It must be … [said] that, where possible, [Wesley C.] Salmon’s theory of mechanistic explanation can be applied only if not interpreted literally, in a strict sense, but as referring to incomplete mechanisms. In order to make his theory more widely applicable and to get closer to the actual elaboration of explanations in scientific practice—and only for these purposes—Salmon came to admit that the level of graininess of a mechanistic description and the context in which it is drawn play a relevant role.” [Raffaella Campaner, “Mechanistic and Neo-mechanistic Accounts of Causation: How Salmon Already Got (Much of) It Right.” Metatheoria: Revista de Filosofía e Historia de la Ciencia. Volume 3, number 2, 2013. Pages 81-98.]
      340. real essentialism (David S. Oderberg): This ontological approach, according to Oderberg, does not, for the most part, prioritize microscopic over macroscopic objects.
           “What is important for our purposes is that real essentialism, whilst incorporating into its definitions whatever correct science has to offer about the inner structures of things, takes all objects, from the very big to the very small, at face value. This means that the qualitative characteristics of things are held to be a real part of ontology, not mere epiphenomena of, or expressions of, or reducible to, the underlying quantitative characteristics of things given by a mathematical theory, no matter how predictively and explanatorily successful the mathematical theory may be.
           “Secondly, real essentialism does not privilege the microscopic over the macroscopic, unless the object of investigation is specifically the microscopic. Taking the macroscopic seriously is shown in the very form of the real essentialist definition, which gives both the genus and the specific difference, for example: ‘Water is a colourless, odourless substance in liquid, solid or gaseous form that …’; ‘Gold is a soft, shiny, yellow, heavy, malleable, ductile metal that …’; ‘A fish is a cold-blooded, water-dwelling animal that ….’ Again, it is not important for present purposes whether the definition is exact. The point is that, unless we are speaking specifically about the microscopic, the macroscopic always figures in a real essentialist definition, either in the genus, or in the specific difference, or both.”
           [David S. Oderberg. Real Essentialism. London and New York: Routledge imprint of Taylor & Francis Group, an Informa PLC business. 2007. Pages 15-16.]
           “I do not propose to pursue hidden structure essentialism here. My concern is with the need for the essentialist to make a rigid distinction between the essence of a thing and those characteristics of the object that are, in a sense to be clarified later, tied to the essence. Whether or not the essence is an internal structure, what it cannot be is simply some privileged group, set, or bundle of ‘essential properties.’ The main reason is what I call the ‘unity problem’: if the essence is a group (set, bundle) of properties, what holds those properties together?” [David S. Oderberg, “Essence and Properties.” Erkenntnis (1975-). Volume 75, number 1, July 2011. Pages 85-111.]
           “David Oderberg’s Real Essentialism is an extended defence of the traditional Aristotelian idea that everything has an essence.…
           “In sum, Oderberg’s Real Essentialism is a thought-provoking and wide-ranging book arguing for the intriguing thesis that essence is to be situated within a hylomorphic metaphysical framework. In his attempt to cover so much ground, however, Oderberg often fails to fill in the details of his arguments. This leaves one unable to engage with the interesting sub ject matter of Oderberg’s work as much as one would have liked.”
           [M. Eddon, “Real Essentialism.” Review article. Mind. Volume 119, number 476, October 2010. Pages 1210-1212.]
           “The book moves from very general metaphysical and epistemological problems concerning the nature and knowability of essence, through more specific issues in ontology concerning substance, matter, form, identity, existence, powers, laws, accidents and properties, and finally to the application of hylemorphic essentialism to questions in the philosophy of nature, especially in the field of biology. The long chapter on biological species, which is extremely well informed from a scientific point of view, is in itself a major contribution to the metaphysics of biology, pre- senting an important challenge to much contemporary scientific and philosophical thought concerning biological taxonomy. The book ends with a chapter on human personhood, defending once more an Aristotelian dualism of matter and form, quite opposed to any kind of neo-Cartesian psychophysical dualism but equally opposed to mainstream contemporary physicalism in the philosophy of mind.” [E. J. Lowe, “Real Essentialism.” Review article. The Philosophical Quarterly (1950-). Volume 60, number 240, July 2010. Pages 648-652.]
      341. evolutionary natural realism (Jane Azevedo): Azevedo has formulated a version of realism informed by Darwinian evolution.
           “So far, in the evolutionary naturalist realist epistemology and methodology I am developing, I have made only two claims about the nature of reality. The first is that reality exists independently of our knowledge of it. The second is that everything that exists is in principle interconnectable with everything else that exists. The connections between things are called causal connections. Causation is, in this sense, a primitive. These ontological claims do not so much constitute an ontology as form constraints on an ontology. They leave open the nature of the causally connected world.
           “But the concepts of evolutionary epistemology that form the basis of the notion of validity that I have developed will take us a little further. The foundation of evolutionary theory is natural selection. Organisms evolve in interaction with the environment, and their perceptual/cognitive systems are such that they maintain a passable fit between an organism and its environment—one that allows for the survival and reproduction of the organism. It follows that the nature of perceptual and cognitive mechanisms themselves (and not only human ones) carries some information about the nature of reality.”
           [Jane Azevedo. Mapping Reality: An Evolutionary Realist Methodology for the Natural and Social Sciences. Albany, New York: State University of New York Press. 1997. Page 182.]
      342. dynamic realism (C. L. Herrick): He develops a version of realism based upon a principle of universal reciprocity.
           “The recent illuminating discussions of functional psychology make it opportune to indicate some of the metaphysical counterparts of this method as embodied in that form of monisin which is most appropriately termed dynamic realism. It would consume too much of the time courteously extended to me by the editor for this purpose to indicate how generally (albeit not always consciously) this tendency in philosophy has permeated recent literature, but none can deny a notable advance in this direction during the last ten years.
           “The extension of the term ‘functional’ into philosophy may be deprecated as bringing an assumption into a sphere whose chief glory it is to avoid all postulates which have not been critically examined. ‘Dynamic,’ as descriptive of a form of realism, seems more happy in that it agrees with the psychological idea that conscious processes are always a ‘doing’ but does not drag in, even by a form of popular allusion, the thought of something behind which is ‘functioning.’ It may be the claim of realism to escape as long possible from preinterpretations, whether of science or of philosophy.”
           [C. L. Herrick, “Fundamental Concepts and Methodology of Dynamic Realism.” The Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods. Volume 1, number 11, May 1904. Pages 281-288.]
           “… what we mean by dynamic realism stands for the view that all parts of the universe are reciprocally bound together because they act together and have grown to be what they are in organic unity of development. Pragmatism is then justifiable in so far as it refers to a methodological concept. That things do work together and our needs are satisfied when a certain set of postulates are conformed to, is, in so far forth, evidence of the correctness of the postulates, but this is only evidence that by this means we have discovered a part of the organic harmony covered by the law of congruousness. The theory is not true because it satisfies our needs, but the fact that it satisfies our needs is evidence that the theory fits into the organism.
           “Realism is not satisfied with one aspect only of being, but accepts the fact of reaction as evidence of the other by the reaction of which with self realization becomes possible.”
           [C. L. Herrick, “The Law of Congruousness and its Logical Application to Dynamic Realism.” The Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods. Volume 1, number 22, October 1904. Pages 595-603.]
           “When we can explain chemical affinity we may attempt to explain instinct; when we have explained instinct we may attempt intelligence. The explanation offered by dynamic realism of the ‘meaning’ of the simplest of natural phenomena will presumptively be the explanation of the principle underlying all reactions.
           “We may ask why a comet pursues a given course rather than another. The answer is two-fold. First, because of the nature of the forces constituting the comet; second, by reason of the combinations of energy existing in the universe through which it passes. In other words, the trajectory of the comet is determined by correspondences existing between the comet and its environment. We might say that the trajectory of the comet is its path of least resistance, but this is only part of the truth. The nature of the energic structure of the comet is also a factor—the most important one. It has, we say, a certain mass of gravity. It has that which makes it a positive energic element in a universe of energy. It might be considered fanciful to suppose that as the extrinsic pull which draws the mother to her child has also its intrinsic side called affection, so there is an intrinsic affection corresponding to the extrinsic pull of the planet. Nevertheless, all analogy would indicate that, if not an affection or instinct, there is nevertheless an intrinsic element in all these cases.”
           [C. L. Herrick, “Genetic Modes and the Meaning of the Psychic.” Psychological Review. Volume 14, number 1, January 1907. Pages 54-59.]
      343. myth of multiculturalism (Russell Jacoby): He critiques this common approach to diversity in the context of American society.
           “In a premodern world, separate groups might develop singular cultures, but in highly organized American society the maintenance of unique cultures is improbable; neither the means nor the requisite isolation exist.…
           “To put this sharply: America’s multiple ‘cultures’ exist within a single consumer society. Professional sports, Hollywood movies, automobiles, designer clothes, name-brand sneakers, television and videos, commercial music and CDs [compact discs] pervade America’s multiculturalism. These ‘cultures’ live, work and dream in the same society. Chicanos, like Chinese-Americans, want to hold good jobs, live in the suburbs, and drive well-engineered cars.…
           “Amid the interminable discussions on multiculturalism virtually no one admits that the diverse ‘cultures’ do not offer any real alternative to American life, leisure or business.”
           [Russell Jacoby, “The Myth of Multiculturalism.” New Left Review. Series I, number 208, November–December 1994. Pages 121-126.]
      344. ideology of universalism (Stefan Jonsson as pronounced in this MP3 audio file): He critiques universalism as a mechanism of oppression and conformity.
           “To appeal to universalism as a way of asserting the superiority of Western culture is to betray universality, but to appeal to universalism as a way of dismantling the superiority of the West is to realize it.…
           “If there is today a global canon of universalism, it consists of documentary traces of past struggles in which oppression was resisted in the name of universal values. Like all canons, that of universalism is selective, and easily turned into a new instrument of oppression. Inevitably, every coding of universality is a particular representation. Universality, once represented, transforms itself into some more or less doctrinaire version of universalism, of which there exist a great number of varieties.…
           “… the ideology of universalism makes it easy to depict anything that obstructs the globalization process, or the capitalist production of uniformity, as an infringement on human rights, or as an obstruction of freedom as such.”
           [Stefan Jonsson, “The Ideology of Universalism.” New Left Review. Series II, number 63, May–June 2010. Pages 115-126.]
      345. true realm of freedom (Joseph McCarney): McCarney discusses Karl Marx’s advocacy of human freedom.
           “At the most general level of all it is uncontroversially clear that he [Karl Marx] shares the vision of history as the history of human emanicipation. It is for him a record of progress leading to ‘that development of human energy which is an end in itself, the true realm of freedom.’ At the level of the freedoms at stake in Eastern Europe there is a plausible line of thought which would keep him fully in step with Hegel. For there are sound textual grounds for supposing that Marx would no less have welcomed the achievement of ‘bourgeois democratic’ freedoms in those circumstances. It is at any rate plain that he did not by any means despise such freedoms, as some of the more unwise of his followers have done. Thus, he was an enthusiastic supporter of wider suffrage and, in practice, of the workers obtaining their full rights within the bourgeois order.” [Joseph McCarney, “The True Realm of Freedom: Marxist Philosophy after Communism.” New Left Review. Series I, number 189, September–October 1991. Pages 19-38.]
      346. Revelation revised (Dimitris J. Kyrtatas [Greek/Hellēniká, Δημήτρης Ι Κυρτάτας, Dēmḗtrēs I Kyrtátas as pronounced in this MP3 audio file]): He argues that previous religious and secular views of the future need to updated in light of the present-day transformative process.
           “‘This is the Revelation given by God to Jesus Christ. It was given to him so that he might show his servants what must shortly happen.’ Thus commences the last book of the New Testament, the Revelation of John.…
           “… Instead of a revolutionary transition from Western capitalism to Soviet socialism, as hoped or feared by many, the world as a whole seems to be in the process of transformation. Ancient historians are thus drawing new paradigms for their discipline. The same texts are being read in a different way, leading to different conclusions. [Friedrich] Engels and [Max] Weber are both seen to have been wrong: early Christianity could have been strongly influenced by social conditions and at the same time immune from the interests of slaves and proletarians. Class conflicts may have been in antiquity as important as they are now without the ancient world following the pattern of general crisis–revolution–transition. Long-term historical evolution needs to be redefined, and the location of religion in late antiquity reexamined.”
           [Dimitris J. Kyrtatas, “Revelation Revised.” New Left Review. Series I, number 190, November–December 1991. Pages 131-137.]
      347. identity politics (Eric Hobsbawm): He explains the complex relationship of the Left with identity politics.
           “Identity groups were certainly not central to the Left. Basically, the mass social and political movements of the Left, that is, those inspired by the American and French revolutions and socialism, were indeed coalitions or group alliances, but held together not by aims that were specific to the group, but by great, universal causes through which each group believed its particular aims could be realized: democracy, the Republic, socialism, communism or whatever. Our own Labour Party [UK] in its great days was both the party of a class and, among other things, of the minority nations and immigrant communities of mainland Britainians. It was all this, because it was a party of equality and social justice.…
           “So what does identity politics have to do with the Left? Let me state firmly what should not need restating. The political project of the Left is universalist: it is for all human beings.…
           “That is why the Left cannot base itself on identity politics. It has a wider agenda. For the Left, Ireland was, historically, one, but only one, out of the many exploited, oppressed and victimized sets of human beings for which it fought. For the ira kind of nationalism, the Left was, and is, only one possible ally in the fight for its objectives in certain situations. In others it was ready to bid for the support of [Adolf] Hitler as some of its leaders did during World War ii. And this applies to every group which makes identity politics its foundation, ethnic or otherwise.
           “Now the wider agenda of the Left does, of course, mean it supports many identity groups, at least some of the time, and they, in turn look to the Left. Indeed, some of these alliances are so old and so close that the Left is surprised when they come to an end, as people are surprised when marriages break up after a lifetime.”
           [Eric Hobsbawm, “Identity Politics and the Left.” New Left Review. Series I, number 217, May–June 1996. Pages 38-47.]
      348. crisis of ideology, culture and civilization (Eric Hobsbawm): He examines the social transformations of our times.
           “I have been asked to speak on ‘the crisis of ideology, culture and civilization’ today—an enormous subject, and one not easy to define.…
           “The events of recent years have indeed been spectacular and worldchanging—and also unexpected and unpredicted. Yet the revolutionary nature of the period we have been—we are still—living through goes far beyond those changes in global politics which are now making it impossible for cartographers to prepare atlases that will not be out of date in a matter of months. Never before in history has ordinary human life, and the societies in which it takes place, been so radically transformed in so short a time: not merely within a single lifetime, but within part of a lifetime.”
           [Eric Hobsbawm, “The Crisis of Today’s Ideologies.” New Left Review. Series I, number 192, March–April 1992. Pages 55-64.]
      349. reclaiming the commons (Naomi Klein): She discusses movements of opposition which are are working to reclaim “communal spaces.”
           “… there are oppositional threads, taking form in many different campaigns and movements. The spirit they share is a radical reclaiming of the commons. As our communal spaces—town squares, streets, schools, farms, plants—are displaced by the ballooning marketplace, a spirit of resistance is taking hold around the world. People are reclaiming bits of nature and of culture, and saying ‘this is going to be public space.’ American students are kicking ads out of the classrooms. European environmentalists and ravers are throwing parties at busy intersections. Landless Thai peasants are planting organic vegetables on over-irrigated golf courses. Bolivian workers are reversing the privatization of their water supply.” [Naomi Klein, “Reclaiming the Commons.” New Left Review. Series II, number 9, May–June 2001. Pages 82-89.]
      350. recognition struggles (Nancy Fraser): She examines problems of displacement and reification.
           “… questions of recognition are serving less to supplement, complicate and enrich redistributive struggles than to marginalize, eclipse and displace them. I shall call this the problem of displacement. Second, today’s recognition struggles are occurring at a moment of hugely increasing transcultural interaction and communication, when accelerated migration and global media flows are hybridizing and pluralizing cultural forms. Yet the routes such struggles take often serve not to promote respectful interaction within increasingly multicultural contexts, but to drastically simplify and reify group identities. They tend, rather, to encourage separatism, intolerance and chauvinism, patriarchalism and authoritarianism. I shall call this the problem of reification.” [Nancy Fraser, “Rethinking Recognition.” New Left Review. Series II, number 3, May–June 2000. Pages 107-120.]
      351. post-identity theories (Paddy McQueen): He discusses the importance of challenging the norms of domination which are found in conventional versions of gender and sex identity.
           “Although there are significant differences between post-identity theories, many of them share an anti-recognition stance insofar as they argue that a politics of recognition inevitably (i) entrenches normalizing forms of identity that ultimately sustain, rather than challenge and eradicate, social inequality, oppression and domination; and (ii) maintains the problematic ideal of authentic, unified and autonomous selfhood. Consequently, post-identity thinkers argue that radical social change can best (or only) be enacted if we move beyond recognition politics through the embrace of gender identities that are in some sense unrecognizable from the perspective of our current, shared conceptual framework. Only in this way can we challenge the oppressive norms that are embedded in normative accounts of sex and gender identity and create a future that diverges significantly from the present. This, in turn, can generate the kind of inclusive, pluralistic democratic sphere that can foster the social acceptance of difference and counteract deeply embedded social inequalities.” [Paddy McQueen, “Post-identity politics and the social weightlessness of radical gender theory.” Thesis Eleven. Volume 134, number 1, 2016. Pages 73-88.]
      352. critical community studies (Ruth Liepins): She discusses an approach to community focused upon issues of power and discourse.
           “The introduction of analyses of discourse and difference raise our awareness of the range of meanings and contestations that are involved in a ‘community.’ Development of questions about who is constructing notions of ‘community’ and what ideas are assembled under the term appear fruitful ways forward for critical community studies. So too, the increased attention to multiply configured identities, places and spaces, highlights how ‘community’ is enacted in contexts embedded within social imaginations and networks. Geographies of ‘community’ may be traced across both material and metaphoric spaces so that neither the tangible or imaginary aspects are forgotten.
           “This paper has proposed that a useful concept of ‘community’ is one which recognises the variable terrains of power and discourse shaping the contextual ground in which the notion germinates.”
           [Ruth Liepins, “New energies for an old idea: reworking approaches to ‘community’ in contemporary rural studies.” Journal of Rural Studies. Volume 16, issue 1, January 2000. Pages 23-35.]
      353. aesthetic theory of world music (Veit Erlmann as pronounced in this MP3 audio file): He critically analyzes the production of “ideologies of difference” in the West.
           “… my main concern in this essay is activated by an analysis of the ways through which ideologies of difference are produced in the West. An aesthetic theory of world music as cultural critique therefore cannot heroize 0therness. And, by the same token, it cannot engage in, say, the sort of influential anthropological project that attempts to bring ‘the insights gained on the periphery back to the center to raise havoc with our settled ways of thinking and conceptualization.’ …
           “World music … is not the new music of the ‘non-western world,’ let alone of the disenfranchised Third World ‘lumpen proletariat.’ Rather, world music seems to be the aesthetic figure corresponding most closely to what [Jean] Baudrillard has called the ‘fractal stage of value,’ a historical moment in which value is no longer dependent on the natural use of the world, nor on a logic of commodity exchange or a structural web of signs. Value, in the viral stage, develops from pure contiguity, from the cancerous proliferation of values without any reference point at all.”
           [Veit Erlmann, “The Aesthetics of the Global Imagination: Reflections on World Music in the 1990s.” Public Culture. Volume 8, number 3, spring 1996. Pages 467-487.]
      354. anti–psychiatry movement (David Cooper, Erving Goffman, Thomas Stephen Szasz as pronounced in this MP3 audio file [born, Szász Tamás István as pronounced in this MP3 audio file], Michel Foucault, Ernest Becker, Thomas Scheff, Ronald David “R. D.” Laing as pronounced in this MP3 audio file, Jean-Paul Sartre, and others): This imprecise, shorthand designation—covering a diverse collection of critiques of psychiatry—has been referenced by various scholars and practitioners. The term itself was coined by Cooper in his book, Psychiatry and Anti-Psychiatry. Notably, Szasz has said that, as a practicing psychiatrist, he is obviously not opposed to psychiatry under all conditions. He does, however, challenge some mainstream approaches within his field. Laing, another major player in the so–called anti–psychiatry movement, critiqued the legitimacy of the diagnosis of schizophrenia. Writing as an Autistic man who, as a child, was once given the now obsolete diagnosis of “Schizophrenic reaction, childhood type” (quite common at the time)—and predicted to spend my entire adult life on government disability payments—Laing’s critique seems, in retrospect, to have been almost prescient. See, for instance, Alliance for People’s Health and The Radical Therapist at Revolvy.
           “For anyone who works in the psychiatric field and who refuses to allow his critical awareness of what he is about to be numbed or engulfed by the institutionalizing processes of formal training and day-by-day indoctrination in the teaching hospital or psychiatric hospital, a number of disturbing questions arise. In this field most particularly, in the midst of people in extreme situations, one experiences the Zen ‘doubt sensation’—why am I here, who put me here, or why have I put myself here (and what is the difference between these questions), who is paying me for what, what shall I do, why do anything, why do nothing, what is anything and what is nothing, what is life and death, sanity and madness?
           “To the institutional survivor none of the more or less glib customary answers to these questions seems adequate. The questioning extends into both the theoretical basis, such as it is, of one’s work and the precise daily operations—gestures, acts, statements in relation to actual other persons. A more profound questioning has led some of us to propose conceptions and procedures that seem quite antithetic to the conventional ones in fact what may be regarded as a germinal anti-psychiatry.
           “The most effective way to explore the possibilities of such an antithetic discipline seems to me to be to investigate the major problem area of the discipline in question. In the case of psychiatry this problem area is that which is defined as schizophrenia.
           “What I have attempted to do in this monograph is to take a look at the person who has been labelled schizophrenic in his actual human context and to enquire how this label came to be attached to him, by whom it was attached, and what it signifies both for the labellers and the labelled.”
           [David Cooper. Psychiatry and Anti-Psychiatry. London and New York: Routledge imprint of Taylor & Francis Group, an Informa PLC business. 2001. Page ix.]
           “When I came back on a second visit to South America it took me several months to realize I was in the third world and to discover the meaning of the motto ‘The Third World first.’ My aim was to assist in the formation of anti-psychiatric communes and an international teaching-learning centre in the third world so that Europeans and North Americans would come here not to teach but to learn, thus helping attack cultural imperialism. Argentina is a favourable ground for this slow work firstly because its psychoanalytic tradition (e.g. [Enrique] Pichon-Rivière, Emilio Rodrigué, Marie Langer) breeds rebellion and breakaway groups; secondly because comradeship links are more extensive and lead to easier exitus from the nuclear family than in the first world; thirdly because after North America Argentina is perhaps the most heavily psychiatrized country in the world and lots of psychiatry makes for lots of anti-psychiatry; fourthly the fluid political scene makes for a good, usable, individual fluidity. I mention these matters because so much of the content of this book has been determined by my experiences in Argentina.” [David Cooper. The Grammar of Living. New York: Penguin Books imprint of Random House, Inc. 1974. Page 4.]
           “The Congress on the Dialectics of Liberation was held in London at the Roundhouse in Chalk Farm from 15 July to 30 July 1967. The present volume is a compilation of some of the principal addresses delivered on this occasion. I would like to outline in this brief introduction how the Congress came about and in particular why we, the organizers, arranged this meeting between these particular people, why we generated this curious pastiche of eminent scholars and political activists.
           “The organizing group consisted of four psychiatrists who were very much concerned with radical innovation in their own field – to the extent of their counter-labelling their discipline as anti-psychiatry. The four were Dr R. D. Laing and myself, also Dr Joseph Berke and Dr Leon Redler. Our experience originated in studies into that predominant form of socially stigmatized madness that is called schizophrenia. Most people who are called mad and who are socially victimized by virtue of that attribution (by being ‘put away,’ being subjected to electric shocks, tranquillizing drugs, and brainslicing operations, and so on) come from family situations in which there is a desperate need to find some scapegoat, someone who will consent at a certain point of intensity in the whole transaction of the family group to take on the disturbance of each of the others and, in some sense, suffer for them. In this way the scapegoated person would become a diseased object in the family system and the family system would involve medical accomplices in its machinations. The doctors would be used to attach the label ‘schizophrenia’ to the diseased object and then systematically set about the destruction of that object by the physical and social processes that are termed ‘psychiatric treatment.’”
           [David Cooper, “Introduction.” The Dialectics of Liberation. David Cooper, editor. London and New York: Verso imprint of New Left Books. 2015. Pages 5-9.]
           “The ‘anti-psychiatry’ movement was a group of ex-psychiatric patients, as well as intellectuals and writers, who organized to advocate for more humane treatment of the mentally ill and to question the very concept of madness and the social control inherent in the psychiatric system. Gaining momentum during the late 1960s and throughout the 1970s, thinkers and writers of the movement suggested that doctors had been too keen to medicalize eccentric behaviour, inhibiting both individuality and unconventional thinking. As such, they were particularly critical of biological psychiatry, especially psychosurgeries, shock treatments, and psychotropic drugs …. At the same moment that the therapeutic impulse was becoming more diffuse in American society, in the form of alternative therapeutic practices and settings such as consciousness raising, leftist radical therapy, therapeutic communities, experimental wards, feminist clinical practices and therapy, as well as self-help, antipsychiatry offered a radical assessment of psychiatry broadly conceived as inherently repressive, belittling, and spirit-crushing ….” [Heather Murray, “‘My Place Was Set At The Terrible Feast’: The Meanings of the ‘Anti-Psychiatry’ Movement and Responses in the United States, 1970s-1990s.” The Journal of American Culture. Volume 37, number 1, March 2014. Pages 37-51.]
           “When psychiatrists of a certain age and educational bent hear the phrase ‘anti-psychiatry,’ they probably recall the movement against the rebirth of biological psychiatry prominent in the 1960s and 1970s. Erving Goffman, Ph.D., Thomas S. Szasz, M.D., and Michel P. Foucault, among others, inspired a crusade among primarily liberal intellectuals to demythologize mental illness and liberate psychiatric patients from the forces of cultural labeling, dehumanizing institutionalization and a burgeoning psychopharmacology intended to medicalize deviance and control eccentricity. Edward Shorter, Ph.D., one of the foremost historians of psychiatry, aptly summarized the perspective of the anti-psychiatry forces …:
           “The movement’s basic argument was that psychiatric illness is not medical in nature but social, political, and legal: Society defines what schizophrenia or depression is, and not nature. If psychiatric illness is thus socially constructed, it must be deconstructed in the interest of freeing deviants, free spirits, and exceptional creative people from the stigma of being ‘pathological.’”
           [Cynthia M. A. Geppert, “The Anti-Psychiatry Movement Is Alive and Well.” Psychiatric Times. Volume 21, number 3, March 2004. Pages 21+.]
           “The issue of voluntarism and its ramifications has been under constant discussion among ex-patient activists, but until recently their published literature and public statements emphasized consciousness raising and anti-psychiatric propaganda There is also a growing literature detailing the activities of various governmental agencies that have utilized psychiatrists in all sorts of clandestine human experiments. Also cited are the practice of sterilization, condoned by psychiatrists, of mental patients in the United States, and revelations of the leadership role of prominent German psychiatrists in the sterilization and murder of hundreds of thousands of mentally ill patients during the Nazi era, a subject overlooked in histories of psychiatry and largely ignored within the American psychiatric profession. Some critics even link American and German psychiatric abuses.” [Norman Dain, “Critics and Dissenters: Reflections on ‘Anti-Psychiatry’ in the United States.” Journal of the History of the Behavioral Sciences. Volume 25, number 1, January 1989. Pages 3-25.]
           “The term stigma and its synonyms conceal a double perspective: does the stigmatized individual assume his differentness is known about already or is evident on the spot, or does he assume it is neither known about by those present nor immediately perceivable by them? In the first case one deals with the plight of the discredited, in the second with that of the discreditable. This is an important difference, even though a particular stigmatized individual is likely to have experience with both situations. I will begin with the situation of the discredited and move on to the discreditable but not always separate the two.
           “Three grossly different types of stigma may be mentioned. First there are abominations of the body—the various physical deformities. Next there are blemishes of individual character perceived as weak will, domineering or unnatural passions, treacherous and rigid beliefs, and dishonesty, these being inferred from a known record of, for example, mental disorder, imprisonment, addiction, alcoholism, homosexuality, unemployment, suicidal attempts, and radical political behavior. Finally there are the tribal stigma of race, nation, and religion, these being stigma that can be transmitted through lineages and equally contaminate all members of a family. In all of these various instances of stigma, however, including those the Greeks had in mind, the same sociological features are found: an individual who might have been received easily in ordinary social intercourse possesses a trait that can obtrude itself upon attention and turn those of us whom he meets away from him, breaking the claim that his other attributes have on us. He possesses a stigma, an undesired differentness from what we had anticipated. We and those who do not depart negatively from the particular expectations at issue I shall call the normals.”
           [Erving Goffman. Stigma: Notes on the Management of Spoiled Identity. New York: A Touchstone Book imprint of Simon & Schuster Inc. 1986. Pages 2-3.]
           “A total institution may be defined as a place of residence and work where a large number of like-situated individuals, cut off from the wider society for an appreciable period of time, together lead an enclosed, formally administered round of life. Prisons serve as a clear example, providing we appreciate that what is prison-like about prisons is found in institutions whose members have broken no laws. This volume deals with total institutions in general and one example, mental hospitals, in particular. The main focus is on the world of the inmate, not the world of the staff. A chief concern is to develop a sociological version of the structure of the self.” [Erving Goffman. Asylums: Essays on the Social Situation of Mental Patients and Other Inmates. Garden City, New York: Anchor Books imprint of Doubleday & Company, Inc. 1961. Page xiii.]
           “Every institution captures something of the time and interest of its members and provides something of a world for them; in brief, every institution has encompassing tendencies. When we review the different institutions in our Western society, we find some that are encompassing to a degree discontinuously greater than the ones next in line. Their encompassing or total character is symbolized by the barrier to social intercourse with the outside and to departure that is often built right into the physical plant, such as locked doors, high walls, barbed wire, cliffs, water, forests, or moors. These establishments I am calling total institutions, and it is their general characteristics I want to explore.
           “The total institutions of our society can be listed in five rough groupings. First, there are institutions established to care for persons felt to be both incapable and harmless; these are the homes for the blind, the aged, the orphaned, and the indigent. Second, there are places established to care for persons felt to be both incapable of looking after themselves and a threat to the community, albeit an unintended one: TB [tuberculosis] sanitaria, mental hospitals, and leprosaria. A third type of total institution is organized to protect the community against what are felt to be intentional dangers to it, with the welfare of the persons thus sequestered not the immediate issue: jails, penitentiaries, P.O.W. [prisoner of war] camps, and concentration camps. Fourth, there are institutions purportedly established the better to pursue some worklike task and justifying themselves only on these instrumental grounds: army barracks, ships, boarding schools, work camps, colonial compounds, and large mansions from the point of view of those who live in the servants’ quarters. Finally, there are those establishments designed as retreats from the world even while often serving also as training stations for the religious; examples are abbeys, monasteries, convents, and other cloisters.”
           [Erving Goffman. Asylums: Essays on the Social Situation of Mental Patients and Other Inmates. Garden City, New York: Anchor Books imprint of Doubleday & Company, Inc. 1961. Pages 4-5.]
           “Although powerful institutional forces lend their massive weight to the tradition of keeping psychiatric problems within the conceptual framework of medicine, the moral and scientific challenge is clear: we must recast and redefine the problem of ‘mental illness’ so that it may be encompassed in a morally explicit science of man. This, of course, would require a radical revision of our ideas about ‘psychopathology’ and ‘psychotherapy’—the former having to be conceived in terms of sign-using, rule-following, and game-playing, the latter in terms of human relationships and social arrangements promoting certain types of learning and values.
           “Human behavior is fundamentally moral behavior. Attempts to describe and alter such behavior without, at the same time, coming to grips with the issue of ethical values are therefore doomed to failure. Hence, so long as the moral dimensions of psychiatric theories and therapies remain hidden and inexplicit, their scientific worth will be seriously limited. In the theory of personal conduct which I have proposed— and in the theory of psychotherapy implicit in it—I have tried to correct this defect by articulating the moral dimensions of human behaviors occurring in psychiatric contexts.”
           [Thomas S. Szasz. The Myth of Mental Illness: Foundations of a Theory of Personal Conduct. New York: Harper Perennial imprint of HarperCollins Publishers Inc. 2010. Pages 262-263.]
           “As a result of the anti-psychiatrists’ self-seeking sloganeering, psychiatrists can now do what no other members of a medical specialty can do: they can dismiss critics of any aspect of accepted psychiatric practice by labeling them ‘ anti-psychiatrists.’ The obstetrician who eschews abortion on demand is not stigmatized as an ‘ anti-obstetrician.’ The surgeon who eschews transsexual operations is not dismissed as an ‘ anti-surgeon.’ But the psychiatrist who eschews coercion and excusemaking is called an ‘ anti-psychiatrist.’ The upshot is that every physician—except the psychiatrist—is free to elect not to perform particular procedures that offend his moral principles or procedures he simply prefers not to perform.” [Thomas Szasz, “Anti-Coercion Is Not Anti-Psychiatry.” The Freeman: Ideas on Liberty. May, 2008. Pages 26-27.]
           “Fifty years ago, it made sense to assert that mental illnesses are not diseases. It makes no sense to do so today. Debate about what counts as mental illness has been replaced by political-judicial decrees and economic criteria: old diseases such as homosexuality disappear, whereas new diseases such as attention-deficit hyperactivity disorder appear.…
           “The proposition that mental illness is not a medical problem runs counter to public opinion and psychiatric dogma. When a person hears me say that there is no such thing as mental illness, he is likely to reply: ‘But I know so-and-so who was diagnosed as mentally ill and turned out to have a brain tumour. In due time, with refinements in medical technology, psychiatrists will be able to show that all mental illnesses are bodily diseases’. This contingency does not falsify my contention that mental illness is a metaphor. It verifies it. The physician who concludes that a person diagnosed with a mental illness suffers from a brain disease discovers that the person was misdiagnosed: he did not have a mental illness, he had an undiagnosed bodily illness. The physician’s erroneous diagnosis is not proof that the term mental illness refers to a class of brain diseases.”
           [Thomas S. Szasz, “The myth of mental illness: 50 years later.” The Psychiatrist. Volume 35, 2011. Pages 179-182.]
           “… [There is] confusion about antipsychiatry rampant in the literature …. They [my critics] could have easily remedied this by adding something like, ‘[Thomas S.] Szasz has made it clear that he is anti-coercion, not anti-psychiatry. In fact, for almost 50 years he has practiced what he calls “contractual psychiatry” or ‒listening and talking.”’” [Thomas S. Szasz, “Psychiatry, Anti-Psychiatry, Critical Psychiatry: What Do These Terms Mean?” Philosophy, Psychiatry & Psychology: PPP. Volume 17, number 3, September 2010. Pages 229-232.]
           “Language is the first and last structure of madness, its constituent form; on language are based all the cycles in which madness articulates its nature. That the essence of madness can be ultimately defined in the simple structure of a discourse does not reduce it to a purely psychological nature, but gives it a hold over the totality of soul and body; such discourse is both the silent language by which the mind speaks to itself in the truth proper to it, and the visible articulation in the movements of the body. Parallelisms, complements, all the forms of immediate communication which we have seen manifested, in madness are suspended between soul and body in this single language and in its powers. The movement of passion which persists until it breaks and turns against itself, the sudden appearance of the image, and the agitations of the body which were its visible concomitants—all this, even as we were trying to reconstruct it, was already secretly animated by this language. If the determinism of passion is transcended and released in the hallucination of the image, if the image, in return, has swept away the whole world of beliefs and desires, it is because the delirious language was already present—a discourse which liberated passion from all its limits, and adhered with all the constraining weight of its affirmation to the image which was liberating itself.” [Michel Foucault. Madness and Civilization: A History of Insanity in the Age of Reason. Richard Howard, translator. New York: Vintage Books imprint of Random House, Inc. 1988. Page 100.]
           “But there is no certainty that madness was content to sit locked up in its immutable identity, waiting for psychiatry to perfect its art, before it emerged blinking from the shadows into the blinding light of truth. Nor is it clear that confinement was above all, or even implicitly, a series of measures put in place to deal with madness. It is not even certain that in this repetition of the ancient gesture of segregation at the threshold of the classical age, the modern world was aiming to wipe out all those who, either as a species apart or a spontaneous mutation, appeared as ‘asocial,’ The fact that the internees of the eighteenth century bear a resemblance to our modern vision of the asocial is undeniable, but it is above all a question of results, as the character of the marginal was produced by the gesture of segregation itself. For the day came when this man, banished in the same exile all over Europe in the mid-seventeenth century, suddenly became an outsider, expelled by a society to whose norms he could not be seen to conform; and for our own intellectual comfort, he then became a candidate for prisons, asylums and punishment. In reality, this character is merely the result of superimposed grids of exclusion.” [Michel Foucault. History of Madness. Jonathan Murphy and Jean Khalfa, translators. Jean Khalfa, editor. London and New York: Routledge imprint of Taylor & Francis Group, an Informa PLC business. 2006. Pages 79-80.]
           “The underlying criticisms of ‘anti-psychiatry’ (in a broad, not the UK-specific, sense) are amplified in a series of rather generic characterizations of a whole series of developments ….” [Andrew Goffey, “Guattari and transversality: Institutions, analysis and experimentation.” Radical Philosophy: Philosophical Journal of the Independent Left. Number 195, January/February 2016. Pages 38-47.]
           “Erving Goffman, the most influential sociological theorist in the ‘anti-psychiatry’ tradition, offers in different works a number of quite distinct approaches in the demarcation of physical from psychiatric disorders. One of his most readable books, Stigma, applies a careful phenomenological and interpersonal analysis to the victims of physical handicap and disfigurement, with a method very similar to that adopted in his celebrated study of ‘The Moral Career of the Mental Patient.’
           “Thus far, Goffman would appear to be using a unitary schema in which the division of the patients’ ‘physical’ categories would contribute nothing to our further understanding of the difficulties experienced by the subject in his various social settings and encounters. Elsewhere, a more definite distinction between physical and psychiatric symptom construction is propounded.”
           [Peter Sedgwick, “Mental Illness Is Illness.” Salmagundi. Number 20, summer–fall 1972. Pages 196-224.]
           “In a previous essay [‘Mental Illness Is Illness’] I have identified and attacked a curious distinction which has become a postulate of much theoretical in ‘anti-psychiatry.’ A number of authors who are critical of psychiatric theory or practice tend to rest their case on a sharp ferentiation which they say can be made between the character diagnosis in physical illnesses and the nature of diagnostic classification in mental illness.… My conclusion was, baldly put, that all ascriptions of illness, whether ‘physical’ or ‘mental,’ are heavily loaded with social value-judgments. For illness is ascribed to another, or else avowed by the ill person, when some gap opens up between (a) a presented behaviour feeling and (b) an important social norm. Illness is deviancy, not all deviancy is illness. To be ill is to manifest discomfort failure in a particular context: it is not simply to fail or to be uncomfortable.” [Peter Sedgwick, “Goffman’s Anti-Psychiatry.” Salmagundi. Number 26, spring 1974. Pages 26-51.]
           “Recently psychiatrists reported an increase in anxiety neuroses in children as a result of the earth tremors in Southern California. For these children the discovery that life really includes cataclysmic danger was too much for their still-imperfect denial systems—hence open outbursts of anxiety. With adults we see this manifestation of anxiety in the face of impending catastrophe where it takes the form of panic. Recently several people suffered broken limbs and other injuries after forcing open their airplane’s safety door during take-off and jumping from the wing to the ground; the incident was triggered by the backfire of an engine. Obviously underneath these harmless noises other things are rumbling in the creature.
           “But even more important is how repression works: it is not simply a negative force opposing life energies; it lives on life energies and uses them creatively. I mean that fears are naturally absorbed by expansive organismic striving. Nature seems to have built into organisms an innate healthy-mindedness; it expresses itself in self-delight, in the pleasure of unfolding one’s capacities into the world, in the incorporation of things in that world, and in feeding on its limitless experiences. This is a lot of very positive experience, and when a powerful organism moves with it, it gives contentment. As [George] Santayana once put it: a lion must feel more secure that God is on his side than a gazelle. On the most elemental level the organism works actively against its own fragility by seeking to expand and perpetuate itself in living experience; instead of shrinking, it moves toward more life. Also, it does one thing at a time, avoiding needless distractions from all-absorbing activity; in this way, it would seem, fear of death can be carefully ignored or actually absorbed in the life-expanding processes.”
           [Ernest Becker. The Denial of Death. New York: The Free Press imprint of Macmillan Publishing Co., Inc. 1975. Page 21.]
           “As we might expect, the grossest differences from our modern Western definition of ‘normal’ behavior would be found among those societies that lived in a dual universe. They would tend to value experiences in the invisible world, and a talent for such experiences. And so we find that auditory hallucinations can be normal in a culture where one is expected to hear periodically the voice of God; visual hallucinations can be normal where, as among the Plains Indians, one’s Guardian Spirit manifested itself in a vision; or where, as among South Italian Catholics, the appearance of the Virgin Mary is a blessed event. Spirit possession can be a great talent even though we consider it psychiatrically a form of dissociation. What we call ‘hysterical symptoms’ are thought to be signs of special gifts, powers that come to lodge in one’s body and show themselves by speaking strange tongues through the mouth of the one who is possessed, and so on. Primitive societies may give their highest rewards to such people, as they do to the shaman whose social function it is to travel into the invisible world and cope with the spirits there. No matter that the shaman may be labelled ‘psychotic’ by our standard psychiatric textbooks, his private experiences of trances, delusions, hallucinations can find a perfect place in tribal life, since all mysterious cause-and-effect, all vital power, lies in the dimension of the invisible.” [Ernest Becker. The Birth and Death of Meaning: An Interdisciplinary Perspective on the Problem of Man. Second edition. New York: The Free Press imprint of the Macmillan Company. 1971. Page 131.]
           “The purpose of this article is to suggest an approach to diagnosis involving what will be called normalization in order to avoid harming rather than helping the prospective patient. This is not to say that one should always normalize. Automatic responses, whether labeling or normalizing, are equally undesirable. Labeling/normalization theory suggests that we need to decrease automatic responses of both kinds. Automatic normalizing can result in enabling, and automatic labeling can result in social rejection.
           “This article has suggested an idea that might help us individually be better therapists or teachers and in the long run change our medical, psychotherapeutic, and educational institutions. The theory of labeling/normalizing alerts us to the dangers of automatic reactions of labeling as well as enabling and gives examples of how both extremes might be avoided. These ideas might help both individuals and societies grow and prosper.”
           [Thomas Scheff, “Normalizing Symptoms: Neither Labeling nor Enabling.” Ethical Human Psychology and Psychiatry. Volume 12, number 3, 2010. Pages 232-237.]
           “As a therapist, from the first moment of contact try to form an empathic emotional union with the depressed patient, by hook or crook, no matter the content. Some find this goal fairly easy, but others might need coaching and practice. Get off of TOPICS, into RELATIONSHIP talk. Discussion of anything that is not happening in the moment is topic talk. An example of relationship talk is ‘I didn’t understand what you just said. Could you repeat it?’ or ‘You seem sad,’ ‘I am proud of you,’ ‘You seem distracted,’ and so on. Relationship talk is about what is happening in the moment, either to the patient or therapist, or between them. For most people, it is very difficult to stay on track, avoid topic talk.” [Thomas Scheff, “A Social Theory and Treatment of Depression.” Ethical Human Psychology and Psychiatry. Volume 11, number 1, 2009. Pages 37-49.]
           “Hidden, covert shame, in combination with either hidden or overt rage, may be the primary components of hatred. The first step is to discuss intense rage. An immediate problem in making this argument persuasive is the difficulty of describing in words the experience of rage and other compelling emotions. When readers are sitting in the comfort of their study, feeling more or less safe and secure, it will take some effort to help them visualize the intensity of ‘war fever,’ or of the feelings that lead to massacres on a vast scale. The intensity and primitiveness of fury beggars verbal description. How is one to convey intense feelings with mere words? Here I will resort to archaic literature, where this difficulty was dealt with by florid exaggeration, so that the words could point the reader toward the intensity of the actual feelings. These words, I take it, are not meant to describe outer reality (they are far too gross), but instead to convey inner, experiential reality, the objective correlative as T.S. Eliot called it, of a fit of rage.” [Thomas J. Scheff, “Is Hatred Formed by Hidden Shame and Rage?” Humanity and Society. Volume 28, number 1, February 2004. Pages 24-39.]
           “I do not myself believe that there is any such ‘condition’ as ‘schizophrenia.’ Yet the label is a social fact. Indeed this label as social fact, is a political event. This political event, occurring in the civic order of society, imposes definitions and consequences on the labelled person. It is a social prescription that rationalizes a set of social actions whereby the labelled person is annexed by others, who are legally sanctioned, medically empowered, and morally obliged, to become responsible for the person labelled. The person labelled is inaugurated not only into a role, but into a career of patient, by the concerted actions of numerous others who for some considerable time become the only ones with whom a sustained relationship is permitted. The ‘committed’ person labelled as patient, and specifically as ‘schizophrenic,’ is degraded from full existential status as human agent and responsible person, no longer in possession of his own definition of himself, unable to retain his own possessions, precluded from the exercise of his discretion as to whom he meets, what he does. His time is no longer his own and the space he occupies is no longer of his choosing.” [R. D. Laing, “What is schizophrenia?” New Left Review. Series I, number 28, November–December 1964. Pages 63-68.]
           “Instead of dementia praecox, read process schizophrenia. Instead of ‘hydrotherapeutic institution,’ read one of our best hospitals or sanatoria. Instead of ‘gymnastic exercises, etc.,’ read group therapy, occupational therapy, milieu therapy. Add a touch of psychotherapy, a sprinkling of electro-shocks for the depression, a dab of hormones for the arrest in his development, and some vitamins and drugs, so as not to deprive him of the benefit of any chance that recent advances in psychiatry can offer.” [R. D. Laing. The Politics of the Family. Concord, Ontario: House of Anansi Press Limited. 1993. Page 22.]
           “A certain amount of the incomprehensibility of a schizophrenic’s speech and action becomes intelligible if we remember that there is the basic split in his being carried over from the schizoid state. The individual’s being is cleft in two, producing a disembodied self and a body that is a thing that the self looks at, regarding it at times as though it were just another thing in the world. The total body and also many ‘mental’ processes are severed from the self, which may continue to operate in a very restricted enclave (phantasying and observing), or it may appear to cease to function altogether (i.e. be dead, murdered, stolen). This account is, of course, highly schematic and has the failings of any preliminary over-simplification.” [R. D. Laing. The Divided Self: An Existential Study in Sanity and Madness. New York: Penguin Books. 1990. Page 162.]
           “The problem of the diagnosis, which of course enters into every report on schizophrenia, is extremely difficult, there being no generally agreed criteria or standards of reliability, regional, national, or international.…
           “For socio-economic reasons, for a long time to come, patients will have to go back to their families, who will have to put up with one another. We try to help the patient and his family to be less disturbing to each other by intensive work with the whole family, including the patient during his stay in hospital. By the time the patient is discharged they will perhaps have learned to understand one another a little better and have come to feel there is someone else who understands them.…
           “Twenty male and 22 female schizophrenics were treated by conjoint family and milieu therapy in two mental hospitals with reduced use of tranquillizers. No individual psychotherapy was given. None of the so-called shock treatments was used, nor was leucotomy. All patients were discharged within one year of admission. The average length of stay was three months. Seventeen per cent. were readmitted within a year of discharge. Seventy per cent. of the others were sufficiently well adjusted socially to be able to earn their living for the whole of the year after discharge.”
           [A. Esterson, D. G. Cooper, and R. D. Laing, “Results of Family-orientated Therapy with Hospitalized Schizophrenics.” The British Medical Journal. Volume 2, issue 5476, December 1965. Pages 1462-1465.]
           “Persons are not separate objects in space. They are centres of orientation to the world. These different centres and their worlds are not islands, but the nature of their reciprocal influence and interaction has always been difficult to incorporate adequately into interpersonal theory. By considering the person from the beginning always in terms of one of his group metamorphoses, without according any theoretical or methodological priority to the person as an abstracted ego extrapolated from his interhuman context, there is some hope that a radical advance in our thinking in this respect is possible.” [R. D. Laing, “Series and Nexus in the Family.” New Left Review. Series I, number 15, May–June 1962. Pages 7-14.]
           “Because capitalism’s atomizing powers systematically and permanently cripple a class of people into vassals - externally and internally - it’s understandable that the totality of people of whom Engels speaks, who had been stricken by illness, can be understood as the unity of harms that come with wage-dependency and as the revolt of Life against these harms which reduce people to the status of objects.
           “Since 1845 the relationship has fundamentally changed, but the alienation remains, and it will last as long as the capitalist system. It is, as you say, ‘assumption and result’ of the relations of production. Illness – you point out – is the only possible form of life in capitalism. In fact, the psychiatrist, who is wage dependent, is a sick person like each of us. The ruling classes merely give him the power to ‘cure’ or to hospitalize. Cure – this is self-evident – can’t be understood in our system to mean the elimination of illness: it serves exclusively as the maintenance of the ability to go to work where one stays sick. In our society there are the well and the cured (two categories of unwittingly sick people who fit the norms of production), and on the other hand those recognized as sick, who are rendered incapable of performing wage work, and whom one sends to the psychiatrist. This ‘policeman’ begins by placing them outside the purview of the law by denying them the most fundamental rights. He is clearly an accomplice of the atomizing powers: he approaches individual cases as if psycho-neurotic disturbances were the personal flaw and fate of an individual.”
           [Jean-Paul Sartre, “Foreword,” in Socialist Patients’ Collective of the University of Heidelberg Turn Illness Into a Weapon: A Polemic and Call to Action by the Socialist Patients’ Collective of the University of Heidelberg. K. D., translator. 2013. Pages vii-x. (Unauthorized, privately published translation of SPK: Aus Krankheit Eine Waffe Machen. Munich, West Germany: TriKont-Verlag. 1972.]
           “A … distinguishing feature of the anti-psychiatric critique is its rootedness in a wider critique of society, which, it was argued, is oppressive and requires the distortion and repression of human potentialities for its effective functioning. This wider societal focus linked the anti-psychiatrists, conceptually, to other political movements of their time and these conceptual links were often consolidated through more practical cooperation.…
           “This degree and form of criticism of psychiatry is, I suggest, historically unique and is thus partly definitive of anti-psychiatry. Or rather, it is if we add that anti-psychiatry posited its critique at a time when psychiatry itself was relatively well established; when there was a psychiatry to be ‘anti-’ towards.”
           [Nick Crossley, “R. D. Laing and the British Anti-Psychiatry Movement: A Socio-Historical Analysis.” Social Science & Medicine. Volume 47, issue 7, October 1998. Pages 877-889.]
           “… both [Thomas S.] Szasz and [R. D.] Laing recognized the inappropriateness of the medical metaphor as applied to human behavior. Szasz … famously described the very idea of mental illness as a myth. Insofar as both men refused to accept the metaphor of mental illness as biological reality and described some of the social processes and consequences of medicalization, their approaches can be said to be deconstructionist in flavor. The difficulties that brought people to seek help from mental health professionals were to be better described as ‘problems of living’—a phrase originally coined by Szasz …, though one with which Laing would have wholeheartedly concurred.” [Ron Roberts, “Laing and Szasz: Anti-psychiatry, Capitalism, and Therapy.” Psychoanalytic Review. Volume 93, number 5, October 2006. Pages 781-799.]
           “The aim of this article is … to see how the language of psychiatry, and the representation it gave of the language of schizophrenia, has changed in accordance to the new approach to mental illness entailed by what we can loosely refer to as the anti-psychiatric school of thought.…
           “What my work attempts to do … is … to highlight the relationship … fictional material might have with the real experience of schizophrenia and try to understand whether the advent of a different kind of psychiatric practice (which while not perhaps coinciding with, was certainly influenced by, the anti-psychiatric movement) created a different approach not only of the actual practice itself but also of its fictional representations.”
           [Michela Canepari, “From Psychiatry to Anti-Psychiatry: an Intersemiotic Journey through the Language of Schizophrenia.” Torre di Babele: Rivista di Letteratura e Linguistica. Volume 8, 2012. Pages 297-337.]
           “The institution of psychiatry grew up in the nineteenth century during the emergence and consolidation of industrial capitalism. Its function was to deal with abnormal and bizarre behaviour which, without breaking the law, did not comply with the demands of the new social and economic order. Its association with medicine concealed this political function of social control, by endowing it with the objectivity and neutrality of science. The medical model of mental disorder has served ever since to obscure the social processes that produce and define deviance by locating problems in individual biology.…
           “Despite the political and professional retrenchment of recent years, there are many developments which presage the ultimate transformation of the psychiatric system. The burgeoning patients’ rights movement and the anti-psychiatry critique are some of these. Rejection of paternalism is also embodied in the increasingly important role of consumers in medicine in general, and the demand for justification of treatments and involvement in decision making.”
           [Joanna Moncrieff, “The medicalisation of modern living.” Soundings. Issue 6, summer 1997. Pages 63-72.]
           “While there can be little doubt that the surrealists were antagonistic to psychiatry I would like to argue that a great deal of their work is of potential interest to psychiatrists. The surrealist movement was opposed to any form of rationalism. It was opposed to anything which could possibly limit the imagination and this was the source of its conflict with psychiatry. But surrealist art and literature was essentially an exploration of the bizarre, the irrational and the unconscious and these are subjects which are, of necessity, of importance to the psychiatrist and the psychotherapist.” [Patrick Bracken, “Psychiatry and Surrealism.” Bulletin of the Royal College of Psychiatrists. Volume 10, April 1986. Pages 80-81.]
           “Chemical imbalance theories of mental disorder soon followed …, providing the scientific basis for psychiatric medications as possessing magic bullet qualities by targeting the presumed pathophysiology of mental disorder. Despite these promising developments, psychiatry found itself under attack from both internal and external forces. The field remained divided between biological psychiatrists and Freudians who rejected the biomedical model. Critics such as R. D. Laing … and Thomas Szasz … incited an ‘anti-psychiatry’ movement that publicly threatened the profession’s credibility.” [Brett J. Deacon, “The biomedical model of mental disorder: A critical analysis of its validity, utility, and effects on psychotherapy research.” Clinical Psychology Review. Volume 33, 2013. Pages 846-861.]
           “While R. D.] Laing never liked the term ‘anti-psychiatry’ – he was part of a wave, albeit not a uniformly characteristic one, of radical critiques of psychiatry.” [Adrian Chapman, “Into the Zone of the Interior: A Novel View of Anti-Psychiatry.” PsyArt Journal. Volume 18, 2014. Pages 14-24.]
           “As a social movement and a theory, anti-psychiatry was founded in the 1960s. The term itself was introduced by the South African psychiatrist David Cooper, who, along with British psychiatrist Ronald Laing and American philosopher of psychiatry Thomas Szasz, played the greatest role in articulating the theory of this movement.” [Milanko Govedarica, “Realism and Anti-Realism in the Philosophy of Psychiatry.” Theoria. Volume 2, 2012. Pages 13-20.]
           “Anti-psychiatry compels psychiatry to be contemporary, to respond to its current challenges, not fall asleep into academicism and the tired repetition of authority. So while academic and institutional psychiatry, like any established profession, will tend towards conservatism, anti-psychiatry will always rouse it from its slumber to confront new problems and to update itself. For this reason, psychiatry can never rest. We will always need resistance to authority, challenges to established practice, and calls for change.” [Vincenzo Di Nicola, “Psychiatry Against Itself: Radicals, Rebels, Reformers & Revolutionaries A Philosophical Archaeology.” The Journal of The International Association of Transdisciplinary Psychology. Volume 4, issue 1, December 2015. Pages 1-18.]
           “The anti-psychiatric movement grew in the realm of politics, particularly the politics of the left, which was considered at one time the main source of progressive ideas and possibly the only instrument against capitalist oppres sion. It gained its initial respect and glamour from its association with the prevailing exist ential philosophy at that time. The need to stengthen the relationship between psychiatry and philosophy is an old one and is based on [Immanuel] Kant’s contention that judgements on matters of sanity should be the prerogative of the philosophical mind.” [Mervat Nasser, “The rise and fall of anti-psychiatry.” Psychiatric Bulletin. Volume 19, 1995. Pages 743-746.]
           “The antipsychiatry movement arose as a group of scholarly psychoanalysts and sociologists shaped an organized opposition to what were perceived as biological psychiatry’s abuses in the name of science. This protest was joined by a 1960s worldwide counterculture that was already rebelling against all forms of political, sexual, and racial injustice.
           “The term ‘antipsychiatry’ was first coined in 1967 by the South African psychoanalyst David Cooper well after the movement was already under way.”
           [David J. Rissmiller and Joshua H. Rissmiller, “Evolution of the Antipsychiatry Movement Into Mental Health Consumerism.” Psychiatric Services. Volume 57, number 6, June 2006. Pages 863-866.]
           “… the importance of Ronald [R. D.] Laing, one of the originators of English anti-psychiatry, lies in this ‘countercultural movement which combines politics with the problematic of the university,’ as Daniele Sabourin has said. Laing is firstly a deviant psychiatrist. For us, he was in the first place this frenzied and somewhat euphoric character, whose flare up with David Cooper had the effect of a bomb in the days of the study group Enfance Aliénée, organized in Paris in 1957 by Maud Mannoni and the journal Recherches.
           “All of psychiatry speaks of the anti-psychiatry of Laing. But does Laing himself still speak of psychiatrists? He is far, already very far from their world and their preoccupations. He has undertaken this ‘trip,’ which he recommends to schizophrenics, on his own account, and he has abandoned his activities in London in order to meditate, so some say, in a monastery in Ceylon. On the other hand, his books are surely there too. It’s impossible to avoid them. They irritate and disrupt specialized gatherings. Public opinion gets mixed up with them.”
           [Pierre-Félix Guattari, “The Divided Laing.” Gary Genosko, translator. The Guattari Reader. Gary Genosko, editor. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Blackwell Publishers Inc. 1996. Pages 37-41.]
      355. mad liberation movement (Robert E. Emerick, Jeffery Shantz, Linda Morrison, and others): This social movement—sometimes described as autonomist—argues for self–determination by mental–health patients and for the humanization of the mental–health system. Relevant websites include MindFreedom and The Icarus Project (which regards psychiatry as a system of oppresssion). It is a contemporary descendant from the anti–psychiatry movement.
           “‘Mad liberation’ is my label for that portion of the broader mental health movement that consists of various types of ‘mental patient, ’ generally former mental patient, self-help groups. Mad liberation also reflects my claim documented throughout paper, that mental patient self-help groups are predominantly politically progressive organizations that constitute a true social movement. However, I take my cue from members of the mental patient movement who variously refer to ‘the mental patients’ liberation front,’ or ‘the insanity liberation movement’ and call themselves ‘psychiatric inmates,’ ‘psychiatric survivors, or ’mad activists.’” [Robert E. Emerick, “Mad Liberation: The Sociology of Knowledge and the Ultimate Civil Rights Movement.” The Journal of Mind and Behavior. Volume 17, number 2, spring 1996. Pages 135-159.]
           “Autonomist movements develop new plans for living, challenging taken-for-granted norms and values …. Many contemporary autonomist movements deploy forms of counterscience, alternative practices for alternative forms and objects of knowledge or expertise. Movements open up new spaces for knowledge production and allow for a body of counterdiscourses to develop …. Many movements attempt to transform society from within, through … ‘laboratories of experience.’ Such laboratories are heterotopias, or actually existing utopias in which the values and ideals that are central to movements’ political projects are embodied and enacted …. Heterotopias are the ‘experiments in practice’ for the coming communities of mad liberation.” [Jeffery Shantz, “Beyond Therapy: Autonomist Movements Against ‘Mental Illness.’” Journal of Social and Psychological Sciences. Volume 1, number 2, July 2008. Pages 66-87.]
           “This research project began as my effort to demonstrate that ‘mad liberation’ was indeed qualified to be called a social movement in the sociological lexicon. As the work has progressed, I have become more clear that this is a human rights movement in the most basic sense. My conversations, readings, and subsequent involvement in movement activities have moved me to a deeper level of commitment and action, and even a detour into the study of bioethics in an effort to better understand the issues. Presently I am trying to balance my professional goal of enhancing sociologists’ sensitivity to recipients’ points of view regarding psychiatric services, and my personal impulses toward direct action: promoting peer support, advocacy, and avenues for the voices of consumers and survivors to be heard at local and national levels. More than a dissertation topic, this work has brought significant changes to my life and my personal identity.” [Linda Morrison, “Committing Social Change for Psychiatric Patients: The Consumer/Survivor Movement.” Humanity and Society. Volume 24, number 4, November 2000. Pages 389-404.]
           “This guide will help you make your own Mad Map. Drawing from the input of hundreds of members of the Icarus Project community, it will take you step by step through the process of creating your own wellness documents. The guides help you identify and share what you need for support in times of crisis, with the safety of knowing that you are drawing inspiration from tried and true resources shared by people with lived experiences. We hope you will recognize your own experiences in what others have written—and thus discover language to describe your experiences and new tools to maintain your well-being and transform your community.” [Teja Jonnalagadda et al. Madness & Oppression: Paths to Personal Transformation & Collective Liberation. New York: The Icarus Project. 2015. Creative Commons. Page 1.]
           “Oppression is the systemic and institutional abuse of power by one group at the expense of others and the use of force to maintain this dynamic. An oppressive system is built around the ideology of superiority of some groups and inferiority of others. This ideology makes those designated as inferior feel confined, ‘less than,’ and hinders the realization of their full spiritual, emotional, physical, and psychological well-being and potential. They are portrayed as ‘others’ and are marginalized via social, mental, emotional, and physical violence which prevents their full inclusion in the community. All actions, systems, cultures, ideologies, and technologies which refuse to take full and equitable consideration of everyone and everything affected by them are aspects of oppression.” [Teja Jonnalagadda et al. Madness & Oppression: Paths to Personal Transformation & Collective Liberation. New York: The Icarus Project. 2015. Creative Commons. Page 6.]
           “The social movement of ‘the mad’ has been variously referred to as the ‘mad liberation,’ ‘anti-psychiatry,’ ‘psychiatric survivor,’ ‘ex-patient,’ ‘ex-inmate,’ and ‘mental health consumer’ movement. The variety of terms illustrates the diversity of concerns, attitudes, and foci that have developed as the movement has grown and changed. Some segments of the movement have been extremely radical and separatist, working to abolish the powers of psychiatry. Other segments have taken a more collaborative route, working to reform the mental health system and provide more responsive, client-driven services and policy changes. Often they have met in the middle.” [Linda Joy Morrison. Talking Back to Psychiatry: Resistant Identities in the Psychiatric Consumer/Survivor/Ex-Patient Movement. Ph.D. dissertation. University of Pittsburgh. Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. 2003. Page 78.]
      356. critique of R. D. Laing’s social philosophy (Joe Warrington): He critiques the social philosophy, particularly with regard to the socially constructed definition of schizophrenia, of Scottish psychiatrist Ronald David “R. D.” Laing.
           “That [R. D.] Laing has been an incredibly valuable and important influence, none can reasonably deny. However, there is a prominent strain of absolutization of the importance of certain experiences, especially of a way-out kind, which militates against Laing’s social views being acceptable as a progressive force. The point, as always of course, is not to chuck the baby out with the bath-water. I hope to avoid this in what follows which is an attempt (1) to give a brief résumé of Laing’s familial theory of schizophrenia, (2) to connect this with the manner in which the family should be seen as a microcosm of society, and (3) to show that Laing’s romanticization of madness is essentially a reactionary stance. Specifically, in relation to the last part, whilst labelling and stigmatism play a large and mystifying part in the plight of a schizophrenic, I do not regard madness as being merely a label.” [Joe Warrington, “A Critique of R. D. Laing’s Social Philosophy (Part 1).” Radical Philosophy: Philosophical Journal of the Independent Left. Number 4, spring 1973. Pages 10-16.]
      357. critical psychiatry (Philip Thomas, Patrick Bracken, and others): They apply critical social theory to psychiatry.
           “Critical theory refers specifically to the approach to the study of society developed in the mid-20ᵗʰ century, associated with the Frankfurt school of philosophy (Max Horkheimer, Theodor Adorno, Herbert Marcuse and latterly Jürgen Habermas). It started as a reaction against totalitarianism in Europe, and the threat to individual autonomy. In recent years critical theory has addressed the social role of science, and especially the nature of theory in human sciences. This has resulted in the growth of critical psychology since the late 1980s, and more recently of critical psychiatry.” [Philip Thomas and Patrick Bracken, “Critical psychiatry in practice.” Advances in Psychiatric Treatment. Volume 10, 2005. Pages 361-370.]
      358. critical social work (Amy B. Rossiter): She applies critical social theory to social work.
           “This paper articulates a perspective on critical social work that draws from poststructuralism and critical theory. Arguing that the critique of positivism, the unreliability of generalizations about humans, and the influence of new social movements have undermined the credibility of mainstream social work practice and theory, the author advocates the need for social work theory and practice that is predicated on social justice. The paper offers a critique of structuralist approaches to practice and then seeks to embed social work practice in epistemic responsibility and communicative responsibility.” [Amy B. Rossiter, “A Perspective on Critical Social Work.” Abstract. Journal of Progressive Human Services. Volume 7, Issue 2, 1997. Pages 23-41. Retrieved on August 30th, 2015.]
      359. critical gerontology (Meredith Minkler, Carroll L. Estes, and others): Applies critical social theory to gerontology.
           “Critical gerontology arose, at least in part, in opposition to the conventional ‘social problems’ approach to aging. By offering an alternative, whether through political economy or hermeneutics and ideology critique, critical gerontology gave voice to what [Georg Wilhelm Friedrich] Hegel called ‘the tremendous power of the negative.’ This oppositional stance was a contribution of extraordinary importance. Critical gerontology also reaffirmed the importance of theory, especially what would come to be called ‘grand theory’ in the tradition of thinkers in the European branch of Critical Theory ([Theodor] Adorno, [Max] Horkheimer, [Herbert] Marcuse).” [Harry R. Moody, “Afterword: The maturing of critical gerontology.” Journal of Aging Studies. Volume 22, 2008. Pages 205-209.]
      360. articulation of global capitalism (Grant Kien): He examines “the U.S. empire-building project.”
           “The imposition and maintenance of global capitalism has meant that military oppression is a phenomenon widely felt in much of the world. I am certainly not suggesting thatmilitary campaigns are unique to capitalism but rather that the present empire-building projects, military and otherwise, are enabled by and organized according to capitalist principals and promote the U.S. model of capitalist liberal democracy as their highest moral goal and justification, regardless of what indigenous political and economic systems might be displaced and the violence thereby incurred by civilian populations. The historical precedents set in Guatemala, Chile, Argentina, Nicaragua, El Salvador, Haiti, and Panama, among other nations, show a clear will to the use of deadly force by the United States and those in its sphere of influence. The present conflict in Iraq and the subtler but no less deadly expansionist campaigns in Chiapas and Colombia are demonstrations of a continuation of the U.S. empire-building project.” [Grant Kien, “Culture, State, Globalization: The Articulation of Global Capitalism.” Cultural Studies ↔ Critical Methodologies. Volume 4, number 4, 2004. Pages 472-500.]
      361. critical terrorism studies (Matt McDonald, Richard Jackson, Alta Grobbelaar [Arabic/ʿArabiyyaẗ, أَلْتَا غْرُوبِّيلَار, ꞌAltā Ġrūbbīlār], Hussein Solomon [Arabic/ʿArabiyyaẗ, حُسَيْن سُلَيْمَان, Ḥusayn Sulaymān], and others): They apply critical social theory to terrorism studies.
           “… reflexivity must be at the heart of any attempt to approach the study of international politics, and certainly those adopting the preface ‘critical.’ With these issues firmly in mind, I want to suggest that defining critical terrorism studies in terms of a concern with emancipation may prove useful both in guiding the types of questions we might ask and particularly in providing ‘philosophical anchorage’ … for an emphasis on those voices marginalised or excluded from traditional accounts of ‘terrorism’ and responses to it.” [Matt McDonald, “Emancipation and Critical Terrorism Studies.” European Political Science. Volume 6, number 3, September 2007. Pages 252-259.]
           “In this article, I have attempted briefly to sketch out the basis for an explicitly ‘critical’ terrorism studies in first, a multi-level critique of the field; and second, the articulation of a minimal set of shared epistemological, ontological and ethical–normative commitments. Clearly, this is only the starting point in a long and potentially fraught intellectual struggle and there are many dangers along the way, not least that CTS [critical terrorism studies] will fail to engage with orthodox terrorism studies scholars and security officials and instead evolve into an exclusionary and marginalised, ghettoised subfield.” [Richard Jackson, “The Core Commitments of Critical Terrorism Studies.” European Political Science. Volume 6, number 3, September 2007. Pages 244-251.]
           “With the knowledge of the social-religious history of militancy in Algeria and the region, Critical Terrorism Studies (CTS) render it impossible to conduct a sufficient study without incorporating inter-subjective practices; thus the history of AQIM [Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, (Arabic/ʿArabiyyaẗ, التَنْظِيم القَاعِدَة فِي البِلَاد المَغْرِب الإِسْلَامِيّ, ʾal-Tanẓīm ʾal-Qāʿidaẗ fī ʾal-bilād ʾal-Maġrib ʾal-ꞌIslāmiyy)], and the social construction of their actions and strategies should be focused on and taken into consideration when formulating an adequate response.” [Alta Grobbelaar and Hussein Solomon, “The origins, ideology and development of Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb.” Africa Review. Volume 7, number 2, 2015. Pages 149-161.]
      362. critical media studies (Jim Wehmeyer, Aaron Trammel, Anne Gilbert, and others): They discuss critical, including some poststructural, examinations of the media.
           “Critical media studies insists on thick systemic industrial analyses; analytical critiques based on poststructuralist theories of subjectivity and textuality; culturally informed aesthetic readings of texts, objects, and semiotic systems; detailed and ethnographically informed audience studies; or on any number of the other ways that you and I have been trained to think, write, and teach about media and media culture. The particularized discourses of the Religious Right, the Methodists, the Shalalas, the liberals, and the grassroots come together before the barricades of the media literacy movement; to the extent they stake out their common ground with the same paradigms against which the critical media studies project defined itself in the 1960s and 1970s, then we stand at fundamental odds with the media literacy movement.” [Jim Wehmeyer, “Critical Media Studies and the North American Media Literacy Movement.” Cinema Journal. Volume 39, number 4, summer 2000. Pages 94-101.]
           “This special issue is deliberately interdisciplinary. By extending play into critical media studies, we investigate how a variety of disciplines bring play beyond its function in game studies and consider how play provides a means to bridge diverse theoretical worlds. These conversations began at the MediaCon: Extending Play conference, held on April 2013 at Rutgers University. The intent of the conference was to de-balkanize play as a concept and theory. Here, we bring together voices from disparate fields in order to consider how play unearths new ways to consider the sociotechnical shifts to which we are subject.” [Aaron Trammel and Anne Gilbert, “Extending Play to Critical Media Studies.” Games and Culture. Volume 9, number 6, 2014. Pages 391-405.]
      363. the medium is the message (Marshall McLuhan and others): They examine, in effect, the causal mechanisms of different media and the emergence of a “global village.”
           “In a culture like ours, long accustomed to splitting and dividing all things as a means of control, it is sometimes a bit of a shock to be reminded that, in operational and practical fact, the medium is the message. This is merely to say that the personal and social consequences of any medium—that is, of any extension of ourselves—result from the new scale that is introduced into our affairs by each extension of ourselves, or by any new technology. Thus, with automation, for example, the new patterns of human association tend to eliminate jobs, it is true. That is the negative result. Positively, automation creates roles for people, which is to say depth of involvement in their work and human association that our preceding mechanical technology had destroyed. Many people would be disposed to say that it was not the machine, but what one did with the machine, that was its meaning or message. In terms of the ways in which the machine altered our relations to one another and to ourselves, it mattered not in the least whether it turned out cornflakes or Cadillacs. The restructuring of human work and association was shaped by the technique of fragmentation that is the essence of machine technology. The essence of automation technology is the opposite. It is integral and decentralist in depth, just as the machine was fragmentary, centralist, and superficial in its patterning of human relationships.” [Marshall McLuhan. Understanding Media: The Extensions of Man. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press. 1994. Pages 7-8.]
           “The medium, or process, of our time—electric technology— is reshaping and restructuring patterns of social interdependence and every aspect of our personal life. It is forcing us to reconsider and reevaluate practically every thought, every action, and every institution formerly taken for granted. Everything is changing—you, your family, your neighborhood, your education, your job, your government, your relation to ‘the others.’ And they’re changing dramatically.
           “Societies have always been shaped more by the nature of the media by which men communicate than by the content of the communication. The alphabet, for instance, is a technology that is absorbed by the very young child in a completely unconscious manner, by osmosis so to speak. Words and the meaning of words predispose the child to think and act automatically in certain ways. The alphabet and print technology fostered and encouraged a fragmenting process, a process of specialism and of detachment. Electric technology fosters and encourages unification and involvement. It is impossible to understand social and cultural changes without a knowledge of the workings of media.”
           [Marshall McLuhan, Quentin Fiore, and Jerome Agel. The Medium is the Massage: An Inventory of Effects. Corte Madera, California: Gingko Press. 1967. Page 9.]
           “Print as an immediate technological extension of the human person gave its first age an unprecedented access of power and vehemence. Visually, print is very much more ‘high definition’ than manuscript Print was, that is to say, a very ‘hot.’ medium corning into a world that for thousands of years bad been served by the ‘cool.’ medium of script Thus our own ‘roaring twenties’ were the first to feel the hot movie medium and also the hot radio medium. It was the first great consumer age. So with print Europe experienced its first consumer phase, for not only is print a consumer medium and commodity, but it taught men how to organize all other activities on a systematic lineal basis. It showed men how to create markets and national armies. For the hot medium of print enabled men to see their vernaculars for the first time, and to visualize national unity and power in terms of the vernacular bounds: ‘We must be free or die who speak the tongue that Shakespeare spake.’” Marshall McLuhan. The Gutenburg Galaxy. Toronto, Ontario: University of Toronto Press. 1962. Page 138.]
           “All the backward countries in the global village are as much turned on by the electric environment as the American Negro or the teen-agers of the Western world. The elders of the literate societies don’t easily turn on because their sensibilities have hardened in a visual mold. But pre-literates and semi-literates and the non-literates of our own society not only ‘turn on’ but they also turn against the older literate and mechanical culture. The American Negro who has long coexisted with this literate culture especially feels anger when he gets ‘turned on,’ because he can see that the causes of his degradation are to be found in a technology that is now repudiated by his masters. When the electric age began to be felt during and after the First World War, the world of Negro jazz welled up to conquer the white. Jazz was Negro product because it is directly related to speech rhythms rather than to any printed page or score. Primitive, tactile art and kinetically charged rhythms in music and painting alike are the normal modes of any non-literate world. They have now become the central mode of our latest technology. This new electric technology, like any other innovation, affords a mirror in which we see the old technologies with ever increasing clarity.” [Marshall McLuhan, Quentin Fiore, and Jerome Agel. War and Peace in the Global Village. San Francisco, California: HardWired. 1997. Pages 79-80.]
      364. critical geopolitics (Gearóid Ó Tuathail and others): They develop approaches to geopolitics focused on “discourse seeking to establish and assert its own truths.”
           “… critical geopolitics seems to rest on general declarations about space and power. Despite the wealth of recent literature on critical geopolitics, there remains a pressing need to deepen and sharpen its character as a distinct intellectual and political project. Part of the reason why critical geopolitics has not yet distinguished itself in a sufficiently precise manner is its surprising failure to rigorously conceptualize and theorize the very object that supposedly defines it: geopolitics. As a concept, geopolitics is regularly evoked and knowingly used yet rarely problematized. There is not yet an adequate theoretical discussion of the functioning of geopolitics as a sign within critical geopolitics. Nor has there been an explicit theoretical discussion of how critical geopolitics should function and how it needs to engage what we have already identified as the geopolitical gaze.” [Gearóid Ó Tuathail. Critical Geopolitics. London and New York: Routledge imprint of Taylor & Francis Group, an Informa PLC business. 2005. Pages 48-49.]
           “Concisely defined, critical geopolitics seeks to reveal the hidden politics of geopolitical knowledge. Rather than defining geopolitics as an unproblematic description of the world political map, it treats geopolitics as a discourse, as a culturally and politically varied way of describing, representing and writing about geography and international politics. Critical geopolitics does not assume that “geopolitical discourse” is the language of truth; rather, it understands it as a discourse seeking to establish and assert its own truths. Critical geopolitics, in other words, politicizes the creation of geopolitical knowledge by intellectuals, institutions and practicing statesmen.” [Gearóid Ó Tuathail, “Introduction: Thinking critically about geopolitics.” The Geopolitics Reader. Gearóid Ó Tuathail, Simon Dalby, and Paul Routledge, editors. London and New York: Routledge imprint of Taylor & Francis Group, an Informa PLC business. 2003. Pages 1-12.]
           “Critical geopolitics has emerged out of the work of a number of scholars in the fields of geography and international relations who, over the last decade, have sought to investigate geopolitics as a social, cultural and political practice, rather than as a manifest and legible reality of world politics. Critical geopolitics is informed by postmodern critiques that have placed the epistemological limits of the ethnocentric practices underpinning Cold War geopolitics in question. Dissonant and dissident voices have articulated feminist, postcolonial and poststructuralist perspectives on the power strategies of Cold War discourse itself, on its privileging and marginalizing, its inclusions and exclusions, on, in sum, the geo-politics of geopolitics itself.” [Gearóid Ó Tuathail and Simon Dalby, “Introduction: Rethinking Geopolitics—Towards a critical geopolitics.” Rethinking Geopolitics. Gearóid Ó Tuathail and Simon Dalby, editors. London and New York: Routledge imprint of Taylor & Francis Group, an Informa PLC business. 2002. Pages 1-15.]
           “Critical Geopolitics was my introductory text to political geography, cartographies of geopolitical strategy, and all the ‘great men’ and grand narratives that put geography on the map …. The text shows how ‘geopolitical proximity’ to the US is far more important than mere spatial proximity.” [Jennifer Hyndman, “Critical Geopolitics: Deconstructing the old and reconstructing anew.” Progress in Human Geography. Volume 39, number 5, 2015. Pages 666-667.]
      365. non-representational theory (Edward Hall and Robert Wilton): They develop a “relational geography of disability.”
           “In this paper we argue that a new phase in the geographical study of disability is emergent. Although the flurry of scholarly activity that characterized the mid-1990s to early 2000s has eased, a number of authors are beginning to identify the potential for a novel approach to dis/ability, drawing on the relational turn and, in particular, non-representational theory (NRT), in geography …. We contend that these developments have the potential not only to advance our understanding of the complex and emergent geographies of disability, but also to unsettle broader assumptions about the nature of the ‘able-body.’” [Edward Hall and Robert Wilton, “Towards a relational geography of disability.” Progress in Human Geography. OnlineFirst edition. August, 2016. Pages 1-18.]
      366. model of freedom (Richard Hull): He develops a model of disability based upon freedom.
           “This chapter presents disability as an issue of human freedom. It discusses the relation between ability and freedom. Many traditional approaches to freedom tend to rule out the idea that disability can be seen as an issue of human freedom. However, it is suggested here that such approaches render freedom quite meaningless in a lot of contexts when, in real life, the importance of freedom stems from the fact that we consider it to have practical meaning. A model of freedom is introduced that links freedom quite closely with ability, capturing the idea that freedom has practical meaning. Using that model, disability can be seen as an issue of freedom. Indeed, it is shown that the kinds of things denied to people who are disabled are important basic freedoms that are conditional to the enjoyment of many other aspects of life. An advantage of such an approach is that it gives disabled people’s claims for better social provision more moral force. That is, they are claims for the provision of important basic freedoms, which any notion of a just and fair society ought to take seriously. Such an approach, then, renders our concept of freedom more inclusive, meaningful and applicable, enabling theorists to more adequately articulate the remediable hardships endured by many members of our community.” [Richard Hull, “Disability and freedom.” Arguing about Disability: Philosophical perspectives. London and New York: Routledge imprint of Taylor & Francis Group, an Informa PLC business. 2008. Pages 93-104.]
      367. historical materialist policy analysis (John Kannankulam as pronounced in this MP3 audio file and Fabian Georgi as pronounced in this MP3 audio file): They develop an analytical approach to the field of “comparative capitalisms.”
           “Starting from the social foundations of institutions, our central aim is to show how institutional complementarity and institutional change can be explained through analysing shifting relationships of social forces. More precisely, we ask how an empirical investigation of relationships of forces can be operationalised. To this end, we propose a ‘historical materialist policy analysis’ (HMPA) approach, in which we have integrated insights of CC [comparative capitalisms] approaches, and which we will briefly illustrate later in the paper by analysing the constellation of forces in the current Euro crisis.…
           “… The HMPA operationalises the analysis of social struggles and relationships of forces in three steps: context analysis, actor analysis and process analysis.”
           [John Kannankulam and Fabian Georgi, “Varieties of capitalism or varieties of relationships of forces? Outlines of a historical materialist policy analysis.” Capital & Class. Volume 38, number 1, 2013. Pages 59-71.]
      368. gendered state-theoretical materialist framework (Stefanie Wöhl as pronounced in this MP3 audio file): She examines the reproduction of gender-based hierarchies in capitalist states.
           “This article develops a gendered state-theoretical materialist framework to show how capitalism as an economic system and the nation-state reproduce gendered hierarchies on multiple levels. With a focus on the symbolic masculine cultural order and its hegemonic political rationality of governing, the current economic crisis and its effects on gender regimes is discussed more specifically.…
           “… I will describe from a gendered state-theoretical materialist perspective how modern capitalism and the nation-state are structured by gender relations and a specific political rationality of masculine hegemony. I then go on to explain how this relates to gender regimes in the European Union (EU) ….”
           [Stefanie Wöhl, “The state and gender relations in international political economy: A state-theoretical approach to varieties of capitalism in crisis.” Capital & Class. Volume 38, number 1, 2014. Pages 87-99.]
      369. critical grounded theory (Dena Hassouneh [Arabic/ʿArabiyyaẗ, دِينَة حَسُونَة, Dīnaẗ Ḥasūnaẗ], James Nelson, Kem M. Gambrell, and others): They develop critical approaches, grounded in critical social theory, to Bernie Glaser and Anselm Strauss’ grounded theory.
           “… we conducted a critical grounded theory study with 23 FOC [faculties of color] in predominately Euro-American schools of nursing.…
           “Faculty of color (FOC) are critical to our ability to diversify the nursing profession, yet little is known about the experiences of this group in predominantly Euro-American schools of nursing. For the purposes of this article, the term Euro-American refers to individuals of solely European descent residing in the United States. To understand the experiences of FOC better, we conducted a grounded theory investigation. The aims of the study were to: 1) explore the influence of racism on nursing FOC; 2) identify strategies to support the recruitment and retention of nursing FOC; and 3) develop a substantive grounded theory of the experiences of faculty of color in predominantly Euro-American schools of nursing.”
           [Dena Hassouneh, “Having influence: Faculty of color having influence in schools of nursing.” Nursing Outlook. Volume 61, issue 3, May–June 2013. Pages 153-163.]
           “We studied the experiences of faculty of color at predominantly White medical schools using a grounded theory approach situated in the critical paradigm). Some of the basic assumptions of the critical paradigm include the belief that all thought is fundamentally mediated by power relations that are socially and historically constituted, that certain groups in any society are privileged over others, and that language is central to the formation of subjectivity. Thus, a critical grounded theory approach builds on and revises the classical grounded theory of Glaser and Strauss by acknowledging the constructed nature of knowledge and knowledge development, while also recognizing the importance of privileging the standpoint of oppressed groups in the research process.” [Dena Hassouneh, Kristin F. Lutz, Ann K. Beckett, Edward P. Junkins, Jr., and LaShawn L. Horton, “The experiences of underrepresented minority faculty in schools of medicine.” Medical Education Online. Creative Commons. Volume 19, 2004. Pages 1-14.]
           “… I will provide some background to grounded theory; explain how I used it within my research as a PhD student and the challenges I faced; and offer some conclusions in which I argue for a critical grounded theory.…
           “Grounded theory had its beginnings during the sixties in the work of Bernie Glaser and Anselm Strauss … and it is often reported to be one of the most popular methods of qualitative research in the social sciences …. Glaser and Strauss developed a method for working in an inductive way, from data to theory, rather than the other way around. ‘Ivory tower’ theorizing, which sought examples from the world beyond to verify its propositions, was fundamentally challenged by a ‘grounded’ approach which discovered theory ‘through interaction with the empirical world, not in isolation from it’ ….”
           [James Nelson, “Navigating grounded theory: a critical and reflective response to the challenges of using grounded theory in an education PhD.” Critical and Reflective Practice in Education. Volume 4, article 3, 2015. Pages 18-24.]
           “The purpose of this qualitative study was to explore Lakota leadership qualities in urban and reservation settings. Using a critical grounded theory approach …, this study attempted to extend current leadership theory by giving voice to non-mainstream individuals in exploring leadership from a Lakota perspective. The central question for the study was: What leadership characteristics are needed to be a successful leader?” [Kem M. Gambrell. Healers and Helpers, Unifying the People: A Qualitative Study of Lakota Leadership. Ph.D. dissertation. University of Nebraska. Linoln, Nebraska. July, 2009. Pages 14.]
           “The primary method of investigation for this study was what I called a critical grounded theory, where critical is defined as initiating a change of perception on the part of the participants. This includes the college students and the in-service cooperating teachers. Because the goal of the study was to examine the success of the secondary music methods experience and use the data to make changes in the course and to see how the research process changed the attitudes, perceptions, and beliefs of the participants, ‘critical’ grounded theory was the appropriate label to describe the research design.” [Frank Abrahams, “Examining the Preservice Practicum Experience of Undergraduate Music Education Majors—Exploring Connections and Dispositions Through Multiple Perspectives A Critical Grounded Theory.” Journal of Music Teacher Education. Volume 19, number 1, 2009. Pages 80-92.]
           “We argue in our book for grounding theory in social research itself—for generating it from the data. We have linked this position with a general method of comparative analysis—different from the more specific comparative methods now current—and with various procedures designed to generate grounded theory. Although our emphasis is on generating theory rather than verifying it, we take special pains not to divorce those two activities, both necessary to the scientific enterprise. Although our book is directed primarily at sociologists, we believe it can be useful to anyone who is interested in studying social phenomena—political, educational, economic, industrial, or whatever—especially if their studies are based on qualitative data.” [Barney G. Glaser and Anselm L, Strauss. The Discovery of Grounded Theory: Strategies for Qualitative Research. New Brunswick, New Jersey: AldineTransaction imprint of Transaction Publishers. 2006. Page viii.]
           “Grounded theory methods provided the strategies for collecting and analyzing data …. Consistent with the emergent character of grounded theory methods, my analysis evolved as I collected and interpreted data. While completing a study of the experience chronic illness, I found that issues about having a problematic body arose repeatedly.” [Kathy Charmaz, “The Body, Identity, and Self: Adapting to Impairment.” The Sociological Quarterly. Volume 36, number 4, autumn 1995. Pages 657-680.]
           “Anselm [Strauss] is perhaps best known for creating the grounded theory method with Barney G. Glaser. The remembrances collected here provide glimpses of how he taught this method and present views of his lasting influence on students. This influence began during his first class meeting with the first cohort of sociology doctoral students in 1968 and lasted until his death in 1996. At that first meeting, Anselm interviewed each one of us as though completing a research study. By the end of class, Anselm glowed with as much excitement as we felt. He told us that we were well chosen to embark on this venture, which turned out to be quite an adventure. After musing for a moment, he chuckled and said with relief, ‘There’s not a careerist among you.’” [Kathy Charmaz, “Teachings of Anselm Strauss: Remembrances and Reflections.” Sociological Perspectives. Volume 43, number 4, winter 2000. Pages S163-S174.]
           “Grounded Theory is an inductive methodology which supports the systematic development of theory. This is in contrast to deductive methodology, which uses pre-determined theories to shape the analysis. Grounded theory is helpful when little is known about the area of investigation.” [Melanie S. George, “Stress in NHS staff triggers defensive inward-focussing and an associated loss of connection with colleagues: this is reversed by Schwartz Rounds.” George Journal of Compassionate Health Care. Volume 3, number 9, 2016. Pages 1-17.]
      370. disability aesthetics (Tobin Siebers): He develops a critical approach to disability.
           “What I am calling disability aesthetics names a critical concept that seeks to emphasize the presence of disability in the tradition of aesthetic representation. Disability aesthetics refuses to recognize the representation of the healthy body—and its definition of harmony, integrity, and beauty—as the sole determination of the aesthetic. It is not a matter of representing the exclusion of disability from aesthetic history, since such an exclusion has not taken place, but of making the influence of disability obvious. This goal may take two forms: 1) to establish disability as a critical framework that questions the presuppositions underlying definitions of aesthetic production and appreciation; 2) to establish disability as a significant value in itself worthy of future development. My claim is that the acceptance of disability enriches and complicates materialist notions of the aesthetic, while the rejection of disability limits definitions of artistic ideas and objects.” [Tobin Siebers, “Disability Aesthetics.” Journal for Cultural and Religious Theory. Volume 7, number 2, spring/summer 2006. Pages 63-73.]
      371. yoga of critical discourse (Andrea M. Hyde): She proposes practices of mindfulness, such as yoga (Sanskrit/Saṃskṛtam, योग, yōga, an Indo-European cognate with “yoking”), to shift away one’s consciousness from ideology.
           “Most impressive for critical social discourses is the power of mindful practices, such as yoga, to shift consciousness away from ideology.… [M]indfulness is a prophylactic against implanted ideological scripts, or as Joel Spring … calls them, ‘wheels in the head.’ This yoga of critical discourse is a necessary counterbalance to the assault that is the current U.S. school reform agenda, which is part of a pervasive and accelerated competition, accumulation, and achievement orientation that exacerbates disease in the mind and body.…
           “Language is the problem. Language traps people into dialectic; traps them into talking about self and other, where body is other. Language even separates people from themselves.”
           [Andrea M. Hyde, “The Yoga of Critical Discourse.” Journal of Transformative Education. Volume 11, number 2, 2013. Pages 114-126.]
      372. dialogism (Mikhail Mikhaylovich Bakhtin [Russian Cyrillic, Михаи́л Миха́йлович Бахти́н, Mihaíl Mihájlovič Bahtín as pronounced in this MP3 audio file] and others): This framework, sometimes referred to as Bakhtinology, incorporates “dialogical self theory,” as originally developed by Hubert J. M. Hermans (MP3 audio file). The perspectives formulated by Bakhtin, a critical literary scholar, have also been appropriated within the field of cultural studies.
           “The narrow understanding of dialogism as argument, polemics, or parody. These are the externally most obvious, but crude, forms of dialogism. Confidence in another’s word, reverential reception (the authoritative word), apprenticeship, the search for and mandatory nature of deep meaning, agreement, its infinite gradations and shadings (but not its logical limitations and not purely referential reservations), the layering of meaning upon meaning, voice upon voice, strengthening through merging (but not identification), the combination of many voices (a corridor of voices) that augments understanding, departure beyond the limits of the understood, and so forth. These special relations can be reduced neither to the purely logical nor to the purely thematic. Here one encounters integral positions, integral personalities (the personality does not require extensive disclosure—it can be articulated in a single sound, revealed in a single word), precisely voices.” [M. M. Bakhtin. Speech Genres and Other Late Essays. Vern W. McGee, translator. Caryl Emerson and Michael Holquist, editors. Austin, Texas: University of Texas Press. 1986. Page 121.]
           “[Fyodor] Dostoevsky’s influence has still far from reached its culmination. The most essential and far-reaching aspects of his artistic vision, the revolution he brought about in the genre of the novel and in the area of literary art generally, have yet to be fully assimilated and realized. We are even today still being drawn into his dialogue on transient themes, but the dialogism he revealed to us, the dialogism of artistic thinking and of an artistic picture of the world, his new model of the internally dialogized world, has not yet been thoroughly examined. Socratic dialogue, which replaced tragic dialogue, was the first step in the history of the new genre of the novel. But that was mere dialogue, little more than an external form of dialogism.” [Mikhail Bakhtin. Problems of Dostoevsky’s Poetics. Caryl Emerson, translator and editor. Minneapolis, Minnesota: University of Minnesota Press. 1984. Page 291.]
           “Linguistics has not succeeded in mastering its object to the same degree in all areas: it is only beginning to master it in syntax, and with difficulty; very little is being done in the area of semantics; absolutely nothing has been elaborated in an area, the obligation of which is the study of large verbal entities (long utterances from everyday life, dialogue, the speech, the tract, the novel, and so on). These utterances also can and should be defined and studied linguistically, as phenomena of language. The examination of these phenomena in ancient bards and rhetoricians, and in their contemporary expression, poetics, cannot be considered scientific owing to the mixture noted above, of the linguistic perspective with those completely alien to it—logical, psychological, and aesthetic.” [Mikhail Mikhaylovich Bakhtin and Kenneth N. Brostrom, “Toward the Aesthetics of the Word.” Kenneth M. Brostrom, translator. Dispositio. Volume 4, number 11/12, summer–fall 1979. Pages 299-315.]
           “As an optimal linguistic form for embodying this tendency, parataxic constructions, which migrated from colloquial speech into literary genres, and led to attenuation of the monologic and strengthening of the dialogic aspect of speech, facilitating the formation of new features in the universal structure of the language (… involving an increased tendency toward dialogism).” [Mikhail M. Bakhtin, “Dialogic Origin and Dialogic Pedagogy of Grammar: Stylistics in Teaching Russian Language in Secondary School.” Journal of Russian and East European Psychology. Volume 42, number 6, November–December 2004. Pages 12–49.]
           “Stated at the highest level of (quite hair-raising) abstraction, what can only uneasily be called [Mikhail M.] ‘Bakhtin’s philosophy’ is a pragmatically oriented theory of knowledge; more particularly, it is one of several modern epistemologies that seek to grasp human behavior through the use humans make of language. Bakhtin’s distinctive place among these is specified by the dialogic concept of language he proposes as fundamental. For this reason, the term used in this book to refer to the interconnected set of concerns that dominate Bakhtin’s thinking is ‘dialogism’ ….
           “Dialogue is an obvious master key to the assumptions that guided Bakhtin̠s work throughout his whole career: dialogue is present in one way or another throughout the notebooks he kept from his youth to his death at the age of 80.”
           [Michael Holquist. Dialogism: Bakhtin and his World. 2ⁿᵈ edition. London and New York: Routledge imprint of Taylor & Francis Group, an Informa PLC business. 2005. Pages 13-14.]
           “Chronotope, ‘time–space’: [Mikhail M.] Bakhtin’s neologism is even more of a stranger to us than ‘dialogism’; the latter is at least in the dictionary. Perhaps that is why, at least in anglophone contexts, it has not been given the welcome accorded to that category or to ‘carnival,’ a phenomenon from the margins which is licensed now in our studies no less than on our streets (in both cases with unobtrusive policing). We think we know where we are with ‘novel’ – naming as it does that generic upstart which made good, and which is somehow peculiarly ours as heirs to its ‘great (English) tradition’ – only to find that this home ground becomes slippery and that Bakhtin means disturbingly more by that term than we could have guessed.” [Graham Pechey. Mikhail Bakhtin: The Word in the World. London and New York: Routledge imprint of Taylor & Francis Group, an Informa PLC business. 2007. Page 82.]
           “The present article investigates the development of the concept of dialogue in [Mikhail M.] Bakhtin’s thought and aims to analyse the nature of the potential influence Bakhtin’s contemporaries in Soviet linguistics may have exerted on his thinking on the dialogical nature of language. At the same time, I try to demonstrate that questions of originality as well as the concept of influence are problematic from the point of view of the historiography of linguistics. The basic question is what counts as criteria for influence and how we can determine the nature as well as extent of potential influence. While there exist obvious parallels between the writings by Bakhtin and the representatives of the early Soviet sociology of language – which are supported by ample textual evidence – it seems that the Bakhtinian conception of language is qualitatively different and, therefore, cannot be reduced into its possible sources. It will be argued that this is also the case with the notion of dialogue which was discussed by Bakhtin’s contemporaries in Soviet linguistics.” [Mika Lähteenmäki, “Two Faces of Originality: On the origins of the concept of dialogue.” Proceedings from the Second International Interdisciplinary Conference on Perspectives and Limits of Dialogism in Mikhail Bakhtin. Stockholm University. Stockholm, Sweden. June 3rd–4th, 2009. Pages 273-280.]
           “… the overuse of Bakhtinian terminology in cultural studies is nowadays likely to lead into a kind of embarrassment outside Bakhtinology proper as well. At times, it seems that any subject worthy of interest in academic conversation is either carnivalistic and grotesque or at least dialogic in the broad, Bakhtinian sense of the term. However, instead of dismissing various fashionable (mis)interpretations of [Mikhail M.] Bakhtin in contemporary cultural studies, I would like to argue that these (mis)appropriations, nevertheless, bring into focus some key problems in our (post)modernity. Put crudely, even a cursory glance at commercial rhetoric related to modern information technologies suffices to convince us that in the best of possible postindustrial information societies, things must be dialogical.” [Kari Matilainen, “Bakhtin and Modernity: Crisis of the Architectonic, Crisis of the Dialogic, Crisis of the Carnivalesque.” Dialogues on Bakhtin: Interdisciplinary Readings. Mika Lähteenmäki and Hannele Dufva, editors. Jyväskylä, Finland: University Printing House. 1998. Pages 36-52.]
           “Mikhail Bakhtin (1895 – 1975), the Russian philosopher of language, developed a social theory that emphasizes performance, history, actuality, and the openness of dialogue from dialectical or partitive thinking to dialogical or relational thinking. Difference, variety, and alterity were the focus of Bakhtin’s attention because he wished to find connections with all degrees of plurality and otherness. His notions are quite appropriate to the search for human conversation over space and time, that is, the search for dialogical resonance in regions.” [M. Folch-Serra, “Place, voice, space: Mikhail Bakhtin’s dialogical-landscape.” Environment and Planning D: Society and Space. Volume 8, number 3, September 1990. Pages 255-274.]
           “The dialogical self proposes a far-reaching decentralization of both the concept of self and the concept of culture. At the intersection between the psychology of the self in the tradition of William James and the dialogical school in the tradition of Mikhail Bakhtin, the proposed view challenges both the idea of a core, essential self and the idea of a core, essential culture. In apparent contradiction with such a view, the present viewpoint proposes to conceive self and culture as a multiplicity of positions among which dialogical relationships can be established. Particular attention is paid to collective voices, domination and asymmetry of social relations, and embodied forms of dialogue. Cultures and selves are seen as moving and mixing and as increasingly sensitive to travel and translocality. Three perspectives for future research of self and culture are briefly discussed: the shifting attention from core to contact zones; increasing complexity; and the experience of uncertainty.…
           “For Bakhtin, the notion of dialogue opens the possibility of differentiating the inner world of one and the same individual in the form of an interpersonal relationship. The transformation of an ‘inner’ thought of a particular character into an utterance enables dialogical relations to occur between this utterance and the utterance of imaginal others.”
           [Hubert J. M. Hermans, “The Dialogical Self: Toward a Theory of Personal and Cultural Positioning.” Culture & Psychology. Volume 7, number 3, 2001. Pages 243-281.]
           “On the interface of the modern (enlightened) and the postmodern self, DST [Dialogical Self Theory] proposes a partly decentralized conception of the self conceiving it as multi-voiced and dialogical. More specifically, the dialogical self is described in terms of a dynamic multiplicity of I – positions or voices in the landscape of the mind, intertwined as this mind is with the minds of other people. In this conception the different, independent positions are related by a continuous I and brought into communication with each other via dialogical activities ….” [Hubert J. M. Hermans, “The dialogical self in education: Introduction.” Journal of Constructivist Psychology. Volume 26, issue 2, 2013. Pages 81-89.]
           “I elaborated on the notion of the extended self by reading [Mikhail M.] Bakhtin’s (1929/1973) book on [Fyodor] Dostoyevsky, in which he introduced the intriguing metaphor of the polyphonic novel. Such a novel is composed of a number of independent and mutually opposing perspectives embodied by characters involved in dialogical relationships. Each of the characters is seen as ‘ideologically authoritative and independent,’ that is, each of them is perceived as the author of his or her own view of the world, rather than an object of Dostoyevsky’s all-encompassing artistic vision.” [Hubert J. M. Hermans, “Dialogical Self Theory and the Increasing Multiplicity of I-Positions in a Globalizing Society: An Introduction.” New Directions for Child and Adolescent Development. Number 137, fall 2012. Pages 1-21.]
           “One of the most significant features of dialogical self theory is that it is not restricted to the boundaries of traditional disciplines and subdisciplines. The theory is devised in the conviction that insight into the workings of the human self requires cross-fertilization between different scientific fields.…
           “The question may be posed whether the fertility of dialogical self theory as a conceptual system for analyzing a variety of phenomena in divergent fields of thought is sufficiently in balance with its empirical applications.”
           [Hubert J. M. Hermans, “How to Perform Research on the Basis of Dialogical Self Theory? Introduction to the Special Issue.” Journal of Constructivist Psychology. Volume 21, issue 3, June 2008. Pages 185-199.]
           “… we propose ‘I-positions’ and dialogical self theory …, in concert with discursive methodology, as a flexible framework for understanding the complex identity creating function of multiple and opposing positions in relation to buying sex.” [Adam M. Crossley and Rebecca Lawthom, “Dialogical Demand: Discursive Position Repertoires for a Local and Global UK Sex Industry.” Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour. Volume 45, issue 2, 2014. Pages 261-286.]
           “For present purposes, relationalism refers primarily to a standpoint in social psychology. This standpoint is premised on the threefold claim that ‘persons exist by virtue of individuals’ relations to others; that, cognately, ‘selves’ are an emergent property of semiotic I-You-Me systems …; and that therefore the task for social psychology is to identify ‘regularities’ of interrelations between specific cultural practices and particular experiences of self.… A similar theme can be found in [Hubert J. M.] Hermans’ Dialogical Self theory ….” [Raya A. Jones, “Relationalism through Social Robotics.” Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour. Volume 43, issue 4, 2013. Pages 405-424.]
           “Drawing from Dialogical Self Theory and from cosmopolitanism, we propose that adequately responding to the ethical and identity challenges presented by globalization requires having Global Consciousness: ‘a knowledge of both the interconnectedness and difference of humankind, and a will to take moral actions in a reflexive manner on its behalf.’ We argue that this approach can ground a distinctively normative psychology of globalization. We consider negative and positive aspects of the golden rule in equal and close relationships, and benevolence in unequal power relationships as behaviour guides for global consciousness, and theorize about institutional leadership that supports the provision of public goods. We offer empirical tests of this approach.…
           “At its core, the dialogical view of self is characterized by four main features: 1) a representation of the perspectives of the other within the self, 2) a combination of plurality and unity regarding those perspectives, 3) an awareness that perspectives are responsive to dominance and social power, and 4) an awareness of the spatial and embodied nature of those perspectives.…
           “… The negative rights/duties implied by the Confucian form of the Golden Rule are particularly useful in managing behaviour where high cultural distance between groups is involved. It is a cautious form of ethics that is more prevention-focused (avoiding mistakes, suppressing negative affect, being correct) than the positive (dialogical, loving, but prone to conflict) form of the Golden Rule articulated in Christianity and in Dialogical Self Theory.”
           [James H. Liu and Matthew MacDonald, “Towards a Psychology of Global Consciousness: Through an Ethical Conception of Self in Society.” Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour. Volume 46, issue 3, 2016. Pages 310-334.]
           “If we are to discard the production/consumption metaphor, the question arises, What kind of an object is a particular film? The move I want to suggest is a shift from film-as-text to a model of film-as-utterance, in the sense used by [Mikhail M.] Bakhtin ….” [Bhrigupati Singh, “Narrating Injustice: British Cultural Studies and Its Media.” Television & News Media. Volume 7, number 2, May 2006. Pages 135-153.]
           “… a discussion of [Mikhail M.] Bakhtin’s notion of ‘realism’ shows how the self is social at an embodied plane in which inter-subjective exchange is anchored. When we refer to the embodied plane, we are referring to the experiential livedness of life into which people find themselves thrown. That is, we seek to account for experiential immediacy of life that is exemplified in instances such as an immediate revulsion at the grotesque, a breathless arrest at the sublime, an irresistible care and commitment to another, and so on. Revisiting Bakhtin makes us aware how this aspect of psychology is lacking in Dialogical Self theory as [Hubert J. M.] Hermans conceives of it.” [James Cresswell and Cor Baerveldt, “Bakhtin’s realism and embodiment: Towards a revision of the dialogical self.” Culture & Psychology. Volume 17, number 2, 2011. Pages 263-277.]
           “When Socialist Realism had its opening night in 1934, Mikhail Bakhtin, an internally exiled critic, saw the festive energy of the masses reduced to the vicarious pathos of the spectator. But he also realized that the democracy which opposed this was not a matter of inviting the people to play a part in Western liberalism’s comedy of manners. The popular culture which he championed and theorized was a drama in which power was forced out of the wings and onto the stage where it could be displayed, mocked, contested and transformed. Bakhtin is perhaps the only major contributor to Marxist cultural theory for whom popular culture is the privileged bearer of democratic and progressive values.” [Ken Hirschkop, “Bakhtin, Discourse and Democracy.” New Left Review. Series I, number 160, November–December 1986. Pages 92-113.]
           “Antonio Gramsci and Mikhail Bakhtin were very different types of thinkers. While the former spent the 1920s maximally involved in the Italian revolutionary movement as leader of the Communist Party, the latter, living in Petrograd at the time of the revolution and throughout the second half of the 1920s, reflected on the experience in religious and philosophical rather than political ways. In the 1930s, while Gramsci languished in [Benito] Mussolini’s prison, theorizing the process by which the revolutionary party could achieve hegemony and seize political power, Bakhtin was internally exiled in Kazakhstan where he taught in an obscure pedagogical institute and wrote erudite essays on the anti-hegemonic potentialities of the novel in the cultural arena.” [Craig Brandist, “Gramsci, Bakhtin and the Semiotics of Hegemony.” New Left Review. Series I, number 216, March–April 1996. Pages 94-109.]
           “Many have seen in [Mikhail M.] Bakhtin’s theory of the novel something relevant for a wide variety of disciplines, from literary studies, narrowly defined, to political theory and anthropology. Accordingly, it has been noted that the theory incorporates an ideal history of literary forms, a philosophy of culture, a typology of discursive relations, and a theory of conflicting social forces. The sources of such a wide-ranging theory seem to be diverse: from Marburg Neo-Kantianism [i.e., a school of neo-Kantianism] to Russian Formalism, Marxist political theory and classical aeshetics.” [Craig Brandist, “Bakhtin, Cassirer and symbolic forms.” Radical Philosophy: Philosophical Journal of the Independent Left. Number 85, September/October 1997. Pages 20-27.]
           “In the 1980s and early 1990s, when poststructuralism set the agenda in cultural theory and shaped the way in which theorists from other traditions were received, the work of the Bakhtin Circle was often seen as anticipating contemporary concerns to a quite uncanny extent. While some adopted [Mikhail M.] Bakhtin as a poststructuralist avant la lettre [literally, ‘before the letter,’ i.e., before the term ‘poststructuralism’ was coined], others seized on Bakhtinian ideas as an alternative way of dealing with the very issues poststructuralism had raised without disappearing into the poststructuralist void of [Jacques] Derrida’s ‘outside text’ or partaking of [Michel] Foucault’s metaphysics of power. Gradually, it became apparent that despite a reiterated adherence to the ‘concrete event’ and ‘social context,’ Bakhtinian theory was itself as thoroughly anti-realist as the poststructuralists themselves.” [Craig Brandist, “Neo-Kantianism in cultural theory: Bakhtin, Derrida and Foucault.” Radical Philosophy: Philosophical Journal of the Independent Left. Number 102, July/August 2000. Pages 6-16.]
      373. dialectic of social science (Paul A. Baran): He examines the relations between “economic theory and economic history.”
           “The relationships between economic theory and economic history, as well as the relationship between both and the historical process, are examined as problems in scientific method and in the sociology of knowledge. Seeing the root of the failure of both approaches to the study of society in their implicit (or explicit) acceptance of the unreconciled antinomy of subject and object of knowledge, the author rejects the worn formula ‘history without theory is dead—theory without history is empty’ as a merely verbal, artificial solution of the difficulty. A genuine way out is attainable only through a radical dissolution of that antinomy itself by recognizing the dialectical unity of subject and object. As the key to the vexing ontological problem is bound to remain forever inaccessible to purely contemplative endeavors, social practice forms the only medium of adequate knowledge of society. Thus the principle of unity of object and subject shades into the corollary maxim of unity of theory and practice.” [Paul A. Baran, “The Dialectic of Social Science.” Monthly Review: An Independent Socialist Magazine. Volume 62, issue 1, May 2010. Pages 37-38.]
      374. empowerment theory (Douglas D. Perkins and Marc A. Zimmerman): They develop an empowerment approach in relation to social policy and social change.
           “Empowerment is a construct that links individual strengths and competencies, natural helping systems, and proactive behaviors to social policy and social change …. Empowerment theory, research, and intervention link individual well-being with the larger social and political environment. Theoretically, the construct connects mental health to mutual help and the struggle to create a responsive community. It compels us to think in terms of wellness versus illness, competence versus deficits, and strength versus weaknesses.… Empowerment-oriented interventions enhance wellness while they also aim to ameliorate problems, provide opportunities for participants to develop knowledge and skills, and engage professionals as collaborators instead of authoritative experts.” [Douglas D. Perkins and Marc A. Zimmerman, “Empowerment Theory, Research, and Application.” American Journal of Community Psychology. Volume 23, issue 5, January 1995. Pages 569-579.]
      375. critical gerogogy (Marvin Formosa): applies critical social theory to gerogogy (which focuses on teaching the elderly). Gerogogy is more commonly spelled “geragogy.”
           “… critical gerogogy was still not embedded in a dialectical context that includes the simultaneous interplay of reflection and action…. The aim of this article is to integrate critical gerogogy within a praxeological epistemology as a continual reconstruction of thought and action in the lived experience of older people. Its objective is to advance the development of critical gerogogy by bringing together critical reflective processes with actual experiences in order to offer more workable principles for the practice of critical gerogogy.” [Marvin Formosa, “Critical Gerogogy: developing practical possibilities for critical educational gerontology.” Education and Ageing. Volume 17, number 1, 2002. Pages 73-86.]
      376. critical development theory (Ronaldo Munck as pronounced in this MP3 audio file and others): Critical social theory is applied to social and economic development (SED).
           “In the current conjuncture there is much talk about ‘the collapse of globalism’ and a move ‘beyond the Washington Consensus’ as the dominant global neo-liberal order enters a crisis of legitimacy. It is thus a good moment to (re)engage with the genealogy and current prospects for a critical development theory or, rather, theories. In the 1990s, capitalist triumphalism saw the neoliberal approach to development in unchecked full flow and it seemed that ‘there was no alternative’ as the gurus of neoliberalism preached. Now we are presented with an opportunity to offer development alternatives that would have real popular purchase. Critical theory’s embrace of a ‘post-development’ which read the whole development enterprise as illusion left no viable challengers to orthodox development theory in the field. While state-led development in the traditional mode, including its radical variant, had little purchase in an increasingly internationalised world order, the issue of development as theory and practice to overcome poverty and inequality has not gone away as a vital global concern. The question today is whether a revitalised critical development theory can meet these challenges.…
           “Critical theory, in its broadest or ecumenical sense, could be said to start with [Karl] Marx, continuing via the Frankfurt School to reach the present, via [Michel] Foucault, in the shape of feminism, ecology and post-colonialism amongst other liberatory pulses. Critical theory is, in essence, concerned with the critique of modernity.”
           [Ronaldo Munck, “Critical Development Theory: Results and Prospects.” Migración y Desarrollo. Number 14, 2010. Pages 33-53.]
      377. group dynamics (Kurt Lewin as pronounced in this MP3 audio file): Groups can produce conformity through groupthink.
           “Logically, there is no reason to distinguish between the reality of a molecule, and atom, or an ion, or more generally between the whole and its parts. There is no more magic behind the fact that groups have properties of their own, which are different from the properties of their subgroups or their individual members, than behind the fact that molecules have properties, which are different from the properties of the atoms or ions of which they are composed” [Kurt Lewin, “Frontiers in Group Dynamics: Concept, Method and Reality in Social Science; Social Equilibria and Social Change.” Human Relations. Volume 1, number 5, 1947. Page 8.]
      378. rhythm and blues (Brian Ward): He examines the interface between Black styles of music and modes of resistance to oppression.
           “This book contends that changes in black musical style and mass consumer preferences offer a useful insight into the changing sense of self, community and destiny among those blacks who rarely left the sorts of evidence, or undertook the sorts of activities, to which historians are generally most responsive.…
           “The book is also guided by the belief that the popular cultures of oppressed groups usually contain within them—explicitly or implicitly—a critique of the system by which those groups are oppressed, and thus actually constitute a mode of psychological resistance to their predicament. Yet this is a complicated and elusive business. As we shall see, black Rhythm and Blues, as art and commerce, politics and entertainment, was also deeply inscribed with many of the social, sexual, moral, economic and even racial values of the dominant culture. Ultimately, the story of Rhythm and Blues reveals the inadequacy of both excessive romanticizations of the counter-hegemonic power of black popular culture, and of Frankfurt School-style critiques of mass culture which reduce it to little more than a succession of profitable commodities whose main function is to reinforce and perpetuate existing configurations of social, sexual, political and economic power. In fact, Rhythm and Blues was a complex, often deeply paradoxical phenomenon which managed both to challenge and affirm the core values and assumptions of mainstream America.”
           [Brian Ward. Just my soul responding: Rhythm and Blues, black consciousness and race relations. London and New York: UCL Press imprint of Taylor & Francis Group, an Informa PLC business. 2003. Page 4.]
      379. leisure ethic (Eva Swidler): She considers the importance of leisure time for the working class.
           “Circularly, the commons and the public sphere require adequate leisure. To restore a social world independent of the market and the workplace, and to keep the commons vital, we need the leisure time to inhabit the commons. We also need our communities to have time to be there with us—hanging on the porch chatting, shooting hoops at the rec center, jamming in the basement. In other words, we need both a vital cultural commons beyond the world of paid labor and we need a leisure ethic, a constant challenge to the very concept and valorization of work. A leisure ethic and the public commons depend on each other. And for both of these, collectivity is key. With the communal revalorization of leisure, by pushing back against the constant attempts of capital to encroach on work-free time and the unmonetized forms of everyday life and community, we take up the most foundational struggle, the struggle against work itself.” [Eva Swidler, “Radical Leisure.” Monthly Review: An Independent Socialist Magazine. Volume 68, issue 2, June 2016. Pages 26-34.]
      380. Quaker Radicalism (Stephan A. Kent and James V. Spickard): They examine the radical tradition in the Religious Society of Friends.
           “No religious group has been more involved in sectarian civil religious action than the Quakers, and this insight holds as true for Britain as it does for the United States. As one scholar observed, ‘Friends, in fulfillment of their peace testimony, have remained at the core of nearly every important twentieth-century peace organization and, indeed, in every movement that defends and insists upon the sanctity of human life.’ What makes Quaker radicalism worthy scrutiny is its religious basis. In the three and a half centuries since its founding, Quakerism has opposed an array of governmentally sancioned policies on religious grounds.” [Stephan A. Kent and James V. Spickard, “The ‘Other’ Civil Religion and the Tradition of Radical Quaker Politics.” Journal of Church and State. Volume 36, number 2, spring 1994. Pages 373-387.]
      381. propaganda model (Edward S. Herman and Noam Chomsky): Rather than the the mass media presenting quality news, they sell the general public to advertisers.
           “This book centers in what we call a ‘propaganda model,’ an analytical framework that attempts to explain the performance of the U.S. media in terms of the basic institutional structures and relationships within which they operate. it is our view that, among their other functions, the media serve, and propagandize on behalf of, the powerful societal interests that control and finance them. The representatives of these interests have important agendas and principles that they want to advance, and they are well positioned to shape and constrain media policy. This is normally not accomplished by crude intervention, but by the selection of right-thinking personnel and by the editors’ and working journalists’ internalization of priorities and definitions of newsworthiness that conform to the institution’s policy.” [Edward S. Herman and Noam Chomsky. Manufacturing Consent: The Political Economy of the Mass Media. New York: Pantheon Books imprint of Random House, Inc. 2002. Kindle edition.]
      382. United States hegemony (Phillip Anthony O’Hara): He describes the position of the U.S. in “the contemporary international system.”
           “Over the last decade or so, it has become increasingly commonplace to describe the United States as an ‘hegemonic power.’ While there are some important differences in the way various theoretical traditions understand the notion of hegemony, which will be explored in detail below, it is generally taken to refer to the dominant power of a particular era and its capacity to shape the international system of that time. That the US has come to be described as hegemonic is indicative of just how powerful most observers consider it to be in comparison with other countries in the contemporary international system. This is somewhat surprising for two reasons: first, for much of the 1980s, and even into the 1990s, it was commonly assumed that the US was in permanent decline ….” [Mark Beeson, “United States Hegemony.” International Encyclopedia of Public Policy: Volume 1—Global Governance and Development. Phillip Anthony O’Hara, editor. Perth, Australia: GPERU imprint of Global Political Economy Research Unit. 2011. Page 533-542.]
      383. left realism (Ronald Osborn, Molly Dragiewicz, John Lea, Shahid Alvi, Martin D. Schwartz, Walter S. DeKeseredy, and others): This term refers to different left perspectives on political realism and on criminology.
           “This article examines the assumptions that underlie Noam Chomsky’s politics and argues that his analysis of US foreign policy since World War II may best be situated within the realist tradition in international relations. Chomsky’s left realism has not been adequately understood or addressed by IR [international relations] scholars for both political and disciplinary reasons. In opposition to most classical realists, he has insisted that intellectuals should resist rather than serve national power interests. In contrast to most political scientists, he has also refused to theorize, critiquing much of the enterprise of social science in terms of what he sees as highly suspect power interests within the academy. Hostility to Chomsky’s normative commitments has consequently prevented IR scholars from discerning key aspects of his project, as well as important historical and theoretical continuities between radical and realist thought.” [Ronald Osborn, “Noam Chomsky and the realist tradition.” Review of International Studies. Abstract. Volume 35, 2009. Pages 351-370.]
           “… left realist work has provided promising directions for understanding the landscape of woman abuse beyond the criminal justice system. FR [father’s rights] groups provide a vital location for exploring the influence of formal and informal factors in producing this form of crime. In order to be true to the realities of crime in general and the experiences of abused women in particular, it is necessary to broaden our focus beyond the criminal justice system primarily connoted by references to law and order.” [Molly Dragiewicz, “A left realist approach to antifeminist fathers’ rights groups.” Crime, Law and Social Change. Volume 54, 2010. Pages 197-212.]
           “Left realism in the UK emerged during the early 1980s as a policy-oriented intervention focusing on the reality of crime for the working class victim and the need to elaborate a socialist alternative to conservative emphases on ‘law and order’ ….
           “On the left there was a confrontation with what was polemically termed ‘Left Idealism,’ a criminology which saw the criminality of the poor as a combination of media induced ‘moral panic’ and criminalisation by ruling elites of what were in effect primitive forms of rebellion ….”
           [John Lea, “Left Realism, community and state-building.” Crime, Law and Social Change. Volume 54, 2010. Pages 141-158.]
           “Left Realism, which can be traced to early dissatisfaction with what was considered to be an idealistic portrayal of the criminal as a proto-revolutionary actor, gained traction among a handful of criminologists who had gathered at the National Deviancy Conference in the UK in 1968.” [Shahid Alvi, “Recognizing New Realities: A Left Realist perspective on the YCJA.” Canadian Criminal Law Review. Volume 18, issue 3, October 2014. Pages 341-358.]
           “Left realism began life in the 1980s, when critical criminology was heavily concerned with white collar and corporate crime, with a beginning interest in state crime. Others on the left were arguing that the very definitions of crime, and the notions of who commits crime, are shaped by both class and race interests in North America and Europe.” [Martin D. Schwartz and Walter S. DeKeseredy, “The current health of left realist theory.” Crime, Law and Social Change. Volume 54, 2010. Pages 107-110.]
      384. critique of policing (Alice Hills): Her focus is on Africa.
           “Public disorder remains a constant threat because political order is fragile, and the armed forces in Africa are always a potential threat to those in power, given their access to weapons and discipline. A consideration of their relations has to be included in any critique of policing and national development, although the rôle of the police in the maintenance of civil order has been obscured by their secondary involvement in coups (as in Ghana, Nigeria, and Sierra Leone in the 1960s), and by their often paramilitary nature. The latter is a reflection of both their historical legacy and environment.” [Alice Hills, “Towards a Critique of Policing and National Development in Africa.” The Journal of Modern African Studies. Volume 34, number 2, June 1996. Pages 271-291.]
      385. materialist naturalism (Allen W. Wood): He develops the work of Friedrich Engels as a materialist perspective based upon naturalism.
           “Obviously there are many possible versions of materialist naturalism, and endlessly many ways of departing from it. Insofar as [Friedrich] Engels’ account suggests the contrary, it is philosophically naïve and misleading. But Engels’ real purpose is to focus attention on the opposition between a materialist outlook, based on naturalism, and its most popular, influential and adamant opponent, a traditional religious outlook, whose chief tenets are that the natural world was created by an extramundane Deity and that souls are immortal. If an ‘idealist’ is someone who believes that the world as a whole is mind-dependent (in other words, someone who rejects realism), then Engels is even within his rights in describing this dominant anti-materialist view as ‘idealism.’ For orthodox theism does hold that God is a mind and that everything besides God is wholly dependent for its being and nature on God’s mental activity (his creative knowledge and will). Engels’ rather manichean distinction between idealism and materialism may be simplistic and philosophically unsophisticated, but it is not wholly misguided.” [Allen W. Wood. Karl Marx. 2ⁿᵈ edition. London and New York: Routledge imprint of Taylor & Francis Group, an Informa PLC business. 2004. Page 167.]
      386. local communisms (Andreas Wirsching as pronounced in this MP3 audio file): He develops a comparative perspective on different versions of European communism.
           “The ‘agrarian question,’ then, is indicative of one of the most important aspects of the history of Bolshevism, because it highlights the fundamental differences between Russia and European countries where communism had also played a certain role. Bolshevism was invented by Lenin for agrarian and highly authoritarian tsarist Russia: that was where it started. But Russia was—in terms of social structure, economic conditions and political system—so different from western European countries that local communisms arising there would inevitably be different. Whether leftist or syndicalist, anarchist or utopian, the most important driving force in left movements in Europe was something else: at the root of communism outside Russia lay the horrific experience of the First World War, and the deep disappointment about what was considered to have been the utter failure of the working-class movement to prevent the war, or at least to have reconstructed a new and just society out of the disaster of war.” [Andreas Wirsching, “Comparing local communisms.” Twentieth Century Communism: A Journal of International History. Issue 5, 2013. Pages 21-40.]
      387. linguistic formation of violence (Andreas Wirsching): He examines the contributions of the “linguistic turn”—and a focus on discourse—to the study of communist history.
           “Certainly, more than two decades after the ‘linguistic turn,’ historians of communism should take more seriously the language of ideology, both as a comprehensive system of meaning and as a determining influence on historical actors. What individuals themselves ‘believed’ or ‘intended’ is, after all, scarcely a question that can be resolved anyway. Therefore any analysis of interwar communism should take as its basis the broad unity between word and deed, and between propaganda and action. To this end, the article will first offer some general thoughts on the possibilities of a ‘linguistic turn’ with regard to research into communism, before going on to examine problems of the linguistic formation of violence as a central, not reducible, feature of communism. From such a point of departure, the final section will address some concrete examples of violence and counter-violence at the end of the Weimar Republic.” [Andreas Wirsching, “Violence as discourse? For a ‘linguistic turn’ in communist history.” Twentieth Century Communism: A Journal of International History. Volume 2, issue 1, May 2010. Pages 12-39.]
      388. mediology as pronounced in this MP3 audio file (Régis Debray as pronounced in this MP3 audio file): This field (French, médiologie as pronounced in this MP3 audio file), influenced by the work of Walter Benjamin, examines the processes of cultural transmission.
           “I call … ‘mediology’ the discipline that treats of the higher social functions in their relations with the technical structures of transmission. I call ‘mediological method’ the case-by-case determination of correlations, verifiable if possible, between the symbolic activities of a human group (religion, ideology, literature, art, etc.), its forms of organization, and its mode of grasping and archiving traces and putting them into circulation. I take for a working hypothesis that this last level exerts a decisive influence on the first two. The symbolic productions of a society at a given instant cannot be explained independently of the technologies of memory in use at the same instant. This is to say that a dynamics of thought is not separable from a physics of traces.” [Régis Debray. Media Manifestos: On the Technological Transmission of Cultural Forms. Eric Rauth, translator. London and New York: Verso imprint of New Left Books. 1996. Page 11.]
           “While a communication society will value the disposable, mutable, and instantaneously accessible, the depth of time rounds out the things that are transmissible and gives them relief and dimension. In the one case, continuance is only an accident; in the other, it is crucial. The evanescence of a message will compromise an act of transmission, but it will not disqualify a communication. Within the nascent discipline of mediology one has the habit of distinguishing among messages according to their material natures as sounds, sights, written words, audiovisual sequences, and so on. From the vantage of cultural significance, however, the fact that a givensense perception is objectified and safeguarded indurable form matters more than the particular faculty in question (hearing, vision, etc.). The information’s recovery and repetition counts for more than the channel cartying it or its specific material nature.” [Régis Debray. Transmitting Culture. Eric Rauth, translator. New York: Columbia University Press. 2004. Page 4.]
           “The notion of spectacle drifts as an entelechy [vital principle] above cultures, an entity lacking all history and economy, without borders or geography. A phantasmagorical notion, colossal and sauntering, it fuels spontaneous faith in the existence of a universal history of the image, of looking, or of recording sound, uniformly imposing itself in every nook and cranny of the so-called ‘global village.’ Islam is no ‘society of the spectacle’—nor is the West, by the way—but for historical reasons that belong to it alone. The billion human beings which constitute it have their own specific ‘ideology,’ their own cultural mediology; this also holds for Buddhism and Confucianism. The interconnectedness of technological networks, far from weakening these religious identities, reanimate and redefine them.” [Régis Debray, “Remarks on the Spectacle.” New Left Review. Series I, number 214, November–December 1995. Pages 134-141.]
           “… mediological periodization allows us to situate the life-cycle of socialism, that great fallen oak of political endeavour, within the last 150 years of the graphosphere; and to explore its ecosystem, so to speak, through its processes of propagation. Socialism will not be treated here in terms of the intrinsic value of any of its branches. Rather, the aim will be to grasp the common mediological basis that underlies all its doctrinal ramifications … by approaching it as an ensemble composed of men (militants, leaders, theoreticians), tools of transmission (books, schools, newspapers), and institutions (factions, parties, associations). The ecosystem takes the form of a particular sociotope, a milieu for the reproduction of certain kinds of life and thought. The professional typographer occupies a special niche within it, the key link between proletarian theory and the working-class condition; herein lay the best technical means of intellectualizing the proletariat and proletarianizing the intellectual, the double movement that constituted the workers’ parties. For a printer is quintessentially a ‘worker intellectual or an intellectual worker,’ the very ideal of that human type who would become the pivot of socialism: ‘the conscious proletarian.’” [Régis Debray, “Socialism: A Life Cycle.” New Left Review. Series II, number 46, July–August 2007. Pages 5-28.]
           “Mediology or mediation studies offer a systematic framework for the interdisciplinary analysis of culture and technology that aims to integrate the social sciences and overcome their limitations. Sociology studies how collectivities are formed and societies are made, but tends to neglect the role of culture and technology; semiotics studies culture, but omits the material conditions of its diffusion; media studies focus on newspapers, colour TVs and the internet, but leaves out other media of communication and transmission; while the history of technology ignores how collective subjectivities are formed and how societies are transformed by techniques and social organizations.” [Frédéric Vandenberghe, “Régis Debray and Mediation Studies, or How Does an Idea Become a Material Force?” Thesis Eleven. Volume 89, number 1, May 2007. Pages 23-42.]
      389. self–sourcing (Martha E. Gimenez): Gimenez examines the corporate exploitation of workers.
           “Politicians, academics, the media, and job seekers focus on downsizing, offshoring, and outsourcing as the main causes of unemployment and declining opportunities, even for college graduates. They neglect, however, the impact of self-sourcing, a term I apply to the complex and relatively unnoticed effects of the radical reorganization of our working and non-working time due to the widespread use of information technologies. In this essay, I will explore the significance of self-sourcing, which I define as the intensification of the process of transferring work from the sphere of production, where it is visible and paid, to the sphere of consumption, where it is invisible and unpaid. This process is not new and it is commonly understood as self-service. It is my contention that self-sourcing signals a qualitative change in the forces and the relations of production, consumption, and circulation, which merits theoretical and empirical investigation.” [Martha E. Gimenez, “Self-Sourcing: How Corporations Get Us to Work Without Pay!” Monthly Review: An Independent Socialist Magazine. Volume 57, issue 7, December 2007. Pages 37-41.]
      390. culturalism (Oscar Lewis): Lewis’ controversial culture–of–poverty thesis—or culturalism—has been examined and critiqued from various perspectives. The thesis has even been approached as a Marxist approach. Lewis originally proposed his thesis in the book, Five Families: Mexican Case Studies in the Culture of Poverty. This thesis was subsequently adopted by U.S. Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan. The alleged problems in the African American family are common issues addressed by the thesis’ proponents.
           “It [poverty in modern nations] suggests class antagonism, social problems, and the need for change; and it often is so interpreted by the subjects of the study. Poverty becomes a dynamic factor which affects participation in the larger national culture and creates a subculture of its own. One can speak of the culture of the poor, for it has its own modalities and distinctive social and psychological consequences for its members. It seems to me that the culture of poverty cuts across regional, rural-urban, and even national boundaries. For example, I am impressed by the remarkable similarities in family structure, the nature of kinship ties, the quality of husband-wife and parent-child relations, time orientation, spending patterns, value systems, and the sense of community found in lower-class settlements in London ….” [Oscar Lewis. Five Families: Mexican Case Studies in the Culture of Poverty. New York: Basic Books, Inc., Publishers. 1975. Page 2.]
           “My own concept of it [human behavior] has evolved as my work has progressed and remains subject to amendment by my own further work and that of others. The scarcity of literature on the culture of poverty is a measure of the gap in communication that exists between the very poor and the middle-class personnel—social scientists, social workers, teachers, physicians, priests and others who bear the major responsibility for carrying out the antipoverty programs. Much of the behavior accepted in the culture of poverty goes counter to cherished ideals of the larger society. In writing about m ulti problem families social scientists thus often stress their instability, their lack of order, direction and organization. Yet, as I have observed them, their behavior seems clearly patterned and reasonably predictable. I am more of ten struck by the inexorable repetitiousness and the iron entrenchment of their lifeways.” [Oscar Lewis, ”The Culture of Poverty.” Scientific American. Volume 215, number 4, October 1966. Pages 19-25.]
           “Once the culture of poverty has come into existence it tends to perpetuate itself. By the time slum children are six or seven they have usually absorbed the basic attitudes and values of their subculture. Thereafter, they are psychologically unready to take full advantage of changing conditions or improving opportunities that may develop in their lifetime.” [Oscar Lewis, ”The Culture of Poverty.” Ekistics. Volume 23, number 134, January 1967. Pages 3-5.]
           “Conflicting views concerning the basic character of poverty are found in legislation and policy as well as academic analysis. An economically-oriented interpretation will lead to the support of one type of policy, while emphasis on poverty as a distinctive sub-culture within the broader society suggests other approaches. A complete reconciliation of these differences is unlikely, but a clarification of the differences may help do away with important ambiguities and inconsistencies in coping with poverty.” [Daniel P. Moynihan, “Report on the Seminar on Poverty.” Records of the Academy (American Academy of Arts and Sciences). Number 1966/1967, 1966–1967. Pages 29-31.]
           “The policy of the United States is to bring the Negro American to full and equal sharing in the responsibilities and rewards of citizenship. To this end, the programs of the Federal government bearing on this objective shall be designed to hove the effects directly or indirectly, of enhancing the stability and resources of the Negro American family.” [Daniel P. Moynihan. The Negro Family: The Case for National Action. Commonly called “The Moynihan Report.” Washington, D.C.: The United States Department of Labor. March, 1965. Page 48.]
           “Debates about the status and progress of black families in the United States started before the Moynihan report and have clearly raged since. The report focused on how black family structure contributed to a host of factors that all impeded progress toward social equity. In the decades since its release, many of the social trends that concerned Moynihan have worsened for blacks and nonblacks alike. Today it is clear that no one factor by itself holds the key to economic and social progress. Policymakers, community leaders, and individuals themselves must act to enhance economic opportunities and social equity for black men and families. Otherwise, we may spend the next 50 years lamenting our continued lack of progress.” [Gregory Acs with Kenneth Braswell, Elaine Sorensen, and Margery Austin Turner. The Moynihan Report Revisited. Washington, D.C.: The Urban Institute. June, 2013. Page 22.]
           “Of the wealth metatheories [individualism, culturalism, structuralism/situationalism, and fatalism], the predictions based on culturalism best fit the data. Table 3 shows that over 40% of the culture of wealth hypotheses were empirically supported, whereas fewer than one-third of the individualism and structuralism/situationalism hypotheses and only about one-fifth of the fatalism hypotheses were supported. In line with culturalism, respondents attributed significant causal importance to personality factors such as drive and risk-taking, and to structural/situational factors such as good schools, ‘pull,’ and inheritance. Once again, the fit was imperfect and pluralism of thought prevailed.” [Kevin B. Smith and Lorene H. Stone, “Rags, Riches, and Bootstraps: Beliefs about the Causes of Wealth and Poverty.” The Sociological Quarterly. Volume 30, number 1, spring 1989. Pages 93-107.]
           “[Oscar] Lewis’s Marxism permeated both his ethnographic work and his subculture of poverty thesis. You will not find it, though, in a glib spouting of dialectics, or in a fatuous waving of rhetorical red banners. There seems to have been nothing in Lewis’s personality that would have predisposed him to such histrionics. Instead, Lewis’s Marxism, like that of so many of his generation, could be seen in his working class sympathies, in his support for unionism, and in his championing of the causes of the downtrodden. It expressed itself above all in that uneven mix of cynicism and respect his generation adopted when dealing with the lower classes and their diverse subcultures. Lewis’s family ethnographies, in fact, resonate with the curiously eclectic politics and aesthetic realism of a Depression Era Marxism in which proletarian artists celebrated the ‘resourcefulness of the poor.’” [David L. Harvey and Michael H. Reed, “The Culture of Poverty: An Ideological Analysis.” Sociological Perspectives. Volume 39, number 4, winter 1996. Pages 465-495.]
           “In the US, … there has grown in recent years a vast literature on the ways in which the government welfare system has created a ‘culture of poverty’—a system in which the state has made it a rational decision for many poor people to stay at home, bear children (including out of wedlock) and receive government support rather than take low-paying and unpleasant jobs. In reply, the question we may wish to ask is: why is a wealthy, advanced society such as the US turning out so many individuals with so few skills and such art impoverished world-view that a life on welfare is thought by them desirable? Some will respond with a weak reference to ‘human nature,’ but the only assertive answers to these questions being offered in the US are from those with genetic and racial explanations. From liberals (in the American sense) we get only embarrassed silence or denials.” [Paul Auerbach, “On Socialist Optimism.” New Left Review. Series I, number 192, March–April 1992. Pages 5-35.]
           “… [Consider] ‘culture of poverty’ … thinking …. [In] neoliberal forms of culturalising poverty, … the creativity of the poor is inspiring and useful for surviving the exclusions of market economies. This perspective emphasises negotiation and negates the possibility of opposition to structures of market domination. It forgets that the poor’s ‘cultures of survival’ have themselves become frontiers of capital accumulation.” [Dia Da Costa, “Subjects of Struggle: theatre as space of political economy.” Third World Quarterly. Volume 31, number 4, June 2010. Pages 617-635.]
      391. critique of identity politics (Martha E. Gimenez): Gimenez develop a sophisticated critique which—given the rise of neofascist white identity politics—has great contemporary relevance.
           “Identity politics, as ideology (e.g. multiculturalism, diversity) and as practice, obscures how class location is the source of common experiences and problems, opening and closing educational, social and economic opportunities. Such commonalities transcend racial, ethnic and cultural differences and could be the base for collective mobilization and organizing in a variety of settings, such as neighborhoods, schools, communities, and workplaces. While it is the case that people with different histories, ancestries and cultures experience class-based commonalities from different perspectives, their material conditions and needs are nevertheless similar. For example, working-class racial and ethnic minorities, especially the poor strata within the working class, need job training, steady employ ment, affordable housing, health care, and so forth. Because identity politics is not based on structural conditions generating objective interests, like class, it can be an ideological weapon for all political standpoints: it can pit people with similar needs against each other, obscuring the material conditions for their potential cooperation and acquisition of political strength. And, it can be used by the dominant classes and dominant identities (e.g. white males) to claim oppression and exclusion by the very policies intended to redress the effects of inequality, via claims of ‘reverse discrimination,’ and ‘political correctness.’” [Martha E. Gimenez, “With a little class: A critique of identity politics.” Ethnicities. Volume 6, number 3, September 2006. Pages 423-439.]
      392. criticism of social formations (Tim Dant): He develops an approach to change grounded in critical social theory.
           “The criticism of social formations is the stuff of politics.… But there is a distinction between the study of politics and the action of politics, although politicians may well find the study of politics useful in planning their actions. Now, criticism of whole social formations, and the forms of whole societies or even groups of societies implies there are limits to the field of politics, both as a field of study and a field of action. To criticise the whole of a social formation is to suggest that political action is not sufficient in itself to bring about the changes in that formation. This is the rather strange situation that brings about critical theory in which there is an interest in, but also dissatisfaction with, the field of political action and an interest in, but dissatisfaction with, the study of social and political formations. Critical theory engages in a form of criticism of social formations that does not express itself as an agenda for political action. It arises precisely through the awareness of the failure of political action, even the most extreme and radical political action of revolution, to bring about the changes needed in social formations. But this is not a reason to abandon criticism; there is still much in the world to disgree with and dissent from. What is more, there is some point in expressing that disagreement, not merely of attacking specific perspectives or actions, but not trying to get to the roots of those perspectives or actions in the social formation.” [Tim Dant. Critical Social Theory: Culture, Society and Critique. Thousand Oaks, California: SAGE Publications, Inc. 2003. Page 2.]
           “… [Tim] Dant does not restrict the purview of ‘critical theory’ to the Frankfurt School. On the contrary, he brings the ‘Germanic’ tradition represented by [Max] Horkheimer, [Theodor] Adorno and [Herbert] Marcuse into constellation with a ‘Gallic’ one – represented by such theorists as [Henrei] Lefebvre, [Roland] Barthes, [André] Gorz, [Alain] Touraine, [Jean] Baudrillard, and even [Michel de] Certeau – proposing that what has customarily been understood as (at least) two distinct bodies of thought would be better understood as a single project. ‘[T]he disparate set of cultural critics I have referred to as “critical theorists” take up similar themes, make use of similar theoretical resources, and, above all, set themselves against the established order that assumes the trajectory of modernity is towards progress. The theorists I have discussed are all dissenters, not about details or facts but about how the modern world is organised.’” [Neil Lazarus, “Critical Social Theory: Culture, Society and Critique.” Review article. The Sociological Review. Volume 54, issue 1, February 2006. Pages 190-194.]
      393. critical theory of religion (Michael Ott and others): They proposes a dialectical and dialogical approach to religion.
           “Dialectic or critical theory gives expression to that which is ‘other’ than what is; to the voice, cries and longings of the innocent victims of the class exploitation, domination, and barbarism of capitalist civil society. Through negative dialectical thought and its methodology of determinate negation, the critical theory of religion gives expression in a materialistic voice to suffering humanity’s religiously expressed longing for justice, redemption, happiness, God or that which is ‘totally Other’ than what is. In the Critical Theory, this totally ‘Other’ is not conceived in a metaphysical, theological, or idealistic way, which abstracts from people’s experiences in the society and history. Rather, the religious notion of the totally ‘Other,’ which is grounded in and expressive of the desperate cries for redemption by the innocent victims of the ‘slaughter-bench’ of history and society …, is translated into a secular, materialistic theory and praxis that has the potential of being a socio-historical force of social change for the creation of a better future society.” [Michael Ott, “Reclaiming the Revolutionary Substance and Potential of Religion: The Critical Theory of Religion.” Michigan Sociological Review. Volume 19, fall 2005. Pages 155-180.]
           “As the critical theory of religion, informed by [Meister] Eckhart, [Georg Wilhelm Friedrich] Hegel, [Karl] Marx, and [Sigmund] Freud, evolves further, it is concerned with the question of whether a conversion to a humanistic religiosity without dogmas, authorities, institutions, and asceticism can come into existence. Such humanistic religiosity has been prepared for centuries through the non-theistic movements from Buddhism to Marxism and Freudianism. According to the comparative, dialectical religiology, in the present world historical transition period from Modernity to Post-Modernity, people do not stand before the alternative to become victims of a culture industry and mass culture characterized by sex, car, and career, on the one hand, and the acceptance of the Abrahamic notion of God, as it appears in Judaism, Christianity, and Islam, on the other hand.” [Rudolf J. Siebert, Michael R. Ott, and Dustin J. Byrd, “The critical theory of religion: From having to being.” Critical Research on Religion. Volume 1, number 1, 2013. Pages 33-42.]
      394. critical constructivism (Greg S. Goodman, Ilhan Kucukaydin [Turkish/Türkçe, İlhan Küçükaydın as pronounced in this MP3 audio file], Michael Bentley, Stephen C. Fleury, Jim Garrison, Gary L. Anderson, and Isaura Barrera as pronounced in this MP3 audio file): They develop various approaches to the constructivist theory of learning informed by critical social theory.
           “Arguments for pedagogical positions are enlivened by political, humanistic, sociological, reflection philosophic, and artistic appeal. A good example … can be taken from the recent film, Freedom Writers (2007). As the film begins, the protagonist, Mrs. Gruwell, is confronted with her own naiveté, or innocence, concerning how to run a classroom within an urban high school. As she considers the students’ needs to understand historic events like the Holocaust, she begins to help them understand the implications of their own racist and prejudicial behaviors. In a perfect world, perhaps Mrs. Gruwell would have been better prepared for her first teaching assignment. If she had come to her first teaching assignment prepared for critical constructivist praxis, she would have been ready to present relevant challenges to her students.” [Greg S. Goodman, “Coming to a Critical Constructivism: Roots and Branches.” Counterpoints. Volume 329, 2008. Pages 13-32.]
           “Critical constructivism distinguishes ideologically infused knowledge from individuals’ critical constructs. For example, dominant values, discourses, and common sense are usually unconsciously (passively) acquired by people in the socialization process, and their meanings are somehow similar and shared by the masses. For critical constructivism, this form of knowledge is socially and ideologically constructed and needs to be deconstructed by individual agents who consciously, actively, and deliberately critique.” [Ilhan Kucukaydin, “Counter-Learning Under Oppression.” Adult Education Quarterly. Volume 60, number 3, 2010. Pages 215-232.]
           “Though constructivism remains the ‘in’ theory in education, what prevails among educators today is the most trivial of the many interpretations of constructivism—simply that meanings are constructed. The critical constructivism we advocate places its emphasis on reflection, imagination, social consciousness, and democratic citizenship. We believe this interpretation should be a central theoretical referent for all educational practitioners. In preservice teacher education, critical constructivism should lie at the center of discussions about the nature of learning, teaching, curriculum and schooling—as a sociopolitical process.” [Michael Bentley, Stephen C. Fleury, and Jim Garrison, “Critical Constructivism for Teaching and Learning in a Democratic Society.” Journal of Thought. Volume 42, number 3-4, fall-winter 2007. Pages 9-22.]
           “… whatever the locus of analysis in critical constructivist research, there is always an interest in issues of power and the intersection of race, class, gender, and disability with the phenomenon under analysis.” [Gary L. Anderson and Isaura Barrera, “Critical Constructivist Research and Special Education Expanding Our Lens on Social Reality and Exceptionality.” Remedial and Special Education. Volume 16, number 3, May 1995. Pages 142-149.]
      395. transformative learning theory or transformation theory (Jack Mezirow, Ilhan Kucukaydin, and Patricia Cranton, and others): They develop an approach to learning using the work of Jürgen Habermas, Paulo Freire, and others. This perspective is associated with the Transformative Studies Institute.
           “Education for liberation and emancipation is a collective educational activity which has as its goal social and political transformation. If personal development takes place, it does so within that context.” [Jack Mezirow, “Transformative learning and social action: A response to Inglis.” Adult Education Quarterly. Volume 49, issue 1, fall 1998. Pages 169-175.]
           “There is much about the postmodern critique that both supports and challenges the validity of Transformation Theory. I agree with [Michel] Foucault who interprets modernity and postmodernity as oppositional attitudes, present in any epoch or period, that assume a continuing critical dialectic, a discourse. As there are no fixed truths or totally definitive knowledge and circumstances change, the human condition may be best understood as a continuous effort to negotiate contested meanings. That is why transformative learning, with its emphasis on contextual understanding, critical reflection on assumptions and validating meaning through discourse, is so important.” [Jack Mezirow, “Transformation Theory – Postmodern Issues.” Presented at the Adult Education Research Conference. DeKalb, Illinois. May 21st–23rd, 1999. Pages 1-8. Retrieved on August 31st, 2016.]
           “I have always made the distinction between the role of the adult educator in fostering critically reflective learning and that of fostering social action. I have suggested that all adult educators should help learners foster transformative learning by becoming critically reflective of the assumptions and frames of reference of others (objective reframing) and of themselves (subjective reframing). Not all adult educators are positioned or knowledgeable enough to foster social action. I have always held that it is entirely appropriate for adult educators who choose to do so to become engaged in social action education when they feel a sense of solidarity with those who have decided to take such a course of action.” [Jack Mezirow, “Transformation theory out of context.” Education Quarterly. Volume 48, issue 1, fall 1997. Pages 60-62.]
           “First, we briefly review transformative learning theory and the various alternative perspectives that have developed since the inception of the theory, including an overview of the extrarational perspective on transformative learning. We determine that the integration of psychic structures from depth psychology, including Jungian psychology, has not been critically analyzed in relation to teaching and learning and that there may not be a common understanding of the meaning of these concepts. If we view knowledge about transformative learning as practical knowledge based on [Jürgen] Habermas’s … framework, we can use this understanding to critically analyze knowledge claims within the extrarational approach to transformative learning theory. It is possible that the current epistemological crisis accounts for this situation in that there is often no consensus about the validity and legitimacy of knowledge and there is no space to question the validity of knowledge claims. Finally, we close with questions that researchers, theorists, and scholars of transformative learning might want to consider in relation to the use of Jungian concepts and terminology within transformative learning theory.” [Ilhan Kucukaydin and Patricia Cranton, “Critically Questioning the Discourse of Transformative Learning Theory.” Adult Education Quarterly. Volume 63, number 1, 2012. Pages 43-56.]
           “Since first introduced by Jack Mezirow in 1978, the concept of transformative learning has been a topic of research and theory building in the field of adult education …. Although Mezirow is considered to be the major developer of transformative learning theory, other perspectives about transformative learning—influenced by the work of Robert Boyd—are emerging. Following a discussion of transformative learning as conceptualized by Mezirow, this Digest describes research and theory building by Robert Boyd and its influence on current perspectives of transformative learning. Some suggestions for fostering transformative learning conclude the Digest.” [Susan Imel, “Transformative Learning in Adulthood.” ERIC digest number 200. Columbus, Ohio: ERIC Clearinghouse on Adult Career and Vocational Education. 1998. Pages 1-7.]
           “Jack Mezirow’s work is perhaps the most well known of theories of transformative learning in the field of adult education. Although [Paulo] Freire’s influence on Mezirow is clearly evident, Mezirow’s view represents a distinct understanding of what transformation means within the actions of adult learning. Based on his work with returning adult women students in the early 1970s, Mezirow … developed a theory of adult learning grounded in cognitive and developmental psychology.” [Jack M. Dirkx, “Transformative Learning Theory in the Practice of Adult Education: An Overview.” PAACE Journal of Lifelong Learning. Volume 7, 1998. Pages 1-14.]
           “One of the research questions that informs this paper asks ‘Can transformative learning theory be put into practice, and if yes, what are some of the differences it makes to the lives of learners?’ A more specific question is ‘Can disorienting dilemmas be triggered by carefully designed exercises, and, if yes, what are the effects on student transformative learning?’ To do this we need first to define and critically review [Jack] Mezirow’s theory, which has, over time, become known as transformative learning theory. According to Mezirow, this theory explains how adult learners make sense or meaning of their experiences, how social and other structures influence the way they construe that experience, and how the dynamics involved in modifying meanings undergo changes when learners find them to be dysfunctional …. Mezirow’s theory owes much to the critical theorists and, in particular, to Jürgen Habermas.” [Michael Christie, Michael Carey, Ann Robertson, and Peter Grainger, “Putting transformative learning theory into practice.” Australian Journal of Adult Learning. Volume 55, number 1, April 2015. Pages 9-27.]
      396. critical constructionist approach (Stanley L. Witkin, Sharon Koehna, Lynn McCleary, Linda Garcia, Melanie Spence, Pavlina Jarvis, and Neil Drummond): Applies critical social theory to social constructionism (the social construction of reality). All of the writers are associated with the “helping professions.” Witkin is president of the Global Partnership for Transformative Social Work. The remaining authors are employed in various health-related fields, including nursing, community health, family medicine, health sciences, and aging.
           “A critical constructionist approach to family services is proposed as a useful framework for family social work. An outline of the foundations and basic ideas of critical constructionism are presented. These ideas are then applied to social work with families. Some practice implications are discussed.” [Stanley L. Witkin, “Family Social Work: A Critical Constructionist Perspective.” Abstract. Journal of Family Social Work. Volume 1, issue 1, 1994. Pages 33-45.]
           “The critical-constructionist approach adopted in this paper is concerned with how various individuals or ‘actors’ (e.g. PWD, caregivers, physicians, etc.) in a given environment ‘are involved in the construction of the meaning of phenomena’ …, such as the provision and receipt of care by a person with dementia. Contextual features, such as the place where care occurs and organizational cultures and policies, also play a role in shaping constructions. Typically, realities are co-constructed with other people through interaction: some constructions are thus held by many individuals and even across cultures. People can construct worlds together or against each other, and what are viewed as ‘good’ or ‘bad’ interactions can be seen as a function of how well different actors interpret and present phenomena through their constructions. These in turn, need to be understood in terms of who (or what) benefits from them.
           “In this sense constructions are not benign and share with Critical Theory the key premise that ‘all thought is fundamentally mediated by power relations that are socially and historically constituted’ …. While ‘constructions are not more or less “true,” in any absolute sense, but simply more or less informed and/or sophisticated’ …, Critical Theorists such as [Pierre] Bourdieu and [Michel] Foucault … have argued that individuals with the greatest ‘social capital’ tend to reproduce social realities that favor their own interests and silence the most vulnerable. Power is linked to knowledge, which may be very context-specific, deriving from majority-shared constructions of truth which inevitably dominate minority-shared versions.”
           [Sharon Koehna, Lynn McCleary, Linda Garcia, Melanie Spence, Pavlina Jarvis, and Neil Drummond, “Understanding Chinese–Canadian pathways to a diagnosis of dementia through a critical-constructionist lens.” Journal of Aging Studies. Volume 26, Issue 1, January 2012. Pages 44-54.]
      397. residue of fire (Bhimrao Ramji Ambedkar [Marāṭhī, भीमराव रामजी आंबेडकर, Bhīmarāva Rāmajī Āṃbeḍakara]): Ambedkar, after critiquing Marxism, considers the aspects of the perspective with which he agrees.
           “What remains of the Karl Marx is a residue of fire, small but still very important. The residue in my view consists of four items:
           1. “The function of philosophy is to reconstruct the world and not to waste its time in explaining the origin of the world.
           2. “That there is a conflict of interest between class and class.
           3. “That private ownership of property brings power to one class and sorrow to another through exploitation.
           4. “That it is necessary for the good of society that the sorrow be removed by the abolition of private property.”
           [Bhimrao Ramji Ambedkar. Buddha or Karl Marx. Sagamihara City, Japan: Dr. Babasabeb Ambedkar International Association for Education. September, 2015. Page 7.]
      398. open Marxism (John Holloway, Werner Bonefeld, Richard Gunn, André C. Drainville, Peter Burnham, Simon Susen, John Michael Roberts, Martin Spence, and others): This perspective views human social relationships as less predictable or fixed and more fluid or contradictory. It has been influenced by autonomism and by other currents within libertarian Marxism.
           “Capital accumulation, for example, is understood not as struggle but as the context within which struggle takes place; capitalist crisis is understood not a intensification of struggle but as providing opportunities for struggle. The categories are understood as closed categories rather than as conceptualisations of antagonistic relations, as relations of struggle, and therefore open. All this has been said before, and is indeed central to the argument of ‘open Marxism.’ What is new for me, perhaps, is the realisation that the central category in all this is labour. A closed, unitary concept of labour generates a closed understanding of all the categories, while an understanding of labour as an open antagonism gives rise to an understanding of all categories as open antagonisms.” [John Holloway. Crack Capitalism. New York: Pluto Press. 2010. Page 160.]
           “‘Openness,’ here, refers not just to a programme of empirical research – which can elide all too conveniently with positivism – but to the openness of Marxist categories themselves. This openness appears in, for instance, a dialectic of subject and object, of form and content, of theory and practice, of the constitution and reconstitution of categories in and through the development, always crisis-ridden, of a social world. Crisis refers to contradiction, and to contradiction’s movement: this movement underpins, and undermines, the fixity of structuralist and teleological-determinist Marxism alike. Rather than coming forward simply as a theory of domination – ‘domination’ reporting something inert, as it were a heavy fixed and given weight – open Marxism offers to conceptualise the contradictions internal to domination itself. Crisis, understood as a category of contradiction, entails not just danger but opportunity. Within theory, crisis enunciates itself as critique.” [Werner Bonefeld, Richard Gunn, and Kosmas Psychopedis (editors’ introduction). Open Marxism. Volume I. Dialectics and History. London: Pluto Press. 1992. Page xi.]
           “In the study of the world economy, open Marxism proposes to go beyond problem-solving realism …, to rejuvenate and challenge the traditional agenda of IPE [international political economy] …, to move beyond ‘marxist fundamentalism,’ and to articulate a sweeping ‘general critique of positivist, mechanical, and economistic perspectives within Marxism and other traditions’ ….” [André C. Drainville, “International Political Economy in the Age of Open Marxism.” Review of International Political Economy. Volume, 1, number 1, spring 1994. Pages 105-132.]
           “The call for the development of ‘open Marxism’ … is a response to the crisis of the various forms of deterministic ‘closed Marxism’ which have dominated radical discourse since the arrival of the state ideology Marxism-Leninism. The attempt to break away from the reductionist dogmatism of Marxist structural-functionalism while avoiding the complementary evil of humanistic subjectivism has a long tradition in Marxist thought.” [Peter Burnham, “Open Marxism and Vulgar International Political Economy.” Review of International Political Economy. Volume, 1, number 2, summer 1994. Pages 221-231.]
           “The author of Crack Capitalism is to be applauded for taking issue with the erroneous presuppositions underlying so-called orthodox Marxism and making a case for an alternative approach, commonly known as ‘open Marxism’ or ‘autonomous Marxism.’ The fundamental differences between ‘orthodox Marxism’ and ‘open Marxism’ manifest themselves in five paradigmatic oppositions: closure versus openness, necessity versus contingency, positivity versus negativity, heteronomy versus autonomy, and universality versus particularity.” [Simon Susen, “‘Open Marxism’ against and beyond the ‘Great Enclosure’?: Reflections on how (not) to crack capitalism.” Journal of Classical Sociology. Volume 12, number 2, 2012. Pages 281-331.]
           “… ‘open Marxism’ … rejects what is seen as a Marxist predilection to either reify the technical process of capital accumulation or to reify the moment of labour’s struggle against the alienating world of capitalist power. Seeking instead to ‘reveal the social form of labour in capitalist society’ …, open Marxists develop categories that comprehend why labour is compelled to assume alienated forms of existence under capitalism.” [John Michael Roberts, “From reflection to refraction: opening up open Marxism.” Capital & Class. Volume 26, number 4, autumn 2002. Pages 87-116.]
           “For the current in Open Marxist thought that is associated with John Holloway, form and fetishism are fundamental.…
           “Both Open Marxism’s focus on form analysis and the analytical tool of class composition are enormously valuable. In considering capitalist forms as modes of existence of social relations, form analysis helps us grasp those social relations in all their messy, actually existing variety. And by understanding instances of class struggle in terms of the systemic tension between variable and constant capital, with living labour as an active creative force, class composition helps us grasp the moving reality of struggle.”
           [Martin Spence, “Form, fetish, and film: Revisiting Open Marxism.” Capital & Class. Volume 34, number 1, 2010. Pages 99-106.]
      399. open Marxist theory of imperialism (Alex Sutton): He applies an open-Marxist perspective to imperialism.
           “The enduring nature of imperialism means that a theory of imperialism will be perennially useful in demystifying its origins and qualities. This paper seeks to show that an open Marxist (OM hereafter) approach is valuable in identifying the necessary qualities of imperialism and its origins in the capitalist social form. Theories of imperialism rest on a theory or conception of the state, which is where OM’s contribution to social theory is most robust. The purpose of this paper is to move towards an OM account of imperialism, and to identify the basic form of a theory of imperialism that is consonant with OM. The paper argues that extant theories of imperialism are dissonant with OM based upon their conceptions of the state, and social relations more broadly.” [Alex Sutton, “Towards an open Marxist theory of imperialism.” Capital & Class. Volume 37, number 2, 2013. Pages 217-237.]
      400. critical focus on power (Milton J. Bennett): He considers how considerations of culture may disregard power.
           “The idea of ‘culture’ may neglect power. Critical theory generally suggests that human interaction is a power play of domination and oppression. People who dominate (the dominant group) make the rules and impose them on others, who are typically oppressed by them. The observational categories of racism, sexism and other ‘isms’ previously or yet to be defined refer to this process, both in individual and institutional terms. This critical focus on power is a robust line of theory and research in intercultural relations ….” [Milton J. Bennett, “The value of cultural diversity: rhetoric and reality—Meeting Report on Fellows Day, International Academy of Intercultural Research 9ᵗʰ Biennial Congress, Bergen, Norway.” SpringerPlus. Volume 5, number 1, December 2016. Creative Commmons. Pages 1-14.]
      401. emancipatory practice (Charles Masquelier): He examines the prospects of democratic control rescued from the repressive mechanisms associated with consumption.
           “After having established the existence of repressive mechanisms in the sphere of consumption, the task of anticipating institutional forms capable of yielding emancipatory practice can no longer be construed merely in terms of a democratic control of production. With the critique of the culture industry elaborated by first-generation critical theorists, one does indeed discover that the emancipation of internal nature ought to be treated as a matter regarding both the labour process and consumption. The vision of democratic control must, in this sense, treat production and consumption as two potential spheres of self-realization ….” [Charles Masquelier. Critical Theory and Libertarian Socialism: Realizing the Political Potential of Critical Social Theory. New York and London: Bloomsbury Academic imprint of Bloomsbury Publishing Plc. 2015. Page 137.]
      402. critical theory of controversy (G. Thomas Goodnight): He positions this critical social theory “where the needs for communication are urgent and its prospects dim.”
           “A critical theory of controversy would require the integration of the normative study of argumentation with critical studies of practices.…
           “The dialectical positioning of a theory of argument against practice is in line with the aims of critical social theory ….
           “The direction of a future critical theory of controversy most likely resides in those predicaments where the needs for communication are urgent and its prospects dim. Thus, argumentation is called upon as a ‘court of appeal’ to mediate with ‘good reasons’ questions crucial to strangers who must find a way to live together under tides of globalizing change.…
           “… the critical practice of argument requires critique of all theories and practices that would substitute reflectively discerned convictions for those reasons that cannot withstand public scrutiny. In this respect, the tasks of a social theory of argument must always remain unfinished, for its goals traffic with ideals.”
           [G. Thomas Goodnight, “Predicaments of Communication, Argument, and Power: Towards a Critical Theory of Controversy.” Informal Logic. Volume 23, number 2, 2003. Pages 119-137.]
      403. critical relational constructionism (Dian Marie Hosking): According to Hosking, Professor of Relational Process at the Utrecht University School of Governance (Utrecht, the Netherlands) and a long-time Associate of the Taos Institute (Chagrin Falls, Ohio), power should be regarded as an interminable relational process of construction.
           “Unlike constructivist theories and investigations, a critical relational constructionism includes its own activities within the scope of its discourse of construction. Thus it treats the activities of theorizing and empirical work as processes of construction. In addition, and just like any other discourse, critical relational constructionism provides a position from which to reflect on the local particularities of other theories and metatheoretical standpoints.…
           “… Rather than constructing a particular form of life as a stable entity with properties and possessions, a critical constructionism theorizes power as a relational process. Power is an ongoing, relational construction, able both to open up and to close down possibilities.”
           [Dian Marie Hosking, “Can Constructionism Be Critical?” Handbook of Constructionist Research. James A. Holstein and Jaber F. Gubrium, editors. New York: The Guilford Press imprint of Guilford Publications, Inc. 2008. Page 671.]
           “One obvious implication is that a critical constructionism must be sensitive to different relational forms, to the possible dominance of vision and visual actants, and to their possible relations with self–other differentiation.” [Dian Marie Hosking, “Can Constructionism be Critical?” Handbook of Constructionist Research. James A. Holstein and Jaber F. Gubrium, editors. New York: The Guilford Press imprint of Guilford Publications, Inc. 2008. Page 679.]
      404. critiques of American exceptionalism (Ian Tyrell, Christian P. Haines, and Paul Giles): These writers develop various critiques of this (unfortunately) common perspective. American exceptionalism, in Foster’s view, is a dangerous and an abhorrent doctrine which continues to be involked as a justification for American imperialism (i.e., manifest destiny and Pax Americana).
           “… any consideration of international ideologies starting from an American base must still come to grips with the specific roles of the nation-state and nationalism in the articulation of those very dreams for transnational futures. In turn, the emphasis in American forms of internationalism on the outreach of specific cultural institutions rooted in American experience indicates how closely ‘internationalism’ has been linked to American exceptionalism through concepts of cultural expansionism.” [Ian Tyrrell, “American Exceptionalism in an Age of International History.” The American Historical Review. Volume 96, number 4, October 1991. Pages 1031-1055.]
           “… Ian Tyrrell’s ‘American Exceptionalism in an Age of International History’ … repudiates American exceptionalism ….” [Michael Kammen, “The Problem of American Exceptionalism: A Reconsideration.” American Quarterly. Volume 45, number 1, March 1993. Pages 1-43.]
           “… the only difference that difference makes for American exceptionalism is the extension and/or intensification of America’s status as imperial center – even, or especially, when the center no longer holds.” [Christian P. Haines. A Desire Called America: Biopolitics and Utopian Forms of Life in American Literature. Ph.D. dissertation. University of Minnesota. Minneapolis, Minnesota. December, 2012. Page 19.]
           “The crucial strategy for the comparativist scholar is to dissociate rhetoric from ethos, the cultural sign from the freight of moral values lodged (often unconsciously) within it. This serves to make manifest the ludic, ‘textual’ qualities of the foreign landscape, and therefore (from our point of view) the constructed and radically provisional nature of the American experience. By the very fact of their location outside or on the margins of American society, Americanists from other parts of the globe may find themselves in a better position to avoid the tautologies of American exceptionalism, and so to help redesign the problematic framework of the area studies model.” [Paul Giles, “Reconstructing American Studies: Transnational Paradoxes, Comparative Perspectives.” Journal of American Studies. Volume 28, number 3, Decemer 1994. Pages 335-358.]
           “Paul Giles, a British scholar of American studies, was among the many who helped steer the agenda of the meeting toward a renewed critique of American exceptionalism as practiced by American scholars. He argued ‘it remains very difficult to dislodge many of the primary, foundational assumptions of American studies, because such assumptions are often bound unconsciously to a residual cultural transcendentalism that fails to acknowledge the national specificity of its own discourse.’ Giles suggests that American studies have a lot to gain from paying attention to, lor instance, European scholars who do not share that assumption.” [Robert Warrior, “Native American Scholarship and the Transnational Turn.” Cultural Studies Review. Volume 15, number 2, September 2009. Pages 119-130.]
      405. theory of intragroup cooperation (Richard H. McAdams): He develops an approach to understanding racial discrimination.
           “… the theory of intragroup cooperation and inter-group conflict illuminates the complex problem of race discrimination. Status production explains both the historic and contemporary contours of race discrimination far better than the prevailing associational model of discrimination. Understanding race discrimination as a means of producing status helps us explain its tenacity in the face of market competition and reveals, within an economic model, the full costs of the practice of discrimination. The effort to gain status by taking status away from others, and the responsive measures this effort elicits, are socially wasteful in the same way that confiscation of material property is wasteful. The inefficiency in the system of status competition is measured by the investments each group makes in gaining or protecting its status. Prohibiting the more productive forms of investments can reduce the wastefulness of such actions even if it does not eliminate it.” [Richard H. McAdams, “Cooperation and Conflict: The Economics of Group Status Production and Race Discrimination.” Harvard Law Review. Volume 108, number 5, March 1995. Pages 1003-1084.]
      406. institutional logics (Mia Raynard, Josef Pallas as pronounced in this MP3 audio file, and Magnus Fredriksson as pronounced in this MP3 audio file): They define the contours of “appropriate behavior” relative to social organizations.
           “As overarching frameworks for interpreting social reality, institutional logics are ‘the socially constructed, historical patterns of cultural symbols and material practices’ that direct attention toward particular stimuli specify criteria for legitimacy and define what constitutes appropriate behavior …. Most institutional scholars now recognize that fields do not necessarily evolve toward stability and convergence around a dominant logic, but often constitute sites of prolonged contestation—both latent and overt …. This relative “incoherence” of institutional demands points to an enduring pattern of complexity that can be challenging contexts for organizations to navigate ….” [Mia Raynard, “Deconstructing complexity: Configurations of institutional complexity and structural hybridity.” Strategic Organization. Volume 14, number 4, November 2016. Pages 310-335.]
           “the development, proliferation and influence of field-wide institutional norms, practices and principles – commonly referred to as institutional logics – has been theorized. Over the last two decades this body of literature has offered a rich and useful perspective through which the influence of norms and beliefs has been examined as underscoring institutional formation. As a field level concept, institutional logics point to the social construction, stability, historical patterns and extensive reach of belief systems and practices …. As such the concept has provided significant insights into how institutional pressures influence and guide organizational actions and provide impetus for institutional change ….” [Josef Pallas and Magnus Fredriksson, “Translating Institutional Logics: When the Media Logic Meets Professions.” Organization Studies. Volume 37, number 11, November 2016. Pages 1661-1684.]
      407. accommodative cognition (S. A. Hamed Hosseini [Persian/Fārsī, س. ا. حَامِد حُسَیْنِی, S. A. Ḥāmid Ḥusaynī): He develops an approach to “the global field of resistance.”
           “… the newly developed perspectives inside the global field of resistance convey a new mode of social thought, coined here the accommodative cognition. In this article, in order to overcome the difficulties of examining the whole diverse global field of resistance for its newly evolved ideological elements, I start by constructing an ideal-type of the so-called anti-globalization movement. The ideal-typical description of the movement is constructed by accentuating those notions of the movement which cannot be easily understood based on dominant theoretical frames. I call this ideal-construction the alter-globalization movement, which can be used as an analytical tool to examine different participant groups, organizations, individuals, and intellectuals within the global field of resistance for the novelty of their styles of thought.” [S. A. Hamed Hosseini, “Beyond practical dilemmas and conceptual reductions: the emergence of an ‘accommodative consciousness’ in the alternative globalization movement.” Portal: Journal of Multidisciplinary International Studies. Volume 3, number 1, January 2006. Pages 1-27.]
      408. counter power (Hilary Wainwright): Wainwright—the editor of Red Pepper magazine and widow of the late Roy Bhaskar—considers strategies for overthrowing neoliberal capitalism.
           “Capitalism is not a monster that can be slain by a single strategic sword. Rather we face a complex and constantly mobile organism, half machine with its automatic drives towards accumulation, half animal with the reflexes to get around barriers, cannibalise other capacities and reproduce itself by feeding rapaciously off its environment. We need to recognise we are up against a hydra-headed system that cannot be destroyed at any one point but can only be surpassed through multiple points of transformation based on an ecology that has at its centre the drive for human wellbeing.…
           “… No hierarchy was sacred as every claim to authority or domination came under scrutiny. New conceptions of knowledge emerged through the movements‘ need to understand and act on structures that were not publicly acknowledged or immediately visible. The break from deference, the pervasive challenge to authority and assertion of cultural equality, fuelled a rebellious, self-confident spirit associated with a qualitative growth in capacities – a result of the rapid expansion of education and heightened expectations arising from the postwar boom and social democracy. Central to the character of these rebellions was the way the struggles of previously subordinate groups, colonised peoples, women, gays, blacks and others, challenged and began to transform dominant mentalities, including those of the traditional left.”
           [Hilary Wainwright, “State of Counter Power – How understanding neoliberalism’s cultural underpinnings can equip movements to overthrow it.” State of Power 2014: Exposing the Davos Class. Nick Buxton, editor. Amsterdam, the Netherlands: Transnational Institute. 2014. Pages 81-94.]
      409. moral distress debate (Georgina Morley): She considers various positions in this debate.
           “… research exploring moral distress has expanded to the multidisciplinary team (MDT). Evidence shows that all healthcare professionals providing both direct and nondirect care can experience moral distress …. However, there is also some evidence suggesting nurses may experience some of the highest levels of moral distress amongst the MDT.… It has also been suggested that nurses’ position in the hierarchy, responsible for carrying out the requests of others yet lacking the authority to make ultimate decisions, could affect perceived levels of moral distress.” [Georgina Morley, “Perspective: The Moral Distress Debate.” Journal of Research in Nursing. Volume 21, number 7, November 2016. Pages 570-575.]
      410. global depeasantization (Farshad A. Araghi [Persian/Fārsī, فَرْشَاد ا. عَرَاقِی, Faršād ʾA. ʿArāqī] and Raj Patel [Hindī, राज पटेल, Rāja Paṭela as pronounced in this MP3 audio file]): Araghi critically examines the urbanization of “Third World peasantries.” Patal expands on the subject from a critical standpoint on “modern industrial capitalism.”
           “… my aim in this article is to analyze what I call ‘global depeasantization,’ a concept abstracted from the social history of our time. It expresses experience of the Third World peasantries between 1945 and 1990, when an increasing number of people who were involved in agriculture with direct access to the production their means of subsistence became rapidly and massively concentrated in urban locations. 1950, only 29 percent of the total world population, and 16 percent of the Third World population lived in urban areas. By the year 2000 nearly half of the world population and percent of the Third world population will live in urban areas. In Latin America and Middle East approximately 70 percent of the population is already urbanized ….” [Farshad A. Araghi, “Global Depeasantization, 1945-1990.” The Sociological Quarterly. Volume 36, number 2 spring 1995. Pages 337-368.]
           “… ‘depeasantization,’ as Farshad Araghi has argued, is a policy that has been an unspoken part of the postwar agricultural policy landscape, indeed a tacit prerequisite for modern industrial capitalism, but it has been made explicit in the latest generation of agricultural development policy. In its 2008 World Development Report on Agriculture, the World Bank makes it baldly clear that small farmers are ‘inefficient’ and, therefore, impediments to agricultural productivity, growth and ‘a pro-poor agenda.’” [Raj Patel, “The hungry of the earth.” Radical Philosophy: Philosophical Journal of the Independent Left. Number 151, September/October 2008. Pages 2-7.]
      411. sociological study of the world of alienated labor (Irving M. Zeitlin): He examines Karl Marx’s sociology in Capital.
           “Capital is … sociological study of the world of alienated labor. At the same time, [Karl] Marx explores in detail what he considers the fundamental aspects of the expanding capitalist system: its developing productive forces and its basic relations of production. In these terms, Capital is a careful examination of the changing existential conditions of men and, concomitantly, of their changing character and consciousness; it is a documentation of his thesis that in the process of material production men alter, along with the conditions of their existence, their entire psychological makeup.
           “The first phase in the development of the productive forces within the capitalist mode of production Marx called ‘simple cooperation.’ While cooperation is characteristic of all large-scale production, simple cooperation prevails during that period in which capital operates on a large scale, but division of labor and machinery play a subordinate part.”
           [Irving M. Zeitlin. Ideology and the Development of Sociological Theory. Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc. 1968. Page 103.]
      412. processual social ontology (Emmanuel Renault as pronounced in this MP3 audio file): The article develops a process ontology approach to critical theory.
           “A processual social ontology can … be assumed at the macro level when institutions are conceived of as existing in a network of internal relations, and as being involved in a process that transform them as well as this network of relations. [Karl] Marx’s theory of capitalism as ‘an organism capable of change and constantly engaged in a process of change’ … provides an illustration of this type of approach to the social. Here, capitalism is not only defined as a social structure, or as a set of macro level ‘social relations of production’ that shape the whole social world. It is also defined by ‘tendencies’ rooted in the functional relations between institutions.” [Emmanuel Renault, “Critical Theory and Processual Social Ontology.” Journal of Social Ontology. Volume 2, number 1, 2016. Creative Commons. Pages 17-32.]
      413. critical theory of social suffering (Emmanuel Renault): He applies critical social theory to the issue of suffering.
           “In what follows, I proceed in three steps. In a first step, I describe various aspects of the contemporary issue of social suffering in order to draw consequences for critical theory as social philosophy and as epistemology. In a second step, I distinguish various programmes in social philosophy: strong ones, weak ones, and mixed ones. In a third step, I try to determine which of them is the more appropriate for a critical theory of social suffering. Indirectly, this critical survey of contemporary debates about social suffering and social philosophy gives me the opportunity to present the main lines of my own contribution to a critical theory of social suffering. More generally, it gives me the opportunity to advocate a renewal of interdisciplinary approaches, as well as social theoretical and epistemological discussions in critical theory.” [Emmanuel Renault, “A Critical Theory of Social Suffering.” Critical Horizons. Volume 11, issue 2, 2010. Pages 221-241.]
      414. philosophical economy of the history of ideas (Harold Cherniss): He examines the Platonic approach to ideas.
           “The saving of the phenomena of intellection and sensation is the primary duty of epistemology; if, however, it should appear that these phenomena can be saved in their own right only by setting up the same hypothesis as was found to be essential for ethics, the coincidence of results would by the principle of scientific economy enunciated in Plato’s phrasing of the astronomical problem lend added validity to the hypothesis in each sphere.…
           “… The problem which Plato set others in astronomy he set himself in philosophy; the resulting theory of Ideas indicates by its economy that it proceeded from the same skill of formulation which charted for all time the course of astronomical hypothesis.”
           [Harold Cherniss, “The Philosophical Economy of the Theory of Ideas.” The American Journal of Philology. Volume 57, number 4, 1936. Pages 445-456.]
      415. cultural studies (Stuart Hall, Richard Hoggart, Slavoj Žižek as pronounced in this MP3 audio file, Susan Bordo, Fredric Jameson, Raymond Williams, and many others): Meaning is produced by, and spread from, centers of social power. One of the major objectives of cultural studies, a term coined by Hall and Hoggart, is to fight dominant ideologies (capitalism, racism, sexism, homophobia, etc.) and unjust domination or oppression. Cultural studies has, in addition to its sources in critical social theory (including cultural hegemony), been informed a variety of other perspectives. The Cultural Studies Association is an academic society devoted to the field. It also publishes the open-access journals, Lateral and Cultural Landscapes.
           “I remember sitting in Richard Haggart’s room discussing what we should call ourselves. ‘Institute,’ he suggested. Well, that sounded suitably grand and austere. But to be honest, the two of us, who constituted at that time the entire faculty and indeed, the students of the enterprise, could not find it in our hearts to take ourselves that seriously. Well, what about ‘Center’? Yes, that had a more informal, rallying-point feel to it, and we settled for that. ‘Cultural Studies’ came much more naturally. It was about as broad as we could make it; thereby we ensured that no department in either the humanities or social sciences who thought that they had already taken care of culture could fail to feel affronted by our presence. In this latter enterprise, at least, we succeeded.” [Stuart Hall, “Race, culture, and communications: looking backward and forward at cultural studies.” What is Cultural Studies?: A Reader. John Storey, editor. London and New York: Arnold imprint of the Hodder Headline Group. 1996. Pages 336-243.]
           “There never was a prior moment when cultural studies and marxism represented a perfect theoretical fit. From the beginning (to use this way of speaking for a moment) there was always—already the question of the great inadequacies, theoretically and politically, the resounding silences, the great evasions of marxism—the things that Marx did not talk about or seem to understand which were our privileged object of study: culture, ideology, language, the symbolic.” [Stuart Hall, “Cultural studies and its theoretical legacies.” Stuart Hall: Critical Dialogues in Cultural Studies. David Morley and Kuan-Hsing Chen, editors. London and New York: Routledge imprint of Taylor & Francis Group, an Informa PLC business. 2005. Pages 261-274.]
           “For me, cultural studies really begins with the debate about the nature of social and cultural change in postwar Britain. An attempt to address the manifest break-up of traditional culture, especially traditional class cultures, it set about registering the impact of the new forms of affluence and consumer society on the very hierarchical and pyramidal structure of British society. Trying to come to terms with the fluidity and the undermining impact of the mass media and of an emerging mass society on this old European class society, it registered the cultural impact of the long-delayed entry of the United Kingdom into the modern world.” [Stuart Hall, “The Emergence of Cultural Studies and the Crisis of the Humanities.” October. Volume 53, summer 1990. Pages 11-23.]
           “… some of the more striking instances of working-class political solidarity seem to have occurred not only in the larger and unmistakeably working-class industries but also to have gained from a sense of continuing local—using this now to mean quite a large area—traditions, loyalties, consciousness. A minority from these groups were able to work within these groups, making active connections between the local solidarity and political solidarity.
           “Today people are moving around more; many of the old areas are being split up; new industries and new forms of industry are recruiting people from all over, offering good wages and a much more fluid range of opportunities. What we want to know is what replaces the old channels by which political consciousness expressed itself—the local, the homogeneous, the solidly ‘working-class’ feeling, the minority within. Or does much of the old feeling carry over?”
           [Richard Hoggart in Richard Hoggart and Raymond Williams, “Working Class Attitudes.” New Left Review. Series I, number 1, January–February 1960. Pages 26-30.]
           “Cultural Studies uses many theories but is not a discipline; it is a field or area of study and can draw fruitfully from several disciplines: the social sciences, history, psychology, anthropology, literary study and others. Each discipline can make its case for pre-eminence; the case made here is for literary study as a way into Cultural Studies. One thing is sure: the student should have an initial discipline outside Cultural Studies, and academic and intellectual training, and a severe one. Without that, all may be a jackdaw’s hopping from one fascinating item to another, a bringing together of glittering, unordered and unassessed heaps; a ragbag of butterfly interests, of opinions shallowly rooted; the relativist outlook, applied directly to the study of the relativist society.” [Richard Hoggart. The Way We Live Now. London: Chatto & Windus imprint of Random House UK Limited. 1995. Page 173.]
           “Cultural studies in its narrower sense has developed mainly within the anglophone academy, while the profile of ‘the cultural sciences’ in other national and regional intellectual formations has often been very different. England, for example, is almost unique in the virtual absence of folklore studies or ‘ethnology’ within its academy. There is, therefore, a real danger not only of a disciplinary closure around cultural studies but also a spatial/national one that would lead to a failure to grasp the globalization as well as the transdisciplinarity of the study of culture today. When, for example, we interrogated our own relationships to Britishness, we were struck by the diversity among us: we had very different stories to tell of national, regional and transnational histories and personal identifications. One of the struggles in writing this book has therefore been to try to bring our intellectual points of reference into line with the diversity of our lives and the lives of our friends, families, children and wider kin, and our networks and places of significance. We do not claim complete success in this: the dialogues that we need to have may sometimes have to follow this book rather than fully inform it.” [Richard Johnson, Deborah Chambers, Parvati Raghuram, and Estella Tincknell. The Practice of Cultural Studies. Thousand Oaks, California: SAGE Publications, Inc. 2004. Page 4.]
           “Here is a point where the interweaving of High Culture, High Art and the life of the General Culture in any age are sharply revealed. That literature offers us a continuing, a deeply intelligent and imaginative, illustration, recreation and valuing of the terms of our ordinary lives. Nothing can in these senses replace it; it can be an embodied revelation, liberation.” [Richard Hoggart, “High Arts and General Culture.” Society. Volume 42, number 1, November 2004. Pages 79-81.]
           “The bedrock of all good museums is their commitment to scholarship in depth. In asking ‘are museums political?’, I shall look more widely than to museums alone. Indeed, I might well have used the title ‘Is Culture political?’ For the interest in ‘Culture’ in virtually all countries, developed, developing, or still underdeveloped, and with all sorts of mixed meanings, is one of the major socio-linguistic concerns across the world today.” [Richard Hoggart, “Are Museums Political.” Society. Volume 41, issue 5, July/August 2004. Pages 65-71.]
           “The questions ‘uneducated’ adults can ask about politics or economics can have a special edge. I like, incidentally, to think that the process of redefinition continued until at least the [nineteen] ’forties and [nineteen] ’fifties, since the subject usually called ‘contemporary cultural studies’ (it is a field rather than a subject), which is now being offered in a number of universities and polytechnics, substantially came out of WEA [Workers’ Educational Association] and Extension Tutorial Classes, many of which had started as ‘straight’ literature classes.” [Richard Hoggart, “The Importance of Literacy.” The Journal of Basic Writing. Volume 3, number 1, fall/winter 1980. Pages 74-87.]
           “In general the picture of contemporary cultural conditions that has been assumed by most British teachers of literature who have worked in this field, although it has considerable strengths, is too limited. It is insufficiently responsive to the complications of contemporary cultural conditions and so to the meanings of much contemporary art at all levels. Popular and mass art is more varied than it recognizes (and what professes to be ‘high art’ sometimes no more than a profession), and the continuity and change within working-class attitudes more complex than it allows for.” [Richard Hoggart, “Literature and Society.” The American Scholar. Volume 35, number 2, spring 1966. Pages 277-289.]
           “Theoretically, it [shopping] comes in many packages (and predictably we can shop around for our favourite theoretical version or brand-name). The tradition of Western Marxism called it ‘commodification,̱ and in that form the analysis goes back at least as far as [Karl] Marx himself, in the famous opening chapter of Capital on commodity fetishism. The nineteenth-century religious perspective is Marx’s way of foregrounding a specifically superstructural dimension in the market exchanges of capitalism. He understood ‘the metaphysical subtleties and theological niceties’ of the commodity as the way in which the labour relationship is concealed from the buyer (the ‘shopper’?) and he thereby grasped commodification as an essentially ideological operation, a form of false consciousness which has the specific function of masking the production of value from the (bourgeois) consumer.” [Fredric Jameson, “Future City.” New Left Review. Series II, number 21, May–June 2003. Pages 65-79.]
           “The Socialist movement definitively split into Social Democratic parliamentary reformism and the new Stalinist orthodoxy, while Western Marxism, which abstained from openly endorsing any of these two poles, abandoned the stance of direct political engagement and turned into a part of the established academic machine whose tradition runs from the early Frankfurt School up to today’s Cultural Studies.” [Slavoj Žižek, “From History and Class Consciousness to the Dialectic of Enlightenment… and Back.” New German Critique. Number 81, autumn 2000. Pages 107-123.]
           “The salient point here is not that I wasn’t listened to, but that what was ‘heard’ had been converted from cultural critique to simple advocacy for the ‘rights’ of the Other. Constructed as advocacy for the ‘rights’ of the Other, my remarks no longer impinged on the philosophical methods or identities of the men in my group. They could continue to exalt (and teach) the ‘Man of Reason’ as the disembodied Subject of philosophical history, while presumably letting the women and minorities that they would hire take care of ‘gender and race.’ Thus, the insights of feminist philosophy are kept ‘in their place,’ where they make no claim on ‘philosophy proper.’ The voices of ‘difference’ are permitted to speak, and business continues to go on as usual.” [Susan Bordo, “The Feminist as Other.” Metaphilosophy. Volume 27, number 1/2, January/April 1996. Pages 10-27.]
           “It is the context, not the formal ‘grammar,’ that is determinative. (I do not believe that there is one grammar of exclusion or one grammar that necessarily ‘enables.’ Sometimes complexity enables; sometimes it effaces and mystifies.) We need to ask out of what practices particular generalizations are forged. We need to look at what they take into account and what they leave out of account. At who gets to contribute and who gets ignored. Whether they are results and recognitions of cultural dialogue or proclamations from a monocultural point of view. Whether they recognize their own (inevitable) limits. Whether they lead to a more inclusive conversation or put a stop to dialogue. In assessing the ‘enabling’ capabilities of any of our analyses and theories, grammatical/logical ‘tests’ are simply too abstract, too formal, too ahistorical.” [Susan Bordo, “‘Maleness’ Revisited.” Hypatia. Volume 7, number 3, summer 1992. Pages 197-207.]
           “Cultural studies is now a movement or a network. It has its own degrees in several colleges and universities and its own journals and meetings. It exercises a large influence on academic disciplines, especially on English studies, sociology, media and communication studies, linguistics and history.…
           “A codification of methods or knowledges (instituting them, for example, in formal curricula or in courses on ‘methodology’) runs against some main features of cultural studies as a tradition: its openness and theoretical versatility, its reflexive even self-conscious mood, and, especially, the importance of critique. I mean critique in the fullest sense: not criticism merely, nor even polemic, but procedures by which other traditions are approached both for what they may yield and for what they inhibit. Critique involves stealing away the more useful elements and rejecting the rest. From this point of view cultural studies is a process, a kind of alchemy for producing useful knowledge; codify it and you might halt its reactions.”
           [Richard Johnson, “What Is Cultural Studies Anyway?” Social Text. Number 16, winter 1986–1987. Pages 38-80.]
           “This essay focuses on the writing and publication practices that developed in and around the Birmingham Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies from the time of its founding in 1964 until the cessation of the journal Working Papers in Cultural Studies, arguably its chief publication, in the late 1970s. Through our engagement with these practices, we want to develop an approach to the question ‘what is cultural studies?’ that is historical, speculative, and above all, materialist. It is historical insofar as it revisits the ‘moment’ of Birmingham, albeit from the perspective of its serial publications. It is speculative to the extent that we hope to build upon these historical traces and make some arguments for the ways in which textual production in cultural studies might be reformulated to allow for more productive engagements with the contemporary conjuncture. Finally, our approach is materialist because we want to de-emphasise the conceptual and biographical aspects of the work that took place at the Centre – the content, as it were – and to draw attention instead to the varied functions of that work vis-à-vis its form.” [Ted Striphas and Mark Hayward, “Working Papers in Cultural Studies, or, the Virtues of Grey Literature.” New Formations. Volume 78, 2013. Pages 102-116.]
           “The methodology of cultural studies provides an … uneasy marker, for cultural studies in fact has no distinct methodology, no unique statistical, ethnomethodological, or textual analysis to call its own. Its methodology, ambiguous from the beginning, could best be seen as a bricolage. Its choice of practice, that is, is pragmatic, strategic, and self-reflective…. It is problematic for cultural studies simply to adopt, uncritically, any of the formalized disciplinary practices of the academy, for those practices, as much as the distinctions they inscribe, carry with them a heritage of disciplinary investments and exclusions and a history of social effects that cultural studies would often be inclined to repudiate.” [Cary Nelson, Paul A. Threichler, and Lawrence Grossberg, “Cultural Studies: An Introduction.” Cultural Studies. Cary Nelson, Paul A. Threichler, and Lawrence Grossberg, editors. London and New York: Routledge imprint of Taylor & Francis Group, an Informa PLC business. 1991. Page 3.]
           “There is no substitute for empirical research. Therefore, concepts need to be sufficiently general and open-ended to allow one to investigate them empirically. This may be especially true of complex, unbounded, and internally heterogeneous phenomena such as cultures. Furthermore, if cultural theorists hope to intervene in culture wars then it would be useful if there was a similarity in scope between the terms used and those employed in the wider world that need to be clarified or challenged.” [James S. Duncan and Nancy G. Duncan, “Culture unbound.” Environment and Planning A. Volume 36, 2004. Pages 391-403.]
           “The point of cultural studies is particularly pragmatic. It is a means of generating knowledge about the structures we live in, and the knowledge it generates is meant to be used. As we have seen over the account I have presented, British cultural studies started out developing methodologies for the textual analysis of representations – what may look like a clearly academic interest. This, however, was just one step along a road which has lead to many destinations and applications; for example, it has lead to important interventions into the formation of cultural policy on urban design, media regulation, the arts industries or multiculturalism. As part of this journey British cultural studies has developed a distinctive mode of research, a mode which allows it to meet its objectives of analysing the articulation between cultural processes and structures in specific historical conjunctures. In this conclusion I want to deal briefly, then, with how we ‘do’ cultural studies: how do we go about research within this tradition.” [Graeme Turner. British Cultural Studies: An introduction. Third edition. London and New York: Routledge imprint of Taylor & Francis Group, an Informa PLC business. 2003. Page 225.]
           “Cultural studies has for sometime been a constituent part of the ‘linguistic turn’ in the humanities and social sciences with writers arguing that language is the central means and medium by which we understand the world and construct culture. Indeed, the contemporary emphasis given to language within cultural studies is itself a part of a wider ‘cultural turn’ that is constituted in two ways. First, culture is explored through its own specific mechanisms and logic without reduction to any other phenomenon (e.g. the mode of production). Second, facets of a social formation that had previously been considered to be quite separate from culture can themselves be understood as cultural. For example, ‘economic forces’ are cultural because they involve a set of meaningful practices, including the social relations of production and consumption, along with questions of design and marketing. Thus, to put meaning at the heart of human activity is also to place the examination of culture at the top of the agenda of the humanities and social sciences.” [Chris Barker and Dariusz Galasiński. Cultural Studies and Discourse Analysis: A Dialogue on Language and Identity. Thousand Oaks, California: SAGE Publications, Inc. 2001. Page 1.]
           “Today in the USA cultural studies is typically associated with ‘minority’ scholars, that is, with multiculturalism and the analysis of race and power. (Here, of course, ‘minority’ has a completely different referent than it did for F. R. Leavis, for whom ‘minority culture’ meant the beleaguered literary culture of those charged with resisting mass communication; and something else again for the French theorist Gilles Deleuze, for whom it meant something more like simply ‘marginal.’) …
           “In the USA cultural studies is less obsessed with America itself than British cultural studies is obsessed with Britain, perhaps because the USA is a global power and attracts more staff and students internationally.”
           [Simon During. Cultural studies: a critical introduction. London and New York: Routledge imprint of Taylor & Francis Group, an Informa PLC business. 2005. Pages 24-25.]
           “Conceptual (and theoretical) de-linking is, in the argument I am advancing the necessary direction of liberation and decolonization, while transformation within the colonial matrix of power is the splendor and limitations of any project of emancipation(s). De-linking is not a problem for ‘emancipating’ projects because they are all presented as transformation within the linear trajectory of Western history and Western thoughts (once again, from Greek and Latin categories of thought, to German’s, English’s and French’s).” [Walter D. Mignolo, “Delinking.” Cultural Studies. Volume 21, numbers 2-3, May/March 2007. Pages 449-514.]
           “In this piece I will reflect upon the usefulness of cultural studies to studies of race and the law, and then make several methodological arguments about how to approach such work. The parallels between the movements, cultural studies, Critical Race Theory and LatCrit [Latina and Latino critical legal theory], are suggestive of their appropriateness for interdisciplinary sharing. All emerged as scholarly movements out of political movement. These scholarly movements encourage scholars to reflect upon the significance of their work with respect to the material conditions of people’s lives. These movements are penetrating, concerned with critiquing the ideological underpinnings of injustice and marginalization, and interpreting the relationship between belief and how people live.” [Imani Perry, “Cultural Studies, Critical Race Theory and Some Reflections on Methods.” Villanova Law Review. Volume 50, issue 4, article 14, 2005. Pages 915-924.]
           “Cultural studies insists that culture must be studied within the social relations and system through which it is produced and consumed and that thus study of culture is intimately bound up with the study of society, politics, and economics. Cultural studies shows how media culture articulates the dominant values, political ideologies, and social developments and novelties of the era. It conceives of U.S. culture and society as a contested terrain with various groups and ideologies struggling for dominance …. Television, film, music, and other popular cultural forms are thus often liberal or conservative, although they occasionally articulate more radical or oppositional positions and are often ideologically ambiguous, combining various political positions.” [Douglas Kellner, “Cultural Studies, Multiculturalism, and Media Culture.” Gender, Race, and Class in Media: A Critical Reader. Gail Dines and Jean M. Humez, editors. Thousand Oaks, California: SAGE Publications, Inc. 2011. Pages 7-18.]
           “Cultural studies came to center attention on how subcultural groups resist dominant forms of culture and identity, creating their own style and identities. Individuals who conform to hegemonic dress and fashion codes, behavior, and political ideologies thus produce their identities within mainstream groups, as members of particular social groupings (such as white, middle-class conservative Americans). Individuals who identify with subcultures, like punk culture, or hip hop subcultures, look and act differently from those in the mainstream, and thus create oppositional identities, defining themselves against standard models.…
           “There is, however, a tendency in cultural studies to celebrate resistance per se without distinguishing between types and forms of resistance (a similar problem resides with indiscriminate celebration of audience pleasure in certain reception studies). Thus resistance to social authority by the homeless evidenced in their viewing of Die Hard could serve to strengthen brutal masculist behavior and encourage manifestations of physical violence to solve social problems.”
           [Douglas Kellner, “Cultural Studies and Social Theory: A Critical Intervention.” Handbook of Social Theory. George Ritzer and Barry Smart, editors. Thousand Oaks, California: SAGE Publications, Inc. 2003. Pages 395-409.]
           “Any schematic overview [of cultural studies] like this necessarily oversimplifies. Having to paint with a broad brush risks missing nuanced differences. But not to generalize sufficiently would mire this account of cultural studies in the very particularism that causes it to become sheer technical method, devoid of theoretical and political connections. This is a major issue when we consider the gathering momentum of poststructural and postmodern approaches to cultural studies as they are positioning themselves as significant alternatives to the positivist cultural studies dominating the field in American and British popular-culture analysis. In a sense, then, I am arguing that cultural studies should return to its more political roots in the work of the Frankfurt School, the Birmingham group and some feminist cultural critics, especially those who do not drink deeply of a fatefully depoliticizing poststructuralism.” [Ben Agger. Cultural Studies As Critical Theory. London and New York: Routledge imprint of Taylor & Francis Group, an Informa PLC business. 2014. Page 229.]
           “The roots of cultural studies are … deeply embedded in the Frankfurt School of critical theory, whether based in pre-Nazi Germany or, thereafter, in Columbia University, New York.” [Peter Wade, “Introduction.” Cultural Studies will be the Death of Anthropology: Mark Hobart and Paul Willis vs Nigel Rapport and John Gledhill. Peter Wade, editor. Manchester, England: Department of Social Anthropology of the University of Manchester. 1997. Pages 1-10.]
           “Strictly, cultural studies cannot be the death of anthropology as we know it because it is already dead. Now, if you must have a hand into which to thrust the smoking gun, cultural studies is the prime suspect. Put simply, anthropology has run out of episteme. But it had its day. Anthropologists did an important job in persuading Europeans that premodern peoples were not primitive or pre-rational, but were as human and culturally complex as they. Ethnocentrism however is still with us and, despite itself, the way anthropology is constituted as a form of knowledge implicates it too.” [Mark Hobart, “For the motion (1).” Cultural Studies will be the Death of Anthropology: Mark Hobart and Paul Willis vs Nigel Rapport and John Gledhill. Peter Wade, editor. Manchester, England: Department of Social Anthropology of the University of Manchester. 1997. Pages 11-19.]
           “… [The] abandonment of criticizing capitalism has been accompanied by an apparent disinterest in understanding and working with organized radical movements, the only possible manner to exact social change. Many in cultural studies make no pretense of being concerned with social change, except perhaps as a hypothetical exercise. Some cultural studies people want to maintain an oppositional air about them, yet with such a shoddy intellectual foundation they often trivialize politics beyond recognition.” [Robert W. McChesney, “Is there any hope for cultural studies?” Monthly Review: An Independent Socialist Magazine. Volume 47, issue 10, March 1996. Pages 1-18.]
      416. Marxism without guarantees (Stuart Hall): Hall developed a nondeterministic approach to cultural studies.
           “It will be clear that, although the argument has been conducted in connection with the problem of ideology, it has much wider ramifications for the development of marxist theory as a whole. The general question at issue is a particular conception of ‘theory’: theory as the working out of a set of guarantees. What is also at issue is a particular definition of ‘determination.’ It is clear from the ‘reading’ I offered earlier that the economic aspect of capitalist production processes has real limiting and constraining effects (i.e. determinancy), for the categories in which the circuits of production are thought, ideologically, and vice versa. The economic provides the repertoire of categories which will be used, in thought.” [Stuart Hall, “The Problem of Ideology—Marxism without Guarantees.” Journal of Communication Inquiry. Volume 10, number 2, June 1986. Pages 28-44.]
           “Long before [Karl] Marx ever hated capitalism he admired it and respected it. It had broken and shattered every other system of human history, it had surpassed it in its dynamic. And it was because he wanted to harness that dynamic of a major, massive world historical productive system to somebody who deserved it more than the bourgeoisie, that he began to see what the negative side of capitalist relations were about. But he had the most profound respect for its capacity to break and shatter the fettering archaic relations into which people are born. Consequently, as it were, to make the test of the truth of marxism depend on the world standing still is, of course to give ourselves all kinds of those necessary guarantees that we may think that we need to have, in order to convince ourselves that we are really on top of the historical process. But to carry that guarantee in our back pockets will prevent us from actually being able to come to terms with the real world.” [Stuart Hall, “For a Marxism Without Guarantees.” Australian Left Review. Volume 1, issue 84, winter 1983. Pages 38-43.]
           “[Stuart] Hall’s maxim of ‘Marxism without guarantees’ stems not only from the practical need to reapply the principles of socialism and democracy to account for social transformation, but also from the theoretical problems associated with postwar western socialism. In the article ‘Marxism without guarantees,’ Hall seeks to demonstrate the weaknesses inherent in the Marxist understanding of ideology and determinism. For Hall, such weaknesses have stemmed from shortcomings that Marx himself, and then [Vladimir] Lenin and [Karl] Kautsky, had attributed to the concepts of ideology and class on the assumption that ideas and ideology are formed within respective class structures.” [Owen Worth, “Re-engaging the third way? Regionalism, the European left and ‘Marxism without guarantees.’” Capital & Class. Volume 93, number 3, autumn 2007. Pages 93-109.]
           “[Stuart] Hall … was about … the question of how the dominant culture has an inbuilt insularity that can only be contested (‘without guarantees,’ his favorite phrase) if we manage to find real alternatives to it, without resorting to the self-defeating means espoused by single-issue constituencies using their self-identities as the only basis for this struggle against the prevailing order.” [Steven Salaita, “‘Marxism, Without Guarantees’: What I Learned from Stuart Hall.” Cultural Critique. Volume 89, January 2015. Pages 136-149.]
           “… within his [Stuart Hall’s] ‘Marxism without guarantees’ there exists ‘no guarantee … there is no necessary correspondence … there is no necessary non-correspondence’ … between one level of a social formation and another, between the social structure and the human agent, or between a cultural practice such as sport and the varied forces acting within a social structure.” [David L. Andrews, “Coming to Terms with Cultural Studies.” Journal of Sport & Social Issues. Volume 26, number 1, February 2002. Pages 110-117.]
           “Perhaps the most memorable site on which to see the vocabulary of … [the] responsiveness to contingency begin to produce theoretical effects is the famous ‘without guarantees’ essay rereading Marx’s conception of ideology. First published in 1983 as part of a volume commemorating the centenary of [Karl] Marxs death, the essay constituted a strategic intervention not only into the particular moment of cultural-politics in Britain (the early [UK Prime Minister Margaret] Thatcher years) but also into the theoretical predicament of Marxism.” [David Scott, “Stuart Hall’s Ethics.” Small Axe. Volume 17, March 2005. Pages 1-16.]
           “[Stuart] Hall’s claim that ideology is resistant to change due to its pervasively structural embeddedness is not meant to imply that people have no choice or power to act rhetorically. As Hall notes, ‘Structures exhibit tendencies, lines of force, openings and closures which constrain, shape, channel and in that sense determine. But structures cannot determine in the harder sense of fix absolutely, guarantee’ …. Although linguistic and social structures exhibit tendencies, they do not guarantee outcomes. Structure is actively reproduced through practice.” [Anne Makus, “Stuart Hall’s Theory of Ideology: A Frame for Rhetorical Criticism.” Western Journal of Speech Communication. Volume 54, fall 1990. Pages 495-514.]
           “After [Joseph] Stalin’s tanks rolled into Hungary in 1956, many on the left in Britain finally lost all faith in the statist totalitarianism of the Soviet Union as any kind of model for a socialist future. The New Left Review, of which Stuart [Hall] became editor, opened up a new space in which socialists could analyse and formulate strategies to oppose the excesses of capitalism and militarism at home and colonialism abroad. It was a new kind of Marxism ‘without guarantees.’ Just as, for Stuart, cultural studies had to have a political sensibility, a critical edge, so all of his later academic work was engaged. Stuart [Hall] argued for a lifetime on the side of the oppressed and excluded.” [Bram Gieben, “Inspirations: Stuart Hall.” Concept: The Journal of Contemporary Communication Education Practice Today. Volume 5, number 1, spring 2014. Online publication. No pagination.]
           “If ‘Marxism without guarantees’ provided a theoretical departure point for a more open form of empirical enquiry, then how did it form the basis for [Stuart] Hall’s understanding of political opposition? It was informed by his reading of hegemony. If Thatcherism represented a hegemonic project that emerged as a response to the economic stagflation of the 1970s, then any response needs to challenge and contest its legitimacy at every level.” [Owen Worth, “Stuart Hall, Marxism without guarantees, and ‘The hard road to renewal.’” Capital & Class. Volume 38, number 3, 2013. Pages 480-487.]
      417. Thatcherism (Stuart Hall): He critiques the legacy of British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher.
           “It is a sign both of the defensiveness and the residual sectarianism afflicting many parts of the left that it misreads an injunction to analyse Thatcherism for a recommendation to swallow it whole. It is time to correct this fatal confusion, most of all because it is now so politically disabling. Unless the left can understand Ihatcherism what it is, why it arose, what its historical specificity is, the reasons for its success in redrawing the political map and disorganizing the left 𔂿 it cannot renew itself because it cannot understand the world it must live in if it is not to be ‘disappeared’ into permanent marginality. It is time, therefore, in the context of rethinking, to make clear exactly what is meant by learning from ␀Thatcherism,’ And we can do this, not only in general terms, but in relation to a concrete example: the current crisis surrounding the NHS [National Health Service].” [Stuart Hall. The Hard Road to Renewal: Thatcherism and the Crisis of the Left. London and New York: Verso imprint of New Left Books. 1990. Page 272.]
      418. cultural studies of numeracy (Patti Lather): They develop an approach, rooted in cultural studies, to quantitative work.
           “… we combined the history of mathematics, quantitative policy analysis, and qualitative research in education to look at what we have come to call cultural studies of numeracy. Inspired by feminist work in the ‘new materialisms’ …, we asked what this body of work might mean for social inquiry, especially its quantitative variants.…
           “… [There has been] a necessary turn for (post)critical inquiry given the digital lives we lead and the growth of ‘big data’ and technocratic governmentality. What we offer is our small contribution to the hope that numeracy will never be the same.”
           [Patti Lather, “Post-Face: Cultural Studies of Numeracy.” Cultural Studies ↔ Critical Methodologies. Volume 16, number 5, October 2016. Pages 502-505.]
      419. politics of cultural studies (Francis Mulhern): He considers the emancipatory aims of cultural studies.
           “There is no doubt that cultural studies has attempted to further emancipatory social aims—socialist, feminist, antiracist, anti-imperialist. Its intervention has been in those substantial, specified senses political. But it is romantic to go on thinking of cultural studies as an ‘intervention.’ It is now an instituted academic activity, and academic activity, whatever its intrinsic merits, is inevitably not the same thing as a political project. What happens when an oppositional tendency becomes a budget-holding discipline, offering credentials, careers, and research funds? More or less what any realistic observer would expect. No academic discipline may honorably or realistically apply political tests to its students and teachers.” [Francis Mulhern, “The politics of cultural studies.” Monthly Review: An Independent Socialist Magazine, Volume 47, issue 3, July/August 1995. Pages 31-39.]
      420. articulation theory (Stuart Hall, Jennifer Daryl Slack, Nakanishi Mikinori [Japanese, なかにし みきのり, Nakanishi Mikinori as pronounced in this MP3 audio file], and others): They develop an approach to ideology, positionality, and hierarchy in cultural studies.
           “I always use the word ‘articulation,’ though I don’t know whether the meaning I attribute to is is perfectly understood. In England, the term has a nice double meaning because ‘articulate’ means to utter, to speak forth, to be articulate. It carries that sense of language-ing, of expressing, etc. Buf we also speak of an ‘articulated’ lorry (truck) where the front (cab) and back (trailer) can, but need not necessarily be, connected to one another. The two parts are connected to each other, but through a specific lingage, that can be broken. An articulation is thus the form of the connection that can make a unity of two different elements, under certain conditions. It is a linkage which is not necessary, determined, absolute and essential for all time. You have to ask, under what circumstances can make a unity of two different elements, under certain conditions. It is a linkage which is not necessary, determined, absolute, and essential for all time. You have to ask, under what circumstances can a connection be forged or made? So the so-called ‘unity’ of discourse is really the articulation of different distinct elements which can be rearticulated in different ways because they have no necessary ‘belongingness.’ The ‘unity’ which matters is a linkage between that articulated discourse and the social forces with which it can, under certain historical conditions, but need not necessarily, be connected. Thus, a theory of articulation is both a way of understanding how ideological elements come, under certain condition, to cohere together within a discourse, and a way of asking how they do or do not become ariculated, at specific conjunctures, to certain political subjects. Let me put that the other way: the theory of articulation asks how an ideology discovers its subject rather than how the subject thinks the necessary and inevitable thoughts which belong to it; it enables us to think how an ideology empowers people, enabling them to begin to make some sense of intelligibility or their historical situation, without reducing those forms of intelligibility to their socioeconomic or class location or social position.” [Stuart Hall, “On Postmodernism and Articulation: An Interview with Stuart Hall.” Journal of Communication Inquiry. Volume 10, number 2, summer 1986. Pages 45-60.]
           “The State condenses very different social practices and transforms them into the operation of rule and domination over particular classes and other social groups. The way to reach such a conceptualization is not to substitute difference for its mirror opposite, unity, but to rethink both in terms of a new concept—articulation. This is exactly the step [Michel] Foucault refuses.…
           “… If [Jacques] Derrida … is correct in arguing that there is always a perpetual slippage of the signifier, a continuous ‘deference,’ it is aim correct to argue that without some arbitrary ‘fixing’ or what I am calling‘articulation,’ there would be no signification or meaning at all.…
           “The articulation of difference and unity involves a different way of trying to monopolize the key marxist concept of determination. Some of the classical formulations of base/superstructure which have dominated marxist theories of ideology, represent ways of thinking about determination which are essentially based on the idea of a necessary correspondence between one level of a social formation and another.”
           [Stuart Hall, “Signification, Representation, Ideology: Althusser and the Post-Structuralist Debates.” Critical Studies in Communication. Volume 2, number 2, June 1985. Pages 91-114.]
           “… neoliberalism never conquered everything. It operated within, and created, a world of great diversity and unevenness. Its early – classic – laboratory was Chile, but the rise of South East Asian tigers was, critically, a state-aided development (by no means the official neoliberal recipe). And in spite of the Western triumphalism of 1989, Russia also retains its specificities – a hybrid of oligarchic and state capitalism combined with authoritarianism. China, too, struggles to define a different model; it currently combines centralised party control with openness to foreign investment, and acute internal geographical dislocations and widespread social conflict with break-neck rates of growth and the lifting of hundreds of millions out of poverty. Indeed, conflict has erupted in many parts of the world where the neoliberal orthodoxy has been adopted. India, so frequently lauded for its embrace of the market consensus, exhibits both extraordinary rifts between the new elites and the impoverished, and multiple and persistent conflicts over its current economic strategy. Other major sites of conflict have been the water and gas wars in Bolivia, and the struggle of ‘the poors’ in Thailand. The emerging articulations of progressive governments and grassroots social movements in Latin America are, in varying ways and in varying degrees, responses to the impact of previous neoliberal policies.” [Stuart Hall, Doreen Massey, and Michael Rustin, “After neoliberalism: analysing the present.” Soundings. Volume 53, spring 2013. Pages 8-22.]
           “The concept of articulation is perhaps one of the most generative concepts in contemporary cultural studies. It is critical for understanding how cultural theorists conceptualize the world, analyse it and participate in shaping it. For some, articulation has achieved the status of theory, as in ‘the theory of articulation.’ Theoretically, articulation can be understood as a way of characterizing a social formation without falling into the twin traps of reductionism and essentialism. It can be seen as transforming ‘cultural studies from a model of communication (production-text-consumption; encoding-decoding) to a theory of contexts’ …. But articulation can also be thought of as a method used in cultural analysis. On the one hand, articulation suggests a methodological framework for understanding what a cultural study does. On the other hand, it provides strategies for undertaking a cultural study, a way of ‘contextualizing’ the object of one’s analysis.
           “However, articulation works at additional levels: at the levels of the epistemological, the political and the strategic. Epistemologically, articulation is a way of thinking the structures of what we know as a play of correspondences, non-correspondences and contradictions, as fragments in the constitution of what we take to be unities. Politically, articulation is a way of foregrounding the structure and play of power that entail in relations of dominance and subordination. Strategically, articulation provides a mechanism for shaping intervention within a particular social formation, conjuncture or context.”
           [Jennifer Daryl Slack, “The theory and method of articulation In cultural studies.” Stuart Hall: Critical Dialogues in Cultural Studies. David Morley and Kuan-Hsing Chen, editors. London and New York: Routledge imprint of Taylor & Francis Group, an Informa PLC business. 2005. Page 113-129.]
           “The word ‘articulation’ can be referred to as a kind of linkage between one thing and another.… [T]he concept of ‘articulation’ had originally been used centuries ago, implying various kinds of meanings related to some realms of dentistry, medicine, biology, and pronunciation. In earlier Cultural Studies, the concept of ‘articulation’ was not applied to its methodology. In the 1970s, that term did appear in the discipline. S. [Stuart] Hall …, the leading scholar in Cultural Studies in those days defined the word ‘articulation’ as follows: ‘Articulation is the form of connection that can make a unity of two different elements, under certain conditions. It is a linkage which is not necessary, determined, absolute and essential for all time.’” [Nakanishi Mikinori, “N. Fairclough’s Concept of Discourse in Terms of Articulation Theory.” 岐阜市立女子短期大学研究紀要第 / Qí-Fù-Shì-Lì-Nǚ-Zi-Duǎn-Qī-Dà-Xué-Yán-Jiū-Jì-Yào-Dì (Gifu City’s Women’s College Research). Volume 58, March 2009. Pages 21-26.]
           “We accept that it is tinkering, but we believe that sufficient political ‘space’ is offered within the ‘relative autonomy’ of state action for policy to be made more sensitive and responsive to people’s needs. Sensible and sensitive tinkering, we argue, may generate long-term and real advantages to be gained from the petty-commodity mode of production, and does not necessarily orchestrate the deformation and collapse of that mode. Our insights, drawn from different aspects of articulation theory, suggest ample opportunity and possibility for a renewal of dialogue between researchers and practitioners.” [Peter M. Ward and G. Chris Macoloo, “Articulation Theory and Self-Help Housing Practice in the 1990s.” International Journal of Urban and Regional Research. Volume 16, number 1, October 2009. Pages 60-80.]
      421. conjunctural analysis (Stuart Hall, Doreen Massey, and others): They engage in a conversation concerning a methodology for studying power arrangements in the field of cultural studies.
           “Thinking conjuncturally involves ‘clustering’ or assembling elements into a formation. However, there is no simple unity, no single ‘movement’ here, evolving teleologically, to which, say, all the artists of any moment can be said to belong. I try to assemble these three ‘moments’ in their fused but contradictory dispersion. As I will try to show, the late 1980s, a moment of explosive creativity in the black arts, is characterized by deep fissures which in turn set in train new trajectories that diverge rather than ‘adding up.’ That is why the 1980s remain so contested, a focus of unfulfilled desire. They can be ‘mapped’ only as the ‘Condensation’ of a series of overlapping, interlocking but non-corresponding ‘histories.’” [Stuart Hall, “Black Diaspora Artists in Britain: Three ‘Moments’ in Post-War History.” History Workshop Journal. Number 61, spring 2006. Pages 1-24.]
           “Doreen [Massey:] There are many different ways of thinking about the current crisis, but certainly one useful way is to think about the present as a conjuncture—this way of analysing was very productive in the discussions about Thatcherism in the late 1970s and 1980s in Marxism Today and elsewhere, in which you played a leading role. Perhaps we should start by thinking about what conjunctural analysis is, and how it differs from other kinds of analysis.…
           “Stuart [Hall:] So conjunctural analysis also means describing this kind of complex field of power and consent, and looking at its different levels of expression—political, ideological, cultural and economic. It’s about trying to see how all of that is deployed in the form of power which ‘hegemony’ describes.…
           “Stuart [Hall:] Think of how the celebrity culture has co-opted ordinary people into the belief that they too can be wealthy and famous. This has very real consequences for how you make a conjunctural analysis of the present. There is a temptation—because it’s the finance sector that has collapsed, thrown us into the crisis—to say, oh well, in the end ‘it’s the economy stupid’: as if the economy determines in a simple way. But if you just look at that, and left out these other conditions which make it possible, you wouldn’t really understand how power is working in this situation, and what is coming into crisis.”
           [Doreen Massey and Stuart Hall, “Interpreting the Crisis: Doreen Massey and Stuart Hall Discuss Ways of Understanding the Current Crisis.” Soundings. Volume 44, number 1, spring 2010. Pages 57-71.]
           “The concept of conjuncture was developed in the middle years of the last century as a way of thinking through the manifest misalignment with political realities of classical deterministic and economistic Marxist models of change. Contrary to classical predictions, western capitalism appeared, from the late 1950s, to be producing a rise rather than a fall in the living standards of the working class, and the working class was becoming more socially and politically divided rather than growing into a homogeneous and radical social force. Two fields of neo-Marxist theory contributed most to understanding the emerging situation.
           “On the one hand there were Antonio Gramsci’s ideas, which contributed an understanding of the complexity of regimes of class domination and subordination, and of the importance of the cultural dimensions of the social order in maintaining these.…
           “Complementary to the engagement with Gramsci’s ideas was the influence of Louis Althusser. He also challenged classical notions of economic determinism, by proposing a complex and multi-levelled model of the social order, in which, as with Gramsci, the ‘levels’ of ideology and the organisation of the state exercised their own causal powers.”
           [Michael Rustin, “Reflections on the Present: A conjunctural analysis of the current global financial crisis.” Soundings. Number 43, winter 2009. Pages 18-34.]
      422. renegotiation of a Caribbean consciousness with the African past (Stuart Hall): Hall, a Jamaican Briton and the founding editor of New Left Review, examines the development of an Afrocentric identity in the Caribbean.
           “The re-emergence of questions of ethnicity, of nationalism—the obduracy, the dangers and the pleasures of the rediscovery of identity in the modern world, inside and outside of Europe—places the question of cultural identity at the very centre of the contemporary political agenda. What I want to suggest is that despite the dilemmas and vicissitudes of identity through which Caribbean people have passed and continue to pass, we have a tiny but important message for the world about how to negotiate identity.…
           “… [There have been] attempts to name the unnameable, to speak about the possibilities of cultural identification, of the different traditions of the peoples for whom on the whole there were no cultural models, the peoples at the bottom of the society. And as you can imagine, that always involved a renegotiation, a rediscovery of Africa.…
           “… [There has been] a renegotiation of a Caribbean consciousness with the African past ….
           [Stuart Hall, “Negotiating Caribbean Identities.” New Left Review. Series I, number 209, January–February 1995. Pages 3-14.]
           “NLR [New Left Review] is a development of Universities and Left Review and The New Reasoner. The political discussion which those two journals have begun, and the contacts they have made are the basis of the New Left. Whatever we are able to do in the journal will, we believe, be an organic growth out of the two different traditions from which we began. In particular, we are anxious to maintain the wide scope of NLR. We are convinced that politics, too narrowly conceived, has been a main cause of the decline of socialism in this country, and one of the reasons for the disaffection from socialist ideas of young people in particular.” [Stuart Hall, “Editorial.” New Left Review. Series I, number 1, January–February 1960. Pages 1-3.]
      423. culture–and–society tradition (Raymond Williams and others): This designation—derived from one of Williams’ books by the same name—has been given, by a significant number of his fellow cultural studies scholars, to the specific orientation towards cultural studies which he and others developed, or reconstructed, during his highly productive academic career. Many of those references are included under this listing.
           “As schools go, … [Matthew] Arnold was himself firmly embedded in the ‘culture-and-society tradition,’ in the words of Richard Hoggart, with which phrase he honours the literary genealogy that Raymond Williams constructed in Culture and Society. Williams himself called it ‘the tradition of English social criticism,’ of which the chief feature was the emergence of ‘culture’ as a ‘criticism of what has been called the bourgeois idea of society.’” [James Walter Caufield, “‘Poetry is the Reality’: Matthew Arnold Tackles the Athletes of Logic (and Theory).” The Cambridge Quarterly. Volume 39, number 3, September 2010. Pages 237-259.]
           “In the study of mass arts, there is need for more connections than have commonly been made between humanistic disciplines as traditionally defined and the ‘human studies’ within the social sciences. I have in mind, for example, the impressively theoretical European tradition in the study of ‘culture and society’ during the nineteenth century, as well as large parts of American social scientific work in this century.” [Richard Hoggart, “Humanistic Studies and Mass Culture.” Daedalus. Volume 99, number 2, spring 1970. Pages 451-472.]
           “In re-creating something of the original and, as it seems to me, most illuminating context of this part of [Richard] Hoggart’s early work, I am not intending to belittle his achievement. The Uses of Literacy, the first half above all, remains a brave and important book to have written at any point. But almost all discussion of that work is now coloured by a kind of double retrospective teleology. The more obvious of these is conventionally dated back to 1964 and the founding of the Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies (CCCS) at Birmingham: the book’s role as a founding text for ‘cultural studies’ has undoubtedly shaped much interpretation of it. The less obvious perspective dates from 1958 and the appearance of [Raymond] Williams’s Culture and Society: the timing of the two books, the partially similar class backgrounds, and the class concerns of the two authors led to their being bracketed together in subsequent discussion, and led, most importantly for my purpose, to Hoggart’s book being treated as a late contribution to what it soon became common to call ‘the culture-and-society tradition.’ By the mid-1960s this emphasis was given a kind of official endorsement by the in-house account of the Birmingham Centre’s history (largely written by Stuart Hall) which saw Hoggart’s book as part of ‘the response to industrialism,’ ‘the prolonged engagement of the literary imagination with industrial society,’ that had been charted by Williams.” [Stefan Collini, “Richard Hoggart: Literary Criticism and Cultural Decline in Twentieth-Century Britain.” Richard Hoggart and Cultural Studies. Sue Owen, editor. New York: Palgrave Macmillan imprint of St Martin’s Press LLC. 2008. Pages 33-56.]
           “In the 1940s and 1950s, three Central European refugees in England, Frederick Antal, Francis Klingender and Arnold Hauser, offered an alternative cultural history, a ‘social history’ of art and literature. In the 1950s and 1960s, the studies of culture and society by Raymond Williams, Edward Thompson and others continued or reconstructed this tradition. Thompson, for instance, objected to the location of popular culture in what he called the ‘thin air’ of meanings, attitudes and values, and attempted to situate it in ‘its proper material abode,’ ‘a working environment of exploitation and resistance to exploitation.’” [Peter Burke. Varieties of Cultural History. Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press. 1997. Pages 185-186.]
           “… [Raymond] Williams was severely deprived of the materials from which to construct a socialist criticism—indeed it is a grimly ironic mark of that deprivation that the social tradition to which he was forced to resort in Culture and Society was one of almost uniform political reaction. The English Marxism available to him was little more than an intellectual irrelevance; indeed if a Marxist criticism comes about in English society, one might risk the paradox that one of its sources will be the fact that Williams had in his own time to reject it.” [Terry Eagleton, “Criticism and Politics: The Work of Raymond Williams.” New Left Review. Series I, number 95, January–February 1976. Pages 3-23.]
           “Cultural Studies as a distinctive problematic, emerges from … the mid-1950s.… The two books which helped to stake out the new terrain—[Richard] Hoggart’s Uses of Literacy and [Raymond] Williams’s Culture and Society—were both, in different ways, works (in part) of recovery.… Culture and Society—in one and the same movement—constituted a tradition (the ‘culture-and-society’ tradition), defined its ‘unity’ (not in terms of common positions but in its characteristic concerns and the idiom of its inquiry), itself made a distinctive modern contribution to it—and wrote its epitaph. The Williams book which succeeded it—The Long Revolution—clearly indicated that the ‘culture-and-society’ mode of reflection could only be completed and developed by moving somewhere else—to a significantly different kind of analysis.…
           “Two rather different ways of conceptualizing cultures can be drawn out of the many suggestive formulations in Raymond Williams’s Long Revolution. The first relates ‘cultures’ to the sum of the available descriptions through which societies make sense cf and reflect their common experience.…
           “If this first emphasis takes up and re-works the connotation of the term ‘culture’ with the domain of ‘ideas,’ the second emphasis is more deliberately anthropological, and emphasizes that aspect of cultures which refers to social practices.”
           [Stuart Hall, “Cultural studies: two paradigms.” Media, Culture & Society: A Critical Reader. Richard Collins, James Curran, Nicholas Garnham, Paddy Scannell, Philip Schlesinger and Colin Sparks, editors. Thousand Oaks, California: SAGE Publications, Inc. 1986. Pages 33-48. Originally published as: Stuart Hall, “Cultural studies: two paradigms.” Media, Culture & Society. Volume 2, number 1, January 1980. Pages 57-72.]
           “Few would dispute the assertion that Raymond Williams’s Culture and Society 1780-1950 has had and even continues to have a definitive in- fluence on what appears to be the dominant British tradition of thinking on culture in its relation to social and political theory.…
           “… we should not foreclose the many-aspected debates current among English radicals of the [19]20s and [19[30s. Nor should we assume that their recalcitrance to the ‘culture and society’ tradition has nothing to teach us at this juncture about the value of a political and material critique that emerges from self-consciously positioned knowledge.”
           [David Lloyd and Paul Thomas, “Culture and Society or ‘Culture and the State’?” Social Text. Number 30, 1982. Pages 27-56.]
           “Cultural studies proponents of all sorts, stemming from [Richard] Hoggart’s … original analysis of working-class discourse, Raymond Williams’ … culture-and-society perspective, neo-Marxist theories of culture and feminist approaches to culture, contend that culture is not an undifferentiated system that serves to integrate society (e.g., [Talcott] Parsons, … following [David ‘Émile’] Durkheim) but instead is a region of serious contest and conflict over meaning. For this reason, cultural studies proponents do not talk about a single culture but rather about many, often cross-cutting cultures — cultures of class, race, gender and nation, amongst others. Indeed, cultural politics is considered an important auxiliary of traditional class politics, more narrowly defined in economic terms.” [Ben Agger. Cultural Studies As Critical Theory. London and New York: Routledge imprint of Taylor & Francis Group, an Informa PLC business. 2014. Page 20.]
           “In 1958 he [Raymond Williams] published Culture and Society …, in which he reviewed the tradition of Criticism, offering a radical reinterpretation of it.…
           “Here we meet the limits of Literary Criticism as a totalizing perspective. Stripped of its elite, judgemental character and applied to lived cultures, the Culture and Society tradition could not generate any sense of determination.”
           [Steve Baron, “The Study of Culture: Cultural Studies and British Sociology Compared.” Acta Sociologica. Volume 28, number 2, 1985. Pages 71-85.]
           “[Raymond] Williams evoked ‘organic’ ways of thinking and feeling, as antitheses to the instrumentalism and individualism which characterised capitalism as a way of life. This was the significance of the ‘Culture and Society’ tradition in his thought. As someone deeply influenced by Marxism, and by collectivist working class movements, Williams saw capitalism to be a connected and dynamic system, and was not afraid to refer to it by its name.” [Michael Rustin, “The Long Revolution revisited.” Soundings. Volume 35, spring 2007. Pages 16-30.]
           “… it is clear that [Raymond] Williams has left us with some original analyses and concepts. However, it is not clear that his importance will ultimately rest with those areas that have been appropriated so far, for example, the idea of a ‘whole way of life,’ the ‘Long Revolution’ in culture or the ‘Culture and Society’ tradition. It will be necessary to continue the work of exploring Williams more specialised writings on dramas, his concept of a knowable community and his discussion of structures of feeling.” [Brian Longhurst, “Raymond Williams: The Sociological Legacy.” Sociology. Volume 24, number 3, August 1990. Pages 519-527.]
           “He [Raymond Williams] was one of the first to elucidate the particularly complex history of the idea of culture, beginning with the romantic critique of capitalism, which served as the basis for the ‘culture and society tradition’ he famously identified and analyzed.…
           “Williams’s insistence on a common culture does not mark a wholesale break with the culture and society tradition. Rather, he frustrates fellow leftists throughout his career—from figures … otherwise antithetical …, to those largely sympathetic to him, like Stuart Hall—by recovering elements of British cultural discourse buried in a century of conservative ‘appropriation.’ …
           “For Williams, … [the] understanding of experience as an active social practice irreducible to individual consciousness or objective, structural determination breaks down many of the conceptual dualisms—artistic vision and natural sight, production and reception, artist and audience, the individual and social institutions—that supported the development of the minority culture model within the culture and society tradition.”
           [Jason M. Baskin, “Romanticism, Collaboration, Culture: Raymond Williams Beyond the Avant-Garde.” Cultural Critique. Volume 83, winter 2013. Pages 108-136.]
           “Raymond Williams’ ‘culture and society’ tradition includes Thomas Carlyle ….” [Graham Pechey, “‘A Complex and Violent Revelation’: Epiphanies of Africa in South African Literature.” Pretexts: literary and cultural studies. Volume 11, number 1, July 2002. Pages 9-25.]
           “[Raymond] Williams’s … argument for a common culture was first developed in … Culture and Society 1780-1950, … in which he moved beyond the English ‘culture and society tradition’ the book so innovatively reviewed and analyzed while making both his review and his moving beyond it the condition of a possibility of ‘a new general theory of culture.’” [Álvaro Pina, “Freedom, Community, and Raymond Williams’s Project of a Common Culture.” Cultural Studies ↔ Critical Methodologies. Volume 5, number 2, 2005. Pages 230-249.]
           “Many … wanted to think about contemporary culture from different, more ideologically smudged vantage points than the ones generally on offer (e.g romantic, modernist, anti-modernist, etc.), within what Raymond Williams called the ‘culture and society’ tradition.” [Dick Hebdige, “Contemporizing ‘subculture’: 30 years to life.” European Journal of Cultural Studies. Volume 15, number 3, 2012. Pages 399-424.]
           “Raymond Williams … [wrote the] study, Culture and Society 1780-1950. For in that book Williams re-read the Romantic ‘culture and society’ tradition (the British version of Continental ‘aesthetic’ discourse) in order to extract the ‘radical elements’ (eg. ‘community’) from a deeply conservative lineage in order to produce an organicist socialist humanist discourse tied to the reformist policies of a [British] Labour corporatism ultimately accommodating to bourgeois hegemony.” [Jean-Philippe Wade, “‘The Humanity of the Sense’: Terry Eagleton’s Political Journey to The Ideology of the Aesthetic.” Theoria: A Journal of Social and Political Theory. Number 77, May 1991. Pages 39-57.]
           “What at last came through, theoretically, in the significant new keywords of ‘culture’ and ‘society’, was the now familiar model: of the arts on the one hand, the social structure on the other, with the assumption of significant relations between them. Yet the types of theory developed from this model were not yet especially useful. This is as true of the immensely influential ‘base and superstructure’ version—in practice more widely adopted than just in Marxist or other socialist movements—as of the various versions of an elite, in which there was a structural affinity between high culture and forms of social privilege deemed necessary to sustain it.” [Raymond Williams, “The Uses of Cultural Theory.” New Left Review. Series I, number 158, July–August 1986. Pages 19-31.]
           “What matters here—and it is a very significant amendment of orthodox Marxist thinking about art—is that art work is itself, before everything, a material process; and that, although differentially, the material process of the production of art includes certain biological processes, especially those relating to body movements and to the voice, which are not a mere substratum but are at times the most powerful elements of the work.” [Raymond Williams, “Problems of Materialism.” New Left Review. Series I, number 109, May–June 1978. Pages 3-17.]
           “A cultural revolution is then always practically centred on the areas and processes of knowledge and decision, each ineffective without the other. In going beyond those changes in the relations of production which are practicable, especially at the distributive level, within persistent inequalities in control of and access to the underlying productive forces—changes which have been both partly achieved and programmatically projected in social-democratic and in ‘actually existing socialist’ formations—cultural revolution—but then, in effect, any full revolution—works for those more general (and necessarily connected) changes which, in changing the whole mode of production, would be at once the processes and the conditions of a general human emancipation.” [Raymond Williams, “Beyond Actually Existing Socialism.” New Left Review. Series I, number 120, March–April 1980. Pages 3-19.]
           “Within both Marxism and structuralism there are diverse tendencies, and there is further diversity in other tendencies in part influenced by them. Several of these tendencies are in sharp opposition to each other. This has to be emphasized not only to prevent reductive labelling but for a more positive reason, that some of these tendencies are compatible with the existing dominant paradigm of literary studies while others are incompatible and have for some years been challenging the dominant paradigm—and thus its profession. I am using ‘paradigm’ broadly in Kuhn’s sense of a working definition of a perceived field of knowledge, indeed of an object of knowledge, based on certain fundamental hypotheses, which carries with it definitions of appropriate methods of discovering and establishing such knowledge.…
           “… The alternative to naturalism is a realism which, while faithful to the contemporary reality which is its subject, is concerned above all to discern the underlying movements in it. Great stress is then put on realism as a dynamic rather than a static category.”
           [Raymond Williams, “Marxism, Structuralism and Literary Analysis.” New Left Review. Series I, number 129, September–October 1981. Pages 51-66.]
           “In 1829, in the Edinburgh Review, [Thomas] Carlyle published his important essay, Signs of the Times. The essay was his first main contribution to the social thought of his time, yet it is perhaps also his most comprehensive contribution. It is a short essay, of little more than twenty pages, yet it states a general position which was to be the basis of all Carlyle’s subsequent work, and which, moreover, was to establish it self in the general thinking of many other writers, and as a major element in the tradition of English social criticism.” [Raymond Williams. Culture and Society: 1780–1950. Garden City, New York: Anchor Books imprint of Doubleday & Company, Inc. 1960. Page 77.]
           “… though Mechanism, wisely contrived, has done much for man in a social and moral point of view, we cannot be persuaded that it has ever been the chief source of his worth or happiness.… Were Painting and Sculpture created by forethought, brought into the world by institutions for that end? No; Science and Art have, from first to last, been the free gift of Nature; an unsolicited, unexpected gift; often even a fatal one. These things rose up, as it were, by spontaneous growth, in the free soil and sunshine of Nature. They were not planted or grafted, nor even greatly multiplied or improved by the culture or manuring of institutions. Generally speaking, they have derived only partial help from these; often enough have suffered damage. They made constitutions for themselves. They originated in the Dynamical nature of man, not in his Mechanical nature.” [Thomas Carlyle, “Signs of the Times.” Edinburgh Review. Volume 49, June 1829. Pages 439-459.]
           “The growth in media studies and cultural studies has been remarkable, in the last twenty years. A space which does not exist, to any effect, within the major news-and-opinion institutions is carved out in other institutions, mainly educational.… But it is then obvious that the conditions under which such work is done are radically different from those in which the work being studied is and in most cases has to be done. It is understandable that reporters and editors, who work under considerable pressure, especially of time, are impatient when confronted by analyses of their work made by researchers who seem to have all the time in the world. I remember a related exchange between a gifted analyst of television and a gifted producer. The analyst had indicated a particular effect through a particular use of shot. ‘Tell me that,’ said the producer, ‘next time I’m filming in the rain on Liverpool Docks at five in the morning.’ But then neither position, as it stands, can be quite accepted.” [Raymond Williams, “Isn’t the News Terrible?” What I Came to Say. Collected essays by Raymond Williams. Neil Belton, Francis Mulhern, and Jenny Taylor, editors. London: Hutchinson Radius. 1989. Pages 140-148. Originally published as: Raymond Williams, “Isn’t the news terrible?” London Review of Books. Volume 2, number 13, July 1980. Pages 6-7.]
           “What quite rapidly happened is that modernism lost its antibourgeois stance, and achieved comfortable integration into the new international capitalism. Its attempt at a universal market, trans-frontier and trans-class, turned out to be spurious. Its forms lent themselves to cultural competition and the commercial interplay of obsolescence, with its shifts of schools, styles and fashion so essential to the market.” [Raymond Williams, “When Was Modernism?” New Left Review. Series I, number 175, May–June 1989. Pages 48-52.]
           “[Karl] Marx argued that by their common membership of a particular class, men will think and act in certain common ways even though they do not belong to the same actual communities, and that the processes of ‘society’ are in fact best understood in terms of the interaction of these classes. Thus, in the nineteenth century, while the abstract descriptions of ‘individual’ and ‘society’ retained their force, a number of new descriptions were made and emphasized, their general import being the indication of particular kinds of relationship. It is on this whole range – rising, as we have seen, from a complex of historical changes and rival intellectual traditions – that certain twentieth-century disciplines have acted.” [Raymond Williams. The Long Revolution. Orchard Park, New York: Broadview Press, Ltd. 2001. Page 95.]
           “‘You’re a Marxist, aren’t you?’ This question would be difficult but not too difficult to answer, if only it ever got asked. But what happens instead of a question is, in my experience, something rather different. There is a kind of flat labelling with this term ‘Marxist’, which became increasingly common during the 1960s and is now a matter of course. I find, looking into my own experience, that I get described as a Marxist here and there in all sorts of contexts and with all sorts of implications. I looked myself up once in the Anatomy of Britain and found myself described as ‘the Marxist Professor of Communications’ and I thought: ‘well, I’m not a professor, I don’t teach communications; I don’t know whether the first term of the description would be more or less accurate than the others.’ Then again, I mix a good deal in what is known in the orthodox press as the extreme Left, which is now composed of many different and in some senses competing organizations. There one very common tactic of argument is to say that somebody is ‘not a Marxist’, in much the flat way that is used from the other side. Or there is the formulation which has become very familiar (almost as familiar as that famous one from between the wars, ‘it is no accident that …’): the flat announcement that ‘this position has nothing in common with Marxism’. Inside the militant socialist organizations, the revolutionary socialist organizations, you hear this kind of argument all the time. People say it to each other about positions which, from the outside, get the one flat label ‘Marxist.’” [Raymond Williams. Resources of Hope: Culture, Democracy, Socialism. Robin Gable, editor. London and New York: Verso imprint of New Left Books. 1989. Page 81.]
           “… no methodology here, thank you; only sincere and vital emotion. But who decides the sincerity and vitality? If you need to ask that you couldn’t begin to understand the answer. People decide it, in themselves and in an active and collaborative critical process.” [Raymond Williams, “Literature and Sociology: in memory of Lucien Goldmann.” New Left Review. Series I, number 67, May–June 1971. Pages 3-18.]
           “Any modern approach to a Marxist theory of culture must begin by considering the proposition of a determining base and a determined superstructure. From a strictly theoretical point of view this is not, in fact, where we might choose to begin. It would be in many ways preferable if we could begin from a proposition which originally was equally central, equally authentic: namely the proposition that social being determines consciousness. It is not that the two propositions necessarily deny each other or are in contradiction. But the proposition of base and superstructure, with its figurative element, with its suggestion of a fixed and definite spatial relationship, constitutes, at least in certain hands, a very specialized and at times unacceptable version of the other proposition. Yet in the transition from Marx to Marxism, and in the development of mainstream Marxism itself, the proposition of the determining base and the determined superstructure has been commonly held to be the key to Marxist cultural analysis.” [Raymond Williams, “Base and Superstructure in Marxist Cultural Theory.” Media and Cultural Studies: Key Works. Revised edition. Meenakshi Gigi Durham and Douglas M. Kellner, editors. Malden, Massachusetts: Blackwell Publishing Ltd. 2006. Pages 130-143. Also published as: Raymond Williams, “Base and Superstructure in Marxist Cultural Theory.” New Left Review. Series I, number 82, November–December 1983. Pages 3-16.]
           “Capitalism represents a development of meaning in that it has been increasingly used to indicate a particular and historical economic system rather than any economic system as such. Capital and at first capitalist were technical terms in any economic system. The later … uses of capitalist moved towards specific functions in a particular stage of historical development; it is this use that crystallized in capitalism. There was a sense of the capitalist as the useless but controlling intermediary between producers, or as the employer of labour, or, finally, as the owner of the means of production. This involved, eventually, and especially in [Karl] Marx, a distinction of capital as a formal economic category from capitalism as a particular form of centralized ownership of the means of production, carrying with it the system of wage-labour.” [Raymond Williams. Keywords: A vocabulary of culture and society. Revised edition. New York: Oxford University Press. 1983. Page 51.]
           “Raymond Williams’ Culture and Society appeared in the ideological climate of the cold war and bears all the makes of it.… There are, however, two reasons why I am going back to this text. First, Williams is a thinker whose significance is not sufficiently appreciated in this country [India]. It is rather sad that his seminal contributions were relegated by Althusserian arguments in the Seventies and then by the spate of poststructuralist and Derridean deconstruction. It is often not sufficiently appreciated that Williams addresses these intellectual formations in his later writings, albeit obliquely. My second reason is that where Williams is heard, it is more often as the author of Culture and Society, as if his later writings were just an old-style Marxist justification of all that he said in this book.” [R. Shashidhar, “Culture and Society: An Introduction to Raymond Williams.” Social Scientist. Volume 25, number 5/6, May–June 1997. Pages 33-53.]
           “I wanted to show how rich and rigorous Raymond Williams’s long-standing engagement in the study of cinema was, and to that end I invite the reader to continue the discovery of Williams’s film corpus.… The reader will find in this concise bit of writing many of the themes we’ve encountered across the corpus of Williams’s interventions into cinema culture ….” [Dana Polan’s preface to Raymond Williams, “Film and the Cultural Tradition.” Cinema Journal. Volume 52, number 3, spring 2013. Pages 19-24.]
           “Whenever a great intellectual and moral presence like Raymond Williams suddenly disappears from his habitual place among us it is natural at first to restore him by various ceremonies and activites of commemoration. The sense of loss and bereavement that was felt immediately after Williams’s death in 1988 has been an instigation not only for public observances of grief and respect but also for our many private acts of recollection and retrospective admiration. I knew him mainly from his immensely grand but directly appealing oeuvre. Certainly the handful of times that I had met him came to mind with all sorts of poignant emphases as, along with many others, I reconstructed from our intermittent meetings the vital personality of his engaging and thoughtful human presence. He was someone many of us listened to—the sound patterns of his direct communication to audiences as speaker, conversationalist and lecturer are discernible in everything he wrote—and from whom all of us quite literally learned a great deal of what is important about modern Western culture.” [Edward W. Said, “Narrative, Geography and Interpretation.” New Left Review. Series I, number 180, March–April 1990. Pages 81-100.]
           “Raymond Williams was a revolutionary. He believed that fundamental shifts in the distribution of political and economic power were necessary in order to change decisively the terms and trajectory of social development to the advantage of the great majority of people in society. However, he was not a Jacobin or a Bolshevik; there was to be no Year Zero. No severance between past, present, and future was contemplated. Recognition of the importance of both continuity and change lay at the heart of his creative enterprise. It was an enterprise in which, as a teacher, critic, novelist, and political activist, he focused upon the mediations between the ordinary commitments of everyday life and the wider relationships in which they take place. Consequently, his investigations did not attempt to employ reason and historical study to dissolve tradition, nor did he attempt to restore, conserve or perpetuate existing traditions of discussion on culture. On the contrary, he used historical study and criticism to ratify what he regarded as positive traditions or continuities to which each new generation shaped its own creative response.” [Don Milligan. Raymond Williams: Hope and Defeat in the Struggle for Socialism. Manchester, England: Studies in Anti-Capitalism. 2007. Creative Commons (with attribution). Page 5.]
           “It is a basic proposition of the social constructionist perspective on masculinity that there are different kinds of masculinities within society. It is also understood that lived masculinities are negotiated performances that maintain the gender scripts that are ‘out there’ in the culture, in institutions, and in relationships and reveal relations of dominance and subordination …. The culturally idealized form of masculinity, hegemonic masculinity, may not be the lived form of masculinity at all, but it remains a powerful, perhaps the dominant, script against which self and others are evaluated across the life course. These points have now been clearly disclosed in theory … and recently in the popular press ….” [Edward H. Thompson, Jr. and Patrick M. Whearty, “Older Men’s Social Participation: The Importance of Masculinity Ideology .” The Journal of Men’s Studies. Volume 13, number 1, October 2004. Pages 5-24.]
           “… without clear cultural guidelines for being an older man, what masculinity expectations guide older men’s lives? Prior empirical work has begun to map the ways in which masculinities and aging are jointly embodied. Some of this body of work puts gender into a life course context and listens to the stories of old men negotiating their masculinities ….” [Edward H. Thompson, Jr and Kaitlyn Barnes Langendoerfer, “Older Men’s Blueprint for ‘Being a Man.’” Men and Masculinities. Volume 19, number 2, June 2016. Pages 119-147.]
      424. cultural materialism (Raymond Williams, Marvin Harris, and others): The develop a materialistic theory of sociocultural phenomena. The term cultural materialism was coined by Williams.
           “What is actually latent in historical materialism is not, in [Georg] Lukács’s categorical sense, a theory of art, but a way of understanding the diverse social and material production (necessarily often by individuals within actual relationships) of works to which the connected but also changing categories of art have been historically applied. I call this position cultural materialism, and I see it as a diametrically opposite answer to the questions which Lukács and other Marxists have posed.” [Raymond Williams, “Lukács: A Man without Frustration.” What I Came to Say. Collected essays by Raymond Williams. Neil Belton, Francis Mulhern, and Jenny Taylor, editors. London: Hutchinson Radius. 1989. Pages 326-334.]
           “Cultural materialism is the strategy I have found to be most effective in my attempt to understand the causes of differences and similarities among societies and cultures. It is based on the simple premise that human social life is a response to the practical problems of earthly existence. I hope to show in this book that cultural materialism leads to better scientific theories about the causes of sociocultural phenomena than any of the rival strategies that are currently available. I do not claim that it is a perfect strategy but merely that it is more effective than the alternatives.” [Marvin Harris. Cultural Materialism: The Struggle for a Science of Culture. Walnut Creek, California: AltaMira Press imprint of Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc. 2001. Page xv.]
           “The essence of cultural materialism is that it directs attention to the interaction between behavior and environment as mediated by the human organism and its cultural apparatus. It does so as an order of priority in conformity with the prediction that group structure and ideology are responsive to these classes of material conditions.” [Marvin Harris. The Rise of Anthropological Theory: A History of Theories of Culture. New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company. 1968. Page 659.]
           “[Raymond] Williams’s political engagements, in the domestic and international crises of the time, were now declaratively revolutionary, and Marxism was the terrain on which he forwarded the theoretical programme he sometimes called cultural materialism. At the same time, his work was called into question on new grounds, as critical investigations of race and racism and the subordination of women claimed their places at the centre of cultural theory and politics.” [Francis Mulhern, “Culture and Society, Then and Now.” New Left Review. Series II, number 55, January–February 2009. Pages 31-45.]
           “[Raymond] Williams sometimes declared that he preferred to think of himself as a revolutionary socialist or communist and historical materialist than as a Marxist. The term ‘Marxist’ was being adopted because it was felt to be ‘more polite than Communist’ but it was wrong to reduce a whole tradition in which millions had participated to ‘a single thinker, however great.’ On the other hand Williams had no hesitation in accepting basic propositions of historical materialism and in making his own distinctive contributions to them in the form of ‘cultural materialism.’” [Robin Blackburn, “Raymond Williams and the Politics of a New Left.” New Left Review. Series I, number 168, Marh–April 1988. Pages 12-22.]
           “… in spite of his [Raymond Williams’] own popular coinage ‘cultural materialism,’ Williams precisely exemplified … [the] idea of mediation between History herself—history as process, as structure, as material if you like but as forceful and actual Thing for sure—and the individual agent, whether a class or a person, battling to find some sufficient answers to questions about what the hell is going on.” [Fred Inglis, “The Figures of Dissent.” New Left Review. Series I, number 215, January–February 1996. Pages 83-92.]
      425. cultural studies of science (Joseph Rouse): He focuses upon the transformative character of scientific practices.
           “Such interpretive programs that focus upon the emerging, sometimes contested, significance of scientific research exemplify what I mean by ‘cultural studies of science.’ Cultural studies of science thus do not reduce science to culture, as if these were discrete and separable in the first place, nor do they programmatically challenge the cultural authority accrued by the natural sciences. Cultural studies instead focus critically upon how and why science matters, to whom, and how people’s possibilities for meaningful action and understanding are reconfigured in part through the development of scientific practices. This emphasis upon reshaping people’s situation … is characteristic of cultural studies. Accounting for the intertwining of knowledge and power is thus central to cultural studies, both because scientific practices significantly transform what people can do and how they can understand themselves, and because scientific practices are responsive to conflicts and resonances within larger patterns of cultural practice.… Neither power nor knowledge is a thing agents or knowers possess or exercise. Power and knowledge are instead dynamic structural features of agents’ and knowers’ situations: action and inquiry are conditioned by a field of power relations and prior knowledge, which they also partially transform.” [Joseph Rouse, “Engaging Science through Cultural Studies.” PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association. Volume 2, 1994. Pages 396-401.]
           “… a number of leftist critics expressed concern that the only result of the cultural studies of science might be an epistemological relativism that makes science impotent in the cause of leftist politics. They called for a return to a materialist analysis of political economy.… [The] emphasis on epistemology made it more difficult to realize the ontological implications of the cultural studies of science and the criticism of ethnographic writing, that is, how both, when taken together, suggested a rethinking of the relationship of nature and technology, body and machine, the lively and the inert, the virtual and the real, all befitting the age of teletechnology. The cultural studies of science and the early criticism ethnographic writing, I am suggesting, pointed to a new understanding of materialism and a revision of ontology, both of which are needed in the age of teletechology.” [Patricia Ticineto Clough, “On the Relationship of the Criticism of Ethnographic Writing and the Cultural Studies of Science.” Cultural Studies ↔ Critical Methodologies. Volume 1, number 2, May 2001. Pages 240-270.]
      426. critical–constructive reflection (Lars Bækgaard as pronounced in this MP3 audio file and Christian T. Lystbæk as pronounced in this MP3 audio file): They examine how research methodology can be regarded as a reflective practice.
           “In this paper, we present a reflexive approach to research design as a means to enhance the reflexivity of the students and thereby enrich their learning experience of research methodology as a reflective practice. We contribute to the growing literature arguing that research methodology should not be considered or taught as beginning from a predetermined starting point or as proceeding through a fixed sequence of steps. Research is a reflective process, i.e. a process that involves continuous alignments and adjustments between different components of the design.…
           “We have experienced a crucial limitation in the many courses and textbooks that are based on the assumption that research methodology involves the application of methods to technical problems, and accordingly on the assumption that teaching research methodology is an add-on process, i.e. about accumulation and reproduction of performance skills and competencies, technical tips and tricks. However, we find that research is better described as involving the alignment and adjustment of methodological choices and considerations, i.e. higher-order abilities, such as the ability to critically reflect on how to apply methods and techniques in specific research projects. As such, it involves continuous critical-constructive reflection on how to align and adjust methods and techniques them to the research purpose, problems and possibilities at hand.”
           [Lars Bækgaard and Christian T. Lystbæk, “From Methods to Design: Teaching Research Methodology as a Reflective Practice.” European Conference on Research Methodology for Business and Management Studies. Editor, unknown. Kidmore End, England: Kidmore End Academic Conferences International Limited. June, 2016. Pages 43-50.]
      427. public pedagogy (Henry Armand Giroux): He applies cultural studies to the emancipatory and regulatory relations between power, culture, and politics.
           “My own interest in cultural studies emerges from an ongoing project to theorize the regulatory and emancipatory relationship among culture, power, and politics as expressed through the dynamics of what I call public pedagogy. Such a project concerns, in part, the diverse ways in which culture functions as a contested sphere over the production, distribution, and regulation of power, and how and where it operates both symbolically and institutionally as an educational, political, and economic force. Drawing upon a long tradition in cultural studies work, I take up culture as constitutive and political, not only reflecting larger forces but also constructing them; in this instance, culture not only mediates history but shapes it. I want to argue that culture is the primary terrain for realizing the political as an articulation and intervention into the social, a space in which politics is pluralized, recognized as contingent, and open to many formations.” [Henry A. Giroux, “Cultural Studies, Public Pedagogy, and the Responsibility of Intellectuals.” Communication and Critical/Cultural Studies. Volume 1, number 1, March 2004. Pages 59-79.]
      428. new authoritarianism (Henry Armand Giroux): To Giroux, Donald Trump is its symbol.
           “[Donald John] Trump is the symbol of a new authoritarianism, which is to say, the sign of a democracy unable to protect and sustain itself. Trump represents corporate domination set free, a political and economic engine that both fuels and feeds on fear and intolerance. He is also the endpoint of a long-standing political system that is ‘part bread-and-circuses spectacle, part celebrity obsession, and part media money machine.’ Trump is the symbol of a frightened society that is increasingly seduced to choose the swagger of a vigilante strongman over the processes of collective sovereignty, the gun over diplomacy, and the wall instead of the bridge. Trump’s public rants and humiliating snipes make for great TV, and are, as Frank Rich once argued, ‘another symptom of a political virus that can’t be quarantined and whose cure is as yet unknown.’ What the American public needs is an ongoing analysis of Trump’s messaging in the context of the historical legacies of white bigotry and intolerance, and an analysis of how right-wing politics have tapped such bigotry to further the self-serving interests of a small economic elite. Such an analysis would situate Trump in the context of the historical racism that has smoldered as a form low-intensity warfare in the United States since its inception, and that has arguably worsened for communities of color since the rise of neo-conservativism in the 1980s. Trump has simply discarded the euphemisms and deploys the ruse of national security to take bigotry, sexism, xenophobia, and political bullying to more aggressive levels.” [Henry A. Giroux. America at War with Itself. San Francisco, California: Open Media Series imprint of City Lights Books. 2017. Pages 31-32.]
      429. comedic and feminist perspectives on the hubris of philosophy (Susan Bordo): She considers, from a cultural studies perspective, the detachment from the physical body, the body of society, and materiality as a whole.
           “The mockery of the aspirations of the intellect has been a central theme of comedy from Aristophanes to Oscar Wilde, and from George Bernard Shaw to Woody Allen. And what is funny about the aspirations of the intellect is what is tragic about those same aspirations from the point of view of tragedy: the inevitable failure of the attempt to detach oneself from the body – the personal body, the social body, and the material contingencies of life in general.
           “We are most familiar with Philosophy’s traditional disdain for the body in the form of the dominant tendency to view instinctual response and emotional reaction as requiring the scrutiny of a dispassionate reason, but never the other way around.”
           [Susan Bordo, “The Cultural Overseer and the Tragic Hero: Comedic and Feminist Perspectives on the Hubris of Philosophy.” Soundings: An Interdisciplinary Journal. Volume 65, number 2, summer 1982. Pages 181-205.]
      430. gendered framework of family viewing (David Morley): He applies a cultural studies approach on gender to television-viewing practices.
           “The gendered framework of family viewing
           “The research reported below concerns two different types of research questions regarding, on the one hand, how television is interpreted by its audiences and, on the other, how television material is used in different families.…
           “In this research, I took the premise that one should consider the basic unit of consumption of television to be the family/household rather than the individual viewer. This was done to raise questions about how the television set is handled in the home, how decisions are made—by which family members, at what times, what is watched—and how responses to different kinds of materials are discussed within the family, and so on. In short, this represents an attempt to analyse individual viewing activity within the household/familial relations in which it commonly operates.”
           [David Morley. Television, Audiences and Cultural Studies. London and New York: Routledge imprint of Taylor & Francis Group, an Informa PLC business. 2005. Page 131.]
      431. green political thought (Robert J. Brulle): He considers the “mutual reliance” between “ecocentric norms” and critical social theory.
           “There is no necessary conflict between ecocentric norms and Critical Theory. Rather, the relationship is one of mutual reliance. One key task for the realissation of the aims of both Critical Theory and ecocentric norms is the development of a strong public sphere. In this discursive arena, the industrialist presuppositions of profitability would not be the deciding force. Rather, the public space defines an arena in which ecological politics would take place and meaningful disagreements and debates about our society and the actions necessary to foster ecological sustainability would be carried out” [Robert J. Brulle, “Habermas and Green Political Thought: Two Roads Converging.” Environmental Politics. Volume 11, number 4, winter 2002. Pages 1-20.]
      432. ecologism (Andrew Dobson): He advocates for this position over environmentalism.
           “We have established the differences between ecologism and other major political ideologies, and the incompatibility between what I have called environmentalism and ecologism is now clear. Ecologism seeks radically to call into question a whole series of political, economic and social practices in a way that environmentalism does not. Ecologism envisages a post-industrial future quite distinct from that with which we are most generally acquainted.…
           “In terms of human relationships with the non-human natural world, ecologism asks that the onus of justification be shifted from those who argue that the non-human natural world should be given political voice to those who think it should not. Environmentalists will usually be concerned about ‘nature’ only so far as it might affect human beings; ecologists will argue that the strong anthropocentrism this betrays is more a part of our current problems than a solution to them.”
           [Andrew Dobson. Green Political Thought. Fourth edition. London and New York: Routledge imprint of Taylor & Francis Group, an Informa PLC business. 2007. Page 189.]
      433. green democracy (Mike Mills): He examines the requirements for establishing this type of social order.
           “My argument has been that if we are only concerned with political outcomes, then green democracy may well be in trouble because such a concern undermines many of the necessary conditions for democracy. However, if we agree that the way we make decisions is a central part of green philosophy, then we begin to set rules by which we must conduct ourselves which, as long as they are not incompatible with democracy (and the important point is that they need not be), provide a solid basis for green decision making. I have also shown, in later sections, the types of theory which may be taken into account (ecocentrism, holism) and the opportunities which polities offer for the incorporation of such ideas (e.g. quality of democracy issues, legal standing, decision making, representation).” [Mike Mills, “Green Democracy: The search for an ethical solution.” Democracy and Green Political Thought: Sustainability, rights and citizenship. London and New York: Routledge imprint of Taylor & Francis Group, an Informa PLC business. 2005. Pages 95-111.]
      434. ecologically guided democracy (Peter Christoff): He considers an ecological “emancipatory project.”
           “the emancipatory project which is shaped by—and in turn constitutes—ecological citizens depends on the revitalisation and extension of civil society. It depends upon the active transformation of private life through creation of a ‘green conscience’, and increased democratic influence over the economic sphere through the actions of ‘green workers,’ ‘green producers’ and ‘green consumers’. This is reflected in the high value which green theorists and activists place on self-rule. This value includes the moral priority given to ‘self-restraint’ within civil society and also to active citizenship as defined by individual (self-)development beyond a merely instrumental relationship to the public sphere; a sense of active responsibility for representation and protection of environmental rights, and the individual and collective use of the public sphere and the state to provide the formal opportunities and protection for the institutions of ecologically guided democracy.” [Peter Christoff, “Ecological Citizens and Ecologically Guided Democracy.” Democracy and Green Political Thought: Sustainability, rights and citizenship. London and New York: Routledge imprint of Taylor & Francis Group, an Informa PLC business. 2005. Pages 149-166.]
      435. ecological restructuring of the state (Marius de Geus as pronounced in this MP3 audio file): He proposes a gradualist approach to ecology.
           “What do we understand by ecological restructuring? Restructuring is akin to transforming as opposed to abolishing the state and the status quo. It is not a dogmatic attempt to create a completely new world that knows no pollution at all and that is clean and beautiful in all respects.… The whole society does not have to be altered, not every stone has to be moved. It encompasses further-reaching changes and reforms on a middle to long term, that can be readjusted, that are aimed at the prevention and solution of the most aggravating forms of pollution and at acute forms of degradation of the environment.… This kind of restructuring will bear the character of compromise and will have to be accomplished in democratic ways. They must be the result of open discussions, of imaginative power, and of the preparedness to accept disagreeble measures.” [Marius de Geus, “The Ecological Restructuring of the State.” Democracy and Green Political Thought: Sustainability, rights and citizenship. London and New York: Routledge imprint of Taylor & Francis Group, an Informa PLC business. 2005. Pages 185-206.]
      436. economic culture (Lawrence Grossberg): He argues that cultural studies needs to return to, and to remake, economics.
           “… I am suggesting that in the contemporary conjuncture, culture’s position is being weakened in favor of the economic. The economic is becoming the domain in which history is made and experienced and resistance defined. Even more, I am hypothesizing that the significant locus of the constitution and experience of change is in the economic and economies— but I do not think this is simply equivalent to the (mistaken) claim of an economization of social life. I will suggest … that there is an emergent ‘structure of feeling’ that is being constituted within and is constitutive of the domain of economics ‘directly,’ increasingly foregrounding matters of what we have to call economic culture. And this partly grounds, I think, the saliency of cultural economy as a set of concerns. But at the same time, if we are to make sense of such changes, we must give up a vision of the social formation as comprised of separate levels or domains and seek a new practice of conjunctural thinking.” [Lawrence Grossberg. Cultural Studies in the Future Tense. Durham, North Carolina: Duke University Press. 2010. Page 151.]
           “… Cultural Studies in the Future Sense evidently adopts an ethical stance – opposing ‘a single logic of productivity and efficiency’ in matters of cultural analysis, and seeking to open up consideration of modernities, as well as seeking to bridge the analysis of culture and economy in new ways. For all its rhetorics of not knowing, I think [Lawrence] Grossberg knows very well where his political allegiances lie.” [Matt Hills, “Cultural Studies in the Future Tense.” Review article. Culture Machine. September, 2012. Pages 1-4.]
           “In one of the most exciting chapters of Cultural Studies in the Future Tense, [Lawrence] Grossberg encourages cultural studies scholars to take up economics. But this isn’t the usual move to remind us that political economy is important, and it isn’t the usual interdisciplinarity that wants to adjust the disciplinary mix by adding a little bit more economic materialism. Grossberg’s relentless ambition is at its most vivid here: he doesn’t want cultural studies practitioners just to read a few books on economics (though he does admit that this might be a good place to start) but to go beyond the endless modelling that preoccupies much of academic economics …. This is the other side of interdisciplinarity: the desire to critically extend the disciplinary fields that you’re interacting with. If interdisciplinarity can often feel like ‘blagging it’ in several places at once, Grossberg’s demand is to reach a level of critical competence in the discipline to be able to convincingly intervene within it. The result might mean making common cause with radical heterodox economics scholars and activists.” [Ben Highmore, “Cultural Studies in Its Mirror Phase.” New Formations. Volume 78, summer 2012. Pages 179-187.]
      437. blue cultural studies (Steven Mentz): His version of cultural studies focuses on maritime culture and early modern English literature.
           “I will close this essay with some brief suggestions for what a ‘blue cultural studies’ – a criticism that takes seriously the place of the ocean in early modern history and culture – might look like.
           “… Fishing may never have been as central as keeping sheep to early modern English poetry, but poets and writers engaged more directly with the oceanic world than we tend to remember.…
           “Finally, a blue cultural studies must consider the physical environment as a substantial partner in the creation of cultural meaning. While ideologies of land ownership, especially around enclosure, have long been a part of the discourse of early modern literary criticism, too little attention has been paid to the ways in which prolonged exposure to the deep sea challenged early modern legal, scientific, and literary habits of thought. In this moment of ecocriticism and environmentalism, the mind-stretching vastness of the sea provides powerful food for thought.”
           [Steven Mentz, “Toward a Blue Cultural Studies: The Sea, Maritime Culture, and Early Modern English Literature.” Literature Compass. Volume 6, issue 5, September 2009. Pages 997-1013.]
      438. Sokal affair (Alan Sokal): As a leftist, Sokal critiqued the cultural studies of science in a masterful literary hoax, “Transgressing the Boundaries: Toward a Transformative Hermeneutics of Quantum Gravity.”
           “The May/June 1996 issue of Lingua Franca included a now well-known article by New York University physicist Alan Sokal describing an unusual experiment. In 1994, Sokal submitted a parody of cultural studies of science to a journal, Social Text, as if it were a serious academic paper. According to Sokal, the purpose of his ‘little experiment’ … was to see whether the journal would publish ‘an article liberally salted with nonsense if (a) it sounded good and (b) it flattered the editors’ ideological preconceptions.’ The editorial collective that controls the content of the journal, which is not peer reviewed, failed to identify the article as a parody and published it …. Sokal triumphantly announced the hoax in Lingua Franca.” [Stephen Hilgartner, “The Sokal Affair in Context.” Science, Technology, & Human Values. Volume 22, number 4, autumn 1997. Pages 506-522.]
           “The scandal of the [Alan] Sokal hoax was marked, then, by a confusion between the discursive bloc of postmodernism and the field of science studies. When the scandal filtered through to the mass public sphere, the distinction between these fields was erased, and the stakes of the scandal were defined simply in terms of a quarrel between the sciences and the literary academy, the two cultures.… Science studies itself, as it is actually and diversely practiced, disappeared as the main target of media attack. The public misconstruction of science studies thus unwittingly confirmed the literary academy’s desire to annex science studies to a theoretical program internal to its own discipline (roughly indicated by the name of postmodernism), as well as its desire to conscript science studies into the culture wars (the scene of its external politics).” [John Guillory, “The Sokal Affair and the History of Criticism.” Critical Inquiry. Volume 28, number 2, winter 2002. Pages 470-508.]
           “Significantly, [Alan] Sokal starts out with genuine quotations by the founders of subatomic physics, and not all of the quotations he cites subsequently are as absurd as has been suggested. Commenting on the purported significance of the hoax, Sokal reveals himself to hold an unreflective, naively realist theory of knowledge which is not at all shared by many of the major scientist-interpreters of nineteenth- and twentieth-century physics. Indeed, most of the founders of quantum mechanics, and several important founders of chaos theory, hold views that Sokal dismisses in a philistine manner when confronted with similar opinions in nonscientific texts.” [Val Dusek, “Philosophy of Math and Physics in the Sokal Affair.” Social Text. Number 50, spring 1997. Pages 135-138.]
           “The Sokal hoax played into and reinforced many of the divisions that have been opened up in the Culture Wars' prolonged backlash against feminism, multiculturalism, and the queer renaissance. We hear more and more progressives, not unlike [Alan] Sokal himself, appealing to Enlightenment ideals of universality and common value as a prescription for rescuing the Left from its patronage of the politics of social identity. Left-wing jeremiads inform us that in our preoccupation with race, gender, and sexuality, we are being led astray. Inevitably, such voices recall the reason why the label of political correctness was first devised—in order to temper the knowingness of those who dwelled on the errors of others. What made the Sokal affair an unusual, but germane, event in the Culture Wars was that it gave rise to an outbreak of old-style correctness, complete with impatient calls for purges of a faux Left.” [Andrew Ross, “Reflections on the Sokal Affair.” Social Text. Number 50, spring 1997. Pages 149-152.]
           “One of the most salient aspects of the affair has been [Alan] Sokal’s recourse to the mainstream media to conduct an ideological campaign against another section of the Left. Sokal has used the media skilfully, both to register his hoax and to generalise its point into a full-scale attack on ‘cultural studies of science’ and ‘postmodern cultural studies’ (which he tends to treat as equivalents). And for many on the Left, his hoax was a welcome public counter to the attention-grabbing ‘relativism’ of much recent cultural theory. Yet Sokal has also provided the press with an ideal occasion to prosecute two of its favourite pastimes – disparaging intellectualism, of any kind, and travestying the Left – while bolstering the sagging image of the ‘scientist’ as a figure of authority and a man of reason and good sense.” [Peter Osborne, “Friendly fire: The hoaxing of Social Text.” Radical Philosophy: Philosophical Journal of the Independent Left. Number 81, January/February 1997. Pages 54-56.]
           “When Social Text entitled its Spring 1996 issue ‘Science Wars,’ it fulfilled its own prophecy. Thanks to Alan Sokal’s now famous parody article, which was published there undetected, a discursive war immediately erupted.” [Bruce Robbins, “Science-envy: Sokal, science and the police.” Radical Philosophy: Philosophical Journal of the Independent Left. Number 88, March/April 1998. Pages 2-5.]
           “It is sad to say, but nonetheless true, that some scholars on the academic left have renounced materialism and strayed into a postmodern wonderland in which there is no objective reality and any one factual claim is as good as the next. Such scholars deserve the criticism to which they have been subjected, and one can’t blame [Alan] Sokal, a leftist himself who taught mathematics at the National University of Nicaragua under the Sandinista government, for exposing them as intellectual frauds. However, one of the misconceptions that has emerged out of the Sokal affair is that the left is dominated by anti-intellectualism, and by implication, that the right is the defender of reason. Nothing could be further from the truth.” [Richard York and Brett Clark, “Debunking as Positive Science: Reflections in Honor of the Twenty-Fifth Anniversary of Stephen Jay Gould’s The Mismeasure of Man.” Monthly Review: An Independent Socialist Magazine. Volume 57, issue 9, February 2006. Pages 3-15.]
           “There are many natural scientists, and especially physicists, who continue to reject the notion that the disciplines concerned with social and cultural criticism can have anything to contribute, except perhaps peripherally, to their research. Still less are they receptive to the idea that the very foundations of their worldview must be revised or rebuilt in the light of such criticism. Rather, they cling to the dogma imposed by the long post-Enlightenment hegemony over the Western intellectual outlook, which can be summarized briefly as follows: that there exists an external world, whose properties are independent of any individual human being and indeed of humanity as a whole; that these properties are encoded in ‘eternal’ physical laws; and that human beings can obtain reliable, albeit imperfect and tentative, knowledge of these laws by hewing to the ‘objective’ procedures and epistemological strictures prescribed by the (so-called) scientific method.” [Alan D. Sokal, “Transgressing the Boundaries: Toward a Transformative Hermeneutics of Quantum Gravity.” Social Text. Number 46/47, spring–summer 1996. Pages 217-252.]
           “Why did I do it? While my method was satirical, my motivation is utterly serious. What concerns me is the proliferation, not just of nonsense and sloppy thinking per se, but of a particular kind of nonsense and sloppy thinking: one that denies the existence of objective realities, or (when challenged) admits their existence but downplays their practical relevance. At its best, a journal like Social Text raises important questions that no scientist should ignore – questions, for example, about how corporate and government funding influence scientific work. Unfortunately, epistemic relativism does little to further the discussion of these matters.” [Alan D. Sokal, “A Physicist Experiments With Cultural Studies.” Lingua Franca. May/June 1996. Pages 62-64.]
           “But why did I do it? I confess that I’m an unabashed Old Leftist who never quite understood how deconstruction was supposed to help the working class. And I’m a stodgy old scientist who believes, naively, that there exists an external world, that there exist objective truths about that world, and that my job is to discover some of them. (If science were merely a negotiation of social conventions about what is agreed to be ‘true,’ why would I bother devoting a large fraction of my all-too-short life to it? I don’t aspire to be the Emily Post of quantum field theory.)” [Alan D. Sokal, “Transgressing the Boundaries: An Afterword.” Philosophy and Literature. Volume 20, number 2, October 1996. Pages 338-346.]
      439. endoscopic gaze (José van Dijck as pronounced in this MP3 audio file): He develops an “insider’s” approach to cultural studies.
           “Endoscopic techniques have changed medical practices dramatically, particularly the skills of surgeons, the setting of the operating theater and the involvement of the patient. Double-serving as a media technology, endoscopy has also profoundly affected the ways in which the interior body is conceptualized and represented in popular media such as television. The interplay of technology, medical practice and cultural appropriation becomes manifest in what I will refer to as the ‘endoscopic gaze.’ … In the past 50 years, our perspective on the interior body – mediated by the surgeon’s eye – has shifted from outside to inside. We no longer peer from the outside in, through an incision in the skin, but instruments allow us ‘immediate’ access to the body’s tiniest details. This insider’s point of view vis-à-vis the body has, meanwhile, pervaded our culture.” [José van Dijck, “Bodies without borders: The endoscopic gaze.” International Journal of Cultural Studies. Volume 4, number 2, 2001. Pages 219-237.]
      440. popular cultural studies or popular culture studies (Ray R. Browne, Carl Mitcham, Don Rodney Vaughan, Raymond Evans, and others): This area of cultural studies is represented through the scholarly society, Popular Culture Association/American Culture Association.
           “… in order for Popular Culture Studies to progress in the desired way, we need to expand our perspective, internationalizing them and becoming ‘increasingly sophisticated about the intricacies and complexities of multiculturalism.’ And we need to blend that sophistication into greater understanding of multinationalistic, ethnic, linguistic, cultish and religious deterministic thrusts into society. We are at a crossroads in Popular Culture Studies and at the opening of several new highway chains.… On the computers of cultures, it is becoming perfectly clear, the lights are flashing all over the screen, alerting us to a sense of urgency in the Humanities and social sciences and the need for certain realizations.” [Ray R. Browne, “Internationalizing Popular Culture Studies.” Journal of Popular Culture. Volume 30, number 1, summer 1996. Pages 21-37.]
           “In the early stages, … the field of popular culture studies was filled with considerable questioning of its validity, of its role, and of its definition. At first many scholars, basing their definitions on the most powerful elements of culture they experienced every day, defined popular culture as the electronic media—TV, movies, radio, MTV. Now, however, most agree that such a definition was too restrictive. Normally we see popular culture as including all aspects of the world we inhabit: the way of life we inherit, practice, and pass on to our descendants; what we do while we are awake; the physical conditions in which we sleep; and the dreams we dream while sleeping.” [Ray B. Browne, “Culture ‘of the people, by the people, for the people’ (growth of popular culture studies).” National Forum. Volume 74, issue 4, fall 1994. Pages 9-12.]
           “… cultural studies of science and technology stress the ways various media—from telegraph and telephone to radio, film, TV, and computer—influence art, religion, politics, commerce, and the ways we think about ourselves and our world. Popular culture studies further enhance our understandings of the marketing, appropriation, and subtle semiotic powers of contemporary technoscience. The photograph invites painting tomove toward the abstract and expressionist, the novel is restructured to incorporate the flashback of the cinema, and political debate adapts to the enclosed space and attention structure of the television.” [Carl Mitcham, “Why Science, Technology, and Society Studies?” Bulletin of Science, Technology & Society. Volume 19, number 2, April 1999. Pages 128-134.]
           “The Andy Grifitth Show is a nostalgic American popular cultural masterpiece valid for all time and is consistently ranked in th top ten television shows. Learning its origins, revealing some behind-the-scenes aspects, and reviewing many of the episodes have led to the identification of specific factors that have contributed to the show’s phenomenal success and endurance. Here, [Don Rodney] Vaughan discusses the show’s importance to popular culture studies.…
           “The Andy Griffith Show is not about reflecting or projecting reality. The producers and writers did not attempt to blend the real world and the fictional world. Although some of the episodes made references to real movies, real TV shows, the Korean War, and FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover, the scripts never alluded to current events, not even to the four Nixon-Kennedy debates taking place during the first few weeks of The Andy Griffith Show.”
           [Don Rodney Vaughan, “Why The Andy Griffith Show Is Important to Popular Cultural Studies.” Journal of Popular Culture. Volume 38, number 2, November 2004. Pages 397-423.]
           “Arguably, popular cultural studies in Australia have been struggling to emerge from beneath the shadow of this now-crumbling paradigm [‘the invasive impact of American popular culture’] since the 1960s. Doubly damned by its imported, alien origins and capitalistic nature, popular culture has been either associated with social deterioration by conservative intelligentsia and excluded from their canonical concerns or recognized simply as a significant part of hegemonic domination by left-wing ‘pessimist’ theorists and studied largely as a process of manipulation and alienation. Conversely, its ‘spectacular world of imagery’ has been more recently scanned by populist optimists for any ideological inferences of the ‘active, resistant, joyous or fantastic,’ just as its ‘gleaming facades’ have been glossed by poststructuralists and postmodernists in a decentering fascination for its endless ‘circulation of signs’ and discursive ‘cultural codes.’ Interpretive paradigms, like promises, are clearly made to be eventually broken, and, as Raymond Williams once observed, they ‘are never simply abandoned. Rather they accumulate anomalies until there is an eventual breaking point.’” [Raymond Evans, “‘Buddy, Can You Spare a Paradigm?’: Popular Cultural Studies in Australian History.” The Journal of Popular Culture. Volume 29, issue 1, summer 1995. Pages 163-174.]
           “… the real blow against the aristocratic culture of the British Empire came during the American Revolution, a war that would not only give rise to the United States of America, but would also create the ideals that American culture would be based on, ideals that would allow a popular culture to flourish. This thesis paper contends that the political and social climate of the Revolutionary Era was essential in shaping the American ethos that would gradually lead to the pop culture that we know today.” [Avinash R. Chandan. Of the People, By the People, For the People: In Defense of American Pop Culture, its Meaning, and its Impact. Masters of History thesis. Graduate School, Rutgers, the State University of New Jersey. Newark, New Jersey. January, 2013. Page 3.]
           “… a [sic; an] intermingled field of popular culture studies and organization studies may have to accept that the phenomena of economy and management are no longer of interest only to ‘organization men’ …. My contention is also that although many scholars would accept this, the field has yet to fully acknowledge the ramifications hereof. Such a way to understand the interplay between popular culture and the world of work organizations would suggest that it is not enough merely to study the ways in which themes from business and management are used in popular culture (e.g. mimic cultural studies), but that the ensuing cultural product have to be taken seriously as forms of economic knowledge.” [Alf Rehn, “Pop (Culture) Goes the Organization: On Highbrow, Lowbrow and Hybrids in Studying Popular Culture Within Organization Studies.” Organization. Volume 15, number 5, 2008. Pages 765-783.]
      441. this neofasist age (Cornel West): He reflects on the implications of a Donald Trump administration in the U.S.
           “I just thank God for Democracy Now! because journalism is almost dead as we move into this neofascist age. And thank god you all are still willing to tell the truth.…
           “… in an emerging neofascist moment, you have the rule of big business, which is big banks and big corporations. You scapegoat the most vulnerable. It could be Muslims, Mexicans, gay brothers, lesbian sisters, indigenous peoples, black peoples, jews, and so on. And then you also have militaristic orientations around the world. And so, you see the extension of the repressive apparatus, as those of us who hit the streets, those of us who will be — are willing to go to jail, we’ve had to recognize we’ll have more coming at us under [the Donald] Trump administration. But, the crucial thing is, is that he had talked about his connection with working people. And it’s clear that the one percent are still running things.…
           “What neofascist — it’s an American style form of fascism. What I mean by that is we’ve had neoliberal rule from Carter to Obama. That neoliberal rule left in place a national security state. It left in place massive surveillance. It left in place the ability of the president to kill an American citizen with no due process. That’s Obama. That was the culmination of the neoliberal era. Now you get someone who is narcissistic — which is to say out of control psychologically — who is ideologically confused — which is to say, in over his head — and who does he choose? The most right wing reactionary zealots which lead toward the arbitrary deployment of law, which is what neofascism is, but to reinforce corporate interests, big bank interest, and to keep track of those of us who are cast as peoples of color, women, jews, Arabs, Muslims, Mexicans, and so forth, and so — So, this is one of the most frightening moments in the history of this very fragile empire and fragile republic.…
           “… you drop bombs on innocent children with U.S. drones and then wonder why the gangsters, the fascists coming out of the Muslim world, are organizing. And of course, we’ve got to be anti-fascist across the board. But this is going to be the most trying of times in our lifetime. There’s no doubt about it. And at 63 years old, I am thoroughly fortified for this fight. I will tell you that.…
           “… And we said before the election that Trump would be a neofascist catastrophe. And it’s very clear from his picks that he is moving in that direction.”
           [Cornel West, “Cornel West on Donald Trump: This is What Neo-Fascism Looks Like.” Democracy Now. December 1st, 2016.]
      442. prophetic pragmatism (Cornel West): This man is among the strongest, most passionate, and most eloquent voices in the African American struggle for emancipation. West develops his own approach to cultural studies framed around the philosophy of pragmatism. He then applies it to multiple liberation struggles in American society.
           “There are multiple cultural studies projects, including: the … neo-pragmatic marxism of Cornel West ….” [Norman K. Denzin, “From American sociology to cultural studies.” Cultural Studies. Volume 2, number 1, 1999. Pages 117-136.]
           “My own kind of pragmatism – what I call prophetic pragmatism – is closely akin to the philosophy of praxis put forward by Antonio Gramsci. The major difference is that my attitude toward Marxism as a grand theory is heuristic rather than dogmatic. Furthermore, my focus on the theoretical development in emerging forms of oppositional thought – feminist theory, antiracist theory, gay and lesbian theory – leads me to posit or look for not an overarching synthesis but rather an articulated assemblage of analytical outlooks, to further more morally principled and politically effective forms of action to ameliorate the plight of the wretched of the earth.
           “On the philosophical level, this means adopting the moderate pragmatic views of John Dewey. Epistemic antifoundationalism and minimalist ontological realism (in its pluralist version) proceed from taking seriously the impact of modern historical and rhetorical consciousness on truth and knowledge. ‘Anything goes’ relativism and disenabling forms of skepticism fall by the wayside, serving only as noteworthy reminders to avoid dogmatic traps and to accept intellectual humility rather than as substantive philosophical positions.”
           [Cornel West. Keeping Faith: Philosophy and Race in America. London and New York: Routledge imprint of Taylor & Francis Group, an Informa PLC business. 2009. Pages 114-115.]
           “… what is … ‘pragmatism at its best’? What form does it take? What are its constitutive features or fundamental components? These questions bring me to my third point – the idea of a prophetic pragmatist perspective and praxis. I use the adjective ‘prophetic’ in order to harken back to the rich, though flawed, traditions of Judaism and Christianity that promote courageous resistance against, and relentless critiques of, injustice and social misery. These traditions are rich in that they help keep alive collective memories of moral (i.e., anti-idolatrous) struggle and nonmarket values (i.e., love for others, loyalty to an ethical ideal, and social freedom) in a more and more historically amnesiac society and market-saturated culture. These traditions are flawed because they tend toward dogmatic pronouncements (i.e., ‘Thus said the Lord’) to homogeneous constituencies. Prophetic pragmatism gives courageous resistance and relentless critique a self-critical character and democratic content; that is, it analyzes the social causes of unnecessary forms of social misery, promotes moral outrage against them, organizes different constituencies to alleviate them, yet does so with an openness to its own blindnesses and shortcomings.
           “Prophetic pragmatism is pragmatism at its best because it promotes a critical temper and democratic faith without making criticism a fetish or democracy an idol.”
           [Cornel West, “The Limits of Neopragmatism.” Southern California Law Review. Volume 63, number 6, September 1990. Pages 1747-1751.]
           “Prophesy Deliverance! is … a call for dialogue—not simply between Christians and Marxists—but more fundamentally in the face of all forms of dogmatism, including those of Christians and Marxists. In fact, my self-styled allegiance to American pragmatism and American jazz is first and foremost a commitment to polyphonic inquiry and improvisational conversation. For me, prophetic Christianity is a deep suspicion of any form of idolatry—of any human effort to evade or deny the contingency and fragility of any human construct (including religious ones). Modern attempts to ossify, petrify, or freeze human creations of method, technique, rationality, sexuality, nationality, race, or empire are suspect. The best of progressive Marxism simply reveals the operations of power and forms of subordination beneath such idolatries (including Marxist ones).” [Cornel West. Prophesy Deliverance!: An Afro-American Revolutionary Christianity. Louisville, Kentucky: Westminster John Knox Press. 2002. Page xii.]
           “The tradition of pragmatism—the most influential stream in American thought—is in need of an explicit political mode of cultural criticism that refines and revises [Ralph Waldo] Emerson’s concerns with power, provocation, and personality in light of [John] Dewey’s stress on historical consciousness and [W. E. B.] Du Bois’ focus on the plight of the wretched of the earth. This political mode of cultural criticism must recapture Emerson’s sense of vision—his Utopian impulse—yet rechannel it through Dewey’s conception of creative democracy and Du Bois’ social structural analysis of the limits of capitalist democracy. Furthermore, this new kind of cultural criticism—we can call it prophetic pragmatism —must confront candidly the tragic sense found in [Sidney] Hook and [Lionel] Trilling, the religious version of the Jamesian strenuous mood in [Reinhold] Niebuhr, and the tortuous grappling with the vocation of the intellectual in [C. Wright] Mills. Prophetic pragmatism, with its roots in the American heritage and its hopes for the wretched of the earth, constitutes the best chance of promoting an Emersonian culture of creative democracy by means of critical intelligence and social action.” [Cornel West. The American Evasion of Philosophy: A Genealogy of Pragmatism. Madison, Wisconsin: The University of Wisconsin Press. 1989. Page 204.]
           “The fundamental motivation for this book is to resurrect Black prophetic fire in our day—especially among the younger generation. I want to reinvigorate the Black prophetic tradition and to keep alive the memory of Black prophetic figures and movements. I consider the Black prophetic tradition one of the greatest treasures in the modern world. It has been the leaven in the American democratic loaf. Without the Black prophetic tradition, much of the best of America would be lost and some of the best of the modern world would be forgotten.
           “All the great figures in this book courageously raised their voices in order to bear witness to people’s suffering. These Black prophetic figures are connected to collective efforts to overcome injustice and make the world a better place for everyone. Even as distinct individuals, they are driven by a we-consciousness that is concerned with the needs of others. More importantly, they are willing to renounce petty pleasures and accept awesome burdens. Tremendous sacrifice and painful loneliness sit at the center of who they are and what they do.”
           [Cornel West. Black Prophetic Fire. Boston, Massachusetts: Beacon Press. 2014. Page 2.]
           “I came to pragmatism a little later [after discovering philosophy]. As an undergraduate, it was [Jean-Paul] Sartre who had a strong influence on me.…
           “… [Richard] Rorty had a tremendous impact on me once I went to Princeton. I didn’t seriously encounter the pragmatic tradition until I went to Princeton.… But I never became a philosopher, professionally speaking. I’ve never taught in a philosophy department. I went straight from graduate school in philosophy to teaching at the Union Theological Seminary (for eight years) and then the Yale Divinity School (for another three).
           “… There is something distinctively American about pragmatism. There’s no doubt about that. But there are a number of things going on in my book [The American Evasion of Philosophy]. One is that my motivations were thoroughly Gramscian. That is to say, I wanted to try and understand the historical specificity of the development of American civilization through a particular philosophical discourse.”
           [Cornel West, “American radicalism.” Radical Philosophy: Philosophical Journal of the Independent Left. Number 71, May/June 1995. Pages 27-38.]
           “[Cornel] West calls ‘prophetic pragmatism’ the theoretical vehicle through which such practical chances can be defined and actualized. It represents a synthesis of West’s intellectual andsocial concerns andof fers a weapon against both cynical realism andfallacious foundationalism: ‘Critical temper as a way of struggle and democratic faith as a way of life are the twin pillars of prophetic pragmatism. The major foes to be contested are despair, dogmatism and oppression’ …. West’s prophetic pragmatism is based on faith in democratic praxis as it is carried out by ‘ordinary people,’ on the possibilities of articulating and actualizing social visions groundedin moral principles, and on three dimensions of thought and action.” [Mark Lawrence McPhail, “Of Hope and Faith and Love: Rhetorical Coherence in Cornel West’s Politics of Convergence.” Qualitative Inquiry. Volume 8, number 4, 2002. Pages 448-462.]
           “… school leaders in our urban centers may wish to ground their work in what Cornel West … calls ‘prophetic pragmatism.’ Prophetic pragmatism is a form of thinking and seeing the world centered on democratic practices. It is an intellectual process built on the premise of existential democracy and requires one to be self-critical and self-corrective as well. Notions of existential democracy emanate from the thinking of John Dewey …, who believed that democracy as compared with other ways of life is the only way of living that uses the power of experience as both an end and means.” [Michael E. Dantley, “African American Spirituality and Cornel West’s Notions of Prophetic Pragmatism: Restructuring Educational Leadership in American Urban Schools.” Educational Administration Quarterly. Volume 41, number 4, October 2005. Pages 651-674.]
           “Prophetic pragmatism, Cornel West’s brand of pragmatism, is best described in the preface of Prophesy Deliverance! as ‘an Afro-American philosophy that is essentially a specific expression of contemporary American philosophy which takes seriously the Afro-American experience.’ Taking the African-American experience seriously, however, does not require one to get rid of useful theories formulated by non-Black thinkers. Philosophical culinary puns aside, West has always attempted to fuse African-American sensibilities and European forms; perhaps one could say that West tries to convert ‘Frankfurters and French fries’ into ‘soul food.’” [Brad Elliott Stone, “Prophetic Pragmatism and the Practices of Freedom: On Cornel West’s Foucauldian Methodology.” Foucault Studies. Number 11, February 2011. Pages 92-105.]
      443. visionary pragmatism (Romand Coles): He explores a radical, ecological democracy in an age of neoliberalism.
           “I conceive of the work that follows as visionary pragmatism. One important way to think of visionary pragmatism is as an energetic refusal of how these two words have so often been opposed to each other, by people on more than one side of more than one antagonism. Visionary pragmatists seek the resonance and dissonance of this pairing, even as others generate contradictory frames to secure various borders of theory and politics.…
           “… visionary pragmatism is pragmatic insofar as it relentlessly thinks, works, and acts on the limits of the present, drawing forth and engendering new resonances, receptivities, relationships, movements, circulations, dynamics, practices, powers, institutions, strategies, shocks, and so forth, in an effort to contribute to desirable changes in our lived worlds. Yet it is visionary in the sense that it maintains an intransigent practice of peering underneath, above, around, through, and beyond the cracks in the destructive walls and mainstream ruts of this world. It lingers in eddies, catches crosscurrents, and cultivates new flows that spill through these cracks and flood beyond the banks. It has an unquenchable appetite for visions that come from beyond hegemonic common sense or exceed it from within, and it devotes itself to looking for clues of these, listening to whispers near and far that articulate suggestive possibilities beyond the assumed boundaries, and seeking modes of political engagement that help inspire, energize, inform, and enact them.”
           [Romand Coles. Visionary Pragmatism: Radical and Ecological Democracy in Neoliberal Times. Durham, North Carolina: Duke University Press. 2016. Pages 17-18.]
           “… we … [can] co-creatively develop new ways of thinking with diverse people that are both visionary and pragmatic, rather than either myopically pragmatic or so ethereally disconnected from the world as to preclude all possibility of meaningful return. We would cultivate relationships, purposes, and transformative agency in relation to the suffering and possibilities of people, places, and the planet. In so doing, we would likely regenerate powerful, reflective, imaginative, and durable support from broader publics—precisely because we have engaged in becoming public and catalyzing publics and publicness with them. They would likely support higher education, then, not as a provider of services, but as an institution with which they are actively implicated in relationships of reciprocity that are complex, plural, dynamic, full of tensions, and creating paths that lead beyond pervasive patterns of devastation. These sorts of publics would likely rally powerfully to defend higher education as a good in common, and they would be a formidable force against efforts to privatize, instrumentalize, or annihilate this and other forms of democracy and commonwealth.” [Romand Coles, “Transforming the Game: Democratizing the Publicness of Higher Education and Commonwealth in Neoliberal Times.” New Political Science. Volume 36, number 4, December 2014. Pages 622-639.]
      444. Constantinian Christianity and neo–Constantinian democracy (Stanley Hauerwas and Romand Coles): They consider the dangerous collaboration between transcendence and immanence.
           “… the sharp distinction between natural and supernatural originated in a nominalist rejection of Scholasticism that aimed to assert the radical sovereignty of God beyond all entanglements with the world, as instrumentality and secular time increasingly came to govern this world ….
           “… [There is] the current course of things—in which Constantinian Christianity (transcendence) and neo-Constantinian democracy (immanence) are collaborating in ways that are propelling the world toward certain hell. Yet there is the possibility of a ladder—or ladders—that might ascend in better directions if the traditions of radical ecclesia and radical democracy each dispossess themselves of the idea that they must be the sole author of each and every rung. This is not an easy or a comfortable ladder to climb. For beneath every rung there is a long way to fall and a tragic history of falling. To be sure, reliance on a ladder, some of whose rungs have been built significantly by others, is dangerous.”
           [Stanley Hauerwas and Romand Coles, “‘Long Live the Weeds and the Wilderness Yet’: Reflections on A Secular Age.” Modern Theology. Volume 26, number 3, July 2010. Pages 349-362.]
      445. discursive psychology (Jonathan Potter, Margaret Wetherell, and many others): This approach to psychological social psychology includes a variety of approaches for examining discourse.
           “There are a number of very good reasons why psychologists should be interested in language. Language is so central to all social activities it is easy to take for granted. Its very familiarity sometimes makes it transparent to us. Yet imagine conveying a complex idea such as ‘meet me Thursday in my room for a discussion of semiology’ without language. It is not easy to see how it could be done.
           “Communication of this kind which involves abstract notions, actions and events removed in time and space, delicate shades of meaning, and logical distinctions depends on people sharing a complex symbolic representational system. Moreover, language is not just a code for communication. It is inseparably involved with processes of thinking and reasoning. Just as it is difficult to imagine sophisticated communication without language, it is hard to see how complex abstract reasoning could be performed by people without a language.
           “The study of language is particularly vital to social psychology because it is simply the most basic and pervasive form of interaction between people.”
           [Jonathan Potter and Margaret Wetherell. Discourse and Social Psychology: Beyond Attitudes and Behaviour. Beverly Hills, California: SAGE Publications, Inc. 1987. Page 9.]
           “DP [discursive psychology] is a perspective that starts with the psychological phenomena as things that are constructed, attended to, and understood in interaction. Its focus is on the ways descriptions can implicate psychological matters, on the ways psychological states are displayed in talk, and on the way people are responded to as upset, devious, knowledgeable or whatever. It thus starts with a view of psychology that is fundamentally social, relational and interactional. It is not just psychology as it appears in interaction; rather, it understands much of our psychological language, and broader ‘mental practices,’ as organized for action and interaction. It is a specifically discursive psychology because discourse – talk and texts – is the primary medium for social action.” [Jonathan Potter and Alexa Hepburn, “Discursive Psychology: Mind and Reality in Practice.” Language, discourse and social psychology. New York: Palgrave Macmillan imprint of St. Martin’s Press. 2007. Pages 160-181.]
           “Discursive psychology begins with psychology as it faces people living their lives. It studies how psychology is constructed, understood and displayed as people interact in everyday and more institutional situations. How does a speaker show that they are not prejudiced, while developing a damning version of an entire ethnic group? How are actions coordinated in a counselling session to manage the blame of the different parties for the relationship breakdown? How is upset displayed, understood and receipted in a call to a child protection helpline? Questions of this kind require us to understand the kinds of things that are ‘psychological’ for people as they act and interact in particular settings – families, workplaces and schools. And this in turn encourages us to respecify the very object psychology.” [Sally Wiggins and Jonathan Potter, “Discursive Psychology.” The SAGE Handbook of Qualitative Research in Psychology. Carla Willig and Wendy Stainton-Rogers, editors. Thousand Oaks, California: SAGE Publications, Inc. 2008. Pages 73-90.]
           “Discourse and Social Psychology offered a complete approach to social psychological matters. It took the chapter headings of the textbooks of the time – attitudes, categories and so on – and developed alternative analyses that often completely rebuilt the original notions. The aim of this paper is to offer something of an audit of the coherence and success of one major strand of discursive psychology after more than a quarter of a century. A full description of the different strands of this work is beyond the scope of this paper, let alone a full evaluation. Part of the problem here is that discourse work has been evolving with different emphases and as parts of different debates over this quarter century, and the different critical responses have a range of specific targets. Inevitably this audit of arguments and issues will engage in considerable simplification.” [Jonathan Potter, “Rereading Discourse and Social Psychology: Transforming social psychology?” British Journal of Social Psychology. Volume 51, number 3, September 2012. Pages 436-455.]
           “Discursive psychology applies the theory and methods of discourse analysis to psychological topics. The kind of discourse analysis that is used here derives from ethnomethodology and conversation analysis, linguistic philosophy, rhetoric and the sociology of knowledge …. It has been applied mostly to how versions of reality and cognition are assembled in discourse of any kind, ranging from formal scientific papers to everyday conversations. This concern with cognition and reality has taken the form of critiques and reformulations, as kinds of discourse practices, of various standard psychological topics, including attitudes, memory, the self, causal attribution, script theory, personality traits, categorization, prejudice and cognitive development.” [Derek Edwards, “Emotion Discourse.” Culture & Psychology. Volume 5, number 3, 1999. Pages 271-291.]
           “In celebration of 25 years of the Discourse and Rhetoric Group (DARG) in the Department of Social Sciences at Loughborough University [Loughborough, England], this special issue is an invitation to reflect critically on original and innovative ways of doing social psychology. It brings together the key voices, themes, arguments, contributions, and contributors that have shaped the emergence of, and the debate around, what is now called Discursive Psychology (DP). This special issue of the British Journal of Social Psychology focuses on the ‘Loughborough school’ of social psychology, where preoccupations with discourse and social psychology emerged as a dynamic, new enterprise in social psychology in the 1980s and early 1990s.” [Martha Augoustinos and Cristian Tileagǎ, “Twenty five years of discursive psychology.” British Journal of Social Psychology. Volume 51, number 3, September 2012. Pages 405-412.]
           “Discursive psychology can be thought of as both a theoretical orientation to the study of language and a methodological approach, wherein the analyst begins with discourse in that discourse is assumed to be the medium of human action …. Perhaps not surprisingly, then, discursive psychology is focused on naturalistic studies and engages in the analysis of audio and video recordings of people interacting in their everyday and institutional contexts.… First, discourse is positioned as action-oriented …. Second, discourse is understood as constructed by the words or conversational devices employed within a given interaction.… Third, the discourse is presumed to be situated within a given interaction.” [Jessica Nina Lester, “Discursive Psychology: Methodology and Applications.” Qualitative Psychology. Volume 1, number 2, August 2014. Pages 141-143.]
           “This critical appraisal begins with a report of the beginnings of my academic life and how it was shaped by the ideas and debates that developed into discursive psychology (DP). My experience points to how limited the social psychology of 25 years ago was and the significance of DP in expanding the disciplinary boundaries. For me, part of the attraction and excitement of ‘the turn to language’ was its confluences with the critical project of feminism. At one point, discourse analysis in psychology was viewed as virtually synonymous with critical or feminist research ….” [Ann Weatherall, “Discursive psychology and feminism.” British Journal of Social Psychology. Volume 51, number 3, September 2012. Pages 463-470.]
      446. narrative analysis of narratives–in–interaction (Alexandra Georgakopoulou [Greek/Hellēniká, Αλεξανδρα Γεωργακοπουλου, Alexandra Geōrgakopoulou as pronounced in this MP3 audio file): She proposes a new approach to narrative or discourse analysis.
           “… [There is] the influential concept of tellability, which is at the core of narrative analysis, and at times being equated with narrativity. Tellability captures the aesthetic, affective, and subjective aspects of narrative; the dynamics of experientiality ….
           “… my contention is that the turn to narratives-in-interaction has to be methodologically grounded and analytically associated with the following three paradigm shifts with increasing purchase within discourse studies: a) new theories of genre, b) a view of identities-ininteraction and c) a late modern celebration of the micro-, that is, of small, unofficial, fragmented and/or non-hegemonic social practices.…
           “… paradigm shifts can provide an overarching theoretical coherence to a systematic turn to narratives-in-interaction at the same time as affording opportunities for much needed inter-disciplinarities for the future of narrative analysis.”
           [Alexandra Georgakopoulou, “The other side of the story: towards a narrative analysis of narratives-in-interaction.” Discourse Studies. Volume 8, number 2, 2006. Pages 335-357.]
      447. critical narrative inquiry or critical narrative analysis (Nadjwa Effat Laila Norton, Debbie Laliberte Rudman, Helene Anne Berman, and others): They develop approaches to narrative inquiry (also called narrative analysis)—the examination of conversational data—informed by critical social theory. Examples of other approaches to narrative inquiry/analysis are also included.
           “In this article, I utilize a multicultural feminist critical narrative inquiry to forefront co-researchers’ processes of engaging conversations with family members that they identified as being able to support their spiritual practices. I utilize narrative inquiry methods and co-researcher methods to highlight how children’s literacies and spiritual practices are engaged by conversations with family members. These include narrative interviews, focus groups, collaborative conversations, participant observation, and children-co-researcher interviews.” [Nadjwa E. L. Norton, “Talking Spirituality with Family Members: Black and Latina/o Children Co-researcher Methodologies.” The Urban Review. Volume 38, number 4, November 2006. Pages 313-334.]
           “During a year-long multicultural feminist critical narrative study, I created storytelling spaces for those who have been silenced, including Latinas/Latinos, Blacks, and children, in order to include their voices in the theorizing that occurs about the practices that inevitably impact their lives. I situated storytelling as a political practice that served to create more equitable societies and educational institutions …. Together, the participants and I engaged in critical reflection about how identities and power manifest themselves within teacher–student relationships and knowledge processes …. Our reflections focused on how race, class, age, gender, sexuality, ability, and spirituality impact how and when one sees and challenges (in)equities ….” [Nadjwa Effat Laila Norton, “Permitanme Hablar: Allow Me to Speak.” Language Arts. Volume 83, number 2, November 2005. Pages 118-127.]
           “This research was designed as a multicultural feminist critical narrative inquiry that engaged participants in multiple methods of data collection over a 1-year period. The study focused data collection and analysis on the social, political, and cultural texts that were evidenced through hip-hop. This project also analyzed what knowledges were evidenced through hip-hop, by whom, in what manner, when, and for what purposes. Within this framework, Black and Latina/Latino children were viewed as agents, producers of knowledges, storytellers, and engagers of social justice who make statements about inequities, culture, and education.” [Nadjwa E. L. Norton, “Young Children Manifest Spiritualities in Their Hip-Hop Writing.” Education and Urban Society. Volume 46, number 3, 2014. Pages 329-351.]
           “The data used in this paper are drawn from a broader study employing critical discourse analysis and critical narrative inquiry to examine the contemporary socio-political reconfiguration of retirement. Drawing upon Foucauldian-informed governmental theory, retirement is drawn upon as a terrain of study to examine the re-configuration of occupational possibilities for ageing individuals.…
           “The aim of critical narrative work is not to seek generalisable understandings of linkages between discourses and narratives, but to gain insight into what is possible and intelligible in a specific context and to stimulate dialogue and action related to social change.”
           [Debbie Laliberte Rudman, “Situating occupation in social relations of power: Occupational possibilities, ageism and the retirement ‘choice.’” South African Journal of Occupational Therapy. Volume 45, number 1, April 2015. Pages 27-33.]
           “Critical narrative analysis best describes the process of knowing upon which this research was based. An assumption underlying this approach is that the contextual dimensions of children’s experiences are valued and are inseparable from the way in which children strive to bring a sense of coherence into their lives. Thus, by listening to the stories children tell, this research sought to give voice to individual experiences and meanings, but to place them in a broader context and thereby examine the social and political connectedness of those experiences.” [Helene Anne Berman. Growing up amid violence: A critical narrative analysis of children of war and children of battered women. Ph.D. dissertation. Wayne State University. Detroit, Michigan. 1996. Page 31.]
           “Critical narrative research (CNR) is an emerging genre that draws on a variety of theoretical traditions and combines sets of criteria for evaluating its validity (i.e., social constructivist, artistic and critical change criteria). As such, CNR frequently border-crosses a variety of theoretical orientations that are postcolonial and poststructuralist in nature. Much of the content of a critical narrative inquiry ‘draws from critical theories, in that they embody a critique of prevailing structures and relationships of power and inequity in a relational context.’ The ‘criticalness’ of narrative research must be elucidated to distinguish the methodology from the mere telling of stories. The term ‘critical’ is used to describe ‘culture, language and participation as issues of power in need of critique with the intent of emendation or alteration in the direction of social justice and participatory democracy’ and has been added to narrative research iorder ‘to signify this explicitly political project.‘” [Luigi Iannacci, “Critical Narrative Research (CNR): Conceptualizing and Furthering the Validity of an Emerging Methodology.” Vitae Scholasticae. Volume 24, 2007. Pages 55-76.]
           “Narrative inquiry focuses on the study of stories as deliberately and purposefully told, constituted of past experiences, and simultaneously ‘connected to the flow of power in the widerworld.’ Narratives are thus embedded within historical, structural, and ideological contexts, social discourses, and power relations. Through their narratives, storytellers locate themselves within the conditions that influence their choices and actions as social agents.” [Nicole Y. Pitre, Kaysi E. Kushner, Kim D. Raine, Kathy M. Hegadoren, “Critical Feminist Narrative Inquiry: Advancing Knowledge Through Double-Hermeneutic Narrative Analysis.” Advances in Nursing Science. Volume 36, number 2, June 2013. Pages 118-132.]
           “Narrative inquiry is one of the many kinds of research that are part of the research approaches that have been gathered under the umbrella of qualitative research. I have advocated the importance of identifying two types of narrative inquiry. Both share the general principles of qualitative research such as working with data in the form of natural language and the use of non computational analytic procedures. Although both types of narrative inquiry are concerned with stories, they have significant differences. The paradigmatic type collects storied accounts for its data; the narrative type collects descriptions of events, happenings, and actions. The paradigmatic type uses an analytic process that identifies aspects of the data as instances of categories; the narrative type uses an analytic process that produces storied accounts. The paradigmatic type is based on what [Jerome] Bruner has termed paradigmatic reasoning; the narrative type is based in narrative reasoning. Narrative inquiry of the paradigmatic type produces knowledge of concepts; the narrative type produces knowledge of particular situations. Both types of narrative inquiry can make important contributions to the body of social science knowledge.” [Donald E. Polkinghorne, “Narrative configuration in qualitative analysis.” International Journal of Qualitative Studies in Education. Volume 8, issue 1, 1995. Pages 5-23.]
           “… the identity stories gathered as data for narrative research are not mirror reflections of people’s experientially functioning identity stories. The gap between the publicly pre- sented story and the lived identity story requires that researchers infer from their collected told stories the actual operating stories (or story fragments) that inform the lives of their subjects.” [Donald E. Polkinghorne, “Explorations of Narrative Identity.” Psychological Inquiry. Volume 7, number 4, 1996. Pages 363-367.]
           “To learn about the impact of long-term unemployment on the career management behaviors of participating mid-career managers, I conducted a narrative inquiry. After gathering the managers’ stories about their experiences I analyzed the content, looking for information about the managers’ pursuit of re-employment, as well as for any characteristics that reflected resilient behavior and any changes in their approach to career management. The findings contributed to the subject of managerial careers in several areas including research, practice, theory and education.” [Ann Marie Gagnon. Resilient Career Narratives: An Analysis of Mid-Career Managers’ Long-Term Unemployment Narratives. Ph.D. dissertation. George Washington University. Washington, D.C. May, 2010. Page 6.]
           “Let me quickly and lightly characterize the two modes so that I may get on more precisely with the matter. One mode, the paradigmatic or logico-scientific one, attempts to fulfill the ideal of a formal, mathematical system of description and explanation. It employs categorization or conceptualization and the operations by which categories are established, lished, instantiated, idealized, and related one to the other to form a system. Its armamentarium of connectives includes on the formal side such ideas as conjunction and disjunction, hyperonymy and hyponymy, ponymy, strict implication, and the devices by which general propositions tions are extracted from statements in their particular contexts.…
           “The imaginative application of the narrative mode leads instead to good stories, gripping drama, believable (though not necessarily ‘true’) historical accounts. It deals in human or human-like intention and action and the vicissitudes and consequences that mark their course. It strives to put its timeless miracles into the particulars of experience, and to locate the experience in time and place. Joyce thought of the particularities of the story as epiphanies of the ordinary. The paradigmatic mode, by contrast, seeks to transcend the particular by higher and higher reaching for abstraction, and in the end disclaims in principle any explanatory value at all where the particular is concerned. cerned. There is a heartlessness to logic: one goes where one’s premises and conclusions and observations take one, give or take some of the blindnesses that even logicians are prone to.”
           [Jerome S. Bruner. Actual Minds, Possible Worlds. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press. 1986. Kindle edition.]
           “… I want to make explicit that my whole argument has implicitly been about the ethics of research into stories, or as I prefer to say, the moral auspices of such research. Qualitative methodologists agree that the ethical issue is not simply attaining the respondent’s consent to have his or her story recorded and analyzed.… Narrative analysis entails extensive ethical obligations. The researcher who solicits people’s stories does not simply collect data but assents to enter into a relationship with the respondent and become part of that person’s on-going struggle (‘la lotta continua’) toward a moral life. As I suggested earlier, that struggle is about narratability and legibility.” [Arthur W. Frank, “Why Study People’s Stories? The Dialogical Ethics of Narrative Analysis.” International Journal of Qualitative Methods. Volume 1, number 1, 2002. Pages 109-117.]
           “Researchers using a holistic-content approach to narrative analysis create an account that exhibits the connections between the parts of an individual’s story that provides an explanation for the story outcome.” [Claudia C. Beal, “Keeping the story together: a holistic approach to narrative analysis.” Journal of Research in Nursing. Volume 18, number 8, 2013. Pages 692-704.]
           18(8) 692–704
           “This article explores narrative analysis as a means of examining this charged relationship between structural stability and contextual change in the production of gender ideologies. My proposition may seem unlikely considering the representation of narrative analysis in feminist discussions of method.” [Venla Oikkonen, “Narrative analysis as a feminist method: The case of genetic ancestry tests.” European Journal of Women’s Studies. Volume 20, number 3, 2013. Pages 295-308.]
           “… the field of narrative analysis is extremely broad. There are numerous types of analysis in a variety of disciplines, and the researcher must of needs limit him/herself to a relatively circumscribed definition of what a narrative is and what narrative analysis is.” [Connie J. Boudens, “The Story of Work: A Narrative Analysis of Workplace Emotion.” Organization Studies. Volume 26, number 9, 2005. Pages 1285-1306.]
           “With the surge of self-narrative inquiry in social sciences, a number of approaches have been developed and applied in qualitative education research. Similar to narrative research, self-narrative ‘is an umbrella term that covers a large and diverse range of approaches’ …. We want to underscore the diversity within self-narrative inquiry, especially the various connotations of ‘self’ and the extent of researchers’ involvement in shaping the stories of ‘self.’” [Yanyue Yuan and Richard Hickman, “‘Autopsychography’ as a Form of Self-Narrative Inquiry.” Journal of Humanistic Psychology. OnlineFirst edition. August, 2016. Pages 1-17.]
           “The aim of the methodological design in this research was to construct a study that would reveal the rich and diverse ways that social workers use reflection. The foundation methodological argument was for constructivist ontology as orientations to the ways people understand their world, interpretivist epistemology to explore the ways that people construct meaning of these experiences and narrative inquiry and critical reflection to guide the research methods.” [Helen Hickson, “Becoming a critical narrativist: Using critical reflection and narrative inquiry as research methodology.” Qualitative Social Work. Volume 15, number 6, 2016. Pages 380-391.]
           “Narrative-photovoice draws on constituencies of photovoice and photo-narratives, but is explicitly underpinned by narrative inquiry theory. As with photovoice, the objective of narrative-photovoice is to give voice to the voice-less and minority voice, but does so through narrative. Therefore, the participants reveal what is displayed in their photographs in the form of narrative. This research can take place individually and collectively.” [Shan Simmonds, Cornelia Roux, and Ina ter Avest, “Blurring the Boundaries Between Photovoice and Narrative Inquiry: A Narrative-Photovoice Methodology for Gender-Based Research.” International Journal of Qualitative Methods. Volume 14, number 3, 2015. Pages 33-49.]
           “An embodied narrative inquiry attends to story realms – the performances and recounting. It is based on connection: connection between the narrator and his/her story; and connection to the audience, the listener(s). These two levels of connection are central to understanding embodied narrative.” [Liora Bresler, “Embodied Narrative Inquiry: A Methodology of Connection.” Research Studies in Music Education. Number 27, 2006. Pages 21-43.]
           “We draw attention to how fictionalizing has become a common and often unquestioned part of responding to concerns about anonymity raised by research ethics boards, but we also move beyond those concerns to other intentions and purposes of fictionalizing in narrative inquiry. We see three purposes for fictionalization: (a) protection of the identities of participants, (b) creation of distance between ourselves and our experiences, and (c) a way to engage in imagination that enriches inquiry spaces and research understandings. We turn first to a brief explication of narrative inquiry, the methodological context for our work.” [Vera Caine, M. Shaun Murphy, Andrew Estefan, D. Jean Clandinin, Pamela Steeves, and Janice Huber, “Exploring the Purposes of Fictionalization in Narrative Inquiry.” Qualitative Inquiry. OnlineFirst edition. April, 2016. Pages 1-7.]
           “In this article, we used narrative inquiry to explore the effects of long-term violence and trauma. Through personal accounts across a 20-year period in Northern Ireland, it became apparent that people experience the effects of trauma many years after the events.” [Karola Dillenburger, Montserrat Fargas, and Rym Akhonzada, “Long-Term Effects of Political Violence: Narrative Inquiry Across a 20-Year Period.” Qualitative Health Research. Volume 18, number 10, October 2008. Pages 1312-1322]
           “Narrative inquiry, ‘an amalgam of interdisciplinary analytic lenses, diverse disciplinary approaches, and both traditional and innovative methods,’ centers on ‘biographical particulars as narrated by the one who lives them’ …. By utilizing a narrative approach as my research methodology, I hope to give voice to aspects of identity that have previously been under-examined in the life of psychotherapists.” [Karen Estrella, “Narrative Inquiry and Arts-Based Inquiry: Multinarrative perspectives.” Journal of Humanistic Psychology. Volume 47, number 3, July 2007. Pages 376-383.]
           “As we traced … some of the ways narrative inquiry has shaped our understanding of the in- and out-of-classroom places within schools, we wanted to continue to make visible the importance of attending to the intersections, to the bumping up places, and to tensions experienced in multiple places and relationships in which life curriculum is made and lived. Attending to these diverse places and relationships allows us to understand narrative inquiry as holding extraordinary potential for shaping pedagogy, that is, for shaping how we might live alongside one another, in classrooms, schools, universities, and communities.” [Janice Huber, Vera Caine, Marilyn Huber, and Pam Steeves, “Narrative Inquiry as Pedagogy in Education: The Extraordinary Potential of Living, Telling, Retelling, and Reliving Stories of Experience.” Review of Research in Education. Volume 37, March 2013. Pages 212-242.]
           “In this article, we explicate how Narrative Inquiry may be lived in health-care education and practice, with a primary focus on nursing. We illustrate the process of the Narrative Inquiry approach through elaboration on the inquirer-participant relationship, storying of experience, and circles of analysis. We reveal how we support our graduate students, the next generation of narrative inquirers, through a Narrative Inquiry Works-in-Progress group.” [Gail M. Lindsay, and Jasna K. Schwind, “Narrative Inquiry: Experience matters.” Canadian Journal of Nursing Research. OnlineFirst edition. August, 2016. Pages 1-7.]
           “This article offers an overview of narrative inquiry, an approach that focuses on the use of stories as data. The idea of narrative inquiry is that stories are collected as a means of understanding experience as lived and told, through both research and literature. Peter Pan is seen as listening to stories in order to make sense not only of his own world but also those of Wendy and her siblings.” [Maggi Savin-Baden and Lana Van Niekerk, “Narrative Inquiry: Theory and Practice.” Journal of Geography in Higher Education. Volume 31, number 3, September 2007. Pages 359-472.]
           “Narrative inquiry is a methodology that frequently appeals to teachers and teacher educators. Part of the appeal is, no doubt, the comfort that comes from thinking about telling and listening to stories. This comfort associated with narratives and stories carries into a sense of comfort with research that attends to teachers’ and teacher educators’ stories.” [D. Jean Clandinin, Debbie Pushor, and Anne Murray Orr, “Navigating Sites for Narrative Inquiry.” Journal of Teacher Education. Volume 58, number 1, January/February 2007. Pages 21-35.]
           “In this article, I use narrative inquiry and self-study to examine my own curricula decisions in teaching race in a course with mostly White teacher education students. Using racialized narratives in teacher education courses can help circumvent resistance and disengagement among education students where race and racism are concerned. Such a focus is important to the education of students in all schools, and particularly to students in urban schools. Urban schools are often populated by students of color and students from lower social classes, whereas teachers are overwhelmingly White and middle class.” [H. Richard Milner IV, “Race, Narrative Inquiry, and Self-Study in Curriculum and Teacher Education.” Education and Urban Society. Volume 39, number 4, August 2007. Pages 584-609.]
           “Although relatively new to the field of music education research, narrative inquiry is proving useful to researchers seeking insight into the human experience of musical engagement and the social worlds in which music-making occurs. Narrative scholarship is distinctive both for its emergent, recursive process of inquiry and its prioritization of mutuality in the relationship between researcher and participant.” [Jeananne Nichols, “Sharing the Stage: Ethical Dimensions of Narrative Inquiry in Music Education.” Journal of Research in Music Education. Volume 63, number 4, 2016. Pages 439-454.]
           “Our own experiences remind us that stories are important; they sustain us and remind us that lives are lived, told, retold, and relived in storied ways. Stories are what we know, how we know, and stories are how we live. Story is that which ties together people in places, and across time. Stories are our obligation to others, and stories create obligations for us as researchers. Narrative inquiry, defined as both research methodology and a view of phenomena, is the intimate study of an individual’s experience over time and in context ….” [Vera Caine and Andrew Estefan, “The Experience of Waiting: Inquiry Into the Long-term Relational Responsibilities in Narrative Inquiry.” Qualitative Inquiry. Volume 17, number 10, 2011. Pages 965-971.]
           “Three commonplaces, temporality, sociality, and place …, are often used to bound narrative inquiry.” [Vanessa L. Bond and Lisa Huisman Koops, “Together Through Transitions: A Narrative Inquiry of Emergent Identity as Music Teacher Educators.” Journal of Music Teacher Education. Volume 24, number 1, 2014. Pages 38-50.]
      448. narrative policy analysis (Michel J. G. van Eeten as pronounced in this MP3 audio file): An approach to policy analysis is formulated based upon narrative analysis or “narratology.”
           “Using narrative to explain action makes clear why most of these researchers do not adhere to a strict definition of narrative, but also incorporate argumentative forms of language. They are interested in what drives the action of actors, how they make the ‘normative leap’ from ‘is’ to ‘ought’ …. Actors use both narrative and argumentation for this goal—where narratives in a strict sense are stories about a sequence of events with beginning, middle, and ends, as in scenarios, and where arguments are built from premises to conclusions.…
           “Within this strand of literature, researchers explicitly reject judging the different narratives in terms of truth value or establishing the primacy of one narrative over another—though some do try to explain empirically why a specific narrative has become dominant …. Implicitly or explicitly, this research often critiques the dominant narrative, given the presence of equally valid alternatives often voiced by less powerful stakeholders. This point is equally important at different stages in the policy process—from competing problem definitions to competing evaluations of policies …. Along the same lines, this research critiques technocratic approaches in these cases, since issues can no longer be decided by appealing to ‘objective facts.’”
           [Michel J. G. van Eeten, “Narrative Policy Analysis.” Handbook of Public Policy Analysis: Theory, Politics, and Methods. Frank Fischer, Gerald J. Miller, and Mara S. Sidney, editors. Boca Raton, Florida, London, and New York: CRC Press imprint of Taylor & Francis Group, an Informa PLC business. 2007. Pages 251-269.]
      449. new cultural politics of difference (Cornel West): West, in the approach he takes here to cultural studies, examines “the ubiquitous commodification of culture in the global village.”
           “In the last few years of the twentieth century, there is emerging a significant shift in the sensibilities and outlooks of critics and artists. In fact, I would go so far as to claim that a new kind of cultural worker is in the making, associated with a new politics of difference. These new forms of intellectual consciousness advance new conceptions of the vocation of critic and artist, attempting to undermine the prevailing disciplinary divisions of labour in the academy, museum, mass media, and gallery networks while preserving modes of critique within the ubiquitous commodification of culture in the global village. Distinctive features of the new cultural politics of difference are to trash the monolithic and homogeneous in the name of diversity, multiplicity, and heterogeneity; to reject the abstract, general, and universal in light of the concrete, specific, and particular; and to historicize, contextualize, and pluralize by highlighting the contingent, provisional, variable, tentative, shifting, and changing.” [Cornel West, “The New Cultural Politics of Difference.” The Cultural Studies Reader. Simon During, editor. Second edition. London and New York: Routledge imprint of Taylor & Francis Group, an Informa PLC business. 2001. Pages 257-267.]
      450. cognitive cultural studies (Lisa Zunshine and others): Zunshine introduces a volume which combines cultural studies with cognitive science.
           “The term ‘cultural studies’ has a long and complicated history, referring to both a particular school of thought (or several related schools) and an ever-expanding set of academic research programs. ‘Cognitive cultural studies’ most commonly evokes the second, broad meaning of the term, thus connoting the incorporation of insights from cognitive science into the study of cultural practices. Yet the first, more specific, meaning turns out to be also directly relevant, in fact, crucially so, as the field of cognitive cultural studies seeks to position itself inside mainstream cultural theory.” [Lisa Zunshine, “Introduction: What is Cognitive Cultural Studies?” Introduction to Cognitive Cultural Studies. Lisa Zunshine, editor. Baltimore, Maryland: The Johns Hopkins University Press. 2010. Pages 1-34.]
      451. cognitive cultural hegemony (Bruce McConachie): He develops an approach to cultural hegemony informed by cognitive cultural studies.
           “Because cultural models contain historical as well as universal constituents, all cultural models are subject to the vagaries of cultural hegemony. As the example of baseball demonstrates, the constraints of structure operate and the possibilities of agency manifest themselves at the cognitive level as well as at the external level of cultural practice. Despite the dominance of racism and sexism on the social imagination, some baseball managers and spectators could and did play with mental images of allfemale and racially integrated teams as well as with images of less homogeneous audiences for the sport. For other managers and spectators, however, the game in their minds would remain male and white, regardless of historical changes and the consequent pressure to adjust their social schemas about baseball.” [Bruce McConachie, “Toward a Cognitive Cultural Hegemony.” Introduction to Cognitive Cultural Studies. Lisa Zunshine, editor. Baltimore, Maryland: The Johns Hopkins University Press. 2010. Pages 134-150.]
      452. mass psychology of Fascism (Wilhelm Reich as pronounced in this MP3 audio file): He distinguishes Fascism from the dialectical materialism of Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels.
           “If one followed and actually experienced the theory and practice of Marxism on the revolutionary left front between 1917 and 1933, one found that it was limited to the objective economic processes and to state politics. The so-called ‘subjective factor’ in history, the ideology of the masses, its development and contradictions, were not even considered, let alone understood. The Marxists failed to apply their own method of dialectic materialism, to keep it alive, and to use it to comprehend every new social phenomenon.
           “That is, the method of dialectic materialism was not applied to new historical phenomena. But fascism was such a phenomena, a phenomenon which was still completely unknown to [Karl] Marx and [Friedrich] Engels and of which [Vladimir] Lenin was aware only in its very beginning. The reactionary comprehension of reality by-passes its contradictions and actual conditions; reactionary politics automatically makes use of those social forces which are against development; it can do that only as long as science does not uncover all the revolutionary forces which of necessity must overcome the reactionary forces. As we shall see later, the mass basis of fascism, the rebelling lower middle classes, contained not only reactionary but also powerful progressive social forces. This contradiction was overlooked; more than that, the role of the lower middle classes, up to the time of [Adolf] Hitler’s coming into power, remained entirely in the background.”
           [Wilhelm Reich. The Mass Psychology of Fascism. Third, revised and enlarged edition. Theodore P. Wolfe, translator. New York: Orgone Institute Press. 1946. Ebook edition.]
      453. transformative organizing model (Steve Williams): He proposes a model for left protest movements.
           “… [The] new model, which is the accumulation of practices past and present, has come to be called transformative organizing.
           “If organizing is the attempt to bring people together to take collective action to resolve a commonly identified problem, then transformative organizing is a particular approach to organizing that situates individual campaigns within a conscious analysis of the underlying systems of exploitation and oppression. Transformative organizing is defined by its explicit intention to transform both those systems and the individuals engaged in those campaigns in an effort to win genuine liberation for all. The model is still in development, but the practice that it is based on is strong and growing in the United States and around the globe. Of course, transformative organizing looks very different based on the place and conditions in which that work is happening. Transformative organizing looks different in Grahamstown, South Africa than it does in San Francisco, United States, but there are core principles that are shared by transformative organizations.”
           [Steve Williams. Demand Everything: Lessons of the Transformative Organizing Model. New York: Rosa Luxemburg Stiftung. March, 2013. Page 4.]
      454. actor network theory (Bruno Latour as pronounced in this MP3 audio file and others): They develop an approach for examining the relations between both human and nonhuman actors.
           “It might be time to put [Karl] Marx’s famous quote back on its feet: ‘Social scientists have transformed the world in various ways; the point, however, is to interpret it.’ But to interpret, we need to abandon the strange idea that all languages are translatable in the already established idiom of the social. Such a preparatory training is important since, as we will see in the next chapter, social aggregates might not be made of human ties.” [Bruno Latour. Reassembling the Social: An Introduction to Actor-Network Theory. Oxford, England, and New York: Oxford University Press. 2005. Page 42.]
           “… actor-network theory (hence ANT) has very little to do with the study of social networks. These studies, no matter how interesting, concern themselves with the social relations of individual human actors – their frequency, distribution, homogeneity, proximity. It was devised as a reaction to the often too global concepts like those of institutions, organizations, states and nations, adding to them a more realistic and smaller set of associations. Although ANT shares this distrust for such vague all-encompassing sociological terms, it also aims at describing the very nature of societies. But to do so it does not limit itself to human individual actors, but extends the word actor – or actant – to non-human, non-individual entities.” [Bruno Latour, “On actor-network theory: A few clarifications.” Soziale Welt. Volume 47, number 4, 1996. Pages 369-381.]
           “ANT [actor-network theory] doesn’t claim that we will ever know if society is ‘really’ made of small individual calculative agents or of huge macroactors; nor does it claim that since anything goes one can pick a favorite candidate at whim. On the contrary, it draws the relativist, that is, the scientific conclusion that those controversies provide the analyst with an essential resource to render the social connections traceable. ANT simply claims that once we are accustomed to these many shifting frames of reference a very good grasp of how the social is generated can be provided, since a relativist connection between frames of reference offers a better source of objective judgment than the absolute (that is, arbitrary) settings suggested by common sense.” [Bruno Latour. Reassembling the Social: An Introduction to Actor-Network Theory. Oxford, England, and New York: Oxford University Press. 2005. Page 30.]
           “The mobilization of the world and of communities on an ever-larger scale multiplies the actors who make up our natures and our societies, but nothing in their mobilization implies an ordered and systematic passage of time. However, thanks to their quite peculiar form of temporality, the moderns will order the proliferation of new actors either as a form of capitalism, an accumulation of conquests, or as an invasion of barbarians, a succession of catastrophes. Progress and decadence are their two great resources, and the two have the same origin. On each of these three lines – calendar time, progress, decadence – it will be possible to locate the antimoderns, who accept modern temporality but reverse its direction. In order to wipe out progress or degeneracy, they want to return toward the past – as if there were a past!” [Bruno Latour. We Have Never Been Modern. Catherine Porter, translator. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press. 1993. Page 72.]
           “‘Ah, I knew it—here the social constructivist is showing the tip of his donkey’s ear! Here are the sophists who proliferate in the obscurity scurity of the Cave. You want to reduce all the exact sciences to simple social representations. Extend multiculturalism to politics. Deprive politics of the only transcendence capable of decisively putting an end to its interminable squabbles.’ And yet it is precisely on this point that science studies, in combination with militant ecology, allows us to break with the deceptive self-evidence of the social sciences by completely abandoning the theme of social constructivism. If the objectors jectors continue to be suspicious, it is because they do not understand that political ecology, in combination with science studies, allows a movement that had always been forbidden before.” [Bruno Latour. Politics of Nature: How to Bring the Sciences into Democracy. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press. 2004. Pages 36-37..]
           “Certainly if ANT [actor-network theory] has any scientific content, it has to be structuralist.
           “… it [the actor] fulfills a function. This is what is so great about structuralism, if I have understood it correctly. Any other agent in the same position would be forced to do the same.”
           [Bruno Latour. Reassembling the Social: An Introduction to Actor-Network Theory. Oxford, England, and New York: Oxford University Press. 2005. Page 153.]
           “[Bruno] Latour returns to Plato’s cave myth repeatedly … suggesting at one point that if sociology is to stop making the same old mistake, that of saying that nature is socially constructed but society is not, if it is to break with ‘the deceptive self-evidence of the social sciences,’ and with social constructionism, it must ‘change the notion of the social, which we inherited, like the rest, from the age of the cave’ ….” [Charles Turner, “Travels without a donkey: The adventures of Bruno Latour.” History of the Human Sciences. Volume 28, number 1, February 2015. Pages 118-138.]
           “How to think about ‘actor-network theory’? It does not relate in any direct way to social network theories – though like these it may be generally understood as an expression of a longer term trend, visible for a century but more strongly since 1945, towards system-like and relational modes for understanding the natural, the social and the technical. Indeed, for the reasons I’ve just touched on, actor-network theory doesn’t really count as a form of sociology. Unsurprisingly, it is a source of frustration for those who seek strong social explanations for the origins of phenomena. For similar reasons it is also frustrating for those primarily concerned with social critique.” [John Law, “On sociology and STS.” The Sociological Review Volume 56, number 4, 2008. Pages 623-649.]
           “The working definition of actor networks in this paper is: The traces of relationships between people, institutions, and artifacts connected by agreements and exchanges.
           “A refined description of actor network stresses that this theoretical framework explains the interactions without the strong reliance on contingency characteristic of [Anthony] Giddens’ structuration theory and [Roy] Bhaskar’s critical realist structuration theory. Actor network theories are as much ontologies as epistemologies …, in which coordination is an issue of relationships.”
           [Francis Harvey, “Constructing GIS: Actor Networks of Collaboration.” Journal of the Urban and Rural Information Systems Association (URISA Journal). Volume 13, 2001. Pages 29-37.]
           “ANT [actor network theory] positions the world as an outcome of a process of inquiry, which is constructed generatively and ontologically, rather than epistemologically …. Following wider poststructural theorisation, ANT calls for the recognition of theory, methodology and self as vital means through which an emergent reality is created—a research reality/network. This approach is opposed to modernist logic or Enlightenment rhetoric, where one claims to view a scene objectively, where knowledge is positioned as truth, as grand, totalising theories implying universal applicability ….” [Kristian Ruming, “Following the Actors: mobilising an actor-network theory methodology in geography.” Australian Geographer. Volume 40, number 4, December 2009. Pages 451-469.]
           “Actor-network theory is ‘co-constructionist’: it seeks to identify how relations and entities come into being together.…
           “[Bruno] Latour first outlined his alternative to social studies of science during an analysis of Louis Pasteur’s discovery of the anthrax vaccine …, and it is worth outlining this case study as it illustrates the co-constructionist character of ANT [actor-network theory].”
           [Jonathan Murdoch, “Ecologising Sociology: Actor-Network Theory, Co-construction and the Problem of Human Exemptionalism.” Sociology. Volume 35, number 1, February 2001. Pages 111-133.]
           “ANT [actor-network theory] and its poststructuralist approach to the social and the technical offered a non-dualist approach and acknowledged that what some define as technical may be seen as social by others and that it is this very construction, negotiation and even dispute about the boundary which is of interest ….” [Nathalie Mitev, “In and out of actor-network theory: a necessary but insufficient journey.” Information Technology & People. Volume 22, number 1, 2009. Pages 9-25.]
           “… the symmetry of actor-network theory is set in … [a distinctive] ontological space …. Actor-network does away entirely with the two poles … [‘human and material agency’], treating the constructed world in between as the only admissible reality. There is no unbridgeable divide between the agents and objects of construction. If any of these objects is constructed, they all are.…
           “… Actor-network … gives us structures without structuralism.”
           [Daniel Breslau, “Sociology after Humanism: A Lesson from Contemporary Science Studies.” Sociological Theory. Volume 18, number 2, July 2000. Pages 289-307.]
           “Actor Network Theory (ANT), otherwise known as the sociology of translation, rejects the idea that ‘social relations’ are independent of the material and natural world …. The contribution of ANT to organization studies lies in recognizing that there is no such thing as a purely social actor or purely social relation …. This contribution is significant in helping to bring the ‘missing masses’ … of non-human actors into the frame – an important and timely move, given the influence of the linguistic turn in organization theory.” [Andrea Whittle and André Spicer, “Is Actor Network Theory Critique?” Organization Studies. Volume 29, number 04, 2008. Pages 611-629.]
      455. critical actor–network theory (Margaret Drouhard and Cecilia Aragon): They combine actor network theory—a perspective which was originally developed by the French philosopher of science Bruno Latour—with critical social theory.
           “The theory proposed in this work, Critical Actor-Network Theory (CANT), weaves together components of Actor-Network Theory (ANT) and Critical Theory (CT). This combination can enable researchers to critically examine technologies as they currently exist, but it also provides mechanisms to help guide design.…
           “Critical Actor-Network Theory (CANT) is a hybrid theory that supports design and analysis. CANT supports crucial work for HCDS [Human-Centered Data Science] including: the explicit examination of power, reflection on bias, network tracing, and analysis of long-term impacts.…
           “CANT goes beyond the analysis of power in institutions and societies, requiring designers to question and challenge their own assumptions through self-reflection.”
           [Margaret Drouhard and Cecilia Aragon, “Critical Actor-Network Theory: Hybrid Theory for Visual Analytics.” Presented at the 19th Association for Computing Machinery Conference on Computer Supported Cooperative Work & Social Computing. San Francisco, California. February 27th–March 2nd, 2016. Pages 1-5. Retrieved on September 2nd, 2016.]
      456. actor–network theory of cosmopolitanism (Hiro Saito [Japanese, ひろ さいと, Hiro Saito as pronounced in this MP3 audio file or ヒロ斎藤, Hiro Saitō as pronounced in this MP3 audio file): He applies Bruno Latour’s actor network theory to Ulrich Beck’s version of cosmopolitanism.
           “The goal of this article is to explore the mechanisms of cosmopolitanism and provide a more solid theoretical foundation for emerging research on the topic. To this end, I build on Bruno Latour’s actor-network theory (ANT). ‘Network’ is one of the most theoretically robust concepts distilled from the so-called relational perspective in sociology …. Among various forms of network analysis, ANT may appear an unlikely candidate for theorizing mechanisms because it is typically seen as descriptive rather than explanatory. For Latour, however, ‘description’ is an alternative form of ‘explanation’—from a variable-based, causal-analytic approach …. I argue that ANT can help the sociology of cosmopolitanism increase its explanatory power precisely because it is the most descriptive analysis.…
           “I … draw on ANT to specify mechanisms that mediate the presumed causal relationship between globalization and the development of cosmopolitanism. Specifically, I argue that cosmopolitan openness is of two kinds: openness to foreign nonhumans, and openness to foreign humans. I examine these two kinds of openness as instances of ‘cultural omnivorousness’ and ‘ethnic tolerance,’ respectively. In addition, 1 consider how foreign nonhumans and humans combine to create a transnational public to debate global risks and work out collective solutions—to engage in ‘cosmopolitics.’ In short, this article proposes ANT-based mechanisms of cultural omnivorousnes, ethnic tolerance, and cosmopolitics as three key elements of cosmopolitanism.”
           [Hiro Saito, “An Actor-Network Theory of Cosmopolitanism.” Sociological Theory. Volume 29, number 2, June 2011. Pages 124-149.]
           “The cosmopolitan gaze opens wide and focuses – stimulated by the postmodern mix of boundaries between cultures and identities, accelerated by the dynamics of capital and consumption, empowered by capitalism undermining national borders, excited by the global audience of transnational social movements, and guided and encouraged by the evidence of worldwide communication (often just another word for misunderstanding) on central themes such as science, law, art, fashion, entertainment, and, not least, politics. World-wide public perception and debate of global ecological danger or global risks of a technological and economic nature (‘Frankenstein food’) have laid open the cosmopolitan significance of fear.” [Ulrich Beck, “The Cosmopolitan Perspective: Sociology of the Second Age of Modernity.” British Journal of Sociology. Volume 51, ssue 1, January/March 2000. Pages 79-105.]
      457. the New Left (C. Wright Mills, Edward Palmer “E. P.” Thompson, Staughton Lynd, and many others): This 1960s–1970s Marxian movement took on a wide range of issues, including: changing drug laws, distributing petitions to boycott supermarkets selling California grapes and holding demonstrations in front of supermarkets which sold them (both focuses of this author’ own new–left activism in the 1960s), gay rights, and revisiting gender roles.
           “Is not our utopianism a major source of our strength? ‘Utopian’ nowadays I think refers to any criticism or proposal that transcends the up-close milieux of a scatter of individuals: the milieux which men and women can understand directly and which they can reasonably hope directly to change. In this exact sense, our theoretical work is indeed utopian—in my own case, at least, deliberately so. What needs to be understood, and what needs to be changed, is not merely first this and then that detail of some institution or policy. If there is to be a politics of a New Left, what needs to be analysed is the structure of institutions, the foundation of policies. In this sense, both in its criticisms and in its proposals, our work is necessarily structural— and so, for us, just now—utopian.” [C. Wright Mills, “Letter to the New Left.” New Left Review. Series I, number 5, September–October 1960. Pages 18-23.]
           “In his letter, [C. Wright] Mills largely refers to anticolonial forces as a means to counter the smug, complacency of American intellectual elites. He makes only the tiniest reference to the emergent Civil Rights Movement and includes no discussion of what we would all now see as the features of 1960s radicalism and the aims of the ‘new left:’ civil rights, free speech, peace and justice, prefigurative politics, and subsequently the new feminism, environmental justice, and gay rights. Nevertheless, Mills’s letter still reads as prescient in that it envisions a ‘new left’ built on a set of political sensibilities no longer exclusively dependent on the labor movement and the working class.” [Stephen Adair, “The Activist Foundation of Sociology.” Humanity & Society. Volume 39, number 1, February 2015. Pages 9-21.]
           “… the New Left first appeared as a revolt against apathy within a particular social and political context. We wished to show the inter-connections between certain phenomena of ‘apathy’ in economic, social, intellectual, and political life: their common ground in an ‘affluent’ capitalist society in the context of Cold War: and to suggest that tensions and positive tendencies were present which might—but need not necessarily—lead people out of apathy and towards a socialist resolution.” [E. P. Thompson, “Revolution Again!: Or Shut Your Ears and Run.” New Left Review. Series I, number 6, November–December 1960. Pages 18-31.]
           “It should not be assumed, however, that the model of revolution presented by some [British] Labour fundamentalists is therefore acceptable. It is not only that its very terms carry an aroma of barricades and naval mutinies in an age of flame-throwers. It is also that the antagonisms of capitalist society are presented in a falsely antithetical manner—without any sense of the contradictory processes of change. An imaginary line is drawn through society, dividing the workers in “basic” industries from the rest. The class struggle tends to be thought of as a series of brutal, head-on encounters (which it sometimes is); not as a conflict of force, interests, values, priorities, ideas, taking place ceaselessly in every area of life.” [E. P. Thompson, “Revolution.” New Left Review. Series I, number 3, May–June 1960. Pages 3-9.]
           “The single most characteristic element in the thought-world of the New Left is the existential commitment to action, in the knowledge that the consequence of action can never be fully predicted; this commitment has survived all changes in political fashion. More concretely, the members of the New Left condemn existing American society as ‘corporate liberalism,’ and seek to replace it with ‘participatory democracy.’ American New Left theorists, however, made the implicit assumption that the United States would not turn toward overt authoritarianism, overlooking the possibility that their own success in unmasking ‘corporate liberalism’ would change the character of the situation and force the Establishment to feel a need for more vigorous controls. The New Left’s assessment of American reality was, in this sense, not too negative, but too hopeful.” [Staughton Lynd, “The New Left.” The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science. Volume 382, March 1969. Pages 64-72.]
           “Galvanized by a continued racial caste system in the South, by growing military action in Southeast Asia, and by disillusionment with America and its technocracy, an emerging evangelical left denounced the evangelical establishment for its inaction against structural injustice As a minority even within progressive evangelicalism, the numbers of evangelicals sympathetic to New Left social critiques were not large. Yet their antiliberal ideology, strident activism, and Manichean rhetoric—evidences of a shared discursive strategy with the New Left—point to a new evangelical political style and underscore the inadequacy of historiographical boundaries of both evangelicalism and the New Left.” [David R. Swartz, “The New Left and Evangelical Radicalism.” Journal for the Study of Radicalism. Volume 3, number 2, fall 2009. Pages 51-79.]
           “The ideas radiating from the IPS [Institute for Policy Studies] reflected a number of the impulses driving a New Left embrace of the neighborhood scale, as its resident intellectuals crisscrossed the lines dividing theory from practice. The ideological evolutions and “social inventions” of two of its resident fellows, in particular, dramatize a story that played out in scores of locations across the country. Milton Kotler and Karl Hess, two of the decade’s best-known proponents of neighborhood autonomy and self-government, galvanized activists in support of their visions, wrote central texts for the neighborhoods movement, and created structures to test their ideas in real-life urban communities. In doing so, they helped to give shape and intellectual coherence to the neighborhood movement’s radical decentralist wing.” [Benjamin Looker, “Visions of Autonomy: The New Left and the Neighborhood Government Movement of the 1970s.” Journal of Urban History. Volume 38, number 3, May 2012. Pages 577-598.]
           “The New Left has made a rather unexpected comeback in current political discourse, catching the interest of figures associated with Ed Miliband’s leadership of the Labour Party, notably the Chair of its Policy Review, Jon Cruddas, and his collaborator Jonathan Rutherford. For those involved in the New Left, especially its early phase when it was a movement of people as well as ideas, this sudden renewal of interest is probably a surprise …. For while the New Left was for forty years one of the major intellectual engines on the British left, since the 1990s it has all but disappeared from view, retreating behind the walls of its one surviving institution, the heavyweight journal New Left Review (NLR).” [Michael Kenny, “Faith, flag and the ‘first’ New Left: E. P. Thompson and the politics of ‘one nation.’” Renewal. Volume 21, number 1, spring 2013, Pages 15-23.]
           “… I want to challenge … [the] understanding of subcultural analysis as a linear progression by going back to the 1950s, and to the representation of youth by writers associated with the 1950s New Left. In this article, I look at the competing representations of youth in key British texts from the period to emphasize the diversity, complexity and contestation of subcultural analysis during the period. In particular, I discuss the alternative versions of youth as produced by early New Left writers Richard Hoggart, Stuart Hall and Colin MacInnes.” [Nick Bentley, “The Young Ones: A reassessment of the British New Left’s representation of 1950s youth subcultures.” European Journal of Cultural Studies. Volume 8, number 1, February 2005. Pages 65-83.]
           “Looking back, what intrigues me now about the 1960s is my effort, and that of many friends, to steer clear of other movements that might have compromised our own aims. This meant either denying that contemporary music, drug culture, revival religion or sexual liberation had much to do with the tasks of radical politics. Or it meant that everything called the ‘youth movement’ would eventually cast off its frivolous apparel and don a political uniform. I was often angriest when I heard the opposite advice (for I half believed it) that the new left was associated, cross-ways, with American culture, with generational politics, a new religious spiritualism, drug culture, and a hundred other manifestations I disliked.” [James Gilbert, “New Left: Old America.” Social Text. Number 9/10, spring–summer 1984. Pages 244-247.]
      458. materiality of ideology (Terry E. Boswell, Edgar V. Kiser, and Kathryn E. Baker): They develop an approach to ideology which affirms its material substance while, simultaneously, acknowledging the ideational content of ideology.
           “Ideology constitutes individuals who will more or less submit to the existing order. The manner in which this subjection is accomplished varies in different types of social formations. In some social formations individuals may be aware of their subjection but accept it as legitimate or at least inescapable. In capitalist social formations the emphasis given to the individual as subject in the first sense obscures subjection as subject in the second sense; the individual perceives submission as freely chosen. Hence lies the power of ideology in capitalist social formations: the production of subjects whose imaginary relation to real relations is that of initiators of action.…
           “The concept of a material matrix of affirmations and sanctions gives substance to the notion of the ‘materiality of ideology,’ while avoiding [Louis] Althusser’s radial claim that ideology is only material practices and not ideas.”
           [Terry E. Boswell, Edgar V. Kiser, and Kathryn E. Baker, “Recent Developments in Marxist Theories of Ideology.” Critical Sociology. Volume 25, number 2/3, March 1999. Pages 358-383.]
      459. psychoanalytic dialectic (Igor Caruso as pronounced in this MP3 audio file): Caruso, an Austrian psychoanalyst and psychologist—of Italian ancestry—examines the dialectical nature of psychoanalysis.
           “Psychoanalysis as a technique, then, is naturally dialectical and social. Psychoanalytical theory, however, can only become truly social when it realizes that, within its own perspectives,it is analyzing social exchanges. In effect, even before a child’s birth his future is conditioned by his position in the family; the child’s response to that position will in turn modify the family’s attitudes; and it is through this open and unceasing dialogue that he will assume his personality. This spiral development is not an abstract ‘ideal’; it is revealed in the child’s real, malleable relations with his environment.
           “The psychoanalytic dialectic must be social because man can only exist and develop within society. The great psychic mechanisms like identification, projection, introjection, repression, sublimation, rationalization—in the way they are described by psychoanalysts—often appear to be sterile, purely intra-psychic exercises, leading nowhere. But if they were, they could have no existence. They exist only because they function, and they function only because they are, in reality, historical and inter-psychic.”
           [Igor Caruso, “Psychoanalysis and Society.” New Left Review. Series I, number 32, July–August 1965. Pages 24-31.]
      460. new neoliberalism (William Davies): Davies, in his critique, distinguishes the new neoliberalism from the older version.
           “Underlying the new neoliberalism’s circumvention of critical forms of knowledge there gapes the truth it is so anxious to avoid—the absence of profitable alternatives to the current, broken model of capitalist accumulation, which it is striving to prop up. Global capitalist development has been confounded by its own success: it has brought about massive over-capacity in manufacturing, with a glut in production driving down profits, combined with a huge over-supply of labour, weakening wages and therefore demand. With only the occasional brief uptick, profitability rates have been falling, business cycle on business cycle, since the end of the trente glorieuses. Underlying this is the drastic failure to achieve a viable and profitable model of capitalism since the demise of Fordist Keynesianism. The once tacit, and now explicit, dependence of the neoliberal model upon the rising indebtedness of public and private sectors has been, as Streeck shows, a forty-year-long exercise in kicking the can down the road. Ultimately, the function of apparently irrational symptoms in today’s neoliberalism is to duck or conceal this realization.” [William Davies, “The New Neoliberalism.” New Left Review. Series II, number 101. September–October 2016. Pages 121-134.]
      461. democratic communism (Peter Fleming): He examines the ways in which capitalism has persisted in spite of itself.
           “Let’s examine dialectical reason …. It seeks to discern a space of synthetic excess born of the contradictions between the capitalist accumulation process – its forces of production (e.g. the social intellect, knowledge sharing, freeware, and so forth) and the relations of production (e.g. private property, patent laws, copyright, the HRM [human resource management] office, the neoliberal state, etc.). The overflowing social surplus that results is divined by way of analytically extending those contradictions towards capitalism’s own structural inabilities. That is to say, those irreconcilable qualities that cannot be subsumed within the universal process and thus explode into a clearing in order to exist for their own sake. A distant and emancipatory ‘other’ emerges from capitalism’s own contradictory dynamics; we might call this democratic communism.” [Peter Fleming. The Mythology of Work: How Capitalism Persists Despite Itself. London: Pluto Press. 2015. Page 160.]
      462. co–production of science and society (Hilary Rose and Steven Rose): They critique various attempts to universalize Darwinian evolution outside of biology.
           “… attempts to transfer the logic of natural selection to other domains betray an ignorance both of debates among biologists over its workings, and of the sociology of scientific knowledge. In what follows we will discuss [Charles] Darwin in the context of his time, the subsequent and current conflicts within evolutionary theory, and its extrapolation into ‘universal Darwinism.’ The framework for our discussion is supplied by the concept of the co-production of science and society. From its birth in the mid-17ᵗʰ century, science assumed an epistemological standpoint outside and above society, receiving cultural authorization to speak the truth about nature.” [Hilary Rose and Steven Rose, “Darwin and After.” New Left Review. Series II, number 63, May–June 2010. Pages 91-113.]
      463. organization of financial systems in capitalist economies (Peter Gowan): He considers two levels of systemic options.
           “The real debate over the organization of financial systems in capitalist economies is not about methods and modes of regulation. It is a debate between systemic options, at two levels.
           • “A public-utility credit and banking system, geared to capital accumulation in the productive sector versus a capitalist credit and banking system, subordinating all other economic activities to its own profit drives.
           • “An international financial and monetary system under national-multilateral co-operative control versus a system of imperial character, dominated by the Atlantic banks and states working in tandem.…
           “… The supply of credit from the financial system to the mass of consumers through the usual mechanisms of credit card, car debt and other loans and mortgages was, however, supplemented by the distinctive mechanism of asset-price bubbles, which generated so-called wealth effects among a relatively broad layer.”
           [Peter Gowan, “Crisis in the Heartland: Consequences of the New Wall Street System.” New Left Review. Series II, number 55, January–February 2009. Pages 5-29.]
      464. mapping London’s emotions (Stanford Literary Lab): The article outlines a project conducted by the Stanford Literary Lab—at California’s Stanford University.
           “… the initial idea—quantifying and mapping novelistic emotions—turned out to be neither easy, nor particularly satisfying: in the end, the map of the emotions of London was only partially accomplished. But in pursuing this objective, we found empirical evidence that supported existing theories about emotions in public; we showed how established narratological polarities (foreground/background, story/discourse) preside, not only over the temporality of narrative, but over its geography as well; and we discovered a striking discrepancy between real and fictional geography, while also sketching the first lineaments for a future ‘semantics of space.’ Corroboration, improvement and discovery: the three axes which have defined the variable relationship between quantitative literary research and existing scholarship. Corroboration, improvement and discovery. Eventually, the day for theory-building will also come.” [Stanford Literary Lab, “Mapping London’s Emotions.” New Left Review. Series II, number 101. September–October 2016. Pages 63-91.]
      465. agency of objects (Gijs van Oenen as pronounced in this MP3 audio file): He develops an approach to agency as a critique of actor network theory.
           “The most important difference between our accounts [Bruno Latour’s actor network theory and the views of Gijs van Oenen] is that my account of the agency of objects is historical; such agency is not, in my view, a transhistorical or universal phenomenon. That it was recently ‘discovered’ is not accidental, but easily explained considering its recent origin, roughly somewhere in the 1980s. Objects acquired agency when human beings began to interactively engage with them. This was a first moment of ‘emancipation’ for the objects. For human beings however, this was also the moment when interactivity started to become ‘too much of a good thing’ for them. The emancipatory freedom of having to act only on norms one could subscribe to oneself turned into a virtual obligation to always do so, turning a blessing into a burden. Increasingly, we as human beings cannot bring ourselves to act on our own norms. Rather than admit defeat and give up on the interactively acquired capacities, we externalize, or outsource, them: we ask objects to exercise them, on our behalf.” [Gijs van Oenen, “Interpassive Agency: Engaging Actor-Network-Theory’s View on the Agency of Objects.” Theory & Event. Volume 14, issue 2, 2011. Pages 1-19.]
      466. moksha (Peter Wilberg): He compares Marxism with the Hindu concept of moksha (Sanskrit/Saṃskṛtam, मोक्ष, mokṣa), “release” or “freedom.”
           “Marxism is … essentially a philosophy of liberation or ‘Moksha.’ The deeper purpose of this tabulation of antonyms however, is that it allows us to introduce a ‘third term’ besides the duality of Marxism and Moksha, but one of no little significance in relation to them both: ‘postmodernism.’ For those unfamiliar with the origins of this term, it is rooted in model of language – both language as such and specific languages or ‘modes of discourse’ (not least philosophical, theological, scientific and theoretical languages) as more or less selective structures of mutually defining or opposing terms such as ‘true’ and ‘false,’ ‘black’ and ‘white,’ ‘higher’ and ‘lower,’ ‘good’ and ‘evil,’ ‘positive’ and ‘negative,’ ‘creative’ and ‘destructive,’ ‘phenomenon’ and ‘noumenon,’ ‘transcendent’ and ‘imminent.’ Such dichotomies or dualisms, though they take the form of binary pairs or verbal distinctions need not necessarily be understood as contradictory opposites or antonyms. The specific theoretical language or ‘discourse’ of Marxism itself for example, though it revolves around a basic set of binary verbal distinctions or dichotomies such as ‘use value and exchange value,’ ‘base and superstructure,’ ‘man and nature,’ ‘idealism’ and ‘materialism,’ ‘scientific’ and ‘utopian’ socialism etc., understands each term as inseparable from its other – whilst the Marxist theoretical framework as a whole is precisely intended to serve the purpose of exploring the historical evolution and transformations resulting from their inner ‘dialectical’ relation. It is to this purpose that we owe [Karl] Marx’s historic analysis of the relation between the use-value and exchange value of a commodity.” [Peter Wilberg. Rudra’s Red Banner: Marxism and Moksha. Privately published. 2008. Pages 8-9.]
      467. critical theory of dialogue (Grant T. Savage): He develops a “temporally–oriented explanation of communicative behavior.”
           “… a critical theory of dialogue assumes (1) that observable communication behaviors index multiple meanings (systems of relevance) and (2) that through the interplay of these relevances ego and alter selectively found a common core of significance about something. Hence, to explain the phenomenon of small group decision making, a critical theory of dialoguere-quires that the researcher examine not only the communication behaviors, but also the systems of relevance and selectivity of the group. Moreover, from the viewpoint of a critical dialogical theory, ISM’s [interact system model of communication’s] descriptive explanation of decision making is problematic since the researcher must assume that the meaning of a communicative behavior remains static over time. Thus, a critical theory of dialogue also proffers a temporally-oriented explanation of communicative behavior which takes into account the historicity of all communicative acts. Rather than predicting the interaction of future decision making groups, a critical theory of dialogue yields a means (1) to assess current decision making and (2) to anticipate the direction of future decision making.” [Grant T. Savage, “A Critical Theory of Dialogue: A Review and Critique of Habermas’ Theory of Universal Pragmatics and Implications for Theories of Decision Making and Negotiation.” Presented at the 35th Annual Meeting of the International Communication Association. Honolulu, Hawaʿi. May 23rd–27th, 1985. Pages 1-27. Retrieved on October 2nd, 2016.]
           “The theoretical foundation for this study is the Interact System Model.… Briefly, the ISM [Interact System Model] uses the propositions of modern system theory as a model of communication …. The most basic structural unit is the act, i.e., one uninterrupted verbal utterance.… Communication occurs in a social system and order in the system is defined by predictably occurring sequences of interaction Consequently, relationships emerge and are defined within an interactive context. Communication is the basis for relationship definition.” [Donald George Ellis. An Analysis of Relational Communication in Ongoing Group Systems. Ph.D. dissertation. University of Utah. Salt Lake City, Utah. August, 1976. Page 20.]
      468. processual monism = pluralism of assemblages (Éric Alliez as pronounced in this MP3 audio file): He develops the scholarship of Félix Guattari and Bruno Latour into “a processual and ontological transdisciplinarity.”
           “This article analyses [Félix] Guattari’s and [Bruno] Latour’s bodies of work as radical developers of a processual and ontological transdisciplinarity.…
           “… It will be understood that the insistence on ‘the machination producing the existent, the generative praxes of heterogeneity and complexity’ …, the very notion of a ‘non-human enunciation’ and the plane of machinic interfaces from which ‘Being crystallizes through an infinity of enunciative assemblages’ …, calls into question all disciplinary boundaries, shortcircuited now by the formula PROCESSUAL MONISM = PLURALISM OF ASSEMBLAGES.…
           “… Collectively translated and redesigned, the ‘magic formula’ PLURALISM = MONISM presents itself as a kind of politics of transdisciplinarity in which each discipline, while extending and testing the entities it mobilizes, enters into an inter-problematization of the modes of assembling its assemblages, liberated from the modern meta-language of the epistemological bifurcation human/non-human, or, more classically, nature/culture (or nature/knowledge, following [Alfred North] Whitehead’s deconstruction of ‘the bifurcation of nature’).”
           [Éric Alliez, “Structuralism’s Afters: Tracing Transdisciplinarity through Guattari and Latour.” Theory, Culture & Society. Volume 32, numbers 5–6, 2015. Pages 139-158.]
      469. theory of literary universals (Patrick Colm Hogan): He formulates a literary approach within the school of cognitive cultural studies.
           “… literary universals are properties and relations that are found across a range of genetically and geographically distinct literatures, which is to say literatures that have arisen and developed separately at least with respect to those properties and relations.…
           “The maximization of unobtrusive patterning and the relationships among rehearsal memory, line length, and aesthetic experience provide clear illustrations of what will necessarily be two central types of descriptive and explanatory study in a theory of literary universals. However, they are mere starting points for research, hypotheses to be modified, elaborated, and perhaps replaced. Again, the study of literary universals, like the study of linguistic universals, is a project that can progress only through the cooperative efforts of a broad range of researchers engaged in an ongoing process of empirical reevaluation of theories and theoretical reorientation of empirical research.”
           [Patrick Colm Hogan, “Literary Universals.” Introduction to Cognitive Cultural Studies. Lisa Zunshine, editor. Baltimore, Maryland: The Johns Hopkins University Press. 2010. Pages 37-60.]
      470. scientific ontological analysis (Helen Mussell): She develops an emancipatory perspective on social responsibility.
           “I advance the thesis that SR [social responsibility] has emancipatory ends, of meeting human needs and flourishing, and that it is best explicated using feminist care ethics. The argument is then focussed on both shoring up and advancing the emancipatory project of SR.…
           “… The scientific ontological approach locates the sort of responsibility SR refers to and why.…
           “… The scientific ontological analysis makes clear that the drawing together of the social with responsibility reveals something particular about the kind of responsibility involved. We have seen that to volunteer to be socially responsible is to acknowledge that there are other’s needs to be met.…
           “Recalling the differentiation between the social scientific and social philosophical projects is important. It highlights how a scientific ontological analysis of the kind being undertaken here is focussed on the development of the actual existent.”
           [Helen Mussell, “The Nature of Social Responsibility: Exploring Emancipatory Ends.” Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour. Early–view edition. September, 2016. Pages 1-22.]
      471. ontological eye (Erik Craig): He critically develops an ontological approach to existential psychotherapy.
           “… [This article features] a systematic, multiperspectival discussion of ontology and its language of being and the challenges an ‘ontological eye’ presents for the theory and practice of existential psychiatry, psychology, and psychotherapy.…
           “… the purpose of this paper is to rekindle interest in developing systematic, ontological foundations for existential psychotherapy. I begin by reflecting on what it means to be an existential psychotherapist before explicating how I understand ontology and the science and language of being. A critical review of historical factors contributing to the ‘de-ontologizing’ of American existential psychology then follows before concluding with a succinct consideration of existential psychotherapy’s present standing.”
           [Erik Craig, “The Lost Language of Being: Ontology’s Perilous Destiny in Existential Psychotherapy.” Philosophy, Psychiatry & Psychology: PPP. Volume 22, number 2, June 2015. Pages 79-92.]
      472. critical psychotherapy (Heidi M. Levitt, Andrew Pomerville, and Francisco I. Surace): They develop a perspective on psychotherapy in which clients are regarded as change agents.
           “Findings highlight the critical psychotherapy experiences for clients, based upon robust findings across these research studies. Process-focused principles for practice are generated that can enrich therapists’ understanding of their clients in key clinical decision-making moments. Based upon these findings, an agenda is suggested in which research is directed toward heightening therapists’ understanding of clients and recognizing them as agents of change within sessions, supporting the client as self-healer paradigm. This research aims to improve therapists’ sensitivity to clients’ experiences and thus can expand therapists’ attunement and intentionality in shaping interventions in accordance with whichever theoretical orientation is in use. The article advocates for the full integration of the qualitative literature in psychotherapy research in which variables are conceptualized in reference to an understanding of clients’ experiences in sessions.…
           “… In particular, the studies found that clients benefited when the therapist helped the client challenge negative and self-critical thoughts, and encouraged and coconstructed with the client a new and more affirming sense of self.”
           [Heidi M. Levitt, Andrew Pomerville, and Francisco I. Surace, “A qualitative meta-analysis examining clients’ experiences of psychotherapy: A new agenda.” Psychological Bulletin. Volume 142, number 8, August 2016. Pages 801-830.]
      473. gender ventriloquism (Nan Seuffert): She compares the attempt of the Occupy movement to speak for the subaltern with the male psychoanalyst speaking for the female patient.
           “Occupy’s position as a leaderless movement has left it open to a dynamic that I call ‘gender ventriloquism’ …, which positions Occupy as a unitary subject that has no voice and does not speak for itself. Ventriloquism is the production of the voice in such a way that it seems to come from a source other than the vocal cords of the speaker.… [There is a] production of knowledge that effectively claims to speak for, represent, or be based on the experience of the subaltern, without the subaltern representing herself, in contributing to the knowledge. The politics of speaking for others, including on the part of academics, has been the subject of much academic work, particularly by feminists.…
           “… [This situation] positions Occupy, like women in some psychoanalytic theory, as not speaking for itself, as needing someone outside, a male expert, to speak for it. In this way the question feminizes Occupy.”
           [Nan Seuffert, “Occupy, Financial Fraternity and Gender Ventriloquism.” Law, Culture and the Humanities. Volume 10, number 3, Octobre 2014. Pages 380-396.]
      474. dialectic of structure and history (István Mészáros as pronounced in this MP3 audio file): He develops a Marxian approach to social formations.
           “The investigation of the dialectical relationship between structure and history is essential for a proper understanding of the nature and the defining characteristics of any social formation in which sustainable solutions are being sought to the encountered problems. This is particularly important in the case of capital’s social formation, with its inexorable tendency toward an all-embracing, structurally embedded determination of all aspects of societal reproduction and the—feasible for the first time ever—global domination implicit in that form of development. It is therefore by no means accidental that, in the interest of the required structural change, [Karl] Marx had to focus critical attention on the concept of social structure, in the historical period of crises and revolutionary explosions of the 1840s when he articulated his own—radically new—conception of history.” [István Mészáros, “The Dialectic of Structure and History: An Introduction.” Monthly Review: An Independent Socialist Magazine. Volume 63, issue 1, May 2011. Pages 41-53.]
      475. critique of the state (István Mészáros): He formulates a Marxist critique in terms of the contemporary state of capitalism.
           “In envisaging a historically sustainable socialist transformation, there can be no departure from the radical orienting principle and measure of substantive equality in terms of which the period of transition to a fundamentally different social metabolic order can be constantly evaluated.
           “All this is perfectly compatible with [Karl] Marx’s views. But in our given historical time the conceptual framework must be articulated in the above sense, reflecting the aggravated and ever-worsening conditions of capital’s irreversible descending phase of development, with its tendency toward humanity’s global destruction, preventable only through the constitution of a substantively equitable social metabolic order. Our critique of the state must be conceived from this perspective.”
           [István Mészáros, “The Critique of the State: A Twenty-First Century Perspective.” Monthly Review: An Independent Socialist Magazine. Volume 67, issue 4, September 2015. Pages 23-37.]
      476. historical realization of consciously pursued substantive equality (István Mészáros): He examines the material conditions required for substantive equality.
           “The historical realization of consciously pursued substantive equality is of course dependent on the actual production of its material conditions in the most comprehensive sense. The advocacy of the realization of such a monumental historical achievement could be only a wishful ‘ought-to-be’ if its conditions would have to be postulated in the form of ‘Divine Grace’ or the deed of some mysterious ‘World Spirit,’ as we find so much of historical development projected in the idealist philosophical conceptions of the past.
           “But in actuality this is not the case with regard the question of substantive equality. For the human natural ground of the unfolding historical process toward the realization of substantive equality is itself material precisely in the most comprehensive sense in which all human beings objectively share the communality of their fundamental natural substratum, with its most varied creative potentiality.”
           [István Mészáros, “From Primitive to Substantive Equality—via Slavery.” Monthly Review: An Independent Socialist Magazine. Volume 68, issue 4, September 2016. Pages 33-55.]
      477. five theses of actually existing Marxism (Fredric Jameson): He develops a matter-of-fact treatment of Marxism.
           “‘Postmarxisms’ regularly emerge at those moments in which capitalism itself undergoes a structural metamorphosis.…
           “Discursive struggle (as opposed to outright ideological conflict) succeeds by way of discrediting its alternatives and rendering unmentionable a whole series of thematic topics.…
           “Social revolution is not a moment in time, but it can be affirmed in terms of the necessity of change in what is a synchronic system, in which everything holds together and is interrelated with everything else.…
           “The collapse of the Soviet Union was not due to the failure of communism but rather to the success of communism, provided one understands this last, as the West generally does, as a mere strategy of modernization.…
           “The Marxisms (the political movements as well as the forms of intellectual and theoretical resistance) that emerge from the present system of late capitalism, from postmodernity … will necessarily be distinct from those that developed during the modern period, the second stage, the age of imperialism.”
           [Fredric Jameson, “Five theses on actually existing Marxism.” Monthly Review: An Independent Socialist Magazine. Volume 47, issue 11, April 1996. Pages 1-8.]
      478. dual power (Fredric Jameson): In this volume edited by Slavoj Žižek, Jameson sets forth his political program and utopian proposal.
           “… dual power will be my political program and will lead to my utopian proposal.
           “The phrase is, of course, associated with [Vladimir] Lenin and his description of the coexistence of the provisional government and the network of soviets, or workers’ and soldiers’ councils, in 1917—a genuine transitional period if there ever was one— but it has also existed in numerous other forms of interest to us today. I would most notably single out the way organizations like the Black Panthers yesterday or Hamas [Arabic/ʿArabiyyaẗ, حَمَاس, Ḥamās, ‘fortitude’ or ‘enthusiasm’] today function to provide daily services—food kitchens, garbage collection, health care, water inspection, and the like— in areas neglected by some official central government. (If you like current Foucauldian jargon, you might describe this as a tension or even an opposition between ‘sovereignty’ and ‘governmentality.’) In such situations, power moves to the networks to which people turn for practical help and leadership on a daily basis: in effect, they become an alternate government, without officially challenging the ostensibly legal structure. The point at which a confrontation and a transfer take place, at which the official government begins to ‘wither away,’ a point at which revolutionary violence appears, will of course vary with the overall political and cultural context itself.”
           [Fredric Jameson, “An American Utopia.” An American Utopia: Dual Power and the Universal Army. London and New York: Verso imprint of New Left Books. Slavoj Žižek, editor. 2016. Pages 1-96.]
      479. ideology of competitiveness (James Rinehart): Rinhart argues that this ideology has been used to justify harmful “decisions and actions.”
           “… competitiveness, or the ideology of competition, is used to justify the decisions and actions of firms, especially when the outcomes adversely affect some people, groups, and classes. Historically, the concept of competitiveness has been used to justify business opposition to unions, reduced hours of work, wage increases, paid vacations, health and safety regulations, antipollution laws, and so on.” [James Rinehart, “The ideology of competitiveness.” Monthly Review: An Independent Socialist Magazine. Volume 47, issue 5, October 1995. Pages 14-23.]
      480. virtual capitalism (Michael Dawson and John Foster Bellamy): They examined the capitalization of the early Internet.
           “The underlying assumption …—[of] what can be termed the model of ‘virtual capitalism’ offered by business—is that the main information providers, as well as the main collecting centers for information, on the information super-highway will be the large communications and entertainment firms. Within this context of corporate dominated capitalism, ‘the information highway,’ [Microsoft’s Bill] Gates informs us, ‘will allow those who produce goods to see, a lot more efficiently than ever before, what buyers want, and will allow potential consumers to buy those goods more efficiently.‘ It is this increased efficiency in selling and buying that more than anything else constitutes the ideal of ‘friction-free capitalism.’” [Michael Dawson and John Foster Bellamy, “Virtual capitalism: The political economy of the information highway.” Monthly Review: An Independent Socialist Magazine. Volume 48, issue 3, July/August 1996. Pages 40-59.]
      481. self–critique (István Mészáros): He examines the issue of self-critique as a requirement for challenging capitalist hegemony.
           “The conscious adoption and successful maintenance of the orienting principle of self-critique is an absolutely fundamental requirement of the historically sustainable hegemonic alternative to capital’s social metabolic order as an organic system.…
           “The qualitatively different organic system of labor’s necessary hegemonic alternative to the established mode of social metabolic reproduction is unthinkable without the conscious espousal of self-critique as its vital orienting principle.”
           [István Mészáros, “The Communal System and the Principle of Self-Critique.” Monthly Review: An Independent Socialist Magazine. Volume 59, issue 10, March 2008. Pages 33-56.]
      482. dynamics of emergence (Zhang Huaxia [Chinese, 张华夏, Zhāng-Huáxià as pronounced in this MP3 audio file): The article develops an approach to emergence in systems research.
           “In this paper, we propose a transition from the traditional static approach to a dynamic approach. Instead of only comparing the wholeness with its parts statically, this dynamic approach focuses on how and why new properties become emergent, as well as how and why emergent wholes or emergent patterns arise. We call this approach the dynamics of emergence. It can be divided into two parts. The first part discusses the micro-dynamics of emergence, focusing on the question of self-organization. In this part, we will examine mechanisms of lower-level components from which emergence of systems arises, including micro-micro (action-formational) mechanisms and micro–macro (action-transformational) mechanisms. The second part discusses the macrodynamics or environment dynamics of emergence, focusing on questions of adaptation and selective evolution. In this part, we will examine mechanisms of the environment from which emergence arises, including macro-micro (downward) mechanisms and macro-macro mechanisms.” [Zhang Huaxia, “Exploring Dynamics of Emergence.” Systems Research and Behavioral Science. Volume 24, number 4, July–August 2007. Pages 431-443.]
      483. cultural sociology (Paul Jones): Drawing upon Jürgen Habermas’ notions of literary and political public spheres, in The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into a Category of Bourgeois Society, Jones attempts to reconcile the Frankfurt School and cultural studies through a cultural sociology.
           “This article … gestures towards a somewhat ambitious project as a contribution to further developing cultural sociology: a reconstructive reconciliation between the ‘sociological’ legacies of Frankfurt critical theory and cultural studies.…
           “I would suggest an aesthetic public sphere perspective might invite the following research agenda for a cultural sociology:
           • “analyses of the comparative conditions of institutional and formational possibility of the minimal critical autonomy required by aesthetic public spheres
           • “the relations between – and fusion of – formerly ‘high’ and ‘popular’ aesthetic public spheres
           • “an exploration of the normative limits of the concept – when is an aesthetic public sphere not critical? Under what conditions do aesthetic public spheres become dominantly ‘hegemonic’ or ‘governmental’?
           • “the viability of the model across differing national and supra-national media/cultural policy environments (including the context of the contradictory dynamics of cultural globalization)
           • “the implications of (especially but not only) feminist critiques of [Jürgen] Habermas’s informing assumptions about bourgeois subjectivity – and norms of autonomy – in the original literary public sphere thesis …
           • “the forms of association between civil society, social movements and multiculturally-based counter publics and aesthetic public spheres on the one hand, and aesthetic public spheres and the (formal) political public sphere of a nation-state on the other
           • “an historicized mapping of the porous borders of the generic forms on which aesthetic public spheres might draw”
           [Paul Jones, “Beyond the Semantic ‘Big Bang’: Cultural Sociology and an Aesthetic Public Sphere.” Cultural Sociology. Volume 1, number 1, March 2007. Pages 73-95.]
           “Women and dependents were factually and legally excluded from the political public sphere, whereas female readers as well as apprentices and servants often took a more active part in the literary public sphere than the owners of private property and family heads themselves. Yet in the educated classes the one form of public sphere was considered to be identical with the other; in the self-understanding of public opinion the public sphere appeared as one and indivisible.” [Jürgen Habermas. The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into a Category of Bourgeois Society. Thomas Burger with Frederick Lawrence, translators. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press. 1991. Page 56.]
      484. cultural sociology of the public sphere (Brad West): He develops an alternative conceptualization to Jürgen Habermas’ view of the public sphere.
           “As part of a larger ethnographic research project, this article analyses the history of memorialization on the First World War Gallipoli battlefields and its relationship with international travel and tourism.… A cultural sociology of the public sphere is proposed as a way of comprehending such tourism, one that avoids assumptions about the severing of meaningful cultural ties with the events and institutions of modernity.…
           “Where [Jürgen] Habermas … largely conceived of the public sphere as a historical entity driven by communicative rationality, I draw on recent cultural scholarship that has theorized it in more universal terms as a zone where the central value system of a society is emotionally debated and ritually contested ….
           [Brad West, “Dialogical Memorialization, International Travel and the Public Sphere: A Cultural Sociology of Commemoration and Tourism at the First World War Gallipoli Battlefields.” Tourist Studies. Volume 10, number 3, 2010. Pages 209-225.]
      485. cultural studies of scientific knowledge (Joseph Rouse): He develops an approach to scientific knowledge informed by cultural studies and social constructivism.
           “In this paper, I shall try to articulate and illustrate some important issues that mark the movement beyond the terms of the disputes between internalists and social constructivists. For convenience, I adopt the phrase ‘cultural studies of scientific knowledge’ to refer to this quite heterogeneous body of scholarship in history, philosophy, sociology, anthropology, feminist theory, and literary criticism. In using such a term, it is crucial to keep in mind that it cuts across some very important theoretical differences, including some significant scholarly work taking place across the very boundaries I am articulating between cultural studies and the social constructivist tradition. My aim is not to reify cultural studies, but to highlight some important issues which might reshape the terms of interdisciplinary science studies.” [Joseph Rouse, “What Are Cultural Studies of Scientific Knowledge?” Configurations. Volume 1, 1992. Pages 1-22.]
      486. cultural studies of drug and alcohol use (Pekka Sulkunen as pronounced in this MP3 audio file): He examines the application of cultural studies to intoxication.
           “The real challenge in cultural studies of drug and alcohol use is to theorise intoxication itself. Radical constructivists tend to associate intoxication with culture and socialisation: conventions, labels and rituals determine how substances are used and how their effects are experienced. On the other hand, intoxicants obviously work on the human body and have ‘natural effects’ on the mind independently of cultural factors.…
           “… approaches that look for functions that alcohol or drugs satisfy tend to stress variations in the societal contexts or individual needs and motives, sometimes focusing on intoxication but often looking mostly at other things. Anthropological studies have analysed the functions of alcohol and drug use in the ritual systems of small, often non-Western societies. They reveal important variability in the way alcohol or drugs are used in different cultural contexts ….”
           [Pekka Sulkunen, “Between culture and nature: Intoxication in cultural studies of alcohol and drug use.” Contemporary Drug Problems. Volume 29, number 2, summer 2002. Pages 253-276.]
      487. dance studies (Gay Morris): The article focuses on the juxtaposition between dance studies and cultural studies.
           “In the mid-1990s several articles appeared in the dance literature calling for a greater alliance between dance scholarship and cultural studies. More recently, dance scholarship has come to be labeled ‘dance studies,’ suggesting that such a link has occurred. Since interdisciplinarity is a key element of cultural studies, it is appropriate to investigate interdisciplinarity in dance studies by examining dance’s relationship to cultural studies. This genealogical task, though, is not as straightforward as it might seem. Cultural studies’ relationship to the disciplines has not been stable over its half-century of existence. Interdisciplinarity, tied so closely to cultural studies’ idea of its own freedom and political mission, has proved difficult to hang onto—so difficult, in fact, that today some consider the field to be in crisis.” [Gay Morris, “Dance Studies/Cultural Studies.” Dance Research Journal. Volume 41, number 1, summer 2009. Pages 82-100.]
      488. cultural identity theory (Tammy L. Anderson, John S. Levin, Kayrencua Walker, Adam Jackson-Boothby, and others): This approach to cultural studies is rooted in movements for liberation.
           “The cultural-identity theory acknowledges this relationship between identity (e.g., drug-related identities) and behavior (drug abuse). It speculates that drug related identification may ultimately distinguish drug use from drug abuse. Future empirical work seeks to determine if drug-related identity change mediates the relationship between such behaviors. This approach allows for a deeper understanding of the drives toward drug abuse and my offer new approaches to drug abuse prevention strategies.” [Tammy L. Anderson, “A Cultural-Identity Theory of Drug Abuse.” Sociology of Crime, Law, and Deviance. Volume 1. Pages 233-262.]
           “Although there is ambiguity over mission and purpose of the community college …, there is generally a uniform view of institutional culture, in large part because of its student population …. Yet, race and ethnicity have rarely been the basis of the cultural identity of the institution. However, as early as 1978 …, there was evidence that race and ethnicity were components of the U.S. community college’s organizational culture and played a role in organizational behaviors, particularly in the behaviors of students.” [John S. Levin, Zachary Haberler, Laurencia Walker, and Adam Jackson-Boothby, “Community College Culture and Faculty of Color.” Community College Review. Volume 42, number 1, 2014. Pages 55-74.]
           “… cultural identity is one form of social identity. It is defined as ‘the emotional significance we attach to our sense of belonging or affiliation with the larger culture’ …. Further, cultural identity has two dimensions: value content and salience. Value content refers to ‘the standards or expectations that people hold in their mind-set in making evaluation.’ The value content and salience dimensions are interrelated. To illustrate, if one cultural identity is salient, people have strong associations of membership affiliation (i.e., salience), and thus they are likely to practice the norms and value patterns of the culture (i.e., value content). The more strongly our self-image is influenced by our larger cultural value patterns, the more we are likely to practice the norms and communication scripts of the dominant, mainstream culture.” [Satoshi Moriizumi, “Constructing Multifaceted Cultural Identity Theory: Beyond Dichotomization of Individualism-Collectivism.” China Media Research. Volume 7, number 2, April 2011. Pages 17-25.]
           “Cultural identity theory has developed largely from a western perspective in order to examine how migrants adapt to living within or alongside another so-called dominant cultural group as illustrated in general texts ….” [Rodney C. Hills and Paul W. B. Atkins, “Cultural identity and convergence on western attitudes and beliefs in the United Arab Emirates.” International Journal of Cross Cultural Management. Volume 13, number 2, 2013. Pages 193-213.]
           “The transgenerational cultural identity model suggests that intergenerational transmission process may differ between immigrant generations. The model was developed based on the cultural identity theory, which assumes that individuals develop and may change their cultural identity as they go through various stages of psychological development. The integral parts of the theory include experiences of connection, differentiation, dynamics of oppression, and resiliency.” [Keitaro Yoshida and Dean M. Busby, “Intergenerational Transmission Effects on Relationship Satisfaction: A Cross-Cultural Study.” Journal of Family Issues. Volume 33, number 2, 2012. Pages 202-222.]
           “The narrative data analysed in this article draws from a larger corpus of focus group interviews with Andalusian-born participants distributed into two different groups: migrants and non-migrants. These data were initially collected to examine the impact of migration experience (as an experience of alterity) in the discursive construction of cultural identity, comparing the structure and content of the arguments deployed by participants in the two groups mentioned when talking about their Andalusian identity ….” [Beatriz Macías Gómez-Estern, “Narratives of migration: Emotions and the interweaving of personal and cultural identity through narrative.” Culture & Psychology. Volume 19, number 3, 2013. Pages 348-368.]
           “This paper summarizes empirical studies the author and her associates have carried out in the past decade pertaining to English language learning and cultural identity changes in China, and related criticism. In response to challenges on the legitimacy of such research regarding unified definition, cause attribution and context relevance, the paper introduces an epistemological distinction between structuralism and constructivism, which helps to clarify the issues under debate and raises questons for future research. The structuralism-constructivism distinction has implications for cultural identity studies in particular, and intercultural communication studies in general.…
           “… With additive bilingualism, the native language and cultural identity are maintained while the target language and cultural identity are acquired; the two co-exist and function in different communicative situations. With productive bilingualism, the competence in native and target languages/cultures enhance each other; the learner benefits from a general cognitive and affective growth and increased creativity.”
           [Yihong Gao, “Legitimacy of Foreign Language Learning and Identity Research: Structuralist and Constructivist Perspectives.” Intercultural Communication Studies. Volume XVI, number 1, 2006. Pages 100-112.]
           “… we prefer the term cultural identity instead of acculturation when describing the cultural experiences of Latina/o immigrants. Cultural identity theory has its roots in a number of liberation movements such as feminism and African American consciousness movements. Theories of cultural identity are liberating because they place a particular emphasis on the expansion of personal consciousness in relation to the cultural context in which one is embedded …. Cultural identity is then understood as a “consciousness development, the generation of more complex cognitions and behaviors as one comes to see oneself in context” [José Rubén Parra-Cardona, Dean M. Busby, and Richard S. Wampler, “No Soy de Aqui ni Soy de Alla: Transgenerational Cultural Identity Formation.” Journal of Hispanic Higher Education. Volume 3, number 4, October 2004. Pages 322-337.]
           “Cultural identity theory reflects the ontological assumption that individuals enact multiple cultural identities constituted in and through discourse with others. The theoretical frame of cultural identity is appropriate for this study to illustrate identifications that include many forms of group categorization.” [Kristin Moss and William V. Faux, II, “The Enactment of Cultural Identity in Student Conversations on Intercultural Topics.” The Howard Journal of Communications. Volume 17, 2006. Pages 21-37.]
           “… many inter-group conflicts result in the drastic alteration or even the destruction of a particular group’s cultural identity. For example, the internal colonization of Aboriginal people, or the slavery of African Americans not only caused great personal suffering, but also succeeded in fundamentally changing the traditional cultures of these groups, and thereby the cultural identity of each and every group member. Even current tensions, such as the ongoing and complex conflict between the Israelis and Palestinians, have at their root the question of a cultural or religious identity through a secure Israeli or Palestinian homeland – each group’s cultural identity may be dramatically affected depending on how the inter-group tension is played out.” [Donald M. Taylor and Esther Usborne, “When I Know Who ‘We’ Are, I Can Be ‘Me’: The Primary Role of Cultural Identity Clarity for Psychological Well-Being.” Transcultural Psychiatry. Volume 47, number 1, February 2010. Pages 93-111.]
           “In what follows, we problematize the way in which the educational field has addressed the topics of cultural identity, cultural difference, and cultural community in these times of rapid globalizing change. We read such mainstream approaches to education and culture against the open possibilities of knowledge production and ethical affiliation that are foregrounded in postcolonial theory, postcolonial literature, art, and popular culture. We believe that addressing these critical issues of cultural identity and the organization of knowledge in schooling is pivotal in a time in which there are deepening patterns of cultural balkanization and disciplinary insulation in educational institutions—a product of the uncertainty precipitated by the proliferation of difference as a consequence of globalization.” [Claudia Matus and Cameron McCarthy, “The Triumph of Multiplicity and the Carnival of Difference: Curriculum Dilemmas in the Age of Postcolonialism and Globalization.” International Handbook of Curriculum Research. William F. Pinar, editor. Mahwah, New Jersey: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Publishers, imprint of Taylor & Francis Group, an Informa PLC business. 2003. Pages 73-82.]
      489. physical cultural studies (Pirkko Markula as pronounced in this MP3 audio file, Michael D. Giardina, Joshua I. Newman, Janelle Joseph, and others): This branch of cultural studies focuses upon the body, including, but not limited to, athletic activity.
           “Physical cultural studies, among many other social sciences, has embraced the challenge of studying the body. Many of these analyses interrogate the cultural construction of the sporting body within neoliberal societies through textual readings to demonstrate the oppressive cultural politics in the representations of physically active bodies. In addition, several ethnographic studies have examined how individuals understand, experience, and practice sport and exercise. While these scholars have critiqued sport and argued for more empowering practices that potentially transform the way sport and physical activity currently subjugate individuals, there is much less work on how to provide practical tools for such transgression. Despite the need for social change in sport and exercise, such pragmatic explorations as critical pedagogy remain almost unexplored within physical cultural studies.” [Pirkko Markula, “Affect[ing] Bodies: Performative Pedagogy of Pilates.” International Review of Qualitative Research. Volume 1, number 3, fall 2008. Pages 381-408.]
           “… we contend that ‘any discussion concerning the imperatives of, and for, physical cultural studies starts (and perhaps ends) along the articulatory axes of politics and practice; and, more specifically, the body—of researcher and researched alike6—as locus of politics and praxis’ …. As such, we suggest that we would do well to begin thinking about the research act of [physical] cultural studies as necessarily being ‘an embodied activity’ ….” [Michael D. Giardina and Joshua I. Newman, “Physical Cultural Studies and Embodied Research Acts.” Cultural Studies ↔ Critical Methodologies. Volume 11, number 6, 2011. Pages 223-234.]
           “This analysis shows that first-generation Caribbean-Canadians’ sporting experiences cannot be read only in relation to the dominant White Canadian group, discourses of racism in sport, or understandings of Afro-Caribbean ‘routes’ or travel experiences. Moreover, globalization and transnationality paradigms do not help us to fully understand the geographic, social, and cultural flows described in this paper. Interactions between diasporic groups in the place of dwelling frame the meanings that are made in recreational sport. A diaspora approach to physical cultural studies is necessary to understand these relationships.” [Janelle Joseph, “Culture, community, consciousness: The Caribbean sporting diaspora.” International Review for the Sociology of Sport. Volume 49, number 6. 2014. Pages 669-687.]
      490. New Materialism (Kyla Wazana Tompkins, Daniela Tepe-Belfrage, Jill Steans, William E. Connolly, and others): This branch of cultural studies, critical social theory, and feminist theory examines the complex material relations between beings and things.
           “At its heart, the New Materialism explores the potentially actant qualities of the material and non-human world—New Materialism then is interested in relations between things, objects, phenomena, materialities, and physical bodies, as well as the relations between those things (things with each other) and humans (humans with things). New Materialism also considers the thingness of the human, the materiality of human bodies, and explores consciousness, feeling, affect, and other circulatory and shared social phenomena as they rise out of the substance of the world. Therefore, much New Materialist thought thinks through and with the biological and chemical make-up of the neurological body itself in relation to an increasingly toxic but always-chemical world.
           “Given these interests, the New Materialism is also interested in speculating about a world in which the human subject is not centered, or even central. The timeliness of this concern, for a species quickly headed towards and in fact already mired in ecological disaster and multiple-species genocide, cannot be over-emphasized. In some New Materialist thinking, particularly the strains of queer of color critique rethinking the relationship between racialized humans and the animal, the current planetary crisis is above all a consequence of the human-centered logic that underlies modern Christological racial capitalism, a logic that produces categories of beings designated as animal or object, in the name of extracting value and labor-energy.”
           [Kyla Wazana Tompkins, “On the Limits and Promise of New Materialist Philosophy.” Lateral: Journal of the Cultural Studies Association. Issue 5.1, spring 2016. Creative Commons. Online publication. No pagination.]
           “The ‘new materialism’ is the most common name given to a series of movements in several fields that criticise anthropocentrism, rethink subjectivity by playing up the role of inhuman forces within the human, emphasize the self-organizing powers of several nonhuman processes, explore dissonant relations between those processes and cultural practice, rethink the sources of ethics, and commend the need to fold a planetary dimension more actively and regularly into studies of global, interstate and state politics.…
           “Appreciation of the fragility of things requires cultivation of greater sensitivity to multiple ways in which contemporary institutions, role definitions and nonhuman processes intersect. Such emergent sensitivities, however, are often linked to a cautious politics of modest change.”
           [William E. Connolly, “The ‘New Materialism’ and the Fragility of Things.” Millennium: Journal of International Studies. Volume 41, number 3, 2013. Pages 399-412.]
           “Class relations are evidently central to any understanding of material inequalities. However, New Materialism does not provide a complete picture of what neoliberalism and austerity looks like. Indeed, in many respects, the ‘New’ Materialism, looks very like ‘old’ variants of Marxism, which at once acknowledge that marginalisation, poverty and suffering has a female face and also an ethnic or racial dimension, yet continue to insist that the reasons for this are not to be found in capitalism and the economic realm per se, but must be sought elsewhere, thus alleviating the need to engage with gender, ethnicity or race in any serious way. There are political choices and consequences attendant upon the marginalisation of gender, ethnicity and race, which are pertinent for understanding and responding to current developments. With respect to gender specifically, the New Materialism debate needs to generate an adequate theory of social relations, production, social reproduction and oppression, in order for its revival to be successful.” [Daniela Tepe-Belfrage and Jill Steans, “The new materialism: Re-claiming a debate from a feminist perspective.” Capital & Class. Volume 40, number 2, 2016. Pages 303-324.]
           “… research, often characterized as ‘new materialist,’ has staged a return/turn to such objects as ‘the body,’ ‘nature,’ and ‘life’ in social and critical theory by bringing ‘matter’ into the purview of our research. We see this attention to matter emerging across disciplines and interdisciplines in neurofeminist engagements with the molecular, ecofeminist theories of the anthropocene, and posthumanist treatments of the coevolution of human and nonhuman animals. Matter generally takes the form of scientific data on bodies and climates and that data become the object around which curiosity circulates and out of which new—materialist—feminist theories emerge. In this article, I demonstrate the limitations of such research ….” [Angela Willey, “A World of Materialisms: Postcolonial Feminist Science Studies and the New Natural.” Science, Technology, & Human Values. OnlineFirst edition. July, 2016. Pages 1-24.]
           “New materialist approaches to cultural studies have developed from a number of directions: via engagements with phenomenology, with Walter Benjamin’s work on the ‘petrified objects’ of the late nineteenth century, with [Martin] Heidegger’s theory of the thing, with [Gilles] Deleuze, and with actor-network theory (especially the work of Bruno Latour). These kinds of materialism are very varied and in some ways incompatible with one another.” [Michelle Henning, “The pig in the bath: New materialisms and cultural studies.” Radical Philosophy: Philosophical Journal of the Independent Left. Number 145, September/October 2007. Pages 11-19.]
           “… the New Materialisms have been integral to the political turn in contemporary theory. More to the point, a growing number of Continental thinkers have consolidated around the argument for how the post-metaphysical, deconstructive approach to politics is lacking in a sufficient concept of the political. This has contributed to the burgeoning discourse in political theology that critically engages the significance of Carl Schmitt’s work as one of the first sustained and most far-ranging critiques of modern liberalism. But whereas Schmitt’s concept of the political rests on the friend-enemy distinction that restores the centrality of sovereignty in accordance with the uniform logic of the one, and as such is seen by many as dangerously antagonistic and at odds with the insights and commitments that have emerged from the political philosophies in the deconstructive, post-metaphysical mode, the New Materialisms provide a basis for an alternative concept of the political.” [Jeffrey W. Robbins, “Renewing Materialism: Gianni Vattimo and Santiago Zabala and the Hermeneutical Option for the Poor.” Philosophy Today. Volume 60, issue 3, summer 2016. Pages 687-702.]
      491. neomaterialism (Joshua Simon): He applies dialectical materialism to subjectivity.
           “Following the insights of Noam Yuran, we see that the neo-materialistic economy is one in which symbols behave like materials (for Yuran, brands are actually commodities made of money). This helps us to understand how brands and labels are regarded as material objects (the criteria of ‘real’ and ‘fake’ in brands, for example) or how labor has shifted from production to consumption (tourism, shopping, entertainment, watching television, advertisements, and social networks).” [Joshua Simon, “Neo-Materialism, Part Two: The Unreadymade.” e-flux. New York. Issue 23, March 2011. Retrieved on October 8th, 2015.]
           “Neomaterialism is a blog run by Joshua Simon, curator and writer and a 2011-2013 Vera List Center Fellow at the New School, who is researching expanded notions of Thingness.
           “The aim of this blog is to examine the order of things today. How come symbols behave like materials (‘fake’ and ‘real’ brands)? Why have commodities become the historical subject (do we furnish our world with IKEA [a furniture and accessories store] or rather we dwell in its world)? Are humans reduced to simply absorbing surpluses (with baby diapers being a form of child labor)? How labor has shifted from production to consumption? Why is everything we do is work (even when we are not employed) and how can a generation overqualified for the labor market can change everything?…
           “Re-introducing different notions of dialectical materialism into the already established conversation on the subjectivity of things, Neomaterialism challenges the investigation which the new-materialists have begun, relating it to labor, debt, credit, animisim and alienation, life-taxes and social organization.
           “With the book Neomaterialism (Sternberg Press, 2013), available in stores now the blog also operates as an ongoing archive for references, reviews and events.”
           [Joshua Simon. Neomaterialism. Blog. Undated. Retrieved on October 8th, 2015.]
      492. allegorical materialism (Jacob Emery): He examines the relations between the production of art and “economic activity.”
           “The most compelling materialist theories of art have to do precisely with this sense that art is a metaphorical expression of the hard historical facts of economic life, with which it advances in tandem.…
           “Some version of allegorical materialism seems to be the most compelling interpretative strategy available to us at the present time, as it is capable both of accounting for the intuitively felt relationship of necessity between economic activity and artistic production—an artist who has nothing to eat cannot live to make art; art develops together with social and technological changes—and of elucidating the content of artworks across the range of media and the spectrum of high and low culture.…
           [Jacob Emery, “Art of the Industrial Trace.” New Left Review. Series II, number 71, September–October 2011. Pages 117-133.]
      493. workers self–directed enterprises (Richard D. Wolff): He examines a possible alternative to capitalism. This approach is explored on the Democracy at Work website (co–founded by Wolff).
           “WSDEs [workers self-directed enterprises] organize economic decisions to serve the interests of the majority of people in each enterprise, the workers. They eliminate the decision-making roles and positions of that minority that rules inside capitalist enterprises (major shareholders or owners and their chosen representatives, typically boards of directors). More broadly, the people themselves – in the persons of enterprise workers and residents of communities interdependent with the enterprise – become the key economic decision makers. Inside the enterprise, the workers become their own board of directors. As such, they receive and distribute the surpluses (profits) their labor generates. That defines the end of exploitation: the end of any enterprise organization in which the producers of surpluses/profits are different people from those who obtain and distribute such surpluses/profits.” [Richard D. Wolff, “Alternatives to Capitalism.” Critical Sociology. Volume 39, number 4, July 2013. Pages 487-490.]
      494. communist alternative (Richard D. Wolff): He proposes an alternative for “a better society.”
           “In presenting the ‘communist alternative’ we speak of communism not as a social system, not in terms of society as a whole. We refer instead to the communist class structure of production as an alternative to the capitalist. We stress a class change in production in the hope and belief that it will help to produce a better society.
           “In an enterprise with a communist class structure of production, the productive laborers-those who produce the surplus-are also the people who get and then distribute that surplus. As they produce collectively, so they collectively appropriate and distribute. Communism, in this limited sense, makes the surplus theirs and thereby ends their exploitation. The concept of ‘worker’ changes accordingly. The productive worker’s tasks in any enterprise organized as a communist collective include more than helping to produce the surplus as in a capitalist enterprise. In the communist enterprise, productive workers must also participate in the collective appropriation and distribution of that surplus. From Monday through Thursday, for example, they produce the surplus; on Friday, they meet to appropriate and distribute it. Productive workers become their own board of directors.”
           [Richard D. Wolff, “Why Communism?” Rethinking Marxism. Volume 19, number 3, July 2007. Pages 322-336.]
      495. radical immanence (Rosi Braidotti as pronounced in this MP3 audio file): She develops a materialist philosophy of immanence.
           “I will also stress issues of embodiment and make a plea for different forms of thinking about and representing the body. I will refer to this in terms of ‘radical immanence.’ This means that I want to think through the body, not in a flight away from it. This in turn implies confronting boundaries and limitations. In thinking about the body I refer to the notion of enfleshed or embodied materialism (I use the two interchangeably).” [Rosi Braidotti. Metamorphoses: Towards a Materialist Theory of Becoming. Malden, Massachusetts: Polity Press. 2002. Page 5.]
           “The key term here is ‘radical immanence,’ that is to say a deeply embedded vision of the embodied subject. As a materialist theory it can provide an answer in so far as it encompasses the body at all levels, also, and maybe especially, the biological one. In the light of contemporary genetics and molecular biology, it is more than feasible to speak of the body as a complex system of self-sustaining forces.” [Rosi Braidotti. Metamorphoses: Towards a Materialist Theory of Becoming. Malden, Massachusetts: Polity Press. 2002. Page 63.]
           “Given that in the materialist philosophy of immanence that I favour there is only one matter – and it is enfleshed or embodied – the process of becoming is a transformation in terms of a qualitative increase (in speed, intensity, perception or colour) that allows one to break into new fields of perception, affectivity, becoming; nothing short of a metamorphosis.” [Rosi Braidotti. Metamorphoses: Towards a Materialist Theory of Becoming. Malden, Massachusetts: Polity Press. 2002. Page 147.]
           “Rosi Braidotti was born in Italy but grew up in Australia, therefore, having double-nationality. It was in Canberra Australia, in 1977 where she started her formative years at the Australian National University, having been awarded with the University medal in Philosophy and the University Tillyward Prize. She did her PHD in Philosophy at Sorbonne in 1981. In 1988 she was nominated Professor at University of Utrecht in Holland and she took on the position of Founding Director of the Dutch School of Women’s Studies, an assignment she carried out until the year of 2005. Braidotti was a pioneer in the studies of European women and she has been considered a world reference in gender studies and critical theory. Her research areas straddle the fields of continental philosophy and epistemology, combining feminist and gender theories and post-structuralist thought.” [Helena Ferreira, “Metamorphoses: Towards a Materialist Theory of Becoming.” Review article. Revista Lusófona de Estudos Culturais. Volume 3, number 1, 2015. Pages 399-403.]
      496. posthuman critical theory (Rosi Braidotti): She develops an approach to the “new materialism.”
           “A primary task for posthuman critical theory … is to draw accurate and precise cartographies for these different subject positions as spring-boards towards posthuman recompositions of a pan-human cosmopolitan bond.” [Rosi Braidotti. The Posthuman. Malden, Massachusetts: Polity Press. 2013. Page 41.]
           “My working definition of a posthuman scientific method in the Humanities as well as in the Life sciences cannot be dissociated from an ethics of inquiry that demands respect for the complexities of the real-life world we are living in. Posthuman critical theory needs to apply a new vision of subjectivity to both the practice and the public perception of the scientist, which is still caught in the classical and outmoded model of the humanistic ‘Man of reason’ … as the quintessential European citizen. We need to overcome this model and move towards an intensive form of interdisciplinarity, transversality, and boundary-crossings among a range of discourses. This transdisciplinary approach affects the very structure of thought and enacts a rhizomatic embrace of conceptual diversity in scholarship. The posthuman method amounts to higher degrees of disciplinary hybridization and relies on intense de-familiarization of our habits of thought through encounters that shatter the flat repetition of the protocols of institutional reason.” [Rosi Braidotti. The Posthuman. Malden, Massachusetts: Polity Press. 2013. Pages 119.]
           “… [Rosi] Braidotti — a key figure in contemporary discussions about feminism, gender and the ‘new materialisms’ …—repeatedly stresses that the aim of her book is to develop an affirmative form of critical theory which, by providing creative alternatives to current arrangements, will allow us to better face various contemporary socio-political challenges. This means, at a more concrete level, that it proposes a ‘critical’ variety of posthumanism as a way of escaping from ‘the seemingly endless polemic between Humanism and anti-humanism.’” [Michiel van Ingen, “Beyond The Nature/Culture Divide? The Contradictions of Rosi Braidotti’s The Posthuman.” Journal of Critical Realism. Volume 15, issue 5, 2016. Pages 530-542.]
      497. postsecular turn in feminism (Rosi Braidotti): She examines the infusion of religious piety and spirituality into feminism.
           “My starting point is that the postsecular turn challenges European feminism because it makes manifest the notion that agency, or political subjectivity, can actually be conveyed through and supported by religious piety, and may even involve significant amounts of spirituality. This statement has an important corollary – namely that political agency need not be critical in the negative sense of oppositional and thus may not be aimed solely or primarily at the production of counter-subjectivities. Subjectivity is rather a process ontology of auto-poiesis or self-styling, which involves complex and continuous negotiations with dominant norms and values, and hence also multiple forms of accountability.” [Rosi Braidotti, “In Spite of the Times: The Postsecular Turn in Feminism.” Theory, Culture & Society. Volume 25, number 6, November 2008. Pages 1-24.]
      498. textual analysis (W. F. Hanks and many others): Hanks considers various approaches.
           “Approaches to textual analysis can be differentiated according to the level(s) at which they constitute text as an object of study. From a linguistic perspective, text can be viewed as the realization of language in coherent, contextually interpretable speech.…
           “… The basic shift in performance studies consists in displacing the primary object of textual analysis from linguistic form to the actualization of form in a public display. These studies are all marked by a commitment to close description of performance events, focusing on socially specific criteria for evaluation, the variability of different renditions, the engagement of a socially structured audience, and especially the distinctive responsibility of the performer to perform with mastery.”
           [W. F. Hanks, “Text and Textuality.” Annual Review of Anthropology. Volume 18, 1989. Pages 95-127.]
      499. queer vitalism (Claire Colebrook): She develops a philosophy of life.
           “Queer Vitalism
           “This essay is about vitalism and the apparent ethical urgency of returning to the problem of life. This urgency of the turn to life, I will argue, far from being a recent, radical and necessarily transgressive gesture, has always underpinned (and presupposed) highly normative gestures in philosophy, literature and cultural understanding. Indeed, the very notion and possibility of the normative, or the idea that one can proceed from what is (life) to what ought to be (ways of living) has always taken the form of vitalism. For the purposes of this essay, then, I will define vitalism as the imperative of grounding, defending or deriving principles and systems from life as it really is.”
           [Claire Colebrook. Sex After Life: Essays on Extinction, Vol. 2. Ann Arbor, Michigan: Open Humanities Press imprint of imprint of Michigan Publishing. 2014. Page 100.]
      500. inclusive urbanism (Adriana Allen, Andrea Lampis, and Mark Swilling): Focusing on urban environments, they critique the Keynesian notion of inclusion and replace it with justice.
           “A key message emerging throughout the book is that urbanization is not a process that automatically delivers justice through agglomeration; instead justice is a moral compass that should guide the way we thinking about alternatives. Thus, untamed urbanisms are not about rejecting all framings – a sterile and probably impossible task – but rather about exposing the many faces that unjust urbanization has and the processes and actions that counteract them. Quite often justice in the city is equated with inclusion, the most significant achievement (in some parts of the world) of the Keynesian project of inclusive urbanism. Inclusion, however, is not the same as justice. Not only was the justice of inclusive urbanism associated with inclusion, in assuming ‘growth’ and ‘material affluence’ as the closest epigones of modernity; it also denied the significance of unjust exploitation of natural resources. If, as suggested by several contributions in this book, justice is accepted as a key value to guide both the assessment of our understanding and action, what are the governance implications? How is a commitment to justice guaranteed or ensured in a world that may have become too complex to envisage the re-assembly of strong unitary states of the kind that were built by post-WWII social democrats? How can social and environmental justice be successfully claimed if space, flows and processes within the city are strongly influenced by global actors and institutions, whereas the defense of rights largely remains within the jurisdiction of weakened national and local governments?” [Adriana Allen, Andrea Lampis, and Mark Swilling, “Untamed Urbanisms: Enacting productive disruptions.” Untamed Urbanisms. Adriana Allen, Andrea Lampis, and Mark Swilling, editors. London and New York: Routledge imprint of Taylor & Francis Group, an Informa PLC business. 2016. Pages 296-306.]
      501. barbarization of peace (Alain Joxe as pronounced in this MP3 audio file): He examines the impact of neoconservatism on war.
           “The new wars always have political and social goals, but these are neither national political objectives, nor traditional imperial objectives any more. This transformation can be explained by the change in the dominant classes, which manage the globalization of the market economy thanks to the digitalization of the financial system and to the technical change in the morphology of the use of violence, also made possible by the electronic revolution. Under this double relationship, the space–time of national objectives of the bourgeoisies of yore has disappeared. It is not a big loss, but it is a big change that, for the time being, destroys the consensual framework of democracy that has long been tied to the scale of the nation-state, which has become inadequate, not to say stupid, in the presence of global strategies. The destruction of ‘national’ or ‘Westphalian’ war objectives has, as its corollary, the proliferation of wars of policing and permanent repression that, without the control and adaptive answers coming from popular forces, could everywhere turn into a form of concentrated and globalized fascist strategy, which would drag the oikoumene [inhabited earth] towards a permanent, Schmittian state of exception. A sort of universal barbarism (the inverse of [Immanuel] Kant’s universal peace) would thus provide legitimacy to all kinds of pillaging and destruction of the environment, capable of increasing the wealth of the rich and the poverty of the poor to a boiling point.” [Alain Joxe, “The barbarization of peace: The neo-conservative transformation of war and perspectives.” Conflict, Security and the Reshaping of Society: The civilization of war. Alessandro Dal Lago and Salvatore Palidda, editors. London and New York: Routledge imprint of Taylor & Francis Group, an Informa PLC business. 2010. Pages 37-56.]
      502. Guantánamo’s symbolic economy (Susan Willis): She critiques the system of forced labor at Gitmo in Cuba.
           “It is widely recognized that any ‘information’ extracted from the poor wretches held there [the Guantánamo Bay Detention Center] could have no bearing on tracking or arresting Al Qaeda [Arabic/ʿArabiyyaẗ, القَاعِدَة, ʾal-Qāʿidaẗ, ‘the base’] operatives. Could it be that Guantánamo, in its mutation from military base to televised torture camp, designates a new point on the world’s symbolic-economy map; that the practices here reveal the first stages of an emerging security industry, one based on quite different principles to those of existing systems; on producing a new sort of security ‘intelligence’ for a globalized media age?
           “Perceived in this light, Guantánamo manifests a distinctive form of labour control. Whereas slavery forced labour out of humans that were defined as chattel, and the wage system turned a worker’s labour power into a commodity to be traded in the marketplace, by extension, the security industry extracts the raw material of intelligence out of humans who are less than chattel; who have no status, except that of the infinitely detained. In terms of a cost/benefit analysis, one can hardly imagine a more profitable mode of production. Outside of investments in infrastructure (the chainlink fence, shackles, concrete floor), and minimal outlays for service and maintenance (hoods and jumpsuits, interrogators, Muslim diets), intelligence is basically free for the taking. Once procured, it feeds the exponential growth of the American appetite for security, and that of an industry to supply it.”
           [Susan Willis, “Guantánamo’s Symbolic Economy.” New Left Review. Series II, number 39, May–June 2006. Pages 123-131.]
      503. posthumanism (Claire Colebrook): Colebrook formulates an approach to “the human” which, she says, is structurally similar to nihilism.
           “Posthumanism, as I will define it here, is not an overcoming of the human but takes a similar form to the structure of nihilism.… The posthuman, similarly, renounces human privilege or species-ism but then fetishizes the posthuman world as man-less; ‘we’ are no longer elevated, separated, enclosed, detached from a man-less world, for there is a direct interface and interconnection—a mesh or network, a living system—that allows for one world of computers, digital media, animals, things and systems. There is a continuation of the humanities, which had always refused that man had any end other than that which he gave to himself, in the posthuman notion that man is nothing but a point of relative stability, connected to one living system that he can feel affectively and read.” [Claire Colebrook. Death of the PostHuman: Essays on Extinction, Vol. 1. Ann Arbor, Michigan: Open Humanities Press imprint of imprint of Michigan Publishing. 2014. Pages 159-160.]
      504. economic sociology of care and rights (Miriam Glucksmann): She focuses on the relational dimensions between givers and receivers of care.
           “The analytical framework outlined in this chapter is rooted in an understanding of the practice and activity of care as a relational process between receivers and givers, usually involving exchange. This supports a substantive concern with historical, cultural and national variation between different overall systems of care provision and the rights that attach to them. Approached this way, the many possible groundings and kinds of rights come into sharp focus. Informal, taken-for-granted expectations and personal or traditional obligations are equally to be considered under the heading of rights as formalisec commitments or state-enforceable laws prescribing citizen- or employment-based rights or putative or universal human rights with their international sanctions. I have concentrated on the right to receive care, but other additional rights, which there is not space to discuss, would be directly implicated in this. The right to give care is the most obvious, but the rights of care workers (paid and unpaid) would also be significant, especially with respect to employment and working conditions.” [Miriam Glucksmann, “Developing an economic sociology of care and rights.” Rights: Sociological Perspecives. Lydia Morris, editor. London and New York: Routledge imprint of Taylor & Francis Group, an Informa PLC business. 2006. Pages 55-71.]
           “[Miriam] Glucksmann offers an engaging discussion about the potential for sociology to make new ground in the areas of citizenship and human rights. Her attention to the question of how access to rights is to be operationalised is of paramount relevance. Rights, Glucksmann concludes, ‘are linked to the circumstances in which they emerge.’ Thus, it is the task of the sociologists to make sense of those circumstances, and to show that claims for the universality of given rights (care rights, for instance) should be replaced by a thorough analysis of the ‘variability in why, when, how and under what circumstances’ rights are likely or not to emerge as a demand.” [Kerman Calvo, “Rights: Sociological Perspecives.” Review article. Essex Human Rights Review. Volume 4, number 1, February 2007. Pages 1-3.]
      505. critical materialist transformation of the Hegelian dialectic (Evald Vassilievich Ilyenkov [Russian Cyrillic, Э́вальд Васи́льевич Илье́нков, É́valʹd Vasílʹevič Ilʹénkov as pronounced in this MP3 audio file): He examines the Marxist transformation of dialectical idealism.
           “The only philosophical position that can defend the honour of materialism in this situation [the dominance of neopositivism] consists of decisively rejecting the old, metaphysical understanding of ‘ideality,’ and of decisively accepting the dialectical-materialist interpretation, which was developed by Karl Marx. The first step on the path to a critical materialist transformation of the Hegelian dialectic, proceeds from the acceptance of the ‘ideality’ of the phenomena of the external world themselves, the world that is outside of and prior to man with his head, and then, more concretely, in the course of the positive solution to the problem of the ‘value-form’ and its fundamental difference from value in itself – this most-typical case of the opposition between a ‘purely ideal form’ and its own material image.” [Evald Ilyenkov, “Dialectics of the Ideal.” Dialectics of the Ideal: Evald Ilyenkov and Creative Soviet Marxism. Alex Levant and Vesa Oittinen, editors. Boston, Massachusetts: Leiden. 2014. Pages 25-78.]
      506. relational Marxism (David Harvey): He focuses on various “green” approaches, including deep ecology and ecofeminism.
           “From deep ecology and other ‘green’ critiques of Enlightenment and Cartesian instrumentality (including those developed in ecofeminism) I find sustenance for a more nuanced dialectical and process-based argument concerning our positionality in the natural world. Writers as diverse as [Alfred North] Whitehead and [Richard Charles] Cobb, [Arne] Næss, and [Van] Plumwood have something important to say on this and I do not find it impossible to translate at least some of what they say into the language of a relational Marxism. This does not lead me to accept some of the more strident rejections of Enlightenment thought (indeed, I think on balance it was positive and liberatory), but it reinforces a rejection of mechanistic and positivist accounts of our postionality in an relation to the rest of the natural world that have often infected Marxism as well as conventional bourgeois forms of analysis.” [David Harvey, “Marxism, Metaphors, and Ecological Politics.” Monthly Review: An Independent Socialist Magazine. Volume 49, issue 11, April 1998. Pages 17-30.]
      507. productive cooperative relations (Michael A. Lebowitz): He proposes a path to socialism.
           “Without question, the easiest transition can be made in the statist firm—it is already at the threshold of new productive relations. Unlike the explicit private interests in capitalist and cooperative productive relations, the statist firm already is in form the property of society as a whole and has as its explicit directive to act in the interests of society as a whole.
           “The path to transform the logic of statist enterprises, then, is to change the directives which they are given by the state. If the new productive relations which are to be built emphasize as a goal the full development of human potential and the creation of new socialist human beings, the nature of these institutions and the instructions given by the state must include the conditions necessary for the realization of this goal. With the development of workers councils and the growing orientation of their activity toward meeting the needs of communities (as expressed by those communities themselves) and with the transparency which allows waste, corruption, and bureaucratic self-interest to be challenged, statist enterprises increasingly can be characterized by socialist productive relations.”
           [Michael A. Lebowitz, “Proposing a Path to Socialism: Two Papers for Hugo Chávez.” Monthly Review: An Independent Socialist Magazine. Volume 65, issue 10, March 2014. Pages 1-19.]
      508. socialism for the twenty-first century (Michael A. Lebowitz): He describes a form of socialism which focuses upon human development.
           “Socialism for the twenty-first century … is not capitalism.
           “Nor is it a statist society where decisions are top-down and where all initiative is the property of state office-holders or cadres of self-reproducing vanguards.…
           “Further, socialism for the twenty-first century is not totalitarianism.…
           “Why, though, do we speak of socialism for the twenty-first century and not simply about socialism? Very simply, because there was a rupture. [Karl] Marx’s critical emphasis upon human development disappeared in twentieth- century socialist experiments. Missing was a focus upon the key link of human development and practice—upon the simultaneous changing of circumstances and self-change. And, with the failure to think specifically about the second product (positive or negative), the question of the nature of people produced under particular relations of production disappeared.”
           [Michael A. Lebowitz, “What Is Socialism for the Twenty-First Century?” Monthly Review: An Independent Socialist Magazine. Volume 68, issue 5, October 2016. Pages 26-43.]
      509. revolutionary practice (Michael A. Lebowitz): According to Lebowitz, “We change ourselves through our activity.”
           “Human development, though, doesn’t drop from the sky. It doesn’t come as the result of a gift from above. It occurs through the activity of people themselves—through what [Karl] Marx called revolutionary practice—‘the coincidence of the changing of circumstances and of human activity or self-change.’ We change ourselves through our activity—through our struggles and through everything we do. The way we produce (in the workplace, in the community, and in the home), the way we relate to others in our activity, the way we govern ourselves (or are governed by others)—all these make us the people that we are. We are, in short, the product of all our activities.” [Michael A. Lebowitz, “The Path to Human Development: Capitalism or Socialism?” Monthly Review: An Independent Socialist Magazine. Volume 60, issue 9, February 2009. Pages 41-63.]
      510. new transnationalism (Daniel Lang/Levitsky): He develops an approach to anticolonialism, anti-imperialism, antinationalism, and anti-Zionism.
           “What I’m labeling as a new transnationalism is resolutely anticolonialist and anti-imperialist, ambivalently antinationalist, firmly if often inchoately anticapitalist, generally anti-authoritarian, and in no way organizationally unified. It recognizes the importance of resistance ‘in the belly of the beast’ while affirming self-determination in an array of communities of resistance and the right of liberation struggles to choose the tactics which they find most suitable to that end. If that sounds like a lot of ‘anti’ and not much ‘pro,’ it often is.
           “… this shared approach, with all its internal tensions, is deeply inscribed on current Jewish critiques of Zionism as well as the current Palestine solidarity movement more generally.”
           [Daniel Lang/Levitsky, “Jews Confront Zionism.” Monthly Review: An Independent Socialist Magazine. Volume 61, issue 2, June 2009. Pages 47-54.]
      511. anti-capitalism (Erik Olin Wright): He explains how one can be anti-capitalist in the twenty–first century.
           “For many people the idea of anti-capitalism seems ridiculous. After all, look at the fantastic technological innovations in the goods and services produced by capitalist firms in recent years: smart phones and streaming movies; driverless cars and social media; Jumbotron screens at football games and video games connecting thousands of players around the world; every conceivable consumer product available on the internet for rapid home delivery; astounding increases in the productivity of labor through novel automation technologies; and on and on. And while it is true that income is unequally distributed in capitalist economies, it is also true that the array of consumption goods available and affordable for the average person, and even for the poor, has increased dramatically almost everywhere. Just compare the United States in the half century between 1965 and 2015: The percentage of Americans with air conditioners, cars, washing machines, dishwashers, televisions, and indoor plumbing has increased dramatically in those fifty years. Life expectancy is longer; infant mortality lower. The list goes on and on.” [Erik Olin Wright, “How to be an Anti-Capitalist for the 21ˢᵗ Century.” Journal of Australian Political Economy. Number 77, winter 2016. Pages 5-23.]
      512. strategic positivism (Elvin Wyly): He proposes a nuanced positivist approach to building “emancipatory geographies.”
           “In this article, I suggest that the presumed linkages between epistemology, methodology, and politics were never fundamental or immutable—and that recent years have brought significant realignments. Right-wing political operatives have coopted many of the epistemologies and methods traditionally associated with the postpositivist academic left. A new generation of progressive, critical geographers is doing first-rate work … that is revitalizing the scientific rigor, policy relevance, and political power of the left. I analyze how this movement of strategic positivism is an integral (but single) element of a pluralist geography that mobilizes trust and deference to synthesize individual specialization and collective goals to build emancipatory geographies.…
           “… strategic positivism recognizes the dangers of universalizing, decontextualized epistemological truth claims of the sort advocated by hard-core positivists in the mid-twentieth century …. Yet strategic positivism also avoids the oppositional universality of antifoundational thought.”
           [Elvin Wyly, “Strategic Positivism.” The Professional Geographer. Volume 61, number 3, August 2009. Pages 310-322.]
      513. globalectics (Ngũgĩ wa Thiong’o): He develops a dialectical approach to globalization.
           “Globalectics is derived from the shape of the globe. On its surface, there is no one center; any point is equally a center. As for the internal center of the globe, all points on the surface are equidistant to it—like the spokes of a bicycle wheel that meet at the hub. Globalectics combines the global and the dialectical to describe a mutually affecting dialogue, or multi-logue, in the phenomena of nature and nurture in a global space that’s rapidly transcending that of the artificially bounded, as nation and region. The global is that which humans in spaceships or on the international space station see: the dialectical is the internal dynamics that they do not see. Globalectics embraces wholeness, interconnectedness, equality of potentiality of parts, tension, and motion. It is a way of thinking and relating to the world, particularly in the era of globalism and globalization.” [Ngũgĩ wa Thiong’o. Globalectics: Theory and the Politics of Knowing. New York: The Wellek Library Lectures in Critical Theory imprint of Columbia University Press. 2012. Page 8.]
           “His [Ngũgĩ wa Thiong’o’s] works include novels, plays, short stories, children’s literature and essays. Ngũgĩ wa Thiong’o … was born in Kamirithu near Limuruin Kiambu district and baptised James Ngũgĩ.” [David Odongo, “Telling the African Story.” Ipsos. October 20th, 2013. Page 25.]
      514. animal management framework (Simon Bruce Carter): develops a self-described “ontological–methodological framework.”
           “This study adopts interpretive qualitative content analyses of documentary and interview accounts to critically describe the practice of animal management and suggest why it takes place the way it does. An ontological-methodological framework is introduced to frame the practice of animal management, relating the methodology of animal management to the underlying ontological orientation of local government. This study highlights some institutional conditions which allow particular animal management activities to flourish. Enforcement of barking dog nuisance and responsible dog ownership education are shown to demonstrate attributes of regulatory success. Conversely, enforcement of effective control and community education processes demonstrate some attributes of regulatory failure.…
           “To explore this animal management framework in practice, institutional discourse from interviewee accounts is examined with a view to understanding why particular regulatory approaches are more or less effective in particular circumstances. The degree and nature of regulation of dogs importantly affects their welfare in the community. In reflecting and reflexively driving community expectations, regulation affects how dogs are perceived by the broader community and how that perception translates into freedoms afforded to dogs.”
           [Simon Bruce Carter, “Establishing a framework to understand the regulation and control of dogs in urban environments: a case study of Melbourne, Australia.” SpringerPlus. Volume 5, issue 1, December 2016. Pages 1-13.]
      515. sado–monetarism (Michael Perelman): He develops an excellent analysis of “market tyranny.”
           “Sado-monetarism threatens health in other ways. Because the purpose of this branch of Procrusteanism is intended to aid the rich at the expense of the poor, nobody should be surprised that it is associated with increases in both poverty and inequality. Richard Wilkinson is at the center of a rich literature that identifies the negative health effects of inequality. Here again, the causal link is stress, which inequality spreads throughout society. This stress harms the rich as well as the poor, suggesting further evidence of the dysfunctionality of capitalism, even by the standards of its intended beneficiaries.
           “Even though traumatization may harm the rich as well as the poor, the initial impact of a sado-monetarist tightening of the economy strikes the jobs of low-wage workers, pushing people who were just getting by into destitution. Over and above stress-related maladies, the poor often live crowded together in unhealthy conditions without nearby sources of good food. Lack of access to quality medical care compounds the health threats of poverty.”
           [Michael Perelman. The Invisible Handcuffs of Capitalism: How Market Tyranny Stifles the Economy by Stunting Workers. New York: Monthly Review Press. 2011. Page 52.]
           “Sado-monetarism is not so much a matter of monetary discipline, as most economists would have it, but of class discipline. In the 1960s, Harry Johnson, a conservative professor from the University of Chicago, writing in a journal dominated by the conservative perspective of his school, offered a shockingly honest evaluation of the class bias of monetary policy. ‘From one important point of view, indeed, the avoidance of inflation and the maintenance of full employment can be most usefully regarded as conflicting class interests of the bourgeoisie and the proletariat, respectively, the conflict being resolvable only by the test of relative political power in the society and its resolution involving no reference to an overriding concept of the social welfare.’” [Michael Perelman, “Sado-Monetarism: The Role of the Federal Reserve System in Keeping Wages Low.” Monthly Review: An Independent Socialist Magazine. Volume 63, issue 11, April 2012. Pages 27-35.]
      516. liberatory social relations (Will Miller): He considers the relationship of human nature to the process of social change.
           “How do we empower ourselves as a self-consciously organized majority, so we can create liberatory social relations in which the free and full development of every person depends on, and is made possible by, the free and full development of all of us?
           “Structurally, we have to take democratic control of what was—and is—social property, the means of production and reproduction of ourselves as a human community. The existing system of private, income-producing property embodies an institutionalized extortion, where those who control the means to work demand an unearned reward (profits, interest and rent) for granting permission to use what we as a society have already labored to create.”
           [Will Miller, “Social Change and Human Nature.” Monthly Review: An Independent Socialist Magazine. Volume 50, issue 9, February 1999. Pages 42-46.]
      517. informatics (Jonathan Beller): He applies cultural studies to the fusing of knowledge with digital “image and code.”
           “In the latest instance of financialization, life (whatever that is) wriggles under an emergently totalizing field of informatics—all communication, all knowing, becomes inseparable from image and code. The expanded field of operations under the domain of the logistics of the screen/image, which places perception and discourse in a feedback loop with capitalized machinery and makes these subject to algorithmic governance clearly extends to the cinema—indeed cinema was a kind of first instance where the dynamics of what was to come became discernible.
           “The reparsing of the informatics of images (of viewing the image as fundamentally composed of information) is also bringing about a reconceptualization and reprogramming of photographic image-capture at the computational level. As it turns out, a tremendous amount of information is lost in the classical projection of images by conventional optics. Rather than creating a limited projection with a single focal plane, as with the classical optical camera projecting light onto an emulsion plate, light field cameras (such as Lytro), use digital sensors ‘to capture all the light’ (all rays of light traveling in space at every point) and thus to capture its directional information. This apparatus moves image capture into the explicitly computational domain. Images can be refocused after the fact in a kind of reverse rendering such that any given image can be refocused at any plane in the field merely by indicating a focal point on that plane with a finger or a mouse and recalibrating the depth of field.”
           [Jonathan Beller, “Informatic Labor in the Age of Computational Capital.” Lateral: Journal of the Cultural Studies Association. Issue 5.1, spring 2016. Creative Commons. Online publication. No pagination.]
      518. emergent critical analytics (Chris A. Eng and Amy K. King): They consider the possible contributions of various fields to cultural studies.
           “This forum examines how movements in scholarship around settler colonialism, new materialisms, disability, and institutionality have profoundly unsettled key foundations of scholarly inquiry. We argue that these emergent critical analytics provide pivotal points of entry into the task of radically reconceptualizing the dominant bodies of the human(ities).…
           “To formally reflect this project of imagining institutionality otherwise toward alternative humanities, this forum will stage conversations between established scholars and emerging scholars (students and junior faculty). Conventional institutional structures often premise a generational approach that privileges linear models of academic development, which can often be reproduced even within formal and informal practices of mentorship. In contrast, we aim to lateralize this relationship by juxtaposing comments by scholars across various institutional positions and intellectual trajectories side-by-side so that unexpected new relationalities may arise from these collaborations. In what ways might the stakes and uses of these analytics—settler colonialism, new materialisms, disability, and institutionality—in research and teaching shift based on one’s professional position and locale? How might students, recent graduates, contingent faculty, nontenured or junior scholars approach these analytics otherwise?”
           [Chris A. Eng and Amy K. King, “Forum Introduction: Emergent Critical Analytics for Alternative Humanities.” Lateral: Journal of the Cultural Studies Association. Issue 5.1, spring 2016. Creative Commons. Online publication. No pagination.]
      519. body studies (Susan Bordo, Virginia L. Blum, Nurit Stadler [Hebrew/ʿIḇəriyṯ, נוּרִיתּ שְׂטָדְּלֶר, Nūriyt Śəṭādəlẹr], Bryan S. Turner, and many others): This interdisciplinary branch of cultural studies and sociology, which is associated with the journal Body & Society, critically examines the body from a variety of standpoints.
           “My point here, if it requires saying, is not to accuse all men of being potential rapists and wife-batterers; this would be to indulge in a cultural mythology about men as pernicious as the sexual temptress myths about women. Rather, my aim is to demonstrate the continuing historical power and pervasiveness of certain cultural images and ideology to which not just men but also women (since we live in this culture, too) are vulnerable. Women and girls frequently internalize this ideology, holding themselves to blame for unwanted advances and sexual assaults. This guilt festers into unease with our femaleness, shame over our bodies, and self loathing. For example, anorexia nervosa, which often manifests itself after an episode of sexual abuse or humiliation, can be seen as at least in part a defense against the ‘femaleness’ of the body and a punishment of its desires. Those desires … have frequently been culturally represented through the metaphor of female appetite. The extremes to which the anorectic takes the denial of appetite (that is, to the point of starvation) suggest the dualistic nature of her construction of reality: either she transcends body totally, becoming pure ‘male’ will, or she capitulates utterly to the degraded female body and its disgusting hungers. She sees no other possibilities, no middle ground.” [Susan Bordo. Unbearable Weight: Feminism, Western Culture, and the Body. Berkeley, California: University of California Press. 1993. Pages 7-8.]
           “Arguably, [Susan] Bordo can be termed the ‘godmother’ of Body Studies and this text [Unbearable Weight: Feminism, Western Culture, and the Body] is viewed by many as one of the first in this area of scholarship. Drawing upon a Foucauldian framework, Unbearable Weight has inspired innumerable scholars largely because it was one of the first to demonstrate the importance of critical and cultural theory for the lived experience of the gendered self. Beautifully written and drawing upon relevant cultural examples, Bordo’s text is essential reading for anyone hoping to engage with Body Studies.” [Niall Richardson and Adam Locks. Body Studies: The Basics. London and New York: Routledge imprint of Taylor & Francis Group, an Informa PLC business. 2014. Page 22.]
           “When a friend had her nose fixed at age seventeen, that settled it. She and I never spoke about her surgery, but somehow the mothers got together and conferred. Even though I couldn’t see the difference myself following my friend’s surgery, my mother was more than enthusiastic. I suppose her postsurgical nose was slightly smaller. In those days, the only kinds of noses that made me think of surgery were very large noses. Slightly large (like my friend’s) or wide noses (like mine) or noses with bumps all seemed fine to my adolescent perception of faces.
           “Young children and adolescents receive their body images wholly from the outside. The adolescent girl, especially, enters the world tentatively and waits for it to say yes or no to her face and body. Now that my face had emerged from its childish amorphousness, it was finished enough to predict its disadvantages. Negotiating adolescence can feel like traveling in a herd of sorts, always under fire or under threat of some dangerous predator; you hope that you will escape notice. Then one day you are singled out—shot down in the field —just when you imagined yourself safely swallowed in anonymity.”
           [Virginia L. Blum. Flesh Wounds: The Culture of Cosmetic Surgery. Berkeley, California: University of California Press. 2003. Page 2.]
           “As part of my ethnography, I have examined a wide assortment of body-based female rituals at the Tomb of Mary. The findings shed light on the interplay between rituals, embodiment, and territoriality, namely the manner in which corporeal rituals tie into land, religious architecture, and cityscape. I show how devotees’ emphasis on corporeal practices and symbols of fertility, rebirth, and maternity at this ancient grotto invigorates the Christian imagination with respect to land ownership and minority identity. These rituals, which I term ‘womb-tomvenerations,’ are manifested in an exceedingly tense, multi-dimensional context: the well-documented Jewish-Muslim struggle in Israel/Palestine; the unrest therein between various Christian denominations; the freighted relations between the Orthodox Patriarchate and both the state of Israel and the Palestinian Authority; as well as the internal strife within the local Orthodox church pitting its predominately ethnic Greek clergy against its Arab-Palestinian laity.” [Nurit Stadler, “Land, fertility rites and the veneration of female saints: Exploring body rituals at the Tomb of Mary in Jerusalem.” Anthropological Theory. Volume 15, number 3, 2015. Pages 293-316.]
           “Growing academic interest in the human body, in both the humanities and social sciences, is an intellectual response to fundamental changes in the contemporary relationship between bodies, technology and society. Scientific advances in medicine and genetics, in particular the new reproductive technologies, stem-cell research, cryonics and cloning techniques, have given the human body a problematic social and cultural status. The global market for the sale of organs has also raised many legal and moral questions about the ownership and economic value of human bodies. For many bio-gerontologists, ageing, disease and death no longer appear to be necessary, immutable facts about the human condition, but contingent and therefore malleable features of human existence. Quite simply the longevity project of rejuvenative medicine proposes that death is avoidable. Many of these medical techniques – such as cryonics for freezing bodies – are still at an experimental stage, but aspects of these technologies will eventually begin to influence our lives in dramatic ways. Alongside these developments, there is an array of procedures associated with cosmetic surgery that are now simply routine features of the management of personal appearance.” [Bryan S. Turner, “Introduction: The Turn of the Body.” Routledge Handbook of Body Studies. Bryan S. Turner, editor. London and New York: Routledge imprint of Taylor & Francis Group, an Informa PLC business. 2012. Pages 1-17.]
           “The body is the material base of our existence as a human being. The body tells our story: Who am I, who are we?
           “On one hand, the body is a part of human existence, which the individual is not free just to choose freely. On the other hand, the body is not determined from the very beginning. Between the given body on one hand and intentional body management on the other, body culture develops in a process, which is historical and collective. The study of body culture casts light on this process and its contradictions between ‘just doing’ and ‘trying to steer.’
           “People ‘make’ their own body, but they do not make it of their own individual will.”
           [Henning Eichberg, “The study of body culture: observing practice.” Anthropologia a Cultura Ciala/Anthropology & Body Culture. Volume 6, 2006. Pages 194-200.]
           “In this article, I discuss sport as a field of investigation in feminist cultural studies, with a particular attention to the sportswoman as a transgressing creature. Through a historical perspective on sport as an arena for constructing and legitimizing gender, but correspondingly also for gender ‘troubling,’ I will discuss how studies of sport and physical activities contribute to the theorizing of body, gender and difference. The sportswoman continues to pose a challenge to established gender relations and dichotomies; nature/culture, mind/body, masculine/feminine, man/woman, flesh/representation. From the ‘Soviet amazon’ of the Cold War, to more recent cases of submitting women to gender tests, transgressions in sport have publicly demonstrated and pushed the boundaries of cultural understandings of gender.” [Helena Tolvhed, “Sex Dilemmas, Amazons and Cyborgs: Feminist Cultural Studies and Sport.” Culture Unbound: Journal of Current Cultural Research. Volume 5, 2013. Pages 273-289.]
           “… digital health and body studies scholars have yet to account for gender-based variations in either the uses or the effects of digital self-tracking devices. Critiques of these devices that assume or imply that the bodily experiences of men and women do not differ or that women andmen bear the same relationship to modern regimes of power risk reproducing themale normativity that sustains gender inequality …. Early market research findings of gender-based variance in self-tracking habits – for instance, women are more likely than men to track their caloric consumption and to monitor their metrics daily, while men are more likely to track their heart rate, blood pressure, and running speed ….” [Rachel Sanders, “Self-tracking in the Digital Era: Biopower, Patriarchy, and the New Biometric Body Projects.” Body & Society. OnlineFirst edition. July, 2016. Pages 1-28.]
           “Here, I revisit the epistemic roots of the body image while also engaging the rich contemporary literature on embodiment and corporeality from a body studies perspective in order to situate the narratives of amputees about the relationship between dismemberment, prosthetization, phantom limb syndrome, and body image. Stories about living with artificial, fleshy, phantomed, and residual limbs unquestionably reveal a number of peculiarities unique to amputees. However, they also offer a distinctively productive ingress into the analytic utility of a ‘re-visioned’ conceptualization of the body image more broadly speaking.” [Cassandra S. Crawford, “Body Image, Prostheses, Phantom Limbs.” Body & Society. Volume 21, number 2, 2014. Pages 221-244.]
           “Arguments within some neuroscientific accounts attempt to account for consciousness with reference to neuronal actively alone …. However, one of the aims of [Gail] Weiss’s account of key figures associated with habit is to demonstrate that these dualities are not so clear-cut, particularly when we consider the histories of the debates that are marshalled by accounts of habit.” [Lisa Blackman, “Habit and Affect: Revitalizing a Forgotten History.” Body & Society. Volume 19, numbers 2 and 3, 2013. Pages 186-216.]
           “In the intervening years since [Michel] Foucault’s seminal analyses of disciplinary surveillance and biopower, surveillance studies scholars have attended to the surveillance-embodiment nexus in various ways. But interestingly, … research collaborations that entwine the fields of surveillance and body studies have been limited. As the field was coalescing during the mid to late 1980s, scholars contemplated the relationship between surveillance and discrimination based on embodied traits like race, sex, age, health, genes, and so on.” [Martin French and Gavin J. D. Smith, “Surveillance and Embodiment: Dispositifs of Capture.” Body & Society. Volume 22, number 2, 2016. Pages 3-27.]
           “Body & Society has since its inception in 1995 played a prominent role in developing the field of body-studies across the humanities and social sciences. It was edited by Mike Featherstone and Bryan Turner who carried through the innovation and creativity of its companion journal, Theory, Culture & Society, in establishing Body & Society as one of the key innovators in the field. Since that time the journal has moved beyond the ‘sociology of the body’ and appealed to a trans-disciplinary audience, including the disciplines of anthropology, art history, communications, cultural history, cultural studies, environmental studies, feminism, film studies, health studies, leisure studies, medical history, philosophy, psychology, religious studies, science studies, sociology and sport studies. The journal has always been characterized by its theoretical openness, reflected in the diverse and wide range of critical approaches to the body reflected in the journal.” [Lisa Blackman and Mike Featherstone, “Re-visioning Body & Society.” Body & Society. Volume 16, number 1, 2010. Pages 1-5.]
           “Studies of embodiment have occupied an increasingly important role in sociology and across the social sciences and humanities since the 1980s. This ‘rise of the body’ has led not only to the establishment of a vibrant interdisciplinary area of ‘body studies’, but has also prompted an ongoing reconstruction of disciplinary and subdisciplinary areas seeking to account more adequately for the embodied nature and consequences of their subject matter. It has also been responsible for a shift in mainstream social theory. A growing number of works concerned with performativity, structuration theory, nature, realism, feminism, and human creativity, for example, are illustrative of an increasingly widespread recognition that the embodied subject needs to be central to any comprehensive understanding of social life.” [Chris Shilling, “The Rise of the Body and the Development of Sociology.” Sociology. Volume 39, number 4, 2005. Pages 761-767.]
           “Whereas film studies has drawn upon work ranging from production history to semiotics and psychoanalysis to conceptualize the ways in which the appearance of life on the cinema screen materializes subjectivities beyond it, STS [science and technology studies] has developed a corpus of theoretical and empirical scholarship that works to refigure material-semiotic entanglements. At the same time that attention to bodies and embodiment has increased in both film studies and STS, questions of how we might refigure life in ways that conjoin the human and nonhuman have revitalized the field of body studies ….” [Jackie Stacey and Lucy Suchman, “Animation and Automation – The Liveliness and Labours of Bodies and Machines.” Body & Society. Volume 18, number 1, 2012. Pages 1-46.]
           “Drawing from sociology, work in body studies and affect theory, and informed by my own ethnographic work on lesbian/queer sadomasochism, in this article I seek to illuminate by way of respondent subjectivities how the body, this ‘drag on signification’ (Martin, 1994), is formative of desire. That is, narratives highlight the centrality of gender (and thus the body) when it comes to desire and the formation of sexuality more generally. To reiterate, the gendered body does not ‘thwart’ desire so much as generate it.” [Corie J. Hammers, “The queer logics of sex/desire and the ‘missing’ discourse of gender.” Sexualities. Volume 18, number 7, 2015. Pages 838-858.]
           “This article recognizes the apparent ambiguity of Japan when viewed from Western-based science, and suggests ways in which this necessitates some qualifications to theories in the sociology of sport and the sociology of the body. It is of necessity exploratory, since research has primarily relied upon desk-based, English-language, sources. It is, however, based upon seven years of monitoring and reviewing contemporary and historical data, popular magazine and newspaper articles (some in Japanese as well as in English) and academic writings on sport and body culture in Japan.” [John Horne, “Understanding Sport and Body Culture in Japan.” Body & Society. Volume 6, number 2, 2000. Pages 73-86.]
           “… [This article] looks at the keep-fit culture not as a series of commercial images nor as the product of broader cultural values, but as a set of situated body practices, that is, practices taking place within specific institutions where these values are not just reproduced but translated and, to some extent, filtered.” [Roberta Sassatelli, “Interaction Order and Beyond: A Field Analysis of Body Culture within Fitness Gyms.” Body & Society. Volume 5, numbers 2–3, 1999. Pages 227-248.]
           “… [The] framing of tattoo as part of a performance of self, while useful as a metaphor, threatens to devolve into the modernist myth of individual sovereignty, or conversely postmodern deconstruction. Tattoo scholarship and body studies more generally have been instrumental in shaping the goals of the project, and while I am in dialog with these, the goal was never strictly academic, any more than it was simply to tell stories. ‘Tattoo culture’ was/is intended to intervene, through creative activity.” [Karen J. Leader, “Stories on the Skin: Tattoo Culture at a South Florida university.” Arts & Humanities in Higher Education. Volume 14, number 4, 2015. Pages 426-446.]
           “Body-studies are quite a new sphere of humanities. Although the discipline has its origins in the 1980s, the socio-cultural anthropology of the body became an important scientific field in the 1990s.…
           “Regardless of the perspective taken, there is one shared characteristic of the issue that links the different approaches towards the somatic: a focus on the body not only opens new scientific perspectives, but also forces scholars to show nuances and even to redefine many issues which seemed clear.”
           [Danuta Sosnowska, “Fryderyk Chopin’s correspondence from the perspective of body studies. The discovery of corporeality.” Interdisciplinary Studies in Musicology. Volume 9, 2011. Pages 265-281.]
           “The rise of body studies has, since its development in the early 1980s, been characterized by a resilience and creativity that shows no signs of abating. There are various reasons for this success, but two are especially worthy of note. Socially informed studies of the materialities, capacities and connectedness of body subjects have maintained their capacity to advance disciplinary, cross-disciplinary and inter-disciplinary work on the subject into new agendas. Additionally, emerging studies in the field continue to facilitate a sustained interrogation of those residual categories that have helped to define, but also restrict, the reach and ambition of sociology and related disciplines, and advance our understanding of social actions, social relationships and societies.” [Chris Shilling, “Afterword: Embodiment, Social Order, and the Classification of Humans as Waste.” Societies. Volume 3, 2013. Open access. Pages 261-265.]
           “The Deleuzian-Spinozan concept of affect is particularly important in the analysis of bodies and body work practices. ‘Affect’ is a burgeoning area in the field of body-studies in sociology, and is implicated in the theoretical reformulation of bodies as processes rather than entities. Affect can be understood as ‘embodied sensations’; as simply the capacity to affect and be affected. Affects mediate action, or becomings …. For this reason affect can be likened to agency, but avoids the problematic aspects inherent in the term, such as its oppositional usage and does not presume the human body as prior to subjectivity ….” [Julia Coffey, “Bodies, health and gender: exploring body work practices using Deleuze.” Research Report 34. Youth Research Centre, Melbourne Graduate School of Education, The University of Melbourne. October, 2012. Pages 1-19.]
           “According to [Michel] Foucault, the medical profession historically gained considerable power to define reality through the control of privileged and respected scientific knowledge. Medical knowledge came to define the boundaries of normality and deviance. Medicine has also objectified our bodies, bringing them under the surveillance of the medical system as objects to be manipulated and controlled. Thus, at the level of ideology, medicine creates the discourse that defines which bodies, activities, and behaviors are normal; at the level of practice, medical procedures are a principal source of the institutional regulation and disciplining of bodies.” [Jen Pylypa, “Power and Bodily Practice: Applying the Work of Foucault to an Anthropology of the Body.” Arizona Anthropologist. Number 13, 1998. Pages 21-36.]
      520. body–based constructionism (Zoltán Kövecses as pronounced in this MP3 audio file): With a focus on metaphor, he develops a distinctive approach to body studies.
           “… it seems possible to propose a synthesis that merges the social constructionist (SC) and universalist approaches into a unified view of emotions and emotion language. It seems appropriate to call this unified approach ‘body-based constructionism’ (BBC) and the prototypical cultural models that the approach aims to uncover the ‘embodied cultural prototype.’ I can of course only suggest this as a hypothesis; much further research will be required to prove it. Many additional languages will have to be analyzed by the methodology described in this book, focusing on emotions other than just the few emotion concepts we have looked at here. It will be important that the languages examined in this light include the ones that provided the evidence for the social-constructionist thesis in the first place.
           “Essentially, the synthesis involves acknowledging that some aspects of emotion language and emotion concepts are universal and clearly related to the physiological functioning of the body. Once the universal aspects of emotion language are parsed out, the very significant remaining differences in emotion language and concepts can be explained by reference to differences in cultural knowledge and pragmatic discourse functions that work according to divergent culturally defined rules or scenarios ….”
           [Zoltán Kövecses. Metaphor and Emotion: Language, Culture, and Body in Human Feeling. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press. 2004. Page 183.]
           “Embodiment is one of the key ideas of cognitive linguistics that clearly distinguishes the cognitive linguistic conception of meaning from that of other cognitively-oriented theories. In the emergence of meaning, that is, in the process of something becoming meaningful, the human body plays an important role …. It is especially what are known as ‘image schemas’ that are crucial in this regard. Image schemas are based on our most basic physical experiences and are inevitable in making sense of the world around us.…
           “Metaphorical conceptualization in natural situations occurs under two simultaneous pressures: the pressure of embodiment and the pressure of context. Context is determined by local culture. This dual pressure essentially amounts to our effort to be coherent both with the body and culture – coherent both with universal embodiment and the culture-specificity of local culture in the course of metaphorical conceptualization. We can achieve this in some cases, but in others it is either embodiment or cultural specificity that plays the more important role.”
           [Zoltán Kövecses, “Metaphor and Culture.” Acta Universitatis Sapientiae, Philologica. Volume 2, number 2, 2010. Pages 197-220.]
           “[Zoltán] Kövecses proposes a new synthesis between the social constructionist and cognitive linguistic views of emotion concepts, which he names Body-based Constructionism (BBC): ‘We should not forever be imprisoned in the mutually exclusive camps of “universalists” versus “social constructionists” in regard to our views about the conceptualization of emotion.’ He explains that this synthesis will involve acknowledging that some aspects of emotion language and concepts are related to the body and thus are universal, but the differences in emotion language and concepts that are not identified as universal can be explained by examining differences in ‘cultural knowledge and pragmatic discourse functions that work according to divergent culturally defined rules or scenarios.’ He also explains that this viewpoint will allow for examples in which culture may suppress, distort or contradict innate tendencies of emotion.” [Rosemarie I. Sokol and Sarah L. Strout, “A Complete Theory of Human Emotion: The Synthesis of Language, Body, Culture and Evolution in Human Feeling.” Culture & Psychology. Volume 12, number 1, 2006. Pages 115-123.]
      521. embodied figurational theory (Mike Atkinson): Atkinson develops the figurational sociology of Norbert Elias (MP3 audio file) into an approach to body studies.
           “Applications of ‘Embodied’ Figurational Theory
           “The under-appreciation of [Norbert] Elias as a complex, multi-disciplinary theorist of embodiment is perhaps no better illustrated than through a brief review of the mainstay subjects to which generational theory is applied.…
           “Figurational theory has been launched into even newer embodied terrain of late.…
           “The embodied performance of violence (not necessarily decoded as emblematic of civilising or decivilising processes) continues as a staple in generational research. Studies of violence as it is enacted against the body in the suicide process …, against others in the context of mixed martial arts …, or in the act of filicide … attest to the enduring significance of Elias’s work for deconstructing how violence, anger and aggression have interlaced biological, psychological and sociocultural dimensions.”
           [Mike Atkinson, “Norbert Elias and the Body.” Routledge Handbook of Body Studies. Bryan S. Turner, editor. London and New York: Routledge imprint of Taylor & Francis Group, an Informa PLC business. 2012. Pages 49-61.]
           “The standard which is emerging in our phase of the civilizing process is characrerized by a profound distance bertween rhe behaviour of so-called ‘adults’ and children. The children have in the space of a few years to attain rhe advanced level of shame and revulsion that has developed over many centuries. Their drives musr be rapidly subjected to the strict conrrol and specific moulding that gives our socitries their stamp, and which developed very slowly over centuries. In this the parents are only the (ofren inadequate) instruments, the primary agents of the conditioning: through them and thousands of other instruments it is always society as a whole, the entire figuration of human beings. that exerts irs pressure on the new generation, forming them more or less perfectly.” [Norbert Elias. The Civilizing Process: Sociogenetic and Psychogenetic Investigations. Revised edition. Edmund Jephcott, translator. Malden, Massachusetts: Blackwell Publishing. 2013. Page 119.]
           “The configuration of a person’s psychical self-regulation – for example, his or her mother tongue – is, through that person’s having grown up in a particular society, thoroughly ‘typical,’ and is at the same time, through his or her having grown up as a unique reference-point within the network of a society, thoroughly individual, i.e. it is a unique manifestation of this typical product. Individual animals are also different from each other ‘by nature,’ as, certainly, are individual people. But this inherited biological difference is not the same as the difference in the structure of psychical self-regulation in adults that we express by the term ‘individuality.’ To repeat the point, a person who grows up outside human society does not attain such ‘individuality’ any more than an animal. Only through a long and difficult shaping of his or her malleable psychical functions in intercourse with other people does a person's behaviour-control attain the unique configuration characteristic of a specific human individuality. It is only through a social moulding process within the framework of particular social characteristics that a person evolves the characteristics and modes of behaviour that distinguish him or her from all the other members of his or her society. Society not only produces the similar and typical, but also the individual. The varying degree of individuation among the members of different groups and strata shows this clearly enough.” [Norbert Elias. The Society of Individuals. Edmund Jephcott, translator. Michael Schröter, editor. London and New York: The Continuum International Publishing Group. 2001. Pages 59-60.]
           “Norbert Elias was born in Breslau [Wroclaw, Poland] in 1897, the son of German Jewish parents. After serving in the German army during World War I, he followed a course in medicine at the University of Breslau. Though his father, a physician, was anxious that Norbert pursue a medical career, Elias soon became enamored of philosophy and psychology. Of his teachers, Richard Honigswald, a leading Neo-Kantian, left the strongest impression – apparently, according to Elias’s later recollection, because of his ‘uncompromising and impatient rejection of metaphysics, old and new alike.’ After spending two semesters at Freiburg and Heidelberg attending lectures by Heinrich Rickert, Karl Jaspers, and Edmund Husserl, Elias returned to Breslau where, in 1922, he took his first and only medical degree.” [Rod Aya, “Norbert Elias and ‘The Civilizing Process.’” Theory and Society. Volume 5, number 2, March 1978. Pages 219-228.]
           “The difference between system integration and social integration, which [Jürgen] Habermas took from [David] Lockwood, is defined to hinge on the role and status of meaning: circumscribed by systemic needs and mechanisms in one case, connected to the interpretive operations and initiatives of interacting subjects in the other. The two forms of integration thus involve different relationships between culture and society. In [Norbert] Elias’s version of figurational sociology, there is – because of the marginal status of culture – no place for such distinctions. As a result, the broader frame of reference that constitutes a potential advantage vis-à-vis the theory of communicative action [Habermas] remains underdeveloped; it lacks the conceptual articulations that would allow it to incorporate and generalize Habermas’s critical perspective.” [Johann Arnason, “Figurational Sociology as a Counter-Paradigm.” Theory and Society. Volume 4, number 2, June 1987. Pages 429-456.]
           “His [Norbert Elias’] magnum opus, The Civilizing Process, which had appeared in German in Switzerland in 1939, was only translated much later with a confusing delay between the first and second volumes (1977, 1982). Nevertheless, his nearly three post-retirement decades were very productive and contributed to considerable international recognition as the proponent of a process-oriented figurational sociology, especially in Britain, Holland, France and his native Germany.” [Raymond A. Morrow, “Norbert Elias and Figurational Sociology: The Comeback of the Century.” Contemporary Sociology: A Journal of Reviews. Volume 38, number 3, 2009. Pages 215-219.]
      522. corporeal feminism (Corie Hammers): She proposes a physical approach to feminism, challenging “the mind/body dualism,” based upon body studies.
           “Work in body studies has attuned us to the dynamism of bodies—that of morphing, lived materiality. Bodies are not, in other words, inert, self-contained entities …. Corporeal feminists and phenomenologists have exposed this fabrication, that of the singular subject, through illuminating the embodied mind and its relational aspects. These mind–body interlinkages undermine the proprietary view of the body—the bedrock of western logic, denaturalizing in turn the (western) subject …. Corporeal feminists challenge the mind/body dualism and have exposed its foundation in masculinism, where ‘man’ is equated with mind and ‘woman’ with immanence. In seeking to corporealize us all, this vein of feminism severs in the process the male–mind–reason triune. Eschewing the corporeal is impossible since, as phenomenology posits, the body is fundamental/foundational to what we know and who we are.” [Corie Hammers, “Corporeality, Sadomasochism and Sexual Trauma.” Body & Society. Volume 20, number 2, 2014. Pages 68-90.]
      523. corporeal turn (Barbara Kirshenblatt-Gimblett): She discusses a Jewish approach to body studies and cultural studies.
           “What has been called the ‘corporeal turn’ in recent Jewish studies is provoking anxiety.… But those who took the corporeal turn never left the text behind. Rather, they brought a concern with the body to the text and found new ways to read and think about those texts.…
           “… What is new in ‘the new Jewish cultural studies’ is not only the concern with gender and sexuality (corporeality is not to be limited to these important topics in any case) but also the cultural turn in literary studies and the emergence of cultural studies. Text has not gone away. Rather, the corporeal turn has intensified interest in text and offered new ways to think about text as a social, corporeal, and material practice.”
           [Barbara Kirshenblatt-Gimblett, “The Corporeal Turn.” The Jewish Quarterly Review. Volume 95, number 3, summer 2005. Pages 447-461.]
      524. homology (Ou-Byung Chae [Korean, 오우 - 병 채, Ou - Pyŏng Ch’ae as pronounced in this MP3 audio file]): This term, which refers to structural resemblance, is used to develop a critique of statism in Korea.
           “As early as 1933, Paek Namun, a Marxist economic historian, gave an insightful comment on the ascendant ethnic discourses. Although these opposed colonial discourses, they were indeed located in the same orbit. He called this relationship ‘homoplasy’ (sangsa), meaning similar qualities with different origins. However, aside from his characterization, An himself had a better grasp. In the early 1930s, he diagnosed that the ‘statism’ of imperial powers and ‘nationalism’ in the colonies were homological, having ‘common roots with different qualities’ (tong’gŭ n ichil). Unlike Paek’s critical stance, An, as a ‘nationalist,’ used the terms to justify and inculcate the ethnic and national consciousness of the Korean people. However, beyond his intention, the term homology conveys more: it also indicates a relationship of antagonistic complicity between colonial and anticolonial discourses.” [Ou-Byung Chae, “Homology Unleashed: Colonial, Anticolonial, and Postcolonial State Culture in South Korea, 1930 – 1950.” Positions. Volume 23, number 2, 2015. Pages 317-347.]
           “At the 2006 inter-Korean military talks, the North Korean representative Kim Youngchul criticized a South Korean practice that many South Korean rural men are getting married to foreign brides. He expressed concerns that the ethnic homogeneity of the Korean nation would be seriously damaged as such practices continue. When the South Korean representative replied that it is ‘only like a droplet of ink in the Han river’ and will not be a problem ‘as long as the immigrants can be assimilated into the mainstream of the society’, the counterpart from the North disagreed, saying that ‘not even a droplet of ink should be permitted.’” [Won Joon Jang, “Multicultural Korea: South Korea’s Changing National Identity and the Future of Inter-Korea Relations.” Stanford Journal of East Asian Affairs. Volume 10, number 2, summer 2015. Pages 94-104.]
      525. cultural memory studies (Astrid Erll as pronounced in this MP3 audio file, Jan Assmann as pronounced in this MP3 audio file, Jeffrey K. Olick, and many others): They develop approaches which examine the intersection of culture and memory.
           “Over the past two decades, the relationship between culture and memory has emerged in many parts of the world as a key issue of interdisciplinary research, involving fields as diverse as history, sociology, art, literary and media studies, philosophy, theology, psychology, and the neurosciences, and thus bringing together the humanities, social studies, and the natural sciences in a unique way. The importance of the notion of cultural memory is not only documented by the rapid growth, since the late 1980s, of publications on specific national, social, religious, or family memories, but also by a more recent trend, namely attempts to provide overviews of the state of the art in this emerging field and to synthesize different research traditions.” [Astrid Erll,  Cultural Memory Studies: An Introduction.” Cultural Memory Studies: An International and Interdisciplinary Handbook. Astrid Erll and Ansgar Nünning, editors. Berlin, Germany, and New York: Walter de Gruyter. 2008. Pages 1-15.]
           “The cultural memory is based on fixed points in the past. Even in the cultural memory, the past is not preserved as such but is cast in symbols as they are represented in oral myths or in writings, performed in feasts, and as they are continually illuminating a changing present. In the context of cultural memory, the distinction between myth and history vanishes. Not the past as such, as it is investigated and reconstructed by archaeologists and historians, counts for the cultural memory, but only the past as it is remembered.” [Jan Assmann, “Communicative and Cultural Memory.” Cultural Memory Studies: An International and Interdisciplinary Handbook. Astrid Erll and Ansgar Nünning, editors. Berlin, Germany, and New York: Walter de Gruyter. 2008. Pages 109-118.]
           “If all individual memory is socially framed by groups, however, groups themselves also share publicly articulated images of collective pasts. For this reason, Halbwachs distinguished between ‘autobiographical memory’ and ‘historical memory.’ The former concerns the events of one’s own life that one remembers because they were experienced directly. The latter refers to residues of events by virtue of which groups claim a continuous identity through time.” [Jeffrey K. Olick, “From Collective Memory to the Sociology of Mnemonic Practices and Products.” Cultural Memory Studies: An International and Interdisciplinary Handbook. Astrid Erll and Ansgar Nünning, editors. Berlin, Germany, and New York: Walter de Gruyter. 2008. Pages 151-161.]
      526. transcending symbolic reality (Ole Bjerg as pronounced in this MP3 audio file): He examines the interface between capitalism and drug addiction.
           “By transcending symbolic reality, the drug user may also be said to transcend the sphere of desire. As we have seen, desire emerges as a result of symbolic castration whereby the subject is integrated into the symbolic order, structuring his desire and pointing him in the direction of different sublime objects endowed with certain symbolic meaning. The drug user, however, desires no object for its sensible or symbolic qualities. What the drug user looks for in the drug is an effect beyond the causality of symbolic reality. The drug user seems to be no longer a castrated subject of desire but rather a de-subjectivized body of drive.” [Ole Bjerg, “Drug Addiction and Capitalism: Too Close to the Body.” Body & Society. Volume 14, number 2, June 2008. Pages 1-22.]
      527. politics of utopia (Fredric Jameson): He develops an approach, grounded in cultural studies, to “the waning of the utopian idea.”
           “… the waning of the utopian idea is a fundamental historical and political symptom, which deserves diagnosis in its own right—if not some new and more effective therapy. For one thing, that weakening of the sense of history and of the imagination of historical difference which characterizes postmodernity is, paradoxically, intertwined with the loss of that place beyond all history (or after its end) which we call utopia. For another, it is difficult enough to imagine any radical political programme today without the conception of systemic otherness, of an alternate society, which only the idea of utopia seems to keep alive, however feebly.” [Fredric Jameson, “The Politics of Utopia.” New Left Review. Series II, number 25, January–February 2004. Pages 35-54.]
      528. cultural logic of late capitalism (Fredric Jameson): He develops an approach in cultural studies to late capitalism.
           “I have felt, however, that it was only in the light of some conception of a dominant cultural logic or hegemonic norm that genuine difference could be measured and assessed. I am very far from feeling that all cultural production today is ‘postmodern’ in the broad sense I will be conferring on this term. The postmodern is, however, the force field in which very different kinds of cultural impulses – what Raymond Williams has usefully termed ‘residual’ and ‘emergent’ forms of cultural production – must make their way. If we do not achieve some general sense of a cultural dominant, then we fall back into a view of present history as sheer heterogeneity, random difference, a coexistence of a host of distinct forces whose effectivity is undecidable. At any rate, this has been the political spirit in which the following analysis was devised: to project some conception of a new systematic cultural norm and its reproduction in order to reflect more adequately on the most effective forms of any radical cultural politics today.” [Fredric Jameson. Postmodernism, or, the Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism. Durham, North Carolina: Duke University Press. 1991. Page 5.]
      529. immanent logic of late capitalism (Slavoj Žižek): He critiques the notion of a “proper capitalist utopia.”
           “Today’s ‘exceptions’—the homeless, the ghettoized, the permanently unemployed—are the symptom of the late capitalist universal system, a growing and permanent reminder of how the immanent logic of late capitalism works: the proper capitalist utopia is that, through appropriate measures (for progressive liberals, affirmative action; for conservatives, a return to self-reliance and family values), this ‘exception’ could be—in the long term and in principle, at least—abolished. And is not a homologous utopia at work in the notion of a ‘rainbow coalition’: in the idea that, at some utopian future moment, all ‘progressive’ struggles—for gay and lesbian rights, for the rights of ethnic and religious minorities, the ecological struggle, the feminist struggle, and so on—will be united in the common ‘chain of equivalences’? Again, this necessity of failure is structural: the point is not simply that, because of the empirical complexity of the situation, all particular ‘progressive’ fights will never be united, that ‘wrong’ chains of equivalences will always occur—say, the enchainment of the fight for African-American ethnic identity with patriarchal and homophobic ideology—but rather that emergencies of ‘wrong’ enchainments are grounded in the very structuring principle of today’s ‘progressive’ politics of establishing ‘chains of equivalences’: the very domain of the multitude of particular struggles with their continuously shifting displacements and condensations is sustained by the ‘repression’ of the key role of economic struggle—the leftist politics of the ‘chains of equivalences’ among the plurality of struggles is strictly correlative to the silent abandonment of the analysis of capitalism as a global economic system and to the acceptance of capitalist economic relations as the unquestionable framework.” [Slavoj Žižek, “Multiculturalism, Or, the Cultural Logic of Multinational Capitalism.” New Left Review. Series I, number 225, September–October 1997. Pages 28-51.]
      530. Žižek studies (Slavoj Žižek and many others): This branch of cultural studies concentrates upon the work of the Slovenian Marxist and public intellectual Slavoj Žižek (born, March 21st, 1949). The open-access and Creative Commons review, The International Journal of Žižek Studies, publishes scholarly research in the field. See also the YouTube channel, Žižekian studies and, the smaller YouTube channel, Žižek studies. Žižek in the international director of the Birkbeck Institute for the Humanities.
           “… the most difficult and important task is a radical economic change that should abolish social conditions that create refugees. The ultimate cause of refugees is today’s global capitalism itself and its geopolitical games, and if we do not transform it radically, immigrants from Greece and other European countries will soon join African refugees. When I was young, such an organized attempt to regulate commons was called Communism. Maybe we should reinvent it. Maybe, this is, in the long term, our only solution.
           “Is all this a utopia? Maybe, but if we don’t do it, then we are really lost, and we deserve to be.”
           [Slavoj Žižek, “We Can’t Address the EU Refugee Crisis Without Confronting Global Capitalism.” In These Times. Online magazine. September 9th, 2015. No pagination. Retrieved on October 1st, 2015.]
           “‘Marxism’ after [Karl] Marx—in both its Social Democratic and Communist versions—lost this parallax perspective and regressed to a unilateral elevation of production as the site of truth, as against the ‘illusory’ spheres of exchange and consumption.” [Slavoj Žižek, “The Parallax View.” New Left Review. Series II, number 25, January–February 2004. Pages 121-134.]
           “The material force of the ideological notion of ‘free choice’ within capitalist democracy was well illustrated by the fate of the [Bill] Clinton Administration’s ultra-modest health reform programme. The medical lobby (twice as strong as the infamous defence lobby) succeeded in imposing on the public the idea that universal healthcare would somehow threaten freedom of choice in that domain. Against this conviction, all enumeration of ‘hard facts’ proved ineffective. We are here at the very nerve-centre of liberal ideology: freedom of choice, grounded in the notion of the ‘psychological’ subject, endowed with propensities which he or she strives to realize.” [Slavoj Žižek, “Against Human Rights.” New Left Review. Series II, number 34, July–August 2005. Pages 115-131.]
           “Is the fact that Communists in power today are the most dynamic capitalists not the ultimate sign of the triumph of capitalism? Another sign of this triumph is the very fact that the ruling ideology can afford what appears to be ruthless self-critique. There is no lack of anticapitalism today. We are even witnessing an overload of the critique of capitalisms horrors: Books, in-depth newspaper investigations, and TV reports abound with stories about companies ruthlessly polluting our environment, corrupted bankers continuing to get fat bonuses while their banks must be saved by public money, and sweatshops working children overtime, etc. There is, however, a catch to all this overflow of critique: What is as a rule not questioned in this critique, ruthless as it may appear, is the democratic-liberal frame of fighting against these excesses.” [Slavoj Žižek, “Living in the Time of Monsters.” Counterpoints. Volume 422, 2012. Pages 32-44.]
           “It is not enough to remain faithful to the communist hypothesis: one has to locate antagonisms within historical reality which make it a practical urgency. The only true question today is: does global capitalism contain antagonisms strong enough to prevent its indefinite reproduction? Four possible antagonisms present themselves: the looming threat of ecological catastrophe; the inappropriateness of private property for so-called intellectual property; the socio-ethical implications of new technoscientific developments, especially in biogenetics; and last, but not least, new forms of social apartheid—new walls and slums.” [Slavoj Žižek, “How to Begin from the Beginning.” New Left Review. Series II, number 57, May–June 2009. Pages 43-55.]
           “… those who preach the need for a return from financial speculation to the ‘real economy’ of producing goods to satisfy real people’s needs, miss the very point of capitalism: self-propelling and self-augmenting financial circulation is its only dimension of the Real, in contrast to the reality of production.” [Slavoj Žižek. First as Tragedy, Then as Farce. London and New York: Verso imprint of New Left Books. 2009. Page 14.]
           “A perfect example of … [the] Hegelian inversion – passage of subject into predicate – is offered by the theory of relativity. As is well known, [Albert] Einstein’s revolution in the conception of the relationship between space and matter occurred in two steps. First, he refuted the Newtonian idea of a homogeneous, ‘uniform’ space by demonstrating that matter ‘curves’ space. It is because of matter that the shortest way between two points in space is not necessarily a straight line – if the space is ‘bent’ by matter, the shortest way is a curve.” [Slavoj Žižek. For They Know Not What They Do: Enjoyment as a Political Factor. London and New York: Verso imprint of New Left Books. 2008. Page 58.]
           “What if, productive as capitalism is, the price we have to pay for its continuous functioning simply has become too high? If we avoid this question and continue to humanize capitalism, we will only contribute to the process we are trying to reverse. Signs of this process abound everywhere, including in the rise of Wal-Mart as the representation of a new form of consumerism targeting the lower classes ….” [Slavoj Žižek. The Year of Dreaming Dangerously. London and New York: Verso imprint of New Left Books. 2012. Page 16.]
           “Judaism, with its ‘stubborn attachment’ (Judith Butler’s term …) to the unacknowledged violent Fonnding gesture that hannts the public legal order as its spectral supplement, is not only split within itself between its ‘public’ aspect of the symbolic Law and its obscene underside (the ‘virtual’ narrative of the irredeemable excess of violence that established the very rule of Law) – this split is at the same time the split between Judaism and Christianity.” [Slavoj Žižek. The Fragile Absolute: or, Why is the Christian legacy worth fighting for. London and New York: Verso imprint of New Left Books. 2000. Page 97.]
           “… there never was a purely symbolic Power without an obscene supplement: the structure of a power edifice is always minimally inconsistent, so that it needs a minimum of sexualization, of the stain of obscenity, to reproduce itself.” [Slavoj Žižek. The Plague of Fantasies. London and New York: Verso imprint of New Left Books. 1997. Page 90.]
           “To break the yoke of habit means: if all men are equal. than all men are to be effectively treated as equal; if blacks are also human, they should be immediately treated as such. Let us recall the early stages of the struggle against slavery in the US, which, even prior to the Civil War, culminated in the anned conllict between the gradualism of compassionate liberals and the unique figure of John Brown ….” [Slavoj Žižek. In Defense of Lost Causes. London and New York: Verso imprint of New Left Books. 2008. Page 172.]
           “Slavoj Žižek, Ph.D., is a senior researcher at the Institute of Sociology, University of Ljubljana, Slovenia, and a visiting professor at a number of American Universities (Columbia, Princeton, New School for Social Research, New York University, University of Michigan). Slavoj Žižek recieved his Ph.D. in Philosophy in Ljubljana studying Psychoanalysis. He also studied at the University of Paris. Slavoj Žižek is a cultural critic and philosopher who is internationally known for his innovative interpretations of Jacques Lacan. Slavoj Žižek has been called the ‘Elvis Presley’ of philosophy as well as an ‘academic rock star.’” [“Slavoj Žižek – Biography.” The European Graduate School: Graduate & Postgraduate Studies. 2012. Retrieved on September 28th, 2015.]
           “The International Journal of Žižek Studies (IJŽS) is an online, peer-reviewed academic journal devoted to investigating, elaborating, and critiquing the work of Slavoj Žižek. IJŽS is an interdisciplinary journal that is open and welcoming to diverse approaches, methodologies, interpretations, and language of composition.” [“Editorial Policies.” International Journal of Žižek Studies. 2007. Retrieved on September 28th, 2015.]
           “Antonio Garcia [conference chair] is an independent researcher and writer. He has taught courses on aesthetics, cultural studies, popular culture, and continental philosophy. His main research interests are in curriculum theory, critical pedagogy, psychoanalysis, cultural theory, and philosophy. He completed his dissertation, The Eclipse of Education in the End Times: Exploring Žižekian Notions of Fantasy in Education, Democracy, and Multiculturalism, from Indiana University in Bloomington, Indiana. He is currently editing a grand volume titled “Žižek and Education” with Sense publishing.” [“Central Steering Committee.” Žižek Studies Conference. Undated. Retrieved on September 28th, 2015.]
           “Arguably the most prolific and widely read philosopher of our time, Slavoj Žižek has made significant interventions in many disciplines of the human and natural sciences. Appropriating Lacanian psychoanalysis as a privileged conceptual fulcrum to reload German idealism (Hegel) through Marxism and, more recently, Christianity, Žižek has written extensively (and in several languages) on a dizzying array of topics that include global capitalism, psychoanalysis, opera, totalitarianism, cognitive science, racism, human rights, religion, new media, popular culture, cinema, love, ethics, environmentalism, New Age philosophy, and politics.” [Jamil Khadir, “Introduction – Žižek Now or Never: Ideological Critique and the Nothingness of Being.” Žižek Now: Current Perspectives in Žižek Studies. Jamil Khadir and Molly Anne Rothenberg, editors. Malden, Massachusetts: Polity Press. 2013. Kindle edition.]
           “[Slavoj] Žižek tries to define a form of subjectivity by which truly revolutionary violence could confront the inauthentic, excessive and illegitimate violence of the state. (This would go beyond the limited steps of Jack in Fight Club.) In this endeavour, he rehearses the quest of both [Georges] Sorel and, under his immediate influence, Walter Benjamin, both of whom tried to imagine a form of revolutionary violence that would break the spell that compels each creation of a new order to establish a new form of forceful domination.” [Christopher J. Finlay, “Violence and Revolutionary Subjectivity: Marx to Žižek.” European Journal of Political Theory. Volume 5, number 4, October 2006. Pages 373-397.]
           “[Slavoj] Žižek’s recent polemics against post-Marxism, multiculturalism and identity politics have only served to highlight the distance that now exists between him and his previous collaborators in the UK and USA, Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe.” [Sean Homer, “It’s the political economy, stupid!: Žižek’s Marxism.” Radical Philosophy: Philosophical Journal of the Independent Left. Number 108, July/August 2001. Pages 7-16.]
           “At first glance, the work of the Slovenian philosopher Slavoj Žižek seems to offer an irresistible range of attractions for theorists wishing to engage with contemporary culture, without accepting the flimsy postmodernist doxa which is often the only available gloss on it. Žižek’s thought is still strongly coloured by his Althusserian background, and he is therefore rightly sceptical of the anti-Enlightenment sloganizing, and revivals of the ‘end of ideology,’ which are the staple of so much cultural commentary today. At the same time, far from being dourly Marxist, his writings are informed by a vivid and sophisticated grasp of Lacanian psychoanalytic theory, and are enlivened by constant reference to works of fiction, cinema, classical music and opera.” [Peter Dews, “The tremor of reflection: Slavoj Žižek’s Lacanian dialectics.” Radical Philosophy: Philosophical Journal of the Independent Left. Number 72, July/August 1995. Pages 17-29.]
      531. Slavoj Žižek’s critique of Western Buddhism (Slavoj Žižek): This term, taken from an article by Eske Møllgaard (MP3 audio file), relates to various critiques made by Žižek, including in The Puppet and the Dwarf: The Perverse Core of Christianity, in two lectures delivered at the University of Vermont (Burlington, Vermont)—“A Critique of Buddhism” (MP3 audio file) and “Buddhism Naturalized” (MP3 audio file)—and a lecture on “The Buddhist Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism” (MP3 audio file) delivered to the European Graduate School (Switzerland). Unfortunately, the sound quality in the second MP3 file—a merger of Žižek’s own presentation and the question–and–answer session which followed—is rather poor.
           “In Buddhist terms, the Lacanian act is the exact structural obverse of Enlightenment, of attaining nirvana: the very gesture by means of which the Void is disturbed, and Difference (and, with it, false appearance and suffering) emerges in the world. The act is thus close to the gesture of Bodhisattva who, having reached nirvana, out of compassion—that is, for the sake of the common Good—goes back to phenomenal reality in order to help all other living beings to achieve nirvana.The distance from psychoanalysis resides in the fact that, from the latter’s standpoint, Bodhisattva’s sacrificial gesture is false: in order to arrive at the act proper, one should erase any reference to the Good, and do the act just for the sake of it. (This reference to Bodhisattva also enables us to answer the ‘big question’: if, now,we have to strive to break out of the vicious cycle of craving into the blissful peace of nirvana, how did nirvana ‘regress’ into getting caught in the wheel of craving in the first place? The only consistent answer is: Bodhisattva repeats this primordial ‘evil’ gesture. The fall into Evil was accomplished by the ‘original Bodhisattva’—in short, the ultimate source of Evil is compassion itself.)
           “Bodhisattva’s compassion is strictly correlative to the notion that the ‘pleasure principle’ regulates our activity when we are caught in the wheel of Illusion—that is to say, that we all strive toward the Good, and the ultimate problem is epistemological (we misperceive the true nature of the Good)—to quote the Dalai Lama himself, the beginning of wisdom is ‘to realize that all living beings are equal in not wanting unhappiness and suffering and equal in the right to rid themselves of suffering.’ The Freudian drive, however, designates precisely the paradox of ‘wanting unhappiness,’ of finding excessive pleasure in suffering itself— … expresses this fundamental self-blockade of human behavior perfectly.The Buddhist ethical horizon is therefore still that of the Good—that is to say, Buddhism is a kind of negative of the ethics of the Good: aware that every positive Good is a lure, it fully assumes the Void as the only true Good. What it cannot do is to pass ‘beyond nothing,’ into what Hegel called ‘tarrying with the negative’: to return to a phenomenal reality which is ‘beyond nothing,’ to a Something which gives body to the Nothing. The Buddhist endeavor to get rid of the illusion (of craving, of phenomenal reality) is, in effect, the endeavor to get rid of the Real of/in this illusion, the kernel of the Real that accounts for our ‘stubborn attachment’ to the illusion.”
           [Slavoj Žižek. The Puppet and the Dwarf: The Perverse Core of Christianity. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press. 2003. Pages 22-23.]
           “… when we are bombarded by claims that in our postideological cynical era nobody believes in the proclaimed ideals, when we encounter a person who claims he is cured of any beliefs, accepting social reality the way it really is, one should always counter such claims with the question: OK, but where is the fetish which enables you to (pretend to) accept reality ‘the way it is’? ‘Western Buddhism’ is such a fetish: it enables you to fully participate in the frantic pace of the capitalist game, while sustaining the perception that you are not really in it, that you are well aware how worthless this spectacle is – what really matters to you is the peace of the inner Self to which you know you can always withdraw ….
           “… What we are unable even to conjecture today is the idea of revolution, be it sexual or social. Perhaps, in today’s stale times of the proliferating pleas for tolerance, one should take the risk of recalling the liberating dimension of such excesses.”
           [Slavoj Žižek, “The Prospects of Radical Politics Today.” Documenta11_platform1: Democracy Unrealized. Okwui Enwezor, editor. Ostfildern-Ruit, Germany: Hatje Cantz Verlag. 2002. Pages 67-85.]
           “Love—you find this in Christianity—is onesided, unilateral. Love means ‘I love you more than everything’: love is precisely what Buddhists would have called the origin of evil. Love is a kind of radical imbalance.” [Slavoj Žižek in Joshua Delpech-Ramey, “An Interview with Slavoj Žižek ‘On Divine Self-Limitation and Revolutionary Love.’” Journal of Philosophy & Scripture. Volume 1, issue 2, spring 2004. Pages 32-38.]
           “[Slavoj] Žižek’s main charge against western Buddhism is that it functions as the perfect ideology for late capitalism. He points out that it is ironic that today, just when ‘European” technology and capitalism are triumphing worldwide’ ….
           “It is clear that Žižek misunderstands the Buddhist notion of emptiness as absorption in the One-All. Furthermore, it could be argued that an act of division not unlike the division in the One-All in Žižek’s Christian theology is to be found in the Buddhist enlightenment experience.…
           “Žižek’s account of good Christian violence is equally questionable. Žižek argues that unlike bad Buddhist violence, which justifies fascist/capitalist state violence, good Christian violence emerges from the split in the One-All (God is split in God/Christ) and takes the form of revolutionary love. Žižek believes that this Christian violent love breaks with the pagan view of violence, but precisely the opposite is the truth: Žižek falls back into the identification of violence and the sacred that is characteristic of pagan or natural (non-Christian) religion. In fact, Žižek’s linkage of violence and love is best understood on the basis of … the link between violence and the sacred in pagan, natural religion.”
           [Eske Møllgaard, “Slavoj “Žižek’s Critique of Western Buddhism.” Contemporary Buddhism. Volume 9, number 2, November 2008. Pages 167-180.]
           “This essay started out as a response to Slavoj Žižek’s recent talk at the University of Vermont on ‘Buddhism Naturalized,’ but evolved into a consideration of subjectivity ….
           “Ultimately … Žižek’s critique sounds to me not so much as a critique of Buddhism’s philosophical core, which I think he hasn’t adequately grasped, than a critique of one of the main tropes and vehicles by which that philosophical core has so often been adumbrated. This is the trope of inner peace and happiness — the cessation of suffering and attainment of bliss through the elimination of ignorance.…
           “… perhaps … why Žižek needs his Marxism: it provides him with an ethical foundation for action. To the extent that it offers an understanding of our relations with all beings who suffer, Buddhism may be more inclusive in this respect: it provides a wider vision for justice and solidarity than Marxism, even at its humanistic best, has ever provided.”
           [Adrian J. Ivakhiv, “Žižek V. Buddhism: Who’s the Subject.” Non + X. Issue 9, 2014. Pages 30-38.]
           “[Slavoj] Žižek does not mention: Buddhism came from or developed around Bodhigaya, around Benares, India. This was no backwoods-of-Nepal, primitive-ideology that was being espoused by the ‘Fully Enlightened One’. Serious sociological studies assert what Žižek cannot state: ‘The arguments relating the rise of Buddhism to urbanization and state formation can be classified under four headings, according as they bear upon the relevance of Buddhism: (1) to the value of merchants, (2) to the nature of city life, (3) to political organization in the urban-based centralized state, (4) to the shift from pastoral to agrarian culture which economically underpinned the rise of cities.’ If anything these real studies illuminate the transitioning confusion from the Axial Age (the era when the great-prophets/teachers of the modern-day’s religions were beginning their dispensations) and we have the relics of those ideas preserved in our literature.” [Dion Oliver Peoples, “Slavoj Žižek’s Interpretation of ‘Buddhism.’” The Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Universities (JIABU). Volume 3, 2012. Pages 107-144.]
      532. critical, radical, or materialist theology (Slavoj Žižek, Carl A. Raschke, Thomas J. J. Altizer, and others): It is a critical theoretical approach to theology. Žižek, for instance, is a “Christian atheist.” That is to say, he follows Christ as a man, not as a God-Man. Elucidating upon the well-known postulate of Friedrich Nietzsche (MP3 audio file), some proponents of this type of theology, such as Altizer, have claimed that “God is dead.”
           “God, what does this mean? The point—the Lacanian point of this is that in a way the moment we speak we unconsciously believe in God. It is our speech which creates God. God is here the moment we talk. Or to quote Talmud, a passage, ‘You have made me into a single entity in this world, for it is written, here O Israel the Lord is our God the Lord is one and I shall make you into a single entity in the world.’ This Talmud formula exemplifies the idea of God kept alive by subjects’ incessant activity.” [Slavoj Žižek. “Slavoj Žižek: God Without the Sacred: The Book of Job, the First Critique of Ideology.” LIVE from the New York Public Library. Paul Holdengräber, interviewer. November 9th, 2010. Page 23. September 23rd, 2015.]
           “This paper elaborates on the divine God through the Lacanian concept of ex-istence. While avoiding the various possibilities of interpreting the ex-sistence of God (imaginary, symbolic…), this article will focus on the ex-sistence of God in the practice of love. We should not understand the love for God, but the love for the neighbours, as announced by Jesus Christ.” [Slavoj Žižek, “Some Thoughts on the Divine Ex-sistence.” Abstract. Crisis & Critique. Volume 2, issue 1. Pages 13-34.]
           “Perhaps the clearest indication of the gap that separates Christianity from Buddhism is the difference in their respective triads. That is to say, in their respective histories, each divided itself into three main strands.” [Slavoj Žižek. Less than Nothing: Hegel and the Shadow of Dialectical Materialism. London and New York: Verso imprint of New Left Books. 2012. Page 108.]
           “A profoundly religious friend once commented on the subtitle of a book of mine, ‘the perverse core of Christianity’: ‘I fully agree with you here! I believe in God, but I find repulsive and deeply disturbing all the twist of celebrating sacrifice and humiliation, of redemption through suffering, of God organizing his own son’s killing by men. Can’t we get Christianity without this perverse core?’ I couldn’t bring myself to answer him: ‘But the point of my book is exactly the opposite one: what I want is all those perverse twists of redemption through suffering, dying of God, etc., but without God!’” [Slavoj Žižek, “The Atheist Wager.” Political Theology. Volume 11, issue 1, January 2010. Pages 136-140.]
           “One can argue that atheism is truly thinkable only within monotheism ….
           “… what if the affinity between monotheism and atheism demonstrates not that atheism depends on monotheism, but that monotheism itself prefigures atheism within the field of religion – its God is from the very (Jewish) beginning a dead one, in clear contrast with the pagan gods who irradiate cosmic vitality. Insofar as the truly materialist axiom is the assertion of primordial multiplicity, the One which precedes this multiplicity can only be Zero itself. No wonder, then, that only in Christianity – as the only truly consequent monotheism – god himself turns momentarily into an atheist.”
           [Slavoj Žižek, “Towards a Materialist Theology.” Angelaki: Journal of the Theoretical Humanities. Volume 12, number 1, April 2007. Pages 19-26.]
           “As is well known, Jacques Lacan claimed that psychoanalytic practice teaches us to turn around Dostoyevsky’s dictum: ‘If there is no God, then everything is prohibited.’ This reversal is hard to swallow for our moral common sense: in an otherwise sympathetic review of a book on Lacan, a Slovene Leftist newspaper rendered Lacan’s version as: ‘Even if there is no God, not everything is permitted!’—a benevolent vulgarity, changing Lacan’s provocative reversal into a modest assurance that even we godless atheists respect some ethical limits ….” [Slavoj Žižek in Slavoj Žižek and Boris Gunjević. God in Pain: Inversions of Apocalypse. New York: Seven Stories Press. 2012. Page 44.]
           “… what about the Buddhist figure of bodhisattva who, out of love for the not-yet-enlightened suffering humanity, postpones his own salvation to help others on the way towards it? Does bodhisattva not stand for the highest contradiction: is not the implication of his gesture that love is higher than salvation? So why still call salvation salvation? And, what we find at the end of this road is atheism – not the ridiculously pathetic spectacle of the heroic defiance of God, but insight into the irrelevance of the divine ….
           “… we are never in a position to directly choose between theism and atheism, since the choice as such is located within the field of belief. ‘Atheism’ (in the sense of deciding not to believe in God) is a miserable pathetic stance of those who long for God but cannot find him (or who ‘rebel against God’…). A true atheist does not choose atheism: for him, the question itself is irrelevant.”
           [Slavoj Žižek, “A Plea for Ethical Violence.” The Bible and Critical Theory. Volume 1, number 1, December 2004. Pages 1-14.]
           “The underlying premise of the present book is a simple one: the global capitalist system is approaching an apocalyptic zero-point. Its ‘four riders of the apocalypse’ are comprised by the ecological crisis, the consequences of the biogenetic revolution, imbalances within the system itself (problems with intellectual property; forthcoming struggles over raw materials, food and water), and the explosive growth of social divisions and exclusions….
           “The turn towards an emancipatory enthusiasm takes place only when the traumatic truth is not only accepted in a disengaged way, but is fully lived: ‘Truth has to be lived, not taught. Prepare for battle!’ …
           “The present book is thus a book of struggle, following Paul’s surprisingly relevant definition: ‘For our struggle is not against flesh and blood, but against leaders, against authorities, against the world rulers … of this darkness, against the spiritual wickedness in the heavens’ (Ephesians 6: 12). Or, translated into today’s language: ‘Our struggle is not against actual corrupt individuals, but against those in power in general, against their authority, against the global order and the ideological mystification which sustains it.’ To engage in this struggle … better to take the risk and engage in fidelity to a Truth-Event, even if it ends in catastrophe, than to vegetate in the eventless utilitarian-hedonist survival of what [Friedrich Wilhelm] Nietzsche [MP3 audio file] called the ‘last men.’”
           [Slavoj Žižek. Living in the End Times. London and New York: Verso imprint of New Left Books. 2011. Kindle edition.]
           “Nowadays, as in former eras, there is a certain amount of posturing and grandstanding about economic oppression and inequality, often resulting in half-baked proposals about combating the new global regime of virtualized and highly financialized capital that has come to be known imprecisely as ‘neoliberalism.’ But the ‘psycho-spiritual’ dimensions of both the nature of such oppression and the trajectories of emancipation are all too frequently shunted aside. Just as classical critical theory tackled these kinds of issues that orthodox forms of political radicalism had dismissed as inconsequential, so a new critical theology is summoned as well to address them squarely and consistently. One contemporary figure who is not routinely classified as part of the ‘new critical theory,’ but whose work has momentous ramifications for supplying the ‘global’ component to an emergent critical theology, is Ulrich Beck. I briefly discussed his contributions to the debates over post-secularism, but we also must regard him as providing some real heft to the idea of critical theology in a genuinely global context.…
           “What I have termed the ‘dialogical’ logos of a new critical theology, the procedural ‘theo-logic’ that emanates from the ‘axiomatic’ logos of the Word made flesh, therefore becomes the only kind of ‘critical’ rationality that can successfully navigate the topography of intersecting power relations that have left the political architecture of the nation-state historically in the lurch. We are all wayfarers, and at the same time we are all ‘stripped naked’— so to speak— when we come face-to-face and communicate with each other in our itinerant voyagings and concurrences. A new, global critical theology would therefore be cosmopolitan in [Ulrich] Beck’s pivotal sense. It would not be some overreaching and disinterested surveillance of vast and turbid transnational hoi polloi. The question of identity in such a global critical theology gives pride of place to the recognition and reciprocal incorporation of difference into the formation of a thousand engaged ‘critical’ subjectivities arising from the inescapable intersubjectivity of a world without national borders and static cultural boundaries for which the venerable science of ‘politics,’ even at the international level, becomes meaningless.”
           [Carl A. Raschke. Critical Theology: Introducing an Agenda for an Age of Global Crisis. Downer’s Grove, Illinois: IVP Academic imprint of InterVarsity Press. 2016. Kindle edition.]
           “What is the future of theology in the midst of rapid geopolitical and economic change?
           “Carl A. Raschke contends that two options from the last century—crisis theology and critical theory—do not provide the resources needed to address the current global crisis. Both of these perspectives remained distant from the messiness and unpredictability of life. Crisis theology spoke of the wholly other God, while critical theory spoke of universal reason. These ideas aren’t tenable after postmodernism and the return of religion, which both call for a dialogical approach to God and the world. Rashke’s new critical theology takes as its starting point the biblical claim that the Word became flesh—a flesh that includes the cultural, political and religious phenomena that shape contemporary existence.
           “Drawing on recent reformulations of critical theory by Slavoj Žiže, Alain Badiou and post-secularists such as Jürgen Habermas, Raschke introduces an agenda for theological thinking accessible to readers unfamiliar with this literature. In addition, the book explores the relationship between a new critical theology and current forms of political theology. Written with the passion of a manifesto, Critical Theology presents the critical and theological resources for thinking responsibly about the present global situation.”
           [Editor. Critical Theology: Introducing an Agenda for an Age of Global Crisis. Publisher’s abstract. Downers Grove, Illinois: InterVarsity Press Academic. 2016. Retrieved on July 30th, 2016.]
           “Critical theology is in many ways the ongoing twenty first-century legacy of so-called pomo [postmodern] theology. Postmodern theology, which started off in the 1980s as an effort to develop an immediate theological application for the tremendously influential philosophy (at the time) of Jacques Derrida, gradually became an extension of what Hent DeVries termed in the late 1990s the ‘religious turn’ in continental philosophy as a whole.…
           “With the revival of political theology … has come a profound new interest in so-called critical theory, a term once used exclusively for the work of the writings of the Frankfurt School, which flourished from the late 1920s until after World War II, but in the last two decades has come to be used for a wide variety of contemporary theorists who draw on the discourses and explicit sociopolitical critiques found in continental philosophy (as well as psychoanalysis). That latest iteration is often known as the ‘new critical theory.’ The interdisciplinary interest in critical theory is also expanding rapidly in the present college and university environments. My own institution just this past year inaugurated such a curriculum because of student demand.”
           [Carl A. Raschke. “Conversation with the Author: IVP Academic editor David Congdon asks author Carl A. Raschke about his new book, Critical Theology.” IVP Academic imprint of InterVarsity Press. 2016. Retrieved on July 30th, 2016.]
           “According to [Slavoj] Žižek, atheism is an intrinsic part of Christianity because Christianity is, as Chesterton stated, the religion in which God himself becomes an atheist.… This view of Žižek is of course a result of his Hegelianism. But, next to Žižek‟s faithfulness to Hegel’s basic scheme, there is no justification for this transition from God the Son sharing the atheist‟s experience on the Cross to the death of God the Father – unless one limits the Father of Christ to the God qua ‘secret Master who knows the meaning of what appears to us to be a meaningless catastrophe’ and the ‘transcendent caretaker who guarantees the happy outcome of our acts’ who is discredited by the case of Job.” [Frederiek Depoortere, “The Faith of Job and the Recovery of Christian Atheism.” Expositions. Volume 4, numbers 1 and 2, 2010. Pages 105-113.]
           “According to [Thomas J. J.] Altizer, God is not absent. He is not merely in eclipse. It’s not simply a question of language and terminology. The problem of images (whether God is ‘up there’ or ‘out there’ or ‘down there’) is really beside the point. God is dead. He died in history, on the Cross. God once existed; he no longer exists. And it is time for Christians to recognize this fact. We are liberated from the power and restraining force of a transcendent God, a God who rules and a God who judges. We are liberated for a life of total engagement in the terrestrial and profane order. Christians can now be secular radicals because God is dead.” [Richard P. McBrien, “Radical Theology: The Honest-to-God to God-Is-Dead.” Commonweal. September 23rd, 1966. Pages 605-608.]
           “Only when God is dead, can Being begin in every Now. Eternal Recurrence is neither a cosmology nor a metaphysical idea, it is Nietzsche's symbol of the deepest affirmation existence, of Yes-saying; accordingly, Eternal Recurrence symbolic portrait of the truly contemporary man, who dares to live in our time, in our history, in our existence.
           “We must observe that Eternal Recurrence is a dialectical inversion of the biblical category of the Kingdom of God. Jesus’ proclamation of the Kingdom of God makes incarnate a transcendent Wholly Other, a Wholly Other that radically reverses the believer’s existence in both the being and the values of the Old Aeon of history, and makes possible even now a participation in the New Aeon of grace. So likewise the ‘existential’ truth of Eternal Recurrence shatters the power of the old order of history, transforming transcendence into immanence, and thereby making eternity incarnate in every Now. Eternal Recurrence is the dialectical antithesis of the Christian God, the creature becomes the Creator when the Center is everywhere.”
           [Thomas J. J. Altizer, “Theology and the Death of God.” The Centennial Review. Volume 8, number 2, spring 1964. Pages 129-146.]
           “I propose to examine one such frontier with the purpose of ascertaining whether or not it is closed to the Catholic thinker: the possibility of an atheistic or death-of-God theology. Many critics have charged that a death-of-God theology can have no possible ground in the life of the Church, that it ignores or simply negates the Christian tradition, and that it collapses theology into a naturalistic or humanistic anthropology. Now if these charges are true I can see no possibility of a Catholic death-of-God theology, nor for that matter could I then see the possibility of any form of Christian atheism. But I believe them to be untrue, and I shall approach these charges by way of taking up the question of the inherent possibility of a Catholic atheistic theology.” [Thomas J. J. Altizer, “Catholic Philosophy and the Death of God.” CrossCurrents. Volume 17, number 3, summer 1967. Pages 271-282.]
           “… when Zarathustra was alone he spoke thus to his heart: ‘Could it be possible! This old saint in his woods has not yet heard the news that God is dead!’” [Friedrich Nietzsche. Thus Spoke Zarathustra: A Book for All and None. Adrian Del Caro, translator. Adrian Del Caro and Robert B. Pippin, editors. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press. 2006. Page 5.]
           “After Buddha was dead, they still showed his shadow in a cave for centuries – a tremendous, gruesome shadow. God is dead; but given the way people are, there may still for millennia be caves in which they show his shadow. – And we – we must still defeat his shadow as well!” [Friedrich Nietzsche. The Gay Science: With a Prelude in German Rhymes and an Appendix of Songs. Josefine Nauckhoff and Adrian Del Caro, translators. Bernard Williams, editor. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press. 2001. Page 109.]
      533. Holocaust theology (Elie Wiesel [Hebrew/ʿIḇəriyṯ, אֵלִי וִיזֶל, Ēliy Wiyzẹl; or Yiddish/Yiyḏiyš, אֵלִיעזֶר ווִיזֶל, Ēliyʿzẹr Wwiyzẹl], Norman Solomon, Barbara Krawcowicz, and others): Various theological responses to the Jewish Holocaust (Ancient Greek/Archaía Hellēniká, ὁλόκαυστος, holókaustos, “whole burning”) have been developed.
           “… one generation after the event, one can still say—or one can already say—that what is called the literature of the Holocaust does not exist, cannot exist. It is a contradiction in terms, as is the philosophy, the theology, the psychology of the Holocaust. Auschwitz negates all systems, opposes all doctrines. They cannot but diminish the experience which lies beyond our reach. Ask any survivor, he will tell you; he who has not lived the event will never know it. And he who went through it, will not reveal it—not really, not entirely. Between his memory and its reflection there is a wall—and it cannot be pierced. The past belongs to the dead, and the survivor does not recognize himself in the words linking him to them. A novel about Treblinka is either not a novel or not about Treblinka; a novel about Treblinka is about blasphemy—is blasphemy. For Treblinka means death—absolute death—death of language and of the imagination. Its mystery is doomed to remain intact.” [Elie Wiesel, “Art and Culture After the Holocaust.” CrossCurrents. Volume 26, number 3, fall 1976. Pages 258-269.]
           “To a surprising degree the answers given by the Holocaust theologians are the same answers as those to be found in earlier traditional sources. Many of them – those we have described under the headings of narrative exegesis, liturgy, the assertion of meaning and value, the imperative of survival, and tikkun [Hebrew/ʿIḇəriyṯ, תִּקּוּן, tiqqūn, ‘repairing’] – are varieties of one of those answers, that of redemption through suffering, worked out with new insights arising from modem psychological and sociological perspectives and applied, often with great sensitivity, to the present situation of the Jewish people.” [Norman Solomon, “Jewish Holocaust Theology.” The Way. Volume 37, number 3, July 1997. Pages 242-253.]
           “In this paper I propose that the category of paradigmatic thinking be applied to the reflections about the Nazi persecutions of the Jews during the Holocaust written by one of the ultra-Orthodox rabbis who strove to provide a meaningful religious interpretation of the assault while the events were still unfolding. Employing this category in the analysis of the wartime writings of Shlomo Zalman Ehrenreich of Transylvania (1863–1944) shows the intricate conceptual structure that enabled him and similar traditionally oriented thinkers to uphold the fundamental tenets of covenantal theology in spite of the historical events that threatened to disrupt it.” [Barbara Krawcowicz, “Paradigmatic Thinking and Holocaust Theology.” Journal of Jewish Thought & Philosophy. Volume 22, issue 2, 2014. Pages 164-189.]
           “… [Elie] Wiesel has created a mouthpiece for his theology. It is a unique Holocaust theology, a theology of questions without answers; one that equates knowledge of the depths of man’s depravity with knowledge of the heights of man’s wisdom.” [Peter Manseau, “Revising Night: Elie Wiesel and the Hazards of Holocaust Theology.” CrossCurrents. Volume 56, number 3, fall 2006. Pages 387-399.]
      534. radical Christianity (Christopher Rowland): He develops a contemporary and largely Western approach to liberation theology.
           “It is a mark of the success of the conservatives within the church down the centuries that they have been able to construct an ideology which makes a challenge to the status quo appear to be a departure from orthodoxy. But the Christian tradition is itself diverse, and my hope is that a glimpse of some of those texts and movements which bear witness to a very different attitude may reveal the fragility of the conservative ideology and the antecedents of contemporary Christian commitment to social change and greater equality. Identifying the memory of those struggles from the mists of the past is an of feminist theology. The full story of radical Christianity would devote a significant place to the creativity and ingenuity of women through the centuries to make space for themselves in an institution and culture which rapidly became male-dominated. I would like to have been able to include more of this story (and a consideration of the medieval period would have included the prominent role of women like Julian of Norwich and Teresa of Avila in the mystical tradition). Much valuable work is being done to recover the important role of women as exponents of a submerged but authentic voice of Christian discipleship. The theological outlook of Julian of Norwich and the creative energy of founders of religious orders like Mary Ward are a reminder that the story I have to tell must remain incomplete without adequate treatment of this subject. I can only plead that this is an area where I am still in the process of discovery myself, and at this stage do not feel able to do improve on the excellent work which is now available from women theologians.” [Christopher Rowland. Radical Christianity: A Reading of Recovery. Eugene, Oregon: Wipf and Stock Publishers. 1988. Pages 9-10.]
      535. postliberal or narrative theology (George A. Lindbeck, Hans Wilhelm Frei as pronounced in this MP3 audio file, and many others): They develop a narrative–based alternative to both fundamentalist and liberal approaches to theology.
           “The intratextual way of dealing with this problem [Biblical hermeneutics] depends heavily on literary considerations. The normative or literal meaning must be consistent with the kind of text it is taken to be by the community for which it is important. The meaning must not be esoteric: not something behind, beneath, or in front of the text; not something that the text reveals, discloses, implies. or suggests to those with extraneous metaphysical, historical, or experiential interests. It must rather be what the text says in terms of the communal language of which the text is an instantiation. A legal document should not be treated in quasi-kabbalistic fashion as first of all a piece of expressive symbolism (though it may secondarily be that also); nor should the Genesis account of creation be turned nondeterministically into science; nor should one tum a realistic narrative (which a novel also can be) into history (or, alternatively, as the historical critic is want to do, into a source of clues for the reconstruction of history). If the literary character of the story of Jesus, for example, is that of utilizing, as realistic narratives do, the interaction of purpose and circumstance to render the identity description of an agent, then it is Jesus’ identity as thus rendered, not his historicity, existential significance, or metaphysical status, which is the literal and theologically controlling meaning of the tale. The implications of the story for determining the metaphysical status, or existential significance, or historical career of Jesus Christ may have varying degrees of theological importance, but they are not determinative. The believer, so an intratextual approach would maintain. is not told primarily to be conformed to a reconstructed Jesus of history …, nor to a metaphysical Christ of faith (as in much of the propositionalistt radition), nor to an Abba experience of God …, nor to an agapeic way of being in the world …, but he or she is rather to be conformed to the Jesus Christ depicted in the narrative. An intratextual reading tries to derive the interpretive framework that designates the theologically controlling sense from the literary structure of the text itself.
           “It is easy to see how theological descriptions of a religion may on this view need to be materially diverse even when the formal criterion of faithfulness remains the same. The primary focus is not on God’s being in itself, for that is not what the text is about, but on how life is to be lived and reality construed in the light of God’s character as an agent as this is depicted in the stories of Israel and of Jesus. Life, however, is not the same in catacombs and space shuttles, and reality is different for, let us say, Piatonists and Whiteheadians. Catacomb dwellers and astronauts might rightly emphasis diverse aspects of the biblical accounts of God’s character and action in describing their respective situations. Judging by catacomb paintings, the first group often saw themselves as sheep in need of a shepherd, while the second group would perhaps be well advised to stress God’s grant to human beings of stewardship over planet Earth. Similarly, Platonic and Whiteheadian differences over the nature of reality lead to sharp disagreements about the proper characterization of God’s metaphysical properties, while antimetaphysicians, in turn, argue that no theory of divine attributes is consistent with the character of the biblical God.”
           [George A. Lindbeck. The Nature of Doctrine: Religion and Theology in a Postliberal Age. Louisville, Kentucky: Westminster John Knox Press. 1984. Pages 120-121.]
           “George Lindbeck’s seminal work The Nature of Doctrine … launched the postliberal movement and expressed sentiments that gathered together the theologians who did not share the revisionist bias in liberation theologies. Nonetheless, practice was central feature here as well. Lindbeck’s famous example in The Nature of Doctrine of a crusader cleaving the skull of an infidel while shouting ‘Christus est dominus,’ functions here as an example of the fact that the truth of a proposition is not tied only to the meaning of the employed words separated from the use of the words and acts, which together form the interpretative context for the proposition. In this case, the act (of cleaving the skull) attaches a false type of lordship to Christ because the meaning of the words is expressed in the use of the words.” [Olli-Pekka Vainio, “Re-Emergence of Practice in Contemporary Theology. Aspects and Prospects.” Perichoresis. Volume 9, number 2, 2011. Pages 183-200.]
           “Postliberal theology, especially in terms of its origins, has often been associated with what is called the ‘Yale School,‘ referring to former Yale Divinity School professors, most notably, Hans Frei and George Lindbeck. Indeed, this has some merit. But if postliberal theology depends solely on Yale for its existence, then, as George Hunsinger notes, ‘postliberal theology is in trouble’. As we will see, it is a broader movement than its professorial advocates from Yale. Postliberal theology has always been more a loose connection of narrative theological interests than it is some monolithic agenda. It represents an overarching concern for the renewal of Christian confession over theological methodology. Rather than reliance on a notion of correlative common experience, postliberal theology moves toward the local or particular faith description of the community of the church.
           “The ‘postliberal’ to which we will be referring in this book will always be theological or philosophical in focus, rather than political. Within the study of theology itself, another distinction must also be made. When used as an unhyphenated word, ‘postliberal,’ it will refer to the movement discussed in this book. The hyphenated form of the word ‘post-liberal’ refers to an earlier, historically specific neo-orthodox rejection of classic theological liberalism during the years before and after World War Two. This is not to say that there are no common threads between the historical situatedness of ‘post-liberalism’ and the later ‘postliberal’ critique of liberal theology as developed by Hans Frei, George Lindbeck and others. Both post-liberal and postliberal theologies reject efforts to modernize Christiandoctrines to make them palatable to contemporary scientific or rational mindsets. Both are concerned with the retrieval and maintenance of classic Christian doctrines and practices of the Church. Nevertheless, due the historical context, the nuanced diff erences among the authors, along with current postliberal insights with respect to postmodernity, we believe that making this distinction between the two is important to maintain.”
           [Ronald T. Michener. Postliberal Theology: A Guide for the Perplexed. London and New York: Bloomsbury T&T Clark imprint of Bloomsbury Publishing Plc. 2013. Pages 3-4.]
           “… a ‘modern’ believer has to affirm that the history with the crucifixion, and the reality of the resurrection faith of those who have confessed him as Lord. This of course was counter to the interpretation of the New Testament texts by the vast majority of ‘pre-modern’ Christian readers all of whom, according to the demythologizing version, would have to be consigned by definition to the ‘mythical’ state of mind, because they read the resurrection narratives as applying to Jesus and go on furthermore to affirm that application as the truth. In the demythologizing view, the real textual subject matter of the New Testament narratives is the birth of faith after Jesus’ death, and not the historical Jesus himself; and the extratextual reality of the resurrection is the representation of Jesus wherever the life of faith is truly proclaimed and accepted.” [Hans W. Frei, “How It All Began: On the Resurrection of Christ.” Anglican and Episcopal History. Volume 58, number 2, June 1989. Pages 139-145.]
           “It is fascinating that of the original and most prominent left-wing Hegelians, only [Karl] Marx remained loyal to the great master and continued as a dialectical thinker. This fact is perhaps related to the crucial discovery which Marx made, that religion is not the basic problem of man but only its ideological symptom, and similarly, therefore, that dialectical thinking is basically neither theology nor (except at the symptomatic level) anti-theology. This discovery, in turn, is probably one of the reasons why Christian theologians, when reasoning in the dialectical mode, have found that in long run critical conversation with Marxism is more fascinating than concern with [Ludwig] Feuerbach, important though he is to a limited extent. If one is going to base his critique of Christianity on a critique of ideology, and on a comprehensive dialectic of man in culture as the material subject of thought and change, then it is well to start with a doctrine of man that is more than simply religious or anti-religious.” [Hans W. Frei, “Feuerbach and Theology.” Journal of the American Academy of Religion. Volume 35, number 3, September 1967. Pages 250-256.]
           “… [There is a] very constant operation to find that fit between textuality and truth. The Reformers saw the place where that fit was realized in the constant reconstitution of the church where the word is rightly preached and where the sacraments are rightly administered. There is where that fit takes place, and there alone. And there without any guarantees. It is a very straight path. It is a tightrope walk towards a very narrow gate. One constantly has to look with unease on the right where referential truth theories abound or, at a more humble level, where neo-conservatives beckon us. Or, we look to the left, where pragmatists tell us that we have no problem of truth or, at a more mundane level, where liberationists explode. And in between is the witness of the church within the text of the Bible.” [Hans W. Frei, “Conflicts in Interpretation.” Theology Today. Volume 49, number 3, October 1992. Pages 334-356.]
           “… a heresy is often the sign that orthodoxy has sacrified the elements of mystery, and along with it tentativeness or open-endedness, to an oversimplified consistency. Jesus’ followers in the early church did not doubt that the work of saving men was the work of omnipotence. But it is equally true and far more easily forgotten that they believed this power to be mysteriously congruent with Jesus’ all too human helplessness and lack of power in the face of the terrible chain of events leading to his death, once that chain had begun to be wound around him. We find these two apparently contradictory tendencies converging in the gospel narrative. To make them harmonious by means of an explanation or theory of Jesus’ passion would be very difficult indeed; but in the story – the descriptive and interpretive retelling of the events – they fit together naturally and easily. We are given hints of his abiding power, of the abiding initiative that remains in his hands even at the moments when he is most evidently helpless, when acted upon rather than agent. But his helplessness is at least equally manifest and genuine. The two are never merged; one may say both that they coexist as well as that transition through circumstances from one to the other.” [Hans W. Frei, Amos N. Wilder, Daniel D. Williams, and Ian D. Kingston Siggins, “Theological Reflections on the Accounts of Jesus’ Death and Resurrection.” The Christian Scholar. Volume 49, number 4, winter 1966. Pages 263-315.]
           “Remarkably, the theological discourse surrounding Hans Frei and postliberal theology has continued for nearly thirty years since Frei’s death. This is due not only to the complex and provocative character of Frei’s work, nor only to his influence upon an array of thinkers who went on to shape the theological field in their own right. It is just as indebted to the critical responses that his thinking continues to inspire.” [Jason A. Springs,  A Wittgenstein for Postliberal Theologians.” Modern Theology. Volume 32, issue 4, October 2016. Pages 622-658.]
      536. constructive theology (Wendy Farley, John D. Caputo, Catherine Keller, Joe Bessler, Ellen T. Armour, Paul E. Capetz, Don H. Compier, Laurel C. Schneider, Paul S. Chung, and others): They develop radical approaches to theological hermeneutics.
           “In the contemporary situation, theology is one place carved out where there is more freedom to explore the back-eddies of tradition and the implications of marginal writings and practices. I understand constructive theology to be a spiritual practice as well as an academic discipline. As an academic practice, it interprets the multiple textual traditions that form the Christian canon. As a constructive practice it also presses toward more adequate interpretations by surfacing the distortions of patriarchy, racism, or ethnocentrism that become sedimented into the institutional life of the church. It reimagines the root symbols and concepts that structure Christian thought and practice in ways that make sense in contemporary society. It is, on the one hand, an aspect of interpretation of doctrinal traditions and is in that sense intimately related to the church. On the other hand, it has a kind of independence from the church's authority structures. In represents that part of Christian practice that engages in critique and that creatively carries Christian thought forward through time. All religions have some mechanisms for mediating authorities that enjoy sacred worth with the flux of human history and the plurality of spiritual needs. In Christianity, theology is one such mechanism. This is perhaps why theologians are sometimes beatified and sometimes burned.” [Wendy Farley, “Duality and Non-Duality in Christian Practice: Reflections on the Benefits of Buddhist-Christian Dialogue for Constructive Theology.” Buddhist-Christian Studies. Volume 31, 2011. Pages 135-146.]
           “Constructive theology has been from the start enmeshed in varieties of radical hermeneutics. This allows Christian faith to attract intellectuals and to work with secular activists; and believe me, Christianity without its intellectuals is not going to be any appealingly populist affair. The more theology absorbs the methods of deconstruction and pluralism, the more the opposition between secularism and religion can itself be deconstructed. And as Jim Wallis has pointed out, ‘the secular left will give up its hostility to religion and spirituality, or it will die.’ And this is politically crucial. For that hostility contributes to an evangelical stereotype about Godless humanists, etc. But the more we heal that hostility, the less we constructive theologians sound like Christians to evangelicals.” [John D. Caputo and Catherine Keller, “Theopoetic/Theopolitic.” CrossCurrents. Winter 2007. Pages 105-111.]
           “My proposal to understand and practice constructive theology as a discourse of leadership has taken shape primarily through my sense of the strengths and shortcomings of other theological methods (e.g., postliberal, revisionist, feminist, and liberation). With postliberals (who, with George Lindbeck, think of religion as analogous to a cultural system), I believe Christian theologies need to move away from the foundationalist models that emerged out of 20ᵗʰ century anxiety over science and the social sciences. Postliberals know that religion is more akin to political or cultural life than to science or particular forms of knowledge. Lindbeck’s understanding of doctrine as grammatical rules avoids the rigidity of dogmatism while acknowledging that theology must continually address changing circumstances in order to be convincing.” [Joe Bessler, “Theological Leadership: A Rhetorical Defense of Constructive Theology.” Encounter. Volume 72, number 2, winter 2012. Pages 1-29.]
           “… we realize that in addition to the weight and shaping influence of tradition and history on our work there are the facts of our contemporary scene that distinguish this time from those of our predecessors. Most notably, our awareness of Christianity’s ambiguous impact on culture expands the boundaries of constructive theology’s audience beyond those who identify themselves as Christians. Concepts of God have political and ethical consequences that reach far beyond the religious and communal bounds of those who espouse them. Western countries and individuals have often invoked God’s name to justify their actions. We must consider the ethical and political implications inherent in any constructed concepts of God. Since such claims affect Christians and non-Christians, Christian theologians must consider the practical consequences of their claims for adherents of other religious and secular traditions.” [Ellen T. Armour, Paul E. Capetz, Don H. Compier, and Laurel C. Schneider, “God.” Constructive Theology: A Contemporary Approach To Classical Themes. Paul Lakeland and Serena Jones, editors. Minneapolis, Minnesota: ortress Press imprint of Augsburg Fortress. 2005. Kindle edition.]
           “I find it more meaningful and important to involve Paul’s theology of Israel for the sake of God’s mission as fruitful dialogue between the church and Israel in which mission as constructive theology enriches itself in understanding the gospel in light of God’s word of covenant and blessing in a thicker manner. Insofar as Jesus Christ comes to us through Israel, the church’s dialogue with the Jewish community remains an indispensable part of the shape of the church’s participation in God’s mission as it is involved in Israel in both the biblical and post-biblical contexts. Paul’s theology of mission must occupy a significant role in the Church’s relationship with the Jewish community.” [Paul S. Chung. Reclaiming Mission as Constructive Theology: Missional Church and World Christianity. Eugene, Oregon: Cascade Books imprint of Wipf and Stock Publishers. 2012. Kindle edition.]
      537. radical Judaism (Arthur Green): To Green, God is a human partner. We can either respond to God’s call or choose to reject it.
           “The need for ongoing human participation in the quest for redemption is the context of the volume you have before you. Radical Judaism means a reframing of our contemporary perspective on the great questions, a leap forward that shows we are not afraid to be challenged by contemporary reality, while we remain devoted to hearing the greater challenge of God’s voice calling out ‘Where are you?’ anew in our age. This means a Judaism that takes seriously its own claims of ongoing Creation and revelation, even as it recognizes all the challenges to them. To ‘take them seriously’ in our day cannot mean simply holding fast to them without question, dismissing the challenges of science and scholarship or seeking to avoid dealing with them. It means rather to rethink our most foundational concepts–God, Torah, and Israel and Creation, Revelation, and Redemption, to ask how they might work in the context of what we really believe in our age, and thus how they might speak to seekers in this century.” [Arthur Green. Radical Judaism: Rethinking God and Tradition. The Franz Rosenzweig Lecture Series. New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press. 2010. Page 189.]
           “… [Here] is the moment for radical Judaism. We understand that all God can do is to call out to us, now as always. All we can do is respond—or not. The consequence of our failure will be monumental. God is indeed in need of humans; and we humans are in need of guidance, seeking out the hand of a divine Partner, one who ‘speaks’ from deep within the heart, but also from deep within our tradition and its wisdom.” [Arthur Green. Radical Judaism: Rethinking God and Tradition. The Franz Rosenzweig Lecture Series. New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press. 2010. Page 192.]
      538. polydoxy (Rabbi Alvin J. Reines, Rabbi Anthony D. Holz, Gary Pence, Virginia Burris, Catherine Keller, Laurel C. Schneider, Mary-Jane Rubenstein, Graham Ward, and others): This approach—which was originally developed as a current within Reform Judaism known as Polydox Judaism—refers to religions which tolerate, even welcome, multiple belief systems. Polydoxy has since been expanded to cover other faith traditions. Subsequently, others have used the term, as well (though with no clear connection to Reines’ work). For further information, visit the Polydoxy: A Religious Structure website.
           “Reines, Alvin Jay rabbi, religion.…
           “Born: September 12, 1926.…
           “Certification: Ordained rabbi, 1952.…
           “Death: Died Nov. 14, 2004.”
           [Editor, “Reines, Alvin Jay.” Who was who in America: With world notables. New Providence, New Jersey: Marquis Who’s Who LLC. 2016. Credo Reference (online).]
           “… the Jewish layperson in the Polydox Jewish Confederation has an equal right to that of clergy members in determining the principles of the Confederation. Not only is this principle logically necessary, but it is pragmatically wise. There can be little question that the chasm between the American Jewish instsituional religions and the American Jews has been widened, if not brought about, by the failure to include laypersons in the decision-making processes of American Jewish religious communities.” [Alvin J. Reines, “Crisis, Polydoxy, and Survival.” Polydoxy. 1978. No pagination.]
           “Polydoxy is a religious or philosophy-of-life ideology whose essential principle is that every person possesses an inherent right to ultimate self-authority over her or his psyche and body. This principle will be referred to as the ‘Polydox Principle.’ Accordingly, every person possesses an ultimate right to determine the religious or philosophic beliefs she or he will accept, the observances she or he will keep, and the morality she or he will follow.
           “A polydox community is one in which persons come together in a formal relationship to pursue in association with one another their commitment to the Polydox Principle. The basic structure of a polydox community can be defined in terms of a covenant that is named the ‘Freedom Covenant.’ A person who is party to the Freedom Covenant pledges to affirm and respect the ultimate right to self-authority of every other party to the covenant in return for the other parties’ pledges to affirm and respect her or his own. A corollary of the Freedom Covenant is that each party’s freedom ends where the other parties’ freedom begins. Membership in a polydox community consists in entering into the Freedom Covenant of the community.”
           [Alvin J. Reines, “The Polydox Confederation.” Religious Humanism. 1987. Pages 84-88.]
           “In the polydox religion, freedom of the individual religionist is ultimate. It is the freedom of the individual to choose among beliefs and practices that is established by the polydox community, not, as in orthodoxy, the beliefs and practices that the individual is compelled to choose. Polydox religionists have the right granted them by their community to accept belief only if it accords with their views of reality; to practice morality according to their individual consciences; and to follow only such ritual as is found meaningful. The rights and limits of the religionist’s freedom in the polydox community can be epitomized in terms of a covenant, a freedom covenant. Every member of the polydox community pledges to affirm the religious freedom of all other members in return for their pledges to affirm his own. Each person’s freedom, consequently, ends where the other person’s freedom begins.” [Alvin J. Reines, “The Term Polydoxy.” Polydoxy. 1975. No pagination.]
           “Polydox Judaism is a religion of ultimate personal freedom. In Polydox Judaism, persons have the right to accept only beliefs of whose truth they are convinced, and to keep only practices whose observance they find meaningful. All other beliefs and practices may rightfully be rejected. Accordingly, adherents of Polydox Judaism may legitimately and properly hold different views regarding the word God, the nature of revelation, or the existence of an afterlife. The fundamental principle of Polydoxy may be stated in terms of a covenant, the Freedom Covenant: Fvery adherent of Polydox Judaism pledges to affirm the freedom of all other adherents in return for their pledges to affirm her or his own, Equally binding in Polydox Judaism is the corollary of the Freedom Covenant: Every person’s freedom ends where the other person’s freedom begins.” [Alvin J. Reines, “Polydox Judaism: A Statement.” Journal of Reform Judaism. Fall 1980. Pages 47-55.]
           “A polydox philosophy of religious education sets forth the nature and purpose of religious education as viewed from the polydox perspective. Necessary to this exposition is an inquiry into fundamental questions pertaining to five sets of relationships: 1) The relationship regarding religious education between parents and their minor children (‘minors’ are here defined as ‘persons whose parents, or those standing in locus parentis, make their religious decisions for them’); 2) The relationship between adults (‘adults’ are here defined as ‘persons who make their own religious education decisions’) and their religious communities; 3) The relationship between adults and their religious communities’ educational institutions (e.g., all organized educational activities of a religious community, from schools and camps for youngsters to study groups and retreats for adults); 4) The relationship between parents and their religious communities whose educational institutions their minor children attend; 5) The relationship between minor students and the religious educational institutions they attend.” [Alvin J. Reines, “A Polydox Philosophy Of Religious Education.” Polydoxy. 1982. Pages 1-16.]
           “Polydoxy is the principle that uudcrlies almost all existing Jewish religious systems: Reformism, Reconstructionism, and Conservatism. They are in de facto if not necessarily du jure agreement on its validity. The beliefs of Orthodox Judaism enumerated above, as well as those of the entire heterogeneous Jewish traditions, when not in conflict with polydox commitment, arc accepted in varying degrees according to personal conviction, The dramatic subjective-existentialist and neo-Orthodox voices within the various Jewish religious communities, which appear to lay down as dogmas beliefs that are based on subjective evidence or no evidence at all, actually express the purely personal opinion of religionists annoying the freedom that is theirs under a polydox religious structure. The ultimate commitment of the modern Jew, as was the commitment of the Jew of the past, is to rationalism; the rationalism that acquires objective evidence for the faith of orthodoxy, the rationalism that turns to polydoxy when the faith of orthodoxy has gone.” [Alvin J. Reines, “Polydoxy and Modern Judaism.” CCAR Journal: The Reform Jewish Quarterly. 1985. Pages 23-29.]
           “In a polydox religion, the political structure serves an opposite function from that in an orthodoxy. There is no authoritative and obligatory body of belief and practice that its members must be brought to accept. The only principle required in a polydoxy is the mutual affirmation of one another’s freedom. This freedom, or self-authority, entails the ultimate right of the polydox religionist to determine for himself the beliefs, rituals, liturgy, services, morals and religious education he will accept. The function of the political structure in the polydox community, consequently, is the reverse of that orthodoxy.” [Alvin J. Reines, “Polydox and Orthodox Religious Structures.” Polydoxy. 1986. No pagination.]
           “The Orthodox halachic definition of who is a ‘Jew’ is entirely unacceptable on philosophic and moral grounds to any polydox or truly liberal Judaism. Thus for those Reform Jews who understand Reform Judaism to be a polydoxy, the Orthodox definition is clearly unsatisfactory. Yet even for those who maintain Reform is something other than a polydoxy, (although what that “something other” might be has never been demonstrated,) the Orthodox definition cannot be morally defended.” [Alvin J. Reines, “The Name Jew.” Polydoxy. 1977. No pagination.]
           “The reason why Reform Judaism requires autarchy of its adherents becomes clear upon considering the conditions necessary for heterarchy. In the state of autarchy, the human person is himself his own authority and the ultimate source of his beliefs, desires, feelings, and actions. This is not to say that a person in the autarchic state cannot and does not seek information and advice from others, rather that the autarchic person retains ultimate authority over himself, and makes the final decisions regarding what he will think and do. In a hierarchic state, however, the person surrenders ultimate authority over himself to some external entity that then has the right to command the person what he is to believe, desire, feel, and do. Needless to say, for a person to surrender his freedom to an authority that commands him what to think and do, such an authority and its commands must exist. Simply because persons may desire hierarchic existence docs not mean they can have hierarchic existence. They must live in a world that provides the authority and commands necessary for authentic heterarchy, and it is this world that Reform Judaism has destroyed.” [Alvin J. Reines, “Reform Judaism: The Shock of Freedom.” HUC Press. 1978. Pages 128-141.]
           “To understand the present crisis of existence of the Jewish collectivity, which I have elsewhere termed the ‘silent holocaust,’ and its relation to the Enlightenment with its consequent Emancipation, we must begin with an analysis of the ontology of the psyches of Jews. Such an ontological analysis of the contemporary Jewish collectivity reveals, I believe, that Jews generally possess one of two modes of perspective. A person’s mode of perspective, broadly speaking (that is, omitting details unnecessary for this discussion), is constituted of two primary elements: a self-view of the characteristics constitutive of his being; and a Weltanschauung, his view of the fundamental characteristics of extramental reality.” [Alvin J. Reines, “Ontology, Demography, and the Silent Holocaust.” Judaism. Volume 38, number 4, fall 1989. Pages 478-487.]
           “… in any group of people such as a synagogue, there not only exists a diversity of beliefs, values, and actions, but—as we today live in a rapidly changing world—this diversity is appropriate, legitimate, and fundamentally healthy. Dr. [Alvin J.] Reines coined the world “polydoxy” to describe such a group that warmly and openly welcomes the diversity that follows from individual autonomy.” [Anthony D. Holz, “Authority and Religion: The Jewish Philosophy of Alvin J. Reines.” CCAR Journal: The Reform Jewish Quarterly. Winter 2016. No pagination.]
           “Jewish philosopher/theologian Alvin Reines has suggested the term ‘polydoxy’ to evoke this compassionate embrace of pluralistic perspectives. In response to what he poses as the ‘impending annihilation’ of the ‘Jewish religious complex,’ Reines goes so far as to argue ‘the ultimate right [emphasis added] of the individual to religious autonomy,’ thereby concretizing freedom as ‘the highest ideal possible to the modern religious community’ and creating an environment for ‘the creativity and experimentation necessary to meet the conditions of a radical and unknown future.’ ‘Deanthropomorphized and demythologized options of belief and observance’ must, he writes, be made widely available. The educational—and pastoral?—ideal of Judaism must abandon ‘endoctrining instruction in theistic absolutism and metaphenomenal providence to education in the soterial, ethical, and theological choices of an open religion.’ I believe that Reines’ proposal speaks as aptly to the diverse Christian ‘religious complex’ as it does to the Jewish.” [Gary Pence, “Constructing a Christian Polydoxy.” Dialog: A Journal of Theology. Volume 30, number 4, winter 2001. Pages 264-269.]
           “Recently, “polydoxy” has been proposed as an alternative, or perhaps an antidote, to orthodoxy, embracing—rather than repressing—the multiplicity, open-endedness, and relationality of both the practice and the object of theology. Clearly, such a framing resonates strongly with the brief reflections on history and theology that I have offered here. However, where the discourse of orthodoxy tends to suppress its own inevitable, ongoing novelty, polydoxy—as proclaimed by the editors and contributors to the volume of the same name—may risk overstating its novelty, as if this were anything but inevitable.…
           “We live in an era in which the forces of change and novelty, diversity and difference, are undeniable. This experience and the sensibility to which this gives rise is scarcely unprecedented, as any student of the late Roman empire, for example, is well aware; nor is it easily separable from the very forces of imperialism and globalization that seem so often intent on suppressing and flattening diversity and difference, then as now.”
           [Virginia Burrus, “History, Theology, Orthodoxy, Polydoxy.” Modern Theology. Volume 30, number 3, July 2014. Pages 7-16.]
           “… given the venerable pronouncements of the death of God, theology at the start of this millennium should be worse off than it is. The undeniable atrophy of those denominations that still support an educated clergy limit the resources for even discerning just which God it is that is presumed dead. The hard questions remain hard; the institutional fragilities remain unsparing. And so the buoyancy we see in theology right now is all the more remarkable. Its life and movement, which in this volume we are nicknaming ‘polydoxy,’ has multiple sources. Indeed, multiplicity itself has become theology’s resource. What had always seemed a liability for Christian theology – multiplicitous differences contending from within and competing from without – has miraculously turned into theology’s friend. Indeed an emergent commitment to the manifold of creation as it enfolds a multiplicity of wisdoms may be functioning as a baseline requirement for theological soundness. A responsible pluralism of interdependence and uncertainty now seems to facilitate deeper attention to ancient religious traditions as well as more robust engagement with serious critiques of religion. This is an approach that no longer needs to hide the internal fissures and complexities that riddle every Christian text or that wound and bless every theological legacy.” [Catherine Keller and Laurel C. Schneider, “Introduction.” Polydoxy: Theology of multiplicity and relation. London and New York: Routledge imprint of Taylor & Francis Group, an Informa PLC business. 2011. Pages 1-37.]
           “As a name polydoxy has no position, no pulse or panache, without its difference from (and thus relation to) living avowals of orthodoxy—classical, retro-, neo- or radical. As a theological neologism, polydoxy tags a couple of millennia behind orthodoxy. But as content it is not only dependent upon orthodoxy but entangled with it. For it is positioned within a discursive field—a multiplicity—largely shaped and hosted by a mainline of western Christian theology.” [Catherine Keller, “Theology’s Multitude: Polydoxy Reviewed and Renewed.” Modern Theology. Volume 30, number 3, July 2014. Pages 127-139.]
           “… which orthodoxy does polydoxy oppose, and which does it clarify? I hope that it opposes nominal orthodoxies whose specific content of ‘right’ results in the denial of constitutive multiplicity and the reification of status quo hierarchies of oppression and practices of torture. This is a fairly uncontroversial hope, or so I hope! I also hope that polydoxy clarifies orthodoxies whose content of ‘right’ is a ‘skillful means’ of love that leads to complex thriving of the world and all of its creatures and to liberation of the oppressed. Polydoxy’s opposition, I then conclude, is to orthodoxy that is neither right nor correct, and so not orthodox anyway. Polydoxy as an umbrella term is useful, I suggest, only so long as it clarifies the constitutive and responsive multiplicity of what we understand—for now—to be ‘right’ and ‘good’ and even ‘true’ and so giving content to ‘orthodoxy.’” [Laurel C. Schneider, “Getting it Right.” Modern Theology. Volume 30, number 3, July 2014. Pages 121-126.]
           “Polydoxy [referring to the book, Polydoxy: Theology of multiplicity and relation] … operates in complex relation to orthodoxy. It would be tempting to reduce this relationship to one of simple opposition—to say, for example, that in the face of orthodoxy’s oneness, certainty, and autonomy, polydoxy unleashes manyness, uncertainty, and relation. But of course, these polydox values emerge from many of the sources (kataphatic, apophatic, and Trinitarian) that compose the orthodox tradition as such. So just as ‘multiplicity’ names not an opposition to oneness but rather a difference both beyond and within oneness, polydoxy claims not an opposition to orthodoxy but a complex ‘intra-activity’ with it. This intra-activity expresses itself in numerous ways. In some deployments, ‘polydoxy’ amounts to a kind of immanent critique of the distinction between orthodoxy and heresy—an exposition of the processes by which ‘rightness’ establishes itself by disavowing, punishing, ridiculing, and/or annihilating whatever differs from it. In this way, heterodoxy can be shown to be constitutive of orthodoxy as such, as its repressed other(s).” [Mary-Jane Rubenstein, “Introducing Polydoxy.” Modern Theology. Volume 30, number 3, July 2014. Pages 1-6.]
           “How do I receive the gift of Polydoxy: A Theology of Multiplicity and Relation? I will receive it, of course, in some way because simply by reading and absorbing the text, it will impact in some measure.…
           “If I have laboured the Christological issues it is because I have yet to have a sense of the Christological model polydoxy is presenting and to highlight that not all Christological models are possible. So choices in the multiplicity have to be made. And if a certain orthodoxy is manifest in this choosing it is not because orthodoxy itself imposes such a model (orthodoxy, as I have emphasised is made and is continually being made as Christian faith seeks understanding), but because the models rejected cannot offer a logic for our salvation.”
           [Graham Ward, “Receiving the Gift.” Modern Theology. Volume 30, number 3, July 2014. Pages 74-88.]
      539. theology of multiplicity (Laurel C. Schneider): Focusing upon the attainment of freedom, Schneider presents a theological challenge to monotheism.
           “The oneness of God in monotheism relieves us of the paradox of love that defies religions, and patriotisms, and identities, upon which wars and their empires depend. Love in a theology of multiplicity cannot turn away from the impossible inexchangeability of the world, cannot assume that missiles are lessons as if what is destroyed can be exchanged for what is gained. If God is love, God cannot be One, an ultimate unity in which the utter inexchangeability of a life for a nation is made not only exchangeable, but coherent. Love is a synonym, therefore, for incarnation just as both are a synonym for divine multiplicity. To follow a God who becomes flesh is to make room for more than One. It is a posture of openness to the world as it comes to us, of loving the discordant, plenipotential worlds more than the desire to overcome, to colonize, or even to ‘save’ them.
           “Love, the only ethics imaginable in a theology of divine multiplicity, is a promise, not a threat. It is the presence/s of the divine, available for encounter if we leave the scripts aside, if we are prepared to have our hearts broken by beauty, awe, and the redemption of responsibility.
           “Divine multiplicity, like any construct, is just a concept, metaphor. It is not divinity. ‘Divinity is, if nothing else, free. And this means that it is also free of theology and doctrine.’ The stories we tell of it, however, form the fabric of imagination about what is possible for us in this world that God so loves.
           “Incarnation…again.”
           [Laurel C. Schneider. Beyond Monotheism: A theology of multiplicity. London and New York: Routledge imprint of Taylor & Francis Group, an Informa PLC business. 2008. Pages 251-252.]
      540. radical Buddhism (Chanju Mun [Korean, 문찬주, Mun-Ch’anju as pronounced in this MP3 audio file]): He examines Buddhist radicalism in South Korea.
           “Radical activists asserted that the institutional order was centered upon monastics and the participation of laymen was limited, and that the institutional Buddhist order could not achieve independence from government intervention. For this reason, radical activists, including both monastics and laymen, focused instead on the propagation of the dharma [Sanskrit/Saṃskṛtam, धर्म, dharma, ‘natural law’]. Even though the progressive group was divided, the emergency order administration brought together progressive opinions for reformation and gave birth to the six groups’ sangha [Sanskrit/Saṃskṛtam, संघा, saṃghā, ‘community’] system, which proposed the addition of two groups of propagation lay priests, male and female, to the traditional four groups: monks, nuns, laymen, and laywomen.…
           “… the established monks were seriously worried about the loss of their positions if the progressive junior monks succeeded in gaining power. These senior monks had already seen the types of measure that could be implemented by the radical Buddhist monks during the time of the emergency order administration.”
           [Chanju Mun, “A Historical Introduction to Minjung (Liberation) Buddhism: A South Korean Version of Radical Buddhism in the 1980s.” Politics, Religion & Ideology. Volume 15, number 2, June 2014. Pages 264-282.]
      541. Buddhist materialism (James Mark Shields): He develops a “Marxian critique of contemplative knowledge,” while examining the revolutionary potential of Buddhism.
           “This paper analyzes both the possibilities and problems of a ‘Buddhist materialism’ constructed along Marxian lines, by focusing in particular on Buddhist and Marxist conceptions of ‘liberation.’ ….
           “The Marxian critique of contemplative knowledge, which aligns with [Richard] Rorty’s ‘constructivist’ preference for [Francis] Bacon over [René] Descartes, noted above, has rarely been revisited since [Karl] Marx’s time, but it seems to be another potentially fertile point of contact/contrast with traditional Buddhist thought—and one that has especial implications for a reconstructed Buddhist materialism. The emphasis on the ‘mind’ in early Buddhist thought … seem to suggest that Buddhism, too, may fall into a into the contemplative or transcendental trap.”
           [James Mark Shields, “Liberation as Revolutionary Praxis: Rethinking Buddhist Materialism.” Journal of Buddhist Ethics. Volume 20, 2013. Pages 461-499.]
           “… we should note that, in addition to traditional Buddhist scepticism towards socialist ‘materialism’ and ‘individualism,’ another factor that hampers the development of Buddhist socialism in any context is the residual anti-religious aspect of Marxist versions of socialism (this has also been an issue with experiments in Christian socialism and liberation theology).” [James Mark Shields, “Zen and the Art of Treason: Radical Buddhism in Meiji Era (1868–1912) Japan.” Politics, Religion & Ideology. Volume 15, number 2, June 2014. Pages 205-223.]
           “… just as socialism can wake Buddhists up from their dogmatic slumbers, Buddhism serves to ‘soften’ the harder edges of mainstream socialist atheism and materialism—in short, Buddhism gives a humanist element that socialism sometimes, perhaps inevitably, seems to lack.” [James Mark Shields, “A Blueprint for Buddhist Revolution: The Radical Buddhism of Senoꞌo Girō (1889–1961).” Japanese Journal of Religious Studies. Volume 39, number 2, 2012. Pages 333-351.]
      542. social dilemma dynamics (J. Mark Weber and David M. Messick): They examine conflicts between short- and long-term interests.
           “At the heart of many experiences in social life lies a social dilemma—a fundamental conflict between the short-term interests of individuals and the longer-term interests of the groups of which they are a part.…
           “The ubiquitous nature of social dilemmas, and their centrality to social life, has prompted a great deal of research in the experimental social sciences. After decades of steady incremental advances in our understanding of the ‘main effects’ in social dilemmas (e.g., communication, uncertainty, group size), researchers have begun to study the interactions and complex contingencies that must be better specified to achieve a more complete understanding of social dilemma dynamics.”
           [J. Mark Weber and David M. Messick, “Conflicting Interests in Social Life: Understanding Social Dilemma Dynamics.” The Handbook of Negotiation and Culture. Michele J. Gefland and Jeanne M. Brett, editors. Stanford, California: Stanford Business Books imprint of Stanford University Press. 2004. Page 374-394.]
      543. peace tourism (Peter van den Dungen as pronounced in this MP3 audio file): He examines travel for the purpose of peace-making.
           “In the growing debate and literature about the contributions of tourism to peace, a particular aspect that has so far been largely ignored is ‘peace tourism.’ This involves visits to places, at home and abroad, which are significant because of their association with such notions as peace-making, peaceful conflict resolution, prevention of war, resistance to war, protesting war, nonviolence and reconciliation. These associations can refer to the past as well as present, and to national as well as international contexts. This chapter identifies and discusses several aspects of peace tourism.
           “In the first place, a growing number of cities can be regarded, or regard themselves, as cities of peace. A variety of peace cities – which constitute an obvious destination for the peace tourist – will be introduced. Secondly, museums play an important role in the national and global tourism industry. In the second half of the twentieth century, a new type of museum came to thefore – the peace museum.”
           [Peter van den Dungen, “Peace Tourism.” International Handbook on Tourism and Peace. Cordula Wohlmuther and Werner Wintersteiner, editors. Klagenfurt, Austria: Centre for Peace Research and Peace Education of the Klagenfurt University. 2013. Pages 62-77.]
      544. dialectical realism and dynamic nominalism (Ian Hacking): He develops a rather novel approach to two perspectives—realism and nominalism—which have been generally regarded as adversarial.
           “Ontology has been characterized as the study of the most general kinds that exist in the universe. Usually the emphasis has been on demarcation: which candidates for existence really do exist. Aristotle and Plato disagreed in their answers, and philosophers have gone on disagreeing ever since. In the chapters that follow I express very little interest in those disputes. As I say …, I think of myself as a ‘dynamic nominalist,’ interested in how our practices of naming interact with the things that we name—but I could equally be called a dialectical realist, preoccupied by the interactions between what there is (and what comes into being) and our conceptions of it.
           “Yet some of the old connotations of ‘ontology’ serve me well, for I want to talk about objects in general. Not just things, but whatever we individuate and allow ourselves to talk about. That includes not only ‘material’ objects but also classes, kinds of people, and, indeed, ideas. Finally, if we are concerned with the coming into being of the very possibility of some objects, what is that if not historical?”
           [Ian Hacking. Historical Ontology. London: Harper University Press. 2002. Page 2.]
           “It [making up people] is about the interactions between people and how they are classified, how people may, by a sort of feedback effect, change because of how they are classified, and change the very sense or boundaries of the original classifications. If, ‘for want of a better word,’ we speak of concepts here, I am not concerned abstractly with the concepts but concretely with the dynamics of interaction involving concepts, institutions, individuals, moral sensibility and the like. This dynamic nominalism (which is also a dialectical realism) may be all wrong, but by golly it does not seem to me to be anodyne. I suspect that this philosophy was what the anonymous reader had in mind. That reader may also have seen (as is announced at the start of the book) that much of the book is a case-history of dynamic nominalism and making up people.” [Ian Hacking, “Indeterminacy in the past: on the recent discussion of chapter 17 of Rewriting the Soul.” History of the Human Sciences. Volume 16, number 2, May 2003. Pages 117-124.]
           “The nominalist controversy need not detain us. There is enough in common between nominalists and their opponents for the two sides to admit the phenomena Ishall present. The attitude to the phenomena will be different, and the background talk about the phenomena will be different, but not enough for us to pause. For example, the nominalist says that the structure of the facts in my world is an imposition upon the world. The world does not come tidily sorted into facts. People constitute facts in a social process of interaction with the world and intervening in its affairs. Importantly, says the nominalist, forms of knowledge are created in a microsociological process. The person who believes the universe has a unique inherent structure will be offended by this description, but if attracted at all by the notion of forms of knowledge, may make use of an alternative background tale. It is this. The world is far too rich in facts for any one organization of ideas to trick it out uniquely in the facts. We select which facts interest us, and a form of scientific knowledge is a selector of questions to be answered by obtaining the facts. A rival, and if possible nonequivalent, form will elicit different facts. The facts are not constructed, although the forms of selection are. In what follows, it does not matter which variant of these two extremes you find most attractive.” [Ian Hacking. The Social Construction of What? Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press. 1999. Page 174.]
           “To conceptualize coproduction involving scientific knowledge that affects human beings’ opportunities for self formation, I adopt Hacking’s … perspective of ‘dynamic nominalism.’ According to this position, new kinds of people such as ‘gay youth’ are not merely discovered by experts, but rather, such human kinds come into being at the same time that human classifications are invented through a process of ‘making up people’ …. Dynamic nominalism further posits that there can be interactive relationships between human classifications and those classified …. As such, the process of making up people can foster ‘looping effects,’ whereby people come to learn how they have been classified, modify their behavior, and create a new reality that can then be described differently by experts …. Unlike some strains of nominalism, Hacking’s position is not antirealist (it is alternately called ‘dialectical realism;’ …). However, interactive relationships always exist between representations of human reality and people who can learn how they have been represented. Even if a human kind is ‘indifferent’ to human action, as in the case of some conditions that we may understand as being rooted in biology, there is still a sense in which it is ‘interactive’ as people experience new discourses and institutions organized around a classification and react to being classified ….” [Tom Waidzunas, “Young, Gay, and Suicidal: Dynamic Nominalism and the Process of Defining a Social Problem with Statistics.” Science, Technology, & Human Values. Volume 37, number 2, March 2012. Pages 199-225.]
           “I discovered much later that at about the same time Michel Foucault spoke of historical nominalism. He was reviewing a famous book about homosexuality (a very well-known book), he says it’s a great book, etc. but that all those people who think that there is such a thing as homosexuality, as opposed to same-sex behaviour, really need to undertake a serious historical nominalism. I spoke of dynamic nominalism, but I could have said ‘historical,’ except I insist on the dynamics, the way in which the naming interacts with what is named. A friend did suggest to me that you could just as well call it dialectical realism as opposed to dynamic nominalism. I said that was OK too.” [Ole Jacob Madsen, Johannes Servan, and Simen Andersen Øyen, “‘I am a philosopher of the particular case’: An interview with the 2009 Holberg prizewinner Ian Hacking.” History of the Human Sciences. Volume 26, number 3, July 2013. Pages 32-51.]
      545. everyware and everywhere (Adam Greenfield and James N. Gilmore): “Everyware” is Greenfield’s prediction of the inseparability of computing and the environment. Gilmore expands upon the Greenfield’s concept to discuss wearable computing.
           “This book is an attempt to describe the form computing will take in the next few years. Specifically, it’s about a vision of processing power so distributed throughout the environment that computers per se effectively disappear. It’s about the enormous consequences this disappearance has for the kinds of tasks computers are applied to, for the way we use them, and for what we understand them to be.
           “Although aspects of this vision have been called a variety of names—ubiquitous computing, pervasive computing, physical computing, tangible media, and so on—I think of them as facets of one coherent paradigm of interaction that I call everyware.
           “In everyware, all the information we now look to our phones or Web browsers to provide becomes accessible from just about anywhere, at any time, and is delivered in a manner appropriate to our location and context.
           “In everyware, the garment, the room and the street become sites of processing and mediation. Household objects from shower stalls to coffee pots are reimagined as places where facts about the world can be gathered, considered, and acted upon. And all the familiar rituals of daily life—things as fundamental as the way we wake up in the morning, get to work, or shop for our groceries—are remade as an intricate dance of information about ourselves, the state of the external world, and the options available to us at any given moment.
           “In all of these scenarios, there are powerful informatics underlying the apparent simplicity of the experience, but they never breach the surface of awareness: things Just Work. Interactions with everyware feel natural, spontaneous, human. Ordinary people finally get to benefit from the full power of information technology, without having to absorb the esoteric bodies of knowledge on which it depends. And the sensation of use—even while managing an unceasing and torrential flow of data—is one of calm, of relaxed mastery.
           “This, anyway, is the promise.”
           [Adam Greenfield. Everyware: The dawning age of ubiquitous computing. Berkeley, California: New Riders imprint Peachpit, a division of Pearson Education. 2006. Pages 1-2.]
           “The title of this article expands on Adam Greenfield’s … concept of “everyware” as a way to describe and theorize ubiquitous, barely detectable technologies operating within and across spaces. Greenfield’s conceptual play on the word ‘everywhere’ encapsulates how, increasingly, ubiquitous technology infiltrates everyday spaces. These technologies ‘comprise any number of mobile, wearable, distributed and context-aware computing applications’ …. Everyware is always on, always gathering data, and is fast becoming a function of the everyday spaces we traverse.…
           “This article focuses on one sub-variant of everyware—wearable technology, and specifically fitness technology—by developing the word ‘everywear’ to deepen and enrich one key area of Greenfield’s analytical concept. Using the term ‘everywear’ permits this article to remain beneath the proverbial umbrella Greenfield’s work encompasses, while trying to more deeply account for the dynamics of wearable fitness technologies.”
           [James N. Gilmore, “Everywear: The quantified self and wearable fitness technologies.” New Media & Society. Volume 18, number 11, December 2016. Pages 2524-2539.]
      546. ontology of consumption (Niamh Mulcahy): She examines “workers–as–consumers.”
           “… the ontology of consumption, understood by Marx as the relationship between capitalists as sellers and workers as possessors of exchange-value in the form of wages, is immediately regarded as an uneven and contradictory relationship. Workers are, in the context of their employment by any one capitalist, primarily considered possessors of labour-power making them a cost of production, and yet at the same time understood to be consumers whose ability to spend money on commodities derives from the wages they are paid.… Those on limited incomes do not tend to spend a lot, and their thrift and prudence is indeed considered a normative issue: although ‘consumption by he rich has been condoned as a means of creating a prosperous economy,’ the working poor ‘have often been encouraged to defer consumption as a moral duty’ ….” [Niamh Mulcahy, “Workers-as-consumers: Rethinking the political economy of use-value and the reproduction of capital.” Capital & Class. OnlineFirst edition. November, 2016. Pages 1-18.]
      547. retrology (Markus Heidingsfelder as pronounced in this MP3 audio file): Focusing on popular music, he considers the exaggeration of the past.
           “The present investigation examines the hypothesis that contemporary pop music has caught ‘retromania’: infected by its own past, it will bring about its own downfall. It identifies this observation as retrology: a specific school of thought within pop history.…
           “… [The] pop crisis … [of] retrology … [is] a negative self-description that centres around the inflation of past references.…
           “… Retrologists’ worst fear is that the day is not far off when pop will forever cease to exist.”
           [Markus Heidingsfelder, “Retrology: Addicted to the Future.” Society and Culture in South Asia. Volume 2, number 2, 2016. Pages 182-203.]
      548. alternative journalism (Chris Atton): He develops a critical approach to the practice of “citizen” journalism.
           “This chapter examines journalism that is produced not by professionals but by those outside mainstream media organizations. Amateur media producers typically have little or no training or professional qualifications as journalists; they write and report from their position as citizens, as members of communities, as activists, as fans.…
           “… The medium itself requires transformation: the position of the work in relation to the means of production has to be critically re-aligned. This requires not only the radicalising of methods of production but a re-thinking of what it means to be a media producer.…
           “There is a … value in adopting the term ‘alternative journalism.’ No longer are we limited to thinking about amateur journalism solely as political projects, whose priorities are radical forms of organising, social movements, and individual or collective consciousness-raising. My own work has sought to explore the implications of what is both an expanded concept of amateur media and, at the same time, a more focused one: that of amateur journalism. Whilst not wishing to lose sight of any particular social relations that may be developed through amateur media production, I argue that any model of alternative media should consider equally processes and products ….”
           [Chris Atton, “Alternative and Citizen Journalism.” The Handbook of Journalism Studies. Karin Wahl-Jorgensen and Thomas Hanitzsch, editors. London and New York: Routledge imprint of Taylor & Francis Group, an Informa PLC business. 2009. Pages 265-278.]
      549. ontology of the present (Fredric Jameson): Understanding present-day reality requries not only an examination of ideology but a phenomenological analysis as well.
           “An ontology of the present is a science-fictional operation, in which a cosmonaut lands on a planet full of sentient, intelligent, alien beings. He tries to understand their peculiar habits: for example, their philosophers are obsessed by numerology and the being of the one and the two, while their novelists write complex narratives about the impossibility of narrating anything; their politicians meanwhile, all drawn from the wealthiest classes, publicly debate the problem of making more money by reducing the spending of the poor.…
           “Any ontology of the present needs to be an ideological analysis as well as a phenomenological description; and as an approach to the cultural logic of a mode of production, or even of one of its stages—such as our moment of postmodernity, late capitalism, globalization, is—it needs to be historical as well (and historically and economically comparatist).”
           [Fredric Jameson, “The Aesthetics of Singularity.” New Left Review. Series II, number 92, March–April 2015. Pages 101-132.]
           “I have … implied that our relationship to our own past as Americans must necessarily be very different and far more problematical than for Europeans whose national histories (the still vital myth of the Great Revolution or the Paris Commune in France, say, or the burning significance in the present of a historical moment such as ‘the making of the English working class’) remain alive within contemporary political and ideological struggles. I think a case could be made for the peculiar disappearance of the American past in general, which comes before us in unreal costumes and by way of the spurious images of nostalgia art, and for which Franklin D. Roosevelt is as dead and unreal as George Washington or Cotton Mather. This has something to do with the triumphant and systematic way in which the American past, and most particularly its great radical traditions, have been stamped out in almost every generation: the 1930s was only the latest great period of militancy to have been obliterated from any living collective consciousness (with the result that the militants of the 1960s were effectively denied any sense of a still vital radical tradition).” [Fredric Jameson. Jameson on Jameson: Conversations on Cultural Marxism. Ian Buchanan, editor. Durham, North Carolina: Duke University Press. 2007. Page 4.]
           “Jameson on Jameson collects a series of interviews with this productive and provocative cultural critic and historical materialist. The contexts of these interviews are quite diverse, spanning three decades (the earliest was first published in 1982) and engaging with scholars representing many political and cultural commitments worldwide. Most have been published before, but not necessarily in English or in the English-speaking world.” [Daniel Gustav Anderson, “Jameson on Jameson: Conversations on Cultural Marxism.” Review article. Rocky Mountain Review. Volume 63, number 2, fall 2009. Pages 283-285.]
      550. leftist ontology of the present (Christopher Breu): He develops a Marxist ontology informed by Marxism, psychoanalysis, and other perspectives.
           “… such a model theorizes the continued way in which various forms of materiality, not just bodily, but geopolitical and political-economic, underpin and exist in contradiction tradiction with the symbolic codings through which we apprehend them in late capitalism, despite all the emphasis on the postindustrial or symbolic nature of contemporary capitalism.
           “This, then, is the model that I want to propose as a leftist ontology of the present. It is an ontology that attempts to attend to all of the powerful epistemological questions raised by poststructuralist theory, while at the same time insisting on the twin forms of materialism asserted by psycho-analysis analysis and Marxism. It recognizes that we only apprehend the material dimensions of life through the medium of language, yet it also marks the way in which the material underpins, shapes, and transforms the domains of language as well as fantasy and desire.”
           [Christopher Breu, “Signification and Substance: Toward a Leftist Ontology of the Present.” A Leftist Ontology: Beyond Relativism and Identity Politics. Carsten Strathausen, editor. Minneapolis, Minnesota: University of Minnesota Press. 2009. Kindle edition.]
      “General Equilibrium Theory (Benjamin Robinson): Robinson formulates “a strong ontology of socialist difference.”
      “Because General Equilibrium theory (GE) remains more uncontested than ever after the fall of European socialism, I take its ontological claims about economic equilibrium as the orienting point of my inquiry into leftist ontology. According to GE, an economy is the unified interrelation of all economic agents through the medium of money. In precapitalist economic formations, money was not yet the sole medium for coordinating distinct parts of the production and exchange process in an articulated whole. It is only with generalized commodity exchange and the universal equivalency of money that a distinct economic system emerges.…
      … the orthodox socialist view that I now consider maintains a strong ontology of socialist difference, thus sharing the exclusivity of GE ontology, only with the opposite polarity.”
      [Benjamin Robinson, “Is Socialism the Index of a Leftist Ontology.” A Leftist Ontology: Beyond Relativism and Identity Politics. Carsten Strathausen, editor. Minneapolis, Minnesota: University of Minnesota Press. 2009. Kindle edition.]
      551. critical Marxism (Gillian Rose): She developed a critical theory based upon a critique of Marxism. This listing includes Rose’s work at various stages of her brief career. She died at 48.
           “Both [Georg Wilhelm Friedrich] Hegel’s and [Karl] Marx’s discourse has been misread and has been either assimilated into the prevalent law or imposed on it. Hegel anticipated this, but Marx, who made the relation of theory and practice so central, misunderstood the relation of his discourse and the possibility of a transformed politics.…
           “This critique of Marxism itself yields the project of a critical Marxism.…
           “To expound capitalism as a culture is thus not to abandon the classical Marxist interests in political economy and in revolutionary practice. On the contrary, a presentation of the contradictory relations between Capital and culture is the only way to link the analysis of the economy to comprehension of the conditions for revolutionary practice.”
           [Gillian Rose. Hegel: Contra Sociology. Atlantic Highlands, New Jersey: The Athlone Press. 1995. Pages 219-220.]
           “This article is intended as a contribution towards the retrieval of [Gillian] Rose’s original project of a Critical Marxism for contemporary social and political theory.… This project is to take the form of linking ‘the presentation of the contradictory relations between Capital and culture’ to ‘the analysis of the economy’ and thereby ‘comprehend the conditions of a revolutionary practice.’ It must be conceded that Rose’s Marxist phraseology appears dated today. But the power and promise of Rose’s early thought lie precisely in its capacity to comprehend the way in which Marxism has been rendered anachronistic, from a standpoint that does not admit of its historical redundancy.… To demonstrate that Rose’s thought is relevant to our age, we must, first, establish – since this is far from self-evident from the texts – that there is a coherent Critical Marxist project contained in her first two works; and, second, we must detail how and why she abandoned it.” [Tony Gorman, “Gillian Rose and the project of a Critical Marxism.” Radical Philosophy: Philosophical Journal of the Independent Left. Number 105, January/February 2001. Pages 25-36.]
           “In this paper I discuss what [Theodor] Adorno means by ‘critical theory’ and the sorts of claims he makes for critical theory in relation to other sociologies. I ask firstly, what does the term concept mean and what does the term ‘object’ mean? Secondly, how are concepts formed in the cognition of society? Thirdly, in what sense are they theoretical and critical? My aim is to assess whether critical theory is coherent and whether it provides a sociological perspective and methodology sui generis.” [Gillian Rose, “How is Critical Theory Possible?: Theodor W Adorno and Concept Formation in Sociology.” Political Studies. Volume XXIV, number 1, April 1976. Pages 69-85.]
           “… visual pleasure never ends, and has its own contradictions. Theorists of the visual argue that there is a specific logic of the gaze and that visual pleasure is deeply bound into the regulatory fictions of heterosexuality. The next section addresses this pleasure and its repressions, and suggests that the retreat to a critical distance is no escape at all. Geographers are pursued by their internal enemy, which ensures the failure of their efforts to stabilize their knowledges.” [Gillian Rose. Feminism and Geography: The Limits of Geographical Knowledge. Malden, Massachusetts: Polity Press. 1993. Page 101.]
           “[Theodor] Adorno’s work draws on traditions inherited from Marxian and non-Marxian criticism of [Georg Wilhelm Friedrich] Hegel’s philosophy, and on the pre-Marxian writings of [Georg] Lukács and of [Walter] Benjamin as much as on their Marxian writings. Interpretation of Adorno suffers when his aims and achievements are related solely to Marx or to a Marxian tradition which is sometimes undefined and sometimes overdefined, and, equally, when he is judged solely as a sociologist. Here, Adorno’s thought is introduced and discussed in its own right, ‘immanently,’ to use his own term. Where appropriate, Adorno’s engagement with and transformation of the many intellectual traditions which inform his work is examined.” [Gillian Rose. The Melancholy Science: An Introduction To The Thought Of Theodor W. Adorno. London and New York: Verso imprint of New Left Books. 2014. Kindle edition.]
           “Cultural geography as a subdiscipline has long argued for the importance of cultural artifacts of many kinds in mediating human experiences of place, space and landscape. Much of this work continues to be shaped by concepts developed as part of what was called ‘the new cultural geography.’ As is well-known, the new cultural geography emerged in the second half of the 1980s, when influential arguments were made for a more theoretically-engaged and more critical cultural geography.” [Gillian Rose, “Rethinking the geographies of cultural ‘objects’ through digital technologies: Interface, network and friction.” Progress in Human Geography. Volume 40, number 3, 2016. Pages 334-351.]
           “Traditions are constructed: written, spoken, visualized, taught, lived. Traditions are representations of a past and the specific aspect of this complex process of representation I want to consider is the way in which the construction of a particular tradition is also always a practice of inclusion and exclusion. In terms of geographical traditionalizing, certain people or kinds of people are included as relevant to the tradition under construction and others are deemed irrelevant.” [Gillian Rose, “Tradition and Paternity: Same Difference?” Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers. Volume 20, number 4, 1995. Pages 414-416.]
           “I propose to return to the pathos of [Jacques] Derrida’s De l’esprit to its logos; to expose the logos lurking in its elegeia [a reflective poem]: to argue that the simultaneous disavowal and displacement of the predicament of diremption results in the ‘ontologizing’ of violence as revelation, as what is ‘laid bare.’” [Gillian Rose, “Of Derrida’s Spirit.” New Literary History. Volume 24, number 2, spring 1993. Pages 447-465.]
           “While this paper focuses on issues of Midrashim [Hebrew/ʿIḇəriyṯ, מִדְרָשִׁים, Miḏərāšiym, explanations or commentaries] and Judaism as politics rather than ethics, it offers fundamental bearings on the conceptualisation of law. It proposes a model of doing politics as politics: ‘the risk of action arising out of the negotiation of law,’ a revision of Hannah Arendt’s discursive and antinomian idea of constitution-making. With the help of [John Greville Agard “P. G. A.”] Pocock’s civic republicanism, I launch a study of the Judaic body politic, a topic massively neglected in mainstream scholarship, which has been promoting the Hebraic paradigm. This study draws on the political experience and wisdom of the Jews as embodied in their civic consciousness. It is constitutional rather than religious literacy that is here explored.” [Gillian Rose, “‘Would That They Forsake Me but Observe My Torah’: Midrash and Political Authority.” The Modern Law Review. Volume 58, number 4, July 1995. Pages 471-485.]
           “[Gillian] Rose interprets her childhood dyslexia and ocular problems as being symptomatic of her unconscious rebellion ‘against the law, the tradition of the fathers, and against the precipitous fortress of the family.’ The ‘blind protestanism’ that produced her dyslexia also created the means of its cultivation. Reading, Rose informs us, became the ‘repository of my inner self-relation’; a means ‘of distance from and deviousness towards myself as well as others,’ and a way of securing a ‘personal, protestant inwardness and independence.’ But, ‘as with the varieties of historical Protestantism, progenitor of modernity’, her newly won independence came at the cost of the ‘incessant anxiety of autonomy.’” [Anthony Gorman, “Gillian Rose’s critique of violence.” Radical Philosophy: Philosophical Journal of the Independent Left. Number 197, May/June 2016. Pages 25-35.]
      552. power of gender ideologies in discourse (Susan U. Phillips): She develops a critical approach to linguistic anthropology.
           “My purpose in this chapter is to show how an interest in the power of gender ideologies in discourse developed in linguistic anthropology, and to locate what I went on to learn about gender ideologies in Tonga within that tradition. I first take up how gender ideologies emerged as a factor in men’s domination of women in the political theory of the women’s movement of the late 1960s and early 1970s. Then I discuss how feminist anthropologists took up the topic in cross-cultural research. This work emphasized men’s control over the public sphere and women’s exclusion from the public sphere as an exercise of power that was bolstered and justified by negative gender ideologies about women.” [Susan U. Philips, “The Power of Gender Ideologies in Discourse.” The Handbook of Language and Gender. Janet Holmes and Miriam Meyerhoff, editors. Malden, Massachusetts: Blackwell Publishing Ltd. 2003. Pages 252-276.]
      553. social medicine (Matthew R. Anderson, Lanny Smith, and Victor W. Sidel): They discuss the “history of progressive activism in medicine.”
           “… we think it might be useful to consider the long and rich history of progressive activism in medicine. This history dates back (at least) to the early nineteenth century when the systematic study of the relationships between society, disease, and medicine began in earnest. This study—and the forms of medical practice derived from it—became known as ‘social medicine.’ Over time the term ‘social medicine’ took on varied meanings as it was adapted to differing societies and diverse social conditions. Nonetheless, certain common principles underlie the term:
           1. “Social and economic conditions profoundly impact health, disease, and the practice of medicine.
           2. “The health of the population is a matter of social concern.
           3. “Society should promote health through both individual and social means.”
           [Matthew R. Anderson, Lanny Smith, and Victor W. Sidel, “What is Social Medicine?” Monthly Review: An Independent Socialist Magazine. Volume 56, issue 8, January 2005. Pages 27-34.]
      554. prosumption (Aleena Chia): She examines production by consumers (“prosumption”) in relation to social media. The term was coined by Alvin and Heidi Toffler.
           “Prosumption emerges from this space between creation and generation, between mediated lifeworlds and corporate pocketbooks. This is the scene of contestation and complicity, where subjects’ consumptive energies on discrete social media platforms are milled through a digital ecosystem to be repurposed through a variety of monetization schemes, for which contextual advertising is only a small part. This is the scene of ambition and ambivalence, where subjects in post-Fordist and postcrunch economies engage in a (rigged) game of cyber-entrepreneurship and feel empowered to sell their productive energies in the digital marketplace.” [Aleena Chia, “Welcome to Me-Mart: The Politics of User-Generated Content in Personal Blogs.” American Behavioral Scientist. Volume 56, number 4, 2012. Pages 421-438.]
           “… prosumption … [is] production in the nonmoney economy.” [Alvin Toffler and Heidi Toffler. Revolutionary Wealth. New York: Alfred A. Knopf. 2006. Pages 157.]
           “… the Web itself was a result of prosumption.” [Alvin Toffler and Heidi Toffler. Revolutionary Wealth. New York: Alfred A. Knopf. 2006. Page 178.]
           “Over the long pull, however, we can expect education also to change. More learning will occur outside, rather than inside, the classroom. Despite the pressure from unions, the years of compulsory schooling will grow shorter, not longer. Instead of rigid age segregation, young and old will mingle. Education will become more interspersed and interwoven with work, and more spread out over a lifetime. And work itself—whether production for the market or prosumption for use in the home—will probably begin earlier in life than it has in the last generation or two. For just such reasons. Third Wave civilization may well favor quite different traits among the young—less responsiveness to peers, less consumption-orientation, and less hedonistic self-involvement.” [Alvin Toffler. The Third Wave. New York: William Morrow and Company, Inc. 1980. Page 400.]
      555. philosophy of time (Peter Osborne and Roger McLure): Osborne examines the claims which may be required to establish such a Marxian philosophy. McLure considers different views of time in analytical philosophy and phenomenology.
           “The place of [Karl] Marx’s thought within the philosophy of time is thus, to a large extent, the key to the relationship of his thought to the modern European philosophical tradition more generally.…
           “… any development of Marx’s philosophical legacy needs to secure three claims: (1) the existence of distinctively social being (this is Marx’s concept of the human); (2) a distinctive temporality associated with this social human being (a temporality rooted in social production); (3) that this distinctively human temporality is – or at least has come to be – ‘historical’ in the sense associated with philosophical concepts of history.”
           [Peter Osborne, “Marx and the philosophy of time.” Radical Philosophy: Philosophical Journal of the Independent Left. Number 147, January/February 2008. Pages 15-22.]
           “The oft-remarked methodological differences between analytical philosophy and phenomenology are fully exemplified in their approaches to time: the method of more or less formalized analysis of statements in which temporal words occur, as against the method of more or less transcendental reflection on the experiences in which temporal concepts are supposed to be rooted. Accordingly, analytical philosophy of time interprets the relation between dynamic and static aspects of time in terms of the distinction between tensed and tenseless statements, thereby bringing the metaphysics of time within the semantics of propositional truth. By contrast, phenomenology investigates time at pre-propositional levels, appealing to sub-linguistic meanings encountered in experience or ‘constituted’ by consciousness.” [Roger McLure. The Philosophy of Time: Time before times. London and New York: Routledge imprint of Taylor & Francis Group, an Informa PLC business. 2005. Page 4.]
      556. politics of time (Peter Osborne): To Osborne, time is central to all politics.
           “… I write of a ‘politics of time’ – indeed, of all politics as centrally involving struggles over the experience of time. How do the forms of the social practices in which we engage structure and produce, enable or distort different senses of time? What kinds of experience of history do they make possible or inhibit? Whose future do they ensure? … A politics of time would attend to the temporal logic of these structures insofar as they open onto, or foreclose, specific historical possibilities, in distinctive temporal modes. It would rethink the political significance of social practices from the standpoint of their temporal forms.” [Peter Osborne, “The Politics of Time.” Radical Philosophy: Philosophical Journal of the Independent Left. Number 68, autumn 1994. Pages 3-9.]
      557. cultural logic of high capitalism (Peter Osborne): He examines changes in temporal form.
           “How best, … after the dissipation of the postmodern illusion, to characterize … the cultural logic of high capitalism today? …
           “… [A] new form of temporality produced by the globalization of the social processes grounding the temporality of modernity is best grasped not simply as the spatial extension of the temporality of modernity (the logic of the new), the aforementioned ‘global modernity,’ but by the term ‘contemporaneity’: that is, as a new, internally disjunctive global historical–temporal form, a totalizing (but not thereby ‘total,’ since it is open to no more than a distributive unification), radically disjunctive, contemporaneity.”
           [Peter Osborne, “The postconceptual condition: Or, the cultural logic of high capitalism today.” Radical Philosophy: Philosophical Journal of the Independent Left. Number 184, March/April 2014. Pages 19-27.]
      558. aesthetic order (Ruth Lorand): Lorand inquires “into the nature of beauty and art.”
           “This book is an inquiry into the nature of beauty and art. It presents a comprehensive theory of aesthetics that emerges from the analysis of the concepts of order and disorder, their various types and interrelations. The theory is based on the fundamental claim that beauty is an expression of a particular type of order, namely the aesthetic order. Art is presented as the product of the attempt to master this order and thereby create beauty.
           “Beauty is paradoxical. The experience of beauty is imbued with a sense of order and necessity—a beautiful object creates the impression that its elements complement each other and are rightly situated. However, the fact that there are neither constitutive nor stipulative rules that govern beauty appears to stand in contrast to the idea that beauty expresses order. In what sense, then, is beauty a form of order? A standard solution forces us to choose one of the following positions: either there are principles of beauty that have not yet been discovered and await philosophical and scientific examination, or there are no aesthetic principles, and beauty is therefore an expression of disorder. The theory presented in this book accepts neither of these positions; it strives to explain beauty in terms of lawless order. This inquiry demonstrates that the paradoxical concept of ‘lawless order’ captures the paradoxical nature of beauty—captures, but does not solve it. The theory of lawless order does not pretend to remove the inherent paradox of beauty. It attempts to exploit the paradox as a means for understanding the peculiarities of the aesthetic experience.”
           [Ruth Lorand. Aesthetic Order: A Philosophy of Order, Beauty and Art. London and New York: Routledge imprint of Taylor & Francis Group, an Informa PLC business. 2003. Page 1.]
      559. post-democratic mutation of representative democracy (Yannis Stavrakakis [Greek/Hellēniká, Γιάννης Σταυρακάκης, Giánnēs Staurakákēs as pronounced in this MP3 audio file]): The article examines the debt crisis in Greece.
           “The passage from early to late modernity is generally associated with a gradual process of democratization, in both political and economic realms. Politically speaking, representative democracy has enjoyed an unprecedented global spread. In the West, especially, political and social rights seemed to have flourished until quite recently.… Up to a certain point the two processes progressed together, which is how the system managed to co-opt popular pressures and social movements and create relative stability: by largely replacing prohibition with commanded enjoyment and disciplinary power with the productive regulation of desire. Both pillars of this process are currently in crisis. The crisis first affected the political realm, marking the post-democratic mutation of representative democracy.” [Yannis Stavrakakis, “Debt society: Greece and the future of post-democracy.” Radical Philosophy: Philosophical Journal of the Independent Left. Number 181, September/October 2013. Pages 33-38.]
      560. kleptography (Finn Brunton): He critically examines the manner in which state surveillance has been transformed into an art.
           “… consider the most powerful form of kleptography, described in a recent Internet Engineering Task Force document: ‘A highly effective form of kleptography would be to make the cryptographic system so difficult to use that nobody would bother to do so.’ Even better than the work of carefully, covertly back-dooring some piece of communications hardware, just make the available systems so tedious, time-consuming, annoying or opaque to use that people, by and large, simply don’t – they send their messages in clear and hope for the best, or try not to think about it. This is the world in which we actually live, and it presents another challenge for critique, for art practice, for design and for aesthetics. The work of security as a way of communicating and a way of living has much to offer: literacy in hardware, software and infrastructure; an approach to law and spaces of sovereignty, imperial control and freedom; the labour of affinity, community and trust; and areas of mathematics with just as much to offer contemporary philosophy (and more immediate political applications) than set theory. As we put a stake through the heart of the theatrical kitsch of state surveillance, can we make the practice of liberated security as an element of daily life interesting, compelling, exciting and beautiful? Can we make secrecy, our secrecy, into an art?” [Finn Brunton, “Kleptography.” Radical Philosophy: Philosophical Journal of the Independent Left. Number 183, January/February 2014. Pages 2-6.]
      561. ontological politics without identity (Harry Halpin): The article rightly, in Foster’s view, presents “the political power of Anonymous,” a hacktivist movement, as a meme. In other words, Anonymous is not a consolidated group.
           “The secret to this scalability and participation lies on the plane of ontology. The political power of Anonymous cannot be separated from its strange world of memes, a unit of self-replicating culture originally theorized by evolutionary biologist Richard Dawkins. On the Internet, strange phenomena such as putting cats inside baked bread – or using simple tools to take down a website in revenge for the repression of WikiLeaks – can spread across the world within minutes. The rise in participation in Anonymous can be directly linked to the ongoing collapse of personal identity, a phenomenon most clearly expressed by unemployed ‘digital native’ youth and those marginalized by established social forms. Anonymous is not just another political movement; it represents the first expression of an ontology that follows from the collapse of the hitherto existing form of the individual subject.” [Harry Halpin, “The philosophy of Anonymous: Ontological politics without identity.” Radical Philosophy: Philosophical Journal of the Independent Left. Number 196, November/December 2012. Pages 19-28.]
           “The new soup is the soup of human culture. We need a name for the new replicator, a noun that conveys the idea of a unit of cultural transmission, or a unit of imitation. ‘Mimeme’ comes from a suitable Greek root, but I want a monosyllable that sounds a bit like ‘gene.’ I hope my classicist friends will forgive me if I abbreviate mimeme to meme.* If it is any consolation, it could alternatively be thought of as being related to ‘memory,’ or to the French word même. It should be pronounced to rhyme with ‘cream.’
           “Examples of memes are tunes, ideas, catch-phrases, clothes fashions, ways of making pots or of building arches. Just as genes propagate themselves in the gene pool by leaping from body to body via sperms or eggs, so memes propagate themselves in the meme pool by leaping from brain to brain via a process which, in the broad sense, can be called imitation. If a scientist hears, or reads about, a good idea, he passes it on to his colleagues and students. He mentions it in his articles and his lectures. If the idea catchs on, it can be said to propagate itself, spreading from brain to brain.”
           [Richard Dawkins. The Selfish Gene. 30ᵗʰ anniversary edition. Oxford, England, and New York: Oxford University Press. 2006. Page 192.]
      562. Obama syndrome (Tariq Ali [ʾUrdū, طَارِق عَلِی, Ṭāriq ʿAlī]). Ali, a Trotskyist, develops a brilliant critique of the first part of Barack Obama’s presidency.
           “The visionless politicians of the “center-left” in North America and Europe had expended their entire political capital defending the neoliberal system: [Bill] Clinton, [Tony] Blair and [Gordon] Brown, [Lionel] Jospin and [Dominique] Strauss-Kahn, [Massimo] D’Alema and [Romano] Prodi, Felipe Gonzales and others had all led from the front, dismantling controls and embarking on an orgy of get-richquick measures while in office or promising to do so as soon as it was possible. Their heirs were paralyzed. [George W.] Bush, Brown and [Silvio] Berlusconi had no opposition worth the name. They carried on just as before. [Barack] Obama’s rhetoric was impressive, but no alternative plan was mapped for the electorate. He promised little but insisted that only the Democrats could pull the economy out of the recession, and he made sure the TV cameras caught him as often as possible engaged in deep conversation with Warren Buffett and Paul Volcker, the two figures whose reputations had survived the crisis. More importantly, Obama and his team of advisers (he deliberately excluded Joseph Stiglitz, to avoid sending the wrong message to Wall Street, one presumes) were incapable of developing any serious economic alternative. It was not that the economic mess had not been foreseen.” [Tariq Ali. The Obama Syndrome: Surrender at Home, War Abroad. London and New York: Verso imprint of New Left Books. 2011. Page 97.]
           “If [Barack] Obama did not believe in this policy [the Iraq War], he would not pursue it. The situation in this war differs from a permanent presence in Iraq With the military-industrial complex in the United States having spent so much money and taken hits, and knowing the economic value of Iraq, it does not want to get out too quickly. Iraq is strategically placed in relation to Iran and the Middle East as a whole. A majority of the U.S. high command probably does not favor total withdrawal from Iraq. Afghanistan is a different case. In the debate over the strategic interests of the United States in Afghanistan, some of the crazier people around NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization] argue that it has nothing to do with Afghanistan. They concentrate on China. Since we have bases on China’s borders, they say, why should we give them up? We can watch them. They talk as though the Chinese are not listening or are unaware of what is going on. Although the Chinese do not talk much in public, their think tanks do carefully study every move the United States makes in Asia.” [Tariq Ali, “Obama’s War: A Lecture.” Social Justice. Volume 37, number 2/3, 2010–2011. Pages 10-26.]
           “Rarely has self-interested mythology—or well-meaning gullibility—been more quickly exposed. There was no fundamental break in foreign policy, as opposed to diplomatic mood music, between the Bush 1 [George H. W. Bush], [Bill] Clinton and Bush 2 [George W. Budh] Administrations; there has been none between the [George W.] Bush and [Barack] Obama regimes. The strategic goals and imperatives of the us imperium remain the same, as do its principal theatres and means of operation. Since the collapse of the USSR, the Carter Doctrine—the construction of another democratic pillar of human rights—has defined the greater Middle East as the central battlefield for the imposition of American power around the world.” [Tariq Ali, “President of Cant.” New Left Review. Series II, number 61, JanuaryᾯFebruary 2010. Pages 99-116.]
      563. uneven development of capitalism (Tariq Ali): The contradictions of capitalism have been intensified by the extreme center.
           “The cowed and docile politicians who work the system and reproduce themselves are what I label the ‘extreme centre’ of mainstream politics in Europe and North America.” [Tariq Ali. The Extreme Centre: A Warning. London and New York: Verso imprint of New Left Books. 2015. Page 8.]
           “The uneven development of capitalism has deepened its contradictions. The astonishing development of technology, the third industrial revolution in the Western world and Japan, has undoubtedly created the material basis to satisfy the needs of all its citizens; but the economic structure based on maximizing profits at any cost is like a concrete wall that divides the top layers from the rest. The cost of production is now so low that the practical value of the commodity has to be ignored in order to keep prices artificially high. With the savage deindustrialization of the West, the parasitic marketing and advertising industries are amongst the largest in the world, second only to arms production. Consumerism has conquered all. Our needs are manipulated. Sixty-seven varieties of jeans, washing powders organic and non-organic, hi-tech gadgets and thousands of other commodities large and small, most of them unnecessary. Who decides? The market, chorus the neoliberals. But the market itself is controlled by the ruling elites, via a set of mechanisms such as the acceleration of inbuilt obsolescence.” [Tariq Ali. The Extreme Centre: A Warning. London and New York: Verso imprint of New Left Books. 2015. Page 116.]
      564. internal contradictions of the system (Tariq Ali): He argues that these contradictions cannot be resolved within the actual capitalist structure.
           “The last few years have proved one fact quite conclusively, a fact which has been highlighted by the economic crises confronting the advanced capitalist countries of Western Europe. It is now abundantly clear that the problems which arise from the functioning of modern or neo-capitalism cannot be solved within the framework of the existing social structures. They can be dealt with in the short term by classic capitalist remedies (deflation, import controls, export subsidies, devaluation, etc.), but in the long run they will continue to plague capitalist societies. These societies will continue to be afflicted by the internal contradictions of the system; contradictions which will finally tear them apart.” Tariq Ali, “The Extra-Parliamentary Opposition.” The New Revolutionaries: A Handbook of the International Radical Left. Tariq Ali, editor. New York: William Morrow and Company, Inc. 1969. Pages 67-78.]
      565. market realism (Tariq Ali): According to Ali, market realism, contra socialist realism, turns literature into “a fetishized commodity.”
           “Instead of ‘socialist realism,’ we have ‘market realism.’ The difference being that it is a self-imposed straitjacket. ‘Market realist’ literature needs to be resisted every bit as strongly as the old ‘socialist realism.’ It demands literature that is treated as a fetishized commodity, self-contained and self-referential.…
           “The resistance to market realism must be, has to be on the level of ideas, not on the basis of gender or race or class. I am not at all sympathetic to the version of political correctness which denounces the whole of European literature as racist and sexist. The logical corollary of this is to say that anti-racist and anti-sexist works are automatically good. Relativism of this sort dissolves all critical judgements and should not be indulged.”
           [Tariq Ali, “Literature and Market Realism.” New Left Review. Series I, number 199, May–June 1993. Pages 140-145.]
      566. re-colonization of Iraq (Tariq Ali): He considered the ramifications of the Iraq War.
           “The immediate tasks that face an anti-imperialist movement are support for Iraqi resistance to the Anglo-American occupation, and opposition to any and every scheme to get the un into Iraq as retrospective cover for the invasion and after-sales service for Washington and London. Let the aggressors pay the costs of their own imperial ambitions. All attempts to dress up the re-colonization of Iraq as a new League of Nations Mandate, in the style of the 1920s, should be stripped away. [Tony] Blair will be the leading mover in these, but he will have no shortage of European extras behind him. Underlying this obscene campaign, the beginnings of which are already visible on [Rupert] Murdoch’s TV channels, the BBC [British Broadcasting Corporation] and CNN [Cable News Network], is the urgent desire to reunite the West.” [Tariq Ali, “Re-Colonizing Iraq.” New Left Review. Series II, number 21, June–July 2003. Pages 5-19.]
      567. permanent war (Chris Hedges): He examines this distortion of Leon Trotsky’s theory of permanent revolution.
           “Citizens in a state of permanent war are bombarded with the insidious militarized language of power, fear and strength that mask an increasingly brittle reality. The corporations behind the doctrine of permanent war—who have corrupted Leon Trotsky’s doctrine of permanent revolution—must keep us afraid. Fear stops us from objecting to government spending on a bloated military. Fear means we will not ask unpleasant questions of those in power. Fear means that we will be willing to give up our rights and liberties for security. Fear keeps us penned in like domesticated animals.” [Chris Hedges, “The Disease of Permanent War.” Truthdig. May 18nd, 2009. Online publication. No pagination.]
      568. vulgar, sophisticated, and plain Marxists (C. Wright Mills): He distinguishes between these three variants of Marxism—presumably associating his own work with the third category.
           “To judge from its practitioners and from its critics there seem to be at least three intellectual types: Vulgar Marxism, Sophisticated Marxism, and Plain Marxism.
           “Vulgar Marxists (as we have seen) seize upon certain ideological features of [Karl] Marx’s political philosophy and identify these parts as the whole. This is true of adherents as well as of critics. We need here say no more about this type.
           “Sophisticated Marxists are much more complicated. They are mainly concerned with marxism as a model of society and with the theories developed with the aid of this model.…
           “Sophisticated marxists generally are commited to current marxist practice on political as well as on intellectual grounds. Consequently, they tend to incorporate into ‘Marxism’ the whole tradition of sociology, before and after Marx.…
           “Plain Marxists (whether in agreement or in disagree meat) work in Marx’s own tradition. They understand Marx, and many later Marxists as well, to be firmly a part of the classic tradition of sociological thinking. They treat Marx like any great nineteenth century figure, in a scholarly way; they treat each later phase of marxism as historically specific. They are generally agreed that Marx’s work bears the trademarks of the nineteenth-century society, but that his general model and his ways of thinking are central to their own intellectual history and remain relevant to their attempts to grasp present day social worlds.”
           [C. Wright Mills. The Marxists. New York: A Laurel Edition imprint of Dell Publishing Co., Inc. 1962. Pages 96-98.]
           “Since [C. Wright] Mills never belonged to any political party – indeed, he probably never even voted – it was the Plain Marxists that were more interesting to Mills. Mills defined a Plain Marxist as someone who works ‘in [Karl] Marx’s own tradition,’ whether in agreement or disagreement with him.” [Clyde W. Barrow, “Plain Marxists, Sophisticated Marxists, and C. Wright Mills’ The Power Elite.” Science & Society. Volume 71, number 4, October 2007. Pages 400-430.]
           “My own impression is that [C. Wright] Mills, in spite of his serious plea for incorporation of what he calls ‘plain marxism’ into social science, is more Weberian than Marxian. In all his essential ideas, e.g., power, power elite, politics, state, stratification, society, bureaucracy or marxism, Mills is far more closer to [Max] Weber than to [Karl] Marx.” [Bipul Kumar Bhadra. The Political Sociology of C. Wright Mills. M.A. thesis. McMaster University. Hamilton, Ontario. July, 1978. Page 37.]
      569. social script theory or social scripting theory (Michael W. Wiederman and others): They examine socialization through “deeply ingrained communications.”
           “Most writings about social scripting theory are geared toward professional or academic audiences. When it comes to using social scripting theory in counseling or therapy, this means that the application to clients is indirect at best.…
           “How might therapists interject social script theory in addressing sexual problems? Starting with an introduction to the general concept of social scripts … as well as providing common examples with which clients can identify, it is hoped that clients will see that scripts are necessary for all of us to be able to function in society. Social scripts provide predictability, lessen anxiety, and reduce the amount of time and energy we have to devote to making sense out of our social worlds. Extending these principles to sexual scripts, clients can come to appreciate the need for sexual scripts, particularly early in a relationship.”
           [Michael W. Wiederman, “The Gendered Nature of Sexual Scripts.” The Family Journal: Counseling and Therapy for Couples and Familes. Volume 13, number 4, October 2005. Pages 496-502.]
           “[Michael W.] Wiederman … proposes a Social Script theory to explain how individuals can be influenced by deeply held cultural beliefs about their sexuality. This theory is based on the assumption that individuals learn how to think, feel, and behave from members of the culture in which they are raised, through scripts or deeply ingrained communications, which are learned within cultures …. These scripts provide meaningful guidelines as to the appropriate timing and expression of certain behaviors, including sexual activity ….” [Lorel Mayberry and Jacqueline Daniel, “‘Birthgasm’: A Literary Review of Orgasm as an Alternative Mode of Pain Relief in Childbirth.” Journal of Holistic Nursing. Volume XX, number X, November 2015. Pages 1-12.]
           “The social script theory is based on the cognitive psychological analysis on human behavior and action. As a language teacher, I’m interested in the possibilities for applying it in the teaching of the Chinese language and culture. In this essay, I will compare the social script theory with a language teaching approach, the Performed Culture Pedagogy that has been carried out in the last decade in the Department of East Asia Language and Literature, Ohio State University, USA …. I will also illustrate the importance of the social scripts while learning language and the necessity of performing the culture while teaching Chinese. However, there are still problems to be solved in the development of the social script theory and the application of the Performance-Based Pedagogy and this essay will also address them.” [Huang Hong, “The Performance-Based Culture.” Intercultural Communication Studies. Volume XVII, number 1, 2008. Pages 126-131.]
           “Social learning and social script theory provided a framework for viewing a person’s reaction to feeling lonely …. Individuals learn to label a social context of only one person as ‘being alone’ and label one’s feeling in that setting as loneliness. Depending on one’s gender, individuals also learn differential reactions to feelings of loneliness.” [David Knox, Karen Vail-Smith, and Marty Zusman, “The Lonely College Male.” International Journal of Men’s Health. Volume 6, number 3, fall 2007. Pages 273-279..]
           “Social scripts are not universal. They are different from one culture to another in one way or another. In some situations social scripts differ slightly whereas in other situations they differ dramatically. In the former case, people in a new culture will experience little or no culture shock while in the latter case people will experience culture shock to a great extent. In cross-cultural communication how to mediate the externalization of social scripts according to specific situations is a big question. On the one hand, social scripts are internalized in a particular culture, usually one’s native culture. On the other hand, social scripts may occur across cultures.” [Hongdang Meng, “Social Script Theory and Cross-Cultural Communication.” Intercultural Communication Studies. Volume XVII, number 1, 2008. Pages 132-138.]
           “Activity theory … and social script theory explain how psychological is grounded in cultural activities. As a matter of fact, cognitive linguistics suffers from the same weakness. It can construct a personal model of culture within the individual, but it cannot explain how this model is socially constructed. A child learns by doing things, by following others, by trying to emulate them, by trying to make his world similar to their world. There is agency involved in these events. The agency comes from the child, but it is an attempt to emulate the social world and the cultural world that he is immersed in. He uses social scripts and language as learning tools and experiential devices to navigate within that milieu.” [Robert N. St. Clair, “Social Scripts and the Three Theoretical Approaches to Culture.” Intercultural Communication Studies. Volume XVII, number 4, 2008. Pages 171-183.]
           “Social script theory, a sociologically-based theory, is thought to provide explanation for individual behaviours and beliefs …. [Michael W.] Wiederman argues that social scripts are learned through being raised in a particular culture and/or through a significant attachment to a particular cultural group …. Social scripts are learned directives for personal actions and values which then play out in the personal and social lives of those who have learned the script. Social script theory may provide an alternative lens through which to look at women’s health and in particular, sexual health, in the population of women who are experiencing poverty and use drugs.” [Donna Lynn Ward. Social Scripts: A Concept Analysis. Master of Nursing thesis. University of Victoria, Victoria. British Columbia. January 2014. Page 8.]
           “Although the current study does not test social scripting theory, the formulation and consequences of sex script adherence contributes conceptually to this analysis as a useful framework for understanding how women make safety-related decisions in intimate contexts. Thus, a variety of cognitions and behaviors may inform an individual’s expectation of events in heterosexual encounters and her perceptions of and responses to risk. Specifically, adherence to traditional gender roles, rape myth acceptance, pornography consumption, alcohol intoxication, sorority affiliation, and prior victimization experiences may inform a woman’s sex scripts and influence the way she processes and reacts to danger.” [Cortney A. Franklin, “Anticipating Intimacy or Sexual Victimization? Danger Cue Recognition and Delayed Behavioral Responses to a Sexually Risky Scenario.” Feminist Criminology. Volume 8, number 2, April 2013. Pages 87-116.]
      570. Cultural–Historical Activity Theory (Andy Blunden): He develops a perspective on “cultural and historical science,” “identity–formation,” and “interpersonal relationships.”
           “It is suggested that if Cultural-Historical Activity Theory (CHAT) is to fulfil its potential as an approach to cultural and historical science in general, then an interdisciplinary concept of activity is needed. Such a concept of activity would provide a common foundation for all the human sciences, underpinning concepts of, for example, state and social movement equally as, for example, learning and personality. For this is needed a clear conception of the ‘unit of analysis’ of activity, i.e., of what constitutes ‘an activity,’ and a clear distinction between the unit of analysis and the substance, i.e., ultimate reality underlying all the human sciences: artifact-mediated joint activity.” [Andy Blunden, “An Interdisciplinary Concept of Activity.” Outlines. Number 1, 2009. Pages 1-26.]
           “Activity theory can and must shed light on identity-formation, interpersonal relationships such as solidarity, loyalty, friendship, ethical commitment, respect for law, pursuit of science, political affiliation, religious identity, ability to cooperate with others, the acquisition of cultural competences and so on. Societies are not homogeneous. The dogmatic identification of the objective meaning of all activity with the interests of an abstractly-conceived ‘society,’ blocks the way to the solution of these problem, and therefore makes the formation of a coherent theory of activity impossible.
           “Activity Theory is very well placed to make a significant contribution to the study of identity formation, but to do so it must let go of the idea of ‘objective’ identity which is determined not by criteria immanent in the experience of an individual, but according to abstract collectivities determined by the theorist’s preconceptions.”
           [Andy Blunden. An Interdisciplinary Theory of Activity. Leiden, the Netherlands, and Boston, Massachusetts: Brill. 2010. Page 227.]
           “The first step towards independence of the Psyche from immediate concern with its feelings is Habit. The acquisition of Habits applies to all grades of mental action. The sense in which Hegel uses the word roughly corresponds to the meaning of ‘operations’ in Activity Theory—actions which by repetition become automatic, freeing the mind from having to pay attention to the execution of simple actions. Thanks to Habit, we can ‘chew gum and walk at the same time.’ Habit can be refined so as to be regarded as an aptitude or skill, being able to do something without thinking.

           “Habit is further developed by Habituation: One who gets inured against external sensations and who hardens the heart against misfortune or becomes indiffferent to the satisfaction of its desires, acquires a strength which consists in a growing independence from its conditions of life, acquiring a distance from the immediacy of its feelings.”

           [Andy Blunden. Concepts: A Critical Approach. Leiden, the Netherlands, and Boston, Massachusetts: Brill. 2012. Page 169.]
      571. valuation of nature (Kathryn Yusoff): She critically examines the ways in which humans value nature.
           “… the benefits we have procured from nature have declined by 30 per cent over the last sixty years, and that this loss is due to an insufficient valuation of nature.…
           “Value … is a means of producing differentiation that is always interested, in the sense of how value designates what matters, to whom, and where (ontologically and geographically). Through these differentiated processes of valuation, radically different biotic entities emerge. If relation defies subject status (entities come into being through their relations, rather than pre-existing things that then form relations), and the one is because of and indebted to the many (we are indebted in all sorts of cultural and corporeal ways to ‘others’ that enable our living well, from stomach bacteria to animal test subjects that bear the burden of disease so that we might not have to), then biodiversifying can be thought as becoming: the active ground of evolution.”
           [Kathryn Yusoff, “The valuation of nature: The Natural Choice White Paper.” Radical Philosophy: Philosophical Journal of the Independent Left. Number 170, November/December 2011. Pages 2-7.]
      572. radical enactivism (Daniel D. Hutto and Erik Myin as pronounced in this MP3 audio file): They consider the embodied aspects of human engagements with the world.
           “A truly radical enactivism differs in important respects from the more conspicuous and already well-established branches of enactivism— Sensorimotor Enactivism and Autopoietic Enactivism. While REC shares much with, and owes much, to its sister accounts, there are significant differences between some of its commitments and what is on offer in these frameworks. In this chapter we highlight these and identify what we take to be the most serious and fundamental challenge facing any bona fide content-free version of enactivism.” [Daniel D. Hutto and Erik Myin. Radicalizing Enactivism: Basic Minds without Content. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press. 2013. Page 23.]
           “Radical enactivism firmly sets its face against computationally inspired cognitivism and its I-conceptions of the mind—those that characterize mentality as essentially disembodied and decontextualized. E-approaches reject the view that cognition is essentially an off-stage, behind-the-scenes computational and calculative activity that can be cleanly distinguished from the messy details of how organisms exist in and interact with their environments.…
           “In rejecting the idea that our primary engagements with the world are content-involving, radical versions of enactivism and embodied cognition assume that organisms can act, react, and interact in psychologically pertinent ways without representing, reasoning, or thinking about the world in contentful ways. In sum, radical enactivism offers a fundamentally different vision of what unifies psychology than that proposed by cognitivism.”
           [Daniel D. Hutto, “Psychology Unified: From Folk Psychology to Radical Enactivism.” Review of General Psychology. Volume 17, number 2, June 2013. Pages 174-178.]
           “Sceptics about the pervasiveness of mindreading doubt that all forms of attending to and keeping track of another’s mental states require the use of mindreading capacities understood in the restrictive sense just described. They doubt that our basic ways of engaging with other minds requires making any conceptually-based mentalistic attributions at any level at all. Neither the attribution of mental state concepts nor the attribution of mental state contents plays any part in basic ways of responding to and keeping track of others’ psychological attitudes. If this is correct then there are embodied and enactive ways of relating to others and attending to their states of mind that do not constitute acts of mindreading for the simple reason that they do not involve making mentalistic attributions.” [Daniel D. Hutto, “Understanding Fictional Minds without Theory of Mind!” Style. Volume 45, number 2, summer 2011. Pages 276-282.]
           “In rejecting the idea that our primary engagements with the world are content-based, my brand of enactivism – which I call radical enactivism – insists that organisms act, react and interact meaningfully long before they can think using concepts and symbols (should they ever come to do the latter) …. It offers a completely different starting point for thinking about our fundamental ways of engaging with the world and others than that proposed by cognitivism. At least in basic cases such encounters do not involve the processing of perceptual content via the way station of representations.” [Daniel D. Hutto, “Limited Engagements and Narrative Extensions.” International Journal of Philosophical Studies. Volume 16, number 3, July 2008. Pages 419-444.]
           “… primary forms of social interaction are about shaping and being shaped by others – being ‘transformed’ by and ‘transforming’ others – through unprincipled embodied engagements. Radical enactivism enables us to make best sense of these engagements by providing the right set of tools for understanding intentionality and experience in non-representationalist terms.” [Daniel D. Hutto, “Interacting? Yes. But, of what kind and on what basis?” Consciousness and Cognition. Volume 18, issue 2, June 2009. Pages 543-546.]
      573. transcendental materialism (Adrian Johnston): Johnston developed his position and then used it to interpret the work of Slavoj Žižek and others.
           “[Slavoj] Žižek’s Schellingian-Hegelian ontology [i.e., Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Schelling and Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel] allows for charting the immanent genesis of the transcendent, for preserving the parallax split of idealism without conceding that an ideal plane of immateriality eternally transcends what transpires at the level of the material Real. This transcendental materialism (as an account of a more-than-material yet non-epiphenomenal subject derived from a specific ontology of the Real) requires a reworked conception of the very nature of the substance of being.
           “Consequently, what Žižek proposes is an ephemeral, aleatory materialism in which the autonomous negativity of subjectivity is able to move from an ‘in itself’ status as substance’s inner inconsistency (i.e., as a not-yet-subjectified subject) to a ‘for itself’ status in which a clear contrast is visible between itself and its various enveloping matrices of mediation (i.e., as a subjectified subject).”
           [Adrian Johnston. Žižek’s Ontology: A Transcendental Materialist Theory of Subjectivity. Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern University Press. 2008. Kindle edition.]
           “Over the past several years, I have gradually constructed and refined the position I label ‘transcendental materialism’ within a context informed by a number of live fault lines of theoretical tensions. More precisely, these specific fault lines are rifts between stances (my own and those with which I engage) relating to each other in the above-described promising manner of combining argumentative ferocity with interpretive generosity. Whatever I might have to contribute to certain ongoing conversations in philosophy/ theory today, I owe to a wonderfully motley ensemble, a sparklingly multifaceted Marxian ‘general intellect,’ of superb interlocutors and debating partners. Transcendental materialism has taken shape in fashions very much determined by its chosen significant others.
           “The chapters of this book contain, among other things, treatments of a number of living figures along lines informed by transcendental materialism. The current thinkers addressed here include, to provide a non-exhaustive list, Alain Badiou, Jane Bennett, William Connolly, Markus Gabriel, Iain Hamilton Grant, Martin Hägglund, Catherine Malabou, Jean-Claude Milner, Colette Soler, Slavoj Žižek, and Alenka Zupančič. Reflecting the invaluable historical sensibilities of the intellectual traditions of Continental Europe, these authors, as anyone familiar with them knows, draw deeply and broadly from the history of ideas (philosophical, psychoanalytic, political) in the process of building their own bodies of concepts. Moreover, like all of the people just mentioned, I view the history of ideas (especially as regards philosophy and psychoanalysis) as not merely historical.”
           [Adrian Johnston. Adventures in Transcendental Materialism. Edinburgh, Scotland: Edinburgh University Press. 2014. Pages 1-2.]
           “… insofar as the word ‘dialectical’ nowadays tends to connote hazy notions of integration and synthesis, it doesn’t seem entirely appropriate for [Slavoj] Žižek to describe his monism of the not-All One as a materialism that is recognizably dialectical. Instead, Žižek’s tethering of so-called dialectical materialism to an ontology of a self-sundering substance internally generating parallax-style antinomies and oppositions seems more like a sort of genetic transcendentalism, a theory centered on the model of a trajectory involving the immanent genesis of the thereafter-transcendent (that is, an emergentist supplement to Kantian transcendental idealism). One could call this theory ‘transcendental materialism,’ defined as a doctrine based on the thesis that materiality manufactures out of itself that which comes to detach from and achieve independence in relation to it.” [Adrian Johnston, “Slavoj Žižek’s Hegelian Reformation Giving a Hearing to The Parallax View.” Diacritics. Volume 37, number 1. Pages 3–20.]
           “… [My] ‘transcendental materialism’ [is] a materialism (of a ‘weak nature’) profoundly influenced by the natural sciences in which those phenomena and structures seeming to require theology for their expression are explained in a non-reductive-yet-non-religious fashion. At the intersection of Freudian-Lacanian psychoanalysis, the life sciences, and select philosophies, I seek to assemble a naturalist-materialist account of those denaturalized, more-than-material temporalities and subjectivities supposedly falling under the jurisdiction of theologies. In my view, one can remain completely committed to the secular legacy of the Enlightenment without thereby sooner or later resignedly condemning oneself to the lukewarm ethical-aesthetic nihilism of today’s biopolitical, pseudoscientific materialisms justly denounced by [Alain] Badiou and [Slavoj] Žižek.” [Adrian Johnston, “Adrian Johnston’s Reply to Clayton Crockett’s Review of His Book.” Political Theology. Volume 11, issue 1, 2010. Pages 158-160.]
           “… one can make out the contours of what can perhaps only be designated by the oxymoron ‘transcendental materialism’ (proposed by Adrian Johnston): all reality is transcendentally constituted, ‘correlative’ to a subjective position, and, to push this throngh to the end, the way out of this ‘correlationist’ circle is not to try to directly reach the In-itself, but to inscribe this transcendental correlation into the Thing itself. The path to the In-itself leads through the subjective gap, since the gap between For-us and In-itself is immanent to the In-itself: appearance is itself ‘objective,’ therein resides the truth of the realist problem of ‘How can we pass from appearance For-us to reality In-itself?’
           “It may appear that the basic defining feature of materialism is a commonsense trust in the reality of the external world—we do not live in the fancies of our imagination, caught up in its web, there is a rich and full-blooded world open to us out there. But this is the premise any serious form of dialectical materialism has to do away with: there is no ‘objective’ reality, every reality is already transcendentally constituted. ‘Reality’ is not the transcendent hard core that eludes our grasp, accessible to us only in a distorted perspectival approach; it is rather the very gap that separates different perspectival approaches.”
           [Slavoj Žižek. Less than Nothing: Hegel and the Shadow of Dialectical Materialism. Brooklyn, New York: Verso imprint of New Left Books. 2012. Pages 906-907.]
           “Within transcendental materialism … the passage from nature to culture does not reveal a struggle of notional transmutation as culture endeavours to rid itself of its basis in nature in the onslaught of history with the promise of completion, but rather reveals a standstill in the heart of being that cannot be brought into a higher moment of truth of free spirit that would bring the circle of circles to an end: the ebb and flow of substance ontogenetically incites the birth of a freely existing subject only through a self-sabotaging, self-destructive movement that defies perfect reconciliation, because this unruliness inheres in all culturally achieved unity and disrupts it from within. Conflict, though here too internal to the system, articulates at this juncture of the passage from nature to culture an irrevocable place of rupture, devastation, or laceration in the absolute, which points to a dialectical residue that can never become a vehicle of internal growth of the structure of the world, yet that simultaneously sustains culture as the very attempt to overcome it. With culture, we see that nature had immanently produced an eruptive, shattering transcendence (the subject) that bursts the seams of any monistic wholeness and gets in the way of the immanent self-development of the absolute by instituting a new age of the world that can never be reconciled with that which came before, in a moment of ontological triumph. As a consequence, if we inscribe culture into the fabric of the universe according to the second model of dialectics, we are forced to conclude that the absolute is open, precarious, and necessarily incomplete, for the symbolic universe is not only constitutively out of joint with nature, but as the always doomed attempt to reconcile itself with the latter, is constantly forced to reinvent itself.” [Joseph Carew. Ontological Catastrophe: Žižek and the Paradoxical Metaphysics of German Idealism. Ann Arbor, Michigan: Open Humanities Press imprint of imprint of MPublishing. 2014. Creative Commons. Pages 156-147.]
      574. dialectics of organization and ideology (Andrew Feenberg): He considers the American New Left.
           “The cultural focus of the new left was a direct response to the emergence of systematic cultural manipulation by government and business in the mass-mediated world of the post-war period.…
           “Subjected to new forms of control from above, the American people, or at least a significant fraction of it, innovated new forms of resistance and subversion based on cultural action from below. These new forms of action had the paradoxical property of enhancing the influence and support of the new left for several years while disorganizing it internally to such an extent that it soon disappeared from the scene.
           “My purpose here is to explain this dialectic. Why was such an exciting and innovative movement so vulnerable to internal disruption, so chaotic, and so oppressive to those who participated in it that it failed to sustain and reproduce itself? I believe that through addressing this question we can learn a great deal about the specific weaknesses of movements based on cultural action from below. Perhaps if we can gain a better understanding of the problems of the new left, we will not be condemned to repeat its errors in the future.”
           [Andrew Feenberg, “Paths to Failure: The Dialectics of Organization and Ideology in the New Left.” Humanities in Society. Fall 1983. Pages 393-419.]
      575. dialectic of fear (Franco Moretti as pronounced in this MP3 audio file): He writes a brilliant parable regarding capitalist oppression of the proletariat.
           “The fear of bourgeois civilization is summed up in two names: Frankenstein and Dracula.… Frankenstein and Dracula lead parallel lives. They are indivisible, because complementary, figures; the two horrible faces of a single society, its extremes: the disfigured wretch and the ruthless proprietor. The worker and capital: ‘the whole of society must split into the two classes of property owners and propertyless workers.’ That ‘must,’ which for [Karl] Marx is a scientific prediction of the future (and the guarantee of a future reordering of society), is a forewarning of the end for nineteenth-century bourgeois culture.…
           “The literature of terror is born precisely out of the terror of a split society and out of the desire to heal it. It is for just this reason that Dracula and Frankenstein, with rare exceptions, do not appear together.”
           [Franco Moretti, “The Dialectic of Fear.” New Left Review. Series I, number 136, November–December 1982. Pages 67-85.]
      576. moment of truth (Franco Moretti): He focuses on change through temporality.
           “The interdependence of truth and crisis in tragedy anticipates the classical rhetoric of revolutionary politics.… The superior ‘morality’ of the General Strike lies in its forcing social actors to their ultimate forgotten ‘truth.’ It is never conceived by [Georges] Sorel as a process (as in Rosa Luxemburg’s roughly contemporary writings), but as a single, ‘instantaneous’ event. As an Apocalypse: the Moment of Truth.…
           “… I certainly believe that it is virtually impossible to extricate the Left from the Right whenever the Left adopts a ‘tragic’ worldview. In an ironic reversal, the Moment of Truth turns out to be an ambiguous—perhaps the most ambiguous—of political mythologies. Which is, after all, the way it should be, since the vast difference between Left and Right is, first and foremost, a product of temporality: of the weight and memories of the past, the open-ended conflicts of the present, the projects and hopes of the future.”
           [Franco Moretti, “The Moment of Truth.” New Left Review. Series I, number 159, September–October 1986. Pages 39-48.]
      577. existentialism and existential Marxism (Jean-Paul Sartre as pronounced in this MP3 audio file and others): Capitalism produces angst (anxiety and depression) and meaningless. The solution for people is to create lives of meaning by struggling against capitalism.
           “Existentialism, like Marxism, addresses itself to experience in order to discover there concrete syntheses; it can conceive of these syntheses only within a moving, dialectical totalisation which is nothing else but history or—from the strictly cultural point of view which we have adopted here—‘philosophy-becoming-the world.’ For us, truth is something which becomes, it has and will have become. It is a totalisation which is forever being totalised. Particular facts do not signify anything; they are neither true nor false so long as they are not related, through the mediation of various partial totalities, to the totalisation in process. ” [Jean-Paul Sartre. Critique of Dialectical Reason. Hazel Barnes, translator. New York: Vintage Books imprint of Knopf Doubleday Publishing Group. 1960.]
           “I borrowed my materials from my own century: Marxism, pacifism, anti-fascism, etc.” [Jean-Paul Sartre. War Diaries: Notebooks from a Phoney War 1939-1940. Quintin Hoare, translator. London and New York: Verso imprint of New Left Books. 1999. Page 80.]
           “Our problem here is that of subjectivity in the context of Marxist philosophy. My aim is to establish with precision whether the principles and truths that constitute Marxism allow subjectivity to exist and have a function, or whether they reduce it to a set of facts that can be ignored in the dialectical study of human development. Taking [Georg] Lukács as an example, I hope to convince you that an erroneous interpretation of certain undoubtedly ambiguous Marxist texts can give rise to what I would call an ‘idealist dialectics’, which in practice ignores the subject, and to show how such a position may be damaging for the development of Marxist studies. My topic is not subject and object, but rather subjectivity, or subjectivation, and objectivity or objectivation. The subject is a different, far more complex problem. When I speak of subjectivity, it is as a certain type of internal action, an interior system—système en intériorité—rather than the simple, immediate relationship of the subject to itself.” [Jean-Paul Sartre, “Marxism and Subjectivity: The Rome Lecture, 1961.” New Left Review. Series II, number 88, July–August 2014. Pages 89-111.]
           “The sole purpose of an absurd existence was indefinitely to produce works of art which at once escaped it. That was its sole justification; an imperfect justification, moreover, which did not succeed in redeeming those long gobs of time that had to be swallowed one after another. It was really a morality of salvation through art. As for life itself, this was to be lived in carefree fashion, any old way. I was doing so well at living it ‘any old way’ that I was getting into a rut: I was acquiring bachelor habits.” [Jean-Paul Sartre, “The Path to Rooted Freedom.” New Left Review. Series I, number 145, May–June 1984. Pages 39-55.]
           “A universalist ideology and practice, born in the most highly industrialized parts of Europe and imported by revolutionary intellectual circles at the end of the nineteenth century into a country whose economic and geo-political structure would seem to define it, in the name of Marxism itself, as a peculiarity—in other words, as such a ‘backward’ nation that Marxist practice (the mobilization of the working masses, etc.) apparently could not develop there, at least without extensive modification.” [Jean-Paul Sartre, “Socialism in One Country.” New Left Review. Series I, number 100, November–December 1976. Pages 143-163.]
           “I have said that we accept without reservation the thesis set forth by [Friedrich] Engels in his letter to [Karl] Marx: ‘Men themselves make their history but in a given environment which conditions them.’ However, this text is not one of the clearest, and it remains open to numerous interpretations. How are we to understand that man makes History if at the same time it is History which makes him? Idealist Marxism seems to have chosen the easiest interpretation: entirely determined by prior circumstances—that is, in the final analysis, by economic conditions—man is a passive product, a sum of conditioned reflexes. Being inserted in the social world amidst other equally conditioned inertias, this inert object, with the nature which it has received, contributes to precipitate or to check the ‘course of the world.’” [Jean-Paul Sartre. Jean-Paul Sartre: Basic Writings. Stephen Priest, editor. Alan Sheridan Smith, translator. London and New York: Routledge imprint of Taylor & Francis Group, an Informa PLC business. 2001. Page 305.]
           “As the 1930’s saw an upsurge in intellectual interest in Marxism, it also saw that interest becoming increasingly attached to a Soviet interpretation. It might be helpful, therefore, to further elucidate [Jean-Paul] Sartre’s view on the dialectics of nature, since his position was first staked out during this period. While Sartre was rather non-political in his early career, it can be said that once he acquired a political outlook, his inclinations pointed him toward [Karl] Marx. Likewise, it can also be said that for his entire intellectual career he opposed the theory of the dialectics of nature.” [William L. Remley, “Sartre and Engels: The Critique of Dialectical Reason and the Confrontation on the Dialectics of Nature.” Sartre Studies International. Volume 18, issue 2, 2012. Pages 19-48.]
           “… I shall assume the ‘enrichment within continuity’ of [Jean-Paul] Sartre’s philosophical project as a whole, that is, from his existential phenomenological texts through to his Marxian dialectical works.…
           According to my reconstruction of Sartre’s work as a whole, I distinguish: (a) three inter-related, although irreducible, discursive planes along which the theory is articulated, which are necessary in order to account for the complexity of ‘Being’ in general, ‘human reality’ and ‘world’; (b) two inter-related, irreducible planes of reality to which theoretical discourse applies.”
           [Maria Antonietta Perna, “Spinozean Multitude: Radical Italian Thought vis-à-vis Sartrean Existential Marxism.” Sartre Studies International. Volume 13, number 1, June 2007. Pages 35-61.]
           “The concept ‘dialectical reason,’ as used by ‘marxist’ theorists, contains buried within it a number of theoretical problems, problems which have significance for where why and how we may use dialectical reason. There are three issues, in particular, on which reflective clarity is both always needed and often lacking. Firstly, what precisely distinguishes ‘dialectical reason’ from ‘analytical reason’? Secondly, how does one legitimise the use of dialectical reason – that is, are there ‘laws’ of dialectical reason, how are they discovered, and to what may they be applied? Thirdly, given that the central concept of dialectics is that of ‘totality,’ and that it is therefore assumed that the observer is always part of the totality being observed, how, if at all, does one escape from historical relativism?
           “It is these problems that [Jean-Paul] Sartre is dealing with in The Critique of Dialectical Reason.”
           [Richard Turner, “Dialectical Reason.” Radical Philosophy: Philosophical Journal of the Independent Left. Number 4, spring 1973. Pages 30-33.]
           “[Jean-Paul] Sartre is often quoted as saying that humans are ‘condemned to be free’ …. We are condemned to the kind of existence we have because we did not choose it and we cannot escape it, except by ceasing to exist altogether. This kind of existence includes freedom because the ways in which the world seems to us, the ways in which we think and feel about it, and the ways in which we behave in response to it are all ultimately manifestations of projects that we have chosen to pursue, that we need not have chosen, and that each of us can yet choose to change. Our characters are not simply given to us, on this view, but are things that we have freedom over. My essence is not my nature: ‘I am condemned to exist forever beyond my essence’ and ‘beyond the motifs and mobiles of my act’ ….” [Jonathan Webber. The Existentialism of Jean-Paul Sartre. London and New York: Routledge imprint of Taylor & Francis Group, an Informa PLC business. 2008. Page 59.]
           “Existentialist thought has not so much blown away as decomposed in order to fertilize various fields of thought. To argue for this proposition and, more generally, to examine what has become of existentialism in the 1980s, I think it useful to begin with a conceptual résumé of the philosophy. After distilling its themes and identifying several widespread misunderstandings about existentialism, we can proceed to survey the intellectual landscape to determine the movement’s current status.” [Alfie Kohn, “Existentialism Here and Now.” The Georgia Review. Volume 38, summer 1984. Pages 381-397.]
      578. absurdism (Albert Camus as pronounced in this MP3 audio file): Camus’ early philosophy, which he referred to as absurdism, originated in some differences he had with the existentialism of Jean-Paul Sartre.
           “For me ‘The Myth of Sisyphus’ marks the beginning of an idea which I was to pursue in The Rebel. It attempts to resolve the problem of suicide, as The Rebel attempts to resolve that of murder, in both cases without the aid of eternal values which, temporarily perhaps, are absent or distorted in contemporary Europe. The fundamental subject of ‘The Myth of Sisyphus’ is this: it is legitimate and necessary to wonder whether life has a meaning; therefore it is legitimate to meet the problem of suicide face to face. The answer, underlying and appearing through the paradoxes which cover it, is this: even if one does not believe in God, suicide is not legitimate. Written fifteen years ago, in 1940, amid the French and European disaster, this book declares that even within the limits of nihilism it is possible to find the means to proceed beyond nihilism. In all the books I have written since, I have attempted to pursue this direction. Although ‘The Myth of Sisyphus’ poses mortal problems, it sums itself up for me as a lucid invitation to live and to create, in the very midst of the desert.” [Albert Camus. The Myth of Sisyphus & Other Essays. Justin O’Brien, translator. New York: Vintage Books imprint of Randon House, Inc. 1991. Page v.]
           “There is but one truly serious philosophical problem, and that is suicide. Judging whether life is or is not worth living amounts to answering the fundamental question of philosophy. All the rest—whether or not the world has three dimensions, whether the mind has nine or twelve categories—comes afterwards. These are games; one must first answer.” [Albert Camus, “The Myth of Sisyphus” in Albert Camus. The Myth of Sisyphus & Other Essays. Justin O’Brien, translator. New York: Vintage Books imprint of Random House, Inc. 1991. Page 3.]
           “… logic cannot be satisfied by an attitude which first demonstrates that murder is possible and then that it is impossible. For after having proved that the act of murder is at least a matter of indifference, absurdist analysis, in its most important deduction, finally condemns murder. The final conclusion of absurdist reasoning is, in fact, the repudiation of suicide and the acceptance of the desperate encounter between human inquiry and the silence of the universe. Suicide would mean the end of this encounter, and absurdist reasoning considers that it could not consent to this without negating its own premises. According to absurdist reasoning, such a solution would be the equivalent of flight or deliverance. But it is obvious that absurdism hereby admits that human life is the only necessary good since it is precisely life that makes this encounter possible and since, without life, the absurdist wager would have no basis. To say that life is absurd, the conscience must be alive.” [Albert Camus. The Rebel: An Essay on Man in Revolt. Anthony Bower, translator. New York: Vintage Books imprint of Random House, Inc. 1991. Page 6.]
           “My bedroom overlooks the main street of our district. Though it was a fine afternoon, the paving blocks were black and glistening. What few people were about seemed in an absurd hurry. First of all there came a family, going for their Sunday-afternoon walk; two small boys in sailor suits, with short trousers hardly down to their knees, and looking rather uneasy in their Sunday best; then a little girl with a big pink bow and black patent-leather shoes. Behind them was their mother, an enormously fat woman in a brown silk dress, and their father, a dapper little man, whom I knew by sight. He had a straw hat, a walking stick, and a butterfly tie. Seeing him beside his wife, I understood why people said he came of a good family and had married beneath him.” [Albert Camus. The Stranger. Stuart Gilbert, translator. New York: Vintage Books imprint of Random House, Inc. 1946. Page 15.]
           “In [Albert] Camus’s view, all the historical attempts to revolt have failed until now: these rebellions have never delivered their goods. The French revolutionaries for instance turned out to be tyrants. That is why Camus gives in his essay a definition of what the true spirit of rebellion should be. Firstly, rebellion is simultaneously an act of acceptance and an act of refusal. ‘The Rebel’ says ‘no’ to any form of oppression but he also says ‘yes’ to himself and the valúes [values] that lie within him – ‘He stubbornly insists that there are certain things in him that are “worthwhile…” and which must be taken into consideration’ …. Secondly, the rebel is ready to die for his rights and dignity, and for the rights and dignity of all human beings. In this sense, rebellion is not an individualistic but an altruistic act.” [Richard Clouet, “The Rebel: The English Translation of Albert Camus’s L’Homme Révolté and the Expression of Hope and Despair.” Philologica canariensia. Numbers 8–9, 2002–2003. Pages 265-273.]
           “In his [Albert Camus’] absurdist period, … Camus explicitly rejected existentialism. In the new and more mature philosophical position he developed in the works published just after the Second World War, Camus remained highly critical of existential thought, and though his rejection of existentialism was generally more implicit and indirect than it had been before, it was no less meaningful in relation to those issues that preoccupied him at the time.” [Richard Raskin, “Camus’s Critiques of Existentialism.” Minerva – An Internet Journal of Philosophy. Volume 5, 2001. Pages 156-165.]
           “Albert Camus, as is well known, described as absurdity the unfathomable abyss that exists between man and the world, between the aspirations of the human spirit and the incapacity of the world to satisfy them. The absurdity, for him, lies neither in man nor in things, but in the impossibility of establishing any other relationship between them than that of strangeness.
           “Every reader has nevertheless noticed that the hero of L’Etranger (The Outsider [or the Stranger]) practised an obscure kind of complicity with the world, compounded of resentment and fascination. This man’s relations with the objects around him are not in the least innocent; absurdity is constantly bringing about disappointment, withdrawal and rebellion.”
           [Alain Robbe-Grillet, “Nature, Humanism and Tragedy.” New Left Review. Series I, number 31, May–June 1965. Pages 65-80.]
           “Albert Camus (1913-60), a French writer of Algerian origin, has been widely acclaimed as a great litterateur. In an eventful and productive life, tragically cut short by a car accident, he published three novels, a collection of short stories, two philosophical works, as also several plays and essays. He was awarded the Nobel Prize for literature in 1957. No ivory tower intellectual, Camus actively participated in the epic political struggles and controversies of his time.
           “Born in a working class family, he was a member of the Algerian Communist Party during 1935-37. He later played an important role in the Resistance movement against the Nazi Occupation of France. He steadfastly strove to secure a just French policy towards Algeria in the face of insurmountable odds. His political philosophy was formed in the crucible of the turmoil, which engulfed Europe in the middle decades of the twentieth century.”
           [Mangesh Kulkarni, “Revolution Versus Revolt: Revisting Albert Camus’ The Rebel.” West Bengal Political Science Review. Volume II, numbers 1-2, January–December 1999. Pages 59-65.]
      579. adventures of the dialectic (Maurice Merleau-Ponty as pronounced in this MP3 audio file): This one-time friend of Jean-Paul Sartre considers the “errors through which” the dialectic “must pass.”
           “The adventures of the dialectic, the most recent of which we have retraced here, are errors through which it must pass, since it is in principle a thought with several centers and several points of entry, and because it needs time to explore them all. With the name ‘culture,’ Max Weber identified the primary coherence of all histories. [Georg] Lukács believes it possible to enclose them all in a cycle which is closed when all meanings are found in a present reality, the proletariat. But this historical fact salvages universal history only because it was first ‘prepared’ by philosophical consciousness and because it is the emblem of negativity. Thence comes the reproach of idealism that is made against Lukács; and the proletariat and revolutionary society as he conceives them are indeed ideas without historical equivalents. But what remains of the dialectic if one must give up reading history and deciphering in it the becoming-true of society? Nothing of it is left in [Jean-Paul] Sartre. He holds as utopian this continued intuition which was to be confirmed every day by the development of action and of revolutionary society and even by a true knowledge of past history. To dialectical philosophy, to the truth that is glimpsed behind irreconcilable choices, he opposes the demand of an intuitive philosophy which wants to see all meanings immediately and simultaneously. There is no longer any ordered passage from one perspective to another, no completion of others in me and of me in others, for this is possible only in time, and an intuitive philosophy poses everything in the instant: the Other thus can be present to the I only as its pure negation.” [Maurice Merleau-Ponty. Adventures of the Dialectic. Joseph Bien, translator. Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern University Press. 1973. Pages 204-205.]
           “In an epilogue [Maurice] Merleau-Ponty espouses a ‘middle way;’ which fights against capitalism for the freedom of the proletariat, and the same time, resists communism and the dictatorship of the proletariat. The book is not for beginners; it presupposes a familiarity with Marxist literature and an under standing of the historic struggle between Party and proletariat. How ever, those who are in a position to appreciate its questions cannot but judge Adventures itself to be an important new chapter in the dialectic.” [S. L. W., “Adventures of the Dialectic.” Review article. The Review of Metaphysics. Volume 27, number 4, June 1974. Page 804.]
      580. revolutionary medicine (Ernesto “Che” Guevara): He proposes the use of medicine in service to revolution.
           “Today one finally has the right and even the duty to be, above all things, a revolutionary doctor, that is to say a man who utilizes the technical knowledge of his profession in the service of the revolution and the people. But now old questions reappear: How does one actually carry out a work of social welfare? How does one unite individual endeavor with the needs of society?
           “We must review again each of our lives, what we did and thought as doctors, or in any function of public health before the revolution. We must do this with profound critical zeal and arrive finally at the conclusion that almost everything we thought and felt in that past period ought to be deposited in an archive, and a new type of human being created. If each one of us expends his maximum effort towards the perfection of that new human type, it will be much easier for the people to create him and let him be the example of the new Cuba.”
           [Che Guevara, “On Revolutionary Medicine.” Monthly Review: An Independent Socialist Magazine. Volume 56, issue 8, January 2005. Pages 40-48.]
      581. critical theory of postcommunism (Ovidiu Ţichindeleanu as pronounced in this MP3 audio file): The articles appliy critical social theory to the nation of Romania.
           “A guiding principle of the critical theory of postcommunism could be that any theoretical disenchantment is a function of the historical conditions that made it possible. For instance, the study of postcommunism brings to light a series of coincidences between neoconservative and certain leftist positions: the adoption of formulas such as ‘the failure of the Left,’ the rebuttal of feminism and multiculturalism, disdain for the ‘American university Left,’ a certain view on the decadence of true values, the rejection of analytical Marxism, the monologic discourse on ‘modernity,’ a resistance to plural ontologies and alternative epistemologies, and last but not least, a devaluation of the role of activism and/or militantism for theory itself.” [Ovidiu Ţichindeleanu, “Towards a critical theory of postcommunism?: Beyond anticommunism in Romania.” Radical Philosophy: Philosophical Journal of the Independent Left. Number 159. January/February 2010. Pages 26-32.]
           “The postcommunist transition has been characterized in Eastern Europe by the return and rearticulation of capitalism and coloniality in this region of the world. Seen from Eastern Europe, the postcommunist transition can be understood as the top-to-bottom integration of East European governmentalities into the political (European Union), security (North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), Frontex), and economic orders (International Monetary Fund, World Bank) of Western governmentalities, at the cost of the general population, and with the open support of the Eurocentric intellectual and formal civil society, including most of the former anticommunist dissidents. In so far as Romania is concerned, the depression of the late 1980s was followed — without any period of recovery — by the catastrophic depression of the 1990s, when poverty and social insecurity reached levels unheard of since World War Two.” [Ovidiu Ţichindeleanu, “Decolonial AestheSis in Eastern Europe: Potential Paths of Liberation.” Social Text. July 15th, 2013. Retrieved on August 22nd, 2016.]
      582. critique of Lasch (Michèle Barrett and Mary McIntosh): They critique Christopher Lasch’s approach to a “narcissistic” culture.
           “At the end of The Culture of Narcissism he [Christopher Lasch] calls, in a rare moment of optimism of the will, for the creation by citizens of ‘communities of competence’ and refers to ‘traditions of localism, self-help, and community action that only need the vision of a new society, a decent society, to give them new vigour.’ The call, however, is too little and too late. His whole analysis of family and state rests on a reactionary defence of the bourgeois, patriarchal, Christian form of the family, which leads to a distorted and exaggerated account of historical change. Furthermore it is an analysis so shot-through with individualism that the ‘vision’ of a new society so unconvincingly evoked at the last moment can inspire little confidence.” [Michèle Barrett and Mary McIntosh, “Narcissism and the Family: a Critique of Lasch.” New Left Review. Series I, number 135, September–October 1982. Pages 35-48.]
           “In order to break the existing pattern of dependence and put an end to the erosion of competence, citizens will have to take the solution of their problems into their own hands. They will have to create their own ‘communities of competence.’ Only then will the productive capacities of modern capitalism, together with the scientific knowledge that now serves it, come to serve the interests of humanity instead.” [Christopher Lasch. The Culture of Narcissism: American Life in an Age of Diminishing Expectations. New York: W. W. Norton & Company. 1979. Page 235.]
      583. human sensuous activity (Len Doyal and Roger Harris): They examine the Marxian approach to praxis and the phenomenological perspective on action.
           “This essay concerns the significance of ‘human sensuous activity’—what has become known variously as ‘praxis’ to many Marxists and ‘action’ to analytic and phenomenological philosophers. Put grandly, our thesis is that it is from labour, and not from language or thought, that the category of meaning arises. That is to say that a logically necessary foundation for agreement in what people say and mean is to be found in what they do—interpreted in a broad and not specifically economic sense which we shall clarify. Our subject matter can be described from a Marxist perspective as the division of manual from mental labour. However, we shall be discussing this division in ontological rather than historical terms.” [Len Doyal and Roger Harris, “The Practical Foundations of Human Understanding.” New Left Review. Series I, number 139, May–June 1983. Pages 59-78.]
      584. Marxist theory of truth (Peter Binns): The living science of Marxism, focused upon truth, should not degenerate into a newfangled scholasticism.
           “Successful agitation leads to the supersession of one agitational programme by another. Hence at one time it can be the demand for bread, at another the slogan ‘All power to the soviets,’ and at another the programme of the first congress of the Communist International. Clearly the only kind of structure which could be of use to practical or revolutionary marxism in its task of transforming reality, is not one in which practice has been divorced from theory, in which the uncovering of truth ‘all takes place within knowledge.’ On the contrary, this would be to turn marxism into the new scholasticism rather than a living science.” [Peter Binns, “The Marxist theory of Truth.” Radical Philosophy: Philosophical Journal of the Independent Left. Number 4, spring 1973. Pages 3-9.]
      585. new mysterianism (Thomas Nagel, Colin McGinn, and others): They develop an approach—originally labeled by Owen Flanagan—to the philosophy of mind and consciousness.
           “Besides the conscious-shy types there is another type that eschews the scientific study of consciousness. I call this second type the ‘new mysterians,’ after a forgettable 1960s pop group called Question Mark and the Mysterians. The new mysterious think that consciousness will never be understood. Whether its causal role is significant or not, it will not be understood. The old mysterians were dualists who thought that consciousness could not be understood because it operates according to nonnatural principles and has nonnatural properties. The new mysterious are naturalists. They believe that mind and consciousness exist and that they operate in accordance with natural principles and are comprised of natural properties, But the new mysterious are a postmodern group, naturalists with a kinky twist. They are trying to drive a railroad spike through the heart of scientism, the view that science will eventually explain whatever is natural. Thomas Nagel was the founder of this group. In his famous paper ‘What Is It like to Be a Bat?’ Nagel argued that there can be no remotely plausible naturalistic account of consciousness, that something essential will always be left out of even our very best theory.” [Owen Flanagan. The Science of the Mind. Second revised and expanded edition. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press. 1991. Page 313.]
           “… the essence of the belief that bats have experience is that there is something that it is like to be a bat. Now we know that most bats (the microchiroptera, to be precise) perceive the external world primarily by sonar, or echolocation, detecting the reflections, from objects within range, of their own rapid, subtly modulated, high-frequency shrieks. Their brains are designed to correlate the outgoing impulses with the subsequent echoes, and the information thus acquired enables bats to make precise discriminations of distance, size, shape, motion, and texture comparable to those we make by vision. But bat sonar, though clearly a form of perception, is not similar in its operation to any sense that we possess, and there is no reason to suppose that it is subjectively like anything we can experience or imagine. This appears to create difficulties for the notion of what it is like to be a bat. We must consider whether any method will permit us to extrapolate to the inner life of the bat from our own case, and if not, what alternative methods there may be for understanding the notion.” [Thomas Nagel, “What Is It Like to Be a Bat?” The Philosophical Review. Volume 83, number 4, October 1974. Pages 435-450.]
           “First-person phenomenal consciousness cannot, even in principle, be captured in the sort of third-person objective description that normal science relishes.
           “There is something right about this point, although it is implausibly used by many philosophers— the ones I dubbed ‘Mysterians’ a decade ago— to argue that although the mind is a natural phenomenon we humans are not smart enough to ever grasp or make intelligible its nature. Why’s that? Because we have no conceptual resources, nor are they in the offing, to comprehend a phenomenon as both subjective and objective. Certain scientistic types, some reductionists and eliminativists, inadvertently encourage mysterianism by seeming to suggest that subjective experience, once seen for what it is, disappears— it is reduced to something else, say the activity of cell assemblies, or eliminated, the way ‘phlogiston’ was eliminated as an explanation of heat exchange.”
           [Owen Flanagan. The Problem Of The Soul: Two Visions Of Mind And How To Reconcile Them. New York: Basic Books imprint of the Perseus Books Group. 2002. Page 88.]
           “The ‘mysterianism’ I advocate is really nothing more than the acknowledgment that human intelligence is a local, contingent, temporal, practical and expendable feature of life on earth – an incremental adaptation based on earlier forms of intelligence that no one would regard as faintly omniscient. The current state of the philosophy of mind, from my point of view, is just a reflection of one evolutionary time-slice of a particular bipedal species on a particular humid planet at this fleeting moment in cosmic history – as is everything else about the human animal. There is more ignorance in it than knowledge.– [Colin McGinn, “All machine and no ghost?: The more we look at the brain, the less it looks like a device for creating consciousness. Perhaps philosophers will never be able to solve the mystery.” New Statesman. February 20th, 2012. Pages 40-43.]
           “There is no denying that the ‘mysterian’ position is pessimistic about our ability to answer every question about nature that we can pose. Am I saying that all is futile and we should go and tend our garden? No, my position is not purely negative …. There are ten points that should serve to make what I am saying more palatable, even liberating.…

           1. “… there is plenty of interesting and important work to be done on the neurophysiology of the mind.
           2. “If we acknowledge that the source of the mystery lies in the structure of human intelligence, then we can avoid being drawn into religious mysticism about consciousness.…
           3. “Knowledge is generally a good thing, but it is not self-evident that complete knowledge of ourselves would leave us better off.…
           4. “If consciousness proves permanently enigmatic, a marvel of nature that we cannot explain, then we can retain our sense of awe about the universe.…
           5. “It is salutary to curb the scientific hubris that has dominated our culture during this century.…
           6. “… I would very much like to know what it is like to be a bat, but I am not willing to become a bat to satisfy my curiosity.
           7. “Nothing I have said precludes us from pursuing successful phenomenology, that is, the systematic description and classification of consciousness per se.…
           8. “Sometimes there is virtue in simply accepting one’s limitations and not trying to pretend that one has not limitations.…
           9. “… The weakness of the mind in one area is typically a side-effect of its strength in another area.…
           10. “A whole new field of investigation now opens up: the study of our cognitive strengths and weaknesses.”

           [Colin McGinn. The Mysterious Flame: Conscious Minds in a Material World. New York: Basic Books imprint of the Perseus Books Group. 1999. Pages 68-75.]

           “Daniel Dennett … pities his mysterian colleagues for imagining that consciousness is some kind of non-functional add-on to the mind which could in principle be separated from it (the ‘zombic hunch,’ Dennett calls this), but implies that the mistake is understandable and correctable.” [Nicholas Humphrey. Seeing Red: A Study in Consciousness. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press. 2008. Page 146.]

           “… some philosophers who do pay attention to empirical work on consciousness are intent on ‘discovering’ reasons why a science of consciousness is utterly impossible, and while at their best they play a valuable devil’s advocate role, much of the wrangling is more combative than constructive. Those defeatist philosophers— now known as mysterians—may in the end be right, of course, but on strategic grounds alone, we should postpone consideration of their self-fulfilling prophecy.” [Daniel C. Dennett, “A daring reconnaissance of red territory.” Brain. Volume 130, 2007. Pages 592-595.]
      586. secular philosophy (Thomas Nagel): He develops “a cosmic point of view” on a variety of issues, including justice, affirmative action, war, political theory, the mind–body problem, physicalism, Aristotelianism, eudaimonia, inner space, the unity of consciousness, and dreams.
           “My subject is the secular philosophical responses to this impulse. I will (somewhat arbitrarily) call the question to which it seeks an answer the cosmic question. It is a question to which a religion could provide an answer, if one accepted it, but my discussion will concentrate on nonreligious responses. The question, again, is this: How can one bring into one’s individual life a full recognition of one’s relation to the universe as a whole? It is this quite general question, rather than the more specific search for redemption, that I will focus on.
           “The secular responses fall into three categories: (a) those that reject the question; (b) those that construct an answer from the inside out, that is, starting from the human point of view; and (c) those that construct an answer from the outside in, that is, starting from a cosmic point of view.”
           [Thomas Nagel. Secular Philosophy and the Religious Temperament: Essays 2002-2008. Oxford, England, and New York: Oxford University Press. 2010. Page 17.]
           “… it is essential to recall that much of the practical employment of reason is in the service of lower functions. Is this a proper exercise of that faculty, or does it have a point beyond the uses of cleverness, prudence, and courage, beyond the rational calculation of the most sensible way to spend one’s time and money, or to organize society? This question prompts Aristotle to pass from the vague characterization that human life, as opposed to other life, is rational, to a consideration of the objects best suited for the exercise of this capacity.” [Thomas Nagel, “Aristotle on Eudaimonia.” Phronesis. Volume 17, number 3, 1972. Pages 252-259]
           “Many things happen in our bodies and our minds we do not have introspective access. With suitable training the range of our nonobservational, introspective awareness can be extended, but we are very complicated organisms, too complicated to oversee every detail of our own operation. Fortunately an enormous amount of what we and our bodies do does not require attention and is the result of minimal learning or none at all.” [Thomas Nagel, “The Boundaries of Inner Space.” The Journal of Philosophy. Volume 66, number 14, June 1969. Pages 452-458.]
           “Everyone knows that something has gone wrong, in the United States, with the conventions of privacy. Along with a vastly increased tolerance for variation in sexual life we have seen a sharp increase in prurient and censorious attention to the sexual lives of public figures and famous persons, past and present. The culture seems to be growing more tolerant and more intolerant at the same time, though perhaps different parts of it are involved in the two movements.” [Thomas Nagel, “Concealment and Exposure.” Philosophy & Public Affairs. Volume 27, number 1, winter 1998. Pages 3-30.]
           “An instrumentally justified principle for identifying fair procedures is very different, as a moral conception, from the deontological idea that some features of a process can legitimize or delegitimize the outcome in themselves, whereas others cannot. The case is analogous, and closely related, to that of a substitution of a purely instrumental criterion of responsibility and desert for a retributive one in the domain of punishment. There too one starts from the idea that people are responsible for causing harm to others, and deserve punishment for it, in the absence of a specific set of excusing conditions.” [Thomas Nagel, “Justice and Nature.” Oxford Journal of Legal Studies Volume 17, number 2, summer 1997. Pages 303-321.]
           “… I believe that there is a necessary connection in both directions between the physical and the mental, but that it cannot be discovered a priori. Opinion is strongly divided on the credibility of some kind of functionalist reductionism, and I won’t go through my reasons for being on the antireductionist side of that debate. Despite significant attempts by a number of philosophers to describe the functional manifestations of conscious mental states, I continue to believe that no purely functionalist characterization of a system entails—simply in virtue of our mental concepts—that the system is conscious.” [Thomas Nagel, “Conceiving the Impossible and the Mind-Body Problem.” Philosophy. Volume 73, number 285, July 1998. Pages 337-352.]
           “We do not live in a just world. This may be the least controversial claim one could make in political theory. But it is much less clear what, if anything, justice on a world scale might mean, or what the hope for justice should lead us to want in the domain of international or global institutions, and in the policies of states that are in a position to affect the world order.” [Thomas Nagel, “The Problem of Global Justice.” Philosophy & Public Affairs. Volume 33, number 2, spring 2005. Pages 113-147.]
           “I was once at an international seminar devoted substantially to the dis- cussion of individual rights, their moral basis, their boundaries, and their relation to other values, moral and political—the aim being to present recent developments in American political theory to interested parties from elsewhere. The Americans in the group were much concerned over such issues as freedom of expression for racists, access to pornography, affirmative action for women and minorities, and restrictions on abortion. After listening for a while to the admirably subtle discussion of these issues, some of the other participants began to grumble. They pointed out that in the countries they came from, there were no free elections, no free press, no protection against imprisonment or execution without trial or against torture by the police, no freedom of religion—or that their countries were threatened by radical religious move- ments which would quickly abolish such freedoms if they came to power. Why were we not talking about those things rather than these ridiculous issues of detail, which were of no concern to them?” [Thomas Nagel, “Personal Rights and Public Space.” Philosophy & Public Affairs. Volume 24, number 2, spring 1995. Pages 83-107.]
           “… there is much to be said about the instrumental value and disvalue of equality; the question of its intrinsic value does not arise in isolation. Yet the answer to that question determines what instrumental costs are acceptable. If equality is in itself good, producing it may be worth a certain amount of inefficiency and loss of liberty.” [Thomas Nagel, “The Justification of Equality.” Crítica: Revista Hispanoamericana de Filosofía. Volume 10, number 28, April 1978. Pages 3-31.]
           “The justice of institutions depends on their conformity to two principles. The first requires the greatest equal liberty compatible with a like liberty for all. The second (the difference principle) permits only those inequalities in the distribution of primary economic and social advantages that benefit everyone, in particular the worst off. Liberty is prior in the sense that it cannot be sacrificed for economic and social advantages, unless they are so scarce or unequal as to prevent the meaningful exercise of equal liberty until material conditions have improved.” [Thomas Nagel, “Rawls on Justice.” The Philosophical Review. Volume 82, number 2, April 1973. Pages 220-234.]
           “… race is an independent and even more intractable cause of the failure of fair equality of opportunity in our society. Because of slavery, followed by a century of legally enforced segregation and economic oppression, and because of their physical identifiability and the continuing prejudices of other members of the society that single them out, blacks form a hereditary group whose members inherit a generic social disadvantage.” [Thomas Nagel, “John Rawls and Affirmative Action.” The Journal of Blacks in Higher Education. Number 39, spring 2003. Pages 82-84.]
           “I believe that the division of standpoints within the individual is a permanent feature of the situation with which any realistic political theory must deal. The balance may be shifted, and various sorts of leverage may change the direction of the overall result, but the coexistence of personal and impersonal will remain, and they will always remain to some extent in competition.” [Thomas Nagel, “What Makes a Political Theory Utopian?” Social Research. Volume 56, number 4, winter 1989. Pages 903-920.]
           “From the apathetic reaction to atrocities committed in Vietnam by the United States and its allies, one may conclude that moral restrictions on the conduct of war command almost as little sympathy among the general public as they do among those charged with the formation of U.S. military policy. Even when restrictions on the conduct of warfare are defended, it is usually on legal grounds alone: their moral basis is often poorly understood. I wish to argue that certain restrictions are neither arbitrary nor merely conventional, and that their validity does not depend simply on their usefulness. There is, in other words, a moral basis for the rules of war, even though the conventions now officially in force are far from giving it perfect expression.” [Thomas Nagel, “War and Massacre.” Philosophy & Public Affairs. Volume 1, number 2, winter 1972. Pages 123-144.]
           “The concept of a person might possibly survive an application to cases which require us to speak of two or more persons in one body, but it seems strongly committed to some form of whole number countability. Since even this seems open to doubt, it is possible that the ordinary, simple idea of a single person will come to seem quaint some day, when the complexities of the human control system become clearer and we become less certain that there is anything very important that we are one of. But it is also possible that we shall be unable to abandon the idea no matter what we discover.” [Thomas Nagel, “Brain Bisection and the Unity of Consciousness.” Synthese. Volume 22, number 3/4, May 1971. Pages 396-413.]
           “It is the purpose of this paper to examine the reasons for believing that physicalism cannot possibly be true. I mean by physicalism the thesis that a person, with all his psychological attributes, is nothing over and above his body, with all its physical attributes. The various theories which make this claim may be classified according to the identities which they allege between the mental and the physical. These identities may be illustrated by the standard example of a quart of water which is identical with a collection of molecules, each containing two atoms of hydrogen and one of oxygen.” [Thomas Nagel, “Physicalism.” The Philosophical Review. Volume 74, number 3, July 1965. Pages 339-356.]
           “Dreams … are not mere memory phenomena. It is a mistake to invest the demonstration that is it impossible to have experiences while asleep with more import than it has. It is an observation about our use of the word ‘experience,’ and no more. It does not imply that nothing goes on in our minds while we dream. True, we cannot have experiences while asleep. But we can have dreams.” [Thomas Nagel, “Dreaming.” Analysis. Volume 19, number 5, April 1959. Pages 112-116.]
           “One would like [Thomas] Nagel to spell out more clearly why he dismisses theism as an answer to the cosmic question and, in so doing, engage some more sophisticated modern conceptions of theism, such as found in neoclassical metaphysics and process thought. Such modern theistic alternatives, for instance, would offer public discourse a more holistic conception of the world, which Nagel rightly seeks, without resorting to various forms of supernaturalism. All this notwithstanding, Nagel’s discussion of religion in the book makes a significant contribution for at least four reasons. First, his ‘religious temperament’ is both insightful and constructive. Second, his formulation of the ‘cosmic question’ is both existentially and metaphysically right on point. Third, his articulation of the various secular responses to the cosmic question offers a clear and nuanced map of the non-theistic philosophical alternatives. And, fourth, his trenchant critique of the reductionistic and anti-teleological tendencies of modern philosophy and science offers a valuable additional voice, indeed a secular voice, to the cultural debate over our understanding of the universe and our place within it.” [William Meyer, “Secular Philosophy and the Religious Temperament: Essays 2002-2008.” Review article. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion. Volume 70, number 3, December 2011. Pages 251-253.]
      587. theory of videotics (Richard Osborne): He examines one’s unconscious mind as a “master-tape of history.”
           “The realm of the videotic covers all spheres of human, and non-human, activity and extends to the unconscious, which we now know is structured like a video-tape. (Often badly worn and likely to play erratically through constant repetition and sudden fast-forward and reverse moves.) The role of the unconscious in the master-tape of history, a history of difference rendered intelligible through man’s technological development, remains under-theorised in the web of power relations which record history through man. In this analysis we can see the state as the plane of relations on which the master-tape is constructed and from which class copies are run to be distributed through the system we know as I.V.A.s. (Individual Videological Apparatuses).” [Richard Osborne, “Towards a Theory of Videotics.” Radical Philosophy: Philosophical Journal of the Independent Left. Number 36, spring 1984. Pages 27-28.]
      588. dogmatics of the True Conservative (Andrew Belsey): He presents an excellent critique of a particular version of conservatism.
           “The dogmatics of the True Conservative is ‘systematic and reasonable’; yet it cannot be presented as such because ‘the essence’ of conservatism ‘is inarticulate.’ To this contradiction is immediately added another: that in spite of its inarticulateness it is ‘capable of expression.’ Ah, but the contradictions resolve themselves at a higher level. Reading the True Conservative’s testament we find that he expresses himself mostly through allusions, images and examples, which allows a good deal of vagueness and imprecision into his discourse. Though ‘it is of the nature of conservatism to avoid abstractions,’ in fact it rarely descends from them, not even when offering an example, as it does not show how the example relates to the abstractions.” [Andrew Belsey, “The Real Meaning of Conservatism.” Radical Philosophy: Philosophical Journal of the Independent Left. Number 28, summer 1981. Pages 1-5.]
      589. geopolitical ideology (Michael Klare): Klare critiques the ideology of geopolitics.
           “Geopolitical ideology was later appropriated by [Adolf] Hitler and [Benito] Mussolini and by the Japanese militarists to explain and to justify their expansionist behavior. And it was this expansionist behavior—which threatened the geopolitical interest of the opposing powers—that led to the Second World War, not the internal politics of Germany, Italy, or Japan.
           “This ideology disappeared to some degree during the Cold War in favor of a model of ideological competition. That is to say, geopolitical ideology appeared inconsistent with the high-minded justifications (in which ‘democracy’ and ‘freedom’ largely figured) given for interventions in the third world.”
           [Michael Klare, “The New Geopolitics.” Monthly Review: An Independent Socialist Magazine. Volume 55, issue 3, July 2003. Pages 51-56.]
      590. emancipation from the oppressive basal frameworks (Mikko Salmela as pronounced in this MP3 audio file): He examines the need for a “regulative ideal” to eliminate the basal (i.e., base) emotions associated with forms of oppression.
           “… recalcitrant emotions constitute a vital source of self-knowledge which, in turn, may contribute to … emancipation from the oppressive basal frameworks. Sincerity is, thus, an important virtue of self-knowledge.…
           “… the normative and emancipatory aspect of authenticity has been important for existentialists and feminists.…
           “… outlaw emotions may give rise to a conscious insight into the sexist, racist, and other oppressive frameworks and thus pave way to emancipation from those frameworks.…
           “… the overall project of emancipation, whether sexual, racial, or political, requires a regulative ideal for the emotions of emancipated selves as well.”
           [Mikko Salmela, “What Is Emotional Authenticity?” Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour. Volume 35, issue 3, 2005. Pages 209-230.]
      591. ethical caring (Nel Noddings): She develops an approach to moral education.
           “From the perspective taken in this book, natural caring is the motivating force behind ethical caring. When something goes wrong (or might go wrong) in our relational encounters, we want to restore or maintain natural caring. To do this, we draw on what I have called our ‘ethical ideal,’ our memories of caring and being cared for. We ask how we might act if this other were not so difficult, if the situation were less complicated, if the burdens were not so great, if we were at our caring best. And through this often challenging process of reflection, we decide what to do, how to respond.
           “Ethical caring, then, derives its strength from natural caring. This is clearly a reversal of Kantian priorities. Ethical caring does not seek moral credit; it seeks a response from the cared-for that completes the encounter—a recognition that is usually spontaneously offered in natural caring. Natural caring is the cherished condition; ethical caring seeks to restore or replace natural caring.”
           [Nel Noddings. Caring: A Feminine Approach to Ethics and Moral Education. Second edition. Berkeley, California: University of California Press. 2013. Page xvi.]
           “[Nel] Noddings’s ethics of caring is not typically characterized by her ontological analysis of a relational self. Only through scattered statements does it become clear that she defines humans as ontologically related to others.… This naturalistic account of the self, however, does not provide a clear deliberation on how exactly human relations constituted the self. Since the notion of a related self is the condition for a new ethics, an analysis of the soundness and insightfulness of the self as the foundation for a new ethics is difficult. Nevertheless, throughout her exposition of the ethics of caring, it seems clear that mother and mothering is the model self and relation on which she bases her ethics.” [Guoping Zhao, “Relational Self, Nel Noddings’s and Emmanuel Levinas’s Ethics, and Education.” Philosophy of Education. 2011. Pages 238-244.]
      592. critical theory of cyberspace (A. Michael Froomkin): He applies Jürgen Habermas’s theory of communicative action to the Internet.
           “I have argued above that the IETF [Internet Engineering Task Force] standards process fits [Jürgen] Habermas’s conditions for the best practical discourse extraordinarily well [in his theory of communicative action]. If the IETF is an example of the discourse principle in action, then critical theory suggests that it sets a standard against which other rulemaking processes should be compared. Although in principle there is no reason why the comparison would not be apt for any rulemaking process, it seems particularly appropriate to begin by focusing on the rulemaking processes that are most similar to the IETF itself, that is, other Internet-based standards processes concerned with making rules that govern how the Internet itself functions. Although the IETF is the leading standards body for the Internet, many formal and informal Internet standards do originate elsewhere.” [A. Michael Froomkin, “Toward a Critical Theory of Cyberspace.” Harvard Law Review. Volume 16, number 3, January 2003. Pages 749-873.]
      593. mediation of power (Aeron Davis): He examines the manner in which political agendas are constructed.
           “… it is not a matter of news media, as independent variable, affecting the cognitive processes and behaviours of political elites. Nor is it simply a matter of political elites adapting their thinking and behaviour to accommodate the requirements of journalists and news production. Instead, journalists and politicians regularly have some form of combined role in the identification and selection of issues and their solutions. How that combined role is utilised in agenda-setting, from the point of view of politicians, is something rarely explored in research.
           “The study presented here is ‘audience-centred’ and is conceived along these latter lines of ‘mediation’ and ‘social interactionism.’ Its starting assumptions are that: politicians consume and make extensive use of news in their daily information gathering and cognitive processes; politicians also have regular interactions with journalists in the course of their work and this also affects their thinking and behaviour. Consequently, journalism and journalists are likely to play a part in the construction of political agendas and political deliberations generally. The study is based on a set of 40 semistructured interviews with MPs [members of the UK Parliament]. It also draws on 12 interviews, with parliamentary officials and members of the House of Lords (all former MPs), and two related sets of interviews with political journalists and political support staff.”
           [Aeron Davis. The Mediation of Power: A critical introduction. London and New York: Routledge imprint of Taylor & Francis Group, an Informa PLC business. 2007. Page 100.]
      594. radical philosophy (Peter Binns and others): It is a critical approach to philosophy, and a social movement, represented in the academic journal, Radical Philosophy.
           “… radical philosophers must take as their starting point the current problems facing the working class. [Antonio] Gramsci correctly saw the only organ through which this could be achieved as the revolutionary party. It is the place where the experience of the class is generalized. It is the ‘crucible where the unification of theory and practice understood as a real historical process, takes place.’” [Peter Binns, “Beginning from Commitment.“ Symposium: What is Radical Philosophy? Radical Philosophy: Philosophical Journal of the Independent Left. Number 3, winter 1972. Page 26.]
           “The radical philosophers … say that the traditionalists who have a stranglehold on the universities are simply occupying themselves with trivilialities and refusing to do what they ought to do. They just state that there is one ‘correct’ procedure for philosophers, and this is the procedure which will lead to a revolution of values. They, on their side, resent the fact that there are so many people called philosophers who are doing nothing at all according to this correct procedure.” [Mary Warnock, “Marxist Course.” Symposium: What is Radical Philosophy? Radical Philosophy: Philosophical Journal of the Independent Left. Number 3, winter 1972. Page 27-28.]
           “… there is surely something new and exciting about the Radical Phllosophy movement. For the first time, the critics of orthodox philosophy are not isolated individuals but an organized group. The group is, as Jerry Cohen said to me only ‘a loose coalition of different tendencies and views which share a sense of alienation from the predominant modes of philosophical theory and practice in this country.‘ But there is the chance that a few philosophers, their isolation removed and their confidence strengthened, may now be encouraged to do something really constructive. It is time for another revolution in British philosophy, and I think the Radical Philosophy movement will act as a powerful catalyst.” [Benjamin Gibbs, “Academic Philosophy and Radical Philosophy.” Radical Philosophy: Philosophical Journal of the Independent Left. Number 1, spring 1972. Page 5.]
           “Contemporary British philosophy is at a dead end. Its academic practitioners have all but abandoned the attempt to understand the world, let alone to change it. They have made philosophy into a narrow and specialised academic subject of little relevance or interest to anyone outside the small circle of Professional Philosophers.
           “Many students and teachers are now dissatisfied with this state of affairs, but so far they have been isolated. The result has been that serious philosophical work outside the conventional sphere has been minimal.
           “The Radical Philosophy Group has been set up to challenge this situation, by people within philosophy departments and in other fields of work. We aim to question the institutional divisions which have so impoverished philosophy: for example, the divisions between academic departments which have cut philosophers off from the important philosophical work already being done by psychologists, sociologists and others; the division between students and teachers which has divorced academic philosophy from the radical activity and ideas of students; and, above all, the divisions which have isolated the universities and other educational institutions from the wider society, thereby narrowing the horizons of philosophical concern.”
           [Editors, “Founding Statement.” Editorial. Radical Philosophy: Philosophical Journal of the Independent Left. Number 1, spring 1972. Frontispiece.]
           “What, then, of the idea of a radical philosophy? The title of this conference – ‘30 Years of Radical Politics and Philosophy’ – conjugates ‘philosophy’ with ‘radical politics,’ studiously avoiding the more tricky term ‘radical philosophy’, and not just for reasons of modesty, or to avoid confusion with the history of the journal.” [Peter Osborne, “Radicalism and philosophy.” Radical Philosophy: Philosophical Journal of the Independent Left. Number 103, Septenber/October 2000. Pages 6-11.]
           “This 200ᵗʰ issue will be the final issue of the current print edition of Radical Philosophy, which has retained the same basic format since the introduction of the Commentary section back in 1994.…
           “Radical Philosophy plans to announce details of its next instantiation to its subscribers and other readers early in 2017.”
           [Peter Osborne, “Editorial: Political physics.” Radical Philosophy: Philosophical Journal of the Independent Left. Number 200, November/December 2016. Page 2.]
      595. politics of Radical Philosophy (David-Hillel Ruben): He critiques the question of whether an involvement of radical philosophers in radical politics would be productive.
           “… many radicals are resigning from Boards of Studies across Britain, since their presence there simply served to legitimize forms which they could not change. Again, someone else suggested that Radical Philosophy should involve itself more with radical political groups. The Claimants Union was mentioned as an example. But do you teach people merely how to receive maximum goodies from the bourgeois state, or do you use it to expose the limits of the bourgeois state, and therefore teach people not to depend on and fetishize the State as an omnipotent and eternal form on which they depend? In the absence of a coherent theory, situated in the debates that have occupied Marxists (or maybe even Anarchists) for a hundred and some years, I really don’t see that Radical Philosophy qua Radical Philosophy will lead people to take the objectively right decisions whatever their intentions.” [David-Hillel Ruben, “The Politics of Radical Philosophy.” Radical Philosophy: Philosophical Journal of the Independent Left. Number 4, spring 1973. Pages 34-37.]
      596. pirate philosophy (Gary Hall): He proposes an approach to radical philosophy based upon resistance.
           “What if we … in our capacity as academics, authors, writers, thinkers and scholars want to resist the continued imposition of a neoliberal political rationality that may appear dead on its feet but is still managing to blunder on? …
           “… what is interesting is the potential pirate philosophy contains for the development of a new kind of economy and society: one based far less on individualism, possession, acquisition, accumulation, competition, celebrity, and ideas of knowledge, research and thought as something to be owned, commodified, communicated, disseminated and exchanged as the property of single, indivisible authors (who, as Andrew Ross notes, are often likely to be corporate entities).”
           [Gary Hall, “Pirate Radical Philosophy.” Radical Philosophy: Philosophical Journal of the Independent Left. Number 173, May/June 2012. Pages 33-40.]
      597. instrumental adaptation (Simon Winlow and Steve Hall): They contrast this reaction to social, cultural, and economic change with creative resistance.
           “We contend that growing numbers of today’s young people exhibit forms of identity and behaviour indicative of instrumental adaptation rather than creative resistance to underlying social, economic and cultural change. Looking at the data gathered so far here and in our wider ethno graphic project …, it is entirely reasonable to suggest that the ability of Western societies to maintain a minimum degree of social cohesion will become a matter of growing significance in the coming years. ‘Youth identity’ numbers amongst a broad range of social phenomena that register the breakdown of the modernist industrial order without necessarily indicating what stable forms might be replacing it or waiting in the wings. Will the next phase of capitalist social history be a Utopia of burgeoning personal freedom, trickle-down economics and universal prosperity or a bleaker dystopian world of atomization and deepening divisions driven into hitherto unknown territory by the remorseless economic logic of global consumer capitalism?” [Simon Winlow and Steve Hall, “Living for the weekend: Youth identities in northeast England.” Ethnography. Volume 10, number 1, March 2009. Pages 91-113.]
      598. production of morality (Tony Skillen): He develops a Marxist critique of morality.
           “The Production of Morality: the Vanishing Hand
           “Morality rests on and reinforces human isolation. social virtue is a means of avoiding a guilty conscience – the earthly wages of sin. The production of this conscientiousness, in turn, is the specific function of the family and the school, as well as the old mother church. Parents and teachers are the judges of ‘acts’ and the administrators of rewards for goodness and punishments for naughtiness – the conscience and the whole servile habit surrounding it is their introjected shadow.…
           “… [Karl] Marx could scorn morality yet assail the evils of capitalism.”
           [Tony Skillen, “Marxism and Morality.” Radical Philosophy: Philosophical Journal of the Independent Left. Number 8, summer 1974. Pages 10-15.]
      599. pure capitalism (Étienne Balibar as pronounced in this MP3 audio file): He considers the hypothesis that we are only now entering this stage.
           “One hypothesis we can formulate, adhering closely to a certain Marxist logic while turning it against some of its postulates about the philosophy of history, is that we are only now entering capitalist society (and, as always, we are only noticing this after the fact, when it is late, perhaps even too late) – or, if you prefer, we’re only now entering ‘pure’ capitalism, which does not have to deal constantly with heterogeneous social forces that it must either incorporate or repress, or with which it must strike some sort of compromise. ‘Pure’ capitalism is free to deal only with the effects of its own logic of accumulation and with those things necessary for its own reproduction.” [Étienne Balibar, “Critique in the 21ˢᵗ century: Political economy still, and religion again.” Emiliano Battista, translator. Radical Philosophy: Philosophical Journal of the Independent Left. Number 200, November/December 2016. Pages 11-21.]
      600. church of animal liberation (Bruce Friedrich): He makes a rather novel proposal to protect the rights of animals under the U.S. Constitution.
           “In this Article, I contend that a belief in animal liberation qualifies as religion under the Free Exercise Clause jurisprudence of the United States Constitution. Thus, every time a prison warden, public school teacher or administrator, or government employer refuses to accommodate the ethical belief of an animal liberationist, they are infringing on that person’s religious freedom, and they should have to satisfy the same constitutional or statutory requirements that would adhere were the asserted interest based on more traditional religious exercise. One possible solution to the widespread violations of the First Amendment rights of animal liberationists would be the incorporation of a ‘Church of Animal Liberation’ under the Internal Revenue Code (as a proper church or as a religious organization). This would help to protect the free exercise rights of those who believe in animal rights because it would give them a religious organization to reference—with articles of incorporation that align with the jurisprudential definition of religion—in making their requests for religious accommodation.…
           “It is worth briefly distinguishing animal rights from animal welfare; the latter philosophy can look extremely similar to animal rights, especially because animals are treated abysmally in the vast majority of ways they are used in society, so those who denounce cruelty to animals in the context of common uses are sometimes confused with animal liberationists.”
           [Bruce Friedrich, “The Church of Animal Liberation: Animal Rights as ‘Religion’ Under the Free Exercise Clause.” Animal Law. Volume 21, number 65, October 2014. Pages 65-119.]
      601. society of enmity (Achille Mbembe): He considers a subject similar to what Foster refers to as “the great unraveling” or what Roy Bhaskar calls “demi–reality.”
           “The desire for an enemy, the desire for apartheid, for separation and enclosure, the phantasy of extermination, today all haunt the space of this enchanted zone. In a number of cases, a wall is enough to express it. There exist several kinds of wall, but they do not fulfil the same functions. A separation wall is said to resolve a problem of excess numbers, a surplus of presence that some see as the primary reason for conditions of unbearable suffering. Restoring the experience of one’s existence, in this sense, requires a rupture with the existence of those whose absence (or complete disappearance) is barely experienced as a loss at all – or so one would like to believe. It also involves recognizing that between them and us there can be nothing that is shared in common. The anxiety of annihilation is thus at the heart of contemporary projects of separation.” [Achille Mbembe, “The society of enmity.” Radical Philosophy: Philosophical Journal of the Independent Left. Number 200, November/December 2016. Pages 23-35.]
      602. counter–insurgency theory (Mark Neocleous [Greek/Hellēniká, Μαρκ Νεοκλέους, Mark Neokléous as pronounced in this MP3 audio file] and Maria Kastrinou [Greek/Hellēniká, Μαρία Καστρινού, María Kastrinoú as pronounced in this MP3 audio file]): They critique community policing as a counter–insurgency measure leveled against migrants.
           “… community policing has since its inception been regarded as a fundamental feature of counter-insurgency theory and practice, certainly since at least the 1970s when community policing became policing’s new big idea. So connected are counter-insurgency and community policing that one RAND [Research and Development Corporation] document produced for the Office of the [U.S.] Secretary of Defense in 2006 summed up fifty years of counter-insurgency research by observing that counter-insurgency ‘is best thought of as a massively enhanced version of the “community policing” technique that emerged in the 1970s.’. In the mind of the state, community policing is counterinsurgency, part and parcel of ‘the other war,’ as counter-insurgency is sometimes called, against insurgents, rebels, the politically organized and the socially marginalized.” [Mark Neocleous and Maria Kastrinou, “The EU hotspot: Police war against the migrant.” Radical Philosophy: Philosophical Journal of the Independent Left. Number 200, November/December 2016. Pages 3-9.]
      603. ideological functions of contemporary moral and political philosophy (Peter Binns): He examines the functions of morality under laissez-faire capitalism.
           “We live in societies not merely – as [Thomas] Hobbes and [John] Locke believed – to satisfy pre-existent individual needs and wants, but because our very needs themselves are overwhelmingly collective and social – they could neither be fulfilled nor created without society. One of the chief ideological functions of contemporary moral and political philosophy is to obscure this point, and by doing so it has covertly underwritten and endorsed laissez-faire Liberalism. Society, this theory informs us, exists solely to give the pre-existing ‘individual’ more elbow room. It therefore sees any attempt to use society to create collective satisfactions and freedoms as an unjustifiable encroachment on the ‘rights’ of the ‘individuals.’” [Peter Binns, “Anti-Moralism.” Radical Philosophy: Philosophical Journal of the Independent Left. Number 10, spring 1975. Pages 18-21.]
      604. critique of authenticity (Roger Waterhouse): He examines the problematic nature of authenticity.
           “Inauthenticity …, playing a part, putting up a front, might at first sight seem more like a straight case of self-relationship, with no essential involvement of others. After all I can rehearse my part alone, in front of the mirror. If I am a secret transvestite I might altogether avoid the company of others when I play my part. But of course the whole significance of role-playing derives from it being essentially a way of presenting myself to others. And even when I am rehearsing, or secretly performing, its significance still derives from its being a pretended relating to others. It is of course a highly sophisticated activity, one which has to be learned and one which forms an essential element in the games of even very small children.” [Roger Waterhouse, “A Critique of Authenticity.” Radical Philosophy: Philosophical Journal of the Independent Left. Number 20, summer 1978. Pages 22-26.]
      605. revolutionary abolitionism (Gopal Balakrishnan [Hindī, गोपाल बालाकृष्णन, Gopāla Bālākrṣṇana as pronounced in this MP3 audio file]): He considers one of the major themes of Karl Marx’s life work.
           “Implicit in … [the] conceptual opposition of state and civil or bourgeois society was an historical process resulting in the inversion of the order of determination between them, the unchaining of its remorseless economic laws leading to the abolition of its constitutive class relations.…
           “… [Karl Marx’s] critique of political economy led to the identification of a law of accumulation that culminated in an absolute class polarization, inexorably leading to its own abolition, and with it the abolition of the state, private property and the family.
           “In common with other Young Hegelians, Marx held that all particular relations and forms not directly based on human universality must be abolished. Marx’s specific variant of this conviction might be best described as ‘abolitionism.’ The Young Hegelians held that religion state and property deserved to perish—with different understandings of what that might entail—because criticism had demonstrated that they were artifacts of man’s servitude and ignorance. In the previous century Enlightenment criticism had hollowed out the old regime, making the Revolution both possible and necessary.”
           [Gopal Balakrishnan, “The Abolitionist—I.” New Left Review. Series II, number 90, November–December 2014. Pages 101-136.]
           “[Karl] Marx never abandoned the revolutionary horizon of his political-intellectual outlook in the approach to 1848, even though its distinguishing language of state and revolution was entirely omitted from his later economics. Moreover, this commitment to the Good Old Cause across the wretched decade that followed proved to be untimely in the best sense. The Paris Commune revealed the potential of the older problematic for further development, and kept open that horizon for another era. Thereafter, the impetus of the early Marx—of revolutionary abolitionism—has stirred in every subsequent great rebellion, from the Russian and Chinese Revolutions to anti-colonialism to the cycle of student and workers’ struggles that preceded the onset of neo-liberalism.” [Gopal Balakrishnan, “The Abolitionist—II.” New Left Review. Series II, number 91, January–February 2015. Pages 69-100.]
      606. occult construction of the world (Alfred Gell): He critically examines world-construction in magical systems.
           “The occult construction of the world …
           “… Because our own explanations of phenomena are overwhelmingly cast in a causal mould, only in the interstices of an otherwise universal causality would it seem that there was anything left to explain. But it is not necessary to see things in this light. What I am postulating, as a correlate to magical or ritual thought, is a world-construction within which events are objectively speaking auite normal and causally-explicable (such as births, death, marriage, productive activities, the seasonal cycle, and so forth) – are grasped as synchronistic phenomena, i.e., as complexes of meaning.”
           [Alfred Gell, “Understanding the Occult.” Radical Philosophy: Philosophical Journal of the Independent Left. Number 9, winter 1974. Pages 17-26.]
      607. self–reflecting stance of philosophy (Lars Albinus as pronounced in this MP3 audio file): He develops an approach to religion focusing on truth, name, and habitation.
           “Taking my own view …, I have laid out a perspective in which religion is summoned as a stranger in the twilight of being friend as well as foe, a partner as well as an adversary, within a self-reflecting stance of philosophy. My thesis is that ‘truth,’ ‘name,’ and ‘habitation’ emerge as nodes of existential importance in religion seen from the angle of thinking initiated in the Twentieth Century and that this perspective not only structures a certain view of religion but is also a theme in its own right in contemporary philosophy …. However, the respects in which these confluences appear differ. What may be glimpsed from the pragmatic view of truth, for instance, as so many uses of the word (challenging the notion of a single concept of truth), does not find a parallel in myth or religion. Instead, myth and religion seem to he recognizable instances of this pragmatic ‘truth’ contrary to their own view.” [Lars Albinus. Religion as a Philosophical Matter: Concerns about Truth, Name, and Habitation. Creative Commons. Warsaw, Poland, and Berlin, Germany: De Gruyter Open Ltd. imprint of Walter de Gruyter GmbH. 2016. Page 222.]
      608. Marxist critique of traditional epistemology (Wal Suchting as pronounced in this MP3 audio file): He examines the difficulties concerned with establishing a Marxist epistemology.
           “In … [a] sense there is no Marxist-materialist ‘theory of knowledge’ or ‘epistemology’ in the sense of a set of propositions about the possible forms and justifications of knowledge in advance of actual procedures of inquiry. Marxist-materialist epistemology, if it can be called that, is negative: it endeavors to remove obstacles (cf. Locke) from the paths of inquiry, to keep open what traditional epistemological ideologies seek to close. Thus, e.g., the considerations on truth did not seek to oppose a ‘Marxist’ conception of truth to others, but rather to remove the ideology of ‘truth.’ Such a position determined the structure of this essay, which laid itself out in the form of critical reactions to received positions.
           “But this must be supplemented by the remark that nevertheless the considerations advanced have political significance, in the sense that it is a … thesis that an ‘open’ problematic of inquiry is one which, when appropriately embodied in social-political practices, is more likely to favor certain directions of social development than others (directions which lead to greater degree of human emancipation). But this is another story.”
           [W. Suchting, “Knowledge and Practice: Towards a Marxist Critique of Traditional Epistemology.” Science & Society. Volume 47, number 1, spring 1983. Pages 2-36.]
      609. Marxist critique of Weberian class analyses (Jon Gubbay): He compares an approach based upon the views of Max Weber with one based upon the views of Karl Marx.
           “Although Marxist class analysis is a distinct enterprise from Weberian class analysis, it is possible for it to draw upon insights and research findings of the latter, although reinterpretation is then necessary. For example, research within a Weberian framework on social mobility, life chances, values and identities might be utilised within a Marxist analysis of the mechanisms promoting and inhibiting class consciousness.
           “It may be useful, in drawing this section to a close, to suggest ways in which the theoretical apparatus of Marxist class analysis might be profitably developed. First, more dynamic interactive class models should be constructed; that is, the image of the flow diagram between classes and class fractions is superior to that of the typology or map.…
           “Secondly, there is a need to re-examine the foundations of the labour theory of value in order to reconceptualise the state as part of the system it regulates rather than as an agent which ‘intervenes’ in it.”
           [Jon Gubbay, “A Marxist Critique of Weberian Class Analyses.” Sociology. Volume 31, number 1, February 1997. Pages 73-89.]
      610. Marxist critique of Weberian rationality (George Friedman): He presents a Marxist critique of Weberian instrumental (or formal) rationality.
           “For Western Marxists, the problem of Weberianism (or the problem of the social and intellectual pathology he described; it being never altogether clear the extent to which these symptoms were pathological for Weber, and the extent to which his treatment of them was to be seen as merely a healthy clearing of the air) posed a threat to socialism at least as much as it represents a standpoint from which to attack capitalism.…
           “Thus, Western Marxism … faced the dilemma or retaining some standpoint for making rational statements about society and the world, without succumbing to Weberian instrumentality and quantification. If they strayed too far into [Max] Weber’s camp, they feared becoming, not so much Weberians, as Leninist and Stalinists.”
           [George Friedman, “Eschatology vs. Aesthetics: The Marxist Critique of Weberian Rationality.” Sociological Theory. Volume 4, number 2 autumn 1986. Pages 186-193.]
      611. historical archaeology of capitalist dispossession (LouAnn Wurst): She argues that capitalism should explicitly become the focus of research in Marxist archaeology.
           “Marxist archaeologists have typically been more prevalent (although still a minority) in the subdiscipline of historical archaeology, which deals with the recent past. Historical archaeology has been defined as the archaeology of the capitalist world, although more benign terms such as ‘modernism’ or ‘the modern world’ are more common …. [It] … has recently [been] claimed that historical archaeology has yet to develop an adequate set of problems to guide and sustain the discipline. I would argue that this is because historical archaeologists have seldom made capitalism the explicit focus of their research.” [LouAnn Wurst, “The historical archaeology of capitalist dispossession.” Capital & Class. Volume 39, number 1, 2015. Pages 33-49.]
      612. cultural phenomenology of culture (Jacqueline M. Martinez): She considers the phenomenological focus in the work of some Latina feminists.
           “In the work that follows, I investigate how the phenomenological emphasis in the work of Latina feminists brings issues of culture and communication directly to bear in ways that allow many of the normative presumptions carried within the discourses that sustain academic and epistemological legitimation to be exposed and interrogated—pushing scholarship into a closer connection with the world we live in. I take that world to be one in which interracial, interethnic, and intercultural communication is interpersonally strained, sustaining systems of meaning in which firmly held and unchecked prejudices remain tacitly and powerfully at work. In pursuing this project it is possible to cultivate perceptual capacities that aid us greatly in critiquing and undercutting racist, sexist, heterosexist presumptions, and individualistic dispositions as they are expressed (made actual) in the concrete, immediate, and embodied lives of human beings communicating. Attention to lived experience is essential, but is not in itself sufficient for this task.” [Jacqueline M. Martinez, “Culture, Communication, and Latina Feminist Philosophy: Toward a Critical Phenomenology of Culture.” Hypatia. Volume 29, number 1, winter 2014. Pages 221-236.]
      613. information inequality (Herbert Schiller): Examines the domination of the information media by corporate capitalism.
           “… [There are] two powerful forces dominating the social sphere at this time. These are a largely freewheeling corporate enterprise system, exerting its will locally and globally, in tandem with an unprecedentedly influential and privately-owned information apparatus, largely devoted to money-making and the avoidance of social criticism.
           “These are the primary sources of today’s deepening social crisis, though clearly other tributaries to current disorders also exist. Still, it is the corporate world’s almost total rejection of social accountability, whatever the arena, that produces a national mood of futility and a steady unravelling of the social fabric.
           [Herbert Schiller. Information Inequality: The Deepening Social Crisis in America. London and New York: Routledge imprint of Taylor & Francis Group, an Informa PLC business. 1996. Kindle edition.]
           “Herbert I. Schiller (1919-2000) was the most prominent figure among a group of Critical Theorists (something of a euphemism for Marxist-influenced scholarship in North America) commenting on trends in the information domain during the late twentieth century.” [Frank Webster. Theories of the Information Society. Third edition. London and New York: Routledge imprint of Taylor & Francis Group, an Informa PLC business. 2006. Page 125.]
      614. informational capitalism (Frank Webster): He develops an elaborate critique of the “information society.”
           “It is my view that we may best appreciate information trends by situating them within the history and pressures of capitalist development. In this, history does matter, so one is not suggesting that capitalism is the same today as it ever was. The informational capitalism we have today is significantly different from the corporate capitalism that was established in the opening decades of the twentieth century, just as that was distinguishable from the period of laissez-faire of the mid- to late nineteenth century. An adequate account of contemporary capitalism would need to identify its particular features, prominent among which are the presence of unprecedentedly large transnational corporations, an intensification of competition on a global scale (and thereby an acceleration of the pace of change within capitalist parameters), the relative decline of national sovereignty and, above all, globalisation. While it is an extraordinarily complex phenomenon, globalisation does, for the most part, shape the world in ways that bring it into conformity with Western ways.” [Frank Webster. Theories of the Information Society. Third edition. London and New York: Routledge imprint of Taylor & Francis Group, an Informa PLC business. 2006. Pages 267-268.]
      615. Hegelian Marxism (Jean Hyppolite as pronounced in this MP3 audio file and others): Develops an approach to Karl Marx based on Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (MP3 audio file).
           “In an extremely cogent manner, [Karl] Marx shows the relation between the science of economics and idealist philosophy from [Immanuel] Kant to [Georg Wilhelm Friedrich] Hegel. The task is to integrate the human science of political economy with Hegel’s Phenomenology, with its concept of negation, the transformation of nature by human labor that humanizes nature and as its counterpart raises the individual to the state of universal man with an understanding of the collective relations and objectivity of being. It is such a unity that Marx seeks for philosophy and economics—a unity that would lead to a new conception of man and the human future, to a praxis that reconciles speculative knowledge and human life as a historical development. In Marx’s opinion, philosophy reaches an impasse in the form of speculative idealism. By restricting itself to the comprehension of what is, as Hegel did, philosophy ends in an insurmountable contradiction. However, the relation of the two disciplines allows political economy, on the one hand, to expand to include the entire problem of man and the relation of man to nature, and philosophy, on the other hand, to transcend itself as speculative knowledge and to realize itself in an action that is the effective emancipation of man rather than merely speculative wisdom.” [Jean Hyppolite. Studies on Marx and Hegel. John O’Neill, translator. New York: Harper Torchbooks imprint of Harper & Row, Publishers. 1973. Pages 72-73.]
      616. Marxist Hegelianism (Chris Cutrone): He presents a Marxist-Hegelian approach to proletarian socialism.
           “The question is, what relevance has [Karl] Marx’s Hegelianism today, and what is the relevance of taking such a Hegelian approach to the history of Marxism subsequent to Marx? ….
           “Marx was not the pre-eminent communist of his time, but rather its critic, seeking to push it further. Marxism was the attempted Hegelian self-consciousness of proletarian socialism as the subject-object of capital.”
           [Chris Cutrone, “Defending Marxist Hegelianism against a Marxist critique.” Weekly Worker. Issue 878, August 11th, 2011. Pages 14-15.]
      617. post-Hegelian Marxist praxis (J. D. Casten): This approach is used to deconstruct artificial intelligence.
           “Now, Critical Theory (and [Theodor] Adorno’s Negative Dialectic), as developed in the Frankfurt School, seems aimed, like an active Darwinism (or more accurately, a post-Hegelian Marxist praxis) at propelling culture forward by a critique of that present which is a remnant of the past: the status quo. Hence the critique of repetitious and formulaic art, and the anti-systematic, anti-methodological, and difficult to summarize, appropriate, and co-opt style of Adorno’s thinking that favors bold schisms and unfamiliar shocks, which would awaken people from their dogmatic slumber. (A possible critique of such a notion might make reference to the fact that errant DNA would more often lead to dysfunction rather than better adaption to existing and new niches in the ecological and sociological environment.)
           “The link between the particular and practice in opposition to theory, is important, in that while theory often strives for that which is universal and absolute (think science and mathematics), practice operates temporally through change, as the particular itself also changes relative to some other particular (spatiotemporally). There is a tension between the contingent, singular, dynamic particular, and the theoretical reasoning that tries to freeze it, e.g. in a concept or percept, through hypostasis, reification and analytical definition: a fetishism that isolates some feature of the inexhaustible ‘object.’”
           [J. D. Casten. Cybernetic Revelation: Deconstructing Artificial Intelligence. Eugene, Oregon: Post Egoism Media. 2012. Page 444.]
      618. Neoplatonic Marxism (Arran Gare): He discusses the relationship between Neoplatonic Christianity and Neoplatonic Marxism.
           “I have argued here for the indissociability of theory and praxis, and for the capacity of metaphysics to go beyond prevailing forms of thought and praxis and thereby to reveal the limitations of the metaphysical assumptions which dominate them. As well as serving to make the world intelligible, a metaphysical system must articulate the problems and aspirations of people and reveal to them how such problems can be overcome and how their aspirations can be realized. In earlier chapters of this work the nature of this dialect between metaphysics and action has been shown: how in the early Middle Ages a version of Neoplatonic Christianity served to unify society and then to provide the means whereby the church was able to achieve ascendancy over secular rulers, how in the seventeenth century mechanistic materialism was able to provide a coherent perspective on both the social and natural world to provide the rising bourgeoisie with a new basis for interpreting the past and legitimating their struggle for political power, and how Neoplatonic Marxism provided the ideological means for the radical intelligentsia and the proletariat to gain and maintain power in the Soviet Union.” [Arran Gare. Beyond European Civilization: Marxism, Process Philosophy, and the Environment. Bungendore, New South Wales, Australia: Eco-Logical Press. 1993. Pages 131-132.]
      619. critical urban theory (Neil Brenner, Peter Marcuse as pronounced in this MP3 audio file, and others): They develop applications of critical social theory to urban spaces. Marcuse, a German–American scholar, is Herbert Marcuse’s son.
           “What is critical urban theory? While this phrase is often used in a descriptive sense, to characterize the tradition of post-1968 leftist or radical urban studies, I argue that it also has determinate social–theoretical content. To this end, building on the work of several Frankfurt School social philosophers, this paper interprets critical theory with reference to four, mutually interconnected elements—its theoretical character; its reflexivity; its critique of instrumental reason; and its emphasis on the disjuncture between the actual and the possible. On this basis, a brief concluding section considers the status of urban questions within critical social theory. In the early 21ˢᵗ century, I argue, each of the four key elements within critical social theory requires sustained engagement with contemporary patterns of capitalist urbanization. Under conditions of increasingly generalized, worldwide urbanization, the project of critical social theory and that of critical urban theory have been intertwined as never before.…
           “… Rather than affirming the current condition of cities as the expression of transhistorical laws of social organization, bureaucratic rationality or economic efficiency, critical urban theory emphasizes the politically and ideologically mediated, socially contested and therefore malleable character of urban space—that is, its continual (re)construction as a site, medium and outcome of historically specific relations of social power. Critical urban theory is thus grounded on an antagonistic relationship not only to inherited urban knowledges, but more generally, to existing urban formations. It insists that another, more democratic, socially just and sustainable form of urbanization is possible, even if such possibilities are currently being suppressed through dominant institutional arrangements, practices and ideologies. In short, critical urban theory involves the critique of ideology (including social–scientific ideologies) and the critique of power, inequality, injustice and exploitation, at once within and among cities.”
           [Neil Brenner, “What is critical urban theory?” City. Volume 13, numbers 2–3, June–September 2009. Pages 198-207.]
           “The main concern of this paper is what I take to be the ultimate purpose of critical urban theory: implementing the demand for a Right to the City. But that is a demand, a goal, that needs definition. Whose right is it about, what right is it and to what city? The paper begins with a look at the actual problems that people face today, and then looks at them in their historical context, focusing on the difference between the crisis of 1968, which produced the demand for the Right to the City, and the crisis we confront today. The question then is: how do we understand the Right to the City today, and how can a critical urban theory contribute to implementing it? The paper suggests an approach to action that relies on three steps a critical theory could follow: exposing, proposing and politicizing.” [Peter Marcuse, “From critical urban theory to the right to the city.” City. Volume 13, numbers 2–3, June–September 2009. Pages 185-196.]
      620. bankocracy (Marie Cuillerai as pronounced in this MP3 audio file and Maria Kakogianni [Greek/Hellēniká, Μαρία Κακογιάννη, María Kakogiánnē as pronounced in this MP3 audio file]): With specific reference to Greece, the authors examine the ways and powers of banks.
           “Bankocracy consists in circulating debt to make money solely from money and time. The primary relationship between a creditor and a borrower is not important. Everything is arranged in order to multiply the number of people involved in the chain; debt must circulate to the point that the debtors no longer know to whom they owe money. A state that wants to offer reassurance regarding its solvency need only increase its penetrability. In reality, it is of little importance if it will be able to repay what it owes. The objective is not for debt to be settled but for it to circulate in order to produce profit.… What is important is not the initial promise but further surplus-promises, the game of simulacrum and its bluffs.” [Marie Cuillerai and Maria Kakogianni, “Bankocracy: Greek money and the ‘new idea’ of Europe.” Radical Philosophy: Philosophical Journal of the Independent Left. Number 186, July/August 2014. Pages 23-28.]
      621. critical conceptualism (Winston Napier): He develops an approach to aesthetics informed by the “problems stemming from racial and ethnic classifications.”
           “I apply the term ‘critical conceptualism’ to the study of social phenomena especially as they concern problems stemming from racial and ethnic classifications. And given its corrective attention to institutionalized prejudice, critical conceptualism is ultimately an ana lytical project geared on promoting renewed understanding of the structure, context and ameliorative possibilities of the political state. At its core is the belief that such understanding is prerequisite for developing the moral sensibilities likely to nurture in us a broader sense of responsibility for the improved quality of communal life.…
           “… the critical conceptualistic responsibility of New Negro art to display with dignity and self esteem black American ontological and expressive forms as well as black American folk legacies cannot be overlooked as important contributions to the pursuit of a society grounded in more harmonious coexistence.”
           [Winston Napier, “Affirming Critical Conceptualism: Harlem Renaissance Aesthetics and the Formation of Alain Locke’s Social Philosophy.” The Massachusetts Review. Volume 39, number 1, spring 1998. Pages 93-112.]
      622. relational–cultural theory (Jean Baker Miller and many others): Informed by Miller’s Toward a New Psychology of Women, clinicians develop a feminist approach to counseling. It is associated with Jean Baker Miller Training Institute at the Wellesley Centers for Women (Wellesley College, Wellesley, Massachusetts).
           “Relational-cultural theory (RCT) theorists advocate expanding the multicultural/social justice counseling competencies beyond the domains of self-awareness, cultural knowledge, and culturally responsive helping skills. This article provides an overview of RCT and discusses how creating and participating in growth-fostering relationships are essential dimensions of human development and psychological well-being. Implications of this theoretical model for counseling practice are also addressed.
           “Relational-cultural theory … was conceived after the publication of Jean Baker Miller’s (1976) Toward a New Psychology of Women, a groundbreaking book that has been translated into more than 20 languages. The ideas in Miller’s book emerged from her clinical practice with women in which she noted that the centrality of relationships in her clients’ lives was inconsistent with the traditional theories of counseling and human development she had been taught in medical school. According to Miller and other feminist theorists of the time, these traditional theoretical models emphasize individuation, separation, and autonomy as markers of emotional maturity and psychological health.”
           [Dana L. Comstock, Tonya R. Hammer, Julie Strentzsch, Kristi Cannon, Jacqueline Parsons, and Gustavo Salazar II, “Relational-Cultural Theory: A Framework for Bridging Relational, Multicultural, and Social Justice Competencies.” Journal of Counseling & Development. Volume 86, number 3, summer 2008. Pages 279-287.]
           “Relational-cultural theory has evolved from the work of Jean Baker Miller … and scholars at the Jean Baker Miller Training Institute (JBMTI), located at the Stone Center at Wellesley College. Unlike many traditional human development theories, which often reflect values of individuation, autonomy, and separation …, RCT [relational-cultural theory] posits that people develop more fully through connections with others. Relationship, rather than autonomy, is the cornerstone of growth. According to RCT, people become relationally complex rather than increasingly individuated and autonomous. Therefore, RCT promotes a contextual and relational lens for understanding human development.” [Thelma Duffey and Catherine Somody, “The Role of Relational-Cultural Theory in Mental Health Counseling.” Journal of Mental Health Counseling. Volume 22, number 3, July 2011. Pages 223-242.]
           “RCT [relational-cultural theory] was developed in the 1970s, primarily by psychologists and psychiatrists affiliated with the Stone Center at Wellesley College, in Massachusetts. Jean Baker Miller’s (1976) groundbreaking work, Toward a New Psychology of Women, provided the foundation for the ongoing development and application of this theoretical perspective.… RCT is feminist theory, due to its analysis and understanding of the significance and impact of gender upon personal and societal relationships. Built upon an approach to therapy, RCT is basically a theory of human development, as well as a therapeutic modality, that emphasizes the belief that individuals grow in connection with one another and that both parties benefit from the relationship …. While the initial focus of this theory was informed by studying mostly white women and the nature of their connections, RCT has expanded and can be applied to all human relationships, with cultural contexts being a necessary consideration in understanding these relationships.” [Ann R. Alvarez and Marceline M. Lazzari, “Feminist Mentoring and Relational Cultural Theory: A Case Example and Implications.” Affilia: Journal of Women and Social Work. Volume 31, number 1, 2016. Pages 41-51.]
           “Moving toward connection, according to RCT [relational-cultural theory], promises developmental growth through three primary processes; healing, resilience, and resistance …. First, healing can resolve previous psychological damage from experiences of relational, political, and spiritual exclusion. Second, recovering from relational hardships through resilience is associated with positive outcomes when there is at least one growth-fostering relationship …. Resilience contributes to increased efficacy in relationships and results in positivconnections. Third, … resistance challenges the ‘power-over paradigm’ ….” [Amy Russell, “Lesbians Surviving Culture: Relational-Cultural Theory Applied to Lesbian Connection.” Affilia: Journal of Women and Social Work. Volume 24, number 4, 2009. Pages 406-416.]
           “Using Relational-Cultural Theory as a theoretical model for interpretation, this article outlines a father’s growth and process of development in a growth-fostering relationship with his son.…
           “… This study shows that fathers grow in mutuality and specifically with their sons. Fathers absorbed the unconditional love and acceptance. Transformation allowed for new experiences, perceptions, emotions and reflections that released fathers from behind the mask of masculinity … where the relational core languished desiring to be loved just for itself.”
           [Carol Watson-Phillips, “Relational Fathering: Sons Liberate Dads.” Journal of Men’s Studies. OnlineFirst edition. August, 2016. Pages 1-17.]
           “Founded in 1995, the Jean Baker Miller Training Institute bases its work on the Relational-Cultural Model of psychological development, which grew out of a collaborative theory-building process led by Jean Baker Miller and her colleagues. The Institute offers workshops, courses, professional trainings, publications, and ongoing projects which explore applications of the relational-cultural approach. At the heart of this work is the belief that the Relational-Cultural model offers new and better ways of understanding the diversity and complexities of human experience.” [Jean Baker Miller, “What Do We Mean by Relationships?” Working paper number 22. Jean Baker Miller Training Institute at the Wellesley Centers for Women. Wellesley, Massachusetts. 1986. Pages 1-13.]
           “My own work at this time centers on trying to understand more about the nature of ‘relational contexts’ and ‘relational modes’ which foster psychological development. I feel very fortunate to be able to do this work with several colleagues who share a general approach and whose work appears in the Working Paper Series produced by the Stone Center for Developmental Studies and Services at Wellesley College. At times, our ideas flow from the interactions among us, so that it would be inappropriate to say that an idea ‘belonged’ to any one person; the idea becomes enlarged and transformed in interchange so that it is not what it was when it began and it is truly everyone’s creation. On other points, we do not all think alike and we keep struggling to honor these differences and to learn from them.” [Jean Baker Miller. Toward a New Psychology of Women. Second edition. Boston, Massachusetts: Beacon Press. 1986. Page xxxiii.]
           “A relational model of therapy requires a reframing of some of the key concepts characterizing the therapeutic process. For example, we believe that transference is a highly relational term that becomes a central focus of the therapeutic work. However, in contrast to more traditional views, we do not find that the therapist’s neutrality is necessary for transference phenomena to emerge fully and productively. Reframing countertransference around the question of how connected or disconnected the therapist feels helps move the therapy to increased mutuality and empowerment. Our understanding of the unconscious is that experiences which have been repressed, dissociated, split off and out of awareness are brought into the relationship when the patient can feel that it is a safe relational context. Finally, we see resistance as a reflection of the patient’s desire for connection and her reasons for fear of it, rather than in terms of a battle between therapist and patient.” [Jean Baker Miller and Irene Pierce Stiver, “A Relational Approach to Understanding Women’s Lives and Problems.” Psychiatric Annals. Volume 23, number 8, August 1993. Pages 424-431.]
      623. emancipatory psychotherapy (James H. Sorrell): He proposes a new form of psychotherapy based upon critical social theorist Jürgen Habermas’ theory of communicative action.
           “The intent of this paper is to examine the inherent contradictions in the practice of psychotherapy that, if left unexamined, ruin the emancipatory prospects that it holds. Critical theory and, more specifically, Jürgen Habermas’ theory of communicative action is utilized as a starting point for reconceptualizing psychotherapy.…
           “… The therapy must contest the way dominant culture is reproduced and transmitted into the daily life and psyche of the individual in such a way that creates suffering in his or her own sociocultural praxis. By conceiving the source of suffering as developmental, emancipatory psychotherapy can best be envisioned as educational in intent.…
           “Meaning is achieved through the coordinated activity of two or more individuals. In settings where there is asymmetry, one participant has more knowledge, power and expertise. Nonetheless the encounter can still result in true self-development for both. If we wish to preserve communicative action as a grounding for an emancipatory psychotherapy, we need to provide an account of therapy that allows for true mutual understanding and real connection to the particular other’s suffering and to the therapists’ motivation to care, despite the presence of asymmetry and the overarching steering media.”
           [James H. Sorrell, “The Pleasure of Dissent: A Critical Theory of Psychotherapy as an Emancipatory Practice.” American Journal of Psychotherapy. Volume 60, number 2, 2006. Pages 131-145.]
      624. emancipatory psychology (Isaac Prilleltensky and Tim B. Rogers): They each call for versions of clinical or counseling psychology focused upon oppression and liberation.
           “Emancipation refers to people’s abilities to pursue their ends in life without oppressive restrictions. Psychology needs an emancipatory orientation as much as society needs an emancipatory psychology. My objective in this paper is to contribute to the development of an emancipatory psychology, a psychology concerned with oppression and liberation. The reason for focusing on emancipation is that it is a prerequisite for the good life and the good society …. An emancipatory psychology seeks to eliminate oppression, deprivation, exploitation and exclusion. It seeks to remove psychological, social, and political barriers to the fulfillment of basic values such as self-determination, caring and compassion and distributive justice …. Oppression exists because dominant groups advance their own interests at the expense of others with less power. Psychology has much to offer to the elimination of oppression ….” [Isaac Prilleltensky, “Human, moral, and political values for an emancipatory psychology.” The Humanistic Psychologist. Volume 24, number 3, autumn 1996. Pages 307-324.]
           “There is clearly a wide range of human activities associated with the notion of emancipation. Finding a means of repairing a bothersome leaky faucet is, in a sense, liberating. So too, in its widest sense, is the freedom of a people from oppressive political rule. Thus the suggested criterion for valuing human social acts cuts a very wide swath, being a useful criterion for day-to-day mundane activities through to the grandest of all human endeavours. Be it the discovery of an effective means of helping someone through a depressive episode or the reformulation of a statistical problem permitting a solution, the activities of psychologists can be seen as emancipatory in varying degrees, and this is the criterion of value being suggested.” [Tim B. Rogers, “Toward an Emancipatory Psychology.” Canadian Psychology/Psychologie canadienne. Volume 31, number 3, July 1990. Pages 215-217.]
      625. postmodern emancipatory psychology (Maureen O’Hara): She argues for a reformation of humanistic psychology.
           “A theoretically reinvigorated humanistic psychology that draws on the best of its past, on constructivist developments in theory, and on the newer neurosciences and advances in mind-body studies is well placed to provide the basis of a postmodern emancipatory psychology. Once it embraces its own polycentrism and unavoidable incoherence, its core values of privileging the unique experience of individual human subjects; placing human suffering, well-being, and the universal need to search for meaningful answers to existential questions at its center; embracing the need to contain and comfort the high anxiety now endemic on both individual and cultural levels; and committing itself to both abatement and prevention of suffering and to the further evolution of human consciousness suggests that the humanistic tradition has much of abiding value to offer individuals and groups in a postmodern world that is in the process of being born. Outside the highly bureaucratized and increasingly centralized health care industry, where the marketplace can act like a real marketplace, people are free to buy what they are looking for from those who wish to provide it, there will be plenty of room for dedicated and enterprising professionals to make a decent living without selling their souls to the psychoindustrial complex.” [Maureen O’Hara, “Emancipatory therapeutic practice in a turbulent transmodern era: a work of retrieval.” The Journal of Humanistic Psychology. Volume 37, number 3, summer 1997. Pages 7-33.]
      626. theory of social practices (Andreas Reckwitz as pronounced in this MP3 audio file): He synthesizes his approach from the practice theories developed by other writers.
           “The task of this article is to work out more precisely the points at which a theory of social practices can be distinguished from its theoretical alternatives, and how its basic vocabulary thus amounts to a novel picture of the social and of human agency. To that end, however, it is necessary to build up ‘ideal types’ of theories which hardly correspond to the variability and distinctiveness of ‘real’ authors. I will use an idealized model of practice theory which leans partly on different and largely common elements of [Pierre] Bourdieu, [Anthony] Giddens, late [Michel] Foucault, [Harold] Garfinkel, [Bruno] Latour, [Charles] Taylor or [Theodore R.] Schatzki, ignoring the peculiarities of the single authors, and which is partly of programmatic character. Similarly, I confront this ideal type of practice theory with idealized theoretical alternatives: the model of the homo economicus and the homo sociologicus, but in particular with culturalist mentalism, textualism and intersubjectivism.” [Andreas Reckwitz, “Toward a Theory of Social Practices: A Development in Culturalist Theorizing.” European Journal of Social Theory. Volume 5, number 2, May 2002. Pages 243-263.]
           “A theory of social practices can reformulate elements of [Michel] Foucault’s or [Pierre] Bourdieu’s … work. It also allows for a selective integration of [Bruno] Latour’s … actor-network theory.…
           “A theory of social practices is surely still more ‘asymmetric’ than Latour’s symmetric anthropology would like to have it. But both on the level of artefacts as well as on that of affects and senses it allows for a more materialistic understanding of the social than most of the approaches that followed the cultural and textual turn. A social practice perspective on the social basically focuses human activity (partly also non-human activity).”
           [Andreas Reckwitz, “Affective spaces: a praxeological outlook.” Rethinking History. Volume 16, number 2, June 2012. Pages 241-258.]
           “It seems that post-Wittgensteinian theory of social practices has good reason to regard artefacts as necessary and influential components of social practices, while wishing to retain an ‘asymmetric’ relation between them and the human agents. When artefacts can only be effective within practices insofar as they are ‘handled’ by human agents and when they are sites of ‘materialized understanding,’ then their status obviously cannot be completely ‘equal’ with that of human agents and their embodied understanding.” [Andreas Reckwitz, “The Status of the ‘Material’ in Theories of Culture: From ‘Social Structure’ to ‘Artefacts.’” Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour. Volume 32, issue 2, June 2002. Pages 195-217.]
      627. Empire (Antonio Negri as pronounced in this MP3 audio file and Michael Hardt): These two autonomist scholars explore the dominance of Empire in modernity.
           “Numerous republican political projects in modernity assumed mobility as a privileged terrain for struggle and organization: from the so-called Socians ofthe Renaissance (Tuscan and Lombard artisans and apostles of the Reform who, banished from their own country, fomented sedition against the Catholic nations of Europe, from Italy to Poland) up to the seventeenth-century sects that organized trans-Atlantic voyages in response to the massacres in Europe; and from the agitators of the IWW [Industrial Workers of the World] across the United States in the 1910s up to the European autonomists in the 1970s. In these modern examples, mobility became an active politics and established a political position.” [Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri. Empire. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press. 2000. Page 214.]
           “Even when labor is subjugated by capital it always necessarily maintains its own autonomy, and this is ever more clearly true today with respect to the new immaterial, cooperative, and collaborative forms of labor. This relationship is not isolated to the economic terrain but, as we will argue later, spills over into the biopolitical terrain of society as a whole, including military conflicts. In any case, we should recognize here that even in asymmetrical conflicts victory in terms of complete domination is not possible. All that can be achieved is a provisional and limited maintenance of control and order that must constantly be policed and preserved. Counterinsurgency is a full-time job.” [Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri. Multitude: War and Democracy in the Age of Empire. New York: The Penguin Press imprint of Penguin Group. 2004. Page 54.]
           “The most significant event of the first decade of the new millennium nium for geopolitics may be the definitive failure of unilateralism. At the end of the last millennium a genuinely new global situation had emerged, which set in motion new processes of governance and began gan to establish new structures of global order. A new Empire was being formed that was qualitatively different from the previously existing imperialisms, which had been based primarily on the power of nation-states. Instead of engaging directly the formation of Empire, pire, however, the dominant forces on the global scene, the U.S. government ernment in particular, denied and repressed the novelty, conjuring up specters from the past, forcing dead figures of political rule to stumble across the stage and replay outdated dreams of grandeur. Ambitions of imperialist conquest, nationalist glory, unilateral decision sion making, and global leadership were all revived, with horrifyingly ingly real violence. Within the United States, where these fantasies were most powerful, what had seemed in the past to be alternatives—isolationism, imperialism, and internationalism—were resuscitated citated and woven together, turning out merely to be different faces of the same project, all stitched together with the thread of U.S. exceptionalism. ceptionalism. It took only a few years, though, for these ghostly figures ures to collapse in a lifeless heap. The financial and economic crisis of the early twenty-first century delivered the final blow to U.S. imperialist perialist glory. By the end of the decade there was general recognition of the military, political, and economic failures of unilateralism. There is no choice now but to confront head-on the formation of Empire.” [Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri. Commonwealth. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press. 2009. Pages 203-204.]
           “What makes Michael Hardt’s and Toni Negri’s Empire … and Multitude … such refreshing reading is that we are dealing with books that refer to and function as the moment of theoretical reflection of-if this word were not to be polluted by its recent use in the Iraq intervention context, one would be almost tempted to say: are embedded in-an actual global movement of anticapitalist resistance: one can sense, behind the written lines, the smells and sounds of Seattle, Genoa, and Zapatistas. So their limitation is simultaneously the limitation of the actual movement.” [Slavoj Žižek, “Multitude, Surplus, and Envy.” Rethinking Marxism. Volume 19, number 1, January 2007. Pages 46-58.]
      628. sociology of the good life (Jordan McKenzie): He develops a Hegelian approach to the subject.
           “… this article will adopt a broadly Hegelian approach to collective notions of the good life. For [Georg Wilhelm Friedrich] Hegel, autonomy, rights and happiness are all made possible by social relationships. Autonomy, rights and happiness are only possible under specific social conditions that are never entirely within our control, and so individual pursuits of the values are destined to fall short.…
           “The relationship between happiness and contentment is critically important to cultural constructions of the good life, but so is the recognition of the distinction between these experiences. Happiness and contentment are distinct emotional experiences that pertain to unique criteria and result in specific outcomes. Consequently, the methods used to pursue these experiences differ as well.”
           [Jordan McKenzie, “Happiness Vs Contentment? A Case for a Sociology of the Good Life.” Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour. Volume 46, issue 3, 2015. Pages 252-267.]
      629. labor surplus and punishment theory (Georg Rusche as pronounced in this MP3 audio file and Otto Kirchheimer as pronounced in this MP3 audio file): They develop a critical social theory on the relations between criminal punishment and economic production. The name given to this perspective has been taken from the article by Shelly S. Schaefer and Christopher Uggen.
           “In order to provide a more fruitful approach to the sociology of penal systems, it is necessary to strip from the social institution of punishment its ideological veils and juristic appearance and to describe it in its real relationships. The bond, transparent or not, that is supposed to exist between crime and punishment prevents any insight into the independent significance of the history of penal systems. It must be broken. Punishment is neither a simple consequence of crime, nor the reverse side of crime, nor a mere means which is determined by the end to be achieved. Punishment must be understood as a social phenomenon freed from both its juristic concept and its social ends. We do not deny that punishment has specific ends, but we do deny that it can be understood from its ends alone. By way of analogy, it might be noted that no one would dream of developing the history of military institutions or of a specific army out of the immutable purpose of such institutions.
           “Punishment as such does not exist; only concrete systems of punishment and specific criminal practices exist. The object of our investigation, therefore, is punishment in its specific manifestations, the causes of its changes and developments, the grounds for the choice or rejection of specific penal methods in specific historical periods. The transformation in penal systems cannot be explained only from changing needs of the war against crime, although this struggle does play a part. Every system of production tends to discover punishments which correspond to its productive relationships. It is thus necessary to investigate the origin and fate of penal systems, the use or avoidance of specific punishments, and the intensity of penal practices as they are determined by social forces, above all by economic and then fiscal forces.”
           [Georg Rusche and Otto Kirchheimer. Punishment and Social Structure. New Brunswick, New Jersey: Transaction Publishers. 2003. Page 5.]
           “Contemporary scholars have modified and tested [Georg] Rusche and [Otto] Kirchheimer’s … labor surplus and punishment theory. Today, labor surplus is typically operationalized as the unemployment rate, while punishment is operationalized as the imprisonment rate ….” [Shelly S. Schaefer and Christopher Uggen, “Blended Sentencing Laws and the Punitive Turn in Juvenile Justice.” Law & Social Inquiry. Volume 41, issue 2, spring 2016. Pages 435–463.]
           “[Georg] Rusche and [Otto] Kirchheimer … theorize a direct connection between the imposition of criminal sanctions and the supply of surplus labor. For capitalism their argument implies that imprisonment and unemployment vary directly …. study analyzes postwar trends in prison admission rates in the United States compare the explanatory power of the Rusche-Kirchheimer (RK) thesis with alternative explanations of these trends (demographic change, organizational inertia, and crime variations). Furthermore, because this application of the Rusche-Kirchheimer formulation gives central importance to competitiveness of labor kets, we consider the theoretical and empirical implications of the reduction competition characteristic of advanced capitalist economies.” [James Inverarity and Daniel McCarthy, “Punishment and Social Structure Revisited: Unemployment and Imprisonment in the United States, 1948-1984.” Review article. The Sociological Quarterly. Volume 29, number 2, summer 1988. Pages 263-279.]
           “The authors of this book attempt to prove two points: first, that punishment in general is a function of economic conditions; and second, that the methods of punishment in use at any particular epoch depend on the available means of production and the state of the labor market. This ecumenical thesis is based on studies limited in time to the period from the close of the Middle Ages to the present day, and confined in space to Western Europe, Russia being completely, and the United States largely ignored. Since the purpose of the book is not to present original information but to elucidate a point of view, the authors have made no attempt at exhaustive first-hand study of original documents—though considerable use is made of statistics.” [David Riesman, “Punishment and Social Structure.” Review article. Columbia Law Review. Volume 40, number 7 November 1940. Pages 1297-1301.]
           “The most recent research on the ‘Rusche and Kirchheimer hypothesis’ generally demonstrates the difficulty in finding a straightforward relationship between the size of the unemployed and imprisoned populations—especially if one extends analysis to a much-needed comparative dimension …. Developments in the United States in the last 20 years or so are also usually mentioned to contradict [Georg] Rusche and [Otto] Kirchheimer’s hypothesis, because in that instance a cyclically oscillating unemployment rate does not seem to have had anything in common with a vertically increasing imprisonment rate (one that is exceptional at a global level). For that reason, in my analysis of the emergence of the ‘great American internment’ during the crucial period of capitalist reorganization in the United States between the oil energy crisis in 1973 and the early 1990s—when the U.S. economy finally took off again—I claimed that we should not speak so much of unemployment as of the ‘pressure to perform’ placed on the working class ….” [Dario Melossi, “A New Edition of Punishment and Social Structure Thirty-Five Years Later: A Timely Event.” Social Justice. Volume 30, number 1, spring 2003. Pages 248-263.]
           “The main object of their work is the specific form that punishment assumes during the bourgeois epoch: imprisonment. The central category they [Georg Rusche and Otto Kirchheimer] employ in addressing the history of detention within this epoch is the principle of less eligibility. Briefly, this principle functions in relation to the state of the labor market. It posits that the standard of living within prisons (as well as for those dependent upon the welfare apparatus) must be lower than that of the lowest stratum of the working class, so that, given the alternative, people will opt to work under these conditions and punishment will serve as a deterrent.” [Dario Melossi, “Punishment and Social Structure.” Social Justice. Review article. Volume 40, numbers 1–2, spring–summer 2014. Pages 265-284.]
           “In this work, [Georg] Rusche and [Otto] Kirchheimer go back to the Middle Ages and examine the close relationship between forms of punishment and the social and economic structure and needs of society in each major period down to the post-War and early Fascist era. They study the various forms of punishment that have been used—fines, the galleys, the grosser forms of corporal punishment, transportation, imprisonment, hard labor, and so on—and show that the specific forms used in any particular period reflect current social and economic conditions, and especially reflect the labor market and the resultant attitude toward labor. They find that in periods when labor was a drug on the market in Europe and human values were low imprisonment in idleness and capital punishment were among the standard punishments.” [Austin H. MacCormick, “Punishment and Social Structure.” Review article. Harvard Law Review. Volume 53, number 7, May 1940. Pages 1216-1218.]
           “The authors feel that the moral, humanitarian influence (the penitentiary idea) which sought to overthrow the classical penologists followed almost automatically in the wake of the decline of the prisoners’ economic value to the overseers and jailers. The reappearance of the ‘ax, the whip and starvation’ technique in the last half of the 19ᵗʰ century was due to the uselessness of prison labor in the face of expanding industry. The reason improvements in penology cannot develop indefinitely is because of the fundamental principle that the lot of the prisoners should be no higher than the lot of the lowest member of society outside the jail. As the use of probation and the money-fine increased in about the 1990’s, based upon the equivalence between the money of the upper class and the rime of the lower class, no decrease in the number of crimes committed resulted.” [Walter Bromberg, “Punishment and Social Structure.” Review article. The American Journal of Orthodpsychiatry. Volume 11, issue 2, April 1941. Pages 390-391.]
           “Historians of punishment have neglected the social, economic, and political factors, the social attitudes, and the philosophical ideas that have precipitated changes in the penal system. They have been too engrossed with the details of the forms and methods of punishments at different stages in history to attempt to explain why these changes occurred. The authors of the present volume, however, are less interested in penal methods than in the underlying forces that brought them about.” [Morris Ploscowe, “Punishment and Social Structure.” Review article. Social Service Review. Volume 13, number 3, September 1939. Pages 540-541.]
           “Punishment and Social Structure is the product of two German emigre scholars working in the International Institute for Social Research, which transferred its activities from Frankfurt am Main [in Germany] to New York City in 1934 after its suppression by the German Government. The work was begun by [Georg] Rusche in Germany in 1931, and completed in the United States by [Otto] Kirchheimer. It is an historical study in the sociology of punishment. The authors’ thesis is that the dominant factor in determining the penal methods of any epoch is the basic economic needs of a commodity-producing society.” [Howard E. Jensen, “Criminology and Penology.” Social Forces. Volume 18, number 2, December 1939. Pages 289-291.]
      630. self-determination theory (Edward L. Deci, Richard M. Ryan, and others): They develop a psychological perspective on autonomy and eudaimonia or “human flourishing.” There is a dedicated website for the theory.
           “Self-determination theory (SDT) is an empirically based theory of human motivation, development, and wellness. The theory focuses on types, rather than just amount, of motivation, paying particular attention to autonomous motivation, controlled motivation, and amotivation as predictors of performance, relational, and well-being outcomes. It also addresses the social conditions that enhance versus diminish these types of motivation, proposing and finding that the degrees to which basic psychological needs for autonomy, competence, and relatedness are supported versus thwarted affect both the type and strength of motivation.…
           “As a macrotheory of human motivation, self-determination theory (SDT) addresses such basic issues as personality development, self-regulation, universal psychological needs, life goals and aspirations, energy and vitality, nonconscious processes, the relations of culture to motivation, and the impact of social environments on motivation, affect, behavior, and well-being. Further, the theory has been applied to issues within a wide range of life domains.”
           [Edward L. Deci and Richard M. Ryan, “Self-Determination Theory: A Macrotheory of Human Motivation, Development, and Health.” Canadian Psychology. Volume 49, number 3, August 2008. Pages 182-185.]
           “Our principal aim is to articulate a framework for the general study of eudaimonia, and to introduce a specific working model of eudaimonia derived from self-determination theory …, with elements that are amenable to empirically based testing and elaboration. Because eudaimonia refers to living well, any theory of eudaimonia consists of a set of prescriptions and proscriptions. How well the theory fairs in terms of yielding a high quality life is thus an empirical question. In other words, the criteria for judging a theory of eudaimonia rest in its ability to predict, and when implemented, bring about, outcomes that people value deeply and that can be said to represent wellness.” [Richard M. Ryan, Veronika Huta, and Edward L. Delci, “Living Well: A Self-Determination Theory Perspective on Eudaimonia.” Journal of Happiness Studies. Volume 9, issue 1, January 2008. Pages 139-170.]
           “… the Aristotelian view of eudaimonia considers well-being not as a state of pleasure versus pain, but as living well.…
           “Many of these elements in Aristotle’s conception of eudaimonia are at the core of self-determination theory’s (SDT’s) conceptions of wellness. SDT began with a focus on intrinsic motivation, or the pursuit of an activity because of its inherent interest and enjoyability …. In this research the role of rewards, the importance of competence, and the central role of autonomy in motivation became topics of study. We then shifted attention to extrinsically motivated activities, those that are instrumental rather than inherently enjoyable, and to how they are adopted and enacted.”
           [Richard M. Ryan, Veronika Huta, and Edward L. Deci, “Living Well: A Self-Determination Theory Perspective on Eudaimonia.” The Exploration of Happiness: Present and Future Perspectives. Antonella Delle Fave, editor. Dordrecht, the Netherlands: Springer Science+Business Media. 2013. Pages 117-139.]
           “… given the research findings, we suggest that self-determination theory (SDT) may be an appropriate theoretical framework for conceiving of and implementing patient-centered for health that focuses on improving the delivery of high quality and cost-effective primary care services.” [Leslie William Podlog and William J. Brown, “Self-determination Theory: A Framework for Enhancing Patient-centered Care.” The Journal for Nurse Practitioners. Volume 12, issue 8, September 2016. Pages e359-e362.]
           “In this paper we outline how the SDT [self-determination theory] perspective provides a valuable framework for understanding the motivational underpinnings of important relational processes, such as attachment, intimacy, communality, and interdependence, and further how this motivational structure helps to predict personal growth and development. Relationships research typically focuses on how individual personality factors (e.g., attachment style) and/or situational factors (e.g., partner responsiveness) affect how important relational processes unfold (e.g., conflict resolution, intimacy) and how these exchanges impact relational functioning (e.g., commitment, satisfaction). Importantly, the incremental value of the SDT perspective is that it provides a framework for understanding both personality and context.” [Jennifer G. La Guardia and Heather Patrick, “Self-Determination Theory as a Fundamental Theory of Close Relationships.” Canadian Psychology. Volume 49, number 3, August 2008. Pages 201-209.]
           “One of the key postulates from SDT [self-determination theory] is that motivation varies in kind, and the most self-determined types of motivation lead to the most adaptive outcomes. Thus, if we are to understand motivational outcomes, we need to go beyond a focus on motivational quantity (i.e., high levels of motivation) and take into consideration the quality of motivation (i.e., the presence or absence of self-determined forms of motivation, such as intrinsic motivation and integrated and identified regulations).” [Robert J. Vallerand, Luc G. Pelletier, and Richard Koestner, “Reflections on Self-Determination Theory.” Canadian Psychology. Volume 49, number 3, August 2008. Pages 257-262.]
           “We will suggest a eudaimonistic framework grounded in Self-Determination Theory (SDT), which has demonstrable explanatory value with respect to adult friendship …, and well-established applicability across the life span ….
           “The term, ‘eudaimonia,’ signifies ‘living well’ or ‘living a good life,’ and friendship is by all accounts essential to living a good life ….”
           [David Ian Walker, Randall Curren, and Chantel Jones, “Good Friendships among Children: A Theoretical and Empirical Investigation.” Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour. Volume 46, issue 3, 2016. Pages 286-309.]
           “We have argued that the road to eudaimonic well-being consists of people’s efforts to fulfill their potential through engaging in meaningful pursuits. How, specifically, might such pursuits help people fulfill their potential and achieve lasting well-being? According to Self-Determination Theory, eudaimonic activity produces well-being if it satisfies basic human needs for autonomy, relatedness, and competence …. [As has been suggested,] ‘Key components of positive health … address essential features of engagement in living …’ ….” [Michael F. Steger, Todd B. Kashdan, and Shigehiro Oishi, “Being good by doing good: Daily eudaimonic activity and well-being.” Journal of Research in Personality. Volume 42, issue 2, February 2008. Pages 22-42.]
      631. critical human resource development (Tara Fenwick): She examines applications of critical social theory to human resource development.
           “The following discussion proposes principles and examples to help advance dialogue towards a ‘critical HRD [human resource development]’ space that might invite participation of researchers, theorists, and practicing professionals in HRD. Clearly there exist theoretical dilemmas and deep contradictions in enacting critical HRD in contemporary organizations. These difficulties largely may be anticipated in what some … argue to be the incommensurable interests of critical orientations (privileging social justice, human rights and environmental sustainability) and organizations/management (maximizing productivity and capital). But critical orientations are far from homogeneous. Considerable theoretical work has opened useful conceptions that move beyond rigid ideological dichotomies of management/labor or false consciousness/emancipation. Furthermore some critically oriented development work is evident now in organizations, suggesting that sites of critical HRD already exist in practice if not in name, however peripherally. Meanwhile, recent work in critical management studies suggests radical shifts underway in re-thinking management, work, knowledge, and organizations. A critical HRD might contribute a necessary perspective to this work, and derive strength from it.” [Tara Fenwick, “Conceptions of Critical HRD: Dilemmas for Theory and Practice.” Human Resource Development International. Volume 8, number 2, June 2005. Pages 225-238.]
      632. normative foundations of critical theory (Piet Strydom): In critiquing an article written by Joseph Ruane and Jennifer Todd, Strydom examines the conditions required for a critical theoretical practice.
           “The leading critical theorists are well aware of the circumstance that since the normative foundations of critical theory do not guarantee the truth and objectivity of social scientific statements or propositions, immanent procedures and concrete analyses are and will remain a basic requirement of critical theoretical social scientific practice. Taking experience seriously …, … one cannot doubt the testability of empirical statements unless one is also willing to deny the possibility of experience itself.… Critical theorists … bring … criteria into play through immanent procedures and concrete analyses in order to fulfil the sufficient conditions of critical theoretical social scientific practice.” [Piet Strydom, “Metacritical Observations on a Reductive Approach to Critical Theory: Ruane and Todd’s ‘The Application of Critical Theory.’” Political Studies. Volume XXXVIII, issue 3, September 1990. Pages 534-542.]
           “… contemporary critical theorists seek to develop complex and powerful theory that is also empirically grounded and validated. This ambitious goal cannot be realized if the formulation of the theory and its empirical application are kept radically separate from each other. Stated most generally, it can be achieved only if theory and data are given equal emphasis in, and empirical research informs all stages of, the theory-building process. This requires the empirical application, evaluation and subsequent revision of the theory.” [Joseph Ruane and Jennifer Todd, “The Application of Critical Theory.” Political Studies. Volume XXXVI, issue 3, September 1988. Pages 533-538.]
      633. critical approach to the ethics of information security (Bernd Carsten Stahl as pronounced in this MP3 audio file, Neil F. Doherty, Mark Shaw, and Helge Janicke as pronounced in this MP3 audio file): They apply critical theory to information security.
           “In order to demonstrate the value of a critical approach to the ethics of information security we have undertaken a content analysis of NHS information security policies. In this section, we present the research framework, before, describing the research methods adopted, to explore it.…
           “… We believe that critical theory is particularly well attuned to issues concerning collective agency, social structure and in particular the socio-economic constitution of society. Using this lens therefore allows better insights into ethical issues arising from these factors. This does not mean that one could not describe the ethics of, say, the commodification of patient data or managerial power struggles in healthcare organisations in other terms, such as those of utilitarianism, Kantian deontology or Aristotelian virtue ethics.”
           [Bernd Carsten Stahl, Neil F. Doherty, Mark Shaw, and Helge Janicke, “Critical Theory as an Approach to the Ethics of Information Security.” Science & Engineering Ethics. Volume 20, issue 3, September 2014. Pages 675-699.]
      634. protocological network of continuous informatic control (Alexander R. Galloway): He examines the allegorical and socially transformative operation of contemporary games.
           “Games are allegories for our contemporary life under the protocological network of continuous informatic control. In fact, the more emancipating games seem to be as a medium, substituting activity for passivity or a branching narrative for a linear one, the more they are in fact hiding the fundamental social transformation into informatics that has affected much of the globe during recent decades. In modernity, ideology was an instrument of power, but now ideology is a decoy, as I hope to have shown with the game Civilization. So a game’s revealing is also a rewriting (a lateral step, not a forward step). A game’s celebration of the end of ideological manipulation is also a new manipulation, only this time using wholly different diagrams of command and control.” [Alexander R. Galloway, “Playing the code: Allegories of control in Civilization.” Radical Philosophy: Philosophical Journal of the Independent Left. Number 128, November/December 2004. Pages 33-40.]
      635. earthly cosmology (David Abram): He develops a phenomenological account of discovering one’s full humanness through the entwining of human beings with other animals.
           “Owning up to being an animal, a creature of earth. Tuning our animal senses to the sensible terrain: blending our skin with the rain-rippled surface of rivers, mingling our ears with the thunder and the thrumming of frogs, and our eyes with the molten sky. Feeling the polyrhythmic pulse of this place—this huge windswept body of water and stone. This vexed being in whose flesh we’re entangled.
           “Becoming earth. Becoming animal. Becoming, in this manner, fully human.”
           [David Abram. Becoming Animal: An Earthly Cosmology. New York: Vintage Books imprint of Random House, Inc. 2010. Page 12.]
           “The phrase that titles this book, ‘becoming animal,’ carries a range of possible meanings. In this work the phrase speaks first and foremost to the matter of becoming more deeply human by acknowledging, affirming, and growing into our animality. Other meanings will gradually make themselves evident to different readers.…
           “… As a phenomenologist, I am … taken with lived experience—with the felt encounter between our sensate body and the animate earth—to suit his philosophical taste.”
           [David Abram. Becoming Animal: An Earthly Cosmology. New York: Vintage Books imprint of Random House, Inc. 2010. Page 19.]
      636. use-values (Bolívar Echeverría as pronounced in this MP3 audio file): He explores the contradictory processes which give rise to such use-values.
           “The following pages take as their point of departure the idea that the central contribution of [Karl] Marx’s discourse to the comprehension of modern civilization lies in the discovery, formulation and critical analysis of a structuring behavioural disposition [comportamiento] of that civilized life on the basic plane of the economy. It is the behavioural disposition of labour [trabajo] and enjoyment that the human subject maintains with nature, constituted as a contradictory reality: on one side, as a process of the production and consumption of ‘use-values’ and, on the other, as a process of the ‘valorization of’ the commodity ‘value’ of those same objects.” [Bolívar Echeverría, “‘Use-value’: Ontology and semiotics.” Andrés Sáenz De Sicilia and Sandro Brito Rojas, translators. Radical Philosophy: Philosophical Journal of the Independent Left. Number 188, November/December 2014. Pages 24-38.]
      637. progressive Marxism (Judith Butler): She argues for a Marxism which rejects the notion of a stable distinction between material life and cultural life. Admittedly, the juxtaposition of “progressive” with “Marxism” is a bit disconcerting to this writer. Clearly, Karl Marx himself was never a progressive.
           “Is the attempt to separate Marxism from the study of culture and to rescue critical knowledge from the shoals of cultural specificity simply a turf war between left cultural studies and more orthodox forms of Marxism? How is this attempted separation related to the claim that new social movements have split the Left, deprived us of common ideals, factionalized the field of knowledge and political activism, reducing political activism to the mere assertion and affirmation of cultural identity? The charge that new social movements are ‘merely cultural,’ that a unified and progressive Marxism must return to a materialism based in an objective analysis of class, itself presumes that the distinction between material and cultural life is a stable one. And this recourse to an apparently stable distinction between material and cultural life is clearly the resurgence of a theoretical anachronism, one that discounts the contributions to Marxist theory since [Louis] Althusser’s displacement of the base-superstructure model, as well as various forms of cultural materialism—for instance, Raymond Williams, Stuart Hall and Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak.” [Judith Butler, “Merely Cultural.” New Left Review. Series I, number 227, January–February 1998. Pages 33-44.]
      638. good life (Judith Butler): She asks whether it is possible lead such a life.
           “… it makes sense to ask: which social configuration of ‘life’ enters into the question, how best to live? If I ask how best to live, or how to lead a good life, I seem to draw upon not only ideas of what is good, but also of what is living, and what is life. I must have a sense of my life in order to ask what kind of life to lead, and my life must appear to me as something I might lead, something that does not just lead me. And yet it is clear that I cannot ‘lead’ all aspects of the living organism that I am, even though I am compelled to ask: how might I lead my life? How does one lead a life when not all life processes that make up a life can be led, or when only certain aspects of a life can be directed or formed in a deliberate or reflective way, and others clearly not?” [Judith Butler, “Can one lead a good life in a bad life?: Adorno Prize Lecture.” Radical Philosophy: Philosophical Journal of the Independent Left. Number 176, November/December 2012. Pages 9-18.]
      639. giving an account of oneself (Judith Butler): She examines the process of constructing a narrative about oneself.
           “Telling a story about oneself is not the same as giving an account of oneself. And yet we can see in the example above that the kind of narrative required in an account we give of ourselves accepts the presumption that the self has a causal relation to the suffering of others (and eventually, through bad conscience, to oneself). Not all narrative takes this form, clearly, but a narrative that responds to allegation must, from the outset, accept the possibility that the self has causal agency, even if, in a given instance, the self may not have been the cause of the suffering in question.
           “Giving an account thus takes a narrative form, which not only depends upon the ability to relay a set of sequential events with plausible transitions but also draws upon narrative voice and authority, being directed toward an audience with the aim of persuasion. The narrative must then establish that the self either was or was not the cause of that suffering, and so supply a persuasive medium through which to understand the causal agency of the self. The narrative does not emerge after the fact of causal agency but constitutes the prerequisite condition for any account of moral agency we might give. In this sense, narrative capacity constitutes a precondition for giving an account of oneself and assuming responsibility for one’s actions through that means. Of course, one might simply ‘nod’ or make use of another expressive gesture to acknowledge that one is indeed the one who authored the deed in question. The ‘nod’ functions as an expressive precondition of acknowledgment. A similar kind of expressive power is at work when one remains silent in the face of the query ‘Do you have anything to say for yourself?’ In both examples, though, the gesture of acknowledgment makes sense only in relation to an implied story line: ‘Yes, I was the one who occupied the position of the causal agent in the sequence of events to which you refer.’”
           [Judith Butler. Giving an Account of Yourself. New York: Fordham University Press. 2005. Pages 18-19.]
           “In a sense, my account of myself is never fully mine, and is never fully for me, and I would like to suggest that this ‘interruption’ of the account always takes place through a loss of the sense of its being mine in any exclusive way. This interruption and dispossession of my perspective as mine can take place in different ways. There is the operation of a norm, invariably social, that conditions what will and will not be a recognizable account. And there can be no account of myself that does not, to some extent, conform to norms that govern the humanly recognizable, or that negotiate these terms in some ways, with various risks following from that negotiation. But, as I will try to explain later, it is also the case that I give an account to someone, and that the addressee of the account, real or imaginary, also functions to interrupt the sense of this account of myself as mine. If it is an account of myself, and it is an accounting to someone, then I am compelled to give the account away, to send it off, to be dispossessed of it at the very moment that I establish it as my account. No account takes place outside the structure of address, even if the addressee remains implicit and unnamed, anonymous and unspecified.” [Judith Butler, “Giving an Account of Oneself.” Diacritics. Volume 31, number 4, winter 2001. Pages 22-40.]
           “In Giving an Account of Oneself, [Judith] Butler … argues that ‘the “I” has no story of its own that is not also the story of a relation – or set of relations – to a set of norms.’ She goes on to note that: ‘If the “I” is not at one with moral norms,’ this means that ‘the subject must deliberate upon these norms,’ and that part of such a deliberation will ‘entail a critical understanding’ of the social genesis and meaning of those norms.” [Jane Rendell, “Giving an Account of Oneself: Architecturally.” Journal of Visual Culture. Volume 15, number 3, December 2016. Pages 334-348.]
           “… Judith Butler’s 2005 book Giving an Account of Oneself … [is] a short and surprisingly accessible meditation on some of the conclusions for ethics that emerge from close readings of some pivotal European philosophers, including [Georg Wilhelm Friedrich] Hegel, [Friedrich Wilhelm] Nietzsche, [Maurice] Merleau-Ponty, and [Emmanuel] Levinas. Her starting point is actually Problems of Moral Philosophy, a 1963 set of lectures by Theodor Adorno, only recently available in English. Adorno’s concern there, like much of his work from 1933 on, focuses on the violence we do others in the name of value and ideology—even at those moments when we act on principle, thinking what we do just and good, and perhaps even insisting that what we do is good for the other, as well.” [Neil Easterbrook, “‘Giving an Account of Oneself’: Ethics, Alterity, Air.” Extrapolation. Volume 49, number 2, summer 2008. Pages 240-260.]
           “Judith Butler in Giving an Account of Oneself does not discuss shame explicitly, but the site of her discussion is the scene of ‘exposure’ before another, in which one tries to account for what one has done. Following [Friedrich Wilhelm] Nietzsche, she notes that such an account is often (although in her opinion not always) prompted by an accusation or an allegation. We are asked whether we are responsible for an evident injustice: ‘Was it you?’ Hence we are in the scene prompted by Adler’s query — was it me, and if not, could it have been?
           “This question prompts an attempt to account for one’s actions, to explain oneself. For Nietzsche, Butler argues, the result is a self-beratement that becomes morality, guilt and bad conscience. In her own discussion here, however, she wants to hold open the possibility that the act of giving an account does not always take place in a punitive context, and that it may have more positive consequences that Nietzsche suggests. This in spite of the fact that, she argues, the attempt to give an account of oneself inevitably fails, precisely because the subject is constitutively unable to fully account for its own origins and actions.”
           [Anna Szörényi, “Giving an Account of Myself: Transgenerational Holocaust Guilt in the Company of Bernhard Schlink and Judith Butler .” The Australian Feminist Law Journal. Volume 33, December 2010. Pages 37-56.]
      640. reflexive historical realism (Susana Narotzky as pronounced in this MP3 audio file): This perspective is proposed as an alternative to ethnographic realism (in anthropology).
           “… I propose a modus operandi that I will tentatively term a ‘reflexive historical realism’ …. It is based on several premises: (1) the need to historicize the concepts used to refer to ‘similar’ phenomena in the ethnographic (or social sciences) literature, (2) the need to clarify personal political projects (that is, so to speak, self-historicization), (3) the need to treat concepts and models as part of the reality to be explained, (4) the belief that social transformation is not totally arbitrary or a mere construction of the willful intellectual reading of the text of symbolic social interaction (that is, that significant causal relations can be found for social phenomena that do not hinge on interpretation), and (5) the belief that there is a reality, beyond symbolic structuring, which produces ‘surprise’ and ‘shock’ in our models and, often, is the force that impels their transformation ….” [Susana Narotzky, “The Project in the Model: Reciprocity, Social Capital, and the Politics of Ethnographic Realism.” Current Anthropology. Volume 48, number 3, June 2007. Pages 403-424.]
           “In this book we use ethnography—both as a mode of inquiry and as a form of political engagement—from the perspective of historical realism. The object of our study is the social relationships that produce—historically—an economic ‘factor’ that has recently been described as “social capital” and has been attached to particular spaces or territories in what has been termed by social scientists and economic historians ‘regional economy,’ ‘industrial district,’ or even ‘economic nationalism.’ … We seek them to problematize the issue of place in the context of contemporary capitalism, an issue that addresses the anthropologist or sociologist interested in revived expressions of locality in a globalizing world as much as the geographer or economist interested in the benefits to be gained for a regional economy from its ‘local culture.’ …
           “… the fault line of our own explorations runs somewhere between … two geographies [Raymond Williams’ ‘structures of feeling’ and David Harvey’s ‘structural logics of capitalist production and regulation’], seeking to discover the dialectical constitution of the one by the other: a history in which people [re-]produce concrete and abstract artifacts for life, these concrete abstractions then providing the landscape that conditions subsequent generations’ reproduction and transformation. We term this kind of approach ‘historical realism’ ….”
           [Susana Narotzky and Gavin A. Smith. Immediate Struggles: People, Power, and Place in Rural Spain. Berkeley, California: University of California Press. 2006. Pages 3-4.]
      641. progressive form of Marxism (Leo Löwenthal as pronounced in this MP3 audio file): He explains critical theory as a historically relativist Marxism.
           “That [‘enlightened version of Marxism’] was never abandoned. I would go even further and say that Critical Theory is a progressive form of Marxism that no longer mechanically accepts Marxist categories in changed historical situations. The theory of immiseration, the unmediated reduction of the superstructure to the base, the theory of the crash as deriving from the fall in the rate of profit have all turned out to be untenable. But basic Marxist themes have never been abandoned. The hypothesis that world history can be described as the result of the struggle between outer and inner nature, and the theory of productive forces and class relations, have never been given up. What have been abandoned are certain economistic categories and predictions that have proven to be wrong. That was entirely in [Karl] Marx’s spirit. He always referred to tendencies and countertendencies. You are right: our interest turned toward a cultural area neglected by the Marxist tradition—psychology. Psychology does not exist in classical Marxism and so we have surely added something to that theory. This, of course, does not fit into that petit-bourgeois catechism of Marxism as proposed by Bukharin. Thus, if the Russian tradition is seen as the legitimate successor of Marxism, then we have not been Marxists.” [Leo Löwenthal. An Unmastered Past: The Autobiographical Reflections of Leo Lowenthal. Martin Jay, editor. Berkeley, California: University of California Press. 1987. Pages 64-65.]
      642. cultural critique of cultural relativism (Xiaorong Li [Chinese, 晓蓉李, Xiǎoróng-Lǐ as pronounced in this MP3 audio file]): The article develops a critique of normative cultural relativism. The “ethnical significance” of culture is distinguished from the tenability of “universal moral values and ethical principles.”
           “The recognition that culture has an ethical significance need not undermine the plausibility of universal moral values and ethical principles. The fact that cultures are different and particularistic does not entail cultural relativism.…
           “… Descriptive cultural relativism (DCR) describes a relativity of moral agents’ judgments to their culture. It describes the differences between cultures in their moral views and standards. By contrast, normative cultural relativism (NCR) requires that moral judgments and standards be considered valid or invalid only relative to an agent’s own culture; in other words, his or her moral views or actions ought to be considered right if and only if they are judged so according to the cultural standards of the community.…
           “I am primarily interested in developing a cultural critique of NCR.…
           “If moral differences from culture to culture are understood, however, as belonging to groups of like-minded moral agents, this does not necessarily entail incommensurability among them.”
           [Xiaorong Li, “A Cultural Critique of Cultural Relativism.” The American Journal of Economics and Sociology. Volume 66, number 1, January 2007. Pages 151-172.]
      643. organizational healing (Edward H. Powley): This approach to organizational recovery and performance enhancement defines growth as “cognitive assessments that reorient individuals toward positive psychological health.”
           “Organizational healing refers to how organizations not only recover from difficulties and resume normal functioning but also explains how organizations enhance their performance after experiencing trauma or harm ….
           “… Explained as psychological improvement and narrative meaning making …, these cognitive mechanisms of PTG [post-traumatic growth] enable individuals to derive meaning and growth from difficulty. Growth refers to cognitive assessments that reorient individuals toward positive psychological health. Healing focuses on dynamics that support posttraumatic organizational growth. Underlying that growth are organizational mechanisms required to resume functioning and build strength to enhance future performance and thereby foster positive organizational systems and cultures.”
           [Edward H. Powley, “The Process and Mechanisms of Organizational Healing.” The Journal of Applied Behavioral Science. Volume 49, number 1, 2012. Pages 42–68.]
      644. weak ontology (Stephen K. White): Through an engagement with the work of various writers, including Judith Butler and Jürgen Habermas, White develops his own version of ontology. He contrasts it with “strong ontology.”
           “Let me turn … to Judith Butler’s work. Of all of the suspects I rounded up, she has been the one most suspicious of ontological claims. She has argued repeatedly that the recourse to an ontological level has typically had the effect of making basic commitments appear to be natural, uncontestable features of human being and the world. Butler has always been eager to make trouble for any thinking that displays such characteristics because it invariably operates in ways that occlude the workings of power. This distancing move away from traditional ontology is not joined, however, with a total renunciation of ontology. Foundations, she argues, are ‘indispensable’ but ‘contingent.’ …
           “… [A] more sophisticated picture of the autonomous self of liberalism nevertheless remains problematic when viewed from the perspective of weak ontology. When one takes seriously the notion of ontological sources, it means that inarticulacy and incompleteness are seen as being continually operative constituents of human agency.”
           [Stephen K. White, “Weak Ontology: Genealogy and Critical Issues.” The Hedgehog Review. Volume 7, number 2, summer 2005. Pages 11-25.]
           “I argue for a ‘weak’ ontological model of ‘foundations’ and employ it in a critical reconstruction of Judith Butler’s work.…
           “Weak ontologies emerge from the conjunction of two insights: acceptance of the idea that all fundamental conceptualizations of self, other and world are contestable, and awareness that such conceptualizations are nevertheless unavoidable for any sort of reflective ethical and political life.…
           “… For a weak ontology, … a seeking of final security is its own kind of forgetting of finitude. The pleasures of this kind of homecoming induce an inattentiveness to the constitutive gap between the human and the beyond human. Vivifying finitude in everyday life means cultivating a quiet, ongoing resistance to finding one’s truth in some identity; but it also means giving place to the constitutive weight of concrete identity.”
           [Stephen K. White, “As the World Turns: Ontology and Politics in Judith Butler” Polity. Volume 32, number 2, winter 1999. Pages 155-177.]
           “The weak ontologist does not know with certainty that strong foundations are false; rather she can merely point to the lack of success of any given foundation in being wholly and universally affirmed by humankind. This lack of success in the past, however, does not demonstrate that the future will hold merely more of the same. I prefer to call this more modest position ‘nonfoundationalism.’…
           “A weak ontology is constituted by a set of ontological figures that are held in a nonfoundationalist fashion. In calling something a ‘figure’ (for example, an account of the self–other relation), I mean to highlight the fact that we do not embrace such an account on the basis of reasoning alone. We also embrace a figure because it appeals to us—like a work of art—in an aesthetic-affective sense.”
           [Stephen K. White, “Violence, Weak Ontology, and Late-Modernity.” Political Theory. Volume 37, number 6, 2009. Pages 808-816.]
           “… I would prefer to simply appeal to something we might call non-transcendental, ‘exemplary ontological scenes.’ The one I find most compelling has at its core an image or portrait of agents within a context of ‘communicative action’ who unexpectedly sometimes stand up and express a ‘no’ to the binding normative order implicit in the context of their interaction and thereby demand justification, despite what is likely to be a low probability of winning this fight in any strategically rational sense. This core exemplary scene, cobbled out of an interpretation of what we find admirable in the idea of human dignity, in turn animates my ethical and political reflections. The scene reflects my depth hermeneutic. It has, for me, a cognitive, normative and aesthetic-expressive force. This scene is exemplary in that it is cognitively plausible, normatively compelling and sublime. My attachment to it is always entangled with what I would have to call a kind of faith, which may have religious sources, or not; but, in either case, it will be of a weak ontological sort. Reason simply does not extend far enough to guarantee the transcendental status of this exemplary scene I affirm.” [Stephen K. White, “Does Critical Theory need strong foundations?” Philosophy and Social Criticism. Volume 41, number 3, 2015. Pages 207-211.]
           “We want to … elucidate a novel way of understanding [Jürgen] Habermas’s project as a whole.
           “In what follows, we will do this by reconfiguring the standard understanding of the onto-ethical infrastructure of the communicative paradigm [theory of communicative action]. On the basis of that, one can better comprehend the character of nonviolent opposition to the law. More specifically, we contend that there is a no-saying dimension in the communicative paradigm that is just as primordial as the understanding-oriented or consensual one.”
           [Stephen K. White, “‘No-Saying’ in Habermas.” Political Theory. Volume 40, number 1, 2012. Pages 32-57.]
           “Strong are those ontologies that claim to reflect for us ‘the way the world is,’ or how God’s being stands to human being, or what human nature is.…
           “… I specifically reply to … [the] criticism that weak ontological commitments are too weak for the real world of politics …. The ethos I argue for is not religiously grounded and does not necessarily lead to a stance of nonviolence; nevertheless, my intention is to explore whether we might be able to cultivate a set of very roughly analogous, nontheistic commitments. Such an ethos is not generated in isolated, individualistic self-examination; rather it begins and ends with the tensions of political life that inhabit relations of identity/difference.” [Stephen K. White, “Reply to James Miller’s Review of The Ethos of a Late-Modern Citizen.” Political Theory. Volume 39, number 1,2011. Pages 174-176.]
           “If the hard surfaces of strong ontologies carry clear, substantive directions for practical life, the opposite is true of weak ontologies. Their surfaces do not bear unqualified inscriptions. And yet these ontologies do provide a figuration of the world that appears to promise at least some orientation or passage to moral-political reflection. Weak ontologies are also not rooted in a crystalline conviction of ultimate cognitive truth. Rather, their proponents acknowledge that they are interpretations of the world. They are contestable pictures with a validity claim that is two dimensional.”
           [Stephen K. White, “Weak Ontology and Liberal Political Reflection.” Political Theory. Volume 25, number 4, August 1997. Pages 502-523.]
           “Using Stephen K. White’s … arguments for the viability of ‘weak ontologies,’ I suggest that a critical post-structuralist approach does not need to be anathema to the making of claims, nor should it be seen as suffering from a paralytic disjuncture from the ‘real world.’ Rather, maintaining critical commitments can mean being reflexive about the inter-subjectivity and indeterminacy of the claims that are ultimately made, and of being accountable to them.…
           “‘Weak ontology’ does not refer to the (lack of) persuasiveness of a theory’s ontological commitments, so much as it refers to the process of arriving at those commitments and an acknowledgement of their contestability. Weak ontology sees that the costs of bracketing out contingency and indeterminacy, which a strong ontology must do, far outweigh the benefits of doing so. Furthermore, a weak ontology approach recognizes that rejecting new ontological commitments, as some postmodern and anti-essentialist views seek to do, is profoundly problematic.”
           [Jennifer Mustapha, “An Analytical Survey of Critical Security Studies: Making the Case for a (Modified) Post-structuralist Approach.” Working paper number 53. York Consortium on International and Security Studies (YCISS). Toronto, Ontario. April, 2011. Pages 1-34.]
      645. real abstraction (Alfred Sohn-Rethel as pronounced in this MP3 audio file): “The changing form of labour, as slave-labour, serf-labour, wage-labour, and the corresponding differences in the determination of the magnitude of value are decisive for the system of economy prevailing in the different stages of development of commodity production. The unvarying formal features of exchange, on the contrary, constitute a mechanism of real abstraction indispensable for the social synthesis throughout and supplying a matrix for the abstract conceptual reasoning characteristic of all societies based on commodity production.” [Alfred Sohn-Rethel. Intellectual and Manual Labour: A Critique of Epistemology. Atlantic Highlands, New Jersey: Humanities Press. 1978. Page 51.]
      646. individuation (Gilbert Simondon as pronounced in this MP3 audio file): Particular beings and things are the outcomes of a perpetual process of individuation (the production of individuals). The particulars (or individuals) may end, but the process of individuation continues. See this YouTube video: Invitation to Collective Individuation: A Vision for Critical Theory and General Praxeology.
           “Does the animal species contain within in it that which pushes each individual to act in a certain way because it is a dog or a cat or a squirrel, in the same way pomegranate seeds are intertwined due to being in a pomegranate and grew in such a manner because it is in its anatomical nature to do so, or is it such that in each animal there is something that actually and actively constitutes the organizing principle, of the aim, reason, and links between the different actions? In other words, are we dealing with a specific activity or an individual activity? What is the carrier of reason?” [Gilbert Simondon. Two Lessons on Animal and Man. Introduction by Jean-Yves Chateau. Drew S. Burk, translator. Minneapolis, Minnesota: Univocal Publishing. 2011. Pages 79-80.]
           “Individuated being is not substance but rather the putting into question of being, being through a problematic, divided, reunited, carried in this problematic, which sets itself up through it and causes it to become. Becoming is not the becoming of individuated being but the becoming of the individuation of being: what happens occurs in the form of a putting into question of being, in other words, in the form of the element of an open problematic, which is the individuation of resolved being: the individual is contemporary of its becoming for this becoming is its individuation; time itself is essence, not as development starting from an origin or tendency towards some end but, rather as resolute constitution of being.” [Gilbert Simondon translated and quoted by David Scott. Gilbert Simondon’s Psychic and Collective Individuation: A Critical Introduction and Guide. Edinburgh, Scotland: Edinburgh University Press. 2014. Page 6.]
           “… the contemporary usage of the term ‘culture’ is paradoxical: the word is employed to designate the result of direct action of man upon man, comparable to that of the gardener or breeder; it remains a question of techniques, techniques for constituting collective or individual habits, or training in the various prohibitions and choices that define a psycho-social personality.” [Gilbert Simondon, “Culture and technics (1965).” Radical Philosophy: Philosophical Journal of the Independent Left. Number 189, January/February 2015. Pages 17-23.]
           “The actual evolution of technical objects does not happen in an absolutely continuous manner; it does not happen in an absolutely discontinuous manner either: it involves stages that are definable by the fact that they bring into being successive systems of coherence. There can be an evolution of a continuous kind between the stages that indicate structural reorganization; it results from improvements in detail resulting from what usage reveals and from the production of raw materials, or from better-adapted attachments. Over the past thirty years the automobile has been improving because of the use of metals better adapted to the conditions of its use, because of increased compression-ratios resulting from research into motor-fuels, and because of the study of the precise shape of cylinders and cylinder-heads in terms of the phenomenon of detonation. The problem of achieving combustion without detonation can only be solved by specific research into the cause of the sound wave inside a petrol mixture at different pressures and temperatures, using different volumes and starting from set points of ignition. But an attempt such as this does not lead to direct uses: the experimental work has still to be done and such trudging towards improvement has its own technicalnesa. The reforms in structure which allow the technical object to reveal its own specific character are the sheer essentials in the becoming of this object. Even if there were no scientific advances during a certain period of time, the progress of the technical object towards its own specificity could continue; the principle of progress is none other than the way in which the object causes and conditions itself in its operation and in the feed-back effect of its operation upon utilization. The technical object, the issue of an abstract work of organization of sub-sets, is the theatre of a number of relationships of reciprocal causalty.
           “These relationships make it possible for the object to discover obstacles within its own operation on the basis of certain limits in the conditions of its use: in the incompatibilities that arise from the progressive saturation of the system of sub-sets there is discoverable an indefiniteness in limitations, and the transcending of these limitations is what constitutes progress.…
           “These are conditions of individuation of a system.”
           [Gilbert Simondon. On the Mode of Existence of Technical Objects. Ninian Mellamphy, translator. Paris: Aubier, Editions Montaigne. 1980. Pages 21-22.]
           “While in his main thesis on ‘Individuation’ [Gilert] Simondon had sought to elaborate a general ontology describing the functional overlaying of material, biological, technical and psycho-social systems and their evolution, in ‘On the Mode,’ his analysis focused on the role of ‘technicity’ as a force of cognitive and, more broadly, cultural transformation intrinsic to tools, machines and technical assemblages. It is this implicit normativity of technics, its mediating capacity in the organization of the social system as a whole, that becomes alienated in a culture incapable of recognizing its own material conditions. As a ‘system of defence against technics,’ therefore, Simondon believes that culture turns blind, if not outright resistant, to this crucial site of psycho-social invention, reducing technology to a set of neutral instruments at the service of a technocratic will or as a monstrous non-human double fomenting technophobic reaction.” [Andrea Bardin and Giovanni Menegalle, “Introduction to Simondon.” Radical Philosophy: Philosophical Journal of the Independent Left. Number 189, January/February 2015. Pages 15-16.]
      647. critique of Third Worldism (Daniel K. Buntovnik): He develops a critique of an approach to Maoism. Global–Southernism, in general, was explored in an earlier chapter of the book.
           “While the critique of ‘Third Worldism’ is by no means exhausted, let us review some key points:
           • “The scientistic, clichéd, campy, kitsch cultist approach to public relations of ‘Third Worldists’ … will never attract the masses to their version of Communism, only anomalous weirdos.
           • “… ‘Third Worldism’ reproduces Orientalism. Their ideas reflect thus less upon the ‘reality’ of life in the Third World and are more a reflection of their own impotency as would-be leftists in the First World.
           • “‘Maoist-Third Worldists’ are not legitimate revolutionists of the proletarian sort. Their goal is not to create a dictatorship of the proletariat. The objective of ‘Global People’s War’ is to knock capitalism back to a pre-imperialist stage by replacing the comprador bourgeoisie with the national-bourgeoisie, keeping the capitalist state intact.
           • “‘Third Worldists’ utterly fail to understand the dynamics of social change. History shows that militating for reforms leads to heightened revolutionary potential. Revolutionaries must struggle in the here and now by demanding concessions which reflect the present situation to bridge the gap between the mass consciousness of today and the radical possibilities of a future socialist society.
           “Down with the pseudo-science of Primitivist-Orientalist-Third Worldism! Down with patriotic bourgeois collaborators, sheepdogs of neo-colonialism and proto-imperialism! Advance global class struggle! The workers’ struggle knows no border!”
           [Daniel K. Buntovnik, “On ‘Maoist Rebel News’ and the Folly of Ultraleftism-Third Worldism.” Daniel K. Buntovnik: 21ˢᵗ Century Proletarian Literature. Blog. December 19rd, 2015. Retrieved on July 10th, 2016.]
      648. participatory populism (Matthew Rhodes-Purdy): He develops a personalist approach focused on Hugo Chávez.
           “This paper aims to transcend this contradiction by analyzing participatory fora created in Venezuela under Hugo Chávez. Neither a personalistic conception of populism nor pure participatory democracy conform to the actual design and practices of Venezuelan participatory organizations. I propose a new framework, which I call participatory populism, for analyzing the role of participatory fora in the broader political strategy of Chávez’s movement.…
           “Personalism emphasizes the unmediated connection of the masses and the leader as the primary source of support for populist regimes and would thus answer yes to the third and no to the others. Participatory democracy, which emphasizes bottom-up empowerment, would give the opposite answers. Participatory populism would answer affirmatively to all three.”
           [Matthew Rhodes-Purdy, “Participatory Populism: Theory and Evidence from Bolivarian Venezuela.” Political Research Quarterly. Volume 68, number 3, September 2015. Pages 415-427.]
      649. critical paradigm (Rami F. Mustafa [Arabic/ʿArabiyyaẗ, رَامِي ف. مُصْطَفَى, Rāmī F. Muṣṭafaỳ]): The article develops an emancipatory approach to critical social theory.
           “Critical Paradigm, which is also known as The Third paradigm …, is concerned with emancipation and transformation …. [Norman] Denzin … captures this point by saying that ‘An emancipatory principle drives such research, which is committed to engaging oppressed groups in collective, democratic theorizing about their common and different perceptions of oppression and privilege’ …. The paradigm emerged out of the German intellectual traditions, and is linked to the works of the Frankfurt School during the 1930s. The paradigm is connected to many scholars like Theodor W. Adorno, Max Horkheimer, Herbert Marcuse, Friedrich Pollock, Leo Löwenthal, and Walter Benjamin. Many contemporary names are connected to the paradigm, the most well known of which is Jürgen Habermas.” [Rami F. Mustafa, “The P.O.E.Ms of Educational Research: A beginners’ Concise Guide.” International Education Studies. Volume 4, number 3, August 2011. Pages 23-30.]
      650. critical and feminist communitarianism as pronounced in this MP3 audio file (Gad Barzilai as pronounced in this MP3 audio file): Barzilai applies critical social theory to communitarianism, a philosophy which emphasizes the responsibilities of individuals to society. He also develops a feminist approach to communitarianism.
           “This book is about law and culture as major pillars in state-society relations. More accurately, it is about legal cultures in nonruling communities. To comprehend and examine communal legal cultures as key phenomena in politics, this book develops a concept that I call critical communitarianism. This revised version of communitarian theory conceives of nonruling communities in the context of the politics of identities, the plurality of legal orders, and state domination (often a violent form of domination legitimized through legal ideology). Critical communitarianism views nonruling communities as cultural foci of mobilization for, or resistance to, state law in the political context of state-society relations.” [Gad Barzilai. Communities and Law: Politics and Cultures of Legal Identities. Ann Arbor, Michigan: the University of Michigan Press. 2003. Page 1.]
           “Critical communitarianism maintains that as a substantial component of communal power and identities law is pervasive and imminent …. Through identity practices, law generates, forms, and expresses human interests, expectations, desires, fears, and behavior. It also produces a sense of political belonging and, alternatively, of political alienation. Thus, many facets of human life are meaningless without communities. Communities largely construct identities, and our personalities are partially embedded in them ….” [Gad Barzilai. Communities and Law: Politics and Cultures of Legal Identities. Ann Arbor, Michigan: the University of Michigan Press. 2003. Page 43.]
           “… I have explained why the dichotomy of ‘individual’ vs. ‘community’ may be very problematic, and that a critical communitarian perspective does encourage symbiotic relationships between states, individuals, and communities.” [Gad Barzilai, “Beyond Relativism: Where is Political Power in Legal Pluralism?” Theoretical Inquiries in Law. Volume 9, number 2, July 2008. Pages 395-416.]
           “My analysis of the legal culture of feminists entails the need for feminist communitarianism. Feminist communitarianism is not an oxymoron. Feminists and communitarians have ascribed significance to social reciprocity and criticize the private-public dichotomy while underscoring a contextually embedded self …. Yet, nonfeminist communitarians have neglected gender equality for the same reasons that many other (male) political theorists have downplayed the predicament of women, as a reflection of maledomination in human epistemology and philosophy …. The importance that communitarians have attributed to communal public good has not by itself rendered a nonfeminist conception of social relations, culture, law, and politics.” [Gad Barzilai. Communities and Law: Politics and Cultures of Legal Identities. Ann Arbor, Michigan: the University of Michigan Press. 2003. Page 147.]
      651. emancipatory communitarianism (Isaac Prilleltensky and others): A communitarian approach—informed by liberation psychology—is proposed and developed.
           “… I propose an emancipatory communitarian approach for psychological discourse and action. The approach I suggest draws primarily from communitarian philosophies and from liberation theories. Although communitarianism complements other orientations well, it has certain weaknesses that are addressed best by theories of emancipation.…
           “The practice of an emancipatory communitarian approach would examine the role of oppression and lack of responsibility toward people in positions of disadvantage. In Latin America, psychologists working within the tradition of liberation psychology best exemplify the notion of social responsibility …. Committed to service to poor people and disenfranchised people, they promote in the community the values of compassion, collaboration, and justice in ways unknown to most psychologists in postindustrial societies.…
           “Emancipatory communitarianism is not a universal or timeless panacea, however. Societies with strong communitarian traditions … are known to have suppressed individual uniqueness.”
           [Isaac Prilleltensky, “Values, Assumptions, and Practices: Assessing the Moral Implications of Psychological Discourse and Action.” American Psychologist. Volume 52, number 5, May 1997. Pages 517-535.]
           “Emancipatory Communitarianism (EC) was first conceptualized by [Isaac] Prilleltensky … to balance and combine the strengths of liberation psychology … and communitarianism …. As liberation psychology stresses the rights of individuals and groups, communitarianism insists upon responsibilities to one another in the larger community …. In practice, EC promotes critical consciousness, a strengths orientation, self-determination, communal responsibility, and advocacy …. Power dynamics are leveled in the counseling relationship and communal values are honored over individualism …. Unlike traditional theoretical approaches, EC favors the poor and disadvantaged, as it strives for distributive justice when working directly with clients and when advocating in political and social venues.” [Michael D. Brubaker, Michael Tlanusta Garrett, Edil Torres Rivera, and Kevin A. Tate, “Justice Making in Groups for Homeless Adults: The Emancipatory Communitarian Way.” The Journal for Specialists in Group Work. Volume 35, number 2, June 2010. Pages 124-133.]
      652. critical theory of creativity (Richard Howells): Couples critical social theory with Navajo theology.
           “A Critical Theory of Creativity argues that a Utopian drive is aesthetically encoded within the language of form. Combining multidisciplinary theory with case studies ranging from planned communities to the relationship between Navajo theology and design, this book demonstrates how humankind is striving to fashion a better world from the raw materials we inherit. Building upon the work of Ernst Bloch, Howells sees the ‘fall’ as a liberation and Prometheus as a hero. He takes religion seriously as a cultural narrative, but replaces divine creation with human creativity. Coupled with this liberation from Eden comes a very human obligation that cannot be delegated to God, to nature or to market forces. A Critical Theory of Creativity’s intellectual compass ranges from Roger Fry to Philip Pullman and Slavoj Žižek, returning always to an empowering, human-centred universe. As Bloch declared in The Spirit of Utopia, ‘Life has been put into our hands.’” [Richard Howells. A Critical Theory of Creativity: Utopia, Aesthetics, Atheism and Design. Abstract. New York: Palgrave Macmillan imprint of St. Martin’s Press LLC. 2015.]
      653. critical theory of the police (William J. Chambliss): For instance, personally speaking, I disagree that we “need” the police. Historically, the police have been a mechanism of white privilege. We need to eliminate the police—in its present form—and create something entirely new.
           “With the politicization of crime functioning to distract the public from politically dangerous issues (such as poverty), we can see [William J.] Chambliss’ project [in his ‘Policing the Ghetto Underclass: The Politics of Law and Law Enforcement’] as a critical theory of the police. His societal-level analysis is analogous to critical theories of popular culture. Just as prime-time television interpellates us toward consumerism, the crime industry invites us to believe that young nonwhite men are synonymous with crime …. The false consciousness of the crime industry distracts us from our own subordination, and inscribes young, nonwhite men as criminals.” [Paul J. Kaplan, “Looking Through the Gaps: A Critical Approach to the LAPD’s Rampart Scandal.” Social Justice. Volume 36, number 1, 2009. Pages 61-81.]

           “A police officer’s career and even his annual income is determined by the number of ‘good collars’ he makes. A ‘good collar’ is an arrest for what is defined as a serious violation of the law that culminates in a conviction. Drug arrests qualify. They are among the easiest convictions, the most difficult to defend, and often lead to the longest prison terms as a result of mandatory sentences. But they are organizationally effective only if the person arrested is relatively powerless. Arrests of white male middle class offenders (on college campuses for example) are guaranteed to cause the organization and the arresting officers strain, as with political influence and money hire attorney’s for their defense. men, however, create only rewards for the organization and quickly processed through the courts, a guilty plea obtained and ganizations reward role occupants whose behavior maximizes rewards for the organization. In a class society, the powerless, the poor, stereotype of ‘the criminal’ are the human resources needed by maximize rewards and minimize strains. It is not surprising, but then, that doubling the number of police officers in the last 10 of people in prison and jail, filled these institutions with minor disproportionate imprisonment of minorities, and institutionalized being a young black man synonymous with being criminal.” [William J. Chambliss, “Policing the Ghetto Underclass: The Politics of Law and Law Enforcement.” Social Problems. Volume 41, number 2, May 1994. Pages 177-194.]
      654. liberative ethics (Miguel A. De La Torre as pronounced in this MP3 audio file, Thelathia N. Young, and Shannon J. Miller, Keri Day, and others): They develop global, contextual, and responsive approaches for the examination of ethics promoting liberation.
           “You hold in your hands the first textbook written on the fairly new academic discipline known as liberative ethics. To accomplish this goal, it was written from the perspective of different marginalized communities. This is not to say that this is the first time these perspectives have been voiced or presented in written form. Obviously, those who both originaly and through the generations have participated in the practice of liberation theology—congregants, clergy, and scholars—were also engaged in critical reflection. In true fashion of the liberationist model, this book merely attempts to put into writing that which has become normative, over decades, among communities experiencing dispossesion and disenfranchisement. Reflection on theology concepts makes no sense if it fails to be contextualized in the everyday lives of the marginalized and seriously considers their hopes and struggles for liberation. Following the lead of those relegated to the underside of history, this book attempts to reflect the praxis—the actions—that the oppressed of the world are employing as they seek their own liberation. What makes this work unique is that until now within the academy, a textbook dedicated solely to liberative ethics from multiple global perspectives, inclusive of US marginalized voices, has not existed.” [Miguel A. De La Torre, “Preface.” Ethics: A Liberative Approach. Minneapolis, Minnesota: Fortress Press imprint of Augsburg Fortress. 2013. Page xi.]
           “Asé is a concept from the Yoruba language/tradition that signifies the life force that manifests all things. It is often used as a means of offering affirmation, and it is commonly translated as ‘so let it be.’ Asé acts as a way for one to co-sign or reaffirm one’s own or another’s claim about what is possible. Our use of the term in the title of this essay is a recognition of the collective epistemological power that is present in the exchange of stories. Not only do we affirm the value of such exchanges between ourselves and with our research participants; we also acknowledge the importance of making visible black queer folks’ abilities to speak to and learn from ourselves. This, we believe, is a challenge to the constant signifying that happens on black lives and that is continually written onto black bodies.…
           “Ethics need not be so hegemonic and discursive that it is unresponsive, stationary, and irrelevant to situated human experiences and personhoods. Fortunately, another consequence of the union between theory/theology and praxis in ethics is a responsive and liberative ethics. At the very center of praxis is the notion that practice learns from thinking/feeling, and thinking/feeling subsequently learns from practice. As ethics bridges this process with the theoretical and theological foundations that inform it, the result is ethical discourse and practice that is responsive.”
           [Thelathia N. Young and Shannon J. Miller, “Asé and Amen, Sister: Black Feminist Scholars Engage in Interdisciplinary, Dialogical, Transformative Ethical Praxis.” Journal of Religious Ethics. Volume 43, issue 2, June 2015. Pages 289-316.]
           “Black liberation and womanist theologies emerged as a way of rethinking and reformulating the Christian gospel to make possible a new vision of events that foregrounded, as necessary, a commitment to the poor and participation in their struggles, as taught by Jesus himself. It allowed Christians in North America to protest social evils and religiously affirm revolutionary changes that were taking place in the United States at the end of the sixties. This theological task was essential in fashioning norms and values that could inform the consitruction of a liberative ethics.” [Keri Day, “Global Economics and US Public Policy: Human Liberation for the Global Poor.” Black Theology: An International Journal. Volume 9, issue 1, April 2011. Pages 9-33.]
      655. principle of freedom (Ernesto Screpanti as pronounced in this MP3 audio file): He defines communism as “the process of social and political transformation through which the principle of freedom supersedes the principle of entitlement.” He advocates the self–managed firm over the capitalist managed firm.
           “I have proposed a rethinking of [Karl] Marx’s theory in which communism in the sphere of consumption is a process, not a state of things—not a social system to be constituted after the capture of the Winter Palace or after a congruous transition period. There is no before and after. Communism is a historical process of transformation. To be precise, it is the process of social and political transformation through which the principle of freedom supersedes the principle of entitlement.…
           “… the principle of freedom, as I defined it in the introduction, separates remuneration from performance and property titles and dictates that everybody is free to draw from the social product according to his needs. As a consequence it implies that finance is not collected on the ground of individual benefits from social goods, but from each according to his abilities.”
           [Ernesto Screpanti, “Freedom and Social Goods: Rethinking Marx’s Theory of Communism.” Rethinking Marxism. Volume 16, number 2, April 2004. Pages 185-206.]
           “A formula for measuring freedom of choice in the production sphere is proposed. Then a capitalist firm and a worker self-managed firm are compared in terms of freedom distribution. It is shown that the workers have little freedom, if any at all, in a capitalist firm, whilst the capitalist enjoys a great deal of freedom. In a self-managed firm, on the other hand, the amount of freedom enjoyed by the workers is positive and often even greater than that of the capitalist. The analysis is further developed by the introduction of asymmetric information. It is argued that, based on plausible hypotheses of monitoring costs, the difference between the amount of freedom enjoyed by self-managed workers and that enjoyed by the capitalist increases.…
           “In the study of comparative economic systems, self-management has often been considered superior to capitalism in terms of efficiency and justice. Economic literature on this issue has achieved high levels of analytical refinement, but no general and unambiguous result. More clear-cut findings could perhaps be achieved if the comparison were made in terms of freedom. Now, it is a common and long-standing view that self-management offers the workers greater freedom than does capitalism. Some people take this opinion to be true by definition, even though it has never been proved analytically, perhaps because an appropriate scientific method for dealing with freedom distribution has never been available. This lacuna has been overcome by recent research and it is hoped that an application of novel analytical tools will give rise to new studies of comparative economic systems.”
           [Ernesto Screpanti, “Freedom of Choice in the Production Sphere: The Capitalist and the Self-managed Firm.” Review of Political Economy. Volume 23, number 2, April 2011. Pages 267-279.]
           “A conservative government, i.e. one aiming at not altering the existing distribution of freedom, should apply a relative freedom preserving taxation that is progressive; an egalitarian government wanting to redistribute freedom from the rich to the poor has to enact a more progressive tax policy. The basic reason for such a result is that, when time constraints are taken into account, the budget constraint only partially limits choice freedom, and the less so the richer a person.” [Ernesto Screpanti, “Progressive Taxation and the Distribution of Freedom.” Review of Political Economy. Volume 26, number 4, October 2014. Pages 618-627.]
           “Egoism means that individuals are agents who aim only at pursuing their own ends, the latter being derived exclusively from individual preferences. Today this assumption takes the form of positing the existence of a given target function representing individual goals and exclusively moving the individual’s actions.” [Ernesto Screpanti, “The Postmodern Crisis in Economics and the Revolution against Modernism.” Rethinking Marxism. Volume 12, number 1, spring 2000. Pages 87-111.]
      656. property rights regimes and accumulation governance structures (Ernesto Screpanti): He develops a twofold classification of the forms of capitalism.
           “This article proposes a classification of capitalist forms on the basis of two concepts, ‘property rights regimes’ (PRRs) and ‘accumulation governance structures’ (AGSs). The former defines the way in which the ownership of wealth and surplus value is distributed, the latter the institutional systems governing the uses of surplus value to sustain accumulation. Three PRRs – ‘concentrated private property,’ ‘diffused private property’ and ‘state property’ – and four AGSs – ‘goods markets,’ ‘companies markets,’ ‘external hierarchies’ and ‘internal hierarchies’ – are defined. Various historical forms of capitalism are described as resulting from particular combinations of PRRs and AGSs. Then a few ideal types are outlined: ‘classical capitalism,’ ‘market-oriented corporate capitalism’ and ‘bank-oriented corporate capitalism.’ Finally a hypothesis is advanced as to how capitalism evolves, namely that historical transformations of PRRs and AGSs tend to pave the way for the emergence of ‘autonomous capital’: accumulation is controlled through complex systems of external hierarchies among firms; the large concerns which are in command of these hierarchical structures are collectively self-owned and formally controlled by their managers through strategic cross-shareholding; no external shareholder exerts effective control.…
           “… in classical capitalism, the very essence of capital, i.e. control of the production process in the firm, was still based on a sort of personal relation. Living labour is dominated by ‘dead labour,‘ but this exists as an active subject only in as much as it is privately owned by a person.”
           [Ernesto Screpanti, “Capitalist Forms and the Essence of Capitalism.” Review of International Political Economy. Volume 6, number 1, spring 1999. Pages 1-26.]
      657. critical approaches and the problem of social construction (Samuel Knafo): He applies critical social social theory to international relations.
           “In this article, I argue, that proponents of the notion of agency have failed to produce a satisfactory response to the question of how critical theory should approach the issue of social construction. The problem stems from the fact that agency is often presented as a new form of causality which could account for social change, a means for explaining social change, rather than as a means to specify the significance of social change. This difference is subtle but fundamental to the project of critical theory, since it is one thing to stress that institutions and/or discourses are socially constructed but another to define what exactly is being constructed. Hence, coming to terms with the issue of social construction is not simply a matter of focusing on the social context to explain international dynamics. Rather, the challenge consists in grasping the historical significance of social institutions and discourses. It consists in problematising what is taken for granted, since critical theorists are themselves conditioned by their own social context.” [Samuel Knafo, “Critical Approaches and the Problem of Social Construction: Reassessing the Legacy of the Agent/Structure Debate in IR.” Working paper number 3. The Centre for Global Political Economy. The University of Sussex. Brighton, England. June 2008. Pages 1-29.]
      658. in situ rhetoric (Danielle Endres, Aaron Hess, Samantha Senda-Cook, and Michael K. Middleton): They consider rhetoric as it originally occurs in human communities.
           “Since as early as the 1980s, rhetoricians have theorized the diverse, intersectional, and multimodal qualities of contemporary rhetoric by documenting, observing, participating in, and analyzing forms of in situ [Latin, in sitū, in the original position, place, or situation] rhetoric. Expanding from a traditional focus on analyzing already documented texts (i.e., speech transcripts, photographs, films, newspaper articles), growing numbers of rhetoricians interested in in situ rhetoric privilege ‘being there’ to experience rhetorical performance as it happens in communities …. Engaging in rhetorical fieldwork, they travel to places where rhetoric happens, speak to people who co-produce and co-experience it, and record their impressions.” [Danielle Endres, Aaron Hess, Samantha Senda-Cook, and Michael K. Middleton, “In Situ Rhetoric: Intersections Between Qualitative Inquiry, Fieldwork, and Rhetoric.” Cultural Studies ↔ Critical Methodologies. Volume 16, number 6, December 2016. Pages 511-524.]
      659. carnal sociology (Loïc Wacquant as pronounced in this MP3 audio file): He describes the body as a “fount of social intelligence and sociological acumen.”
           “Put tersely, carnal sociology is a sociology not of the body as sociocultural object but from the body as fount of social intelligence and sociological acumen. It starts from the brute fact that, as argued above, the human agent is a sentient and suffering being of flesh and blood.… Carnal sociology strives to eschew the spectatorial viewpoint and to grasp action-in-the-making, not action-already-accomplished. It aims to detect and document the deployment of the practical schemata that fashion practice: the cognitive, conative, and affective building blocks of habitus, whose layering and operations are fully open to empirical investigation ….
           “Carnal sociology applies to any object and can use a variety of methods so long as these treat the social agent as embodied and embedded.…
           “Carnal sociology is premised on a syllogism and a dare. The syllogism is the following: if it is true that the body is not just a socially construct-ed product but also a socially construc-ting vector of knowledge, practice, and power, then this applies to the body of the sociologist as inquirer.”
           [Loïc Wacquant, “For a Sociology of Flesh and Blood.” Qualitative Sociology. Volume 28, number 1, March 2015. Pages 1-11.]
           “… this approach [carnal sociology] takes seriously the embarrassing fact that social agents are motile, sensuous, and suffering creatures of flesh, blood, nerves and sinews doomed to death, who know it and make their world through and with their enskilled and exposed ‘mindful bodies’ …. And it insists that this proposition applies to the sociologist no less than to the people she studies, be they muay thai boxers, lathe operators, school teachers or corporate lawyers.
           “Carnal sociology is based on a bet (or a dare): that we can turn carnality from problem to resource for the production of sociological knowledge.”
           [Loïc Wacquant, “Homines in Extremis: What Fighting Scholars Teach Us about Habitus.” Body & Society. Volume 20, number 2, June 2014. Pages 3-17.]
           “… the very purpose of enactive ethnography is to submit oneself to the special social gravity and sensual magnetism of the phenomenon, precisely to provoke those changes and use them as crucial data points recorded with one’s own flesh and blood. The carnal sociologist knows full well that she will not emerge the same at the other end of the experiment and she intuits that this coming self-transformation is not without risks and costs. But such is the wondrous potency of libido scientifica [Latin, libīdō scientifica, ‘scientific libido’] – for those who possess it or are possessed by it – that she will throw herself body and soul into the work.” [Loïc Wacquant, “Putting Habitus in its Place: Rejoinder to the Symposium.” Body & Society. Volume 20, number 2, June 2014. Pages 118-139.]
           “A carnal sociology that seeks to situate itself not outside or above practice but at its ‘point of production’ requires that we immerse ourselves as deeply and as durably as possible into the cosmos under examination; that we submit ourselves to its specific temporality and contingencies; that we acquire the embodied dispositions it demands and nurtures, so that we may grasp it via the prethetic understanding that defines the native relation to that world—not as one world among many but as ‘home’ ….” [Loïc Wacquant, “Carnal Connections: On Embodiment, Apprenticeship, and Membership.” Qualitative Sociology. Volume 28, number 1, winter 2005. Pages 445-474.]
           “[Loïc] Wacquant’s account of carnal sociology offers a vision that is profoundly, rather than superficially, embodied. He gives a highly persuasive depiction of bodily practice as generative of meaning, a view buttressed by his ethnographic work. He makes disciplinary border crossings, toward naturalized philosophy and neurocognitive thought, to find resources for thinking carnally. Sociologists of the body (not to mention feminists across the disciplines …) have expressed a similar call for a deeper, more fleshly grasp of embodiment, and a more embodied sense of sociality. They have described various features of embodiment— including the phenomenal …, the elusory and affective …, and the sociomaterial and biopolitical …—to get at aspects of sociality that cannot be addressed through discourse or cultural inscription alone. Many sociologists, though, have been circumspect about drawing from biological, and specifically neurobiological, paradigms …. Nonetheless, Wacquant’s move resonates with broadly aired concerns about the limits of social constructionism, with its nature/culture dualisms, de-fleshed sense of the body-subject, and its tendency towards anti- (rather than merely critical) empiricism …. It is also compatible with the post-genomic thinking of biological matter as agentic, dynamic and flexible, and (in the case of humans at least), as inextricably social.” [Victoria Pitts-Taylor, “A Feminist Carnal Sociology?: Embodiment in Sociology, Feminism, and Naturalized Philosophy.” Qualitative Sociology. Volume 28, number 1, March 2015. Pages 19-25.]
      660. deadly symbiosis (Loïc Wacquant): In the context of the neoliberal state, Wacquant describes the intersection between “the welfare wing” and “the penal wing”—resulting in the punishment of poverty.
           “In this article, I put forth two interconnected theses, the first historical, replacing the carceral institution in the full arc of ethnoracial division and domination in the United States, the second institutional, explaining the astounding upsurge in black incarceration in the past three decades as a result of the obsolescence of the ghetto as a device for caste control and the correlative need for a substitute apparatus for keeping (unskilled) African Americans ‘in their place,’ i.e. in a subordinate and confined position in physical, social, and symbolic space. I further argue that, in the post-Civil Rights era, the remnants of the dark ghetto and the fast-expanding carceral system of the United States have become tightly linked by a triple relationship of functional equivalency, structural homology, and cultural fusion.” [Loïc Wacquant, “Deadly Symbiosis: When Ghetto and Prison Meet and Mesh.” Punishment & Society. Volume 3, number 1, January 2001. Pages 95-133.]
           “Whatever the modalities of their advent, it is indisputable that the linked stinginess of the welfare wing and munificence of the penal wing under the guidance of moralism have altered the makeup of the bureaucratic field in ways that are profoundly injurious to democratic ideals. As their sights converge onto the same marginal populations and territories, deterrent workfare and the neutralizing prison foster vastly different profiles and experiences of citizenship across the class and ethnic spectrum. They not only contravene the fundamental principle of equality of treatment by the state and routinely abridge the individual freedoms of the dispossessed. They also undermine the consent of the governed through the aggressive deployment of involuntary programs stipulating personal responsibilities just as the state is withdrawing the institutional supports necessary to shoulder these and shirking its own social and economic charges. And they stamp the precarious fractions of the proletariat from which public aid recipients and convicts issue with the indelible seal of unworthiness. In short, the penalization of poverty splinters citizenship along class lines, saps civic trust at the bottom, and sows the degradation of republican tenets. The establishment of the new government of social insecurity discloses, in fine, that neoliberalism is constitutively corrosive of democracy.” [Loïc Wacquant. Punishing the Poor: The Neoliberal Government of Insecurity. Durham, North Carolina: Duke University Press. 2009. Page 313.]
           “Not crime, but the need to shore up an eroding caste cleavage, along with buttressing the emergent regime of desocialized wage labour to which most blacks are fated by virtue of their lack of marketable cultural capital, and which the most deprived among them resist by escaping into the illegal street economy, is the main impetus behind the stupendous expansion of America’s penal state in the post-Keynesian age and its de facto policy of ‘carceral affirmative action’ towards African-Americans.” [Loïc Wacquant, “From Slavery to Mass Incarceration: Rethinking the ‘race question’ in the US.” New Left Review. Series II, number 13, January–February 2002. Pages 41-60.]
           “… recent developments on both the labor, welfare, and criminal justice front suggest that Spain presents a very interesting case to study and think through, so as to further specify the mechanisms, dimensions, and pathways of the ongoing drift toward the penal regulation of marginality in the dualizing city as well as choice materials for probing the broader reengineering of the state to which this drift contributes.” [Loïc Wacquant, “Neoliberal penality at work: a response to my Spanish critics.” RES: Anthropology and Aesthetics. Number 15, 2011. Pages 115-123.]
           “Viewed against the backdrop of the full historical trajectory of racial domination in the United States, the glaring and growing ‘disproportionality’ in incarceration that has afflicted African-Americans over the past three decades can be understood as the result of the ‘extra-penological’ functions that the prison system has come to shoulder in the wake of the crisis of the ghetto. Not crime, but the need to shore up an eroding caste cleavage, along with buttressing the emergent regime of desocialized wage labor to which most blacks are fated by virtue of their lack of marketable cultural capital, and which the most deprived among them resist by escaping into the illegal street economy, is the main impetus behind the stupendous expansion of America’s penal state in the post-Keynesian age and its de facto policy of ‘carceral affirmative action’ toward African-Americans ….” [Loïc Wacquant, “The new ‘peculiar institution’: On the prison as surrogate ghetto.” Theoretical Criminology. Volume 4, number 3, August 2000. Pages 377-389.]
           “… the American society of the post-Fordist and post-Keynesian era, the world’s only superpower and symbolic Mecca. This is a society characterized by the deliberate dismantling of the social state and the correlative hypertrophy of the penal state, the crushing of trade unions and the dictatorship of the ‘shareholder-value’ conception of the firm, and their sociological effects: the generalization of precarious wage labour and social insecurity, turned into the privileged engine of economic activity.” [Pierre Bourdieu and Loïc Wacquant, “NewLiberalSpeak: Notes on the new planetary vulgate.” Radical Philosophy: Philosophical Journal of the Independent Left. Number 105, January/February 2001. Pages 2-5.]
      661. food regime analysis or food regimes theory (Philip McMichael, Harriet Friedmann, and others): They develop an Marxist approach for examining food relations under capitalism.
           “My point is that the food regime concept is a key to unlock not only structured moments and transitions in the history of capitalist food relations, but also the history of capitalism itself. It is not about food per se, but about the relations within which food is produced, and through which capitalism is produced and reproduced. As such, the food regime is an optic on the multiple determinations embodied in the food commodity, refocusing from the food commodity as object to the commodity as relation, with definite geo-political, social, cultural, ecological, and nutritional relations at significant historical moments ….” [Philip McMichael, “A food regime analysis of the ‘world food crisis.’” Agriculture and Human Values. Volume 26, number 4, December 2009. Pages 281-295.]
           “In this essay I explore the likely contours of a future system of international production and trade of agro-food products by examining the character of two past international food regimes, and the forces shaping a possible third regime. The essential features of a food regime are found in the characteristics of large-scale food production and consumption, and their relation to the organization of the state system. A food regime includes the norms or rules governing international agro-food transactions, thus reflecting the concern with normative factors found in the ‘international regimes’ literature …. However, the analysis of food regimes departs from much of that literature by giving greater attention to structural factors such as the organization of agro-food capital and the state system.” [Philip McMichael, “Tensions between National and International Control of the World Food Order: Contours of a New Food Regime.” Sociological Perspectives. Volume 35, number 2, summer 1992. Pages 343-365.]
           “Political management of surpluses underwrote the post-Second World War food regime. It restored and stabilized metropolitan agro-industrial complexes, and incorporated Third World states and consumers within concessional circuits of food aid …. That is, the food regime was a political construct, managed by states across the north/south divide. The transitory character of this food regime derived from the contradictory national and international movements around which it was constructed.” [Philip McMichael, “Rethinking Globalization: The Agrarian Question Revisited.” Review of International Political Economy. Volume 4, number 4, winter 1997. Pages 630-662.]
           “The Japan-centered East Asian import complex emerged as a consequence of the postwar food regime, and as a consequence of its collapse. Just as the postwar food regime was centered in the political management of US food surpluses, so an emerging food regime may center on a food import complex such as that forming in East Asia. The postwar food regime grew out of the need to dispose of the surpluses arising from an overproduction of agricultural products stimulated by US government policy (notably, various subsidized commodity programs devised to stabilize the US farm sector).” [Philip McMichael, “A Global Interpretation of the Rise of the East Asian Food Import Complex.” World Development. Volume 28, number 3, March 2000. Pages 409-424.]
           “The food crisis, embedded as it is in the global energy crisis, is symptomatic of the neo-liberal food regime and its ‘petro-farming’ foundation (fossil-fuel dependence on chemical fertilizers, pesticides and herbicides, mechanization and food transport). The ‘new agriculture,’ while acknowledging the need for ecological accounting, nevertheless proceeds from this model. Ecological accounting includes mandated and subsidized emissions targets, spawning the agrofuel industry as an alternative to fossil fuels.” [Philip McMichael, “Banking on Agriculture: A Review of the World Development Report 2008.” Journal of Agrarian Change. Volume 9, number 2, April 2009. Pages 235-246.]
           “… power and property are not sufficient for a food regime analysis. Are tensions stabilized? What institutions provide the pivot and give meaning to a stable constellation of relationships? For instance, is there a counterpart in a financialized food regime to food aid as a pivot of the 1947–73 food regime? Legitimacy of food aid depended on both of the following: (1) convergent interests and expectations among diverse and highly unequal actors, including US farm commodity groups and legislators, Third World governments, grain trading corporations, consumers who benefited from falling grain and meat prices; and (2) an ideological framework that defined these as humanitarian, developmental, or anything but a trade relation, even though the scale of food aid shipments dominated world price formation for three decades ….” [Harriet Friedmann, “Discussion: moving food regimes forward: reflections on symposium essays.” Agriculture and Human Values. Volume 26, number 4, December 2009. Pages 335-344.]
           “The impasse in international economic relations is centred on agriculture because in the agrofood sector there exists the largest gap between national regulation and transnational economic organization. This gap is the legacy of the post-World War II food regime, the rule-governed structure of production and consumption of food on a world scale. The food regime was created in 1947 when alternative international regulation in the form of the proposal for a World Food Board was rejected. At the GATT [General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade], the only clear positions are those which ‘decouple’ and ‘deregulate’ elements of a food regime that no longer works. The present alternatives for a new regime are not formally proposed. They must be teased out from analyses of the social forces involved in global agrofood restructuring.” [Harriet Friedmann, “The Political Economy of Food: a Global Crisis.” New Left Review. Series I, number 197, January–February 1993. Pages 29-57.]
           “During the food regime, intensive livestock production was a pre-eminently national sector, first in the USA, then in Europe and other advanced capitalist countries. Yet it shared with the industry of the period a deeper process of transnational, intrasectoral integration. Like automobiles or aircraft—in which multiple components produced in different factories, and in different national economies, came to be linked by transnational corporations as direct subsidiaries or through subcontracts—the specialised livestock sector was connected, via the transnational feedstuffs industry, to specialised crop farmers.” [Harriet Friedmann, “Distance and Durability: Shaky Foundations of the World Food Economy.” Third World Quarterly. Volume 13, number 2 1992. Pages 371-383.]
           “[Harriett] Friedmann and [Philip[ McMichael identified two past food regimes, and suggested that we were in transition to a third. The characteristics of this third regime were still unfolding, but it was most frequently articulated as a corporate-friendly international regulatory regime that some consider crippling to state autonomy. Predictions that the internationalization of the regulatory regime and the state-initiated institutionalization of corporate rights will be key features of the third food regime have proven durable. Therefore, contrary to the optimism of free-trade proponents, the neoliberal regime is primed to extend and entrench existing inequalities between nation–states.” [Gabriela Pechlaner and Gerardo Otero, “The Neoliberal Food Regime: Neoregulation and the New Division of Labor in North America.” Rural Sociology. Volume 75, number 2, 2010. Pages 179-208.]
           “This article uses the concept of food regimes to interrogate whether there are any grounds for hope that we might one day achieve a more sustainable set of ecological relations that can operate in a stable form and at a global scale. In its early iterations, Food Regimes Theory (FRT) provided a compelling alternative to the rather linear and deterministic narratives of agricultural change that characterized the ‘New Rural Sociology’ …. While Food Regimes Theory dwelt on some pessimistic subject matter—the collapse of colonial food systems, the Dust Bowl, the Great Depression and the deceptive logic of the post-WWII Aid initiatives—it nonetheless established the grounds by which key sets of food relationships might be reconfigured in dramatically changed form. In short, it broke out of the linear history of food industrialization, and opened the space for alternative visions of our food futures.” [Hugh Campbell, “Breaking new ground in food regime theory: corporate environmentalism, ecological feedbacks and the ‘food from somewhere’ regime?” Agriculture and Human Values. Volume 26, number 4, December 2009. Pages 309-319.]
           “… a re-commoning of food would certainly open up the prospect of a transition towards a new food regime in which the several food dimensions are properly valued and primacy rests in its absolute need for human beings. But in order to move in this direction, the very foundations of how economics and social sciences perceive foods and foodstuff have to be reassessed. The following sections aim to show how rivalry and excludability, the features used by the economic school to define private/public/common goods, are just social constructs and not ontological properties of goods. Then, using the food regime theory, discussion moves to some current developments in the industrial food system (mainstream) and innovative niches (urban alternative food networks and rural food sovereignty movement), proposing a transition pathway towards a new model: the food commons regime.” [Jose Luis Vivero Pol, “Transition towards a food commons regime: re-commoning food to crowd-feed the world.“ Presented at Cross-disciplinary issues for food governance, the General Conference of the European Consortium for Political Research. Montreal, Quebec. August, 2015. Pages 1-33. Retrieved on December 21st, 2016.]
           “From a utilitarian point of view, food as a global commons could be thought of as ‘the greatest possible amount for the greatest possible number of individuals,’ what is commonly coined in marketing terms as ‘enough food for all.’ From the legal point of view, and using the fundamental right to be free from hunger, the least consideration of food as a global common could be translated into the minimum amount of food for the maximum amount of people, considering the minimum a quantity that prevents from suffering hunger, although not the ideal in quantity and quality to be considered food secure. The food-provided caloric requirements are unique for each person, depending on his body needs, physical activity, weather conditions and ethnic considerations, but these requirements are also absolute: they cannot either be negotiated with our body nor vary depending of the relative abundance of food.” [Jose Luis Vivero Pol, “Food as a commons: Reframing the narrative of the food system.” SSRN Electronic Journal. April, 2013. Pages 1-28.]
      662. social resilience (Natalie Bolzan and Fran Gale): They apply critical social theory to two Australian communities in crisis.
           “The findings reveal some fundamental changes that occurred in structural relations, in ways suggesting sustained change, both within and beyond the communities in which the projects were based. The features of altered social relations indicate a social resilience (evoked in the presence of the ‘threat’ of chronic disadvantage), which can be transformative. The sustainability of the social resilience evoked is supported by anecdotal evidence indicating the structural changes that have occurred in these two communities and which critical social theory predicts lead to sustained change …. Longitudinal research is currently underway to provide the practice evidence that the changes observed have been sustained in both communities.
           “The features of social resilience from the young people’s perspective, which emerged as significant from this research, are thus agency, power and being authors of one’s own solution, nontotalising identities, civic connection, public space, respect and trust, as well as hope.”
           [Natalie Bolzan and Fran Gale, “Social resilience: Transformation in two Australian communities facing chronic adversity.” International Social Work. OnlineFirst edition. November, 2016. Pages 1-14.]
      663. aikido (Morihei Ueshiba [Japanese, 植芝 盛平, Ueshiba Moritaira as pronounced in this MP3 audio file; うえしば もりへい, Ueshiba Morihei as pronounced in this MP3 audio file; or ウエシバ モリヘイ, Ueshiba Morihei as pronounced in this MP3 audio file] and many others): The intentionally nonviolent Japanese martial art, aikido (Japanese, 合気道, aikidō as pronounced in this MP3 audio file; あいきどう, aikidō as pronounced in this MP3 audio file; or アイキドー, aikidō as pronounced in this MP3 audio file)—which can be translated as system of harmonious spirit—was originally developed by Ueshiba. An aikidoist is an aikidōka (Japanese, 合気道家 as pronounced in this MP3 audio file; あいきどうか as pronounced in this MP3 audio file; or アイキドーカ as pronounced in this MP3 audio file). Aikido was briefly discussed in the introduction to the book. Some of the principles of aikido have also been applied to other areas (including Pierre Bourdieu’s notion of habitus), as illustrated below.
           “All the principles of heaven and earth arc living inside you. Life itself is the truth, and this will never change. Everything in heaven and earth breathes. Breath is the thread that ties creation together. When the myriad variations in the universal breath can be sensed, the individual techniques of the Art of Peace are born.
           “Consider the ebb and flow of the tide. When waves come to strike the shore, they crest and fall, creating a sound. Your breath should follow the same pattern, absorbing the entire universe in your belly with each inhalation. Know that we all have access to four treasures: the energy of the sun and moon, the breath of heaven, the breath of earth, and the ebb and flow of the tide.
           “Those who practice the Art of Peace must protect the domain of Mother Nature, the divine reflection of creation, and keep it lovely and fresh. Warriorship gives birth to natural beauty. The subtle techniques of a warrior arise as naturally as the appearance of spring, summer, autumn, and winter. Warriorship is none other than the vitality that sustains all life.
           “When life is victorious, there is birth; when it is thwarted, there is death. A warrior is always engaged in a life-and-death struggle for Peace.
           “Contemplate the workings of this world, listen to the words of the wise, and take all that is good as your own. With this as your base, open your own door to truth. Do not overlook the truth that is right before you. Study how water flows in a valley stream, smoothly and freely between the rocks. Also learn from holy books and wise people, Everything—even mountains, rivers, plants, and trees—should be your teacher.”
           [Morihei Ueshiba. The Art of Peace. John Stevens, translator. Boston, Massachusetts, and London: Shambhala. 1992. Pages 21-24.]
           “There is no enemy in Aikido. It is wrong to think that having an opponent or an enemy, or trying to be stronger than him and trying to overpower him is true budo. True Budo [Buddha] has no opponent, True Budo has no enemy. True Budo is to become one with the universe. The purpose of Aikido practice is not to become strong, nor is it to fell an opponent. Rather, it is necessary to have one’s heart at the center of the universe, then as little as it may be, help maintain peace among the peoples of the earth. Aikido is both like a compass that enables each person to realize his own individual destiny, as well as a way of unity and love.
           “At anywhere, at anytime, no matter how anyone may attack me, I have no fear, for I have left everything in the hands of God. This is not just when holding a sword, but always; for one must have a heart that clings neither to life nor death, but rather one that leaves things in the hands of the Creator.…
           “Whenever I am asked about my hopes for those who are applying themselves to the austere training of Aikido, I must answer that I would like them all to scrutinize well the circumstances of the world from beginning to end, to listen well to the words of men, and then to take that which is best and make it a part of themselves. Then with this foundation they must go forward and open the gate of the self.…
           “Within the subtle variations and flux of the universe there are spring, summer, autumn and winter, just as we humans feel joy or anger, love and pleasure. As much as possible we must diligently work so that second by second the eternal fluctuations of the universe become the same, a continuum.… [A]ll the laws of the universe have a single root or origin, the great workings of which are the Universal Truth. Those who would train in Aikido should research deeply the functions of this original, unitary principle, and so imbibe Universal Truth; in other words to become more and more like the spirit of loving protection of all things which is something that never misses being aware of anything.”
           [Morihei Ueshiba, “Aikido: Memoirs of Morihei Ueshiba O Sensei.” Aiki News. Winter, 1992. Pages 1-64.]
           “Strength has more to do with intention than with the size of your biceps. It has more to do with your spirit and your energy flow than with the number of push-ups you can do. Aikido is the distillation of [Morihei] Ueshiba’s vision and appreciation of what actually happens in nature. In hundreds of dojos (practice halls) across the world, Aikidoists are daily proving that a unified intention can accept and redirect the most awesome brute strength. It may be hard to accept, but it is a fact that a single reed can pierce a solid oak when blown with the force of a typhoon. You need only think of this image to appreciate the strength of a unified intention.…
           “… paradoxically, we are writing a book about harmony. Our goal is to help you achieve balance and harmony through the resolution of conflict. Remember, however, that harmony is inextricably bound up with the conflict from which it sprang. You may never find that tranquil beachafter all, the sand upon which you lie is the result of the conflict of rock and water against rock—but you need not be afraid to face your struggles. ‘Growing up,’ as a wise person once said, ‘is not for sissies.’”
           [Terry Dobson and Victor Miller. Aikido in Everyday Life: Giving in to Get Your Way. Berkekey, California: Blue Snake Books imprint of North Atlantic Books. 1993. Pages xiv-xv.]
           “… I use a dance rather than a martial metaphor to narrate … [an aikido] encounter and bring to light its key features in a way that will free the reader of the images, thoughts, and feelings associated with war. Dialogue or discovery metaphors would also have presented alternative cognitive and interpretative ensembles and, as such, also would have achieved my goal. You dance aikido to a ternary rhythm pattern, staying centered throughout the movement. From a position of centeredness, you connect with your partner. Then, staying centered, you channel the energy that your partner offers you. Finally, maintaining a strong center, you conclude the interaction.” [Philippe Martin, “Conflict Resolution Using Transactional Analysis and Aikido.” Transactional Analysis Journal. Volume 34, number 3, July 2004. Pages 229-242.]
           “… some miscommunication occurs as a result of creating meaning based on preconceived notions and past experiences. Awareness of these biases helps entrepreneurs develop more openness to new perspectives. The Japanese martial art of Aikido offers a way to enhance awareness by focusing on mind–body coordination. In addition, it serves as a metaphoric vehicle for pedagogically enhancing communication effectiveness, particularly in entrepreneurial settings with high stress or conflict.” [Kay C. A. Rudisill, “Aikido Practices, Communication Awareness and Effective Entrepreneurship.” Journal of Human Values. Volume 13, number 1, April 2007. Pages 35-42.]
           “Although we have no empirical data that says ‘people who have completed a two hour introductory session in aikido make better leaders than those who haven’t,’ we do have the anecdotal feedback of our participants who are outright enthusiastic. … In both our experience and in the comments of our students, we see powerful parallels between the principles and practice of aikido and the principles and practice of effective leadership.” [James G. Clawson and Jonathan Doner, “Teaching Leadership through Aikido.” Journal of Management Education. Volume 20, number 2, May 1996. Pages 182-205.]
           “The synergy that I experience from the juxtaposition of the teaching of qualitative methods and the teaching of the Martial Arts – specifically aikidō – emerges from what I believe these two artful disciplines, and their habitus, share. My first point concerns appreciating both aikidō and qualitative inquiry as Arts (with a capital A), with developed senses of embodiment and aesthetic pleasures. Though perhaps not as developed as it should, viewing qualitative research and inquiry as art, is a leitmotif [underlying theme] running through the field’s development …. It is a position propelled by emancipatory humanistic approaches to qualitative inquiry, which emphasize the ‘social’ over the ‘science’ (in the term ‘social sciences’), and which, in line with Harold Garfinkel and Erving Goffman, view the realm of the social as a matter of everyday artful affair. People are actors who are creatively expressive, and this bears aesthetic dimensions on everyday interactions and performances.” [Chaim Noy, “An aikidōka’s contribution to the teaching of qualitative inquiry.” Qualitative Research. Volume 15, number 1, February 2015. Pages 4-21.]
      664. rainbow theology (Patrick S. Cheng): He proposes a theology for the worldwide Asian LGBT (Lesbian–Gay–Bisexual–Transgendered) population.
           “I will start by exploring the symbol of the rainbow. Many cultures around the world—and throughout history—have been fascinated by the rainbow, and I would like to examine three characteristics of the rainbow that I find particularly interesting: (1) multiplicity; (2) diaspora; and (3) hybridity. Second, I will argue that the rainbow—and its associated characteristics of multiplicity, diaspora, and hybridity—is a particularly helpful way of understanding the experiences of queer Asian people of faith. As such, I am claiming my identity tonight as a rainbow theologian. Third, I will sketch out what a rainbow, or queer Asian, theology might look like in light of the themes of multiplicity, diaspora, and hybridity.…
           “… I have come to realize that there is a huge pastoral need to address the spiritual, emotional, and even physical violence that is experienced by many LGBT [Lesbian–Gay–Bisexual–Transgendered] Asian people of faith around the world.”
           [Patrick S. Cheng, “The Rainbow Connection: Bridging Asian American and Queer Theologies.” Theology & Sexuality. Volume 17, issue 3, 2011. Pages 235-264.]
      665. critical legal studies and critical legal theory (Roberto Unger, Duncan Kennedy, Karl Klare, Alan Hunt, and others): A left and critical theoretical approach to legal studies and legal scholarship.
           “Critical legal studies is the first movement in legal theory and legal scholarship in the United States to have espoused a committed Left political stance and perspective. A left-wing academic trend of considerable breadth in the field of law is in itself worthy of attention, but one which has assumed an organized form and has already made a marked impact loudly demands careful scrutiny….
           “The influence of Marxist scholarship in the United States has been very limited. It is significant for an understanding of critical legal theory to note that just as Marxism begins to have some influence on radicalized intellectuals during the 1970s, this occurs precisely at the time when the Marxist tradition itself is going through its most significant internal upheaval of recent times. The period in which critical legal studies comes into existence is one in which its radical political perspective encounters a bewildering variety of internal variation, differentiation and sectarianism within contemporary Marxism. This made the adoption of any single strand of modern Marxist theory unlikely, but more importantly, reduced the general attraction of Marxism as the alternative intellectual paradigm. Secondly, the strand of Marxism which has had the greatest influence within critical legal theory focuses upon the processes of legitimacy and of hegemony. This strand, even in its early formulation by [Antonio] Gramsci, and even more clearly in the case of the Frankfurt School of ‘critical theory,’ was concerned to search for linkages with other intellectual traditions; the most important of these being with European sociology, especially that of Max Weber [MP3 audio file]. The core concerns with legitimation, domination, hegemony and consciousness which underpin the critical legal project raise precisely the exciting and challenging theoretical project of synthesizing different intellectual traditions. The implicit theoretical basis of critical legal theory rests upon the project of theoretical synthesis or syncretism.”
           [Alan Hunt, “The Theory of Critical Legal Studies.” Oxford Journal of Legal Studies. Volume 6, number 1, 1986. Pages 1-45.]
      666. Hebrew humanism (Martin “Mordechai” Buber [Hebrew/ʿIḇəriyṯ, מָרְטִין ”מָרְדֳּכַי“ בּוּבֶּר, Mārəṭīn “Mọrədŏḵạy” Būbẹr]): He developed Jewish approaches to socialism, philosophy, and spirituality. “Mordechai” was Buber’s Jewish name.
           “In the first place …, Hebrew humanism means the return to the linguistic tradition of our own classical antiquity, the return to the Bible; in the second place, it means reception of the Bible, not because of its literary, historical, and national values, important though these may be, but because of the normative value of the human patterns demonstrated in the Bible; thirdly, distinguishing between what is conditioned by the times and what is timeless, in order to make the reception achieve its purpose; and fourthly, setting the human living patterns thus obtained before the eyes of our time with its special conditions, tasks, and possibilities, for only in terms of special conditions can we translate the content we have received into reality.” [Martin Buber, “Hebrew Humanism.” Israel and the World: Essays in a Time of Crisis. New York: Schocken Books. 1963. Pages 240-252.]
           “By opposing Hebrew humanism to a nationalism which is nothing but empty self-assertion, I wish to indicate that, at this juncture, the Zionist movement must decide either for national egoism or national humanism. If it decides in favor of national egoism, it too will suffer the fate which will soon befall all shallow nationalism, that is, nationalism which does not set the nation a true supernational task. If it decides in favor of Hebrew humanism, it will be strong and effective long after shallow nationalism has lost all meaning and justification, for it will have something to say and to bring to mankind.” [Martin Buber, “Hebrew Humanism.” (Different essay.) The Writings of Martin Buber. Will Herberg, editor. Cleveland, Ohio: Meridian Books imprint of the World Publishing Company. 1956. Pages 293-299.]
           “The social system of modern socialism or communism has, like eschatology, the character of an annunciation or of a proclamation. It is true that Plato was moved by the desire to establish a reality proportioned to the Idea, and it is true that he also sought, to the end of his days and with unflagging passion, for the human tools of its realization; but only with the modern social systems did there arise this fierce interplay of doctrine and action, planning and experiment.…
           “The polemics of [Karl] Marx and [Friedrich] Engels have resulted in the term ‘utopian’ becoming used, both within Marxism and without, for a socialism which appeals to reason, to justice, to the will of man to remedy the maladjustments of society, instead of his merely acquiring an active awareness of what is ‘dialectically’ brewing in the womb of industrialism. All voluntaristic socialism is rated ‘utopian.’”
           [Martin Buber. Paths in Utopia. R. F. C. Hull, translator. Boston, Massachusetts: Beacon Press. 1958. Page 9.]
           “The world of It is set in the context of space and time. The world of Thou is not set in the context of either of these.
           “Its context is in the Centre, where the extended lines of relations meet—in the eternal Thou. In the great privilege of pure relation the privileges of the world of It are abolished. By virtue of this privilege there exists the unbroken world of Thou: the isolated moments of relations are bound up in a life of world solidarity. By virtue of this privilege formative power belongs to the world of Thou: spirit can penetrate and transform the world of It. By virtue of this privilege we are not given up to alienation from the world and the loss of reality by the I—to domination by the ghostly. Reversal is the recognition of the Centre and the act of turning again to it. In this act of the being the buried relational power of man rises again, the wave that carries all the spheres of relation swells in living streams to give new life to our world.
           “Perhaps not to our world alone. For this double movement, of estrangement from the primal Source, in virtue of which the universe is sustained in the process of becoming, and of turning towards the primal Source, in virtue of which the universe is released in being, may be perceived as the metacosmical primal form that dwells in the world as a whole in its relation to that which is not the world—form whose twofold nature is represented among men by the twofold nature of their attitudes, their primary words, and their aspects of the world. Both parts of this movement develop, fraught with destiny, in time, and are compassed by grace in the timeless creation that is, incomprehensibly, at once emancipation and preservation, release and binding. Our knowledge of twofold nature is silent before the paradox of the primal mystery.”
           [Martin Buber. I and Thou. Ronald Gregor Smith, translator. Edinburgh, Scotland: T. & T. Clark. 1947. Pages 99-100.]
           “… just as the idea of an inner duality is Jewish, so is the idea of redemption from it. True, juxtaposed against it is the Indian idea of redemption, purer and more unconditional; but this idea signifies not a liberation from the soul’s duality, but a liberation from its entanglement in the world. Indian redemption means an awakening; Jewish redemption, a transformation. Indian redemption means a divesting of all appearance; Jewish redemption, a grasping of truth. Indian redempion means negation; Jewish redemption, affirmation. Indian redemption progresses into timelessness; Jewish redemption means the way of mankind. Like all historical views, it has less substance but more mobility. It alone can speak as Job does, “I know that my redeemer liveth” …, and, with the psalmist, “Renew a steadfast spirit within me” …. The redemption idea of the Jew Jesus is rooted in it. The Messianic ideal of Judaism took its human aspect from it. And when, in Jewish mysticism, the original character of the God-idea changed, when the dualistic view was carried over into the very concept of God, the Jewish idea of redemption attained the high plane of the Indian: it grew into the idea of the redemption of God, the idea of the reunion of God’s being (which is separated from things) with God’s indwelling, which—wandering, erring about, dispersed—abides with things. It became the idea of God’s redemption through the creature: through every soul’s progress from duality to unity, through every soul’s becoming one within itself, God becomes One within Himself.
           “It is this striving for unity that has made the Jew creative. Striving to evolve unity out of the division of his I, he conceived the idea of the unitary God. Striving to evolve unity out of the division of the human community, he conceived the idea of universal justice. Striving to evolve unity out of the division of all living matter, he conceived the idea of universal love. Striving to evolve unity out of the division of the world, he created the Messianic ideal, which later, again under the guiding participation of Jews, was reduced in scope, made finite, and called socialism.”
           [Martin Buber. On Judaism. New York: Schocken Books Inc. 1995. Pages 56-57.]
           “… a stern silence ruled in the … twilit room. Then the man with the shepherd’s face raised his heavy lids, which had been lowered the whole time, and said slowly and impressively, ‘You are right.’
           “I sat in front of him dismayed. What had I done? I had led the man to the threshold beyond which there sat enthroned the majestic image which the great physicist, the great man of faith, [Blaise] Pascal, called the God of the Philosophers. Had I wished for that? Had I not rather wished to lead him to the other, Him whom Pascal called the God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, Him to whom one can say Thou?
           “It grew dusk, it was late. On the next day I had to depart. I could not remain, as I now ought to do; I could not enter into the factory where the man worked, become his comrade, live with him, win his trust through real life-relationship, help him to walk with me the way of the creature who accepts the creation. I could only return his gaze.”
           [Martin Buber. Eclipse of God: Studies in the Relation between Religion and Philosophy. (“Hebrew Humanism.”) Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press. 2016. Pages 30-31.]
           “What brought the Socialist [Moses] Hess to the glorification of nation and land in their relation to one another? And how was it that in this work he reached a power of expression which he never achieved in his Socialist writings? Georg Lukács, a leading Marxist thinker of our times, describes Hess as ‘an absolutely foundered predecessor of [Karl] Marx, whose fate was all the more tragic because he was not only personally an absolutely honest revolutionary but also, of all the idealist dialecticians, approximated most closely to Marxian dialectics.’ Lukács accounts for Hess’ ‘failure’ on the grounds that ‘he was wrecked as a theoretician through coming into contact with Dialectical Materialism.’” [Martin Buber, “Moses Hess.” Jewish Social Studies. Volume 7, number 2, April 1945. Pages 137-148.]
           “Religious socialism, [Martin] Buber taught, is in consonance with the spirit of authentic or primal Judaism (Urjudentum)—echoes of which are found in the pansacramentalism of Hasidism, but its pristine expression is found in what Buber referred to as the Hebrew humanism of the Bible. ‘The men of the Bible are sinners like ourselves, but there is one sin they do not commit, our arch-sin: they do not dare confine God to a circumscribed space or division of life, to “religion.” They have not the insolence to draw boundaries around God’s commandments and say to him: “Up to this point, you are sovereign, but beyond these bounds begins the sovereignty of science or society or the state”’ ….” [Paul Mendes-Flohr, “Nationalism as a Spiritual Sensibility: The Philosophical Suppositions of Buber’s Hebrew Humanism.” The Journal of Religion. Volume 69, number 2, April 1989. Pages 155-168.]
           “In 1933, many of his [Martin Buber’s] thoughts received renewed formulation in an essay entitled ‘Biblical Humanism.’ Much as ‘humanism moves from the mystery of language to the mystery of the human person,’ so that ‘the reality of language , … [will] become operative in man’s spirit’ and its ‘truth … itself prove in the persons existence,’ ‘Biblical humanism moves from the mystery of the Hebrew language to the mystery of the Hebrew being.’ Through attentiveness to the Biblical word, an ‘ordering and directing word,’ the primal forces of the Jewish people would be reborn. The response to this word would be the ‘ordering of the directing deed’ from which ‘the archetype of this people [first] sprung.’” [Michael Fishbane, “Martin Buber as an Interpreter of the Bible.” Judaism. Volume 27, issue 2, spring 1978. Pages 184-195.]
           “The mature expression of [Martin] Buber’s concern with realizing the divine through true community is the religious socialism which he developed in the period immediately after the First World War. This development was decisively influenced by the socialism of Buber’s friend Gustav Landauer, the social anarchism of Michael Kropotkin, and the distinction between ‘community’ and ‘association’ in Ferdinand Tonnies’s work, Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft (1887).” [Maurice S. Friedman. Martin Buber: The Life of Dialogue. New York: Harper Torchbooks imprint of Harper & Row, Publishers. 1960. Page 45.]
           “As a result of the stimulus provided by the creative communal experiments in Israel and in response to the need to focus his thinking along the lines dictated by his position as professor of social philosophy, Buber wrote Paths in Utopia, a history of socialistic thinking and a statement of his own position. This book represents the fruits of almost fifty years of study and reflection in the area.” [Malcolm L. Diamond. Martin Buber: Jewish Existentialist. New York: Oxford University Press. 1960. Pages 13-14.]
      667. disruptive pedagogy (Alina S. Ball): It is an application of critical legal theory to business law.
           “The Article elevates this discourse by examining the disruptive pedagogy business law clinicians engage in when they integrate critical legal theory into their courses.…
           “Disruptive technologies introduce a new set of attributes from what the mainstream has historically valued. Thus, disruptive pedagogies will produce different results in law students; lawyers who are deeper thinkers, engage critically with the law, and have a stronger professional identity.
           “… To promote higher order thinking and deepen the learning of their students, business law clinicians should employ disruptive pedagogies, such as incorporating critical legal theory into their clinics.”
           [Alina S. Ball, “Disruptive Pedagogy: Incorporating Critical theory into Business Law Ethics.” Clinical Law Review. Volume 22, number 1, fall 2015. Pages 1-53.]
      668. performative pedagogy (Aaron Schutz and Norman K. Denzin): They advocate, in Denzin’s words, the contribution of “performance-based human disciplines” “to radical social change.” Schutz’s article, “Theory as Performative Pedagogy: Three Masks fo Hannah Arendt,” is referenced in the article written by Denzin, “The Call to Performance.”
           “… like [Hannah] Arendt, the educational scholars cited here and in the previous section are often engaged in a project of performative pedagogy through the form of their writing itself. [Magdalene] Lampert, for example, brings her readers into the dilemmas she faces herself, opening the possibility that these readers might respond to these dilemmas differently than she or her colleague did, and explicitly noting that one’s answer depends upon who one is as a particular person. For her part, [Maxine] Greene models in her writing her own struggles to imagine the world differently, while also bringing in range of metaphorical and artistic works, seeking to nurture her audience’s capacity for imagination instead of attempting to enforce a single interpretation. And [Caroline] Clark, et al., in their original ‘reader’s theater’ article, sought to model for their readers another approach to preserving a multivocal set of perspectives on the world, experimenting with ‘a form [that] allows each of us to tell the story of the many truths of collaboration.’” [Aaron Schutz, “Theory as Performative Pedagogy: Three Masks fo Hannah Arendt.” Educational Theory. Volume 51, number 2, spring 2001. Pages 127-150.]
           “… postmodern educational scholars have shown how apparently ‘freeing’ practices of collaboration, dialogue, and critical thinking in classrooms can actually be powerful tools for domination, forming students into predetermined ways of being and thinking. And I agreed that these observations have been important and useful. My problem with postmodernists’ focus on the pastoral, however, was their general failure to acknowledge that only the children of the privileged are likely to encounter many educational settings substantially organized around sophisticated pastoral strategies. Students at the bottom of the educational hierarchy, in contrast, generally experience more obviously oppressive forms of ‘blunt’ discipline, suffering through years of rote pedagogy, individual seat-work, and enforced silence.” [Aaron Schutz, “Theory Illuminates (and Conceals): A Response to the Critique by Samantha Caughlan.” Educational Researcher. Volume 34, number 2, March 2005. Pages 17-19.]
           “… an analysis of power plays a central role in youth organizing. Both in youth organizing and in traditional PA, members often begin by asking questions about who has power/resources in the community, how those with power can be challenged, how power can be taken from the powerful, and what power youths already have ….” [Darwyn Fehrman and Aaron Schutz, “Beyond the Catch-22 of School-Based Social Action Programs: Toward a More Pragmatic Approach for Dealing with Power.” Democrary & Education. Volume 19, number 1, spring 2011. Pages 1-9.]
           “This essay, in the form of a manifesto, invites symbolic interactionists to think through the practical, progressive politics of a performative cultural studies; an emancipatory discourse connecting critical pedagogy with new ways of writing and performing culture …. I believe performance-based human disciplines can contribute to radical social change, to economic justice, to a cultural politics that extends critical race theory and ‘the principles of a radical democracy to all aspects of society’ … and to change that ‘envisions a democracy founded in a social justice that is “not yet”’ …. I believe that symbolic interactionists should be part of this project ….” [Norman K. Denzin, “The Call to Performance.” Symbolic Interaction. Volume 26, number 1, 2003. Pages 187-207.]
      669. politics of critical theory (Simone Chambers): She considers the political legacy of early critical social theory.
           “… Critical Theory set out to do two things. Firstly, to show the internal relationship between knowledge and experience. Facts are socially constructed both in how we perceive them and in their own right, that is, to the extent that social facts are not natural accidents but products of human activity. The second and much more complicated task that Critical Theory set for itself was to use the interconnectedness of knowledge and experience to break out of the given and project normative goals and ends. Thus Critical Theory is envisioned as political in the sense of embracing the unavoidably political nature of all theory and attempting to direct it towards rationally chosen ends. It is this second task that appears to be stymied by Critical Theory’s own analysis of the contradictions of modernity.” [Simone Chambers, “The politics of Critical Theory.” The Cambridge Companion to Critical Theory. Fred Rush, editor. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press. 2004. Pages 219-247.]
      670. care theory (Nel Noddings, Aaron Schutz, and others): They develop approaches to moral education.
           “In care theory, relation is ontologically basic …. Human beings are born from and into relation; it is our original condition. This basic feature of care ethics is important for global ethics because it starts with neither the collective nor the individual. In rejecting those starting places, care ethics shares the relational perspective of Martin Buber …. If we start with the collective, we may derive a powerful communitarian ethic …, and this can give us essential guidance in the traditional tasks of moral education, but it can also blind us to problems within our own communities and make it more difficult to appreciate the views of outsiders.” [Nel Noddings, “Moral Education in an Age of Globalization.” Educational Philosophy and Theory. Volume 42, number 4, June 2010. Pages 390-396.]
           “When caring is used to describe a particular sort of relation, both carer and cared-for make significant contributions to the relation. The carer attends – listens to the expressed needs of the cared-for – and responds in a way that either satisfies the need or explains satisfactorily why the need cannot be met. In the latter case, a continuing effort is made to maintain a caring relation even though the immediate need cannot (or, perhaps, should not) be satisfied. The cared-for, in turn, contributes by recognizing the effort; he or she feels cared for and reveals this recognition in some form of response. Then, and only then, does a caring relationship exist.” [Nel Noddings, “Care and Coercion in School Reform.” Journal of Educational Change. Volume 2, number 1, February 2001. Pages 35-43.]
           “I do not mean to suggest that the establishment of caring relations will accomplish everything that must be done in education, but these relations provide the foundation for successful pedagogical activity. First, as we listen to our students, we gain their trust and, in an on-going relation of care and trust, it is more likely that students will accept what we try to teach. They will not see our efforts as ‘interference’ but, rather, as cooperative work proceeding from the integrity of the relation. Second, as we engage our students in dialogue, we learn about their needs, working habits, interests, and talents. We gain important ideas from them about how to build our lessons and plan for their individual progress. Finally, as we acquire knowledge about our students’ needs and realize how much more than the standard curriculum is needed, we are inspired to increase our own competence ….” [Nel Noddings, “Caring in education.” Infed. 2005. Online publication. No pagination.]
           “‘Care’ theory has become a staple of educational scholarship over the last decade …. Yet, ‘care’ can, at times, become a relatively vague place-holder for those who wish to promote a more nurturing approach to schooling. Therefore, this essay focuses in on the work of perhaps the field’s richest, and most complex thinker: Nel Noddings.” [Aaron Schutz, “Caring in Schools is not Enough: Community, Narrative, and the Limits of Alternity.” Educational Theory. Volume 48, number 3, summer 1998. Pages 373-393.]
      671. historical meta-ontology (Gerry Stahl): He compares the approaches of Karl Marx and Martin Heidegger.
           “Both [Karl] Marx and [Martin] Heidegger formulate theories of technological Being, expressed in the related conceptions of abstract value and calculable stock. For each of the thinkers, the theory of technological society is elaborated within an historical meta-ontology, which attempts to comprehend the contemporary form of Being as having developed out of Western civilization and to criticize it as limited, contradictory and self-concealing. But, whereas man, beings and Being-itself are treated by Heidegger as if they were monads with windows to each other but no developed relations, Marx grasps them precisely by their mediations. Heidegger, claiming to inquire after the conditions of the possibility of their having relations to each other, hypostatizes even Being – which is no being, but a moment in the mediation of beings – into an in-itself with essential characteristics, possibilities and temporality. Marx, in contrast, understands people and their products as determining the totality of interrelations, which in turn determines them, a totality which is most appropriately conceptualized by a theory of the mode of production as the primary sphere of mediation. The term ‘Being’ is unnecessary to Marx’s theory for it is implicitly dealt with, rather than being fixated upon and glorified.” [Gerry Stahl. Marx & Heidegger. Raleigh, North Carolina: Lulu.com. 2016 (from 1975). Page 208.]
      672. how to change the world (Eric Hobsbawm): He considers the contemporary relevance of Marxism.
           “One may hazard the guess that most natural scientists and technologists active in socialist states in 1983 would also take the view that Marxism was irrelevant to their professional activities, though they might be reluctant to express it in public, and although they, like all serious scientists, would necessarily have views about the relation between the natural sciences and the present and future of society.
           “This state of affairs represents a distinct narrowing of the scope of Marxism, one of whose most powerful appeals to past generations has been precisely that it seemed to constitute a comprehensive, all-embracing and illuminating view of the world, of which human society and its development form only one part. Is it likely to continue? It is impossible to tell. One might merely note some signs of a reaction against the complete extrusion of the non-human cosmos from Marxism. One might also note that the philosophical fashions for denying the objective existence or accessibility of the world on the grounds that all ιfacts’ exist only by virtue of the prior structuring of concepts in the human mind have lost some of their popularity. (It is indeed difficult to combine with praxis, whether that of scientists or those who wish to change the world by political action.)”
           [Eric Hobsbawm. How to Change the World: Reflections on Marx and Marxism. New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press. 2011. Pages 381-382.]
      673. theory of sound (Gerry Stahl): He develops a critical approach to electronic music.
           “Two reasons for electronic music’s experimental quality can be given in terms of its social context. Recent composers reject the props to listening exploited by commercial music, arrangements of romantic music, movie sound tracks, television backgrounds, and advertising jingles. They are thereby forced to search for new approaches less manipulative of their material and their audience. Techniques suggested by the electronic instruments are tried out, judged by the ear, varied, explored. Encouragement of the unanticipated becomes the paradoxical goal. The listener, too, must remain open to the unknown, struggle with a work’s meaning, and draw conclusions.
           “Secondly, the use of generalized technical equipment for synthesizing sound structures creates its own world of possibilities, circumscribed by the use of one or more loudspeakers. This largely unexplored realm calls for new emphases and for divergences from practices appropriate to instrumental music. Traditional instruments were developed with the triadic chord in mind and expressive interpretation as a primary goal. Now, with synthesis by means of scientifically standardized circuits, the elements into which the technician can analyze all acoustic phenomena assume a major role.
           “Theory of sound emerges in the practice of electronic music with thematic prominence. Because everything must be built up from scratch from abstract temporal orderings, that is certain effects unrealizable with an orchestra can be achieved more easily than can simple harmonies. Previously unimaginable sonorities and the whole range of temporal intervals are readily available. Through careful splicing of tape or with the aid of electronic control, the most intricate rhythms can be produced.”
           [Gerry Stahl. Essays in Social Philosophy. Raleigh, North Carolina: Lulu.com. 2016. Pages 71-72.]
      674. critically reflexive practice (Ann L. Cunliffe): She considers its importance for the field of management education.
           “What is critically reflexive practice and why is it important to management education? … In practical terms, this means examining critically the assumptions underlying our actions, the impact of those actions, and from a broader perspective, what passes as good management practice. The concept of reflexivity has been debated across a variety of disciplines including sociology, the natural sciences, and psychology … and more recently in organization and management studies …. However, it is often difficult to translate the conceptual and theoretical aspects into practical implications for managing. In this article, I suggest that the practice of critical reflexivity is of particular importance to management education because by thinking more critically about our own assumptions and actions, we can develop more collaborative, responsive, and ethical ways of managing organizations.” [Ann L. Cunliffe, “Republication of ‘On Becoming a Critically Reflexive Practitioner.’” Journal of Management Education. Volume 40, issue 3, December 2016. Pages 747-786. Originally published as: Ann L. Cunliffe, “On Becoming a Critically Reflexive Practitioner.” Journal of Management Education. Volume 28, issue 4, August 2004. Pages 407-426.]
      675. critical theory of ethics (John Dewey): He focuses upon social institutions and moral codes which form character.
           “Without forming any critical theory of the institutions and codes which are forming character, without even considering whether they are what they should be, the individual yet comes at least to a practical recognition that it is in these institutions that he gets his satisfactions, and through these codes that he is protected. He identifies himself, his own life, with the social forms and ideals in which he lives, and repels any attack upon them as he would an attack upon himself. The demands which the existing institutions make upon him are not felt as the coercions of a despot, but as expressions of his own will, and requiring loyalty as such. The conventional conscience, if it does not grow into this, tends to become slavish, while an intelligence which practically realizes, although with out continual reflection, the significance of conventional morality is free in its convictions and service.” [John Dewey. Outlines of a Critical Theory of Ethics. Ann Arbor, Michigan: The Inland Press imprint of Register Publishing Company. 1891. Pages 185-186.]
      676. ordinary affects (Kathleen Stewart): She beautifully considers “a shifting assemblage of practices and practical knowledges.”
           “The ordinary is a shifting assemblage of practices and practical knowledges, a scene of both liveness and exhaustion, a dream of escape or of the simple life. Ordinary affects are the varied, surging capacities to affect and to be affected that give everyday life the quality of a continual motion of relations, scenes, contingencies, and emergences. They’re things that happen. They happen in impulses, sensations, expectations, daydreams, encounters, and habits of relating, in strategies and their failures, in forms of persuasion, contagion, and compulsion, in modes of attention, attachment, and agency, and in publics and social worlds of all kinds that catch people up in something that feels like something.
           “Ordinary affects are public feelings that begin and end in broad circulation, but they’re also the stuff that seemingly intimate lives are made of. They give circuits and flows the forms of a life. They can be experienced as a pleasure and a shock, as an empty pause or a dragging undertow, as a sensibility that snaps into place or a profound disorientation. They can be funny, perturbing, or traumatic. Rooted not in fixed conditions of possibility but in the actual lines of potential that a something coming together calls to mind and sets in motion, they can be seen as both the pressure points of events or banalities suffered and the trajectories that forces might take if they were to go unchecked. Akin to Raymond Williams’s structures of feeling, they are ‘social experiences in solution’; they ‘do not have to await definition, classification, or rationalization before they exert palpable pressures.’”
           [Kathleen Stewart. Ordinary Affects. Durham, North Carolina: Duke University Press. 2007. Pages 1-3.]
           “In this article I would like to raise some questions that unsettle the seemingly disparate identities that justify this turn – the critical, structural forms of attention assigned to the critic on one side and the affective, dynamic attentions that animate everyday life on the other. For example, are the suspicious, wary sentiments of the style of critique under question so disconnected from the atmosphere and actions of our current civic sphere? And do the times and spaces we are living in truly demand methods that are less critical, wary, and discerning? As a way into these questions, this article will address an intriguing, internal conflict within a text that has been widely commended for its response to calls for methodological change, Kathleen Stewart’s Ordinary Affects …. Though it is marked as a departure from ‘paranoid reading’, I argue that Stewart’s work gives us reason to reconsider the potential, character, and social utility of suspicious attention, and thus the division of critical and social methods. By highlighting this counter-narrative within Stewart’s work, my discussion also addresses broader questions about the nature of affect and the value of critical reading that have arisen in recent and prominent debates about methodology.” [Ashley Barnwell, “Creative paranoia: Affect and social method.” Emotion, Space and Society. Volume 20, August 2016. Pages 10-17.]
           “In … [one] kind of the working-class novel … feelings extend outwards, from kindness to loyalty to mates to loyalty to the union to loyalty to socialism, without too many barriers being set up, because it’s much the same feeling being and defining yourself collectively as this kind of industrial and political person. Among the ragged-arsed inhabitants of that deliberately named Mugsborough the structure of feeling is very different, and there is a bitterness which could only have been let out in any tolerable way by a man who was also earning directly as a working man.” [Raymond Williams, “The Robert Tressell Memorial Lecture, 1982.” History Workshop. Number 16, autumn 1983. Pages 74-82.]
           “… [There are] new structures of feeling such as the modern experience of mobility ….” [Raymond Williams, “Film and the Cultural Tradition.” Cinema Journal. Volume 52, number 3, spring 2013. Pages 19-24.]
      677. experimental writing (Wendy Knepper and Sharae Deckard): They examine “radical world literature.”
           “Avant-garde and experimental writings have been associated with a wide range of political perspectives and agendas, including emancipatory struggles for social justice, ‘progressive’ ideologies, militant actions, repressive regimes, and allegedly apolitical forms of creative expression. This special issue focuses on a radical strand of experimental world literature, one that participates critically and creatively in the ongoing struggle for affirmative social transformation in a globalizing world. This kind of radical literary experiment is indebted, at least in part, to the revolutionary ideas and practices of the nineteenth-century avant-garde, which inaugurated and inspired ‘a range of social postures and strategies for artists by which they could differentiate themselves from current social and cultural structures while also intervening in them’ …. This spirit of avant-gardism continued to stimulate the emancipatory agendas and fictions of the twentieth century, including its anti-colonial, democratic, feminist/queer, and ecological movements. Such experiments have contributed to a radical imagination, understood as an ongoing and collective effort ‘to think critically, reflexively and innovatively about the social world’ …. However, in our contemporary era of neoliberal capitalism and still-incomplete decolonization, we suggest that radical experimental writing now faces distinctive creative challenges as it seeks to surpass the known limits of globalization’s own world-making experiments and to inaugurate new forms of collective knowledge and coexistence.” [Wendy Knepper and Sharae Deckard, “Towards a Radical World Literature: Experimental Writing in a Globalizing World.” Ariel: A Review of International English Literature. Volume 47, number 1–2, January–April 2016. Pages 1-25.]
      678. ontology of totality–exteriority (Jayan Nayar [Hindī, जायं नायर, Jāyaṃ Nāyara as pronounced in this MP3 audio file]): He examines the politics of hope and the human condition.
           “An ontology of totality-exteriority underpins … the ‘point zero’ perspective of Eurocentric philosophies. The space of presence and absence that defines the boundary between totality-exteriority in this account of the human condition may be regarded as a socio-historic actual, susceptible to the dictates of the material forces of the world of the ‘said,’ yet never quite subsumed by the futurity of ‘the sayings,’ of becoming, of the ‘real.’ In this understanding of totality-exteriority, therefore, the responsibility for the suffering Other entails the correction of the ‘actual,’ by the embrace of ‘prepolitical proximity that is sought to inform the ‘political’ as (Levinasian) ‘first philosophy.’ Put simply, responsible politics, in this view, involves the repair of the distance between the ‘ideal’ and the ‘actual,’ the inclusion of the excluded Other into totality, from exteriority, from absence into presence, from Non-Being into Being.” [Jayan Nayar, “The Politics of Hope and the Other-in-the-World: Thinking Exteriority.” Law and Critique. Volume 24, number 1, February 2013. Pages 63-85.]
      679. orders of inhumanity (Jayan Nayar): He considers the dehumanization of global development.
           “While once colonialism was blatant in its dehumanizing of social relationships, notwithstanding the claims of the ‘civilizing mission,’ now that same dehumanization takes place under the acceptable, if not desirable, guise of globalized development. The ‘poor’ has come to replace the ‘savage/native;’ the ‘expert consultant,‘ the ‘missionary;’ ‘training seminars,’ mass ‘baptizing;’ the handphone in the pocket, the cross on the altar. But some things—the foreigner’s degree, attire, consumer items, etc.—don’t change. And what of the ‘comprador elites,’ that band of minority mercenaries who symbolized to the colonialist all that was good about what it meant to be the servile ‘civilized,‘ who served as the faithful mouthpieces of the master? Today, many go by the names of ‘government functionaries’ and ‘entrepreneurs.’ Regenerated by these contemporary ideological weapons of the desired human condition, the processes of ordering, of creating orders of inhumanity, carry on with violence intact.” [Jayan Nayar, “Orders of Inhumanity.” Transnational Law & Contemporary Problems. Volume 9, fall 1999. Pages 599-631.]
      680. reclaiming of the voice of judgment (Jayan Nayar): He discusses a major challenge to corporate and political power.
           “This reclaiming of the voice of judgement represents a significant challenge to the power of corporations and governments to define the economic good of society. I believe this heralds a new politics of law. The challenge is to recognize these expressions of people’s judgements as law, truly of the people, by the people, for the people. The time will come when a different law is done – out of conflict and struggle, defeat and suppression, no doubt. But the time will come.” [Jayan Nayar, “Doing Law Differently: How do we police transnational corporations if the legal processes are manipulated by them?” New Internationalist. Number 330, December 2000. Pages 20-21.]
      681. crisis of sovereignty (Jayan Nayar): He considers the individual’s agency over “global sociopolitical and legal relations.”
           “We observe that at the root of the crisis of sovereignty, and of the sovereign subject, is a perceived betrayal, an abandonment even, of ‘man,’ as ‘subject,’ as the ontological originary figure of Eurocentric Enlightenment mythology. Central to this crisis of the ‘subject’ is the realization that the state, as the bounded expression of sovereign will, appears to be neither the protective, emancipative receptacle vehicle for Man’s historical march toward the future, nor the supreme actor in defining the actualities of global sociopolitical and legal relations. The long-held assumption of sovereignty, therefore, as the original point of reference for the philosopher seeking to locate the site and the boundaries of subjectivity through ‘political belonging’ appears no longer sacrosanct under the present conditions of ruptured state formations and practices within a context of neoliberal, globalized, transterritorialized relations; indeed, not only the states of the Third World but also those of the ‘developed’ First World today appear as little more than ‘cunning’ states where constitutional–legal postulations of citizenship and rights merely serve the purposes of internal legitimization, as the more pressing business of negotiating the opportunities and vicissitudes of global capitalism are undertaken.” [Jayan Nayar, “On the Elusive Subject of Sovereignty.” Alternatives: Global, Local, Political. Volume 39, number 2, May 2014. Pages 124-147.]
      682. structure of the capitalist systems (Adam Przeworski as pronounced in this MP3 audio file): He examines the twentieth–century social democratic movement.
           “… the structure of the capitalist systems built by social democrats turned out to be the following: (1) the state operates those activities which are unprofitable for private firms but necessary for the economy as a whole; (2) the state regulates, particularly by pursuing anti-cyclical policies, the operation of the private sector; and (3) the state mitigates, through welfare measures, the distributional effects of the operation of the market.
           “The regulatory activities of the state are based on the belief that private capitalists can be induced to allocate resources in a manner desired by citizens and expressed at the polls. The basic notion is that in a capitalistic democracy resources are allocated by two mechanisms: the ‘market’, in which the weight of preferences of decision-makers is proportional to the resources they control, and the state, in which the weight of preferences is distributed equally to persons qua citizens. The essence of contemporary social democracy is the conviction that the market can be directed to those allocations of any good, public or private, that are preferred by citizens and that by gradually rationalizing the economy the state can turn capitalists into private functionaries of the public without altering the juridical status of private property.”
           [Adam Przeworski, “Social Democracy as a Historical Phenomenon.” New Left Review. Series I, number 122, July–August 1980. Pages 27-58.]
      683. ultra–imperialism (Karl Kautsky as pronounced in this MP3 audio file): He explains the imperialist monopolization over competition.
           “What [Karl] Marx said of capitalism can also be applied to imperialism: monopoly creates competition and competition monopoly. The frantic competition of giant firms, giant banks and multi-millionaires obliged the great financial groups, who were obsorbing the small ones, to think up the notion of the cartel. In the same way, the result of the World War between the great imperialist powers may be a federation of the strongest, who renounce their arms race.
           “Hence from the purely economic standpoint it is not impossible that capitalism may still live through another phase, the translation of cartellization into foreign policy: a phase of ultra-imperialism, which of course we must struggle against as energetically as we do against imperialism, but whose perils lie in another direction, not in that of the arms race and the threat to world peace.”
           [Karl Kautsky, “Ultra-Imperialism.” New Left Review. Series I, number 59, January–February 1970. Pages 41-46.]
           “Imperialism … is the single hope, the single idea of the future which offers anything to present society. Consequently this delusion will increase until the proletariat gains the power to determine the policy of the nation, to overthrow the policy of imperialism and substitute the policy of Socialism. The longer this competitive armament continues, the heavier the load that will be laid upon the people of each country. Consequently each class will seek more and more to shove these loads off upon other classes, and therefore the more this competitive Armament will tend to sharpen class antagonism.” [Karl Kautsky. The Road to Power. A. W. Simons, authorized translator. Chicago, Illinois: Progressive Woman Publishing Co. 1909. Pages 108-109.]
           “The terms in which [Karl] Kautsky’s Marxist orthodoxy has been diagnosed were set by [Vladimir] Lenin: the specific errors of which Kautsky was convicted (the state, imperialism, etc.) were said to be sustained by an undialectical treatment of Marxism as dogma rather than as a guide to action …. The crucial issue is the relation of theory and practice. Although Lenin’s assessment is more nuanced than is commonly supposed, this issue has usually been addressed by his partisans in terms of the theoretically uninteresting contention that Kautsky was guilty of a kind of akrasia [Greek/Hellēniká, ἀκρασία, a̓krasía, lacking good judgment or, literally, lacking command], of weakness of the revolutionary will. Western Marxist theorists, on the other hand, found a separation of theory and practice in the philosophical underpinnings of Second International Marxism, a separation that could be overcome by the reassertion of a ‘critical Marxist’ philosophical perspective that envisions the unity of theory and practice.” [Alan Shandro, “Karl Kautsky: On the Relation of Theory and Practice.” Science & Society. Volume 61, number 4, winter 1997/1998. Pages 474-501.]
      684. construct of embodiment (Niva Piran [Bulgarian Cyrillic, Нива Пиран, Niva Piran]): The article examines body, mind, and culture regarding women and girls.
           “The construct of embodiment denotes specific assumptions regarding body and mind, as well as body and culture.…
           “The research program on the Experience of Embodiment construct adds to the psychological literature by providing a new lens through which to examine ways in which girls and women inhabit their bodies from positive experiences of embodied agency and attuned self-care to negative experiences of restricted agency and self neglect or harm. The emergence of dimensions of experience that capture both positive and disruptive ways of inhabiting the body, allows the tracing of shifts in embodiment throughout girls’ and women’s life journeys.”
           [Niva Piran, “Embodied possibilities and disruptions: The emergence of the Experience of Embodiment construct from qualitative studies with girls and women.” Body Image. Volume 18, September 2016. Pages 43-60.]
      685. power–law pespective (Max Boisot and Bill McKelvey): They develop an approach to “organizational effectiveness.”
           “Until recently, the default assumption of many scientists was that most natural phenomena are distributed according to the bell curve or normal distribution. However, PLs [power laws] are now being discovered in such a great number and variety of phenomena that some scientists are calling them ‘more normal than “normal.”’ …
           “… Managers need to learn enough about PLs to avoid both the potential incoherences of the chaotic regime as well as the tempting oversimplifications that so often plague the ordered regime ….
           “In a world that is becoming ever more connected and complex, however, management inquiry is yet to take up the PL challenge. It lacks an adequate conceptualization of extreme outcomes and so, unsurprisingly, is unable to incorporate them into its current theorizing. We have therefore drawn from the complexity sciences to introduce a more penetrating treatment of PLs, extreme outcomes, and scale-free theory into management inquiry. We believe that PL thinking will ultimately connect the concept of organization used in the social sciences with those used in the kindred fields of biology and ecology ….”
           [Max Boisot and Bill McKelvey, “Connectivity, Extremes, and Adaptation: A Power-Law Perspective of Organizational Effectiveness.” Journal of Management Inquiry. Volume 20, number 2, June 2011. Pages 119-133.]
      686. proportionism (Paul Walker and Terence Lovat): They develop a critical approach to moral decision-making related to medical issues.
           “… we argue here that moral decision making in clinical situations should look beyond established normative ethical frameworks or principles derived from them, towards an approach framed here as Proportionism. The Proportionist approach seeks the highest good based upon a balance between a priori rules and empirical ‘greatest good for the greatest number’ utilitarian calculations, with, as its starting point, the actual reality of the patient and their situation.…
           “We argue … that clinicians need to move away from an over-dependence on substantive frameworks or principles derived from them, towards a procedural framework, framed here as Proportionism. In a Proportionist approach, the clinical decision making is set in the context of this particular patient, in her actual situation. The empirical, greatest Good, utilitarian option is balanced by a proportional awareness of fundamental a priori rules. A rules-based decision is balanced by an appropriate proportion of empirical utility situation awareness. A Proportionist approach allows for tolerance of anomalous positions in an ethical dilemma where interpretations offered by both the deontological and the teleological frameworks are valid, but both need to be moderated and made complete by an empathic, compassionate, caring, self-insightful, and virtuous clinician in communicative discourse with the participants in the dilemma. Thus, together, in the language of the virtue ethical framework, they achieve practical wisdom in order to impel practical action which results in the flourishing of all in the discourse.”
           [Paul Walker and Terence Lovat, “Towards a Proportionist Approach to Moral Decision Making in Medicine.” Ethics & Medicine. Volume 32, number 3, fall 2016. Pages 153-161.]
      687. social analytical prism (Ephrat Huss [Hebrew/ʿIḇəriyṯ, אֶפְרָתּ הוּסּ, ʾẸp̄ərāt Hūss]): She develops a typology for studying Bedouin (Hebrew/ʿIḇəriyṯ, בֶּדוּאִי, Bẹḏūʾiy; or Arabic/ʿArabiyyaẗ, بَدَوِيّ, Badawiyy) women.
           “This paper outlines a typology of visual analytical prisms based on social critical theories. Four compositional art analysis paradigms are presented. These include (a) two descriptive analytical prism-compositional analyses of spatial division for resources in the system, (b) compositional analyses of the reciprocal relationship between figure and background, or micro and macro levels of experience, and two transformative analytical prisms, (c) using compositional mechanisms as a way to self-define content for marginalized and silenced groups, and (d) using visual language to shift static social stands and negotiate multiple perspectives.…
           “… so many art therapy clients are sent to art therapy because of cultural difficulties with language, and as such, are living in high context social realities with systemic problems. From this, it would seem worthwhile to attempt to create a more rigorous compositional analysis of art based in social theories. The aim of this paper is to create a model for analyzing the visual compositional mechanisms of art through a social analytical prism.”
           [Ephrat Huss, “Toward a social critical, analytical prism in art therapy: The example of marginalized Bedouin women’s images.” The Arts in Psychotherapy. Volume 50, September 2016. Pages 84-90.]
      688. gray spacing (Oren Yiftachel [Hebrew/ʿIḇəriyṯ, אֹרְן יִפְתָּחְאֵל, Ōrẹn Yip̄ətāḥəʾēl]): The article applies critical urban theories to Bedouin Arabs.
           “The paper draws on critical urban theories (CUT) to trace the working of oppressive power and the emergence of new subjectivities through the production of space. Within such settings, it analyzes the struggle of Bedouin Arabs in the Beersheba metropolitan region, Israel/Palestine. The paper invokes the concept of ‘gray spacing’ as the practice of indefinitely positioning populations between the ‘lightness’ of legality, safety and full membership, and the ‘darkness’ of eviction, destruction and death. The amplification of gray space illuminates the emergence of urban colonial relations in a vast number of contemporary city regions. In the Israeli context, the ethnocratic state has forced the indigenous Bedouins into impoverished and criminalized gray space, in an attempt to hasten their forced urbanization and Israelization. This created a process of ‘creeping apartheid,’ causing the transformation of Bedouin struggle from agonistic to antagonistic; and their mobilization from democratic to radical. The process is illustrated by highlighting three key dimensions of political articulation: sumood (hanging on), memory-building and autonomous politics. These dynamics underscore the need for a new CUT, which extends the scope of spatial–social critique and integrates better to conditions of urban colonialism, collective identity and space, for a better understanding of both oppression and resistance.…
           “… The identification of ‘gray spacing’ as a ceaseless process of ‘producing’ social relations, bypasses the false modernist dichotomy between ‘legal’ and ‘criminal,’ ‘oppressed’ and ‘subordinated,’ ‘fixed’ and ‘temporary.’ As such, it can provide a more accurate and critical lens with which to analyze the making of urban space in today’s globalizing environment, marked by growing mobility, ethnic mixing and political uncertainty.”
           [Oren Yiftachel, “Critical theory and ‘gray space’: Mobilization of the colonized.” City. Volume 13, number 2–3, June–September 2009. Pages 240-256.]
      689. humanist or humanistic sociology (John F. Glass, Glenn A. Goodwin, William Du Bois, R. Dean Wright, Marc J. LaFountain, Janine Schipper, Shawn Bingham, Corey Dolgon, Daina Cheyenne Harvey, James Pennell, and many others): An emancipatory and human–centered approach to sociology is proposed. The Association for Humanist Sociology is devoted to this framework.
           “Humanistic sociology is concerned with a critical analysis of the values and institutions of society from the normative position that whatever contributes to the liberation of the human mind and spirit and the enhancement of man’s potentialities is good, and it supports te larger social struggle for liberation from all forms of repression, exploitation, and domination. In this regard, humanistic sociology is a radical sociology, although I do not wish to use the terms synonymously.
           “The humanistic approach is not anti-science, anti-intellectual, or anti-rational. Indeed it is deeply committed to science and rationality. But there is also an attempt to correct an imbalance in Western thought that has downgraded, ignored, or negatively labeled the affective as well as the positive side of man. And it does demand that the scientist recognize the subjective, intuitive side of himself ….”
           [John F. Glass, “Toward a Sociology of Being: The Humanistic Potential.” Sociological Analysis. Volume 32, number 4, winter 1971. Pages 191-198.]
           “Three general underlying themes emerge from the preceeding review of humanistic sociology. These themes are: (1) an emphasis on the unique aspects of human beings, i.e., a view of the human subject as a conscious, relatively autonomous, and existential actor (rather than ‘reactor’); (2) humanistic sociologists consciously embracing values of freedom, equality, and self-determination for all humankind and encouraging the creation of institutions and social contexts that perpetuate these values; and, (3) the rejection of a rigid positivism while accepting scientific principles generally.…
           “… Humanistic sociology begins by recognizing that there is no social science that is free from value-bias and that ideological axes can be ground in even the most positivistic of research.”
           [Glenn A. Goodwin, “Toward a Paradigm for Humanistic Sociology.” Humanity and Society. Volume 27, number 3, August 2003. Pages 340-354.]
           “Humanistic sociology is not a difficult idea to define. For the humanistic sociologist, sociology is the study of how to make a better world. The key commitment is that people matter. As economist Kenneth Boulding … noted, ‘the question for the social sciences is simply: what is better and how do we get there?’ This is the conversation of humanistic sociology. It is a conversation about values. As a discipline, we need to be designing and implementing social systems for people rather than plugging people into systems that don’t understand or meet human needs. The question becomes ‘What tools do we have, what knowledge do we possess, what understandings will ultimately make this world a better place for all people to live in?’ Humanistic sociology must be an exploration of effective social arrangements, institutions, and social forms that improve the conditions of living. Sociology is for people.” [William Du Bois and R. Dean Wright, “What Is Humanistic Sociology?” The American Sociologist. Volume 33, number 4, winter 2002. Pages 5-36.]
           “… humanistic sociology would be seen as propagating a critical, value-committed perspective that exalts the individual as a unique, meaning-endowing, feeling, creative, autonomous, equalitarian subject who is capable of growth, self-determination, transcendence and an overcoming of false consciousness, ideological distortion and institutionalized inequity. It fosters a convergence of critical-applied and existential phenomenological and hermeneutic approaches that call for qualitative, non-objectifying inquiry into the experience of social reality.” [Marc J. LaFountain, “Foundations of Humanistic Sociology.” The Humanistic Psychologist. Volume 13, number 2, summer 1985. Pages 18-27.]
           “It [the question] is to ask of humanistic sociology just why it exists. It is to ask why their/our humanism takes the form of a ‘science.’ Despite our renovations, humanistic science is still science. Why do we do this? To negate or be the antidote to positivistic, functional, behavioral approaches (and ironically, give them their breath by doing so)? To make a better world? To know for the sake of knowing? To have something to say?…
           “… As an ‘expert’ on and in the conversations of people, humanistic sociology must be ever vigilant of its possible condescension toward and imposition on the common-sense world. That we humanists revel in our ‘discovery’ of the common-sense lived-world is enough to alarm us that even we humanists have lost touch with ourselves.”
           [Marc J. LaFountain, “Humanistic Sociology.” The Humanistic Psychologist. Volume 28, numbers 1–3, spring–summer–fall 2000. Pages 369-381.]
           “In our literature, we [humanistic sociologists] describe ourselves as sociologists concerned with issues of peace, social justice, and inequality. I tell my students that humanist sociologists believe that sociology should be used to address human needs and to solve social problems, or as AHS [Association for Humanist Sociology] cofounder Al Lee … put it, ‘to serve people, not their manipulators.’ At other times, I have described humanist sociology as a ‘sociology that matters,’ a sociology that ‘makes a difference,’ a sociology that passes the ‘who cares’ test, and as a sociology that ‘confronts structures of power.’” [Woody Doane, “Confronting Structures of Power: Toward a Humanist Sociology for the 21ˢᵗ Century.” Humanity and Society. Volume 27, number 4, November 2003. Pages 615-625.]
           “… reflexivity is … central to humanist sociology. Indeed, our organization [Association for Humanist Sociology] was bourne from such disciplinary reflexivity.” [Janine Schipper and Shawn Bingham, “Introduction: Reflecting on Humanist Sociology.” Humanity & Society. Volume 36, number 4, November 2012. Pages 287-289.]
           “… we are witnessing the corporatization of the academy. Consequently, we are constantly pressured to ‘prove’ our value in quantitative and cost–benefit assessments. For many of our colleagues, teaching has become a means to some evaluative end. The sociology for people … that we cherish has increasingly become the ‘sociology for the institution.’ For the humanist sociologist, dedicated to social activism and public sociology, these trends have placed serious constraints on what we do and who we are.” [Corey Dolgon, Daina Cheyenne Harvey, and James Pennell, “Teaching Humanist Sociology.” Humanity & Society. Volume 39, number 2, May 2015. Pages 131-134.]
      690. critical transhumanism (Jeremy Oduber): He develops a critical approach which intends to transcend humanism.
           “Critical transhumanism finds its footing in its critique of the very same humanism that popular transhumanism holds on to so dearly, and it is there where the most critical potential lies. This is not to say that technology does not play a role in these types of critiques, or that it is condemned. In fact, the liberating possibilities of technology and technological fiction are explored more thoroughly in critical transhumanism than in popular transhumanism. A detailed analysis of critical humanism is, unfortunately, far beyond the scope of this work, but some important aspects will briefly be covered. Critical transhumanism is often an aspect of feminist criticism, if only because the feminist topics of anti-naturalism, the hegemony of binary discourse, and examinations of the role of the body in culture are concordant with the themes of transhumanism. The goal of critical transhumanism, in contrast to the more simplistic and, quite frankly, disingenuous goals of popular transhumanism, is to find productive ways of using the discourse of technology and technological progress in order to aid in the project of dismantling the stable individual subject that forms the core of humanism. In essence, the purpose of critical transhumanism is to truly transcend humanism.” [Jeremy Oduber. Dissecting the Transhuman Experience in Deus Ex: Human Revolution. Master’s thesis. University of Amsterdam. Amsterdam, the Netherlands. July, 2013. Pages 11-12.]
      691. critical posthumanism (Thorsten Botz-Bornstein as pronounced in this MP3 audio file): He develops an approach informed by the well-known critique of modernity, and its metanarratives, by French philosopher and social theorist Jean-François Lyotard (MP3 audio file).
           “Critical Posthumanism exists already in various forms, reaching from straightforward anti-cloning campaigns to sophisticated studies informed by disciplines such as structuralism, feminism, and postcolonial studies. My Critical Posthumanist agenda consists in characterizing the posthuman world as the latest grand narrative that humanity has produced, the narrative of Virtual Reality. Most generally, ‘narrative’ is defined as ‘the representation of an event or a series of events’ …. [Jean-François] Lyotard’s statement that ‘the grand narrative [progress, Marxism, etc.] has lost its credibility’ … has generally been accepted but I believe that it is still possible to describe the whole process of civilization as a process that transforms reality into a mediated, narrated reality. And Virtual Reality (including its posthuman extensions) represents the last stage of a continuous development.” [Thorsten Botz-Bornstein, “Critical Posthumanism.” Pensamiento y Cultura. Volume 15, number 1, June 2012. Pages 20-30.]
           “Simplifying to the extreme, I define postmodern as incredulity toward metanarratives. This incredulity is undoubtedly a product of progress in the sciences: but that progress in turn presupposes it. To the obsolescence of the metanarrative apparatus of legitimation corresponds; most notably, the crisis of metaphysical philosophy and of the university institution which in the past relied on it. The narrative function is losing its functors, its great hero, its great dangers, its great voyages, its great goal. It is being dispensed in clouds of narrative language elements — narrative, but also denotative, prescriptive, descriptive, and so on. Conveyed within each cloud are pragmatic valencies specific to its kind. Each of us lives at the intersection of many of these. However, we do not necessarily establish stable language combinations, and the properties of the ones we do establish are not necessarily communicable.” [Jean-François Lyotard. The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge. Geoff Bennington and Brian Massumi, translators. Manchester, England: Manchester University Press. 1984. Page xxiv.]
      692. pragmatic sociology of critique (Luc Boltanski as pronounced in this MP3 audio file)): He develops a sociological approach to emancipation.
           “The main criticism we have made of critical sociology is, briefly put, its overarching character and the distance at which it holds itself from the critical capacities developed by actors in the situations of everyday life. The pragmatic sociology of critique, by contrast, fully acknowledges actors’ critical capacities and the creativity with which they engage in interpretation and action en situation. But it nevertheless seems difficult, pursuing this programme, to realize all the ambitions connected with a metacritical orientation.” [Luc Boltanski. On Critique: A Sociology of Emancipation. Gregory Elliott, translator. Malden, Massachusetts: Polity Press. 2011. Page 43.]
           “… [Luc] Boltanski and others developed what he terms a ‘pragmatic sociology of critique.’ While others in Britain, particularly Margaret Archer, have emphasized lay reflexivity and actors’ evaluative relation to the world …, Boltanski and associates have developed a more focused analysis of disputation and justification. Although he defends this move, Boltanski acknowledges that in focusing on actors’ own, often restricted perspectives, we risk losing the more radical critiques that the more structural and overarching sociologies provide.” [Andrew Sayer, “On Critique: A Sociology of Emancipation.” Review article. Contemporary Sociology. Volume 41, number 6, 2012. Pages 798-800.]
           “By taking as its starting point everyday conflicts that show the openness of situations, the sociology of critical capacities [of Luc Boltanski] shares common ground with ethnomethodology. However, this focus on situations is combined with a strong interest in the macrostructural element of the orders of worth. Unlike [Pierre] Bourdieu, Boltanski posits that conflicts are not determined or predefined by the existence of these orders. The sociological explanation consists in the task to show the tensions between these different orders of worth. Since conflicts are inherently open for different forms of justification, it is the actors themselves who base their explanations on these orders to either give weight to their arguments or to rebut other arguments.” [Michael Guggenheim and Jörg Potthast, “Symmetrical twins: On the relationship between Actor-Network theory and the sociology of critical capacities.” European Journal of Social Theory. Volume 15, number 2, May 2012. Pages 157-178.]
      693. sociology of critical capacity (Luc Boltanski and Laurent Thévenot as pronounced in this MP3 audio file): They consider two forms of critique.
           “Criticism can be internal to a world when flaws or faults are noticed, and beings are re-qualified or discovered as relevant. Or criticism can be more radical and based on an exteriority. Then, the critique stands outside and relies on an alternative world. It is precisely because persons, unlike things, can exist in a plurality of worlds that they always have the possibility of denouncing a situation as unjust (even if criticism is unequally easy according to the current constraints they have to deal with). In the model we outlined, a critical capability can then be seen as a characteristically anthropological stance.…
           “A first form of criticism consists in denouncing a reality test that is relevant in a certain world by unveiling the presence inside the testing device itself of extraneous beings (or outsiders), relevant in another world.…
           “But criticism can be much more radical. We shall outline now a second figure in which the target of the criticism is the very principle of equivalence on which the reality test is based. In this case, the aim of the criticism is to substitute for the current test another one relevant in another world.”
           [Luc Boltanski and Laurent Thévenot, “The Sociology of Critical Capacity.” European Journal of Social Theory. Volume 2, number 3, August 1999. Pages 359-377.]
           “For [Luc] Boltanski and [Laurent] Thévenot, ‘people, just like scientists, continuously suspect, ask questions and test the world in their everyday lives’ …. In some situations ‘the actors expose and unfold their actions verbally.’ Using language, they attempt to generalize and put facts together. They use language in a manner which is similar to the scientific usage of language’ ….” [Bruno Frère, “Genetic Structuralism, Psychological Sociology and Pragmatic Social Actor Theory: Proposals for a Convergence of French Sociologies.” Theory, Culture & Society. Volume 21, number 3, 2004. Pages 85-99.]
      694. post-oppositional politics of change (AnaLouise Keating): She develops a relational approach informed by the views of Ralph Waldo Emerson.
           “I adopt a non- or post-oppositional approach that (1) redefines self-reliance and individualism in more relational terms, and (2) uses this relational approach to re-examine Emersonian self-reliance. Like canonical forms of American individualism, these alternate, multicultural forms resist external socially imposed sources of authority and underscore the importance of self-trust, yet they do so without reinforcing narcissistic, self-enclosed concepts of identity. Instead, they replace the monologic belief in isolated individual human beings with a more flexible theory of identity and human nature, where self-development occurs always in the context of others.… By positing complex interconnectedness between each individual and society, these intersubjective models of individualism offer alternatives to the exclusionary, dualistic divisions between personal and communal identities found in conventional interpretations of an American self and traditional narratives of the national experience.” [AnaLouise Keating. Transformation Now!: Toward a Post-Oppositional Politics of Change. Urbana, Illinois: University of Illinois Press. 2013. Page 71.]
      695. holistic thinking (Ellen L. Frost): She describes this type of thinking as “a national security imperative.”
           “Globalization, far from being a media buzzword, is real, mostly new, and quite different from its pre-World War I ancestor. Coming to grips with this force calls for substantially transforming the way that U.S. leaders think about the world and adjusting their policy instruments accordingly. U.S. policymakers should forge a strategy based on cross-disciplinary analysis informed by all aspects of globalization, including not only commercial, financial, technological, military, political, environmental, and social aspects, but also cultural, religious, psychological, educational, and historical perspectives. Holistic thinking has become a national security imperative.” [Ellen L. Frost, “Globalization and National Security: A Strategic Agenda.” The Global Century: Globalization and National Security. Volume I and II. Richard L. Kugler and Ellen L. Frost, editors. Honolulu, Hawaiʿi: University Press of the Pacific. 2002. Pages 35-74.]
      696. ideological and moral aspects of the disappearance of communism on the global stage (Theodore Roosevelt Malloch): He considers the consequences of an end to the international dominance of Marxism–Leninism.
           “The ideological and moral aspects of the disappearance of communism on the global stage have been much overlooked. The reconstruction now taking place in the formerly centrally planned economies presupposes a radical shift of attitudes and core beliefs. It is necessary to be aware of new, emerging ideologies—something always fills a vacuum. New core ideas are still surfacing, as fundamentalism of a religious variety is resurfacing on nearly every continent. This time around, using communications networks, the ideologies will also be global in nature. They will often have ugly faces rooted in age-old forms of bigotry, racism, and ethnic and religious rivalry. The United Nations has recently issued a warning of a different sort—that glaring, growing inequalities in the distribution of wealth based on information assets may lead to dangerous polarization between richer and poorer countries.” [Theodore Roosevelt Malloch, “Corporations in the World Economy: Dynamic Innovation.” The Global Century: Globalization and National Security. Volume I and II. Richard L. Kugler and Ellen L. Frost, editors. Honolulu, Hawaiʿi: University Press of the Pacific. 2002. Pages 637-652.]
      697. transformative paradigm (Donna M. Mertens and many others): This approach, previously referred to as the transformative–emancipatory paradigm, applies critical social theory and social constructionism to mixed-methods and evaluation research. One of the underlying assumptions is the existence of multiple versions of reality.
           “I outlined the assumptions associated with the transformative paradigm and its implications for a mixed methods approach to evaluation …, to wit:
           • “Axiological: The guiding principles for ethical practice in evaluation concern the ability of the evaluation to address issues of human rights and social justice.…
           • Ontological: The nature of reality is such that different versions of reality are held by people in different societal positions. The evaluator has a responsibility to reveal the different versions of reality and to support stakeholders in their critical interrogation of those versions of reality in order to identify which have the greatest potential to further human rights and social justice.
           • “Epistemological: The evaluators need to identify the cultural norms and beliefs of relevance in the context and be respectfully responsive to those norms and beliefs.
           • “Methodological: The methodology associated with the transformative paradigm begins with critical dialogue (hermeneutical explorations) and is designed in a cyclical manner to be responsive to the information needs at particular points in the project, with specific attention to culturally appropriate methods.”
           [Donna M. Mertens, “Program Evaluation without a Client: The Case of the Disappearing Intended Users.” The Canadian Journal of Program Evaluation. Volume 25, number 3, 2012. Pages 47-57.]
           “The transformative paradigm is one philosophical framework that helps organize thinking about how evaluators ‘can serve the interests of social justice through the production of credible evidence that is responsive to the needs of marginalized communities. It provides a meta-physical umbrella to guide evaluators who work in communities that experience discrimination and oppression on whatever basis—gender, disability, immigrant status, race/ethnicity, sexual identification, or a multitude of other characteristics associated with less access to societal privileges’ …. Evaluators often work in contexts in which a variety of possible solutions are possible for a problem, however, in the context of wicked problems, evaluators and stakeholders need to work together to determine which of the solutions are culturally responsive and have the potential to increase social justice.” [Donna M. Mertens, “Assumptions at the philosophical and programmatic levels in evaluation.” Evaluation and Program Planning. In Press edition. June, 2016. Pages 1-7.]
           “The transformative ontological assumption recognizes the multi-faceted nature of reality. Human beings often believe that they know what is real, but each concept of what is real is influenced by the positionality of the person. A person who is in a position of unearned privilege by virtue of skin color, gender, or lack of a disability might hold one version of reality. However, a person who is not in that privileged position may hold quite a different version of reality.…
           “Epistemologically, knowledge is not viewed as absolute nor relative; it is created within a context of power and privilege. Evaluators need to develop respectful and collaborative relationships that are culturally responsive to the needs of the various stakeholder groups in order to establish conditions conducive to revealing knowledge from different positions.”
           [Donna M. Mertens, “Philosophical Assumptions and Program Evaluation.” SpazioFilosofico. Number 13, February 2015. Pages 75-85.]
           “My theoretical orientation derives from the work of feminists, ethnic/racial minorities, and people with disabilities and their advocates regarding ways to approach research and evaluation in a way that more validly represents the views of those with the least power.” [Donna M. Mertens in Katherine Ryan, “Advantages and Challenges of Using Inclusive Evaluation Approaches in Evaluation Practice.” American Journal of Evaluation. Volume 19, number 1, 1998. Pages 101-122.]
           “I used the underlying philosophical assumptions associated with the Transformative Paradigm to posit its suitability to underpin evaluation work in culturally complex contexts. I explained that philosophical assumptions are really guides to action in evaluation and that it is important to critically explore the assumptions that underlie our work. Working within the transformative paradigm is not about following a defined step-by-step method, as much as it involves thinking critically about how realities are shaped, and how the evaluator can work with stakeholders to accurately capture their realities and link them to social action.” [Donna M. Mertens, “Transformative Research and Evaluation and Dimensions of Diversity.” Presented at Social Science Methodology in the New Millennium: Sixth International Conference on Logic and Methodology. Amsterdam, the Netherlands. August 17th–20th, 2004. Pages 1-10. Retrieved on December 24th, 2015.]
           “The transformative paradigm offers a metaphysical umbrella that brings together commensurate philosophical strands. It is applicable to people who experience discrimination and oppression on whatever basis, including (but not limited to) race/ethnicity, disability, immigrant status, political conflicts, sexual orientation, poverty, gender, age, or the multitude of other characteristics that are associated with less access to social justice.” [Kelly M. Munger and Donna M. Mertens, “Conducting Research with the Disability Community: A Rights-Based Approach.” New Directions for Adult and Continuing Education. Number 132, winter 2011. Pages 23-33.]
           “The transformative paradigm is one philosophical framework that helps to organize thinking about how evaluation can serve the interests of social justice through the production of credible evidence that is responsive to the needs of marginalized communities. It provides a metaphysical umbrella to guide evaluators who work in communities that experience discrimination and oppression on whatever basis—gender, disability, immigrant status, race/ethnicity, sexual identification, or a multitude of other characteristics associated with less access to societal privileges.” [Donna M. Mertens, “What Does a Transformative Lens Bring to Credible Evidence in Mixed Methods Evaluations?” Mixed Methods and Credibility of Evidence in Evaluation. Donna M. Mertens and Sharlene Hesse-Biber, editors. San Francisco, California: The Jossey-Bass Education Series imprint of John Wiley & Sons, Inc. 2013. Page 28.]
           “Transformative scholars assume that knowledge is not neutral, but is influenced by human interests, that all knowledge reflects the power and social relationships within society, and that an important purpose of knowledge construction is to help people improve society ….” [Donna M. Mertens, “Inclusive Evaluation: Implications of Transformative Theory for Evaluation.” American Journal of Evaluation. Volume 20, number 1, 1999. Pages 1-14.]
           “The transformative paradigm of research and evaluation provides an overarching theoretical framework to guide evaluators who wish to address issues of cultural complexity …. The transformative paradigm serves as a useful theoretical umbrella to explore philosophical assumptions and guide methodological choices. Although most evaluation approaches could benefit from an increased understanding of cultural complexity and competency, evaluation approaches such as those labeled inclusive …, human rights-based …, democratic …, or culturally responsive … are most commensurate with this paradigm.…
           “Ontologically, this paradigm explicitly interrogates the social and cultural forces that determine what is deemed to be real, how power and privilege play into the accepted definitions of reality, and the consequences of accepting one reality over another. Epistemologically, the transformative paradigm calls for a respectful and knowledgeable link between the evaluator and the stakeholders, with explicit recognition of the influence of power and privilege in human relations and trust building. Methodologically, decisions are guided by a deep understanding of the cultural norms and values in the program context and usually are associated with dialogue among the stakeholders, the use of mixed methods of data collection, and shared power in the use of the findings.”
           [Donna M. Mertens, “Stakeholder Representation in Culturally Complex Communities: Insights from the Transformative Paradigm.“ Fundamental Issues in Evaluation. Nick L. Smith and Paul R. Brandon, editors. New York: The Guilford Press. 2008. Pages 41-60.]
           “Quite briefly, the transformative paradigm is a framework of belief systems that directly engages members of culturally diverse groups with a focus on increased social justice …. The axiological belief is of primary importance in the transformative paradigm and drives the formulation of the three other belief systems (ontology, epistemology, and methodology). The fundamental principles of the transformative axiological assumption are enhancement of social justice, furtherance of human rights, and respect for cultural norms. These are not unproblematic ethical principles for researchers.” [Donna M. Mertens, “Transformative Mixed Methods Research.” Qualitative Inquiry. Volume 16, number 6, 2010. Pages 469-474.]
           “The Inclusive/Transformative Model of evaluation will focus on the dimensions of the interactive link between the evaluator and the members of the community that the program is designed to serve. It will reflect a shift in emphasis to inclusivity and transformation in terms of a more integrated view of evaluation with program personnel, participants, and the communities in which they are located. Much intellectual energy will need to be brought to bear to develop this model, but even more importantly, and perhaps more difficult, will be the change in the channeling of emotional energy on the parts of all involved to this end.” [Donna M. Mertens, “Inclusivity and Transformation: Evaluation in 2010.” American Journal of Evaluation. Volume 22, number 3, 2001. Pages 367-374.]
           “The transformative paradigm … provides a framework of belief systems that directly engages members of culturally diverse groups with a focus on increased social justice. Being firmly rooted in a human rights agenda, ethical implications for evaluation are derived from the conscious inclusion of a broad range of people who are generally excluded from the mainstream in society. It strives to extend the meaning of traditional ethical concepts to more directly reflect ethical considerations in culturally complex communities. Power issues in terms of determining the evaluation focus, planning, implementation, and use will also be examined from a transformative ethical stance based on axiological assumptions related to respect for communities that have been pushed to the margins and recognition of the resilience that rests within their members.” [Donna M. Mertens, “Transformative Considerations: Inclusion and Social Justice.” American Journal of Evaluation. Volume 28, number 1, March 2007. Pages 86-90.]
           “The transformative paradigm emerged in response to individuals who have been pushed to the societal margins throughout history and who are finding a means to bring their voices into the world of research. Their voices, shared with scholars who work as their partners to support the increase of social justice and human rights, are reflected in the emergence of the transformative paradigm to guide researchers.” [Donna M. Mertens, “Philosophy in mixed methods teaching: The transformative paradigm as illustration.” International Journal of Multiple Research Approaches. Volume 4, number 1, April 2010. Pages 9-18.]
           “The transformative paradigm’s central tenet is that power is an issue that must be addressed at each stage of the research process. The development of the research focus represents a crucial decision point early in the research process. Typically, researchers turn to scholarly literature to identify a research problem. However, in transformative mixed methods research, a researcher might make use of a variety of quantitative and qualitative methods to determine the focus of research, with a specific concern for power issues. Important ways of gathering insights under the transformative paradigm include methods of involving community members in the initial discussions of the research focus. This can be done in many ways, such as focus groups, interviews, surveys, and threaded discussions.” [Donna M. Mertens, “Transformative Paradigm: Mixed Methods and Social Justice.” Journal of Mixed Methods Research. Volume 1, number 3, July 2007. Pages 212-225.]
           “The transformative paradigm provides an umbrella for researchers who view their roles as agents to further social justice. The axiological assumption provides a conceptual framework from which the other assumptions of the paradigm logically flow. Researchers who recognize the importance of being culturally responsive are inclined to learn the norms of behavior in communities, as well as to explore different understandings of ethical research approaches.” [Donna M. Mertens, “Transformative Mixed Methods: Addressing Inequities.” American Behavioral Scientist. Volume 56, number 6, 2012. Pages 802-813.]
      “… although we embrace the transformative-emancipatory stance paradigm as a lens through which social justice issues can be addressed—and we have used this lens ourselves in some of our work …, we believe that there are at least some occasions when using this paradigm does not go far enough in terms of giving voice to people who have been traditionally excluded, namely, those who represent disenfranchised and the least advantaged groups in society and who have the least power. Specifically, although adopting a transformative-emancipatory stance is extremely useful for giving voice to the powerless, transformative researchers—as do all other types of researchers—still exercise control over the research decisions made at all four stages of the research process ….” [Anthony J. Onwuegbuzie and Rebecca K. Frels, “Toward a new research philosophy for addressing social justice issues: Critical dialectical pluralism.“ International Journal of Multiple Research Approaches. Volume 7, number 1, April 2013. Pages 9-26.]
      “The research philosophical stance for our study was … a critical dialectical pluralistic stance, which operates under the assumption that, at the macro level, social injustices are ingrained in every society. According to this stance, rather than the researcher presenting the findings …, the researcher assumes a research-facilitator role that empowers the participant(s) to assume the role of participant-researcher(s), who, in turn, either present/perform the findings themselves or co/present/co-perform the findings with the research-facilitator(s).” [Anthony J. Onwuegbuzie, Roslinda Rosli, Jacqueline M. Ingram, and Rebecca K. Frels, “A Critical Dialectical Pluralistic Examination of the Lived Experience of Select Women Doctoral Students.” The Qualitative Report. Volume 19, article 5, 2014. Pages 1-35.]
      “A fully mixed concurrent dominant status design involves conducting a study that mixes qualitative and quantitative research within one or more of, or across the aforementioned three components in a single research study. In this design, the quantitative and qualitative phases are mixed concurrently at one or more stages or across the stages.” [Nancy L. Leech and Anthony J. Onwuegbuzie, “A typology of mixed methods research designs.” Quality and Quantity. Volume 43, 2009. Pages 265-275.]
      “… in the present study, the following two epistemological perspectives were combined: pragmatism-of-the-middle and constructivism.” [Hesborn O. Wao and Anthony J. Onwuegbuzie, “A Mixed Research Investigation of Factors Related to Time to the Doctorate in Education.” International Journal of Doctoral Studies. Volume 6, 2011. Pages 115-134.]
      “The transformative-emancipatory perspective specifically addresses social inequities in order to enact positive social change related to oppression, power, and privilege. In working with marginalized groups, voice and power are particularly important considerations that should be addressed in all stages of the mixed methods design. Theoretical frameworks, methods, and the researcher all must have strong relationships to the communities involved. Emphasizing values, this perspective offers mixed methods inquiry specific value-based goals to be incorporated at all stages.” [Peggy Shannon-Baker, “Making Paradigms Meaningful in Mixed Methods Research.” Journal of Mixed Methods Research. Volume 10, number 4, October 2016. Pages 319-334.]
      “We use this concept [Thomas Kuhn’s ‘scientific anomalies’] to investigate the ‘transformative paradigm,’ a research approach specifically purposed with addressing and redressing social injustice …. In particular, we examine its association with pragmatist mixed methods scholarship to explain the attractiveness of its particular emphasis on foregrounding axiological concerns. We do this not as a critique of the transformative paradigm, but rather as a means of exploring what we find to be the uneasy logical relationship within the transformative paradigm between axiology and methodology, and, by extension, the underspecified axiological positioning of pragmatist mixed methods approaches more generally.” [Catharine Biddle and Kai A. Schafft, “Axiology and Anomaly in the Practice of Mixed Methods Work: Pragmatism, Valuation, and the Transformative Paradigm.” Journal of Mixed Methods Research. Volume 9, number 4, 2015. Pages 320-334.]
      698. critical theory of justice (Iris M. Young): She develops a theoretical model which envisions a society from from domination.
           “It [the work of Jürgen Habermas] … can provide a critical theory of justice with its needed capacity to distance itself from any and all actual social circumstances.” [Iris M. Young, “Toward a Critical Theory of Justice.…
           “… [The] form of reasoning about justice [in this article] in effect measures a society against itself rather than measuring the society directly against an ahistorical set of principles. It can thus be seen as a way of interpreting one Marxist understanding of the meaning of normative evaluation within capitalist society. On that account, claims about justice or injustice can be made meaningfully within capitalist society by showing how the organization of that society cannot even measure up to the standard of justice it itself generates.…
           “This process of reasoning about justice serves two purposes. Its main function is to identify sources of domination in the social arrangements of a particular society.… The second function served by the model is to project a vision of an alternative organization of that society which is free from domination.”
           [Iris M. Young, “Toward a Critical Theory of Justice.” Social Theory and Practice. Volume 7. number 3, fall 1981. Pages 279-302.]
      699. critical theory of justice and transnational justice (Rainer Forst): Develops a critical theory of justice and transnational justice as a critique of the relations of justification.
           “In ‘First Things First’ I position myself in the controversy between Nancy Fraser and Axel Honneth over the correct definition of a critical theory of justice by offering a third proposal based on the principle of justification, though one which develops a diagnostic and evaluative form of pluralism. It aims to avoid certain difficulties with normative justification and with the perspective of critical theory on contemporary societies.” [Rainer Forst. Justification and Critique: Towards a Critical Theory of Politics. Malden, Massachusetts: Polity Press. 2014. Kindle edition.]
           “This paper argues for a conception of transnational justice that provides an alternative to globalist and statist views. In light of an analysis of the transnational context of justice, a critical theory is suggested that addresses the multiple relations of injustice and domination to be found in this context. Based on a universal, individual right to reciprocal and general justification, this theory argues for justifiable social and political relations both within and between states. In both of these contexts, it distinguishes between minimal and maximal justice and stresses the interdependence of domestic and transnational justice. On both levels, minimal justice calls for a discursive structure of justification, whereas maximal justice implies a fully justified basic social structure.” [Rainer Forst, “Towards a Critical Theory of Transnational Justice.” Abstract. Metaphilosophy. Volume 32, numbers 1/2, January 2001. Pages 160-179.]
      700. critical social justice perspectives (Annette J. Browne, Denise S. Tarlier, and others): They develop or propose applications of critical theory to social justice.
           “A critical social justice perspective therefore prompts us to see beyond an individualistic perspective — the vantage point that has been typical of health-care practiced in the biomedical paradigm. Thus, the objectives of this paper are to (i) articulate why a critical social justice perspective (in addition to, and intersecting with, the biomedical foci of NP [nurse practitioner] practice) is essential to promote sustainable role development for NPs, and (ii) consider how, from a critical social justice perspective, NP practice must reach beyond individually focused care to address the root causes of health, illness and healthcare inequities — particularly in light of the increasing levels of disparities in our societies.” [Annette J. Browne and Denise S. Tarlier, “Examining the potential of nurse practitioners from a critical social justice perspective.” Nursing Inquiry. Volume 15, issue 2, June 2008. Pages 83-93.]
           “A critical point of view from which to criticize unjust social relations and structures should not depend on a cultural or historical particular social formation because this dependence reduces its critical potential. The best way to overcome this limitation, which affects the effort to develop a critical social justice, is by appealing to a foundation of a normative point of view that fosters the substantive elements that will constitute that critical social justice.” [Gustavo Pereira, “What do we Need to be Part of Dialogue? From Discursive Ethics to Critical Social Justice.” Critical Horizons. Volume 16, number 3, August 2015. Pages 280–298.]
           “In this paper, my primary purpose is to discuss these four tasks as a framework for the promotion of a social justice agenda. In the process, I will be focusing on neoliberalism as one particular example of a system of domination that oppresses a significant proportion of society, which needs to be addressed by community psychologists and other advocates for social justice. While discussing each of the four tasks, I will be recommending a few concrete strategies that community psychologists and other advocates can consider and enact in the course of conducting their research and practice.” [Renato M. Liboro, “Forging Political Will from a Shared Vision: A Critical Social Justice Agenda Against Neoliberalism and Other Systems of Domination.” Social Justice Research. Volume 28, number 2, June 2015. Pages 207-228.]
           “The basic position of the human resource function is between organizations and employees. Because of this, HRD [human resource development] professionals often aim not to favor the organization or the employee too heavily. Instead, human resource functions are generally balanced between the two. This makes HRD professionals especially viable candidates for promoting social justice at work and for encouraging others to do so as well, through employee-related policies, people-related strategies, and training and education. However, as a field, HRD has historically been less concerned with critical social justice perspectives than with organizational outcomes, though critical perspectives have been articulated and advanced by scholars.” [Joshua C. Collins and Dominique T. Chlup, “Criticality in Practice: The Cyclical Development Process of Social Justice Allies at Work.” Advances in Developing Human Resources. Volume 16, number 1, 2014. Pages 481-498.]
      701. critical theory of liberalism (David G. Seibert): “If one thinks critically about liberalism as an ideology, then its defects become apparent. We can think critically about liberalism as an ideology because other ideologies are available. For example communitarians argue we need a more stable environment for cultivating social relationships than liberalism can provide. Liberalism ignores these needs and this is its central problem.” [David G. Seibert. “A Critical theory of Liberalism: a case for community.” Honor’s thesis. College of Saint Benedict and Saint John’s University. May, 1996. Retrieved on September 13th, 2015.]
      702. the town and the gown (Éva Forgács as pronounced in this MP3 audio file): The article describes the red–baiting of Hannes Mayer (MP3 audio file).
           “At first, [Hannes] Meyer saw no immediate connection between his matter-of-fact declaration of being a scientific Marxist and its volcanic consequences, but he soon came to see them as most people were inclined to, a mere political manoeuvre, albeit friendly fire coming from a political ally.…
           “… even in his initial contacts with Soviet colleagues, Meyer sought justice at home rather than a job in Moscow. He may not have hoped to regain his position as director of the Bauhaus [a one-time art school in Dessau, Germany], but he was not ready to give in and accept defeat. The scope of this article does not allow the analysis or the evaluation of Meyer’s work as architect or educator. But examination of a few documents not considered previously permit one to come to the conclusion that Meyer’s first thought after his firing was not emigration to the Soviet Union, but a legal fight against what he thought to be ossified opportunistic political strategies in Germany, where he was living and intended to continue to live.”
           [Éva Forgács, “Between the Town and the Gown: On Hannes Meyer’s Dismissal from the Bauhaus.” Journal of Design History. Volume 23, number 2, January 2010. Pages 265-274.]
      703. gender box framework (Carol J. Pierce Colfer): She develops an approach to examining gender roles in the field of forest management.
           “The gender box …, referred to in the title of this Occasional Paper, is partially designed to reflect the organisation of the coming discussion.…
           “In this framework [gender box], … three scales—macro, meso and micro—comprise layers of influence on any given woman (many affect men too). The boundaries between scales are fluid and fuzzy; they represent more continua than discrete layers and, importantly, they mutually interact ….”
           [Carol J. Pierce Colfer, “The gender box: A framework for analysing gender roles in forest management.” Occasional Paper number 82. Center for International Forestry Research. Bogor Barat, Indonesia. 2013. Pages 1-45.]
      704. presentism (Susan Watkins): Based upon the historical record of capitalism, she critiques the optimistic view—as expressed in U.S. President Barack H. Obama’s campaign mantra, “Yes, we can”—that significant reforms can be made to the present-day world.
           “Ontologically, the idea of a politics without a future would seem a non-starter, if we accept that futurity is a constitutive dimension of human experience, as our habits of procreation—indeed all cultural creation—suggest we should; while any effective action embodies in itself a difference between ‘then’ and ‘now.’ The present itself, as a political moment, can only be grasped through periodization; a process of differentiation that necessarily posits a future as well as a past. Sociologically, the ‘Great Look Forward’ was not a matter of messianic belief but a rational response to the experience of accelerating social and economic change. Analytically, the history of capitalism teaches us that this will continue; conditions will alter, even if relations remain the same. Ideologically, however—… no future’ would already appear to be established as the postmodern order of the day: a changeless now, from horizon to horizon, and a presentist politics reduced to the mindless repetition of the words, ‘Yes, we can.’” [Susan Watkins, “Presentism?: A Reply to T. J. Clark.” New Left Review. Series II, number 74, March–April 2012. Pages 77-102.]
      705. cyber–Marx (Nick Dyer-Witheford): He examines the interface between “high–technology capitalism” and struggle.
           “The central feature of … [the] latest phase is the increasing level of automation, and, in particular, the replacement of industrial workers by cybernetic systems and continuous flow processes based on automatic control. This brings with it a series of interrelated developments, which reverberate through the capitalist economy. These include a shift of living labour from the actual treatment of raw materials to preparatory or supervisory functions; new developments in organised research and university education; a speed up in production and a consequent pressure for more effective inventory control, market research and demand management; and increasingly large, and increasingly quickly obsolete, investments in large technological systems. These developments in turn generate a compulsion to introduce exact planning of production not only within each enterprise but also within the economy as a whole—leading to more state intervention. All of these changes, however, relate back to the overwhelming imperative of capitalism, the maintenance of the rate of profit.” [Nick Dyer-Witheford. Cyber-Marx: Cycles and Circuits of Struggle in High-technology Capitalism. Urbana, Illinois: University of Illinois Press. 1999. Page 85.]
      706. critical Weberianism (David Nolan, Gabriel Rossman, Yiannis Gabriel [Greek/Hellēniká, Γιάννης Γαβριήλ, Giánnēs Gabriḗl as pronounced in this MP3 audio file], and Kym Thorne): Various critical theoretical approaches to the work of Max Weber are developed.
           “A more critical (Weberian) model of professionalism suggests it can be better understood as an occupational identity that functions as a mechanism of social control. Professionalism may, for example, provide an effective means by which workers may accept the need to work long or inconvenient hours without additional recompense because they are ‘professionals’ or, alternatively, a means by which journalists might refuse to act in ways that might ‘compromise their professionalism’ (by, for example, revealing the identity of a source).” [David Nolan, “Journalism, education and the formation of ‘public subjects.’” Journalism. Volume 9, number 6, 2008. Pages 733–749.]
           “The political economy literature is parallel to, and larger than, that on synergy. This literature, largely grounded in the Neo-Marxian tradition, but also drawing on the critical Weberian tradition, argues that the mass media promote hegemony, in part thanks to their for-profit, and especially corporate, ownership.” [Gabriel Rossman, “The Influence of Ownership on the Valence of Media Content: The Case of Movie Reviews.” Center for Arts and Cultural Policy Studies, Princeton University. Working Paper number 27, fall 2011. Pages 1-14.]
           “The area of scholarship on knowledge work that has had greatest sensitivity to the role of customers has been that on consultants …. Perhaps there is much that can be gleaned from this scholarship that can inform a wider understanding of knowledge and professional work. Beyond this, the following areas appear potentially rich avenues to travel down in order to deepen our understanding of knowledge and professional work through an engagement with the rise of the consumer. Within a critical Weberian tradition, there may be space for the joining of the rational-legal authority of organizational hierarchy not only to professional knowledge but also to the figure of the consumer.” [Yiannis Gabriel, “Organizations and their consumers: Bridging work and consumption.” Organization. Volume 22, number 5, 2015. Pages 629-643.]
           “This thesis makes critical Weberian value judgements about all the antagonisms that may exist within the distinctive claims about cyberspace and those antagonisms that are presented as ‘self evident truths’ yet appear to be ‘unreal’ and contradictory. For example, the supposedly antagonistic, yet apparently collusive, relationship between neoliberalism and the postmodern during the cyberspace epoch. Throughout this thesis the intention is to use what Freund considers the most valuable part of Weber’s ideal type methodology, its ‘ability to discover the flaws in doctrines which claim to reproduce reality and of determining the distance which separates their conceptual intention from the historical reality which they purport to reflect’ ….” [Kym Thorne. Conjuring hegemony in cyberspace problematics: towards a public administration of (in)visible values. Ph.D. thesis (U.S. English, dissertation). University of South Australia. Adelaide, South Australia, Australia. August, 2010. Page 14.]
           “It seems at first a mystery how the undoubted superiority of Calvinism in social organization can be connected with this tendency to tear the individual away from the closed ties with which he is bound to this world. But, however strange it may seem, it follows from the peculiar form which the Christian brotherly love was forced to take under the pressure of the inner isolation of the individual through the Calvinistic faith. In the first place it follows dogmatically. The world exists to serve the glorification of God and for that purpose alone. The elected Christian is in the world only to increase this glory of God by fulfilling His commandments to the best of his ability.” [Max Weber. The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism. Talcott Parsons, translator. London and New York: Routledge imprint of Taylor & Francis Group, an Informa PLC business. 2001. Page 64.]
      707. Marxist critical project (Alan Bradshaw, Norah Campbell, and Stephen Dunne): They assert the importance of proposing political economic alternatives.
           “The Marxist critical project, then, affirms that it isn’t enough to understand the politics of consumption by analysing and contrasting modes of production – a critique of political economy, as he [Karl Marx] sees it, must also produce an imaginative space within which political economic alternatives can be proposed, considered and ultimately produced. Marxism, then, seeks to think behind whatever it is that bourgeois political economic categories have concealed in order to make it possible to construct an alternative political economy.” [Alan Bradshaw, Norah Campbell, and Stephen Dunne, “The politics of consumption.” Ephemera: Theory & Politics in Organization. Volume 13, number 2, May 2013. Pages 203-216.]
      708. poetic atheology (Giorgio Agamben as pronounced in this MP3 audio file): Colby Dickinson uses this term to describe Agamben’s work.
           “By utilizing the work of Giorgio Agamben, this essay examines how the poetic can exist as the last refuge of meaning in an ‘atheological’ world, that is, one without its previous theological justifications.…
           “… [Giorgio] Agamben’s embrace of a poetic atheology allows him to reread theology (and ethics) anew. Hence, from the traditions of the mystics and Cabalists, Agamben draws a formulation of divine potentiality that runs counter to the sovereign images of God which have thus far dominated the history of theology. In this reformulation of God’s power, it is God’s descent into the ‘abyss’ of God’s own potentiality and impotentiality that brings forth creation.
           “… There is a radical continuum established here between the immanent world filled with poetic tasks and the world that theology would claim on the other side of our linguistic existence. They are worlds, however, so completely interwoven that they structurally mirror each other, often provoking comments from Agamben that sound eerily like theological speculations, though his claim is that they are the furthest thing from it. What we have in the end is a state wherein God’s creative acts find their only proper reflection in our creative acts … if we allow ourselves to see it as such, that is, if we reside in the same potentiality wherein God was once said to dwell but now wherein we see only ourselves. And, in this sense, there would perhaps be little distinction between God and humanity, a fact which has generated a sort of pantheistic possibility in Agamben’s work ….”
           [Colby Dickinson, “The Poetic Atheology of Giorgio Agamben: Defining the Scission Between Poetry and Philosophy.” Mosaic: A journal for the interdisciplinary study of literature. Volume 45, number 1, March 2012. Pages 203-217.]
           “The protagonist of this book is bare life, that is, the life of homo sacer (sacred man), who may be killed and yet not sacrificed, and whose essential function in modern politics we intend to assert. An obscure figure of archaic Roman law, in which human life is included in the juridical order [ordinamento] solely in the form of its exclusion (that is, of its capacity to be killed), has thus offered the key by which not only the sacred tests of sovereignty but also the very codes of political power will unveil their mysteries. At the same time, however, this ancient meaning of the term sacer presents us with the enigma of a figure of the sacred that, before or beyond the religious, constitutes the first paradigm of the political realm of the West.” [Giorgio Agamben. Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life. Daniel Heller-Roazen, translator. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press. 1998. Page 12.]
           “If the spectator recognizes in this absolute principle the highest truth of his being in the world, he must coherently think his reality starting from the eclipse of all content and of all moral and religious determination; like [Jean-Philippe] Rameau’s nephew, he condemns himself to seeking his substance in what is most alien to him. Thus the birth of taste coincides with the absolute split of ‘pure Culture’: the spectator sees himself as other in the work of art, his being-for-himself as being-outside-himself; and in the pure creative subjectivity at work in the work of art, he does not in any way recover a determinate content and a concrete measure of his existence, but recovers simply his own self in the form of absolute alienation, and he can possess himself only inside this split.” [Giorgio Agamben. The Man Without Content. Georgia Albert, translator. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press. 1999. Page 37.]
           “Perhaps the greatest divide between our experience of politics and that of the Greeks lies in our awareness that persuasion itself becomes violence in certain forms and circumstances, specifically when persuasion goes beyond the free linguistic relation of two human beings, and is taken up by modern techniques of reproducing spoken and written language. This is the essence of the only widespread form of violence that our society can claim to have invented, at least in its modern form: propaganda.” [Giorgio Agamben, “On the Limits of Violence.” Elisabeth Fay, translator. Diacritics. Volume 39, number 4, 2009. Pages 103-111.]
           “In our discussion of the state of exception, we have encountered numerous examples of … [the] confusion between acts of the executive power and acts of the legislative power; indeed, as we have seen, such a confusion defines one of the essential characteristics of the state of exception.… But from a technical standpoint the specific contribution of the state of exception is less the confusion of powers, which has been all too strongly insisted upon, than it is the separation of ‘force of law’ from the law.… That is to say, in extreme situations ‘force of law’ floats as an indeterminate element that can be claimed both by the state authority (which acts as a commissarial dictatorship) and by a revolutionary organization (which acts as a sovereign dictatorship). The state of exception is an anomic space in which what is at stake is a force of law without law ….” [Giorgio Agamben. State of Exception. Kevin Attell, translator. Chicago, Illinois: The University of Chicago Press. 2005. Pages 38-39.]
           “… the animal is in relation to his circle of food, prey, and other animals of its own kind, and it is so in a way essentially different from the way the stone is related to the earth upon which it lies. In the circle of the living things characterized as plant or animal we find the peculiar stirring of a motility by which the living being is ‘stimulated,’ i.e., excited to an emerging into a circle of excitability on the basis of which it includes other things in the circle of its stirring. But no motility or excitability of plants and animals can ever bring the living thing into the free in such a way that what is stimulated could ever let the thing which excites ‘be’ what it is even merely as exciting, not to mention what it is before the excitation and without it. Plant and animal depend on something outside of themselves without ever ‘seeing’ either the outside or the inside, i.e., without ever seeing their being unconcealed in the free of being. It would never be possible for a stone, any more than for an airplane, to elevate itself toward the sun in jubilation and to stir like the lark, and yet not even the lark sees the open.” [Giorgio Agamben. The Open: Man and Animal. Kevin Attell, translator. Werner Hamacher, editor. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press. 2004. Page 58.]
           “What is at issue here, to be precise, is an extremely delicate and vital problem, perhaps the decisive question in the history of Christian theology: the Trinity. When the Fathers of the Church began to argue during the second century about the threefold nature of the divine figure (the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit), there was, as one can imagine, a powerful resistance from reasonable-minded people in the Church who were horrified at the prospect of reintroducing polytheism and paganism to the Christian faith.…
           “But, as often happens, the fracture that the theologians had sought to avoid by removing it from the plane of God’s being, reappeared in the form of a caesura that separated in Him being and action, ontology and praxis. Action (economy, but also politics) has no foundation in being: this is the schizophrenia that the theological doctrine of oikonomia [Greek/Hellēniká, οἰκονομία, oi̓konomía, ‘economy’] left as its legacy to Western culture.”
           [Giorgio Agamben. What is an Apparatus: and Other Essays. David Kishik and Stefan Pedatella, translators. Werner Hamacher, editor. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press. 2009. Pages 9-10.]
           “The concept of potentiality has a long history in Western philosophy, in which it has occupied a central position at least since Aristotle.…
           “My concern here is not simply historiographical. I do not intend simply to restore currency to philosophical categories that are no longer in use. On the contrary, I think that the concept of potentiality has never ceased to function in the life and history of humanity, most notably in that part of humanity that has grown and developed its potency [potenza] to the point of imposing its power over the whole planet.”
           [Giorgio Agamben. Potentialities: Collected Essays in Philosophy. Daniel Heller-Roazen, translator and editor. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press. 1999. Page 177.]
           “In Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life Giorgio Agamben draws upon metaphysics, philosophical anthropology, set theory and the philosophy of language to advance a number of radical politico-philosophical claims. In contrast to arguments that understand political community as essentially a common ‘belonging’ in a shared national, ethnic, religious, or moral identity, Agamben argues that ‘the original political relation is the ban’ in which a mode of life is actively and continuously excluded or shut out (ex-claudere) from the polis. The decision as to what constitutes the life that is thereby taken outside of the polis is a sovereign decision.” [Andrew Norris, “The exemplary exception: Philosophical and political decisions in Giorgio Agamben’s Homo Sacer.” Radical Philosophy: Philosophical Journal of the Independent Left. Number 119, May/June 2003. Pages 6-16.]
           “Without intending to minimize [Giorgio] Agamben’s writings in the fields of politics or ontology, it is our view that his clearest pedagogical statements come in his analysis of texts, especially literary texts. While Agamben’s juridical and ideological works have provided valuable new assessments of contemporary history and the place of the person within the assorted political systems of modernity, they do not address the dynamic maieutics of the classroom, of Socratic dialogue and pedagogical enactment. Rather, it is in those works concerned with linguistic expression and the (often hidden) truths contained in language that Agamben expresses his philosophy of education. It is a personalistic philosophy that seeks out the meeting-place of the ethical and the aesthetic in the formation of the human being.” [Thomas Erling Peterson, “The Personalistic Pedagogy of Giorgio Agamben.” Educational Philosophy and Theory. Volume 46, number 4, April 2014. Pages 364-369.]
           “His [Giorgio Agamben’s] analysis both builds upon and corrects Michel Foucault’s claim that politics in our time is constituted by disciplines of normalization and subjectification that Foucault labels ‘bio-power.’ For Foucault, biopower is fundamentally modem. ‘What might be called a society’s “threshold of modernity,”’ he writes, ‘has been reached when the life of the species is wagered on its own political strategies. For millennia, man remained what he was for Aristotle: a living animal with the additional capacity for political existence; modem man is an animal whose politics places his existence as a living being in question.’ This passage seems to imply not only that modernity is political in a different way than the previous millennia had been, but that it is more political, even essentially so. If politics was an ‘additional capacity’ with Aristotle, now politics is of our essence, and life has become its object.” [Andrew Norris, “Giorgio Agamben and the Politics of the Living Dead.” Diacritics. Volume 30, number 4, winter 2000. Pages 38-58.]
           “Although [Giorgio] Agamben is better known for his critical diagnostic of the contemporary global politics, all of his books end on an affirmation of the possibility of a radically different form-of-life. In a 2004 interview, he has explicitly rejected any attribution of a ‘personal or psychological pessimism’ to his work and proclaimed that his critical interlocutor was ‘more pessimistic than he was.’” [Sergei Prozorov, “Why Giorgio Agamben is an optimist.” Philosophy and Social Criticism. Volume 36, number 9, 2010. Pages 1053-1073.]
           “[Giorgio] Agamben’s work on sovereignty is appealing because of the parsimonious way that it seemingly captures our current political situation. He describes the sovereign’s role in constituting the normal legal system through its power to decide upon what is exceptional to its order. Law is withheld or suspended from the exception. Those captured within the exception face sovereign power without the mediation of legal rights, and are called ‘bare life’ or homo sacer. These relations can be thought of topographically: the exception indicates the space of the normal juridical order. Similarly, the paradigmatic space of the exception is the concentration camp, which is defined by the sovereign.” [Paul A. Passavant, “The Contradictory State of Giorgio Agamben.” Political Theory. Volume 35, number 2, April 2007. Pages 147-174.]
      709. critical anthropology (Stephen Nugent, Stanley Diamond, Bob Scholte, Eric R. Wolf, and others): Applies critical social theory to anthropology.
           “This volume is a collection of articles published in the journal Critique of Anthropology between 1975 and 1991. Its purpose is to illustrate key trends in what is sometimes referred to as ‘critical anthropology,’ a non-dogmatic Marxist turn within anthropology that has strongly shaped the field. The cohesion among these articles is provided not by fealty to a particular line of argument, but by the lasting influences that the arguments contained within have had on anthropology. Because many of the articles have long been out of print and inaccessible in original form, this book is a teaching resource and, for future generations of scholars, a compendium of original arguments that are of continued relevance to the evolution of the discipline.” [“Introduction.” Critical Anthropology: Foundational Works. Stephen Nugent, editor. Walnut Creek, California: Left Coast Press, Inc. 2012. Page 7.]
      710. colonial archaeology (Patricia E. Rubertone): She discusses an archaeologic approach to the European colonizers of the present-day United States.
           “… colonial archaeology … has as its subject of study early American life—not of all Americans, but of those of European, predominantly Anglo-Saxon descent. Whereas this research gives little attention to, or at best downplays, the social, economic, and cultural relations that emerged between Indian people and Euroamerican settlers, or among the native societies themselves, the other category of studies extols them. Orientated around the theme of acculturation, this research emphasizes the transformations in native societies brought about by European influence and domination. In spite of the differences in subject matter, both colonial archaeology and acculturation studies are linked by common premisses about Native America and about the nature of Indian responses to European colonialism.” [Patricia E. Rubertone, “Archaeology, colonialism and 17ᵗʰ-century Native America: towards an alternative interpretation.” Conflict in the Archaeology of Living Traditions. Robert Layton, editor. London and New York: Routledge imprint of Taylor & Francis Group, an Informa PLC business. 2005. Pages 32-45.]
      711. Class Wargames (Richard Barbrook): He considers a communist art project.
           “Two decades after the implosion of the Soviet Union, the once distinct systems of East and West were now fused into a single integrated form of domination which combined the ideological rigidity of Stalinism with the commodity conformism of Fordism. During the second phase of our campaign of ludic subversion, Class Wargames had become focused upon making our own distinctive contribution to the political analysis of this historical trajectory of spectacular domination. Through our performances and publicity, we’d aimed to provide a compelling – and entertaining – alternative to the Left’s stultified debates over the tragic fate of the 1917 Russian Revolution.” [Richard Barbrook. Class Wargames: ludic subversion against spectacular capitalism. Creative Commons. Brooklyn, New York: Minor Compositions imprint of Autonomedia. 2014. Page 204.]
      712. valorization of contingency (Angela Mitropoulos [Greek/Hellēniká, Αγγέλα Μητρόπουλος, Angéla Mētrópoulos as pronounced in this MP3 audio file]): She considers the juxtasposition of contract (theory) and contagion.
           “The valorisation of contingency involves a complex dynamic of the rise and refoundation of the contractual, the entanglement of contract with contagions both metaphoric and empirical, emblematic and historical. There is no binary between contract and contagion in what follows, even if there is at times juxtaposition.… That is to say: revisions of contract point to a reorganisation of uncertainty, as its displacement, or its valorisation, but for the most part as the re-imposition of necessity. This takes place in a dynamic of the crossing and restoration of limits, and in this a re-reading of Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari’s discussion of the axiomatic is relevant.” [Angela Mitropoulos. Artpolitik: Social Anarchist Aesthetics in an Age of Fragmentation. Creative Commons. Brooklyn, New York: Minor Compositions imprint of Autonomedia. 2012. Page 26.]
      713. post-capitalist machines (various authors): They present strategies for demanding radical change.
           “What are the machines you work within? Street signs and billboards? The internet and social networks? The clothes on your back? High street shops? Mobile phones? Like the original ‘saboteur’ who threw her wooden shoe, her ‘sabot’ (clog in French), into the factory machine so that it would grind to a halt and produce free time for her rather than profits for her boss, we can reverse-engineer the world around us.…
           “What post-capitalist machine is waiting to be imagined inside your head?”
           [Various authors. User’s Guide to Demanding the Impossible. Creative Commons. Brooklyn, New York: Minor Compositions imprint of Autonomedia. 2010. Pages 28 and 31.]
      714. strategies of resistance (Eclectic Electric Collective): They consider climate-change activism.
           “Each one of … [the] ‘climate camps’ drew together various experiences of struggles for ancestral territories, environmental defense, and of displacement and immigration in the region. They brought together local and regional campaigns and people from neighboring states with the aim to form and articulate demands and action strategies of resistance towards a growing number of developing infrastructure mega-projects in Mexico – in particular open-pit mines and large-scale dams. These convergences also went further in formulating proposals for autonomous community solutions to the climate crisis that were shared and reflected on between each gathering.” [Eclectic Electric Collective. El Martillo Project. Creative Commons. Brooklyn, New York: Minor Compositions imprint of Autonomedia. 2010. No pagination.]
      715. absence (John Gruntfest): Gruntfest—who defines politics as “the absence of imagination” and art as “the absence of life”—writes leftist poetry. “Che” is a reference to Ernesto “Che” Guevara.
           “It is not possible to live in a world of dualities, dichotomies, dialectics, dissections, interrogation, and analysis. There is only one life and we are it. What is politics but the absence of imagination? What is art but the absence of life? If energy is to be preserved, then we must use fluctuations in the quantum field to create a force that is ongoing, life enhancing, joyous, creative, mind expanding, futuristic, hopeless, all pervasive, transcendent, and yet rooted in the present moment. When one works through the relationship of art and politics, one comes out the other side and finds that there is nothing there. Alone, left to one’s own devices, assume the worst has already happened and take the next step. Jump off into the void and embrace infinite possibility.” [John Gruntfest, “No Stars, no Solos – just Sound, Motion, and Energy: an Interview with John Gruntfest.” Mute magazine. December 10th, 2015. Online publication. No pagination.]
           “only in resistance is there power
           “whether thought fact explosions
           “many mamas request newborn tenderness
           “fill the penal slot with rectitude
           “regret nothing forget nothing
           “psychotropic tumultuousness
           “no repentance no humiliation
           “only in resist tense is there power
           “‘none for all, all is mine’”
           [John Gruntfest. Future Che. Creative Commons. Brooklyn, New York: Minor Compositions imprint of Autonomedia. 2010. Page 40.]
      716. nanopolitics (The Nanopolitics Group): They develop a politics focused on the body.
           “Nanopolitics is the name of a practice that a group of us have been engaged in London. A practice of sensibilities, an experiment in living politics from, with and through the body – and vice versa. Since 2010, we have spent a few days a month together in different spaces, bringing our bodies and sensitivities to what we experience as urgent political matters, as a mode of collective reflection and action.
           “We share a feeling and notion that politics does not just reside in voting, making statements, protesting, or even in our everyday/everynight movements, but that politics can be a tangible experiment of feeling and acting that’s based in our bodies and their ways of relating. One level of this involves working upon the everyday, the normalised and naturalised gestures and environments we often find ourselves stuck within: the ways in which we inhabit the city, the street, our workplaces, neighbourhoods and homes are no more ‘natural’ than the Olympic Park that’s risen from the ground in London recently. How can we find other ways of moving and relating in and across those spaces? What happens when we contest the regimentation of certain modes of inhabitation, putting our bodies on the picket line, dancing on the roof of a bus stop, wrangling with a police cordon, finding that our voice trembles as we speak at an assembly…?”
           [The Nanopolitics Group. Nanopolitics Handbook. Creative Commons. Brooklyn, New York: Minor Compositions imprint of Autonomedia. 2013. Page 19.]
      717. U.S. war culture (Kelly Denton-Borhaug): The article examines the implications of the militarization of the United States.
           “The myth of redemptive violence at the heart of war culture and the popularity of this franchise teaches that violence will save us. This same quasi-religious belief is at the root of the real wars and violence that surround us. Not only is war thrilling and highly entertaining, we have convinced ourselves that there is no other way. It is not by accident that the nation has been engaged continually in multiple real wars for over 15 years in the United States; we have been at war most of my life. Nevertheless, few citizens seem very concerned by the fact that we have surrounded ourselves with—in fact, built our country upon—the most violent, expensive, globally dispersed system of militarization the world has ever known. We sigh and tell ourselves that ‘war is a necessary sacrifice,’ given the terrible unrepentant evil of our supposed enemies. Sound familiar? Meanwhile, the outsized military technical prowess of the United States makes us much more like the ‘First Order’ than the ‘Resistance,’ truth be told.” [Kelly Denton-Borhaug, “US War Culture and the Star Wars Juggernaut.” Theology and Science. Volume 14, number 4, 2016. Pages 393-397.]
      718. historical communism (Randhir Singh [Guramukhī Pajāba script, ਰਣਧੀਰ ਸਿੰਘ, Raṇadhīra Sigha; or Šāh Mukhī Panǧāba script, رَنَدْھِیرَ سِنْگھَ, Ranadhīra Singha]): From a dialectical materialist standpoint, Singh examines communism, and contrasts it with communalism, particularly in relation to India.
           “… without ‘historical communism’ as it has been called, this world of ours would have been a far more inhuman and hopeless place. Beyond its historically specific achievements mentioned above, to which could be added many more, is a somewhat intangible aspect of the social reality around us today, a general illumination, as it were, that bathes all the failed or successful particularities of our age You have to take only one quick look around to recognise the living presence of ‘historical communism’ in the enhanced awareness of humankind the world over concerning issues of human dignity, of justice and injustice, of equality, nppression and exploitation, in the voice and hope the poor and opppressed have come to acquire in our times, in the quality and spread,of their struggles for a better life and, above all, in their confidence, despite all the retreats and reverses, that they can fight and win their emancipation.” [Randhir Singh, “‘Crisis of Socialism’: Notes in Defence of a Commitment.” Economic and Political Weekly. Volume 27, number 30, July 1992. Pages 1623-1627.]
           “Communalism in India, a problem for a long time, has become, in its recent upsurge, a dangerously disruptive phenomenon and a potent threat to Indian people’s struggle for a better life. Scholars of diverse persuasions have sought to understand and explain it, often with a view to help in the struggle against communalism.…
           “It is the parallel shift on the left, however, which is of immediate interest to us. The disenchantment here was with the outcome of conventional class-politics as practised by the established communist parties, which had long lost its way in the mire of ‘economism’ and much of the working class itself to the ruling class politics. Quite a few of the radicals too, therefore, sought salvation elsewhere—and found it in the emerging, highly visible, struggles of the long oppressed and more disadvantaged sections of the Indian people, ‘identities’ as they came to be called: minor nationalities or ethnic groups, religious minorities, dalits, tribals, women, and so on, all impelled to action by an iniquitous economic development, all struggling against an oppressive, homogenizing Indian state and India’s equally oppressive social structures, and all of them seeking their rights and a place of dignity and honour among the Indian people.”
           [Randhir Singh, “Communalism and the Struggle against Communalism: A Marxist View.” Social Scientist. Volume 18, number 8/9, August–September 1990. Pages 4-21.]
           “… protests and developments, ranging from ‘terrorism’ to communalism, have indeed materialised, above all as the consequences of a politics dominated by the ruling classes. As practised by their different political formations in recent years, in its utterly unscrupulous internecine competition for power and ineptitude of leadership, this politics has been producing one after another intractable problems for the ruling classes and tragedies for the people. Even a cursory search for interconnections will show that within the larger socio-economic context of Indian society, it is the ruling class politics at the centre and in the states which has, in each case, created and later sustained the political problems which have become or come to be perceived as ‘the terrorist problem’ in different parts of the country—an entirely indigenous creation which others, imperialism and its allies, are taking full advantage of. At the other end, bankrupt and increasingly bereft of legitimacy in facing the problems of its own generation, this politics, its powerlessness making it only more repressive all the times, has created and come to sustain ‘a terrorist state,’ making the defence of democratic rights all the more necessary and urgent, though more risky also.” [Randhir Singh, “Terrorism, State Terrorism and Democratic Rights.” Economic and Political Weekly. Volume 27, number 6, February 1992. Pages 279-289.]
           “… insofar as we today have a stake in the ‘unity and integrity’ of India, not as nationalists, but as communist revolutionaries, who, at the present historical juncture, view it as an important favourable condition for the advance of the Indian peoples' common struggle for socialism, this unity is also best fought for and preserved within this theoretical position and the political practice flowing from it, i.e., as a part of the struggle against the Indian ruling classes against their economy and politics. (It is fashionable these days to speak of India as ‘a nation-in-the making.’ One might add that if you leave it to the ruling classes, India may well be on its way to be ‘a nation-in-the-unmaking.’)” [Randhir Singh, “Marxists and the Sikh Extremist Movement in Punjab.” Economic and Political Weekly. Volume 22, number 34, August 1987. Pages 1440-1442.]
           “While one continues to hope that compulsions of the objective situation, pressure from below and the remnants of Marxism and socialist commitment within, may yet push or persuade the mainstream communist Left to recover its ability to dream and with it, its original promise to the Indian people, the future of this promise, it seems, is now linked to the future of the revolutionary Left. This Left can, if it wants, restore its lost honour to the word ‘communist,’ once the proudest name in politics. It has the potential to offer our people the alternative revolutionary politics they need and are indeed looking for. But the realisation of this potential demands a fundamental reorientation of its politics and overcoming of its splintered state. It needs to abandon dogmas or orthodoxies of yester years (of both ‘official Marxist’ and ‘Maoist’ vintage) and return to the Marxism of Karl Marx, to ‘think as Marx would have thought in their place’—the only sense in which ‘the word Marxist has any raison d’etre’, Engels had insisted. It needs to be Marxist in its assessment of what has happened in the Soviet Union and its implications. Still more, it has to assess its own past with the ‘ruthless severity’ and ‘mercilessness,’ typical of Marx in matters of revolutionary theory and practice.” [Randhir Singh, “A Note on the Current Political Situation: Some Issues And A Conclusion.” Mainstream Weekly. Volume XLVIII, number 34, August 2010. Online publication. No pagination.]
           “Prof. Randhir Singh passed away on 31 January 2016. His contribution had multifarious aspects. He was an organic teacher who redefined the very role of a teacher and expanded the horizon of classroom. As a distinguished teacher, he achieved unparalleled presence revealed masterfully through two commonly held views: Prof. Randhir Singh said ‘this’ on ‘it’ and ‘I am his student’. A lifelong student of political science, he eventually became its pioneer signifier to expanding its epistemology and going beyond established boundaries. Randhir Singh was a Marxist par excellence who took Marxism as a weltanschauung, a world view, applying dialectical methods to understand and address crucial questions of our time.…
           “Randhir Singh analysed all three prevalent streams [the evolution of political institutions, voting behavior and modernization, and the application of ancient wisdom in the modern nation of India] through using dialectical materialism as a crucial vantage point.”
           [Dhananjay Rai, “Professor Randhir Singh (1922–2016): Worldview of Radical Change.” Obituary. Social Change. Volume 46, number 3, September 2016. Pages 486-491.]
      719. punkademics (Zack Furness at al.): They examine the intersection of punk music and the ivory tower.
           “While I had long been attuned to the fact that there were some professors and many more graduate students who, like me (circa 2005, when I hatched the idea for this book), simultaneously played in bands while they taught classes and worked on their degrees, I often wondered about whether there are a lot of ‘us’ out there. By ‘us’ I mean punkademics, or the professors, graduate students, and other PhDs who, in some meaningful or substantive way, either once straddled or continue to bridge the worlds of punk and academia through their own personal experiences, their scholarship, or some combination thereof.” [Zack Furness et al. Punkademics The Basement Show in the Ivory Tower. Creative Commons. Brooklyn, New York: Minor Compositions imprint of Autonomedia. 2012. Page 8.]
      720. semiocapitalism (Eduardo Molinari as pronounced in this MP3 audio file): He considers capitalism in the context of semiotics.
           “The main task of semiocapitalism is a perverse use of language, transforming all transformation processes into information. The production of value (of capital gain) stems from the recombining itself. This leads me to ask – and this is at the core of a new, emancipating education – what kind of culture needs an economic model based on transgenic single crop farming? What artist’s paradigm, what type of images does this kind of economic organization, this new policy of global food production need? One answer, not a very positive one, is that today’s neoliberalism needs a transgenic culture. But naturally there are always seeds of rebellion.” [Eduardo Molinari. Walking Archives: The Soy Childrenr. Fernando Aita, translator. Creative Commons. Brooklyn, New York: Minor Compositions imprint of Autonomedia. 2012. Page 5.]
      721. critical semantics (Sonia Tamar Seeman, Roland Greene, and Adam Arvidsson): Three distinct perspectives are developed. Seeman approaches a Foucauldian approach to semantics. Greene focuses on “literary criticism with words.” Arvidsson examines social justice.
           “The opening of the 2006 DVD Anthology of Macedonian čalgija (Antologija na Makedonskata čalgija) travels through sun-saturated B-roll views of Macedonian rural landscapes, while a synthesiser plays Western European chords underneath a guitar-plucked melody. Next the camera fades into the image of a Christian church, and then blends into a shot of the old Muslim Ottoman commercial centre (čaršija). Thus begins the first documentary on čalgija [originally Arabic/ʿArabiyyaẗ, جَالْغِيّ, ǧālġiyy, “rhythm”], a treasured yet controversial Macedonian musical genre that indexed urbanity and prestige among Muslim, Christian and Jewish town-dwellers.…
           “… I claim that the re-casting of Macedonian čaršija calls for what I term a ‘critical semantics’ of the varied interpretations of čaršija, by situating musical signs within the knowledge systems that produce them per an ‘archaeology of knowledge’ critique of discourses …, thus tracing the process by which re-signification occurred.”
           [Sonia Tamar Seeman, “Macedonian Čaršija: A Musical Refashioning of National Identity.” Ethnomusicology Forum. Volume 21, number 3, December 2012. Pages 295-326.]
           “Neither intellectual history nor etymological analysis, the project finds its central purpose as literary criticism with words, rather than authors or works, as the primary objects of investigation. I call the approach of this book ‘critical semantics’ in tribute to the models of historical, cultural, and other kinds of semantic investigation acknowledged in my first note. Still, this work is different from such antecedents because these five words are implicated in an intellectual fabric different from that of the modern period: more pragmatic than theoretical, less homogeneous across languages, and far less certain about which words are ‘key’ and which are not.” [Roland Greene. Five Words: Critical Semantics in the Age of Shakespeare and Cervantes. Chicago, Illinois: University of Chicago Press. 2013. Page 12.]
           “What I have called here critical semantics responds to a long tradition of writing about literature and language according to words. In the end, the luminous term in the phrase is not semantics, but critical. Critical semantics is a critic’s job of work, … and the emergence of digital resources makes the social role of the critic even more vital.” [Roland Greene. Five Words: Critical Semantics in the Age of Shakespeare and Cervantes. Chicago, Illinois: University of Chicago Press. 2013. Page 175.]
           “It is only when they [participants in ‘modern rational mass politics’] have found a way of thinking politically about what they are doing, and of inventing a semantics of justice that can attract people into movements and legitimize their actions, that graphic designers in Toronto, game modders, fashion workers in Milan, the Philippines, India and China can build the kinds of institutions that are able to resist and moderate the impact of the logic of capital on their lives.…
           “I don’t know if my notion of ‘productive publics’ will be part of such a new critical semantics.”
           [Adam Arvidsson, “Thinking beyond neo-liberalism: A response to Detlev Zwick.” Ephemera: Theory & Politics in Organization. Volume 13, number 2, May 2013. Pages 407-412.]
      722. Source → Target pattern (Stéphane Laurens as pronounced in this MP3 audio file): She examines representations of social influence.
           “The Source → Target pattern is not a Master → Subject pattern, it is a facet, a particular aspect (→) of a much more complex relationship. A relationship of influence that contains a part of self-influence (↪) and also some feedback or response-influence (←).
           “Some classical theories show that this asymmetric influence of a unique and over-powerful source can represent the primitive form of the relationship, but that this initial relationship transforms and makes way for reciprocal influences where every subject is at the same time a source and a target.”
           [Stéphane Laurens, “Social Influence: Representation, Imagination and Facts.” Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour. Volume 37, issue 4, 2007. Pages 401-413.]
      723. revolution of everyday life (Raoul Vaneigem as pronounced in this MP3 audio file): He examines the populist nature of political revolution.
           “People who talk about revolution and class struggle without referring explicitly to everyday life, without understanding what is subversive about love and what is positive in the refusal of constraints – such people have a corpse in their mouth.” [Raoul Vaneigem. The Revolution of Everyday Life. Donald Nicholson-Smith, translator. London: Aldgate Press. 2001. Page 26.]
           “There is only one way to be radical. The wall that must be knocked down is immense, but it has been cracked so many times that soon a single cry will be enough to bring it crashing to the ground. Let the formidable reality of the third force emerge at last from the mists of history, with all the individual passions that have fuelled the insurrections of the past! Soon we shall find that an energy is locked up in everyday life which can move mountains and abolish distances. The long revolution is preparing to write works in the ink of action ….” [Raoul Vaneigem. The Revolution of Everyday Life. Donald Nicholson-Smith, translator. London: Aldgate Press. 2001. Page 62.]
           “Power cannot be overthrown like a government. The united front against authority covers the whole spectrum of everyday life and enlists the vast majority of people. To know how to live is to know how to fight against renunciation without ever giving an inch. Let nobody underestimate Power’s skill in stuffing its slaves with words to the point of making them the slaves of words.” [Raoul Vaneigem. The Revolution of Everyday Life. Donald Nicholson-Smith, translator. London: Aldgate Press. 2001. Pages 102-103.]
      724. logotherapy (Viktor Emil Frankl as pronounced in this MP3 audio file): Frankl’s existential psychotherapeutic approach was framed by his experiences as a captive in the Auschwitz concentration camp.
           “Let us first ask ourselves what should be understood by ‘a tragic optimism.’ In brief it means that one is, and remains, optimistic in spite of the ‘tragic triad,’ as it is called in logotherapy, a triad which consists of those aspects of human existence which may be circumscribed by: (1) pain; (2) guilt; and (3) death. This chapter, in fact, raises the question, How is it possible to say yes to life in spite of all that? How, to pose the question differently, can life retain its potential meaning in spite of its tragic aspects? After all, ‘saying yes to life in spite of everything,’ to use the phrase in which the title of a German book of mine is couched, presupposes that life is potentially meaningful under any conditions, even those which are most miserable. And this in turn presupposes the human capacity to creatively turn life’s negative aspects into something positive or constructive. In other words, what matters is to make the best of any given situation. ‘The best,’ however, is that which in Latin is called optimum—hence the reason I speak of a tragic optimism, that is, an optimism in the face of tragedy and in view of the human potential which at its best always allows for: (1) turning suffering into a human achievement and accomplishment; (2) deriving from guilt the opportunity to change oneself for the better; and (3) deriving from life’s transitoriness an incentive to take responsible action.” [Viktor Frankl. Man’s Search for Meaning: An Introduction to Logotherapy. Part two. Boston, Massachusetts: Beacon Press. 1992. Pages 139-140.]
           “We have stated that that which was ultimately responsible for the state of the prisoner’s inner self was not so much the enumerated psychophysical causes as it was the result of a free decision. Psychological observations of the prisoners have shown that only the men who allowed their inner hold on their moral and spiritual selves to subside eventually fell victim to the camp's degenerating influences. The question now arises, what could, or should, have constituted this ‘inner hold’?” [Viktor Frankl. Man’s Search for Meaning: An Introduction to Logotherapy. Part one. Ilse Lasch, translator. Boston, Massachusetts: Beacon Press. 1992. Page 78.]
           “By way of a deliberate oversimplication for didactic purposes one could define logotherapy by the literal translation as healing through meaning. What in logotherapy is called the will to meaning indeed occupies a central place in the system. It refers to the fact which reveals itself to a phenomenological analysis, namely, that man is basically striving to find and fulfill meaning and purpose in life. Today, the will to meaning is often frustrated. In logotherapy, one speaks of existential frustration. Patients who fall into this diagnostic category usually complain of a sense of futility and meaninglessness or emptiness and void. In logotherapy, this conditon is termed ‘existential vacuum.’” [Viktor E. Frankl, “Logotherapy and Existentialism.” Psychotherapy: Theory, Research and Practice. Volume 4, number 3, August 1967. Pages 138-142.]
      725. critical disability theory and critical disability studies (David L. Hosking, Julie Avril Minich, and many others): They apply critical perspectives within disability studies.
           “Critical disability theory (CDT) is an emerging theoretical framework for the study and analysis of disability issues. A jurisprudence of disability based on critical disability theory identifies with the legal realist tradition and builds on the Critical Legal Studies movement. In this paper, I outline my conception of critical disability theory as a theoretical basis for a jurisprudence of disability. The various components of CDT are often approached within an interdisciplinary ‘Disability Studies’ framework, but by grounding CDT within the critical theory tradition, I adopt and incorporate particular philosophical approaches which derive from that tradition which are not necessarily encompassed within the idea of ‘Disability Studies.’” [David L. Hosking, “Critical Disability Theory.” Paper presented at the 4ᵗʰ Biennial Disability Studies Conference at Lancaster University, UK. September 2nd–4th, 2008. Pages 1-17. Retrieved on September 27th, 2015.]
           “Reframing disability studies as methodology also demands attention to the practice of teaching as well as research. In the final paragraphs of this essay, I turn to questions of pedagogy, a topic not often discussed in research publications like this one, to address how the neoliberalization of higher education impacts the accessibility of knowledge in disability studies classrooms.… First, student disability services often rely on a medical model of disability (for instance, requiring documentation or diagnoses that can be costly, time-consuming, unsafe, or impossible for students to produce, particularly students with inconsistent health care access) that is at odds with the theoretical premises of critical disability studies. Second, instructors who occupy a position of institutional vulnerability as adjunct, temporary, or untenured faculty may find meeting students’ access needs overwhelming and, in some cases, unachievable; this is especially true when teachers have unmet access needs of their own. And yet the question remains: If we are not giving careful thought to how attendance policies, seating arrangements, assignments, lighting, and mode of instruction make the knowledge generated in our classes accessible or inaccessible, can we claim to be ‘doing disability studies,’ no matter how anti-normative the theory used in our research might be?” [Julie Avril Minich, “Enabling Whom? Critical Disability Studies Now.” Lateral: Journal of the Cultural Studies Association. Issue 5.1, spring 2016. Creative Commons. Online publication. No pagination.]
           “Critical disability studies has emerged as a frame of reference within which researchers attempt to theorize the ontological issue while focusing on a wide myriad of hegemonic discourses and practices through which ‘impairment’—which includes ‘mental health problems’—is defined as a private, typically deviant, individual matter, which is necessary in order to recapture impaired bodies and minds as nondualistic, dynamic, relational, and fundamentally social phenomena in our societies ….” [Caroline Vandekinderen, Griet Roets, and Geert Van Hove, “The Researcher and the Beast: Uncovering Processes of Othering and Becoming Animal in Research Ventures in the Field of Critical Disability Studies.” Qualitative Inquiry. Volume 20, number 3, 2014. Pages 296-316.]
           “Critical disability studies must respond to the inequities of globalization and place an analysis of disability at the epicentre of a geo-political imagination. Specifically Global North critical disability studies have failed to engage with the Global South …. There are 400 million disabled people in the Global South (66–75% of the world’s disabled people).… The assumption of a disability and poverty relationship has created the strongest linkages between disability and the broader development agenda. Whilst disabled people do indeed make up the majority world, they remain excluded from global citizenship.” [Dan Goodley and Rebecca Lawthom, “Hardt and Negri and the Geo-Political Imagination: Empire, Multitude and Critical Disability Studies.” Critical Sociology. Volume 39, number 3, 2011. Pages 369-384.]
      726. critical or radical human geography (David Harvey, Olaf Kuhlke as pronounced in this MP3 audio file, Nicholas Blomley, Bruce D’Arcus, and others): They apply critical social theory to human geography.
           “When recently asked to comment on the state of critical geography today, I answered that I thought the movement (if that is what it is) was having difficulties articulating any collective vision of exactly what to be critical of (apart, that is, from other geographers). But I also felt greatly encouraged by the critical work being done by some younger geographers and thought this testified to the intellectual vigour of the genre. Being put upon the spot to give examples, I referred to a short-list of books from the English-speaking world that I had recently come across.” [David Harvey, “Editorial: The Geographies of Critical Geography.” Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers. Volume 31, number 4, December 2006. Pages 409-412.]
           “It has always been the task of critical analysis and critical theory to evaluate the relationship between objectives (political and technical) and knowledge structures and to excavate the ways that seemingly neutral knowledges covertly support and even promote particular political goals and class or other social interests. To this activity critical geography has much to contribute that is novel and important. But the deeper ambition of critical theory, at its best, has been to engage in the search for political and economic alternatives insofar as it could show that actually existing political–economic power structures and systems were not conducive to human emancipation and that the knowledge structures they produced were as much part of the problem as the solution.” [David Harvey, “The Sociological and Geographical Imaginations.” International Journal of Politics, Culture, and Society. Volume 18, numbers 3–4, June 2005. Pages 211-255.]
           “Professionally, for the first time for many years I found myself in a conventional geography department, which was very useful for me. It renewed my sense of the discipline, and reminded me what geographers think about how they think. [The University of] Oxford doesn’t change very fast, to put it mildly. Working there had its pleasurable sides, as well as the more negative ones. By and large, I liked the physical environment, but found the social environment—particularly college life—pretty terrible. Of course, you quickly become aware of the worldly advantages afforded by a position at Oxford.” [David Harvey, “Reinventing Geography.” New Left Review. Series II, number 4, July–August 2000. Pages 75-97.]
           “From their inception, cities have arisen through geographical and social concentrations of a surplus product. Urbanization has always been, therefore, a class phenomenon, since surpluses are extracted from somewhere and from somebody, while the control over their disbursement typically lies in a few hands. This general situation persists under capitalism, of course; but since urbanization depends on the mobilization of a surplus product, an intimate connection emerges between the development of capitalism and urbanization. Capitalists have to produce a surplus product in order to produce surplus value; this in turn must be reinvested in order to generate more surplus value. The result of continued reinvestment is the expansion of surplus production at a compound rate—hence the logistic curves (money, output and population) attached to the history of capital accumulation, paralleled by the growth path of urbanization under capitalism.” [David Harvey, “The Right to the City.” New Left Review. Series II, number 53, September–October 2008. Pages 23-40.]
           “A disciplinary trend, critical human geography is the result of the growing influence of—and interest in—critical theory in the social sciences. This paradigm change in scholarly thought must be understood in relation to, and as the result of, historical and social conditions. Although critical human geography is an emergent paradigm at a global scale, the discussion here focuses on its development in Anglo-American geography.
           “The emergence of critical human geography is tied closely to the social tensions of U.S. and British politics during the late 1960s. In the United States, it was especially the impact of the civil rights movement and the reaction to the Vietnam War that resulted in various forms of social critique and protest. In academia, this trend translated into the influence of a wide array of theoretical developments. Among them were Marxist critiques of capitalism, the critical theory of the Frankfurt School, French poststructuralism, post-colonial theory, feminist thought, and queer theory. A general theme uniting these different philosophical approaches is their use in reconceptualizing two aspects of human geography.
           “First, critical human geography seeks to provide a broad critique of the prevalent paradigms of scientific inquiry in the discipline. It is a reaction against positivism and its concern with objectivity and the scientific method…. In summary, critical human geography intends to function as a potent critique of traditional scientific models in the discipline. It especially aims to deconstruct previously taken-for-granted scientific models by showing how scientific researchers, projects, data, and reports all are embedded in the power structures of a society and thus actively involved in socially constructing certain realities….
           “Second, critical human geography seeks to provide a powerful critique of the cultural, economic, social, and political geography of capitalist societies. Such endeavors have resulted in Marxist critiques of the capitalist logic behind urban design, expositions of the global patterns of exploitation in trade, studies on the increasing uniformity of cultural expression as a result of an emerging global culture industry, and much more. In addition, geographers have paid particular attention to the growing infringement on the public sphere, as evidenced by the number of studies addressing the surveillance and regulation of public space….
           “Much more than just a critique of scientific approaches, critical human geography offers a variety of methods to provide a critical analysis of society. Most important in the methodological approach is the argument that all knowledge and the spatial characteristics of reality are socially constructed. Marxist, but particularly poststructuralist, approaches in critical human geography seek to deconstruct taken-for-granted notions of space. The predominant tool of deconstruction is discourse analysis. Discourse analysis looks at the ways in which texts (e.g., speeches, articles, inscriptions) attach meaning to certain places and how these meanings are purposely created to represent certain positions of power. In other words, it links texts and the meaning they give to places with the people who created these texts and their positions of power. This is done to show how power is used to give meaning to places and to silence other texts and meanings.”
           [Olaf Kuhlke, “Critical Human Geography.” Encyclopedia of Human Geography. Thousand Oaks, California. SAGE Publications, Inc. 2006. Online resource.]
           “Radical geography began as an explicitly termed area of study in Anglophone geography during the late 1960s amid a context of crisis. Cold war militarism and imperialism had a heavy human cost in Vietnam, extreme race and class stratification of American cities had been accompanied by massive unrest, and the global economy was limping along under inflation, stagnant productivity gains, and a looming international debt crisis. At the same time, some ecologists issued dire warnings of impending doom that accompanied soaring populations. What, some began to ask, did geography have to offer—not just to understanding these deep problems but also to solving them?
           “The answer for some was a turn to Marxist theory and a radical politics….
           “By the early 1980s, radical geography had gone mainstream as its practitioners rose to the vanguard of geographic scholarship. More recently, radical geography arguably has lost its previous influence as broadly left geography has diversified under the banner of critical geography. The confidence of the initial development of radical geography has given way to a period of greater uncertainty and internal debate. The shift from radical geography to critical geography is a product of a number of factors. First, the influence of postmodernism and poststructuralism during the 1980s and 1990s severely challenged the theoretical foundations of Marxism at the root of radical geography. At the same time, the changing theoretical winds themselves were rooted in more grounded critiques of the radical geography project. Feminist and antiracist geographers, for example, objected to what they believed was the narrowly class-based commitments of Marxist geography.
           “Radical geography was perhaps in part a victim of its own success in that its ideas became so well established within geography that they became taken for granted and seen as a kind of new orthodoxy in need of challenge by a newer generation of scholars. Still, the emergence of radical geography began a vibrant period of innovation in geography that came about largely as a result of the forceful quest both to challenge dominant thinking and practice and to make a difference in the geographic world beyond the gates of the academy.”
           [Bruce D’Arcus, “Radical Geography.” Encyclopedia of Human Geography. Thousand Oaks, California. SAGE Publications, Inc. 2006. Online resource.]
           “Radical and critical geographies seek not only to interpret the world, but also to change it through the melding of theory and political action. As my epigram notes, this has been a long-standing, yet controversial, concern. In its particular engagement with the world, critical geography claims to be unique. [Duncan] Fuller and [Rob] Kitchin … term this a ‘critical praxis,’ which they distinguish from ‘applied’ forms of geographic engagement, that serve the interests of the state or business.” [Nicholas Blomley, ”The spaces of critical geography.” Progress in Human Geography. Volume 32, number 2, 2008. Pages 285-293.]
           “Critical geography must … remain critical of the social and political realities of the present, but also alert to, and perhaps productive of, better futures. We need sharp, incisive critiques of existent geographies of power and violence, yet not at the expense of a careful, considered utopianism.” [Nicholas Blomley, “Critical geography: anger and hope.” Progress in Human Geography. Volume 31, number 1, 2007. Pages 53-65.]
      727. paradigm of Dual Globalizations (Saied Reza Ameli [Persian/Fārsī, سَعِید رِضَا عَامِلِی, Saʿīd Riḍā ʿĀmilī]): He examines the relationship between virtual and physical space in a religious context.
           “The paradigm of Dual Globalizations … highlights the position of virtual space and physical place as two major master forces of individual and social identification. According to this paradigm, sociology, anthropology and cultural studies can not reflect the actual reality without having a profound understanding of social behaviour in relation to the virtual world and the actual real world.
           “This paradigm affects both the methodology and perception of reality, and related views and theories to understand social and individual behaviour. Understanding religion, religiosity and religious identity in the contemporary world is accompanied by a substantial index called the ‘virtual space’ which introduces ‘indexes of religious norms’ and ‘references of religious outward and inward presentation’ and ‘the roots of religious norms.’”
           [Saied Reza Ameli, “Virtual Religion and Duality of Religious Spaces.” Asian Journal of Social Science. Volume 37, number 2, 2009. Pages 208-231.]
      728. law of development (The Internationalists): While developing a “dialectical conception of development,” the authors critique Northrop Frye’s “objective idealist” version of literary criticism as fascistic.
           “This is the law of development in material and social things which an idealist must deny because under this law he will have to recognize that there are no universal models of experience, that there are no abstract or universal values in politics or ethics, that the old must surrender to the new, that capitalism must be replaced by socialism, that literature concretely reflects this phenomenon of contradiction between the new and the old, that literature develops along with society, and that literary forms also develop historically. Idealists like [Northrop] Frye have a metaphysical conception of evolution or development as against dialectical conception of development ….
           “Frye’s concept of development in science is nothing more or less than a metaphysical conception of development as an increase, detached from man’s social productive activities and historical needs.
           “… Literature does not ‘increase’ like science. but it develops as society develops.… Literature and art do have a history in spite of Frye’s commonplaces of literary criticism.”
           [The Internationalists, “Objective Idealism is Fascism: A Denunciation of Northrop Frye’s ‘literary Criticism.’” Ideological Forum. Number 3, circa 1969. Pages 1-31.]
           “The phrase ‘The Critical Path’ is, I understand, a term in business administration, and was one that I began hearing extensively used during the preparations for the Montreal Expo in 1967.… There were many paths, some well trodden and equipped with signposts, but all pointing in what for me was the wrong direction. They directed me to the social conditions of [William] Blake’s time [1757-1827], to the history of the occult tradition, to psychological factors in Blake’s mind, and other subjects quite valid in themselves. But my task was the specific problem of trying to crack Blake’s symbolic code, and I had a feeling that the way to that led directly through literature itself The critical path I wanted, therefore, was a theory of criticism which would, first, account for the major phenomena of literary experience, and, second, would lead to some view of the place of literature in civilization as a whole.” [Northrop Frye, “The Critical Path: An Essay on the Social Context of Literary Criticism.” Daedalus. Volume 99, number 2, spring 1970. Pages 268-342.]
           “Aureate diction at the present time is out of style in some respects. The man who carefully memorizes the longest words in the dictionary to impress his friends with does not now impress them. Their use is permitted only in facetious writing, and the kind of humor shown in calling a ‘lie’ a ‘terminological inexactitude’ gets more ponderous and unbearable with each new practitioner of it. In literary criticism this means, as we have already seen, an unsympathetic approach to poets who we think have been deceived by the [?] [?] of long words.” [Northrop Frye, “Intoxicated with Words: The Colours of Rhetoric.” University of Toronto Quarterly. Volume 81, number 1, winter 2012. Pages 95-110.]
           “Literary criticism in its present form grew up in the nineteenth century, under the shadow of philology. Philology had many spokesmen who were in the direct line of Renaissance humanism, but it often became interpreted in a much more superficial way. Still, in a modified and expanded form, the philological program became the standard method of graduate training in the humanities departments of modern universities. The literary scholar learns to operate, in graduate school, a research machinery that enables him, for the rest of his life, to organize and convey information about literature and add to our stock of knowledge about it.” [Northrop Frye, “Expanding Eyes.” Critical Inquiry. Volume 2, number 2, winter 1975. Pages 199-216.]
           “Recently I’ve become more and more preoccupied with what becomes of the Bible when it is examined from the point of view of literary criticism. I think the first question that confronts one, then, is in what language has the Bible been written? The factual answers are Hebrew and Greek, but they hardly do justice to a book which has exerted most of its cultural influence in Latin and vernacular translations.” [Northrop Frye, “The Meaning of Recreation: Humanism in Society.” The Iowa Review. Volume 11, number 1, winter 1980. Pages 1-9.]
           “The word myth means different things in different fields: in literary criticism it is gradually settling down to mean the formal or constructive principle of literature. Where there is a fiction, the shaping form, to which every detail in the writing has to be assimilated, is the story or plot, which Aristotle called mythos and declared to be the ‘soul’ of the fiction. In primitive periods such fictions are myths in the sense of anonymous stories about gods; in later ages they become legends and folk tales, then they gradually become more ‘realistic,’ i.e., adapted to a popular demand for plausibility, though they retain the same structural outlines.” [Northrop Frye, “Myth as Information.” The Hudson Review. Volume 7, number 2, summer 1954. Pages 228-235.]
           “Structural analysis brings rhetoric back to criticism, but we need a new poetics as well, and the attempt to construct a new poetics out of rhetoric alone can hardly avoid a mere complication of rhetorical terms into a sterile jargon. I suggest that what is at present missing from literary criticism is a coordinating principle, a central hypothesis which, like the theory of evolution in biology, will see the phenomena it deals with as parts of a whole. Such a principle, though it would retain the centripetal perspective of structural analysis, would try to give the same perspective to other kinds of criticism too.” [Northrop Frye, “The Archetypes of Literature.” Criticism: the Major Statements. Third edition. Charles Kaplan and William Anderson, editors. New York: St. Martin’s Press. 1991. Pages 500-514.]
           “[William Butler] Yeats tells us that what fascinates us is the most difficult among things notimpossible. Literary criticism is not in so simple a position. Teaching literature is impossible; that is why it is difficult. Yet it must be tried, tried constantly and indefatigably, and placed at the center of the whole educational process, for at every level the understanding of words is as urgent and crucial a necessity as it is on its lowest level of learning to read and write.” [Northrop Frye, “Criticism, Visible and Invisible.” College English. Volume 26, number 1, October 1964. Pages 3-12.]
      729. crashing the party (John Nichols): He examines the rise to power of Donald J. Trump.
           “[Donald J.] Trump was destined to win the Republican nomination because he had figured out the Republican Party. He knew that, since the time of Richard Nixon’s ‘southern strategy’ and ‘moral majority’ campaigning in the early 1970s, party leaders had made the most cynical of political bargains. They would seek power promising to advance the right-wing social agenda of conservative southern and rural voters, and then they would govern as representatives of wealthy campaign donors and Wall Street. As long as they ginned up fears about integration and immigration and affirmative action and abortion rights and marriage equality for lesbians and gays at election time, the GOP insiders calculated that they could keep winning elections with a carefully-orchestrated politics of division and foreboding. The problem was that Republican presidents and congresses rarely used the power that came with their victories to deliver any kind of economic progress for those who provided the party’s essential votes; indeed, by embracing race-to-the-bottom trade deals, bailouts for banks and every other agenda item advanced by Wall Street, party leaders in Congress made their base voters more economically vulnerable. Trump figured out that he could insert himself into the Republican primaries, describe the other candidates for the party’s nomination as campaign-finance crooks and double-dealing political grifters, and win.” [John Nichols. Crashing the Party: Democrats, Republicans, and the Crisis of U.S. Politics. New York: Rosa Luxemburg Stiftung. October, 2016. Pages 7-8.]
      730. Marxist geography (Richard Peet and others): A branch of critical (human) geography which uses Marxism to examine the spatial relations of human geography.
           “All contradictions stem from the inherent characteristics of a mode of production; however, there are many ways of categorizing and discussing them, leading to ‘disciplinary differences’ even within a holistic Marxist science. Marxist geography is one mode of categorization. We can discuss the evolution of contradictions in their geographical contexts—for the capitalist mode of production this context means a territorial structure which at all scales characteristically assumes a center—periphery shape. And we can discuss environmental relations which are typified by the domination of nature….
           “In the coming struggle for our collective survival geography, especially in its environmental form, has a highly significant role to play. But it cannot be a geography like that of the past directly servicing the power structure and (thus) characterized by simplistic theories of environmental relations and merely spatial theories of spatial relations. It must dare to be a radical geography at a time of geographical crisis, one which ties spatial and environmental appearances to the essential forces and structures of human existence. As the late Stephen Hymer so simply put it: ‘To be radical, or to be a scientist, is the same thing: it is a question of trying to go to the root of the matter’”
           [Richard Peet, “Societal Contradiction and Marxist Geography.” Annals of the Association of American Geographers. Volume 69, number 1, March 1979. Pages 164-169.]
      731. situation analysis of the Vietnamese electricity sector (Christine Wörlen as pronounced in this MP3 audio file): They examine the “transition towards a socially inclusive renewable energy.”
           “The study at hand gives an overview of the framework conditions for a transition towards a socially inclusive renewable energy based electricity sector in Viet Nam. The Paris Agreement 2015 states that peaking of global emissions has to occur as soon as possible, and that climate neutrality has to be achieved in the second half of the 21ˢᵗ century.
           “The decarbonisation of the electricity sector is a corner stone for climate neutrality and since key technologies are available already, decarbonisation is much easier than for other emission sources. While allowing economic development and increasing electricity supply – this study considers renewable energy to be the adequate tool to sustainably decarbonize the power sector.
           “Using a series of indicators, this study assesses the readiness for an energy transition and a low carbon pathway in Viet Nam. Even though the transport and heat sections of the energy sector are relevant for greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, our analysis concentrates on the enabling environment of the electricity sector.”
           [Christine Wörlen. Situation Analysis of the Vietnamese Electricity Sector. Berlin, Germany: Rosa Luxemburg Stiftung. May, 2016. Page 10.]
      732. self-reflective sociological aesthetics of law (Andreas Fischer-Lescano as pronounced in this MP3 audio file): He critically develops an aesthetic approach which acknowledges both social and human forces.
           “Aesthetic theory has the potential to develop a sensorium for the rational and arational forces of law. But the aesthetic knowledge of law is underdeveloped. That is why this article proposes a self-reflective sociological aesthetics of law that is capable of acknowledging human and social forces.…
           “… through a reflective movement from within legal form itself, sociological aesthetics of law can cast new light on the other of the rationality of the law, on its repressed and often unthematized sides. Its instruments enable reflection on how rational and non-rational forces – hence the aesthetic dimensions of the constitution of reality – operate in law. Approaches along these lines have indeed been developed, especially in works that explore the connections between ethics and aesthetics. The result concerns a structural coupling of sociological aesthetics as a science with the legal system – in other words, an aesthetic elucidation of the law which has the potential to refine the modes of perception and the decision-making programs of the law.”
           [Andreas Fischer-Lescano, “Sociological Aesthetics of Law.” Law, Culture and the Humanities. OnlineFirst edition. July, 2016. Pages 1-26.]
      733. dialectic democratic theory (Giorgi Tskhadaia [Georgian, გიორგი ცხადაია, Giorgi Tskhadaia]): He combines the work of Jürgen Habermas and Georg Lukács.
           “When summarizing my theoretical mixture of [Jürgen] Habermas and [Georg] Lukács, it turns out that there are four equally crucial notions that constitute the dialectic democratic theory. These notions are: Communicative praxis (borrowed from Habermas), goal-oriented praxis (the one that involves political power and the subjective appraisal of the objective reality, in contrast to the Habermasian notion of conflict-free communicative relations oriented on reaching understanding), totality and reification. The proper theory of democracy is the one that is constructed with these four notions. The problem of Lukács was that he lacked the communicative notion of praxis, whereas Habermas didn‘t take seriously the notions of totality and purposive rationality (goal-oriented praxis). Dialectic theory of democracy unites all four of them into one doctrine and does offer an alternative not only to the Lukácsian or Habermasian philosophies, but to the normative philosophy as well.” [Giorgi Tskhadaia. Dialectic Democratic Theory: Developing a Proper Democratic Theory by Combining the Theories of Lukács and Habermas. M.A. thesis. Central European University. Budapest, Hungary. 2013. Page 33.]
      734. triadic typology (Marcin K. Zwierżdżyński as pronounced in this MP3 audio file): He develops a perspective on religious education.
           “In this paper I will use an alternative, triadic typology, which distinguishes three models of religious education in schools: mono-confessional, inter-confessional and multi-confessional.… [T]he mono-confessional model is exclusive in perceiving and representing religious traditions, the inter-confessional model is inclusive in perceiving and representing religious traditions, while the multi-confessional model is pluralist in perceiving and representing religious traditions.…
           “The mono-confessional (exclusive) model deals with one confession among one tradition (for example Sufism among Islam or Theravada among Buddhism etc.).…
           “The inter-confessional (inclusive) model is concerned with many confessions among one tradition (for example Protestantism and Catholicism in Christianity, or Shaktism and Krishnaism in Hinduism etc.).…
           “In the multi-confessional (pluralist) model, many confessions within many traditions are laid out (for example Christianity, Islam, Judaism, Hinduism, Buddhism, Taoism, Shinto, Confucianism, Baha’i, Sikhism, Zoroastrianism, Gnosticism, Paganism, New Age etc.).”
           [Marcin K. Zwierżdżyński, “Searching and Finding: Personal Identity in Cognitively Oriented Religious Education.” Religions and Identities in Transition. Irena Borowik and Małgorzata Zawiła, editors. Baden-Baden, Germany: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft mbH & Co KG. 2010. Pages 163-183.]
      735. critique of everyday life (Henri Lefebvre as pronounced in this MP3 audio file): According to Lefebvre (1901-1991), critique is not merely possessing an abstract knowledge of everyday life but knowing how to transform it. The original French designation is “critique de la vie quotidienne” (MP3 audio file).
           “Thinking people were obsessed with the political drama. Rightly so. But they were forgetting that although the political drama was being acted out or decided in the higher spheres – the State, parliament, leaders, policies – it still had a ‘base’ in matters relating to food, rationing, wages, the organization or reorganization of labour. A humble, everyday ‘base.’ Therefore many Marxists saw criticism of everyday life as useless and antiquated; they perceived it as a reworking of an old-fashioned, exhausted critique of bourgeois society, little more than a critique of triviality – therefore a trivial critique.
           “For this reason philosophers today are experiencing difficulties of a kind unknown to their predecessors. Great or small, profound or superficial, their lives have lost that simplicity and elegance of line they attribute (fictitiously, no doubt) to the lives of their illustrious models. Philosophers and philosophy can no longer be isolated, disguised, hidden. And this is precisely because everyday life is the supreme court where wisdom, knowledge and power are brought to judgement.”
           [Henri Lefebvre. Critique of Everyday Life. John Moore and Gregory Elliott, translators. The one-volume edition. London and New York: Verso imprint of New Left Books. 2005. Verso ebook edition.]
           “… [Spiritual] products contain a truth. They express concrete human life by transposing it. They become the elements of ways of life or cultures which have always had a partial validity and certain of which (especially Greek life and culture) can perhaps be integrated into the modern world once this has been organized and renewed. In general, such ways of life resulted from the repetition and accumulation of the humblest actions of practical life. History displays, however, in most great civilizations, a distressing contradiction between the magnificence of ideological justifications, costumes and words, and the monotony of everyday gestures. Only the future will be able to resolve this form of contradiction between consciousness and reality.” [Henri Lefebvre. Dialectical Materialism. John Sturrock, translator. Minneapolis, Minnesota: University of Minnesota Press. 2009. Pages 141-142.]
           “… Lefebvre considered the everyday to be the decisive category linking the economy to individual life experiences. Whereas the economic had long played an overarching role under capitalism, the everyday was now acquiring the same significance. The declared goal of his intellectual project was, above all, a ‘revalorization of subjectivity’ and the quest for spaces that allow for autonomy and creativity.” [Klaus Ronneberger (translated by Stefan Kipfer and Neil Brenner), “Henri Lefebvre and Urban Everyday Life: In Search of the Possible.” Space, Difference, Everyday Life: Reading Henri Lefebvre. Kanishka Goonewardena, Stefan Kipfer, Richard Milgrom, and Christian Schmid, editors. London and New York: Routledge imprint of Taylor & Francis Group, an Informa PLC business. 2008. Page 135.]
           “Henri Lefebvre has had an extraordinary effect, the depth and breadth of which we are only now beginning to appreciate. Lefebvre, steeped in the French Communist Party tradition yet one of its most trenchant critics, and just as much a situationist come the 1960s, offered a highly philosophical rationale for the reframing of politics as inherently spatial. Space is the ontology of politics for Lefebvre. The production of space is what capitalism does – capitalism has survived since the nineteenth century, he once famously remarked, ‘by occupying space, by producing a space.’” [Neil Smith, “New geographies, old ontologies: Optimism of the intellect.” Radical Philosophy: Philosophical Journal of the Independent Left. Number 106, March/April 2001. Pages 21-30.]
      736. rhythmanalysis (Henri Lefebvre): Lefebvre critically examines the analytical use of rhythm as both theory and method.
           “A fundamental forecast: sooner or later the analysis succeeds in isolating from within the organized whole a particular movement and its rhythm. Often coupled empirically with speculations (see, for example, doctors in the field of auscultation, etc.), the analytic operation simultaneously discovers the multiplicity of rhythms and the uniqueness of particular rhythms (the heart, the kidneys, etc.). The rhythmanalysis here denned as a method and a theory pursues this time-honoured labour in a systematic and theoretical manner, by bringing together very diverse practices and very different types of knowledge: medicine, history, climatology cosmology poetry (the poetic), etc. Not forgetting, of course, sociology and psychology, which occupy the front line and supply the essentials.” [Henri Lefebvre. Rhythmanalysis: Space, Time and Everyday Life. Stuart Elden and Gerald Moore, translators. London and New York: Continuum. 2004. Page 16.]
           “At no moment have the analysis of rhythms and the rhythmanalytical project lost sight of the body. Not the anatomical or functional body, but the body as polyrhythmic and eurhythmic (in the so-called normal state). As such, the living body has (in general) always been present: a constant reference. The theory of rhythms is founded on the experience and knowledge [connaissance] of the body: the concepts derive from this consciousness and this knowledge, simultaneously banal and full of surprises – of the unknown and the misunderstood.” [Henri Lefebvre. Rhythmanalysis: Space, Time and Everyday Life. Stuart Elden and Gerald Moore, translators. London and New York: Continuum. 2004. Page 67.]
           “Some men lift a heavy load. In this simple action the reality of the object governs the activity directly. The shape of the load, its volume, the direction it has got to be moved in, are the objective conditions which the action obeys. Moreover the number of men able to help and their physical strength enter as determining elements into the sequence of synchronized movements which will lead to the load being shifted. By virtue of a reciprocal adaptation of men and object, the activity of this human group will acquire a form, a structure and a rhythm. These remarks can be extended from a very simple case like this to very complex ones: the manufacture of an object, a laboratory experiment, etc. Every time human effort is applied to a ‘product,’ a concrete unity is formed between subject and object, looked at practically. The subject and object are not merged, neither are they abstractly distinct; they are opposed in a certain relationship. They form a clearly determined dialectical whole.” [Henri Lefebvre. Dialectical Materialism. John Sturrock, translator. Minneapolis, Minnesota: University of Minnesota Press. 2009. Page 108.]
           “The process of rhythmanalysis, as [Henri] Lefebvre proposes, does not aim to ‘isolate an object, or a subject, or a relation [but it] seeks to grasp a moving but determinate complexity (determination not entailing determinism).’ The entire concept of rhythmanalysis is therefore one of using rhythm as a tool or a method, rather than an object of analysis. In this manner rhythm can be an instrument of understanding for a broad array of topics outside the field of music: one can listen to space as one listens to music. Even Lefebvre’s focus on the body as a central referent for any study of rhythm and cycles is not one of subjectifying the body, but using it as a starting point in analysis and as a tool (our body as a free-range metronome).” [Aleksandra Vojcic, “Henri Lefebvre and Elements of Rhythmanalysis.” Theoria. Volume 21, 2014. Pages 71-103.]
           “Rhythms have specific characteristics, which Lefebvre explores. Wherever time, space and an expenditure of energy coincide, there is rhythm. Rhythm is always relative; faster rhythms imply slower rhythms, and vice versa. Silence is a rhythm as much as the noise of hubbub, which the rhythmanalyst can dissect to identify the specific rhythms of which it is composed. Rhythms are about repetition, yet repetition produces difference. We need to be outside of rhythms to notice and analyse rhythms. Usually taken for granted, rhythms become clearer with their breakdown, the onset of arrhythmia. It is when providing specific insights into the workings and analysis of rhythms that I think Lefebvre is at his best. His rhythmanalysis urges us towards a more cadenced understanding of the worlds, whichever worlds, we choose to investigate.” [Dave Horton, “Rhythmanalysis: Space, Time and Everyday Life.” Time & Society. Volume 14, number 1, 2005. Pages 157-159.]
           “Rhythm makes us remember, repeating by rote, making habits and routines; but it is amnesiac, making us forget – only to return afresh. As Henri Lefebvre reminds us, ‘dawn is always new’ …. Rhythm is double-sided, it doubles up, even double-crosses itself, both the earthly and ethereal, enforcing the work of labour as much as the play of pleasure. Rhythm has equal facility to be a regressive or progressive political weapon, as we discuss below. Rhythm is multiply inflected, both traumatic and cathartic. There is a rhetoric to rhythm, we feel it, it carries an affective charge, conveying meaning as feeling and tone, rather than logic or information.” [Julian Henriques, Milla Tiainen, and Pasi Väliaho, “Rhythm Returns: Movement and Cultural Theory.” Body & Society. Volume 20, numbers 3 and 4, 2014. Pages 3-29.]
      737. spatial poetics of Jonah (Anthony Rees): He applies critical theory to the Biblical narrative of Jonah.
           “Commentators have noted that a narrative feature of Jonah [Hebrew/ʿIḇəriyṯ, יוֹנָה, Yōnāh] is the repeated use of the verb yarad [Hebrew/ʿIḇəriyṯ, יָרַד, yārạḏ], ‘to go down,’ the use of which always has Jonah as its subject. The present paper examines the use of this term in conversation with space theory. To where does Jonah go down? What are the ‘third-space’ implications of those spaces, and how do they relate to the commission of Jonah? And how are these ‘goings down’ related to the various ‘comings up’ which also feature in the story? Some of these ‘comings up’ are lost in translation, so my work here relies on the directional nuances inherent in the Hebrew constructions. Through these questions, we may arrive at a spatial poetics of the Jonah story, and further appreciate the narrative artistry of this well-loved tale.” [Anthony Rees, “Getting Up and Going Down: Towards a Spatial Poetics of Jonah.” The Bible & Critical Theory. Volume 12, number 1, 2006. Pages 40-48.]
      738. creation spirituality (Matthew Fox): This Roman Catholic turned Episcopal (Anglican Communion) priest develops a North American alternative to the theology of liberation from Latin America. As a Roman Catholic priest, in the Dominican Order (Order of Preachers), Fox was, at one point, silenced by Cardinal and Prefect of the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith Joseph Ratzinger (later, Pope Benedict XVI).
           “… I owed to Père Chenu the answer to my question of questions: How do I relate spirituality to culture, prayer to social justice, politics to mysticism? He named the creation spirituality tradition for me. In encountering this tradition, my entire life would gain a focus and a direction that it never had before. It would also gain a notoriety that I never, in my ecclesial naivete, could have predicted.
           “The most pressing question I had brought with me to Paris— how do mysticism and social justice relate (if at all)?— now had a context! So did the issues of dualism and the demeaning of body and matter. Creation spirituality would bring it all together for me: the scriptural and Jewish spirituality (for it was the oldest tradition in the Bible, that of the Yahwist author of the ninth or tenth century before Christ); science and spirituality; politics and prayer; body and spirit; science and religion; Christianity and other world religions. It would be my task to study creation spirituality more deeply and to begin a cultural translation of it. This task would prove to be a process in its own right with unforeseen consequences.”
           [Matthew Fox. Confessions: The Making of a Postdenominational Priest. Revised and updated. Berkeley, California: North Atlantic Books. 2015. Pages 79-80.]
           “For years North Americans had been translating liberation theology from the south into English, but what had really altered up north? Why had liberation theology taken so little foothold in the north? Might it be that translations were not enough; that we had to create our own base communities and our own liberation from our own particular demons?” [Matthew Fox. Confessions: The Making of a Postdenominational Priest. Revised and updated. Berkeley, California: North Atlantic Books. 2015. Pages 218-219.]
           “For the New Reformation to take place the West must acknowledge what is now obvious for all to see: There are two Christianities in our midst. One worships a Punitive Father and teaches the doctrine of Original Sin. It is patriarchal in nature, links readily to fascist powers of control, and demonizes women, the earth, other species, science, and gays and lesbians. It builds on fear and supports empire building.
           “The other Christianity recognizes the Original Blessing from which all being derives. It recognizes awe, rather than sin and guilt, as the starting point of true religion. It thus marvels at today’s scientific findings about the wonders of the fourteen-billion-year journey of the universe that has brought our being into existence and the wonders of our special home, the earth. It prefers trust over fear and an understanding of a divinity who is source of all things, as much mother as father, as much female as male. It is an emerging ‘woman church’ that does not exclude men, and tries to consider the whole earth as a holy temple. Because it honors creation, it does not denigrate what creation has accomplished, which includes the 8 percent of the human population that is gay or lesbian and those 464+ other species with gay and lesbian populations. It considers evil to be a choice that we make as humans—one that separates us from our common good—and that we can unmake.”
           [Matthew Fox. A New Reformation: Creation Spirituality and the Transformation of Christianity. Rochester, Vermont: Inner Traditions. 2006. Page 18.]
           “The spiritual community that I’m part of, called the Creation Spirituality movement, has been developing rituals of grieving that are so needed today. And in our rituals of ‘the Cosmic Mass’ (see thecosmicmass.com), we use premodern forms of worship such as dance together with postmodern forms like VJ, DJ, rap, and more, to bring life alive in body and soul within a liturgical lineage. Two summers ago we celebrated a Cosmic Mass at the Sounds True conference in Colorado for 1,000 persons of varied religious backgrounds and none, and most everyone was thrilled to pray in that manner. The Ecstatic Dance movement also brings body back to communal prayer.
           “If more people see creativity being put to use to save the planet, not just to make more gee-whiz gadgets and consumer items, they will become motivated and excited rather than depressed and anxious. They will want to get on board and undertake the discipline that learning takes to become full allies and partners in the struggle to melt denial and pessimism. A new depth of community could emerge from these efforts because community is primarily born of the common work we do together, and saving the planet as we know it is a common work par excellence.”
           [Matthew Fox, “Love Is Stronger Than Stewardship: A Cosmic Christ Path to Planetary Survival.” Tikkun: to heal, repair, and transform the world. Volume 30, number 2, spring 2015. Pages 40-42.]
           “The four paths of creation spirituality name the mystical journey for us and direct us to the way of compassion. The first path, called the Via Positiva, is the way of delight, wonder, and awe. Awe is our experience of the sacred in creation. The second path is darkness, the Via Negativa, the negative way. It is a path of silence, of letting go and letting be. Humour is a part of this path but also suffering and grief. Grief requres heart work. When we get wounded we have to pay attention to that and to all the forms of darkness to see what they are telling us. People in Alcoholics Anonymous know about the Via Negativa, about bottoming out. When you can do the bottoming out, the letting go, then creativity follows because we are all creative.
           “The third path is the Via Creativa, the creativity that flows from the bottoming out. That is the divine image in us giving birth. Meister Eckhart says: ‘What does God do all day long? God lies in a maternity bed giving birth.’ This path honours our birthing capacity.
           “The fourth path is the Via Transformativa, the transformative way, which is the way of the prophet. In it we give birth to that which produces compassion, healing, and justice for society, nature, and for our lives. We are free to give birth to many things: we can birth bulldozers to tear down rainforests, or nuclear weapons to destroy all life on Earth. But the fourth path channels our birthing powers, our imagination, into something useful and appropriate, and that would be compassion which is celebration, healing, and justice.
           “In this way other paths start over again: the poor can rejoice, lament, create, and live anew. In this way there is more delight to share for everybody and everything and we co-create with God what Thomas Aquinas called the ‘sheer joy’ that God takes in creation.”
           [Matthew Fox, “Finding the well-trod mystical path to salvation.” The Times. London. September 21st, 1992.]
           “The name, in the form ‘Creation Centered Spirituality’, was first coined by Matthew Fox, and expounded in Original Blessing and other books. His vision, whilst springing from the Christian tradition — built on the Jewish conception of the world as the fundamental revelation of God, and of eco-justice as fulfilment of that revelation — nevertheless also embraces the new cosmology and science. The Centre for Creation Spirituality was set up at St James’s Church, Piccadilly, London, as a result of four talks Matthew Fox was invited to give at St James’s in 1987. A follow-up meeting had resulted in local groups being started, and the need for a focal point then became clear, both as a central contact place as well as a means of providing contact between groups. This centre was started on a voluntary basis by Petra Griffiths, first from her own home, and later from St James’s itself when Donald Reeves, the rector, agreed to provide an office base.” [Grace Blindell. What is Creation Centred Spirituality? Illustrations by Marie Allen. London: Association for Creation Spirituality. 2001. Page 42.]
           “The main current in [Matthew] Fox’s theology is his affirmation of God’s physical creation. The current is positive, helpful and propels us forward. The undercurrent is his misunderstanding of Fall and Redemption, and this is negative, distracting, and deflects his followers into futile uncertainties.
           “The current is clear and easily seen, the undercurrent can only be felt.… What I want to do here is to lay bare the undercurrent, so that we might understand it and respond in more constructive ways to what Fox is saying. I will explain what I think is the root of Fox’s misunderstanding and propose that, in fact, the doctrine of original sin, when understood in context, is good and even beautiful.”
           [Andrew Basden, “True ‘Creation Spirituality’: Original Blessing and Original Sin, a critique of Matthew Fox’s theology.” The John Ray Initiative Briefing Papers. Number 7, 2000. Pages 1-4.]
      739. deep ecumenism (Matthew Fox and others): This term, coined by Fox, refers to a radical attempt to seek common ground with members of different faith traditions.
           “Deep ecumenism or interfaith is one of the signs of our times and one of the signs of hope in our time. We must learn to relate to traditions different from ours not only out of respect but out of eagerness to learn and to seek out common ground, common values, common action. In doing so we will be renewing our own traditions, simplifying them, stripping them down to essentials. And we will be renewing our own souls and our own practices both internal and external, our work on ourselves and our work in society.” [Matthew Fox. Confessions: The Making of a Postdenominational Priest. Revised and updated. Berkeley, California: North Atlantic Books. 2015. Page 402.]
           “Deep ecumenism, or the coming together of our spiritual traditions at the level of practice and not mere theological position papers, is also a hopeful sign. Spirituality is about action and acts of compassion. It is not a psychic coping mechanism. It is the way we mirror the unending beauty of the universe.” [Matthew Fox, “Hope, Yes; Optimism, No.” Tikkun: to heal, repair, and transform the world. Volume 15, number 1, January 2000. Page 29.]
           “While exploring differences through thick dialogue can lead to new understanding, we also can learn by going deeper into our own understanding and in this way discovering the deep ecumenism of other traditions, as well.” [P. Douglas Kindschi, “Exploring ‘deep ecumenism’ of one’s own and other traditions.” Allendale, Michigan: Grand Rapids Press of the Kaufman Interfaith Institute at Grand Valley State University. August 21st, 2016. One page article.]
           “Deep ecumenism … has much to offer to environmentalism. A truly ecumenical theology can underpin a trans-religious approach of caring for the natural world. That is why fundamentalists, capitalists and pro-development activists are suspicious of it. As we saw at the beginning of this book, more and more people from different religious traditions are committing themselves to caring for the world because they realise that nature and the material world are the deepest and most pervasive symbolic images of that which all genuine religions seek – the transcendent. At the heart of all true religion is the search for God, for the God that transcends all the revelations of the religious books – Bible, the Quran, the Bhagavad Gita – for the God who is more often found in music, in art, in the wilderness, and above all in the natural world than in the self-engrossed, sad faces of the followers of particular revelations and saviours. There is only one non-negotiable, and that is that we only have one world – this one – so it must be here that we will find God. If we destroy the world, we destroy not only ourselves, but also the most important symbol of God that we have.” [Paul Collins. Judgment Day: The struggle for life on earth. Sydney, Australia: University of New South Wales Press Ltd. 2010. Page 267.]
      740. critical theory of advertising (John Harms and Douglas Kellner): “A variety of recent books address these problems and in this article we shall point to their contributions toward developing a critical theory of advertising, while also indicating some of their limitations. Several recent books on advertising take an explicitly critical sociological orientation toward advertising as a means of reproducing the existing capitalist society. This literature argues that not only does advertising carry out crucial economic functions in managing consumer demand and in aiding capital accumulation, but it also helps produce the sort of ideological ambience required by consumer capitalism, thus linking, more or less successfully, macro and micro analysis. Some of this literature provides illuminating historical framing of the history of advertising and the consumer society, as well as providing sociological analysis, cultural and ideological critique, and political proposals to regulate or curtail advertising in contemporary capitalist societies.” [John Harms and Douglas Kellner, “Toward A Critical Theory of Advertising.” Illuminations. Undated. Retrieved on September 13th, 2015.]
      741. instrumentalization theory (Andrew Feenberg): Develops a critical theory of technology. Despite Feenberg’s adoption of the term “instrumentalization,” his theory is not an elitist theory of the state (a branch of so-called “instrumental Marxism”).
           “Instrumentalization theory holds that technology must be analyzed at two levels, the level of our original functional relation to reality and the level of design and implementation. At the first level, we seek and find affordances that can be mobilized in devices and systems by decontextualizing the objects of experience and reducing them to their useful properties. This involves a process of de-worlding in which objects are torn out of their original contexts and exposed to analysis and manipulation while subjects are positioned for distanced control. Modern societies are unique in de-worlding human beings in order to subject them to technical action-we call it management-and in prolonging the basic gesture of de-worlding theoretically in technical disciplines which become the basis for complex technical networks.
           “At the second level, we introduce designs that can be integrated with other already existing devices and systems and with various social constraints such as ethical and aesthetic principles. The primary level simplifies objects for incorporation into a device while the secondary level integrates the simplified objects to a natural and social environment. This involves a process which, following [Martin] Heidegger, we can call ‘disclosure’ or ‘revealing’ of a world. Disclosing involves a complementary process of realization which qualifies the original functionalization by orienting it toward a new world involving those same objects and subjects.
           “These two levels are analytically distinguished. No matter how abstract the affordances identified at the primary level, they carry social content from the secondary level in the elementary contingencies of a particular approach to the materials. Similarly, secondary instrumentalizations such as design specifications presuppose the identification of the affordances to be assembled and concretized….
           “The theory is complicated, however, by the peculiar nature of differentiated modern societies. Some of the functions of the secondary instrumentalization do get distinguished institutionally rather than analytically. Thus the aesthetic function, an important secondary instrumentalization, may be separated out and assigned to a corporate ‘design division.’ Artists will then work in parallel with engineers. This partial institutional separation of the levels of instrumentalization encourages the belief that they are completely distinct. This obscures the social nature of every technical act, including the work of engineers liberated from aesthetic considerations, if not from many other social influences, by their corporate environment….
           “In Marx the capitalist is ultimately distinguished not so much by ownership of wealth as by control of the conditions of labor. The owner has not merely an economic interest in what goes on within his factory, but also a technical interest. By reorganizing the work process, he can increase production and profits. Control of the work process, in turn, leads to new ideas for machinery and the mechanization of industry follows in short order. This leads over time to the invention of a specific type of machinery which deskills workers and requires management.”
           [Andrew Feenberg, “Critical Theory of Technology: An Overview.” Tailoring Biotechnologies. Volume 1, Issue 1, Winter 2005. Pages 47-64.]
           “The dialectic of technology is short-circuited under capitalism in one especially important domain: the technical control of the labor force. Special obstacles to secondary instrumentalization are encountered wherever integrative technical change would threaten that control. These obstacles are not merely ideological but are incorporated into technical codes that determine formally biased designs. As we have seen, the integration of skill and intelligence into production is often arrested by the fear that the firm will become dependent on its workers. The larger context of work, which includes these suppressed potentialities, is uncovered in a critique of the formal bias of existing designs. The critical theory of technology exposes the obstacles to the release of technology’s integrative potential and thus serves as the link between political and technical discourse.” [Andrew Feenberg. Transforming Technology: A Critical Theory Revisited. Oxford, England, and New York: Oxford University Press. 2002. Page 177.]
      742. radical cosmopolitics (James D. Ingram): After critiquing certain other versions of cosmopolitanism, Ingram presents his own radical approach.
           “Cosmopolitanism is an attempt to realize the imperative of universalism—to grasp the human world as one and ourselves as, to at least some extent, connected to, and therefore at least to some degree responsible for, all of it. Cosmopolitics, as I will use the term, is the attempt to act politically in the world on the basis of this understanding.” [James D. Ingram. Radical Cosmopolitics: The Ethics and Politics of Democratic Universalism. New Directions in Critical Theory (series). New York: Columbia University Press. 2013. Page 36.]
           “The lesson of a democratic perspective on human rights is that we should see them as concerned with people’s ability to participate meaningfully in the direction of collective life. What this would mean is understanding the politics of human rights as an active, critical-democratic cosmopolitics in the sense I have developed in this book, and human rights promotion the practice of promoting and supporting this politics.” [James D. Ingram. Radical Cosmopolitics: The Ethics and Politics of Democratic Universalism. New Directions in Critical Theory (series). New York: Columbia University Press. 2013. Page 275.]
           “Cosmopolitanism, on the view I put forth here, should not be understood in terms of its content, as a blueprint, a roadmap, or a design, but as an ideal and a project. It is an ideal that can be and has been invoked from a wide range of historical, social, political, and cultural locations, each time reflecting those specificities while also seeking to transcend them. Its unity therefore lies in the form or direction of these attempts, in their efforts to transcend rather than in the precise aim of transcendence, in the valence of their seeking more than in what specifically is sought. Moreover, the cosmopolitan impulse to universalization gives rise to a political demand and therefore also a project: to overcome the obstacles to realizing the equal freedom and dignity of every human being everywhere. I argue that we can best affirm cosmopolitanism today as a critical politics of universalization, a practice that asserts universal values against what denies them here and now. It is such a cosmopolitics, rather than another utopian vision or doctrine of cosmopolitanism, that I seek to articulate here.” [James D. Ingram. Radical Cosmopolitics: The Ethics and Politics of Democratic Universalism. New Directions in Critical Theory (series). New York: Columbia University Press. 2013. Page 20.]
      743. critical cosmopolitanism (Gerard Delanty, Anthony Moran, and others): Examines cosmopolitanism, the view that all human beings are members of a single community, as a socially and historically situated phenomenon.
           “Critical cosmopolitanism is an emerging direction in social theory and reflects both an object of study and a distinctive methodological approach to the social world. It differs from normative political and moral accounts of cosmopolitanism as world polity or universalistic culture in its conception of cosmopolitanism as socially situated and as part of the self-constituting nature of the social world itself. It is an approach that shifts the emphasis to internal developmental processes within the social world rather than seeing globalization as the primary mechanism. This signals a post-universalistic kind of cosmopolitanism, which is not merely a condition of diversity but is articulated in cultural models of world openness through which societies undergo transformation. The cosmopolitan imagination is articulated in framing processes and cultural models by which the social world is constituted; it is therefore not reducible to concrete identities, but should be understood as a form of cultural contestation in which the logic of translation plays a central role. The cosmopolitan imagination can arise in any kind of society and at any time but it is integral to modernity, in so far as this is a condition of self-problematization, incompleteness and the awareness that certainty can never be established once and for all. As a methodologically grounded approach, critical cosmopolitan sociology has a very specific task: to discern or make sense of social transformation by identifying new or emergent social realities.” [Gerard Delanty, “The cosmopolitan imagination: critical cosmopolitanism and social theory.” Abstract. The British Journal of Sociology. Volume 57, issue 1, 2006. Pages 25-47.]
           “…In contrast to the dominant Enlightenment notion of cosmopolitanism as a transnational republican order, current developments in social theory suggest a post-universalistic cosmopolitanism that takes as its point of departure different kinds of modernity and processes of societal transformation that do not presuppose the separation of the social from the political or postulate a single world culture.… [T]he emphasis shifts to the very conceptualization of the social world as an open horizon in which new cultural models take shape. In this approach, which I term critical cosmopolitanism, the cosmopolitan imagination occurs when and wherever new relations between self, other and world develop in moments of openness. It is an approach that shifts the emphasis to internal developmental processes within the social world rather than seeing globalization as the primary mechanism and is also not reducible to the fact of pluralism.” [Gerard Delanty, “The Cosmopolitan Imagination.” Abstract. Revista CIDOB d’Afers Internacionals. Numbers 82-83. Pages 217-230.]
           “The idea of a critical cosmopolitanism is relevant to the renewal of critical theory in its traditional concern with the critique of social reality and the search for immanent transcendence, a concept that lies at the core of critical theory. It also opens a route out of the critique of domination and a general notion of emancipation that has so far constrained critical theory. In addition, it offers a promising approach to connect normative philosophical analysis with empirical sociological inquiry. The cosmopolitan imagination offers critical social theory a normative foundation that makes possible new ways of seeing the world. Such forms of world disclosure have become an unavoidable part of social reality today in terms of people’s experiences, identities, solidarities and values. These dimensions represent the foundations for a new conception of immanent transcendence; it is one that lies at the heart of the cosmopolitan imagination in so far that this is a way of viewing the world in terms of its immanent possibilities for self-transformation and which can be realized only by taking the cosmopolitan perspective of the Other as well as global principles of justice.” [Gerard Delanty. The Cosmopolitan Imagination: The Renewal of Critical Social Theory. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press. 2009. Pages 2-3.]
           “… cosmopolitan ethics does not appear philosophically aloof, or as a liberal apology. Instead, ongoing attempts to articulate alternative possible futures by cosmopolitans, combined with a well-judged appreciation of the ambivalences they construct, can be seen as a creative ethical resource for engaging with contested political circumstances. It will not solve all problems, but it does suggest the possibility of understanding problems in a way that fosters, rather than inhibits, creative engagement.” [James Brassett, “Cosmopolitanism vs. Terrorism? Discourses of Ethical Possibility Before and After 7/7.” Millennium – Journal of International Studies. Volume 36, number 311, 2008. Pages 311-338.]
           “Cosmopolitanism is rapidly replacing globalization in social science’s popularity stakes …. Where initially globalization was seen as giving a new impetus to cosmopolitan trends and tendencies, including identities, outlooks and cultural orientations, cosmopolitanism has increasingly moved into the foreground of interest. For proponents it provides a normative framework for a new post-national world of mobility, flows, and blurred boundaries, suggesting new ways of being in the world, new forms of political orientation, and new kinds of political arrangements.” [Anthony Moran, “The Cosmopolitan Imagination: The Renewal of Critical Social Theory.” Review article. Contemporary Sociology. Volume 39, number 6, 2010. Pages 692-693.]
      744. cosmopolitan democracy (David Held, Daniele Archibugi as pronounced in this MP3 audio file, and others): They advocate a transformation of the world order from one based on threat to one based on democratic principles.
           “The notion of cosmopolitan democracy recognizes our complex, interconnected world. It views certain policies as appropriate for local governments or national states, others as appropriate for different regions, and still others such as the environment, world health, and economic regulation that need new institutions to address them. Deliberative centers beyond national territories get involved, appropriately, when cross-border or transnational groups are affected by a public matter, especially when ‘lower’ decision-making levels cannot manage international policy questions and when democratic legitimacy can only be properly redeemed in a transnational context.
           “Put differently, a cosmopolitan democracy describes a world where citizens must come to enjoy multiple citizenships. They are citizens of their own communities, of the wider regions where they live, and of a cosmopolitan global community. We must develop institutions that reflect the multiple issues, questions, and problems that link people together regardless of their particular nation-state.”
           [David Held, “Globalization and Cosmopolitan Democracy.” Peace Review. Volume 9, number 3, September 1997. Pages 309-314.]
           “… the idea of a democratic cosmopolitan order is not simply compatible with the idea of confederalism, a wholly voluntary, treaty-based union. constantly renewed through limited agreements. It is the case that the creation of a cosmopolitan democracy requires the active consent of peoples and nations: initial membership can only be voluntary. It would be a contradiction of the very idea of democracy itself if a cosmopolitan democratic order were created non-voluntarily, that is, coercively. If the initial inauguration of a democratic international order is to be legitimate. it must be based on consent. However, thereafter, in circumstances in which people themselves are not directly engaged in the process of governance. consent ought to follow from the majority decision of the people’s representatives. so long as they – the trustees of the governed – uphold cosmopolitan democratic law and its covenants. Against this background, commitment to the regulatory procedures of this order would be non-voluntary, and would remain so as long as it was bound and circumscribed by this law …. If cosmopolitan democratic law were entrenched and enforced there would be a clear duty to obey the law. But if those who governed flouted the terms of cosmopolitan law, the basis of political legitimacy would be eroded.” [David Held. Democracy and the Global Order: From the Modern State to Global Governance. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press. 1995. Page 231.]
           “One of the core demands of cosmopolitan democracy is to obtain a substantial change in national foreign policy priorities, especially those of the powerful liberal Western states. To be a good member of the international community, a democratic state should abide by international norms, participate in international organization activities, contribute to the provision of global public goods, and support democratization where appropriate. For example, consolidated democracies should support foreign political parties and activists willing to foster democracy in despotically ruled countries rather than those who might be more congenial to their own national interests. For too long democratic countries have passively accepted or even actively supported dictatorial regimes when this has been in their interest. A new foreign policy doctrine based on solidarity among democratic forces is now needed.” [Daniele Archibugi and David Held, “Cosmopolitan Democracy: Paths and Agents.” Ethics & International Affairs. Volume 25, number 4, winter 2011. Pages 433-461.]
           “The logic grounding the pursuit of cosmopolitan democracy depends on a number of assumptions …:
           • “Democracy is to be conceptualized as a process, rather than as a set of norms and procedures.
           • “A feuding system of states hampers democracy within states.
           • “Democracy within states favours peace, but does not necessarily produce a virtuous foreign policy.
           • “Global democracy is not just the achievement of democracy within each state.
           • “Globalization erodes states’ political autonomy and thereby curtails the efficacy of state-based democracy.
           • “The stakeholders’ communities in a relevant and growing number of specific issues do not necessarily coincide with states’ territorial borders.
           • “Globalization engenders new social movements engaged with issues that affect other individuals and communities, even when these are geographically and culturally very distant from their own political community.”
           [Daniele Archibugi, “Cosmopolitan Democracy and its Critics: A Review.” European Journal of International Relations. Volume 10, number 3, 2004. Pages 437-473.]
           “Cosmopolitan democracy is a project of normative political theory that attempts to apply some of the principles, values and procedures of democracy to the global political system. As a consequence of the fall of the Berlin Wall, democratic regimes have spread in the East and in the South. For the first time in history, elected governments administer the majority of the world population and, although not all these regimes are equally respectful of basic human rights, there is a significant pressure to achieve representative, accountable and lawful administration. Democracy has become, both in theory and in practice, the sole source of legitimate authority and power.” [Daniele Archibugi, “Cosmopolitan Democracy: A Restatement.” Cambridge Journal of Education. Volume 42, issue 1, 2012. Pages 56-66.]
           “From the Congress of Vienna to the end of the Cold War, threats, wars, accords and diplomacy have regulated affairs between states; but this process has never been inspired by the principles of democracy. In place of transparency of action, there have been summits held behind closed doors; cunning diplomats and secret agents have usurped the functions of elected representatives, and judicial power has been overshadowed by intimidation or reprisal. In the final analysis, it is force—political, economic or, ultimately, military—that has regulated conflict.” [Daniele Archibugi, “Cosmopolitical Democracy.” New Left Review. Series II, number 4, July–August 2000. Pages 137-150.]
           “… I will look at the question of global economic governance, and critically examine the claims of Third Way advocates (while recognizing the tensions within this approach). Second, I will look at the question of global political governance, and particularly the issue of humanitarian intervention. In this section, I contrast Third Way perspectives with those of cosmopolitan democrats, and argue that the claim of the former to uphold the principles of the latter are mistaken.” [Ray Kiely, “Comment: The global Third Way or progressive globalism?” Contemporary Politics. Volume 8, number 3, September 2002. Pages 167-184.]
           “Cosmopolitan Democracy calls for citizens who can respond in ways consistent with the inherent dignity of all human beings. This principle of moral equality, or what we could call the principle of humanity, in turn is based upon at least two other basic moral values and dispositions: sympathy and respect …. Sympathy is a positive value in that it calls for the active response of care, while respect is a negative value in that it requires refraining from violating the rights of others.” [Dale T. Snauwaert, “Cosmopolitan Democracy and Democratic Education.” Current Issues in Comparative Education. Volume 4, number 2, 2002. Pages 5-15.]
           “Federalist models stress the direct and equal representation of citizens in global bodies, centralization of the means of coercion, and supremacy of federal law over state law. Confederal models stress the gate-keeping role of governments between citizens and global institutions, dispersion of military and coercive capabilities, and the ability of individual member states to block any undesired collective decision. The argument of this article is particularly relevant for an intermediate model that is known as ‘cosmopolitan democracy’ ….” [Mathias Koenig-Archibugi, “Is global democracy possible?” European Journal of International Relations. Volume 17, number 3, 2011. Pages 519-542.]
           “[David] Held’s advocacy of CSD [cosmopolitan social democracy] has developed in response to neoliberalism, Third Way social democracy, and ‘radical anti-globalism.’” [Brian Roper, “Reformism on a global scale? A critical examination of David Held’s advocacy of cosmopolitan social democracy.” Capital & Class. Volume 35, number 2, June 2011. Pages 253-273.]
           “As a global governance model, cosmopolitan democracy is defined as multilayered governance, grounded on the principles of democracy, democratic justice, peace, rule of law and human rights. As for the form of organization, the model of the cosmopolitan democracy stands between the federalist and the confederal model, keeping a moderate centralization of power. The cosmopolitan democracy approach rejects the idea of a global government, because it could degenerate in forms of totalitarianism. So, the cosmopolitan democracy scenario rejects the formation of a global cosmopolitan institution with the ultimate authoritative function, as defended in other cosmopolitan governance proposals ….” [Andreea Iancu, “The Human Security Paradigm and Cosmopolitan Democracy.” Symposion. Volume 1, number 2, 2014. Pages 167-174.]
           “The notion of Cosmopolitan Democracy as a value and cornerstone for building lasting peace is based on an premise, which finds proof in modern history, i.e. that war has never been fought between two liberal democracies. If this continues to hold true, as liberal democratic values continue to spread, civil society should expand and as as an outcome we should expect more peace in the world. This does not mean that current social structures are perfect and that they don’t require improvement, rather it means that a solid basis already exists for making incremental changes instead of radical ones.” [Miodrag Božović. The European Union and Cosmopolitan Democracy: An Idea for Peace. Patrizia Pellizari, translator. Privately published. May, 2009. Page 49.]
           “If national governments have so little independent power, why bother voting for them? If power has passed elsewhere, to effectively unaccountable supranational political institutions or international economic actors, then on what does the legitimacy of democratic politics rest? The widespread distaste with which politics is currently contemplated in the West cannot be separated from these issues. At the very least it suggests that the legitimacy of liberal democratic politics, although as yet uncontested by alternative systems of governance, remains in need of substantial moral justification and practical reform. Such a historical conjuncture demands a democratic response that is both international and national in its orientation, and that understands the liberal democratic state at the confluence of global and local forces. In David Held’s Democracy and the Global Order we may have such a project.” [David Goldblatt, “At the Limits of Political Possibility: The Cosmopolitan Democratic Project.” New Left Review Volume I, number 225, September–October 1997. Pages 140-150.]
           “… even if we hold that democracy has some intrinsic value this, of course, does not entail that this intrinsic value is the only relevant consideration we should bear in mind when judging the desirability of democracy. It might, for example, be the case that democracy has intrinsic value but that if it produces calamitous outcomes then its intrinsic value would be overridden by its instrumental disvalue. In such circumstances another system would be preferable notwithstanding any intrinsic value that democracy possesses. In short, affirming that cosmopolitan democracy has intrinsic value gives us no warrant to ignore the kind of outcomes it is likely to yield.” [Simon Caney, “Cosmopolitanism, Democracy and Distributive Justice.” Global Justice, Global Institutions. Daniel Weinstock, editor. Calgary, Alberta: University of Calgary Press. 2005. Pages 29-63.]
           “… both radical communitarians and cosmopolitan democrats recognize a kind of ‘world citizenship’ in which individuals ‘can fall within the jurisdiction of several authorities; they can have multiple identities and they need not be united by [national] social bonds which make them indifferent to, or enemies of, the rest of the human race.’” [J. Robert Kent, “A Global Challenge: Refraining Democracy and Education.” American Studies. Volume 41, number 2/3, summer/fall 2000. Pages 375-391.]
      745. praxeological emancipatory cosmopolitanism (Charlie Thame): He develops a nondualist approach to critical international theory drawing from the works of Martin Heidegger and Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel.
           “… being reliant on a foundational commitment to ethical subjectivity, there is an essential tension between [Andrew] Linklater’s commitment to the development of more ethical and emancipatory human relations and his philosophical defence of this position. This is why we have argued that we are constitutively unable to build an emancipatory cosmopolitanism from dualist premises, and why we need to overcome Linklater’s rationalist emancipatory cosmopolitanism with a praxeological emancipatory cosmopolitanism. Herein lies our original contribution to critical international theory.” [Charlie Thame. Love, Ethics, and Emancipation: The Implications of Conceptions of Human Being and Freedom in Heidegger and Hegel for Critical International Theory. Ph.D. thesis (U.S. English, dissertation). Department of International Politics, Aberystwyth University. Aberystwyth, Wales. 2012. Page 390.]
      746. cosmopolitan cultural model (Piet Strydom): He discusses the sociocultural structures required for cosmopolitization.
           “I will focus on the process of cosmopolitisation and draw attention in particular to the variety of sociocultural structures formed in its course which serve as necessary supports or vehicles of cosmopolitanism in its different manifestations. In the case of each of the different types of structure, the corresponding mechanism responsible for it is also specified. The argument is that while certain necessary structures are in evidence to a certain degree, a vital moment of structure formation, and hence the adequate operation of its sustaining mechanism, is as yet largely lacking. The core component of the argument, therefore, is the analysis of the problem of the formation of the kind of cultural model of cosmopolitanism and the corresponding mode of societal leaming that would allow institutionalisation of a cosmopolitan infrastructure and the complementary organisation of society.” [Piet Strydom, “Toward a global cosmopolis?: On the formation of a cosmopolitan cultural model.” Irish Journal of Sociology. Volume 20, number 2, November 2012. Pages 28-50.]
      747. virtual cosmopolitanism (Miriam Sobré-Denton): She explores global community-building through social media networks.
           “… virtual cosmopolitanism can be viewed as cosmopolitanism that is facilitated by mediated social spaces, in which cultural and social capital may be transmitted through social media networks, allowing for a greater transnational spread of ideas than corporeal cosmopolitanism …. In particular, the interest lies in mobilizing such virtual cosmopolitan spaces to engage in intercultural and trans-local spaces for social justice advocated for by cosmopolitanism’s notion of ethical global citizenship …. This essay explores how virtual cosmopolitanism may already exist as a means for trans-local and transnational community-building for social justice movements and activism, including community liaison-building across more corporeal cultural borders and boundaries.” [Miriam Sobré-Denton, “Virtual intercultural bridgework: Social media, virtual cosmopolitanism, and activist community-building.” New Media & Society. Volume 18, number 8, 2016. Pages 1715-1731.]
      748. negotiating bioethics (Adèle Langlois as pronounced in this MP3 audio file): She considers bioethics from an international perspective.
           “Bioethics as a field has evolved from two separate disciplines: medical ethics and moral philosophy. Concern for ethics in terms of patient welfare fi rst appeared in the form of the Hippocratic oath, while moral philosophers have come to reflect on dilemmas faced by modern society alongside more abstract meta-ethics …. Bioethics is now seen to cover a wide range of issues, including genetics, reproductive technologies and biomedical research.” [Adèle Langlois. Negotiating Bioethics: The governance of UNESCO’s Bioethics Programme. London and New York: Routledge imprint of Taylor & Francis Group, an Informa PLC business. 2013. Page 5.]
           “The term ‘global governance’ derives from the Commission on Global Governance, which met in 1995 to report on the future of the UN …. It refers to governance within and as an output of the international system, aimed at addressing those issues that have the potential to affect everyone, irrespective of national borders. As Robert Goodin … puts it, ‘Cross-boundary spillovers – political and moral, as well as economic and environmental – are now absolutely endemic.’ Alongside states, transnational actors such as UN agencies, large corporations and civil society organizations are important actors in how (and how well) these spillovers are managed …. ‘Global governance’ has both descriptive and normative connotations in this regard. Robert Keohane … describes it as rule-making and the exercise of power on a global scale, by entities not necessarily authorized to act by general consensus (with ensuing implications for legitimacy). James Rosenau … used the same premise, but from a different angle: because governance systems lack the traditional legitimacy conferred by democratic election, for example, they can only be effective if the great majority of those they cover agree to them. In this sense, then, governance has an inherent normative purpose; it is derived from shared goals rather than formal authority.” [Adèle Langlois. Negotiating Bioethics: The governance of UNESCO’s Bioethics Programme. London and New York: Routledge imprint of Taylor & Francis Group, an Informa PLC business. 2013. Page 30.]
      749. Marx’s theory of ecological sustainability (John Bellamy Foster): He expand Marx’s “political-economic critique of capitalism” to ecological sustainability.
           “Although [Karl] Marx was clearly concerned with the nineteenth-century destruction of the soil and other ecological problems present in his time, it would clearly be wrong to suggest that such ecological concerns were at the very core of his theory of capitalist crisis. Marx, who tended toward revolutionary optimism, believed that capitalism would be replaced by a society of freely associated producers—its demise speeded along by its own internal political-economic contradictions-long before the kinds of ecological problems that he observed could become truly critical. Marx’s thought did not, however, stop with the political-economic critique of capitalism in this sense. He was concerned about issues of ecological sustainability, not so much in relation to capitalism, but in relation to the future society of freely associated producers with which he identified—that is, communism itself …. His frequent references to the necessity of sustainability in the human relation to the earth are therefore directed at working out a fundamental distinction between communism and capitalism.” [John Bellamy Foster, “The Crisis of the Earth: Marx’s Theory of Ecological Sustainability as a Nature-Imposed Necessity for Human Production.” Organization & Environment. Volume 19, number 3, September 1997. Pages 278-295.]
      750. ecological significance of value (Paul Burkett): Burkett applies “Marx’s value analysis” to ecology.
           “It is … hoped that the systematic application of [Karl] Marx’s value, use value, and exchange value categories to a set of representative critics will help sharpen and clarify the terms of debate over the ecological significance of Marx’s value analysis. In short, the purpose here is to stimulate further discussion, not to foreclose it.…
           “… any attempt to directly attribute value to nature, without taking account of the historical specificity of wealth’s social forms, results in an inability to specify the precise value-form taken on by nature (value in terms of what, and for whom?) without running into serious theoretical difficulties. The most common problem here is the inability to define nature’s ‘value’ without conflating value, exchange value, and use value, and thereby submerging the real ecological contradictions and class tensions associated with capital’s free appropriation of nature.”
           [Paul Burkett, “Nature’s ‘Free Gifts’ and the Ecological Significance of Value.” Capital & Class. Volume 23, number 2, summer 1999. Pages 89-110.]
      751. Marxist theory of nature (Alfred Schmidt as pronounced in this MP3 audio file, Noel Castree, and others): Schmidt develops this theory in relation to changes in forms of social practice. Castree focuses upon “the production of nature.”
           “Apart from the sheer extent of the literature to be taken into account, considerable difficulties are involved in the attempt to delineate the concept of nature in dialectical materialism. There is no systematic Marxist theory of nature of such a kind as to be conscious of its own speculative implications. It was therefore necessary to develop our theme by bringing together often widely disparate motifs from the main phases of development of Marxist thought. In view of the extraordinary entanglement of these motifs, it was not possible wholly to avoid occasional repetitions, overlaps, and cross-references, so that the subjects dealt with in the individual chapters or sections do not always coincide precisely with what is announced in the headings.“ [Alfred Schmidt. The Concept Of Nature In Marx. Ben Fowkes, translator. London and New York: Verso imprint of New Left Books. Page 18.]
           “In making the attempt to present [Karl] Marx’s concept of nature, one cannot avoid discussing [Friedrich] Engels’s formulations of a dialectical materialist theory of nature. As a strict historical materialist, Engels took the view that phenomenal nature, as also all scientific and philosophical knowledge of nature, was always related to the changing forms of social practice. Like Marx he repeatedly tried to show that natural science, in the materials it works on, the method it uses, and the way it poses questions, is at once the expression and the instrument of the progress of the forces of production.” [Alfred Schmidt. The Concept Of Nature In Marx. Ben Fowkes, translator. London and New York: Verso imprint of New Left Books. Page 51.]
           “Although [Alfred] Schmidt rigorously lays out some fundamental bases for the development of an ecological or ‘Green’ Marxism, his partially desocialized and declassed interpretation of [Karl] Marx nonetheless leads him into a pessimistic attitude toward the possibilities for a reconciliation of people with nature in postcapitalist society. Diverging from Marx’s vision of a simultaneous naturalization of human beings and humanization of nature based on a democratic socialization of the productive potentials created under capitalism, Schmidt takes refuge in an uncritical determinism. His deterministic Marxism treats capitalism’s tendency toward an exploitative industrialization of nature as a progressive transhistorical law of economic development—similar to official Marxism’s objectivist emphasis on desocialized productive forces as the motor of social evolution.” [Paul Burkett, “Nature in Marx Reconsidered: A Silver Anniversary Assessment of Alfred Schmidt’s Concept Of Nature In Marx.” Organization & Environment. Volume 10, number 2, June 1997. Pages 164-183.]
           “… the crux of the issue … remains: how to fashion a Marxist theory of nature which avoids the Scylla of a residual naturalism and the Charybdis of an anti-naturalistic social constructionism. Since my intention is not only to undertake a critique, the third aim of this essay is to offer a solution of sorts: namely, a little-known reading of the Marx-nature-capitalism triptych which phrases its claims in terms of the production of nature. At first sight, this phrase seems only too redolent of the social constructionism to which I am objecting. However, it will be my suggestion that this framework offers the potential for a powerful Marxian theory of nature which is not founded on the Nature-Society dualism.” [Noel Castree, “Marxism and the Production of Nature.” Capital & Class. Volume 23, number 2, summer 1999. Pages 89-110.]
      752. greening of the geographical left (Noel Castree): He examines the greening of left geography.
           “… [The] greening of the geographical left could hardly have come at a better time. In the context of proliferating environmental problems, new interventions in ‘nonhuman’ nature and new issues surrounding our own bodily natures, it has offered rich theoretical, empirical and normative resources with which to work on two fronts simultaneously. On the one side, the geographical left now has a considerable intellectual weaponry with which to contest hegemonic understandings of nature within business, government, academia and civil society. It is a sad fact of turn-of-the-millennium life that the question of nature is predominantly phrased—and answered—in neoliberal terms …. In a stunning act of ideological appropriation, states and corporations worldwide have drawn the sting of the environmentalists’ critique that erupted on the scene during the early 1970s and have made nature a part of their own agendas.” [Noel Castree, “False Antitheses? Marxism, Nature and Actor-Networks.” Antipode. Volume 34, issue 1, January 2002. Pages 111-146.]
      753. Anthropocene discourse (Noel Castree): He contributes to a discussion of “how the environmental humanities can change the world.”
           “The claims I make about ‘Anthropocene discourse’ arise from a close reading of the published writings of environmental humanists and an array of geoscientists. To that extent, this essay’s normative arguments are anchored in evidence about how these humanists today position themselves in a wider landscape of thought (and policy). This is why the diagnosis and prescriptions offered here should be read as constituting an informed and constructive intervention by someone who considers themselves part of the environmental humanities community. I hope it fosters some useful reflection and possibly a little debate about how the environmental humanities can change the world.” [Noel Castree, “The Anthropocene and the Environmental Humanities: Extending the Conversation.” Environmental Humanities. Volume 5, 2014. Pages 233-260.]
      754. non–local ecologies of practice (David Rousell): He discusses the educational implications of the Anthropocene thesis.
           “Over the last three decades, scientists have uncovered the extent of human impacts on the earth’s operating systems with increasing clarity and precision. These findings have prompted scientific claims that we have transitioned out of the Holocene and into the Anthropocene epoch in the earth’s geological history …. At the same time, the traditional humanist underpinnings of the university have been eroded by the ongoing digitisation, massification, and decentralisation of higher education. This article argues that higher education has a crucial role to play in responding to the Anthropocene thesis, which at the same time provides a powerful impetus for reimagining the university through posthumanist concepts.…
           “This article explores the implications of the Anthropocene thesis for rethinking university learning environments in response to recent movements towards digitisation, decentralisation, and massification in higher education. Scientific perspectives on the Anthropocene are first addressed to provide the material context for the discussion. This is followed by a series of cultural readings of the Anthropocene as an age typified by rapidly changing material conditions that call for new knowledge practices and ontological orientations …. Critical perspectives on the neo-liberal university are then explored, pivoting on the argument that the humanist underpinnings of the contemporary university no longer correspond with its digitised and decentralised operations. Ironically, it is the very decentralisation of university structures and hierarchies that may open up radical alternatives associated with distributed learning networks and non-local ecologies of practice …. Such distributed learning environments are thus proposed as theatres of operation in which posthumanist visions of the university might be prototyped, or at least placed into experimental play. As such, this article retools philosophical concepts associated with dwelling, the regional, and emplacement through a posthumanist lens in an attempt to render them adequate to the challenges presented by the Anthropocene thesis.”
           [David Rousell, “Dwelling in the Anthropocene: Reimagining University Learning Environments in Response to Social and Ecological Change.” Australian Journal of Environmental Education. Volume 32, number 2, July 2016. Pages 137-153.]
      755. behavioral materialism (Aleksandr A. Fedorov [Russian Cyrillic, Александр Анатольевич Фёдоров, Aleksandr Anatolʹevič Fëdorov as pronounced in this MP3 audio file]): He develops a dialectical materialist approach to behaviorology.
           “… we define behaviorology as a science addressing the contingent relations between actions and other events.…
           “… Dialectical materialism in behavioral sciences is behavioral materialism. By some amazing fluke, behaviorologits gave the same name to the scientific philosophy underlying behaviorology.… [It may be related to] the following terms: scientific materialism (the materialist orientation among natural scientists), selectionistic materialism (the materialist orientation among researchers in the life sciences); and behavioral materialism (the materialist orientation in behaviorology) ….
           “For true dialectical materialists, the attributes ‘dialectical-materialist’ or ‘Marxist’ in fact mean ‘scientific.’ … Behaviorology is the scientific study of behavior (within the Skinnerian contingency-based framework), so we can carefully examine whether behaviorology contains dialectical elements.”
           [Aleksandr A. Fedorov, “Behaviorology and Dialectical Materialism: On the Way to Dialogue.” Psychology in Russia: State of the Art. Volume 3, 2010. Pages 171-180.]
           “The broad sense of ‘behavioral biology’ … means nothing else than something like ‘behaviorology.’ …
           “The strength of behavioral ecology lies in its theoretical roots, those of ethology in its ability to cope with the surprises of the phenotypic machinery. In the confrontation between schools of thought, battles have been lost and won, careers were built, academic positions conquered, resources of funding agencies snatched from rivals, research departments were created or modified and others were closed. Then, scientific boundaries became blurred … and today behaviorology textbooks must review the results of both schools to attain to comprehensiveness …. Many of us think as ethologists at certain times and as behavioral ecologists at others.”
           [Bernard Thierry, “Behaviorology Divided: Shall We Continue?” Behaviour. Volume 144, number 8, August 2007. Pages 861-878.]
      756. critical thinking (Jane Gilgun): She focuses on its importance in critical social theory.
           “The expert use of critical theory requires critical thinking, which means several things including and analysis of whether justice, fairness, and care operates in the distribution of money, material goods, and status in terms of justice, fairness, and care. Critical theorists also identify strategies that people use in the abuse of their power that gains them money, material goods and statuses. Critical theorists identify and challenge wide-spread ideas that some people are more worthy than others and deserve the money, material goods, and statuses that they gain through exploiting others.” [Jane Gilgun. Critical Theory Stands up to Abuses of Power. Seattle, Washington: Amazon Digital Services LLC. 2010. Kindle edition.]
      757. critical theory of glossolalia (David Christopher Lane): He applies critical theory to the practice of speaking in tongues (Greek/Hellēniká, γλωσσολαλία, glōssolalía).
           “It has been nearly 40 years since I first spoke in tongues. It still stands out in my mind as a genuinely remarkable experience, though over the years I have developed a distinctive, if controversial, theory about what glossolalia ultimately indicates.” [David Christopher Lane. Speaking in Tongues: Toward a Critical Theory of Glossolalia. Walnut, California: First Neural Library Edition imprint of MSAC Philosophy Group. 2011. Kindle edition.]
           “In conclusion, I think it is important to note that even if glossolalia is explained as a recursive throwback to our evolutionary past when language first emerged, or as an adaptive signal to confirm to others in our tribe that ecstasy is possible, it is a truly amazing experience and may be indicative of other more luminous states of consciousness within the human neuroanatomy.” [David Christopher Lane. Speaking in Tongues: Toward a Critical Theory of Glossolalia. Walnut, California: First Neural Library Edition imprint of MSAC Philosophy Group. 2011. Kindle edition.]
      758. eParticipation (Øystein Sæbø as pronounced in this MP3 audio file, Jeremy Rose, and Leif Skiftenes Flak as pronounced in this MP3 audio file): They develop an approach to “active citizenship.”
           “eParticipation involves the extension and transformation of participation in societal democratic and consultative processes mediated by information and communication technologies (ICT), primarily the Internet. It aims to support active citizenship with the latest technology developments, increasing access to and availability of participation in order to promote fair and efficient society and government. Democracy and the formal political process are fundamentally dependent on effective communication and informed decision making about public issues among citizens, politicians, officers, and other stakeholders who may be impacted by political decisions …. Governments may seek to promote participation in order to improve the efficiency, acceptance, and legitimacy of political processes. Citizens, non-governmental organizations, lobbyists, and pressure groups may demand participation to promote their own interests, either within the established political system or outside it through activism and opinion forming. Many forms of ICT with the potential to support participation are readily available (or in development). Examples include chat technologies, discussion forums, electronic voting systems, group decision support systems, and Web logs (blogs).” [Øystein Sæbø, Jeremy Rose, and Leif Skiftenes Flak, “The shape of eParticipation: Characterizing an emerging research area.” Government Information Quarterly. Volume 25, issue 3, July 2008. Pages 400-428.]
      759. critique of animal anthropology (Matthew C. Watson): He considers a “multispecies mythology.”
           “Adopting animals as analytical and narrative resources functions to defer anxiety about futures haunted by industrial ruination. Facing the planetary trauma of environmental destruction, we cultivate human hope by giving narrative form to the survival of endangered animal others.… Casting animals as semiotic resources for a mythos of survival thus becomes legible as a form of ‘cruel optimism’ …. Animal anthropology is, in part, a means for those of us in the human sciences to cope with the brute and brutal facts of catastrophic global changes that may precipitate human extinction. The atmospheric concentration of carbon dioxide has passed the ‘tipping point’ of 400 parts per million. Mythologies are narrativized systems of attitudes and values that make such facts culturally, politically, and ethically sensible.” [Matthew C. Watson, “On Multispecies Mythology: A Critique of Animal Anthropology.” Theory, Culture & Society. Volume 33, number 5, September 2016. Pages 159-172.]
      760. the new instantaneity (Heidi Herzogenrath-Amelung as pronounced in this MP3 audio file): The applies critical social theory to the new media, such as Twitter.
           “It [this article] points to the emergence of a new form of instantaneity enabled by these networked forms of communication that serves to reinforce systemic inaction rather than the change widely associated with these technologies. It draws on philosophy and critical theory as useful conceptual frameworks for highlighting the ways in which Twitter and co. increasingly call us to action but crowd out thought, thereby passing over opportunities for real social change.…
           “Let me introduce … [an] example of the new instantaneity that illustrates the inherently short-circuiting tendencies of social media: In the run-up to the 2012 London Olympics, a member of the Greek national team of athletes was barred from participating in the games for some allegedly racist comments made on her personal Twitter account …. Commenting on a reported influx of Nile-virus-carrying mosquitoes in her native Greece, Voula Papachristou tweeted, ‘With so many Africans in Greece, the West Nile mosquitoes will be getting home food!!!’”
           [Heidi Herzogenrath-Amelung, “The new instantaneity: how social media are helping us privilege the (politically) correct over the true” Media, Culture & Society. Volume 38, number 7, October 2016. Pages 1080-1089.]
      761. critical reconstructionist method (Toula Nicolacopoulos [Greek/Hellēniká, Τούλα Νικολακόπουλος, Toúla Nikolakópoulos as pronounced in this MP3 audio file]): She develops a systematic methodology for critiquing liberalism.
           “My inquiry will adopt what can be referred to as a critical reconstructionist method.…
           “First, the exposition of a particular theory addresses the theory at its surface level of inquiry with three tasks in mind. To begin with, it will identify ‘the theory’s own adequacy criterion.’ This is the criterion that the theory puts forward, whether implicitly or explicitly, as that by which to judge the success of its inquiry.…
           “The second aspect of the critical reconstructionist method, the reconstruction of a particular theory, addresses each theory at the deep structural level.… In this regard, the reconstruction should begin by identifying the categories that a theory constitutes as public and private, paying attention to the precise way(s) in which the surface level discourse effects the assimilation of, what Stanley Benn and Gerald Gaus call, ‘deviant cases’ to its bipolar view of social life.…
           “The third, critical component of critical reconstructionism involves two tasks, one negative and the other positive. The main objective of the negative aspect of the critique is to place the theory’s surface level claims alongside its deep structural commitments in order to expose the theory’s incoherence.…
           “Showing that a particular theory fails to satisfy its own adequacy criterion establishes the negative claim that the theory fails as a response to the problem of liberalism’s definition. However, the critique also has a positive side in revealing the conditions of what would constitute a more adequately formulated theory. These conditions serve to identify a relatively superior response to the problem of liberalism’s definition until all possible formulations are exhausted.
           “Critical reconstructionism thus provides a way of revealing: (1) the source of the surface level inadequacies of any account of liberalism, and by extension, of the sort of approach it exemplifies; and (2) an account’s position in a rational progression and, in one particular case, its position as the most advanced. Importantly, it does so without having to appeal to considerations external to the particular account, considerations that may themselves form the subject matter of yet another surface level dispute. It therefore, also accords with the requirement that the critique proposed be immanent to liberal theory.”
           [Toula Nicolacopoulos. The Radical Critique of Liberalism. Melbourne, Australia: re.press. 2008. Creative Commons. Pages 73-76.]
      762. project Jacobin (Bhaskar Sunkara [Telugu, భాస్కర్ సుంకర, Bhāskar Suṅkara]): He discusses his radical, primarily U.S.–oriented, magazine, Jacobin. Foster is a lifetime subscriber.
           “… Jacobin is nothing without its politics—it has no lasting significance otherwise. In some ways we’re more akin, in the us context, to Against the Current, Monthly Review or New Politics, not just because we come from the same Marxist tradition, but because they’re directly political journals. But I actually don’t see Jacobin as part of a wider publishing scene. It’s not a theoretical journal like Historical Materialism; it’s fundamentally a mass-oriented publication, without striving to be a broad, reportage-heavy movement publication like In These Times or The Nation. In some ways we’re trying to be the equivalent of what The New Republic is for liberals. I don’t even mind using the word ‘middlebrow.’ Jacobin is like nothing else in this space: it’s explicitly Marxist, it’s programmatically socialist, yet our goal is to speak to as many people as possible.” [Bhaskar Sunkara, “Project Jacobin.” New Left Review. Series II, number 90, November–December 2014. Pages 29-43.]
           “… Jacobin was founded on the premise that there still is an audience for critical commentary. A survey of the political outlets today yields two kinds of publications. The esoteric ones, sites of deliberate obfuscation, utterly disconnected from reality. They find their foils in unchallenging rags that treat their readers like imbeciles. With mainstream pretenses, high school yearbook prose, and rosy reports of mass movements in the making, their role is even more disorienting.
           “We aspire to avoid both traps. Substantive engagement does not preclude entertainment. Discarding stale phrases and ideas does not necessitate avoiding thought itself. Voicing discontent with the trappings of late capitalism does not mean we can’t grapple with culture at both aesthetic and political levels. Sober analysis of the present and criticisms of the Left does not mean accommodation to the status quo.
           “Jacobin is not an organ of a political organization or captive to a single ideology. Our contributors are, however, loosely bound by common values and sentiments:
           “Just thinking about commodities from a feminist standpoint a number of categories become evident as inadequate. To begin with just three:
           • “+ As proponents of modernity and unfilled project of the Enlightenment.
           • “+ As asserters of the libertarian quality of the socialist ideal.
           • “+ As internationalists and epicureans.
           “We will have no editorial position beyond this. Every writer speaks for him or herself.”
           [Bhaskar Sunkara, “Editor’s Note: Introducing Jacobin ….” Jacobin. Issue 1, winter 2011. Page 1.]
      763. analysis of anti-genderism as a defence mechanism (Eva von Redecker as pronounced in this MP3 audio file): She discusses the right-wing hegemonic worldview.
           “The analysis of anti-genderism as a defence mechanism partly points to underlying social factors such as economic and symbolic precarization. Nevertheless, it can also be informative for an assessment of more immediate counter-strategies. If anti-genderism is understood not as a (however distorted) take on feminist gender studies, but as an image circulating to defend and mobilize a deeply reactionary world-view, it becomes immediately evident that simple correction of its mistakes does not lead very far. It is also far from consolidating grounds for an alternative, left hegemonic project. An additional reason why clarification and enlightenment do not help hinges on the fact that, certain absurdities aside, anti-gender discourse does in part understand its object with surprising correctness. Most anti-gender positions refer to a supposedly natural or divine order to counteract constructivism, yet the very fear that gender might be messed with highlights that they have learned something from feminism – they just do not like it.” [Eva von Redecker, “Anti-Genderismus and right-wing hegemony.” Radical Philosophy: Philosophical Journal of the Independent Left. Number 198, July/August 2016. Pages 2-7.]
      764. strong constructionism (Steven Engler): He examines the validity of this approach—in the critical study of religion—when contrasted with weak constructionism.
           “… [The] tendency to refer to ‘construction(s)’ any time that any aspect of contingency is involved waters down the concept. It obscures the fact that constructionism is valuable if the theory is made explicit, if, that is, we clarify what is constructed from what and how. We can call the first of these ‘weak constructionism’ and the latter ‘strong constructionism.’ The former is common in Religious Studies but of little value; the latter is rare, yet valuable.…
           “… there is little point in referring to ‘constructs’ or in publishing articles on ‘the social construction of X’ unless one is doing strong constructionism.
           “Strong constructionism is fundamentally a theoretical perspective that analyses the constitution of specific phenomena from raw materials of a different type or order. It focuses on discursive and social processes of construction. More studies of this sort would be of great value for the study of religion. In sum, we could do with more constructionist work and less constructionist talk.”
           [Steven Engler, “Two Problems with Constructionism in the Study of Religion.” Revista de Estudos da Religião. Creative Commons. Number 4, 2005. Pages 28-34.]
           “There are a host of middle-ground theoretical positions between naïve realism and radical constructionism: i.e., recognizing that ‘religion,’ as a third-order term, is a contingent, ideological construct does not prevent our using it in the study of religion …. In addition, in general terms, the fact that what we say does not refer to independently existing objects does not make our statements false or meaningless.” [Steven Engler, “‘Religion,’ ‘the Secular’ and the Critical Study of Religion.” Studies in Religion / Sciences Religieuses. Volume 40, number 4, 2011. Pages 419-442.]
      765. Post–West (Wilfred M. McClay): He examines the process of redefining nationhood, in modernity, with an absence of shared values.
           “The term ‘Post-West’ is a felicitous one for our purposes, since it implies a combination of dependency and departure. What we mean by the Post-West is a massive intensification of certain very Western ideas, to the exclusion of others. The hypertrophy of the idea of ‘rights,’ detached from notions of individual limitations or accountability, is a vivid example of the sort of thing I mean.
           “But at the very center of the Post-Western idea is a redefinition of the meaning of the nation. We have come from being Nature’s Nation to contemplating the Denatured Nation. America is no longer to be thought of as an entity whose cohesion is based on a shared set of values, shared social and institutional arrangements, a shared legal structure, a shared history, a shared culture, and a shared standard of citizenship. Or, to the extent that it is so conceived, and a modernist rather than postmodernist ideal prevails, all such desiderata are considered subordinate to certain international and universalistic values: humanitarianism, egalitarianism, democracy, international equity. Either way, the nation-state is understood to be inadequate, and the idea of national sovereignty obsolete. There is a strong overriding sense of experiment in the Post-West (though a sense one cannot find in Frost and can only rarely find in the great American tradition). It is a sense of ‘experiment’ as the promise of total and open-ended human transformation, a sense that amounts (as Richard Rorty makes explicit) to an unrelenting war against the limiting conceptions of God and nature.”
           [Wilfred M. McClay, “Is America an experiment?” The Public Interest. Number 133, fall 1998. Pages 3-22.]
      766. a critical theory of public life (Ben Agger): Rewriting public discourse in the interests of radical democracy.
           “In what I … have called fast capitalism, texts are dispersed into the context of everyday life in such a way that they are not read critically, at one remove, but are received and enacted vicariously. Hence texts turn into the disempowered lives they script. This has always been so in capitalism. But in fast capitalism the boundary between text and world has blurred to such an extent that it is nearly impossible to identify where text leaves off and world begins. This is the secret power of textuality today: texts write our lives without the apparent mediation of authoriality; hence we are prevented from writing new texts. A critical theory of public life needs to understand how the public sphere has been taken over by these disguised tracts and treatises that silently advocate a range of behaviors inimical to freedom and justice.“ [Ben Agger. A Critical Theory of Public Life: Knowledge, Discourse and Politics in an Age of Decline. London and New York: Routledge imprint of Taylor & Francis Group, an Informa PLC business. 1991. Pages 2-3.]
           “I situate myself and my version of critical theory midway between orthodox Marxism and post-Marxism. Neither is dialectical enough to enable one to rethink Marx’s approach to capitalism in relevant ways…. [I]t is impossible to separate one’s own knowledge-constitutive interests … from the readings of theory that condition one’s own empirical and political diagnoses.” [Ben Agger. The Discourse of Domination: From Frankfurt School to Postmodernism. Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern University Press. 1992. Google Play edition.]
           “Critical theory, poststructuralism, and postmodernism challenge the territoriality of sociology, including its differentiation from other disciplines in the human sciences as well as its heavy reliance on method with which to solve intellectual problems. All three perspectives oppose the mathematization of the world, even if they logically allow for mathematics as one discourse among many. This is not to privilege qualitative methodology.” [Ben Agger, “Critical Theory, Poststructuralism, Postmodernism: Their Sociological Relevance.” Annual Review of Sociology. Volume 17, 1991. Pages 105-131.]
      767. dialectic of desire (Ben Agger): He examines the Frankfurt School’s critique of Fascism.
           “… I want to suggest that the Frankfurt analysis of fascism … offered a notion of the dialectic of desire that explains all sorts of vicissitudes and blockages in the subsequent development of advanced capitalism. Desire in this sense – in line with [Herbert] Marcuse’s later more explicit writings on the possibility of a Freudian Marxism, to be discussed below – is both a subjective and objective process that links the individual to social structure. In its destructive form, desire seeks the total absorption of the surrounding object-world, virtually an infantile projection …. Later, as we shall see, desire is also potentially a Utopian concept in that its destructive-aggressive tendencies can be seen not as a death instinct desiring the destruction of oneself and others but as an instinct that wants to overcome the pain of an alienated social condition.” [Ben Agger, “The Dialectic of Desire: The Holocaust, Monopoly Capitalism and Radical Anamnesis.” Dialectical Anthropology. Volume 8, number 1/2, October 1983. Pages 75-86.]
      768. material turn in religious studies (Johan M. Strijdom): He examines the presentation of the sacred in concrete terms.
           “… the material turn in Religious Studies should not stop with the recognition that the sacred is necessarily present in concrete things in the world, but that it would still crucially need critical theory to assess the political, social and economic uses of these objects in religions as well as in the comparative study of religions. The material turn, in short, should not preclude the possibility of a systemic critique, but should continue to expose power relations at work in the uses of such objects in religions, the comparison of religions and in the comparative study of religions. What, we should finally ask, are the moral implications of this turn in the way we speak about religions in our comparative explorations?” [Johan M. Strijdom, “The material turn in Religious Studies and the possibility of critique: Assessing Chidester’s analysis of ‘the fetish.’” HTS Teologiese Studies/Theological Studies. Volume 70, number 1, 2014. Pages 1-7.]
      769. LGBTQIA identity (Katelyn M. Cooper and Sara E. Brownell): This inclusive designation is explored.
           “As we transition our undergraduate biology classrooms from traditional lectures to active learning, the dynamics among students become more important. These dynamics can be influenced by student social identities. One social identity that has been unexamined in the context of undergraduate biology is the spectrum of lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, queer, intersex, and asexual (LGBTQIA) identities. In this exploratory interview study, we probed the experiences and perceptions of seven students who identify as part of the LGBTQIA community.…
           “We use the term ‘LGBTQIA’ as an umbrella term that embraces minority gender and sexual orientation identities including, but not limited to, lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, queer, intersex, and asexual. The term is meant to be inclusive of individuals who do not identify as straight or cis-gender [one whose gender self-identity corresponds with her or his biological sex]; however, we recognize that some individuals with such identities may not wish to be included in this group. Each individual’s identity is different, and we use the term to reference the community as a whole but not to imply that individual experiences are the same.”
           [Katelyn M. Cooper and Sara E. Brownell, “Coming Out in Class: Challenges and Benefits of Active Learning in a Biology Classroom for LGBTQIA Students.” CBE—Life Sciences Education. Volume 15, issue 3, Fall 2016. Pages 1-19.]
      770. queer phenomenology (Sara Ahmed [ʾUrdū, سَارَہ احْمَد, Sārah ʾAhmad]): She develops a Marxist approach phenomenology in the context of queer studies.
           “Queer gatherings are lines that gather—on the face, or as bodies around the table—to form new patterns and new ways of making sense. The question then becomes not so much what is a queer orientation, but how we are orientated toward queer moments when objects slip. Do we retain our hold of these objects by bringing them back ‘in line’? Or do we let them go, allowing them to acquire new shapes and directions? A queer phenomenology might involve an orientation toward what slips, which allows what slips to pass through, in the unknowable length of its duration. In other words, a queer phenomenology would function as a disorientation device; it would not overcome the ‘disalignment’ of the horizontal and vertical axes, allowing the oblique to open up another angle on the world.” [Sara Ahmed. Queer Phenomenology: Orientations, Objects, Others. Durham, North Carolina: Duke University Press. 2006. Pages 171-172.]
           “… [The] ‘Marxist’ (in her own representation of them) accusations against phenomenology are most evident in the first chapter, where she argues that phenomenology erases the material and economic conditions of philosophy – the matter and labour upon which it depends – along with the ‘signs’ of an object’s particular history. Objects are ‘cut off from [their] histories of arrival’ in phenomenology, and presented instead as ‘given’. ‘Matter’ takes ‘form’ – but the process of that taking form is elided. Yet if phenomenology has only ‘surface appeal’ and lacks the necessary ‘worldliness,’ then why choose it as the theoretical framework for an argument that aims to look beyond and behind the appearance of race and sexuality in order to establish their historical and cultural contingency?” [Kaye Mitchell, “Queer Phenomenology: Orientations, Objects, Others.” Review article. Radical Philosophy: Philosophical Journal of the Independent Left. Number 143, May/June 2007. Pages 51-53.]
      771. queer ecology (Timothy Morton): He proposes an application of queer theory to ecology.
           “I’ll propose some hypothetical methods and frameworks for a field that doesn’t quite exist—queer ecology.… This exercise in hubris is bound to rattle nerves and raise hackles, but please bear with me on this test flight. Start with the basics. Let’s not create this field by comparing literary-critical apples and oranges. Let’s do it the hard way, up from foundations (or unfoundations). Let’s do it in the name of ecology itself, which demands intimacies with other beings that queer theory also demands, in another key. Let’s do it because our era requires it—we are losing touch with a fantasy Nature that never really existed (I capitalize Nature to make it look less natural), while we actively and passively destroy life-forms inhabiting and constituting the biosphere, in Earths sixth mass extinction event. Giving up a fantasy is even harder than giving up a reality.” [Timothy Morton, “Queer Ecology.” PMLA. Volume 125, number 2, March 2010. Pages 273-282.]
      772. queer theory and queer studies (Judith Butler and many others): It focuses upon both normative and non-normative forms of sexuality or sexual identity.
           “It is not just that a death is poorly marked, but that it is unmarkable. Such a death vanishes, not into explicit discourse, but in the ellipses by which public discourse proceeds. The barbarism at issue here is the barbarism of the civilizational mission, and any counter-imperialist politics, especially a feminist and queer one, must oppose it at every turn. For the point is to establish a politics that opposes state coercion, and to build a framework within which we can see how the violence done in the name of preserving a certain modernity, and the conceit of cultural homogeneity or integration, form the most serious threats to freedom. If the scenes of torture are the apotheosis of a certain conception of freedom, it is a conception free of all law and free of all constraint, precisely in order to impose law and to exercise coercion.” [Judith Butler. Frames of War: When Is Life Grievable? New York: Verso imprint of New Left Books. 2009. Page 132.]
           “The queer lives that vanished on September 11 were not publicly welcomed into the idea of national identity built in the obituary pages, and their closest relations were only belatedly and selectively (the marital norm holding sway once again) made eligible for benefits. But this should come as no surprise, when we think about how few deaths from AIDS were publicly grievable losses, and how, for instance, the extensive deaths now taking place in Africa are also, in the media, for the most part unmarkable and ungrievable.” [Judith Butler. Precarious Life: The Powers of Mourning and Violence. London and New York: Verso imprint of New Left Books. 2004. Page 35.]
           “The Anthropocene seems to override vast amounts of critical work in queer theory, trans-animalities, posthumanism and disability theory that had destroyed the false essentialism of the human. The ‘human’ of the late twentieth century had increasingly become a humanity of difference, defined less by being than an ongoing strategy or performance or becoming. But this humanity of becoming and self-differentiation was possible only by way of a negative universalism, where the human was unified by having no essence other than that which it gave itself through existence.” [Claire Colebrook, “What is the Anthropo-Political?” in Tom Cohen, Claire Colebrook and, J. Hillis Miller. Twilight of the Anthropocene Idols. Ann Arbor, Michigan: Open Humanities Press imprint of imprint of Michigan Publishing. 2016. Pages 81-125.]
           “Anyone with a passing familiarity with queer theory should be suspicious of any introductory article on queer studies and religion, including this one.1 In making this observation, I cast no aspersion on the various lucid and helpful introductory overviews of queer theory …, queer studies and religion … and queer theology …. Rather, I want to draw attention to the tension between the demands of an introductory article—order, classify, simplify—and the suspicions of queer theory. Because ‘‘queer’’ has an array of meanings and ‘‘queer theory’’ includes a variety of scholarly endeavors, writing an introduction requires making choices about what queer means and what queer theory includes.3 And such choices are precisely the kind of regulatory, normalizing, exclusionary practices that queer theory interrogates.” [Kent L. Brintnall, “Queer studies and religion.” Critical Research on Religion. Volume 1, number 1, April 2013. Pages 51-61.]
      773. Black queer studies (E. Patrick Johnson, Mae G. Henderson, and others): They synthesize Black studies and queer studies.
           “… we hope that the interanimation of these two disciplines—black studies and queer studies—whose roots are similarly grounded in social and political activism, carries the potential to overcome the myopic theorizing that has too often sabotaged or subverted long-term and mutually liberatory goals. As a productive and progressive political and analytical paradigm, the intersectionality of black and queer studies marks not only a Kuhnian paradigm shift, but also a generational shift mandated by the complexity of contemporary subjectivities. Monolithic identity formations, like monologic perspectives, cannot survive the crisis of (post)modernity. In today’s cultural marketplace, the imperatives of race and sexuality must give way to messier but more progressive stratagems of contestation and survival. Therefore, as we see it, our project here is fundamentally a liberatory one—in the sense that it is grounded in the assertion of individual rights balanced by communal accountability in the interest of ensuring social justice. And ‘social justice inclusive of sexuality,’ argues Mark Blasius, ‘can only be conceptualized or enacted from explicit recognition of the relationships between sexual oppression and the oppression of other disenfranchised groups and coalition with them on the basis of our intersecting identities of class, gender, age, sexual orientation, ‘able’- (and desirable-) boundedness, race, and ethnicity, among othere. Toward this aim, our collection seeks to enlist the strategies, methodologies, and insights of black studies into the service of queer studies and vice versa.” [E. Patrick Johnson and Mae G. Henderson, “Introduction: Queering Black Studies/‘Quaring’ Queer Studies.” Black Queer Studies: A Critical Anthology. E. Patrick Johnson and Mae G. Henderson, editors. Durham, North Carolina: Duke University Press. 2005. Pages 1-17.]
      774. critical queer theory (Michael Hames-García): Applies critical social theory within queer theory (the examination of sexual identity, orientation, or preference as socially constructed).
           “I … suggest that … [a] task for a critical queer theory should be a reintroduction of materialist questions of class and capitalism…. [B]y disguising the reality of economic influences on desire, queer theory is complicit with capitalist ideology. The goal of a critical theory of gay and lesbian identity … should be to elucidate those connections that exist between capitalism and the regulation of sexuality….
           “… If critical social theory has traditionally (although not exclusively) been more concerned with history, economics, and their relations to culture and ideology, what might the contours of a critical queer theory look like? Can queer theory be critical theory? Additionally: To what extent can the privileging of desire as a realm of freedom and/ or transgression occlude the collusion of desire with domination and oppression?”
           [Michael Hames-García, “Can Queer Theory be Critical Theory?” New Critical Theory: Essays on Liberation. William S. Wilkerson and Jeffrey Paris, editors. Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers. 2001. Kindle edition.]
      775. queer theology (Kerri A. Mesner and many others): This approach is at the intersection of queer theory and theology.
           “My struggles bridge the theoretical and the contextual as well; as a minister, how do I navigate complex theological conversations with colleagues and professors in a predominantly mainstream seminary setting, where, for many students, the notion of ‘queer theology’ is, at best, a new idea, and at worst, a direct confrontation with dearly-held beliefs? As a scholar and activist, how do I navigate my conviction that ‘ministry’—and, indeed ‘church’—is perhaps most significantly what happens outside the church building on a Sunday morning, that ministry, for me, emerges evocatively within my academic scholarship…and, moreover, that my understanding of ministerial calling compels me to confront the intersections of Christian theology and anti-lgbtq violence?” [Kerri A. Mesner, “Innovations in Sexual-Theological Activism: Queer Theology Meets Theatre of the Oppressed.” Theology & Sexuality. Volume 16, issue 3, 2010. Pages 285-303.]
      776. queer politics (Mark Norris Lance, Alessandra Tanesini as pronounced in this MP3 audio file, and many others): They focus on issues of identity politics.
           “One must distinguish … tactical identity endorsements from questions of pure, brutal, short-term political effectiveness. It might be the case that straight but not narrow people could achieve results by claiming this identity for themselves. Virtually any act might, in some circumstance, be politically useful, but our contention is that their success will be partly predicated on the fact that straight people are often taken more seriously than queers by straight society even on matters of queer politics. In these cases strategic success is obtained by implicit reliance on homophobic expectations. Hence, we are sceptical about claims that such endorsements are politically progressive.” [Mark Norris Lance and Alessandra Tanesini, “Identity judgements, queer politics.” Radical Philosophy: Philosophical Journal of the Independent Left. Number 100, March/April 2000. Pages 42-51.]
      777. queer international theory (Cynthia Weber): The article considers reasons why this field has never emerged in the field of international relations.
           “Queer and critical non-engagement, on the one hand, or their gentrification, on the other, may bring comfort to Disciplinary IR [international relations], as its: power is further centralized; its ontology, epistemology, methodology, and their politics are spared critical ‘attacks’; its ‘pluralist’ practices are evidenced by gentrified Queer International Theory; and its disciplinary status is secured. Yet, the discipline more broadly has much to lose by allowing Disciplinary IR to regulate queer and other critical international theories to the point of non-engagement. Regulation not only limits how international politics is enriched by critical inquiry …. It cedes considerations of key international phenomena — narrowly and broadly defined — to other academic disciplines. This is precisely what has been happening over the past decade with investigations of Queer International Politics.” [Cynthia Weber, “Why is there no Queer International Theory?” European Journal of International Relations. Volume 21, number 1, March 2015. Pages 27-51.]
      778. prestige–goods ideology (Kristian Kristiansen as pronounced in this MP3 audio file): He examines “long-distance exchange networks” and “tribal hierarchies.”
           “I propose that traditional tribal and communal belief systems and systems of minor ranking were gradually undermined and manipulated by the establishment of long-distance exchange networks. These linked the tribal groups of Europe together in a new prestige-goods ideology. When the system was amplified by a combination of new military innovations and a matching ideology of ruling élites, the foundation was laid for the development of new tribal hierarchies. Such an explanation puts the long-disputed evidence for so-called Mycenaean influence in northern Europe into its proper perspective. It was clearly the manipulation of such social and ideological value systems that triggered social evolution. The impact of the subsistence economy was only determining in the sense that it set barriers. Such barriers are evidenced in the regional cyclical developments of exchange networks and consumption based on local cycles of over-exploitation and ecological deterioration, but the dynamics of the system was rooted in the social and ideological organization of society. In particular distinct forms of value expressed in the circulation of material items are crucial for understanding the transformation of social rank in this period.” [Kristian Kristiansen, “Value, ranking and consumption in the European Bronze Age.” Domination and Resistance. Daniel Miller, Michael Rowlands, and Christopher Tilley, editors. London and New York: Routledge imprint of Taylor & Francis Group, an Informa PLC business. 2005. Pages 211-214.]
      779. liberation studies (Melanie Kaye/Kantrowitz): She proposes an eclectic disciplinary area.
           “An extension of women’s studies is being made with the incorporation of a transnational perspective in the curriculum. Students and teachers in these classes examine not only women’s issues but also discuss the interactions among gender, race, class and national identities to understand how structures of oppression and privilege are interrelated. As suggested by a professor, Liberation Studies can combine Women’s Studies, Ethnic Studies, Jewish Studies and Queer Studies. This way, fragmented identities are connected and the gap between theoretical and practical work is closed.” [Melanie Kaye/Kantrowitz, “Liberation Studies Now.” The Women’s Review of Books. Volume 16, number 5, February 1999. Pages 15-16.]
      780. emancipatory research (Linda S. Behar-Horenstein, Xiaoying Feng [Chinese, 笑迎丰 Xiào-yíng-Fēng as pronounced in this MP3 audio file], and others): This type of research focuses on emancipation, liberation, and social justice.
           “The purpose of this study was to provide a synthesis of findings from a database of quantitative emancipatory research studies and to elucidate their implications for practice by conducting systematic critical appraisal. While analyzing the findings of these studies, five overarching descriptions emerged including: agency in community health; instructional practice and student engagement; learning experiences impact student performance; how participation, student characteristics and programmatic opportunities; and international education, evaluation, and professors’ specialization.” [Linda S. Behar-Horenstein and Xiaoying Feng, “Emancipatory Research: A Synthesis of Quantitative Evidence.” OSR Journal of Research & Method in Education. Volume 5, issue 3, version III, May-June 2015. Pages 46-56.]
      781. critical sociology (Graham Cassano, Richard A. Dello Buono, and many others): A general term for applications of critical social theory (and, sometimes, critical realism) to sociology.
           “Capitalism is founded on the ability to appropriate the social surplus of society by the few who control the means of production and of subsistence. The consequence of these capitalist social relations is a chronic and environmentally unsustainable dynamic, periods of boom alternating with bust, resulting in longer and deeper crises that inflict ever greater pain on more and more of the world’s population. The Association for Critical Sociology, through the journal Critical Sociology and the book series Studies in Critical Social Sciences, and during the many conferences and panels it sponsors, is committed to providing both a space for critical analysis and an opportunity to have an open dialogue that can examine the consequences of capitalist development and the potential for resistance.” [Association for Critical Sociology. 2015. Retrieved on September 13th, 2015.]
           “It is real relations that supply the generative mechanisms underpinning the explanatory thrust of a critical sociology.” [Graham Scrambler, “Critical Realism, Sociology and Health Inequalities: Social Class as a Generative Mechanism and its Media of Enactment.” Alethia (subsequently renamed and reestablished as Journal of Critical Realism). Volume 4, issue 1, July 2001. Pages 35-42.]
      782. way of liberation (Adyashanti [Sanskrit/Saṃskṛtam, आद्यशंति, Ādyaśaṃti]): The book develops an approach to spiritual awakening.
           “The Way of Liberation is medicine used to cure various states of spiritual dis-ease. Just as medicine is not itself good health but a means to good health, these teachings are not Truth but a means of revealing Truth. The Indian sage Ramana Maharshi [Tamiḻ, ரமண மஹரிஷி, Ramaṇa Mahariṣi] likened spiritual teachings to thorns used to remove other thorns, and I rather like that image.
           “To study The Way of Liberation teachings is to study yourself. To study yourself does not mean to add more knowledge to your cluttered brain’s ideas about yourself, but to remove all of the customary defining characteristics you usually associate self with: name, race, gender, occupation, social status, past, as well as all of the psychological judgments you make about yourself. When the self is stripped down to its essential core, all that can be said about it is: ‘I am; I exist.’
           “What then is the I that exists?
           “This is not a book about spiritual betterment, self-improvement, or altered states of consciousness. It is about spiritual awakening, going from the dream state of ego to the awakened state beyond ego as quickly and efficiently as possible. The journey isn’t what anyone anticipates, and enlightenment isn’t what it is frequently sold as. I won’t be telling you how to achieve bliss or unending happiness, find your soul mate, or the ten easy steps to making a quick million bucks. I don’t believe in deceptive advertising or luring in spiritual seekers with false promises. Many spiritual seekers already live on a steady diet of spiritual junk food, those nice-sounding platitudes that have little or no transforming effect other than to dull the dissatisfaction inherent in the dream state. If you like that sort of thing, this isn’t the book for you.”
           [Adyashanti. The Way of Liberation: A Practical Guide to Spiritual Enlightenment. Campbell, California: Open Gate Sangha, Inc. 2012. Pages xi-xii.]
      783. Marxist feminism (Selma James, Martha E. Gimenez, Michelle Rodino-Colocino, Martha E. Gimenez, and many others): Examines the ways in which the capitalist system oppresses women, including by relying upon the unpaid labor of housekeeping and mothering. Overturning capitalism will emancipate women (as well as men).
           “What then might be the object of Marxist feminism? In the most general terms it must be to identify the operation of gender relations as and where they may be distinct from, or connected with, the processes of production and reproduction understood by historical materialism.” [Michele Barrett. Women’s Oppression Today: The Marxist/Feminist Encounter. New edition. London and New York: Verso imprint of New Left Books. 2014. Google Play edition.]
           “In this article, I will identify the differences between these two important currents within feminist theory [materialist feminism and Marxist feminism], and the reasons for the return of feminist appeals to materialism at a time when the theoretical shift towards idealism and contingency seems hegemonic in the academy. Given the conflicting views that coexist under the materialist cover, I will argue for a clear break between Materialist and Marxist Feminisms, and for a return to the latter necessitated by the devastating effects of capitalism on women and the consequent political importance of a theoretically adequate analysis of the causes of their plight.” [Martha E. Gimenez, “What’s material about materialist feminism?: A Marxist Feminist critique.” Radical Philosophy: Philosophical Journal of the Independent Left. Number 101, May/June 2000. Pages 18-28.]
           “The following analysis contributes to the revival of a healthy feminist Marxism and Marxist feminism by exploring the ‘feminism’ of [former Alaska Governor] Sarah Palin. Palin declared herself a ‘feminist’ in 2010 and, using a folksy, populist rhetorical style, articulated anti-feminist arguments and policy. At first glance, Palin’s feminism may appear as trivial campaign discourse designed to appeal to right-wing women during the midterm elections. But Palin’s brand of feminism shows the ‘crafty,’ ‘resourceful’ nature of anti-feminism (and ultimately, of patriarchy) that Eagleton … locates in today’s capitalism. As an anti-feminist discourse that revises history to claim authenticity, and therefore, legitimacy against a feminism that is allegedly outdated and wrongheaded, Palin’s feminism complements postfeminism’s contention that liberal and radical feminism is ‘so done’ …. Conservative Palinite feminism, in contrast, is part of a larger move of the right-wing anti-choice movement to reclaim feminism as theirs. During the US midterm elections of 2010, at least two prominent Senatorial candidates embraced feminism or were cast as feminists by the anti-choice political action committee, the SBA List (Susan B. Anthony List), which generates revised histories of first-wave feminism to support anti-choice candidates.” [Michelle Rodino-Colocino, ““Feminism” as Ideology: Sarah Palin’s Anti-feminist Feminism and Ideology Critique.” tripleC: Cognition, Communication, Co-operation. Volume 10, number 2, 2012. Creative Commons. Pages 457-473.]
           “… the Marxist–feminist analysis I offer in this paper is not ‘reductionist’ but historical in the Marxist sense; it postulates that just as the production of things is organized in qualitatively different ways or modes of production, the reproduction of life and concomitant social relations are also structured in qualitatively different ways. Although at the level of observable phenomena there appears to be such a degree of continuity to warrant the conclusion that gender differences and gender inequality are a transhistorical phenomenon rooted in transhistorical societal or individual causes, [Karl] Marx’s methodology leads to the identification of underlying historically different structural conditions of possibility under capitalism, conditions that remain unchanged despite changes at the level of observable phenomena such as, for example, greater male involvement in housework and childcare, increases in women’s income, women’s access to male-dominated jobs, professions, careers, political office, etc.” [Martha E. Gimenez, “Capitalism and the Oppression of Women: Marx Revisited.” Science & Society. Volume 69, number 1, January 2005. Pages 11-32.]
      784. social reproduction theory (Lise Vogel and others): They develops a “unitary” Marxist feminist theory focused upon social reproduction. Marxism and the Oppression of Women is one of the founding texts of Marxist feminism. To Vogel, the socialist feminist theory of “dual systems” is unnecessary. See this lecture by Vogel in a YouTube video. Social reproduction theory has also been applied to other subjects.
           “With their roots in a practical commitment to women’s liberation and to the development of a broad-based autonomous women’s movement, participants in the socialist-feminist movement have only recently begun to explore their relationship to trends and controversies within the Left. At the theoretical level, the exploration has taken the form of several waves of publications seeking, on the one hand, to delineate the substance of socialist feminism more clearly, and on the other, to situate women’s oppressiomore precisely within, rather than alongside, a Marxist theory of social reproduction. These efforts are important, although they continue to suffer from an inadequate theoretical orientation. Socialist-feminist theory has not yet overcome its tendency to analyse women’s oppression in dualistic terms as a phenomenon that is independent of class, race, and mode of production.” [Lise Vogel. Marxism and the Oppression of Women: Toward a Unitary Theory. Revised edition. Leiden, the Netherlands and Boston, Massachusetts: Brill. 2013. Page 34.]
           “The overriding theme of [Lise] Vogel’s book [Marxism and the Oppression of Women] is that Marxism offers a unified theoretical framework that can best explain women’s oppression by situating it in the capitalist mode of production. She contends that past socialist movements, in spite of significant advances and contributions, did not fulfill the promise of a synthesis between feminism and Marxism, largely because of theoretical weaknesses and misunderstandings regarding the roots of women’s oppression, as well as a certain economistic framework.” [Jessie Muldoon, “A Marxist theory of women’s oppression.” International Socialist Review. Issue 100, spring 2016. Online publication. No pagination.]
           “Social reproduction theory as well as other complimentary bodies of literature serve as an appropriate framework through which to understand and critically reflect upon the sporting experiences and career aspirations of Black high school boy’s basketball players because they help us to explore the central questions of how and why relationships of inequality and domination are reproduced in society and its many social institutions (particularly schools). Broadly speaking, reproduction theorists have been concerned with the ways in which the educational or schooling process, in particular, has helped to perpetuate or reproduce the social relationships and attitudes needed to sustain the existing dominant economic and class relations of the larger society. Organized school sport’s prominent place in America’s educational system has rendered it a potential site for the social reproduction of inequality.” [John N. Singer and Reuben A. Buford May, “The career trajectory of a Black male high school basketball player: A social reproduction perspective.” International Review for the Sociology of Sport. Volume 46, number 3, September 2010. Pages 299-314.]
           “The promise of social reproduction theory lies in its commitment to a materialist explanation of women’s oppression that rejects economic reductionism without forfeiting economic explanation. Its premises, if fully developed, are essential to a renewed socialist feminism, for they can provide a coherent theoretical underpinning to an anti-capitalist coalition politics. They have, however, rarely been articulated as such. Instead, those who ground their work in social reproduction theory tend to rely on, as I will show, certain structural functionalist concepts and logic, reproducing many of the shortcomings that plagued dual systems theory. In the process, they undermine their theory’s innovations and emancipatory potential.” [Sue Ferguson, “Building on the Strengths of the Socialist Feminist Tradition.” Critical Sociology. Volume 25, number 1, January 1999. Pages 1-15.]
      785. psychoanalytic–Marxism (Eugene Victor Wolfenstein): He proposes an emancipatory approach to psychoanalysis.
           “If we don’t limit ourselves to the conjuncture of Marxism and psychoanalysis, it would be more accurate to say that the discourse has been doubled. In recent times we have witnessed an extraordinary flowering of feminist theorizing, parallel in its own way to the development of racial and ethnic (broadly, anticolonial) discourse during the 1950s and 1960s. The parallel is not incidental. In each case oppressed collectivities developed social movements aimed at ending their oppression. In the process they challenged the hegemonic discourses of those who oppressed them.
           “The theories generated in these movements cannot be contained within the discourse of psychoanalytic-marxism. But neither can psychoanalytic-marxism be contained by either or both of them. Rather they are on different analytical levels. Psychoanalytic-marxism is a theory of human emancipation. In itself, however, human emancipation is an empty universal. By contrast, emancipatory struggles are particular and concrete. They generate theories and practices that are attuned to the interests and desires of specific collectivities. Psychoanalytic-marxism cannot replace these theories, and it is not, in itself, a practical movement. Its aim is to contribute something to these more concrete struggles, in the hope that by so doing it simultaneously facilitates the realization of the more general emancipatory project.”
           [Eugene Victor Wolfenstein. Psychoanalytic-Marxism: Groundwork. New York: The Guilford Press imprint of Guilford Publications, Inc. 1993. Pages 134-135.]
      786. developmental systems theory (Anne Fausto-Sterling): She develops an approach for reconciling nature and nurture.
           “Developmental systems theorists deny that there are fundamentally two kinds of processes: one guided by genes, hormones, and brain cells (that is, nature), the other by the environment, experience, learning, or inchoate social forces (that is, nurture).…
           “How, specifically, can DST [developmental systems theory] help us break away from dualistic thought processes? Consider an example described by systems theorist Peter Taylor, a goat born with no front legs. During its lifetime it managed to hop around on its hind limbs.”
           [Anne Fausto-Sterling, “Dueling Dualisms,” in Anne Fausto-Sterling. Sexing the Body: Gender Politics and the Construction of Sexuality. New York: Basic Books imprint of Perseus Books Group. 2000. Pages 1-44.]
      787. intersexual body (Anne Fausto-Sterling): Fausto-Sterling questions the male–female model of sex. She argues, instead, that at least five may exist.
           “… if the state and the legal system have an interest in maintaining a two-party sexual system, they are defying nature. For biologically speaking, there are many gradations running from female to male; along that spectrum lie at least five sexes – perhaps even more.
           “Medical investigators recognize the concept of the intersexual body. But medicine uses the term ‘intersex’ as a catch-all for three major subgroups with some mixture of male and female characteristics: the so-called true hermaphrodites, whom I call herms, who possess one testis and one ovary (the sperm- and egg- producing vessels, or gonads); male pseudo-hermaphrodites (‘merms’), who have testes and some aspects of female genitalia but no ovaries; and female pseudo-hermaphrodites (‘ferms’), who have ovaries and some aspects of the male genitalia but lack testes.
           “It is difficult to estimate the frequency of intersexuality; it’s not the sort of information one volunteers on a job application. John Money of Johns Hopkins University, a specialist in the study of congenital sexual-organ defects, suggests that intersexuals may constitute as many as four percent of births.”
           [Anne Fausto-Sterling, “How Many Sexes Are There?” The New York Times. March 12th, 1993.]
           “In 1993 I published a modest proposing suggesting that we replace our two-sex system with a five-sex one. In addition to males and females, I argued, we should also accept the categories herms (named after ‘true’ hermaphrodites), merms (named after male ‘pseudo-hermaphrodites’), and ferms (named after female ‘pseudo-hermaphrodites’). I’d intended to be provocative, but I had also been writing tongue in cheek, and so was surprised by the extent of the controversy the article unleashed. Rightwing Christians somehow connected my idea of five sexes to the United Nations– sponsored 4ᵗʰ World Conference on Women, to be held in Beijing two year later, apparently seeing some sort of global conspiracy at work.…
           “Stop infant genital surgery. We protest the practices of genital mutilation in other cultures, but tolerate them at home. Some of my medical colleagues are apparently so scandalized bymy thoughts on intersexuality that they refuse to discuss them with me. Perhaps they think that I am sacrificing the wellbeing of unfortunate children on the altar of gender politics. How could I possibly consider using a poor intersexual child as a battering ram to assault the fortress of gender inequality?”
           [Anne Fausto-Sterling, “Should There Be Only Two Sexes,” in Anne Fausto-Sterling. Sexing the Body: Gender Politics and the Construction of Sexuality. New York: Basic Books imprint of Perseus Books Group. 2000. Pages 78-114.]
      788. economism (Simon Choat): In defending the Marxism against some anarchists’ false claims, he critiques the view that Marxists are economistic.
           “Sometimes the accusation is that Marxism is economistic, i.e. that it proposes that all historical phenomena can be explained as products of an always-determinant economic base. If it were true, then this charge would certainly undermine Marxism’s validity. But very few Marxists have actually endorsed this kind of economism in which Marxism is supposed to be a master key that can unlock every single aspect of human history. Certainly, Marx himself was more circumspect, presenting his work as a theory of the origins and development of the capitalist mode of production in Western Europe whose wider applicability was yet to be established …. In the same way that Marxism is not inherently authoritarian (evidenced by the broad range of organisational strategies advocated by different Marxists), neither is it inherently economistic.” [Simon Choat, “Marxism and anarchism in an age of neoliberal crisis.” Capital & Class. Volume 40, number 1, February 2016. Pages 95-109.]
      789. critical sociomaterial approach (Joan H. Fujimura): She examines the means by which the social sciences should engage with nature’s materiality.
           “I address the question of how the social sciences should engage with the materiality of nature—in this case, the molecular genetics of sex determination. I employ a critical sociomaterial approach to social scientific engagements with the biological sciences. The sociomaterial approach encompasses the poststructuralist view that meanings are not inherent in events, phenomena, and things. That is, it assumes that humans attribute meanings to things through complex interactions based within specific locations in society, culture, and history. For example, the meanings attributed to nature—how nature is read—differ depending on its reader’s location in time and place …. This approach also builds on feminist and sociocultural studies of science that have argued against the neat divide between nature (as nature in the raw) and culture (as social discourses and meanings).” [Joan H. Fujimura, “Sex Genes: A Critical Sociomaterial Approach to the Politics and Molecular Genetics of Sex Determination.” Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society. Volume 32, number 1, autumn 2006. Pages 49-82.]
      790. radical feminism (Kathie Sarachild, Shulamith Firestone, and many others): The Dialectic of Sex, by Shulamith Firestone, is one of the key texts. In The SCUM Manifesto (which does contain profanity), arguably an acronym for the “Society for Cutting Up Men,” the diagnosed paranoid schizophrenic Valerie Solanas wrote that all men should be killed. Some anti-feminists have taken her words, clearly not representative of the views held by most radical feminists, as evidence for the supposed dangers of the philosophy. U.S. right-wing radio entertainer Rush Limbaugh has stereotyped and disparaged radical feminists as feminazis. In reality, the objective of radical feminism (radfem) is to eliminate patriarchy (male dominance).
           “In the radical feminist view, the new feminism is not just the revival of a serious political movement for social equality. It is the second wave of the most important revolution in history. Its aim: the overthrow of the oldest, most rigid class/caste system in existence, the class system based on sex—a system consolidated over thousands of years, lending the archetypal male and female roles an undeserved legitimacy and seeming permanence. In this perspective, the pioneer Western feminist movement was only the first onslaught, the fifty-year ridicule that followed it only the first counteroffensive—the dawn of a long struggle to break free from the oppressive power structures set up by nature and reinforced by man.” [Shulamith Firestone. The Dialectic of Sex: The Case for Feminist Revolution. New York: Bantam Books. 1972. Page 15.]
           “… SCUM is impatient; SCUM is not consoled by the thought that future generations will thrive; SCUM wants to grab some thrilling living for itself. And, if a large majority of women were SCUM, they could acquire complete control of this country within a few weeks simply by withdrawing from the labor force, thereby paralyzing the entire nation.” [Valerie Solanas, The SCUM Manifesto. 1968. Pages 12-13.]
           “Patriarchy is the oppressing structure of male domination. Radical feminism makes visible male control as it is exercised in every sphere of women’s lives, both public and private.” [Robyn Rowland and Renate Klein, “Radical Feminism: History, Politics, Action.” Radically Speaking: Feminism Reclaimed. Diane Bell and Renate Klein, editors. North Melbourne, Victoria, Australia: Spinifex Press. 1996. Page 11.]
           “Radical feminists suggest that patriarchy, which has existed since very early in the history of civilisation, predates all other forms of oppression such as capitalist forms of gender inequality. This structure is ingrained within modern society and neither legal equity nor education will succeed in achieving gender equality. Patriarchy is caused by factors such as the exploitation of female biology by men—for example the fact that women are weaker during pregnancy, by marriage and family relationships which allow women’s labour to be exploited within the home, and by heterosexual relationships, which some suggest enables the exploitation of women by men. For this reason, lesbian relationships and political lesbianism are often seen as one method of combatting patriarchy.” [Elizabeth Ford. Feminist Field Notes: A Girl’s Guide to the Gender Revolution. Raleigh, North Carolina: Lulu.com. 2015. Page 13.]
      791. socialist feminism or dual-systems theory (Donna Haraway, Sylvia Walby, Holly Graf, Gillian Howie, Zillah Eisenstein, and many others): According to this blend of Marxist feminism and radical feminism, women, in their struggle against domination or oppression, must challenge both patriarchy and capitalism (the dual systems).
           “This chapter is an effort to build an ironic political myth faithful to feminism, socialism, and materialism. Perhaps more faithful as blasphemy is faithful, than as reverent worship and identification. Blasphemy has always seemed to require taking things very seriously. I know no better stance to adopt from within the secular-religious, evangelical traditions of United States politics, including the politics of socialist feminism. Blasphemy protects one from the moral majority within, while still insisting on the need for community. Blasphemy is not apostasy. Irony is about contradictions that do not resolve into larger wholes, even dialectically, about the tension of holding incompatible things together because both or all are necessary and true. Irony is about humour and serious play. It is also a rhetorical strategy and a political method, one I would like to see more honoured within socialist-feminism. At the centre of my ironic faith, my blasphemy, is the image of the cyborg.
           “A cyborg is a cybernetic organism, a hybrid of machine and organism, a creature of social reality as well as a creature of fiction. Social reality is lived social relations, our most important political construction, a world-changing fiction. The international women's movements have constructed ‘women's experience,’ as well as uncovered or discovered this crucial collective object. This experience is a fiction and fact of the most crucial, political kind. Liberation rests on the construction of the consciousness, the imaginative apprehension, of oppression, and so of possibility. The cyborg is a matter of fiction and lived experience that changes what counts as women’s experience in the late twentieth century. This is a struggle over life and death, but the boundary between science fiction and social reality is an optical illusion.”
           [Donna Haraway, “A Cyborg Manifesto: Science, Technology, and Socialist-Feminism in the Late Twentieth Century.” Simians, Cyborgs and Women: The Reinvention of Nature. Donna Haraway, editor. London and New York: Routledge imprint of Taylor & Francis Group, an Informa PLC business. 2010. Pages 213-256.]
           “Cyborgs are kin, whelped in the litter of post–World War II information technologies and globalized digital bodies, politics, and cultures of human and not-human sorts. Cyborgs are not machines in just any sense, nor are they machine-organism hybrids. In fact, they are not hybrids at all. They are, rather, imploded entities, dense material semiotic ‘things’—articulated string figures of ontologically heterogeneous, historically situated, materially rich, virally proliferating relatings of particular sorts, not all the time everywhere, but here, there, and in between, with consequences. Particular sorts of historically situated machines signaled by the words ‘information’ and ‘system’ play their part in cyborg living and dying. Particular sorts of historically situated organisms, signaled by the idioms of labor systems, energetics, and communication, play their part.” [Donna Haraway, “Awash in Urine: DES and Premarin® in Multispecies Response-ability.” WSQ: Women’s Studies Quarterly. Volume 40, numbers 1 and 2, spring/summer 2012. Pages 301-316.]
           “Socialist feminists do not think that the oppression of women is based solely on the economic system, and they suggest that patriarchy and capitalism are combined into one system. They believe that we must understand the continuing effects that colonization, imperialism, and racism have on the women of the world.” [Holly Graf. A Very Short Summary of Socialist Feminist Theory and Practice. April 30th, 2012. Page 3. Retrieved on August 27th, 2015.]
           “Dual-systems theory is a synthesis of Marxist and radical feminist theory. Rather than being an exclusive focus of either capitalism or patriarchy, this perspective argues that both systems are present and important in the structuring of contemporary gender relations. Contemporary gender inequality is analysed as a result of the structures of a capitalist and patiarchal or capitalist-patriarchal society.” [Sylvia Walby. Theorizing Patriarchy. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Basil Blackwell Ltd. 1990. Page 5.]
           “The aim of this paper is to indicate, via this ‘abrupt distance afforded by the abstract concept,’ what has been subsumed, elided, and erased in the recent canonization of feminist theory and to suggest that the exclusion of materialism, associated with socialist feminism, has led to a form of ‘cultural’ feminism within which is a particular thread of anti-realism that has left feminism unable to articulate, investigate or analyze its own conditions.” [Gillian Howie, “After Postmodernism: Feminism and Marxism Revisited.” Critical Matrix. Volume 16, fall 2007. Pages 40-55.]
           “… socialist-feminism has continued to develop and change. While maintaining a commitment to understanding the connections between male dominance and economic exploitation, much (though not all) socialist-feminist research has moved away from the search for all-encompassing theoretical analyses.” [Doreen J. Mattingly and Karen Falconer-Al-Hindi, “Should Women Count?: A Context for the Debate.” Professional Geographer. Volume 47, number 4, 1995. Pages 427-435.]
           “Seeking to dispel the mystique of cultural feminism, these chapters aim to retrieve the best insights of socialist-feminism and to combine them with a non-identitarian version of the politics of recognition. Only such an approach, I maintain, can meet the intellectual and political challenges facing feminist movements in a period of neoliberal hegemony.” [Nancy Fraser. Fortunes of Feminism: From State-Managed Capitalism to Neoliberal Crisis. London and New York: Verso imprint of New Left Books. 2013. Pages 9-10.]
           “… I have rebutted arguments that cast the concerns of socialist-feminism as incompatible with those of newer paradigms centered on discourse and culture. Putting aside the usual sectarian blinders, I have proposed conceptions of gender, justice, and recognition that are broad enough to encompass the concerns of both camps. These conceptions are two-dimensional. Spanning both distribution and recognition, they are able to comprehend both the class-like aspects and status aspects of women’s subordination.” [Nancy Fraser. Fortunes of Feminism: From State-Managed Capitalism to Neoliberal Crisis. London and New York: Verso imprint of New Left Books. 2013. Page 173.]
           “Although there are socialist women who are committed to understanding and changing the system of capitalism, socialist feminists are committed to understanding the system of power deriving from capitalist patriarchy. I choose this phrase, capitalist patriarchy, to emphasize the existing mutual dependence, of the capitalist class structure and male supremacy. Understanding this ‘interdependence’ of patriarchy and capitalism is essential to the political analysis of socialist feminism. It becomes necessary to understand that patriarchy (as male supremacy) existed before capitalism and continues in post-capitalist societies.” [Zillah Eisenstein, “Constructing a Theory of Capitalist Patriarchy and Socialist Feminism.” Critical Sociologist. Volume 25, issue 2-3, March 1999. Pages 196-217.]
           “Today, with the Left itself battling to survive a cold destructive climate, more would agree with the North American feminist Zillah Eisenstein, a leading theoretician of socialist feminism in the USA in the 1970s, who recently declared— adapting to what she sees as new realities, rather than expressing anger or sectarian sentiment—that ‘the specification of feminism as socialist has little political context today.’ Socialism, she feels, seems to hold out little promise for women, and the radical edge of feminism is now to be maintained through a focus on ‘the particularities of women’s lives.’ In agreement with those known as ‘difference theorists,’ Eisenstein now argues that it is in their specific identity as women that feminists should seek a politics which unites all women through the assertion and revaluing of our experience of ‘difference.’” [Lynne Segal, “Whose Left?: Socialism, Feminism and the Future.” New Left Review. Series 1, number 185, January–February 1991. Pages 81-92.]
           “The politics I am calling ‘socialist-feminism’ has long been a self-aware wing of modern feminism, playing a major role in the women’s liberation revival of the late 1960s, as well as providing the dominant perspective for much women’s history scholarship since then. While modern socialist-feminism is uniquely self-aware and self-defined, I believe that it is possible to trace such politics back at least to the mid nineteenth century and to argue that they have consistently been a radicalizing force in the larger history of feminism. This article can be read, therefore, as a contribution to the reconstitution of the socialist-feminist tradition, as part of a contest with other kinds of feminism for control over the meaning and political direction of the contemporary women’s movement.” [Ellen Carol DuBois, “Woman Suffrage and the Left: An International Socialist-Feminist Perspective.” New Left Review. Series 1, number 186, March–April 1991. Pages 20-45.]
      792. imperialist feminism (Deepa Kumar [Bengali/Bāṅāli, দীপা কুমার, Dīpā Kumāra as pronounced in this MP3 audio file]): The article explores the logic of a perspective which is framed by the racism underlying the clash–of–civilizations thesis.
           “… the logic of imperialist feminism in the twenty-first century … [is] shaped by the deeply racist framework of the ‘clash of civilizations,’ which is based on the idea that the West is a superior culture because it believes in democracy, human rights, secularism, women’s rights, gay rights, freedom of speech, and a whole host of other liberal values, whereas the Global South is barbaric, misogynistic, driven by religion, and illiberal. From this follows the ‘white man’s burden’ and the ‘white woman’s burden’ to intervene through any means necessary, including wars of colonization, to ‘liberate’ less fortunate women in other parts of the world.” [Deepa Kumar, “Imperialist feminism.” International Socialist Review. Number 102, fall 2016. Online publication. No pagination.]
      793. feminist stylistics (Sara Mills): She develops a feminist approach to linguistic analysis.
           “This book aims to describe a form of analysis which I have termed ‘feminist stylistics.’ Both the ‘feminist’ and the ‘stylistics’ parts of this phrase are complex and may have different meanings for readers. Nevertheless, the phrase itself is one which best sums up my concern first and foremost with an analysis which identifies itself as feminist and which uses linguistic or language analysis to examine texts. Feminist analysis aims to draw attention to and change the way that gender is represented, since it is clear that a great many of these representational practices are not in the interests of either women or men. Thus, feminist stylistic analysis is concerned not only to describe sexism in a text, but also to analyse the way that point of view, agency, metaphor, or transitivity are unexpectedly closely related to matters of gender, to discover whether women’s writing practices can be described, and so on. By close reading, using techniques from a range of linguistic and literary backgrounds, my aim is to present readers with a vocabulary to describe what is going on in texts and what is going on in the readers themselves when they read. When we read we do not always read suspiciously; we are used to certain types of messages and they often do not strike us as necessarily oppressive or pernicious. We often view language simply as a tool or as a vehicle for ideas, rather than as a material entity which may in fact shape those ideas.” [Sara Mills. Feminist Stylistics. London and New York: Routledge imprint of Taylor & Francis Group, an Informa PLC business. 2005. Page 1.]
      794. feminist critical philosophy of climate change (Regina Cochrane): She develops an approach informed by the work of Theodor Adorno.
           “It will argue that, in order to adequately address both the climate crisis and feminist concerns about buen vivir [living well or the good life] as a response to climate change, a different critique of Enlightenment modernity is necessary—one drawing on [Theodor] Adorno’s nonidentitarian philosophy of negative dialectics and on the negative dialectical understanding of Enlightenment modernity that he developed with early Frankfurt School colleague Max Horkheimer.
           “Especially troubling for feminists is the woman–nature relation as anthropomorphized in notions of Mother Earth and the Pachamama. Such notions serve to reinforce women’s assigned role as caregiver by essentializing it … and by accusing women who choose to practice family planning of violating tradition ….”
           [Regina Cochrane, “Climate Change, Buen Vivir, and the Dialectic of Enlightenment: Toward a Feminist Critical Philosophy of Climate Justice.” Hypatia. Volume 29, number 3, summer 2014. Pages 576-598.]
      795. green feminism (Patricia E. “Ellie” Perkins): She offers a feminist critique of the prices of environmental goods and services.
           “For environmental goods and services which have no markets, it is standard practice to estimate proxy prices using quite bizarre methods: house price differentials in different neighbourhoods are used as a proxy for the value of clean air, scenic views, and other environmental amenities; the amount of money some people spend to visit national parks becomes an estimate of the value of conserving nature and biodiversity; questionnaires are used to probe public support for hypothetical environmental protection measures; estimates of the value of housework for national economies may be calculated using preliminary census or time-use survey information and the minimum wage. From a feminist and ecological viewpoint, such ‘prices’ are very problematic as measures of the value of both marketed and unmarketed things.” [Ellie Perkins, “Markets or discourse?: A Green Feminist Alternative Value Process.” Women & Environments International Magazine. Number 54/55, spring 2002. Pages 15-18.]
      796. feminist therapy (Shoshana Magnet, Shaindl Diamond, Susan T. Marcus-Mendoza, Laura S. Brown, Tracy C. Bryan, Jennifer Radden, Deborah L. Finfgeld, Anne L. Israeli, Sarcy A. Santor, Joan C. Chrisler, Jean M. Lamont, Kathy M. Evans, Elizabeth A. Kincade, Aretha F. Marbley, Susan R. Seem, Susan Contratto, Jessica Rossier, Kazuko Takemura [Japanese, 竹村 和子, たけむら かずこ, or タケムラ カズコ, Takemura Kazuko as pronounced in this MP3 audio file], and many others): They apply feminist theory, including emancipatory praxis, to psychotherapy.
           “Feminist therapy situates individual pain against a larger context of systemic inequality. We are specifically talking about a feminist therapy that understands individual and collective discrimination as trauma that both results from and is intensified by interlocking systems of racism, sexism, heterosexism, ableism, and classism. That is, feminist therapists understand that individuals and collective injuries must be situated within specific familial, social, and historical contexts. We argue that feminist therapy can offer an excellent place for students to turn to deal with some of the grief, anger, and upset that may be caused by examining difficult issues in class or that may arise following a shift in student’s thinking and politicization that strains their current intimate relationships with partners, friends, or family.” [Shoshana Magnet and Shaindl Diamond, “Feminist Pedagogy Meets feminist Therapy: Teaching Feminist Therapy in Women’s Studies.” Feminist Teacher. Volume 21, number 1, fall 2010. Pages 21-35.]
           “Although feminist therapy is ideal for incarcerated women, there are many inherent difficulties in doing feminist therapy in correctional settings. One of the basic tenets of feminist therapy is examining and learning to resist harmful social structures. Prison is one of the most oppressive social structures. In prison, resistance is not only discouraged, it is often harshly punished. Women who are incarcerated must conform to prison rules and regulations, no matter how demeaning or irrational the rules may seem. To do otherwise can lead to loss of privileges, time in solitary confinement, and even longer prison stays due to denial of parole or loss of reductions in time for good behavior. Therefore, resistance must occur in passive, internal, or non-public forms. Feminist therapy sessions can be a safe place where all emotions and frustrations can be expressed without fear of reprisal. Although active resistance may be potentially detrimental to an incarcerated woman, therapy can still focus on recognizing and analyzing damaging influences in women’s lives and help them plan for the future.” [Susan T. Marcus-Mendoza, “Feminist Therapy Behind Bars.” Women’s Studies Quarterly. Volume 32, number 3/4, fall 2004. Pages 49-60.]
           “It has been barely two decades since a small number of women within the psychotherapy professions profoundly affected by the insights of the women’s movement began to use the term feminist therapy to describe their work. Feminist therapy is unique among theoretical orientations. It is one of few approaches to psychotherapy whose roots lie outside of the behavioral sciences. It is founded, instead, in the theories and philosophies of the U.S. women’s movement of the 1960s and 1970s. As a grass-roots phenomenon, feminist therapy developed through informal exchanges of style, technique, and experience among its practitioners. As with other aspects of the women’s movement, feminist therapy has eschewed identified leaders or authority figures. However, this almost organic process has yielded strikingly similar philosophies of treatment among the early feminist therapists that continue to guide feminist therapy theory and practice today.” [Laura S. Brown, “The Future of Feminist Therapy.” Psychotherapy. Volume 29, number 1, spring 1992. Pages 51-57.]
           “… assuming for the moment that feminist therapists do indeed engage with something that other therapists would identify as countertransference, this article will offer a discussion of the ways in which feminist practice defines its version of this mythical beast and how we see its use to be valuable. Because feminist practice has built into it certain kinds of assumptions, there also are fairly predictable places where countertransference, or as feminist practitioners prefer to call it, the symbolic relationship of the therapist to the client, can lead to difficulties and entanglements in treatment.” [Laura S. Brown, “Feelings in Context: Countertransference and the Real World in Feminist Therapy.” Psychotherapy in Practice. Volume 57, number 8, August 2001. Pages 1005-1012.]
           “Feminist therapy uses analysis of gender, power, and social location as a means of understanding the emotional distress and behavioral dysfunctions that trouble people who enter psychotherapy. Because of feminist therapy’s initial emphasis on working with women, and the fact that many of the first cohort of therapists who worked with and wrote about survivors of interpersonal violence identified as feminists, feminist therapy has often been applied with clients who present to us as troubled by their own selfinflicted violent behavior, or those who come because others are troubled by that behavior. In this article, we will discuss how feminist therapy conceptualizes self-inflicted violence and illustrate how a feminist therapist might work with a person presenting with this as a distressing behavior.” [Laura S. Brown and Tracy C. Bryan, “Feminist Therapy With People Who Self-Inflict Violence.” Journal of Clinical Psychology: In Session. Volume 63, number 11, November 2007. Pages 1121-1133.]
           “The aim of this essay is to clarify and refine one of the many points at which theory has contributed to practice: the embrace, within some forms of feminist therapy, of what is known as relational individualism. Honoring and validating the relational model of self play an important role in much feminist therapeutic endeavor. Yet this model rests, theoretically, on a tangle of psychological assumptions, moral and political values, and mental health norms that require, and have yet to receive, close analysis.…
           “The desirability of the relational model of self and its valorization has not been defended here. A preliminary to such a defense, though, is what this analysis has shown: that the relational self sought in feminist therapy represents a coherent object of attainment. As a desideratum of therapy, relationality is a goal and ideal informed by abnormal psychology as well as by ideology. It represents an end that is distinguishable from the more individualistic ideals of traditional therapeutic endeavor with which it has often been cast in contrast. Yet while distinctive, it permits and even requires the exercise and expression of autonomy.”
           [Jennifer Radden, “Relational Individualism and Feminist Therapy.” Hypatia. Volume 11, number 3, summer 1996. Pages 71-96.]
           “Feminist therapists who practice within a social constructionist framework … need to recognize the sociocultural oppressions that diagnostic labels impose. Because traditional diagnostic categories have largely been developed by White males, they insidiously encourage practitioners to analyze human behavior through a White patriarchal lens. Moreover, behaviors outside of this narrow viewfinder can easily be mislabeled as pathological …. For example, the energetic behavioral style of many African American women … might be classified as histrionic from a White malestream perspective. Alternatively, from a social constructionist viewpoint, this same conduct might be seen as an asset, which should be channeled to overcome racist oppression.” [Deborah L. Finfgeld, “New Directions for Feminist Therapy Based on Social Constructionism.” Archives of Psychiatric Nursing. Volume XV, number 3, June 2001. Pages 148-154.]
           “Feminist therapy is influenced by a feminist analysis of society, and provides a model of empowerment for women who are treated as an oppressed minority in society. Feminist therapy may involve interventions, such as social activism, that extend beyond individual therapy sessions, in order to affect broader societal changes. Feminist therapy engenders the notion that the ‘personal is political’; that personal experiences are embedded in a political context and reality. Feminist therapists recognize that women’s mental health can not be fully improved in individual therapy, but only through making effective structural changes to society. As a result, many therapists advocate for systemic changes which will ultimately lead to the betterment of women’s lives and society.” [Anne L. Israeli and Darcy A. Santor, “Reviewing effective components of feminist therapy.” Counselling Psychology Quarterly. Volume 13, number 3, September 2000. Pages 233-247.]
           “Can exercise contribute to the goals of feminist therapy? We believe that the answer is a resounding ‘yes.’ However, encouraging sedentary women to take up a sport or maintain an exercise routine will never be easy; the barriers to exercise are high for many women, and feminist therapists must be creative in supporting and assisting women in moving from contemplating exercise to actually doing it.… Remember that exercise helps not only mental health but physical health as well, a message that may be especially important for low income older and ethnic minority women.
           “Feminist therapy is a revolutionary act …. So … prescribe some exercise to develop your clients’ stamina and resilience. They’ll need it to win both the battle for equality and the revolution within ….”
           [Joan C. Chrisler and Jean M. Lamont, “Can Exercise Contribute to the Goals of Feminist Therapy?” Women and Therapy. Volume 25, number 2, June 2002. Pages 9-22.]
           “Feminist philosophers, therapists, and clients have had a profound effect on the fields of counseling and psychology, especially regarding gender bias and gender role stereotyping …. As a result of raising the consciousness of the profession, there have been significant changes in conceptualization, diagnosis, and treatment. The basic premise of feminist therapy--that the political is the personal …—remains. In feminist therapy, there is no lasting individual change without social change. Clients are enmeshed in their sociopolitical and cultural contexts, and true and lasting psychological change must address the issues within these contexts as well as individual issues. This theme is primary throughout our discussion of feminist counseling and therapy.” [Kathy M. Evans, Elizabeth A. Kincade, Aretha F. Marbley, and Susan R. Seem, “Feminism and Feminist Therapy: Lessons from the Past and Hopes for the Future.” Journal of Counseling & Development. Volume 83, number 3, summer 2005. Pages 269-277.]
           “Feminist therapy and feminist therapy theory emerged out of the ferment of the women’s movement in the 1960s and 1970s. Women in consciousness raising groups all over the country began to reveal previously unspoken and even unlabeled aspects of their lives. Affirmation, questioning, and self-revelation took place at a profoundly personal level. Women began to realize threads of similar experience with each other as women, as women in relationship with men, as women yearning for connections with other women, as daughters, as workers, and as lovers. As they discussed their experiences with therapists, or as therapists in these groups probed their discomfort with their training experiences, common themes emerged. Most problems were seen as internal to the individual. Most patients were blamed for their problems. Women’s anger and frustration had no place in therapy.” [Susan Contratto and Jessica Rossier, “Early Trends in Feminist Therapy and Practice.” Women & Therapy. Volume 28, number 3/4, 2005. Pages 7-26.]
           “… in feminist therapy the client’s recognition of her desire comes about through the language which the therapist is supposed to embody. This could lead to a reconceptualization of transference, because feminist therapy aims at empowering clients to break out of the norms of the stereotypical gender roles required by society, rather than at normalizing them into ‘acceptable’ social behavior. Moreover, the Other itself, through which the signifier emerges, actually occupies the locus of impossibility of signification, namely the site of a radical ‘lack.’ But this lack, in feminist terms, could be redefined as something beyond that which is implied by castration based upon sexual difference. In other words, the transference that occurs in feminist therapy can offer an opportunity in which to subvert the androcentricism implied in Lacan’s definition of transference, as well as in the present social and cultural system.” [Kazuko Takemura, “(Counter-)transference and the politics of feminist therapy: Toward naming a new ‘problematics that has no name.’” Feminism & Psychology. Volume 21, number 4, November 2011. Pages 529-535.]
      797. feminist phenomenology (Johanna Oksala as pronounced in this MP3 audio file): She applies Husserlian phenomenology to feminism.
           “Feminist phenomenology has an important role in reminding us that there is a whole region of experience that philosophers have failed to think.
           “The aim of this article is to question this perspective and to suggest that the challenges facing feminist phenomenology are more fundamental.… This article attempts to show that an analysis of these experiences does not simply point to the need to complement phenomenology with vivid descriptions of labour pains, for example, but suggests a need to rethink radically such fundamental phenomenological questions as the possibility of a purely eidetic phenomenology and the limits of egological sense-constitution.”
           [Johanna Oksala, “What is feminist phenomenology?: Thinking birth philosophically.” Radical Philosophy: Philosophical Journal of the Independent Left. Number 126, July/August 2004. Pages 16-22.]
      798. masculinism (Sandra Stanley Holton, Mélissa Blais as pronounced in this MP3 audio file, Francis Dupuis-Déri as pronounced in this MP3 audio file, Carrie Mott, Susan M. Roberts, Peggy Watson, and Ellen Dubois): They develop various critiques of this anti-feminist, reactionary, and—sometimes—male supremacist movement or current.
           “‘Masculinism’ in the writing of history refers generally to the gender-blindness that may characterise the work of historians (often male), within both popular history and history as an academic discipline. Such masculinism arises from various approaches: the presence of women may simply be overlooked in masculinist accounts of events or explorations of change and continuity; or such accounts may think it adequate to subsume the history of women under that of men; or, at the most extreme, they may deny altogether the possibility of women having a distinct history as a sex. The following discussion will first explore how gender blindness may operate even where women are included in an account of a historical process or of a social interaction between the sexes. It then argues that some of the most influential twentieth-century accounts of the women’s suffrage movement may also be characterised as masculinist.” [Sandra Stanley Holton, “Challenging Masculinism: personal history and microhistory in feminist studies of the women’s suffrage movement.” Women’s History Review. Volume 20, number 5, November 2011. Pages 829-841.]
           “As is true of feminism, antifeminism is a heterogeneous current, traversed by various ideologies, and present on several fronts. In ideological terms, antifeminism is generally posited on the existence of a higher order, be it the will of God, human nature, national destiny, or social stability. Since the 1980s a new form of antifeminism has emerged: the so-called ‘masculinist’ movement, or ‘masculinism.’ Masculinism asserts that since men are in crisis and suffering because of women in general and feminists in particular, the solution to their problems involves curbing the influence of feminism and revalorizing masculinity. The goal of this article is to describe and analyse the masculinist phenomenon. We will challenge the argument that masculinism is a social or cultural trend that, rather than dealing with real problems such as the transformation of the labour market, scapegoats women and feminists.” [Mélissa Blais and Francis Dupuis-Déri, “Masculinism and the Antifeminist Countermovement.” Social Movement Studies. Volume 11, number 1, January 2012. Pages 21-39.]
           “In general the treatment of urbex [urban exploration] in geography has tended to mirror some of the troubling characteristics of urban exploration itself. We wonder how it is that most analysts of urbex have felt it is sufficient simply to note in passing the deeply gendered and exclusionary nature of the practice, and avoid any sustained or meaningful critique or engagement with extensive relevant feminist literature pertinent to the topic. It seems to us that this might be because the majority of geographers interested in urbex seem, for the most part, to accept the highly individualized, masculinist approach adopted by many urbexers themselves. This is a troubling situation, and one not without irony.” [Carrie Mott and Susan M. Roberts, “Not Everyone Has (the) Balls: Urban Exploration and the Persistence of Masculinist Geography.” Antipode. Volume 46, number 1, January 2014. Pages 229-245.]
           “In the recent literature on gender relations in Eastern Europe, it is quite often said that democratization has ‘opened up a space’ within which women can now seek to identify their interests and organize. That is undoubtedly the case. At the same time, however, as offering a space to women, the transition to liberal capitalism offers men the opportunity of putting a greatly increased social distance between themselves and women. It is the rise in masculinism which is the primary characteristic of gender relations in Eastern Europe today. If we grasp this, I argue, we also grasp the opportunity to more fully apprehend the way in which masculinism forms the very bedrock of Western liberal democracy.” [Peggy Watson, “The Rise of Masculinism in Eastern Europe.” New Left Review. Series I, number 198, March–April 1993. Pages 71-82.]
           “… early enfranchisement hardly left a vibrant feminist legacy in Australia, which remained a profoundly masculinist society; in particular, as both the books here under consideration note, women’s active political participation in the years after enfranchisement has been strikingly low. This contradiction—an early but weak national feminism—forms the framework for both of these extremely rich studies of the workings of gender inequality in Australian history.” [Ellen Dubois, “Antipodean Feminism.” New Left Review. Series I, number 206, July–August 1994. Pages 127-131.]
           “Out of curiosity and frustration I asked the computer how many listings there were under the heading Feminism. The computer had to think about that for awhile, then answered that since 1972 to the present time there were 1,493 listings under feminism. Zero under masculism.
           “I think that’s why I’m writing this article. The day the Library has as many listings under masculism as under feminism is the day that I can stop writing about men’s issues.
           “It’s not that men aren’t discriminated against. Oh, we ARE discriminated against, and that’s bad. But what makes it worse is that no one is willing to see it. The public won’t acknowledge it, the media won’t usually publish anything about it, we can’t even get one listing in the computer catalog of the New York City Public Library, for crying out loud.
           “We are invisible.”
           [Mel Feit, “What Masculist Movement? A Personal Call to Arms.” Transitions: The Journal of Men’s Perspectives. Volume 9, number 6, December 1989. Pagination unknown.]
      799. critique of heteronormativity (Peggy Reeves Sanday, Wayne Martino, Goli M. Rezai-Rashti [Persian/Fārsī, گُلِی م. رِضَایِی رَشْتِی, Gulī M. Riḍāyiy Raštī], Terrell Carver, and Colin Danby): They develop various critiques of heterosexuality and heterosexuals as the social norm.
           “As one of the founding feminist anthropologists I never objected to men studying women or women studying men. Indeed, my resistance to the concept of male dominance in the early l970s … was based on the conviction that because men did not study women they were blind to local realities, which made it easy to project ethnocentric ideas about power and dominance.…
           “What I find missing in these articles is a concern with the metacultural matrix of the local sex-gender system. To think in terms mostly of male and female status and role—men’s view/women’s view—mires the ethnographer in the immediacies and expectations determined by age and stands in the way of a more fluid perspective such as suggested by standpoint theory, existentialism, semiotics, discourse analysis, gender performativity theory, and the critique of heteronormativity.”
           [Peggy Reeves Sanday, “Packing and Unpacking Gender.” Men and Masculinities. Volume 11, mumber 2, December 2008. Pages 206-210.]
           “This paper draws on feminist, postcolonial and queer analytic frameworks to address the pedagogical significance of veiling and the Muslim subject in the aftermath of September 11. It addresses questions related to the knowledge and analytic frameworks needed to engage pedagogically with a politics of difference vis-à-vis the gendered body and practices of veiling in the context of teacher and public school education. The paper discusses implications for developing an approach to anti-racist education that is capable of addressing the limits of Orientalist representations of veiled women, while still entertaining a critique of heteronormativity and sexism as they apply across the Orientalist divide. The pedagogical implications of such tensions are explored in light of drawing on bodies of knowledge that attend to the historical specificity of gender and race relations, as well as engaging with analytic frameworks that inform a knowledge of the body as a cultural signifier. We conclude that a basis for articulating an anti-racist politics must be capable of engaging with a more sophisticated understanding of gender relations, sexuality, agency, and resistance within the context of interrogating narratives about the practices of veiling and unveiling.…
           “The historical narratives documented in this paper point to the significance of mobilizing discourses capable of achieving such a pedagogical imperative that is governed by the need to engage with the ‘gender underpinnings of Orientalism’ understood in terms of the capacity of Western representational practices to constitute the veiled Muslim subject as a sign under which “we” increasingly come to recognize ourselves not only as gendered and heteronormative subjects but also as located in the free West, where women are not imprisoned’ ….”
           [Wayne Martino and Goli M. Rezai-Rashti, “The politics of veiling, gender and the Muslim subject: on the limits and possibilities of anti-racist education in the aftermath of September 11.” Discourse: Studies in the Cultural Politics of Education. Volume 29, number 3, September 2008. Pages 417-431.]
           “We contend that it would be a mistake to take the critique of heteronormativity as merely the politics of tiny minorities, having little effect on the vast majority. And that is why, as we have maintained throughout, it would be seriously misleading to read [Judith] Butler’s politics as one of mere inclusion or simple multicultural recognition. Our effort here has been to elaborate the politics of heteronormativity through Butler’s troubling of kinship.” [Terrell Carver, “Kinship Trouble: Antigone’s Claim and the Politics of Heteronormativity.” Politics & Gender. Volume 3, number 4, December 2007. Pages 427-449.]
           “… the splits between straight and gay, and married and unmarried, have been in large measure a result of state action and state classification. Social scientists who want to speak the language of policy are drawn into using the state’s terms and drawn into the state’s relentless desire to distinguish good citizens from bad ones. As a result, work that is presented as neutral or disinterested can be implicated in state repression. Please notice that to point out these connections is not to doubt the enterprise of social science as such or to argue that logic, evidence, or careful argument are mere subterfuges for power. Quite the opposite. The critique of heteronormative social science is precisely that it sins against reason and evidence by adopting unwarranted assumptions and logical shortcuts.” [Colin Danby, “Political economy and the closet: heteronormativity in feminist economics.” Feminist Economics. Volume 13, number 2, April 2007. Pages 29-53.]
      800. logic of moral reasoning (Susan F. Parsons): She considers the morality of feminism.
           “Feminist writings, by contributing to the present criticisms of moral epistemology, have left in their wake a great number of issues which now call for some imaginative and sensiti ve handling if we are to develop in our understanding of the moral enterprise. We need to consider an account which is not only more satisfactory in its understanding of feminist concerns, but also more adequate as a rendering of the logic of moral reasoning, for these two are inextricably bound up with one another.” [Susan F. Parsons, “Feminism and the Logic of Morality: A Consideration of Alternatives.” Radical Philosophy: Philosophical Journal of the Independent Left. Number 47, autumn 1987. Pages 2-12.]
      801. second-wave feminism (Nancy Fraser): She explains this turn of feminism as “a transformative political project.”
           “All told, second-wave feminism espoused a transformative political project, premised on an expanded understanding of injustice and a systemic critique of capitalist society. The movement’s most advanced currents saw their struggles as multi-dimensional, aimed simultaneously against economic exploitation, status hierarchy and political subjection. To them, moreover, feminism appeared as part of a broader emancipatory project, in which struggles against gender injustices were necessarily linked to struggles against racism, imperialism, homophobia and class domination, all of which required transformation of the deep structures of capitalist society.” [Nancy Fraser, “Feminism, Capitalism and the Cunning of History.” New Left Review. Series II, number 56, March–April 2009. Pages 97-117.]
      802. hierarchical order and discipline (Daniel Fidel Ferrer): He considers the intersection of reason and freedom.
           “Hierarchical order and discipline is the way of ranking people (maybe things too) and keepig soil order, Namely to keep you in ‘your place’; means your social status or lack thereof status. The more this is needed as we build ‘caste’ system anywhere. High school is where reason and freedom meet the societies need for order and more imporly for all of is is the ‘control’ of he idividual. Increase all of the opportunities for the control of the individual—power in society against freedom. The sheep need to stay the sheep and do sheep things; and not step out of the way of the sheep. Control of the individual is the control over people as ‘sheep’ analogy.” [Daniel Fidel Ferrer. Confrontations: Philosophical reflections and aphorisms. Privately published. 2011. Creative Commons. Page 313.]
      803. model of self-identity (Allison Weir): She develops an approach focused on both relational feminism and postmodern/poststructuralist feminism.
           “In this paper I will work toward a model of self-identity which can address some of the concerns of both relational feminism, which argues that the ideal of self-identity too often conceals a defense against connection with others, and postmodern and poststructuralist feminism, which argues that the concept of self-identity can be understood only in terms of the system of meaning which produces it: a system predicated on a logic of exclusion of nonidentity or difference. My attempt to clarify a normative ideal of self-identity comes out of a conviction that we need to uphold a commitment to women’s struggles for identity and autonomy in the context of feminist critiques of defensive atomistic individualism and critiques of the concept of the disembedded subject as the free and unfettered author of his destiny.” [Allison Weir, “Toward a Model of Self-Identity: Habermas and Kristeva.” Feminists Read Habermas: Gendering the Subject of Discourse. London and New York: Routledge. 1995. Pages 264-262.]
      804. performativity theory (Reuben Rose-Redwood and Michael R. Glass): They consider “performative articulations of power” in geography.
           “From revolutionary declarations of independence and the delimitation of territory to the embodied politics of everyday life, the performative articulations of power that constitute the ‘political’ as a space of social action only ‘take effect’ as a result of considerable material-discursive effort. The force of such performative acts is theref ore always provisional yet may nevertheless acquire the aura of permanence and stability by meaus of what Judith Butler calls the ‘ritualized repetition of norms’ …. If socio-political norms must be continuously reiterated in order to be sustained, these regulatory practices can be seen as performative to the extent that they succeed at bringing into being the very effect that they proclaim. This applies just as much to assertions of territorial sovereignty, the surveying of private property, or the naming of a city’s streets as it does to the embodiment of gendered subjectivities or the calculative practices that enact ‘the economy.’ It is little wonder, then, that theories of performativity have influenced scholars in such a wide range of fields, from literary theory, gender studies, and linguistics to international relations, economic sociology, and human geography. Performativity theory has taken on a life of its own in each of these disciplinary contexts, dancing to several different tunes even within a single field of study, and it is through this reiterative and citational process that the performative itself has come into being as a contested theoretical terrain.” [Reuben Rose-Redwood and Michael R. Glass, “Introduction: Geographies of Performativity.” Performativity, Politics, and the Production of Social Space. Michael R. Glass and Reuben Rose-Redwood, editors. London and New York: Routledge imprint of Taylor & Francis Group, an Informa PLC business. 2014. Pages 1-34.]
           “… I personally take a … performative stance on the question of the ‘real’ …. That doesn’t mean critical geography is ‘anti-science.’ What it means is that critical geographers don’t view science as a value-neutral enterprise that is equivalent to the biological determinism that you are peddling. I know enough about the history of science over the past century—eugenics, intelligence testing, etc.—to recognize the ideology of scientific racism and sexism when I see it.… [Reuben Rose-Redwood in Reuben Rose-Redwood and Jonathan M. Smith, “Strange encounters: a dialogue on cultural geography across the political divide.” Journal of Cultural Geography. Volume 33, number 3, 2016. Pages 356-378.]
      805. socialism from below (Hal Draper, Amrit Wilson, Orlando Chirino as pronounced in this MP3 audio file, David McNally, Wayne Price, Dan Swain, Lucien van der Walt, Michael Schmidt, and others): This perspective—which is accepted by various Marxist (including some Marxist–Trotskyist, Marxist–Luxemburgist, and Marxist–Leninist) and anarchist schools of thought or tendencies—is distinguished from the more classically Soviet, Maoist, and Cuban Marxist–Leninist “socialism from above.” Center for Economic Research and Social Change (including the International Socialist Review), New Politics, the Alliance for Workers’ Liberty, ZCommunications, and others support this position. Arguably, Karl Marx himself pioneered the socialism from below.
           “… the following pages propose to investigate the meaning of socialism historically, in a new way. There have always been different ‘kinds of socialism,’ and they have customarily been divided into reformist or revolutionary, peaceful or violent, democratic or authoritarian. etc. These divisions exist, but the underlying division is something else. Throughout the history of socialist movements and ideas, the fundamental divide is between Socialism-From-Above and Socialism-From-Below.
           “What unites the many different forms of Socialism-from-Above is the conception that socialism (or a reasonable facsimile thereof) must be handed down to the grateful masses in one form or another, by a ruling elite which is not subject to their control in fact. The heart of Socialism-from-Below is its view that socialism can be realized only through the self-emancipation of activized masses in motion, reaching out for freedom with their own hands, mobilized ‘from below’ in a struggle to take charge of their own destiny, as actors (not merely subjects) on the stage of history. ‘The emancipation of the working classes must be conquered by the working classes themselves’: this is the first sentence in the Rules written for the First International by [Karl] Marx, and this is the First Principle of his life-work.”
           [Hal Draper. The Two Souls Of Socialism. Revised edition. Berkeley, California: Independent Socialist Committee—A Center for Socialist Education. 1966. Pages 3-4.]
           “Socialist and democratic developed from below through a gradual and often slow process of education and discussion. In this way, land was redistributed to women and people of previously oppressed groups who never before had a right to this means of survival. Oppressive feudal marriage laws were changed to give women more power.” [Amrit Wilson, “Socialism from below.” New Statesman & Society. Volume 4, number 154, June 1991. Page 10.]
           “… [An] important issue is the role of social classes in this revolution. You don’t have to refer to [Karl] Marx, [Friedrich] Engels, [Vladimir] Lenin, or [Leon] Trotsky to know that the only way to overturn capitalism, a system in which a minority imposes its will on the majority, is that the working class and the people, we who are the majority and the producers, take the lead in expropriating the enterprises and place them under our control. In that sense, what we mean by socialism is very simply stated.” [Orlando Chirino, “Venezuela’s PSUV and Socialism from Below: Interview with Orlando Chirino.” New Politics. Volume 11, number 4, winter 2008. Pages 17-22.]
           “The dominant trend in socialist thought during this period, then, was a new variant of socialism from above. The struggle of working class people to create new institutions of popular democratic control was seen as having little or nothing to do with the creation of a socialist society. Instead, elected socialist officials would simply take over the existing bureaucratic structures of society and run them more humanely. Rather than a qualitatively different society, socialism was depicted as a gently improved form of the existing social order. Yet, despite the wide influence of this doctrine, some Marxists remained committed to the idea of socialism from below. The most important of these was the Polish revolutionary Rosa Luxemburg.…
           “… [The] upsurge in militant working class activity powerfully influenced the thinking of some radical writers and organisers. A few of them began to think of the working class as the group that could change society. Indeed, some theorists began to talk in terms of the working class liberating itself through its collective action. Notable in this regard was the French revolutionary Flora Tristan, who linked together ideas of working class self-emancipation and women’s liberation with the proposal for a world-wide organisation of workers. But it was in the writings and the organising of a German socialist, Karl Marx, that the working class took centre stage in socialist thought. Inspired by the emergence of this class, [Karl] Marx developed a wholly new socialist outlook based upon the principle of socialism from below.”
           [David McNally. Socialism from Below. Chicago, Illinois: International Socialist Organization. 1986. Ebook edition.]
           “Today such state-Communism has been relatively discredited with the fall of the Soviet Union and the turn of the Chinese state to open capitalism. As a consequence, the concept of socialism-from-below has become widely attractive to many radicals. However, the concept of socialism-from-below, at least as raised by [Hal] Draper and by [David] McNally (at least until his most recent book), has been used ambiguously. Contrary to the views of the anarchists, these writers claim that Marxism is most consistent with revolutionary socialism-from-below, and that anarchism is an example of authoritarian socialism. I will argue instead that the divide between authoritarian and libertarian-democratic tendencies runs through (inside) Marxism as well as through anarchism. However, I believe that, while there is value in Marxism, overall, anarchism is most consistent with the development of a liberating socialism-from-below.” [Wayne Price, “Socialism from Above or Below.” The Utopian. Volume 3, 2002. Pages 75-85.]
           “If socialism is just about taking control of the existing state, it is understandable that many are suspicious of it. But socialism from below implies a different approach. It argues that the institutions of the state are structured in a way that denies popular control. Alongside the formally ‘democratic’ pieces of the state – where those exist – are a series of hierarchically organised bodies, the police, army, judiciary, civil service etc., that limit the space for democracy. These are a block on the possibility of extending democratic control in society. These institutions must be removed and replaced.…
           “If socialism from below is to mean anything today, it is as a guiding thread that runs through our political practice, one that constantly reminds us to ask whether and how what we do empowers people to become agents of their own emancipation. To achieve this truly would be ‘doing politics differently’ – differently from the capitalist parties, broken social democracy, and, sadly, so many revolutionary groups that have gone before. The devil, as ever, is in the detail; but no one said it was going to be easy.”
           [Dan Swain, “Socialism from Below.” New Politics. July 17th, 2015. Online publication. No pagination.]
           “… [One] arena where socialism from below matters is the question of democracy. There has historically been, and to a certain extent there still is, a way of talking about socialism as being concerned first and foremost with material comfort and a more equal distribution of wealth and resources. To the extent that democracy fits into this it is often as an optional extra, a ‘good thing,’ but not strictly part of the picture. Socialism from below rejects this, and re-asserts democracy as an integral part of socialism. Socialism from below follows from a commitment to democracy in socialism in the following way: If your goal is just material comfort, or a better distribution of resources, you don’t need mass participation. You don’t need to involve, engage and mobilize a movement. Or rather, you do, but only temporarily, only in order to back up demands and policies, put pressure on those in power. If, on the other hand, your goal is a society in which the overwhelming majority are capable of participating in the running of society, you have to be concerned with empowering them to do so, and this empowerment requires a level of democracy.” [Dan Swain, “Socialism still comes from below.” Socialist Worker. July 16th, 2015. Online publication. No pagination.]
           “The common idea – ‘socialism from below’ – is … widely shared.
           “The Socialist Workers Party, in spite of its own obviously Stalinist internal regime, also subscribes to that idea, and its Greek co-thinkers use the tag as the title of their bimonthly journal.…
           “I have said that the SWP [Socialist Workers Party] subscribes to ‘socialism from below’ in spite of its own obviously Stalinist internal regime, but in fact it is arguable that such a regime follows from the conception of ‘socialism from below’ as interpreted by the SWP, by its co-thinkers and its ex-members.”
           [Mike Macnair, “Socialism from below: a delusion.” Weekly Worker. Issue 1071, August 2015. Online publication. No pagination.]
           “We [the New Left] also challenged the prevailing view that the so-called affluent society would of itself erode the appeal of socialist propaganda—that socialism could arise only out of immiseration and degradation. Our emphasis on people taking action for themselves, ‘building socialism from below’ and ‘in the here and now,’ not waiting for some abstract Revolution to transform everything in the twinkling of an eye, proved, in the light of the re-emergence of these themes after 1968, strikingly prefigurative.” [Stuart Hall, “Life and Times of the First New Left.” New Left Review. Series II, number 61, January–February 2010. Pages 177-196.]
           “… I will analyze the ways in which the themes in my conception of socialism-from-below appear (or are ignored) in analyses of the Occupy movement. By examining its key discussions, I intend to situate Occupy within the Infrastructure of Dissent and [Rosa] Luxemburg’s theories on social transformation through mass mobilization. By situating Occupy within these theories, I will offer a refreshed look at the opportunities and obstacles facing leftist struggle in our time, in order to gain a better grasp upon how mass movements might bring us closer to realizing a society of socialism-from-below.” [Holly Campbell. Building Socialism From Below: Luxemburg, Sears, And The Case Of Occupy Wall Street. Major research paper for Master’s in Social Justice and Community Engagement. Wilfrid Laurier University. Brantford, Ontario. 2014. Page 34.]
           “The Challenge: Defining a Socialism from Below …
           “The crippling contradiction at the heart of Bolshevism lies between its central defining images of modernity and its socialist politics and culture. The former entail a theory of productive forces and of the economic superiority of capitalist methods; the latter calls for increasingly conscious, collective, and egalitarian self-assertion from below. The contradiction is an antagonistic one: to choose either horn of the dilemma is to undercut the basis of the other. Bolshevism certainly broke the automatic link between level of productive forces and socialist revolution.”
           [Philip Corrigan, Harvie Ramsay, and Derek Sayer, “Bolshevism and the USSR.” New Left Review. Series I, number 125, January–February 1981. Pages 45-60.]
           “For anarchists, individual freedom is the highest good, and individuality is valuable in itself, but such freedom can only be achieved within and through a new type of society. Contending that a class system prevents the full development of individuality, anarchists advocate class struggle from below to create a better world. In this ideal new order, individual freedom will be harmonised with communal obligations through cooperation, democratic decision-making, and social and economic equality. Anarchism rejects the state as a centralised structure of domination and an instrument of class rule, not simply because it constrains the individual or because anarchists dislike regulations. On the contrary, anarchists believe rights arise from the fulfilment of obligations to society and that there is a place for a certain amount of legitimate coercive power, if derived from collective and democratic decision-making.” [Lucien van der Walt and Michael Schmidt, “Socialism from Below: Defining Anarchism,” in Lucien van der Walt and Michael Schmidt. Black Flame: The Revolutionary Class Politics of Anarchism and Syndicalism. Oakland, California: AK Press. 2009. Pages 33-82.]
      806. Radical Faeries (John A. Stover III, Peter Hennen, Douglas Sadownick, Don Kilhefner, and many others): They describe a Marxist, anarchist, feminist, pagan, Native American, and mythopoeic culture in the LGBTQ (Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgendered, and Queer) community. Radfae.org is a Radical Faerie website.
           “The Radical Faeries are an international movement of rural collectives, casual and formal urban communities, and focused spiritual retreats (more commonly known as gatherings) in the United States, Canada, Europe, Australia, and Thailand. By 2005, the movement’s original focus on gay male spirituality was primarily explored, if at all, in the context of faggot-only contexts both new (Thailand) and old (the West Coast of the U.S.). Faggot-only events excluding women now compete with the more predominate mixed-gendered environments where Faerie women are welcomed. The regularly debated division between faggotonly and mixed-gendered spaces has created a split among the Faeries, all of whom are constructing multilayered and contrasting identities.” [John A. Stover III, “When Pan Met Wendy: Gendered Membership Debates Among the Radical Faeries.” Nova Religio: The Journal of Alternative and Emergent Religions. Volume 11, issue 4, May 2008. Pages 31-55.]
           “Part progressive social movement, part countermovement, part spiritual revival, part green political experiment, the Radical Faeries are a tribe of gentle gender warriors, queer folk, self-described ‘country faggots.’ Theirs is an eclectic community composed primarily (but not exclusively) of men with same-sex interests who explicitly reject traditional notions of masculinity. This is signaled in part by an active embrace and satire of the historically sedimented associations between same-sex orientation and effeminacy, which is most apparent in theway the community deploys drag. Radical Faerie culture is forged from an astonishingly diverse cultural tool box that includes Marxism, feminism, paganism, Native American and New Age spirituality, anarchism, the mythopoetic men’s movement, radical individualism, the therapeutic culture of self-fulfillment and self-actualization, earth-based movements in support of sustainable communities, spiritual solemnity coupled with a camp sensibility, gay liberation, and drag. Like the gay leather community, Radical Faeries exist at the margins of the margins; they are often stigmatized by other members of the queer community. For all these reasons, Radical Faerie culture provides a fascinating site for the study of gender resistance and compliance.” [Peter Hennen, “Fae Spirits and Gender Trouble: Resistance and Compliance Among the Radical Faeries.” Journal of Contemporary Ethnography. Volume 33, number 5, October 2004. Pages 499-533.]
           “When future generations look back on gay liberation’s role in the greater creation of human consciousness, and what ideas helped shepherd civilization from its most primitive tendencies to more noble evolutionary possibilities, they will, in my opinion, have to spend substantial time studying the Radical Faerie movement, which was launched in 1979.…
           “The Radical Faerie movement is historically important because it was the first large-scale effort to organize gay-identified men on an indigenously homosexual spiritual basis, unlike gay synagogues, churches, and so on, which rely on heterosexist mythologies and dogmas.”
           [Douglas Sadownick, “The ‘Secret’ Story of the Radical Faeries.” The Gay & Lesbian Review Worldwide. Volume 18, number 1, January–February 2011. Pages 29-31.]
           “Last year marked the thirtieth anniversary of the founding of the Radical Faeries. Since 1979, the Radical Faeries have developed into a vital international gay spirituality and consciousness movement. Along with the AIDS Quilt, the Radical Faeries is arguably the most important ongoing grassroots subculture in the GLBT [Gay Lesbian Bisexual Transgendered] world at large.…
           “Dogma is shunned by the Faeries, while the sharing of personal explorations and experiences is valued. During the past thirty years, however, there are certain patterns that I have observed. First, the Radical Faeries are gay-centered. By ‘gay-centered’—academics call it ‘gay essentialism’ as opposed to [Michel] Foucault’s ‘social constructionism’—I mean our identity begins with ‘us’ not ‘them.’ At the same time, it is larger than ‘us’ and ‘them’ polarities—more like yin and yang wholeness.”
           [Don Kilhefner, “The Radical Faeries at Thirty (+one).” The Gay & Lesbian Review Worldwide. Volume 17, number 5, September–October 2010. Pages 17-21.]
           “I just want to write to you to say how much I loved Don Kilhefner’s piece on the founding of the Radical Faeries [in the Sept.–Oct. 2010 issue]. I have never considered myself, formally, a Radical Faerie, but I found myself almost in tears at the end of it, especially when the author talked about the feelings that he, Harry Hay, and John Burnside had driving back from that first gathering—that ‘something of historical and spiritual significance for gay people had just transpired, and our silence spoke of how humbled we were by the experience.’ In our irony-saturated age of trivializing feelings and worshipping banality, it would be wonderful to get back to that sense of closeness, beauty, tenderness, and openness.” [Perry Brass, “Radical Faeries: Kudos and a Correction.” Letter to the editor. The Gay & Lesbian Review Worldwide. Volume 18, number 1, January–February 2011. Page 6.]
      807. anti-racist queer feminist historical materialism (David Camfield): The article brings together Marxist thought with critical race feminism.
           “This article proposes that bringing together Karl Marx’s key intellectual contributions and the best of contemporary anti-racist (or critical race) queer feminism is a promising direction for critical social theory. The aim of this move is a sublation that simultaneously preserves and changes these elements in order to produce an anti-racist queer feminist historical materialism (I will also refer to this as reconstructed historical materialism). The essential reason for bringing together these two bodies of thought in this manner is that each has generated vitally important insights while also being restricted in its explanatory power because of limitations that can be remedied with complementary knowledge offered by the other. The proposed theory would rethink Marx’s path-breaking materialist conception of history and powerful theory of the capitalist mode of production through the more expansive conceptions of social reality offered by anti-racist queer feminism while simultaneously reworking these latter contributions through Marx’s critical materialism and particular attention to historical specificity and social form.” [David Camfield, “Theoretical foundations of an anti-racist queer feminist historical materialism.” Critical Sociology. Volume 42, number 2, March 2016. Pages 289-306.]
      808. transfeminism (Antonella Corsani as pronounced in this MP3 audio file and others): This version of feminism focuses upon transgendered women.
           “This essay is situated at the intersection of two trajectories of critical thought: feminism and post-workerism. In the displacements brought about by feminism, it seeks to grasp the need to rethink the categories of the critique of political economy. The feminism to which I am referring here is essentially that which reconfigured itself following its confrontation with the homosexual and post-colonial movements—a feminism that I will call transfeminism …
           “… Therefore, the task with which feminism-—but we should speak instead of transfeminism—ever since Viginia Woolf’s day has been charged in its struggles, namely to kill ‘the angel in the house,’ returns as a myth.”
           [Antonella Corsani, “Beyond the Myth of Woman: The Becoming-Transfeminist of (Post-)Marxism.” SubStance. Timothy S. Murphy, translator. Volume 36, number 1, 2007. Pages 106-138.]
           “For many, the word entertainer means a celebrity—the actors, musicians, even athletes who we exalt to icon status. But to many dykes, authors, especially queer ones, are the greatest entertainers of all, for their ability to inspire, move and outrage us with their words.…
           “A transsexual lesbian feminist, Serano is a darling of San Francisco’s queer lit scene (her readings are like mini-Butchies concerts). Helen Boyd, who has chronicled her husband’s transition to her wife and championed the concerns of trans partners (especially straight-to-gay spouses), is a well-known feminist among the country’s alt-leaning transsexual and cross-dresser scene.”
           [Diane Anderson-Minshall, “Transfeminism has a new face: queer authors Julia Serano Helen Boyd are changing the way we think about gender.” Curve. Volume 17, number 7, September 2007. Pages 64+.]
      809. material feminism (Jennifer Wicke, Stacy Alaimo, Susan Hekman, Teresa L. Ebert, Elliot R. Wolfson, and others): This version of feminism focuses on the oppression of the physical bodies of women living in the natural world.
           “The purpose of this anthology is to bring the material, specifically the materiality of the human body and the natural world, into the forefront of feminist theory and practice. This is no small matter indeed, and we expect this collection to spark intense debate. Materiality, particularly that of bodies and natures, has long been an extraordinarily volatile site for feminist theory—so volatile, in fact, that the guiding rule of procedure for most contemporary feminisms requires that one distance oneself as much as possible from the tainted realm of materiality by taking refuge within culture, discourse, and language.” [Stacy Alaimo and Susan Hekman (editorial introduction). Material Feminisms. Stacy Alaimo and Susan Hekman, editors. Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press. 2008. Kindle edition.]
           “The present text is grounded in the conviction that canonical feminist understandings of gender and sexuality institutionalized by ‘post’ theories (as in poststructuralism, postcolonialism, postmodernism, postmarxism) are – after one allows for all their local differences and family quarrels … – strategies for bypassing questions of labor (as in the labor theory of value) and capital (the social relation grounded in turning the labor power of the other into profit) and instead dwell on matters of cultural differences (as in lifestyles). Reclaiming a materialist knowledge, I contest the cultural theory grounding canonical feminism. Specifically, I argue that language – ‘discourse’ in its social circulations – ‘is practical consciousness’ ([Karl] Marx and [Friedrich] Engels, German Ideology) and that culture, far from being autonomous, is always and ultimately a social articulation of the material relations of production.” [Teresa L. Ebert, “Rematerializing Feminism.” Science & Society. Volume 69, number 1, January 2005. Pages 33-55.]
           “My assumption is that sex/gender – women and men as socio-sexual beings – comprises a particular material base which generates and shapes history and society.
           “Certain aspects of the total process of life and society have to do with the fact that we are sexual beings, driven by desire for and need of one another. These needs and desires enable us to empower each other as human beings, and to create others, as individuals and species. These socio-sexual features must be comprehended in and for themselves; they comprise particular parts of the weaving together of society as a processual whole. Together with other human necessities, such as the need for food, shelter and beauty, sexuality creates or constitutes social life.…
           “… All feminist researchers who are concerned with historical materialism make some use or other of its hypothesis of what constitutes the foundations of history and society.”
           [Anna G. Jónasdóttir, “Sex/Gender, Power and Politics: Towards a Theory of the Foundations of Male Authority.” Acta Sociologica. Volume 31, number 2, 1988. Pages 157-174.]
           “Speculative realism first went viral on the Internet a couple of years ago and is now making itself felt in academic articles and books. I came to speculative realism via my immersion in new material feminism and after many years of engaging with feminist theory and politics. Although feminism continually tuned me into the daily politics of sexism and the need to combat these on an everyday basis through our intellectual practices with students as well as our individual and collective actions on the bus, in our homes, workspaces, and in the streets, new material feminism had enlivened my senses, bringing to the fore engagement with the world as body–mind entanglement.” [Carol A. Taylor, “Close Encounters of a Critical Kind: A Diffractive Musing In/Between New Material Feminism and Object-Oriented Ontology.” Cultural Studies ↔ Critical Methodologies. Volume 16, number 2, April 2016. Pages 201-212.]
           “Material feminism thus brings ontology (rather than epistemology) centre-stage in an attempt to register the inextricable entanglements of bodies in time and space, with histories, the socio-political and the material …. It argues for a redefinition of how we come to understand embodied relationships between the natural and social – of how biological materiality can be taken into account in the intertwining gendered and sexed experiences of pregnancy, parenting and motherhood without recourse to the polarizations of essentialism/constructionism.” [Megan Warin, “Material Feminism, Obesity Science and the Limits of Discursive Critique.” Body & Society. Volume 2, number 4, December 2015. Pages 48-76.]
      810. postmodern spirituality (Dan Lee): He distinguishes this approach from deconstructive postmodernism.
           “… unlike deconstructive postmodernism, spiritual or constructive postmodernism does not reject the idea of meaningful worldviews. Postmodern spirituality is, above all, driven by the reactionary worldview that the science, materialism and individualism of Western Enlightenment cannot address the deepest human yearnings 𔃒. It seeks instead to restore mystery and connectedness to spiritual life and practice and has brought with it a robust, renewed interest in the religious mystics of the past … with minimal concern for the tradition in which they might have been situated. What the age of science sought to demystify, postmodern spirituality seeks to re-mystify. Postmodern spirituality should not be confused with New Age, for its interest in hearing these individual voices is not so that they may be syncretized. It is not seeking to form them collectively into a new religion which distorts or glosses over the distinctives of each in an attempt to unify them as if they were a single voice. On the contrary, postmodern spirituality celebrates the uniqueness of each voice …—and does not pretend that their truth claims are similar or compatible.“ [Dan Lee, “The Buddha and the numen: postmodern spirituality and the problem of transcendence in Buddhism.” International Journal of Dharma Studies. Volume 4, number 14, 2016. Open access. Pages 1-16.]
      811. cluster model (Alison Stone): Beginning with a critique of French materialist feminism, she proposes another model for typing sex.
           “… were we to eliminate the two-gender system (as I have suggested we can, in principle), the cluster model would cease to carry these invidious normative implications.
           “In any case, the cluster model need not be interpreted as implying that some individuals are more female or more male than others. Instead, the model can be interpreted as stating that anyone who has enough properties from the relevant cluster crosses a threshold into belonging to that sex, where all those who cross this threshold are equally as female or male as one another (irrespective of whether they have, say, all of the properties of their sex, most of these properties, or just some of them).”
           [Alison Stone, “The incomplete materialism of French materialist feminism.” Radical Philosophy: Philosophical Journal of the Independent Left. Number 145, September/October 2007. Pages 20-27.]
      812. secular Womynism (Patricia-Anne Johnson): She develops a secular African American feminist (womynist) theology. The spelling “womyn,” when it is used, intentionally takes the man/men out of woman/women.
           “Secular Womynism seeks to address these pivotal question(s) and to deconstruct and unsettle the boundaries and dominant discourse put in place by traditional Womanism. Shall we dare to speak the unspoken? How does the African-American female subject (who deems herself Womanist) construct an evolutionary phenomenology of morals outside of the organized institutional church? What is the relationship between the subject and ‘truth’ in Womynist epistemological terms? How do we move from an archeology (traditional Womanism) to a genealogy (Feminist/Womynism) of Womynist thought? How does such movement become a significant register, a decisive moment on an historical continuum of Black female subjectivity, feminist structuralism and Womynist theory?” [Patricia-Anne Johnson, a.k.a. “Medusa,” “Secular Womynism: A View From The Left.” Feminist Theology. Volume 15, number 3, 2007. Pages 368-383.]
      813. Black feminism (Deborah K. King and many others): This type of feminism emerged as a response to the absence of focus on issues of racism in white-dominated feminism.
           “Black women have long recognized the special circumstances of our lives in the United States: the commonalities that we share with all women, as well as the bonds that connect us to the men of our race. We have also realized that the interactive oppressions that circumscribe our lives provide a distinctive context for black womanhood. For us, the notion of double jeopardy is not a new one.…
           “The dual and systematic discriminations of racism and sexism remain pervasive, and, for many, class inequality compounds those oppressions. Yet, for as long as black women have known our numerous discriminations, we have also resisted those oppressions. Our day-to-day survival as well as our organized political actions have demonstrated the tehacity of our struggle against subordination.”
           [Deborah K. King, “Multiple Jeopardy, Multiple Consciousness: The Context of a Black Feminist Ideology.” Signs. Volume 14, number 1, autumn 1988. Pages 42-72.]
      814. thealogy (Naomi R. Goldenberg and many others): This term—referring to feminist theology—is a portmanteau, or combined term, based upon “theology.” Theós (Ancient Greek/Archaía Hellēniká, Θεός), God, is replaced with Theía (Ancient Greek/Archaía Hellēniká, Θεία), Goddess. Thealogy is sometimes associated with Wicca (“the Craft”) and Neopaganism.
           “The teaching or doctrines of modern witchcraft should not be referred to as theology. Thea is the word for ‘goddess’ and is a more appropriate root for a term referring to theories of feminist witchcraft. The word theology has also come to be used almost exclusively in regard to Christian god-talk. The advent of witchcraft, with its colorful goddess-talk, requires a new term. I hope witches and scholars of feminist religion will adopt my suggestion and name themselves thealogians.” [Naomi R. Goldenberg. Changing of The Gods: Feminism and the End of Traditional Religions. Boston, Massachusetts: Beacon Press. 2001. Page 96.]
           “… lately, I have come to understand that thealogy and witchcraft are a long way from losing their radical efficacy. Although I worry about whether or not success will spoil the Craft, others fear that the goddess is posing a serious threat to the hegemony of traditional religious thought. Once again, the goddess is under attack. This time her most potent detractors are to be found in the ranks of the sisterhood. Those feminist theorists and theologians among us who know the value of witchiness ought to speak up.” [Naomi R. Goldenberg, “Witches and Words.” Feminist Theology. Volume 12, number 2, January 2004. Pages 203-211.]
           “The term ‘thealogy’ was coined by Naomi Goldenberg to refer to academic discourse on the Goddess …. An often-quoted definition is Charlotte Caron’s ‘reflection on the divine in feminine and feminist terms’ …. To date, the term ‘thealogy’ has almost exclusively been used to refer to a Goddessian enterprise, as distinct from feminist theology.” [Mary Ann Beavis, “Christian Goddess Spirituality and Thealogy.” Feminist Theology.. Volume 25, number 2, January 2016. Pages 125-138.]
           “The Dalai Lama said it would be Western women who would come to the rescue of the world. Might it actually be Goddess Thealogy? How would people re-act to a change in the mythology? Well, if the popularity of the recent movie Avatar is any indicator, the movie many I know equated with Goddess church, I think the Sacred Feminine might stage a coup based on the concept of inter-connection, reverence for Nature, a Mother Goddess, and respect of one another and the planet. Most people thought those were pretty cool ideas they would like practiced in society. My radio show listeners proclaimed they wanted to book passage on the first ship to Pandora. Over and over people in my community, with teary eyes, retold the powerful scene in Avatar as Jake knelt at the Tree of Souls, imploring Pandora’s Goddess for help, saying his race, the Earthlings, called the Sky People, had destroyed their Mother and tomorrow they were coming to destroy Her.” [Karen Tate, “The Politics of Eco-Feminist Goddess Spirituality: A Theology for a Sustainable Future.” Goddess Thealogy: An International Journal for the Study of the Divine Feminine. Volume 1, number 1.1, December 2011. Pages 49-57.]
           “In this paper I want to suggest that this attitude owes much to western Christianity with its emphasis on a transcendent God, and a transcendental spirituality. In such a context, immortality becomes the ultimate form of transcendence. In its place, I wish to advocate an understanding of death based upon certain thealogical insights, which differs significantly from accounts of death based upon Christian theological notions of a God removed from the process of change. In rejecting the transcendental ethos of Christian monotheism, I shall also test the efficacy of a thealogical approach by applying its account of mortality to three case studies. A thealogical approach to death, I shall argue, offers a more holistic and unified account of human life than its Christian counterparts.” [Beverley Clack, “Revisioning Death: A Thealogical Approach to the ‘Evils’ of Mortality.” Feminist Theology. Volume 8, number 22, September 1999. Pages 67-77.]
           “Paul Reid-Bowen argued that ‘personal forms of survival’ are for the most part not affirmed by Goddess feminists and would be inconsistent with a metaphysic in which human beings are said to be part of nature. However, Goddess thealogian Starhawk is willing to speak of meeting loved ones in a life after death. It is fair to say that while ‘affirming the body’ has been a major theme in feminist theologies, ‘accepting death’ has not.” [Carol P. Christ, “The Last Dualism: Life and Death in Goddess Feminist Thealogy.” Journal of Feminist Studies in Religion. Volume 27, number 1, spring 2011. Pages 129-145.]
           “… as a direct consequence of duality came the identification of flesh, nature, woman and sexuality with the Devil and the forces of evil.…
           “How to reconcile this biased and intrinsically hostile view of life with a thealogical approach that seeks to reclaim and reintegrate all that has been debased by patriarchal monotheism? Some followers of the Goddess movement claim that the concept of darkness as hostile was a historical development that grew out of the solar myths of invading nomadic tribesmen replacing earlier lunar myths of Stone and early Bronze Age agrarian cultures in such places as Sumeria and Babylon. In the lunar myths, the dark phases of the moon may have symbolized ‘the ineffable wisdom and mystery of life and its power to regenerate itself.’”
           [Jacqueline daCosta, “To Explore Whether the Concept of ‘Dark’ as Expressed in Theology Can Be Reconciled in Any Way to the ‘Dark’ of Thealogy.” Feminist Theology. Volume 12, number 1, September 2003. Pages 103-117.]
           “Strictly adhering to the definition, the word [thealogy] breaks down into two parts: Thea (Goddess) and logos (word, discourse, reason). Its counterpart, Theology, is broadly defined by various schools of thought but most often understood primarily as the study of the nature of God; it can also denote a specific system or school of opinions concerning God and religious questions such as systematic theology or natural theology; in addition to being a course of specialized religious study usually at a college or seminary. While seemingly inclusive in scope, theology often has a focal handicap—it is monotheistic in its thinking, examining God from a narrow and monocular lens often concretions by its own dogma, and often exclusivist and hampered by truth claims. Thealogy, on the other hand, is pluralistic, syncretistic and inclusive. It is fluid and comprehensive, able to contain many different belief systems and ways of being. Thealogy does not stand in opposition to, but as a complement to, Theology as a branch of religious study.” [Patricia ꞌIolana, “Divine Immanence: A Psychodynamic Study in Women’s Experience of Goddess.” Claremont Journal of Religion. Volume 1, issue 1, 2011. Pages 86-107.]
           “Faith in a goddess in the face of death may have been conceived by the ancient Cretans in quite simple terms, or in thealogically complex and profound terms, and the full range in between as well, just as religious beliefs vary among individuals, and over an individual’s lifetime, in any society.” [Marymay Downing, “Prehistoric Goddesses: The Cretan Challenge.” Journal of Feminist Studies in Religion. Volume 1, number 1, spring 1985. Pages 7-22.]
           “… an understanding of religion based on representation assumes that religion is an interrelated aspect of human culture and an interrelated discipline of scholarly study; that religion is an intellectual category; that language is a cultural construction; that the goal of study is to propose generalizations; and whose method is to engage in translation in which the unknown/unfamiliar is critically approached through the known/familiar.…
           “… feminist thealogians or theologians who ascribe to the representation understanding of religion will have much in common with historians of religions who ascribe to the representation understanding of religion.”
           [Karen Pechilis, “Introduction: Feminist Theory and the Study of South Asian Religions.” Journal of Feminist Studies in Religion. Volume 24, number 1, spring 2008. Pages 5-11.]
      815. feminist critical theory (Regina Becker-Schmidt): “The following parts are dedicated to pointing out Becker-Schmidt’s contributions to feminist Critical Theory. In the second section, I describe Becker-Schmidt’s empirical research on female factory workers, and the next section is dedicated to her social theory, the thesis of the ‘double socialization’ of women through wage labor and domestic work.” [Barbara Umrath, “Feminist Critical Theory in the Tradition of the Early Frankfurt School: The Significance of Regina Becker-Schmidt.” Canon: The Interdisciplinary Journal of The New School for Social Research. Spring 2010.]
      816. womanism (Alice Walker): It is an approach to African American feminism.
           “womanist
           1. “From womanish. (Opp. of ‘girlish,’ i.e., frivolous, irresponsible, not serious.) A black feminist or feminist of color. From the black folk expression of mothers to female children, ‘You acting womanish,’ i.e., like a woman. Usually referring to outrageous, audacious, courageous or willful behavior. Wanting to know more and in greater depth than is considered ‘good’ for one. Interested in grown-up doings. Acting grown up. Being grown up. Interchangeable with another black folk expression: ‘You trying to be grown.’ Responsible. In charge. Serious.
           2. Also: A woman who loves other women, sexually and/or nonsexually. Appreciates and prefers women’s culture, women’s emotional flexibility (values tears as a natural counter-balance of laughter) and women’s strength. Sometimes loves individual men, sexually and/or nonsexually. Committed to survival and wholeness of entire people, male and female. Not a separatist, except periodically, for health.…
           3. “Loves music. Loves dance. Loves the moon. Loves the Spirit. Loves love and food and roundness. Loves struggle. Loves the Folk. Loves herself. Regardless.
           4. “Womanist is to feminist as purple is to lavender.”
           [Alice Walker. In Search of Our Mothers’ Gardens: Prose. New York: Open Road Integrated Media. 2011. Page 6. Also found, with slight modifications, in: Alice Walker, “Womanist–Buddhist Dialogue.” Buddhist-Christian Studies. Volume 32, 2012. Page 45.]
           “The word ‘lesbian’ may not, in any case, be suitable (or comfortable) for black women, who surely would have begun their woman-bonding earlier than Sappho’s residency on the Isle of Lesbos. Indeed, I can imagine black women who love women (sexually or not) hardly thinking of what Greeks were doing; but, instead, referring to themselves as ‘whole’ women, from ‘wholly’ or ‘holy.’ Or as ‘round’ women—women who love other women, yes, but women who also have concern, in a culture that oppresses all black people (and this would go back very far), for their fathers, brothers, and sons, no matter how they feel about them as males. My own term for such women would be ‘womanist.’ At any rate, the word they chose would have to be both spiritual and concrete and it would have to be organic, characteristic, not simply applied.” [Alice Walker. In Search of Our Mothers’ Gardens: Prose. New York: Open Road Integrated Media. 2011. Pages 54-55.]
           “Young womens no good these days, he say. Got they legs open to every Tom, Dick and Harry.
           “Harpo look at his daddy like he never seen him before. But he don’t say nothing.
           “Mr. _____ say, No need to think I’m gon let my boy marry you just cause you in the family way. He young and limited.
           “Pretty gal like you could put anything over on him.
           “Harpo still don’t say nothing.
           “Sofia face git more ruddy. The skin move back on her forehead. Her ears raise.
           “But she laugh. She glance at Harpo sitting there with his head down and his hands tween his knees.
           “She say, What I need to marry Harpo for? He still living here with you. What food and clothes he git, you buy.
           “He say, Your daddy done throwed you out. Ready to live in the street I guess.
           “She say, Naw. I ain’t living in the street. I’m living with my sister and her husband. They say I can live with them for the rest of my life. She stand up, big, strong, healthy girl, and she say, Well, nice visiting. I’m going home.
           “Harpo get up to come too. She say, Naw, Harpo, you stay here. When you free, me and the baby be waiting.
           “He sort of hang there between them a while, then he sit down again. I look at her face real quick then, and seem like a shadow go cross it. Then she say to me, Mrs. ____, I’d thank you for a glass of water before I go, if you don’t mind.
           “The bucket on the shelf right there on the porch. I git a clean glass out the safe and dip her up some water. She drink it down, almost in one swallow. Then she run her hands over her belly again and she take off. Look like the army change direction, and she heading off to catch up.”
           [Alice Walker. The Color Purple. New York: Open Road Integrated Media. 1982. Pages 45-46.]
           “Remember
           “When we ended
           “It all
           “–for a weekend-
           “& how
           “We knew?
           “You took
           “The tea bowl
           “That I
           “Broke
           “In
           “Carelessness
           “To glue together
           “Again
           “At your
           “House.”
           [Alice Walker. Alice Walker—poems. Classic Poetry Series. Paris, France: PoemHunter.Com – The World’s Poetry Archive. 2012. Page 26.]
           “Gender oppression is … a main factor operating in the oppressive paternal ideology in which a father’s control of the family’s private resources effectively gives him license to violate his women. It reveals the family’s weak internal structures in African – American families where a girl child is not safe even in her own family. The word ‘domestic’ usually implies the sense of protection, comfort and the place where one can feel one’s own identity. However the various forms of brutal violence like incest and rape perpetrated within home reveals how the relationships of mother, daughter, wife or sister have lost their meaning for the male sex. Family as the site of oppression is an important concern for [Alice] Walker.… This aspect has been criticized by various critics saying that Walker is waging treacherous assault upon a mythologically unified black community.” [Priya K, “Violence in Alice Walker’s the Color Purple.” IOSR Journal Of Humanities And Social Science. Volume 19, issue 7, July 2014. Pages 51-54.]
      817. womanist theology (Kelly Brown Douglas, Linda E. Thomas, Donald McCrary, Chandra Taylor Smith, and many others): It is an African American feminist approach to theology.
           “Two years ago I anxiously prepared to teach womanist theology for the first time. My own theological training never provided me with an opportunity to do course work that involved any serious reflection on Black women’s experience. I was, therefore, excited to be able to offer students a chance to study theology which emerged from the lives and struggles of Black women. Yet, when I sat down to develop the course the gaps in my theological training conspired against me. I did not have a model for developing a course such as womanist theology. I did not know how to begin to teach students about Black women’s reality and theological concerns. I wrestled with how to structure the course so that it would do justice, in a fourteen-week semes ter, to the stories of those who had a long history of invisibility in the theological academy.” [Kelly Brown Douglas, “Teaching Womanist Theology: A Case Study.” Journal of Feminist Studies in Religion. Volume 8, number 2, fall 1992. Pages 133-138.]
           “Womanist theology is an emergent voice of African American Christian women in the United States.… But womanist religious reflection is more than mere deconstruction. It is, more importantly, the empowering assertion of the black woman’s voice. To examine that voice, this essay divides into three parts. First, I look at the overall state of womanist theology. Its development denotes a novel reconstruction of knowledge, drawing on the abundant resources of African American women since their arrival to the ‘New World,’ as well as a creative critique of deleterious forces seeking to keep black women in ‘their place.’” [Linda E. Thomas, “Womanist Theology, Epistemology, and a New Anthropological Paradigm.” CrossCurrents. Volume 48, number 4, winter, 1998/1999. Pages 488-499.]
           “As a practicing Christian for almost twenty years and the former spouse of a Presbyterian pastor for eight years of a fifteen-year marriage, I have witnessed firsthand the incredible power and security the church structure provides for many black women. However, I have witnessed, too, the difficulty black women experience when they attempt to claim or exercise authority within the traditional church. Through a series of discussions with nontraditional pastors and laypersons about the unequal power structure in the black church, I became aware of and interested in an important religious and scholarly move- ment called womanist theology and began to see it as an appropriate subject for the writing classroom. Derived from Alice Walker’s womanism, which itself has its roots in black feminism, womanist theology employs a socioreligious hermeneutic that examines and critiques tridimensional oppression—racism, sexism, and classism—while locating and celebrating the contributions that black women have made to securing secular and sacred freedoms.” [Donald McCrary, “Womanist Theology and Its Efficacy for the Writing Classroom.” College Composition and Communication. Volume 52, number 4, June 2001. Pages 521-552.]
           “I have discussed some of the general worries of African American women intellectuals about approaching philosophical constructs like pragmatism. I have also considered several locations where both pragmatist thought and the basic intellectual agendas of black women converge. I now reflect on the particular alliance of radical empiricism and ‘womanist’ theology. First, I think constructive ‘womanist’ theologians share commonalities with pragmatism. However, I will attempt to further characterize some of the distinctive ways that ‘womanist’ theology and radical empiricism correspond by briefly examining their similar challenges to the elite tradition of Western intellectual thought, their focus on concrete experience, and their self-critical cultural and historical situation. Consequently, I propose that where James’s pragmatism and African American women’s constructive theology intersect, an African American women’s philosophical theology also emerges.” [Chandra Taylor Smith, “Pragmatism and Womanist Theology: Interpretive Possibilities.” American Journal of Theology & Philosophy. Volume 19, number 2, May 1998. Pages 209-223.]
      818. Dianic Wicca (Kristy S. Coleman): Coleman conducted an ethnographic study of this feminist Wiccan “trad” (tradition).
           “This book is about the Dianic Wiccan tradition. It presents the first in-depth, ethnographic study of Dianic Wicca through its focus on a branch of the religion called Circle of Aradia (CoA) in the Los Angeles area. In this religion—of, by, and for women —the concept of the Divine is explicitly and solely female.
           “Dianic Wicca is a subgroup within the contemporary Pagan religion. Paganism is an umbrella term that identifies a variety of modern religious traditions, particularly those influenced by the ideas or practices of pre-Christian European “pagan” religions. Many Pagan traditions attempt to incorporate elements of historical religions, cultures, and mythologies into their beliefs and practices, thus Paganism (and Wicca in particular) is sometimes referred to by its proponents as “The Old Religion.” Wicca is the largest subgroup of this accumulation of practices. Many core components of Wicca were imports from Britain to the United States, primarily through the writings of Gerald Gardner. He claimed to have been initiated into a secret hereditary group of Witches about which he writes in his 1954 Witchcraft Today. This book represents the initial introduction of Wicca to the United States, preceding even his initiates. This history of Wicca has been recorded by many scholars, and thus is not replicated here. Key to the history is the noted influence of feminism on Wicca starting in the United States in the 1970s, and in particular the influence of Dianic Wicca.”
           [Kristy S. Coleman. Re-riting Woman: Dianic Wicca and the Feminine Divine. Lanham, Maryland: AltaMira Press imprint of Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc. 2009. Pages 1-2.]
      819. cultural feminism (Margaret Jane Radin, Linda Alcoff, and many others): This position, one of the types of “difference feminism,” accepts the existence of distinct feminine and masculine essences. This approach is frequently embraced by Roman Catholic feminists.
           “Rather than referring to ‘relational feminism,’ I will call this list ‘cultural feminism,’ to make clear a social constructionist view: The culture has constructed us as the typical woman. I received gender training from my mother, as a lot of you did from yours, and my daughter is receiving it now from other school children. And so we have been constructed as female by the culture. We are—you know what the list is—cooperative, empathetic, nonhierarchical, nonaggressive, self-sacrificing for the larger group (usually the family), noncompetitive, nurturing, and so forth.” [Margaret Jane Radin, “Reply: Please Be Careful with Cultural Feminism.” Stanford Law Review. Volume 45, number 6, July 1993. Pages 1567-1569.]
           “… cultural feminists argue that the problem of male supremacist culture is the problem of a process in which women are defined by men, that is, by a group who has a contrasting point of view and set of interests from women, not to mention a possible fear and hatred of women. The result of this has been a distortion and devaluation of feminine characteristics, which now can be corrected by a more accurate feminist description and appraisal. Thus the cultural feminist reappraisal construes woman’s passivity as her peacefulness, her sentimentality as her proclivity to nurture, her subjectiveness as her advanced self-awareness, and so forth. Cultural feminists have not challenged the defining of woman but only that definition given by men.” [Linda Alcoff, “Cultural Feminism versus Post-Structuralism: The Identity Crisis in Feminist Theory.” Signs. Volume 13, number 3, spring 1988. Pages 405-436.]
           “Cultural—Difference—Feminism … Argues that women have innate, ethical characteristics and values that are superior to men’s. Hence, cultural feminists seek to reclaim women’s roles, especially motherhood, with pride, highlighting the way they are devalued by men …” [Mel Gray and Jennifer Boddy, “Making Sense of the Waves: Wipeout or Still Riding High?” Affilia: Journal of Women and Social Work. Volume 25, number 4, 2010. Pages 368-389.]
      820. feminist epistemology (Margareta Halberg): She examines various attempts to develop an epistemology.
           “I have given a critical account of the attempts to construct a feminist epistemology, identifying three main tensions in feminist theorizing. It has been argued that none of the problems may be solved at the theoretical level. The tension between objectivism and relativism is inherent in the feminist standpoint epistemology and cannot be overcome. Either there is a feminist objectivist standpoint, grounded in a women’s position in society, or there is no such standpoint. If it is recognized that there are many various, and sometimes necessarily contradictory, ‘women’s standpoints,’ there is no possible way of deciding which one is the objective one.” [Margareta Halberg, “Feminist Epistemology: An Impossible Project?” Radical Philosophy: Philosophical Journal of the Independent Left. Number 52, autumn 1989. Pages 3-7.]
      821. intersectionality as pronounced in this MP3 audio file (Kimberlé Williams Crenshaw, Patricia Hill Collins and many others): This perspective, also called intersectional theory, is closely related with standpoint theory. Intersectionality, originally developed out of critical race theory (a legal theory) and womanism (African American feminism) by Crenshaw, was introducted into sociology by past president of the American Sociological Association, Patricia Hill Collins. Crenshaw is also the executive director of the African American Policy Forum.
           Intersectionality—as demireality or disunity—is a sophisticated description of the contradictions of capitalism. Thus, classism (capitalist domination or oppression) needs to be considered along with racism (white domination or oppression), sexism (male domination or oppression), and other structures of oppression. Since oppression (domination) is complex, emancipation needs to be multidimensional. White women, for instance, might be be oppressors, as whites, and oppressed, as women. For dominated populations, shifting the center of one’s thinking (or standpoint epistemology) implies the elimination of Friedrich Engels’ concept of false consciousness. The U.S. occupies an intersection of capitalist imperialism and rugged individualism. Capitalism is collapsing, and “individuals” are becoming increasingly alienated. It is a recipe for increased gun violence and disaster.
           “Very few theories have generated the kind of interdisciplinary and global engagement that marks the intellectual history of intersectionality.…
           “Rooted in Black feminism and Critical Race Theory, intersectionality is a method and a disposition, a heuristic and analytic tool.”
           [Devon W. Carbado, Kimberlé Williams Crenshaw, Vickie M. Mays, and Barbara Tomlinson, “Intersectionality: Mapping the Movements of a Theory.” Du Bois Review. Volume 10, number 2, fall 2013. Pages 303-312.]
           “Placing African American women and other excluded groups in the center of analysis opens up possibilities for a both/and conceptual stance, one in which all groups possess varying amounts of penalty and privilege in one historically created system. In this system, for example, white women are penalized by their gender but privileged by their race. Depending on the context, an individual may be an oppressor, a member of an oppressed group, or simultaneously oppressor and oppressed….
           “In addition to being structured along axes such as race, gender, and social class, the matrix of domination is structured on several levels. People experience and resist oppression on three levels: the level of personal biography; the group or community level of the cultural context created by race, class, and gender; and the systemic level of social institutions. Black feminist thought emphasizes all three levels as sites of domination and as potential sites of resistance.
           “Each individual has a unique personal biography made up of concrete experiences, values, motivations, and emotions. No two individuals occupy the same social space; thus no two biographies are identical….
           “Oppression is filled with such contradictions because these approaches fail to recognize that amatrix of domination contains few pure victims or oppressors. Each individual derives varying amounts of penalty and privilege from the multiple systems of oppression which frame everyone’s lives.
           “A broader focus stresses the interlocking nature of oppressions that are structured on multiple levels, from the individual to the social structural, and which are part of a larger matrix of domination.”
           [Patricia Hill Collins. Black Feminist Thought: Knowledge, Consciousness, and the Politics of Empowerment. Boston: Unwin Hyman. 1990. Pages 221-238.]
           “Intersectional paradigms view race, class, gender, sexuality, ethnicity, and age, among others, as mutually constructing systems of power. Whereas all of these systems are always present, grappling with their theoretical contours is far more difficult than merely mentioning them.… The focus here is on intersections of race, nation, and gender, but selected essays also examine how these constructs intersect with other equally important systems of power. For example, while not a major focus of this volume, social class is an important sub-theme. In particular, an increasingly heterogeneous Black social-class structure has brought a greater degree of civil-rights protection to middle-class African Americans. What are the new contours of race and class-consciousness that accompany these new social relations? Historically, African Americans have shown a strong degree of racial solidarity, largely because they had common problems and saw their fate as intricately linked. Despite significant changes in the post–Civil Rights era, African American voting behavior still shows a noteworthy degree of racial solidarity, one indicator that Black Americans choose race over class.” [Patricia Hill Collins. From Black Power to Hip Hop: Racism, Nationalism, and Feminism. Philadelphia, Pennsylvania: Temple University Press. 2006. Pages xxii-xxiii.]
           “… how might social theory speak more effectively to contemporary social phenomena in ways that address the realities of social inequalities, power, and politics? Two contemporary fields of study that seemingly eschew the backward-looking ‘posting’ of contemporary social phenomena in favor of a forward-looking approach speak to this question. As knowledge projects, American pragmatism and intersectionality both aim to use their tools of analysis to grapple with contemporary social issues, and, as such, both might have implications for contemporary social theory.” [Patricia Hill Collins, “Social Inequality, Power, and Politics: Intersectionality and American Pragmatism in Dialogue.” The Journal of Speculative Philosophy. Volume 26, number 2, 2012. Pages 442-457.]
           “Because contemporary theories of social class emphasize production, do not adequately address the realities of poor and working-class African American youth within the global capitalist political economy. Within American sociology, most approaches to African American social structures focus on jobs, labor market placement and wage inequalities. For example, … [one may consider] the increasing intersection of and prison within contemporary African American civil society.” [Patricia Hill Collins, “New commodities, new consumers: Selling blackness in a global marketplace.” Ethnicities. Volume 6, number 3, September 2006. Pages 297-317.]
           “… I have proposed early on to replace the category of ‘patriarchy’ with the neologism kyriarchy [MP3 audio file], which is derived from the Greek words kyrios (lord/ slavemaster/ father/ husband/ elite/ propertied/ educated man) and archein (to rule, dominate)….
           “Kyriarchy is best theorized as a complex pyramidal system of interlocking multiplicative social and religious structures of superordination and subordination, of ruling and oppression…. Such kyriarchal relations are still today at work in the multiplicative intersectionality of class, race, gender, ethnicity, empire, and other structures of discrimination. In short, kyriarchy is constituted as a sociocultural and religious system of dominations by intersecting multiplicative structures of oppression. The different sets of relations of domination shift historically and produce a different constellation of oppression in different times and cultures. The structural positions of subordination that have been fashioned by kyriarchal relations stand in tension with those required by radical democracy.”
           [Elisabeth Schüssler Fiorenza. Changing Horizons: Explorations in Feminist Interpretation. Minneapolis, Minnesota: Fortress Press imprint of Augsburg Fortress. 2013. Kindle edition.]
           “The inner voice, or ‘still small voice,’ connected with experience is foundational to the epistemology of intersectionality and to why spirit is so central to its development. Intersectionality or multiracial feminism—feminism—what antiracist feminist scholar Chela Sandoval calls ‘differential consciousness’—grows from an internal sense of the intrinsic value of human beings—of oneself and one’s communities. That is why Sandoval calls differential consciousness the ‘methodology of love.’ ‘Differential consciousness’ describes an ability to read power relations and respond in a way that helps oppressed peoples survive. It is a technology for reading a situation and choosing tactics that enable one to act effectively to equalize power relations. Sandoval uses ‘technology’ to refer to the ‘practical arts’ of activism. Technologies combine pragmatism and creativity, highlighting activism as an artful practice, one that is always changing along with the practitioner and the situations she encounters. Sandoval writes, ‘The differential technologies of oppositional consciousness, as utilized and theorized by a racially diverse US coalition of women of color, demonstrate the procedures for achieving affinity and alliance across difference; they represent the modes that love takes in the postmodern world.’ Working across differences is not only about strategic activism. It is a way of loving others and working from a place of love in the contemporary United States….
           “I hypothesized that I would draw from activists’ life stories a ‘queer feminist’ theory-in-praxis that prioritizes struggles against racism, poverty, and violence, based on a view of these struggles as central to the projects of women’s and queer liberation.”
           [Sharon Doetsch-Kidder. Social Change and Intersectional Activism: The Spirit of Social Movement. New York: St. Martin’s Press imprint of Palgrave Macmillan imprint of St. Martin’s Press LLC. 2012. Pages 3-4 and 159.]
           “As a forty-nine-year-old Black lesbian feminist socialist mother of two, including one boy, and a member of an interracial couple, I usually find myself a part of some group defined as other, deviant, inferior, or just plain wrong.…
           “Institutionalized rejection of diference is an absolute necessity in a profit economy which needs outsiders as surplus people. As members of such an economy, we have all been programmed to respond to the human differences between us with fear and loathing and to handle that difference in one of three ways: ignore it, and if that is not possible, copy it if we think it is dominant, or destroy it if we think it is subordinate.…
           “As Paulo Freire shows so well in The Pedagogy of the Oppressed, the true focus of revolutionary change is never merely the oppressive situations which we seek to escape, but that piece of the oppressor which is planted deep within each of us, and which knows only the oppressors’ tactics, the oppressors’ relationships.”
           [Audre Lorde, “Age, Race, Class, and Sex: Women Redefining Difference,” in Audre Lorde. Sister Outsider: Essays and Speeches. (Paper delivered at the Copeland Colloquium. Amherst College. April 1980.) New York: Ten Speed Press imprint of Crown Publishing Group, a division of Random House, Inc. 2007. Pages 115-124.]
           “I have come to believe over and over again that what is most important to me must be spoken, made verbal and shared, even at the risk of having it bruised or misunderstood. That the speaking profi ts me, beyond any other effect. I am standing here as a Black lesbian poet, and the meaning of all that waits upon the fact that I am still alive, and might not have been. Less than two months ago I was told by two doctors, one female and one male, that I would have to have breast surgery, and that there was a 60 to 80 percent chance that the tumor was malignant. Between that telling and the actual surgery, there was a three-week period of the agony of an involuntary reorganization of my entire life. The surgery was completed, and the growth was benign.” [Audre Lorde, “The Transformation of Silence into Language and Action.” I am Your Sister: Collected and Unpublished Writings of Audre Lorde. Rudolph P. Byrd, Johnnetta Betsche Cole, and Beverly Guy-Sheftall, editors. Oxford, England, and New York: Oxford University Press. 2009. Pages 39-43.]
           “One of the central aspects of intersectionality in relation to multiple viewpoints in tagging is the questioning of ideas about exclusive categories. Categories are instead seen as intersecting, fluid and socially constructed. Intersectional theories also bring forth the importance of that people from different intersectional categories should be able to express themselves. Self-expression is seen as important both in terms of their identities and opinions in general, and in relation to identity categories. For example, one woman cannot speak for all women, because of the existence of other identity categories that maybe are taken for granted (especially if they represent majorities) and hidden.” [Isto Huvila and Kristin Johannesson, “Critical about clustering of tags: An intersectional perspective on folksonomies.” Information Science and Social Media: Proceedings of the International Conference Information Science and Social Media (ISSOME 2011). August 24th–26th, 2011. Åbo/Turku, Finland. Retrieved on November 19th, 2015.]
           “… the first wave of ethnic studies programs sprung up as a result of a collective attempt on the part of antiracist activists of all kinds to transform an exclusionary and racist educational system.… A … crop of race scholars, such as Patricia Hill Collins, bell hooks, Alan Johnson, Paula Rothenberg, and Audre Lorde, to name but a few, have adopted an intersectional approach to understanding race and ethnicity and thereby pointed out the inextricable relationship among the categories of class, race, gender, and sexuality. In fact, a growing number of textbooks and readers attest to this intersectional approach to societal analysis …” [Abby L. Ferber, Andrea O’Reilly Herrera, and Dena R. Samuels, “The Matrix of Oppression and Privilege: Theory and Practice for the New Millennium.” American Behavioral Scientist. Volume 51, 2007. Pages 516-530.]
           “The ideologies of the alter-globo [alter-globalization] and ‘social movements’—even of Occupy and 15-m [the Spanish anti-austerity movement]—were closer to a soft anarchism, or left-liberal cosmopolitanism, more or less informed by intersectional identity consciousness, depending on national context. Those tendencies are still around, as are surviving far-left strains: the new oppositional structures by no means exhaust the movements’ aspirations; but where protest has crystallized into national political forms, they have not so far been anarchist or autonomist.” [Susan Watkins, “Oppositions.” New Left Review. Series II, number 98, March–April 2016. Pages 5-30.]
           “Race, class, and gender were once seen as separate issues for members of both dominant and subordinate groups. Now, scholars generally agree that these issues (as well as ethnicity, nation, age, and sexuality)—and how they intersect—are integral to individuals’ positions in the social world …. These intersections are referred to as the race-class-gender matrix, the intersectional paradigm, interlocking systems of oppression, multiple axes of inequality, the intersection, and intersectionality; like most authors, we use the term ‘intersectional approach‘ to refer to the research application of these concepts. Scholars using the intersectional tional approach will socially locate individuals in the context of their ‘real lives’ …. They also examine how both formal and informal mal systems of power are deployed, maintained, and reinforced through axes of race, class, and gender …. Research using the intersectional approach broadly extends across the humanities, social sciences, and natural sciences. In fact, it is not an exaggeration to suggest that wherever one looks in women’s and gender studies and across much of the academy, intersectionality is being theorized, applied, or debated ….” [Michelle Tracy Berger and Kathleen Guidroz, “Introduction.” The Intersectional Approach: Transforming the Academy through Race, Class, and Gender. Michelle Tracy Berger and Kathleen Guidroz, editor. Chapel Hill, North Carolina: The University of North Carolina Press. 2009. Pages 1-22.]
           “Thinking through unacknowledged male privilege as a phenomenon, I realized that, since hierarchies in our society are interlocking, there was most likely a phenomenon of white privilege that was similarly denied and protected. As a white person, I realized I had been taught about racism as something that puts others at a disadvantage, but had been taught not to see one of its corollary aspects, white privilege, which puts me at an advantage.…
           “I see a pattern running through the matrix of white privilege, a pattern of assumptions that were passed on to me as a white person.…
           “… it is hard to disentangle aspects of unearned advantage which rest more on social class, economic class, race, religion, sex, and ethnic identity than on other factors. Still, all of the oppressions are interlocking ….”
           [Peggy McIntosh, “White Privilege: Unpacking the Invisible Knapsack.” Peace and Freedom Magazine. July/August 1989. Pages 10-12.]
           “Research and teaching that focuses on the intersections of race, ethnicity, gender, and other dimensions of identity is a relatively new approach to studying inequality. (Inequality for these purposes is defined as institutionalized patterns of unequal control over and distribution of a society’s valued goods and resources such as land, property, money, employment, education, healthcare, care, and housing.) Intersectionality has gained its greatest influence in the post-civil rights era and has been developed and utilized most prominently in the new scholarship created in the interdisciplinary fields of ethnic studies, women’s studies, area studies, and, more recently, lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender studies, cultural studies, critical legal studies, labor studies, multicultural studies, American studies, and social justice education. Intersectional analysis begins with the experiences of groups that occupy multiple social locations and finds approaches and ideas that focus on the complexity rather than the singularity of human experience.”[Bonnie Thornton Dill and Ruth Enid Zambrana, “Critical Thinking about Inequality: An Emerging Lens.” Emerging Intersections: Race, Class, and Gender in Theory, Policy, and Practice. Bonnie Thornton Dill and Ruth Enid Zambrana, editors. New Brunswick, New Jersey: Rutgers University Press. 2009. Pages 1-21.]
           “… I shall focus on theorizings of intersectional gender/sex currently in widespread use. In line with my self-positioning as a Feminist Studies professor-guide with passions for certain theorizations, but no wish to canonize or universalize them, the theoretical positions that I have chosen to present here should be seen as a selection that could have been made differently. They do not represent a canon (i.e., a body of texts and theories claiming to represent the ‘core’ of the field). Rather, they should be seen as situated nodal points …, that is, as temporary crystallizations in ongoing feminist negotiations of located theory making.” [Nina Lykke. Feminist Studies: A Guide to Intersectional Theory, Methodology and Writing. London and New York: Routledge imprint of Taylor & Francis Group, an Informa PLC business. 2010. Page 49.]
           “… a common critique by feminists located in the West (even if of Indian origin) about Indian feminism through the 1970s and 1980s was its focus on the ‘other’: caste, religion, class, community, peasants instead of speaking about one’s self. This was seen as a denial of ‘selfhood,’ a silencing of her ‘private’ selves, desires, body and sexualities. Twenty years later, this very fact—Indian feminism’s persistent engagement with matters of diversity, identity, religion, caste and difference—led to the relabelling of Indian feminists as intersectional analysts ….” [Maitrayee Chaudhuri, “Feminisms and sociologies: Locations and intersections in a global context.” Contributions to Indian Sociology. Volume 50, number 3, October 2016. Pages 343-367.]
      822. structural intersectionality (Sumi Cho [Korean, 수미 조, Sumi Cho as pronounced in this MP3 audio file], Kimberlé Williams Crenshaw, Leslie McCall, and Donna Coker): They apply intersectional theory to structural inequality.
           “The recasting of intersectionality as a theory primarily fascinated with the infinite combinations and implications of overlapping identities from an analytic initially concerned with structures of power and exclusion is curious given the explicit references to structures that appear in much of the early work. Within academic as well as political discourse, Black feminism emphasized the role of structures in constituting the conditions of life in which racially and economically marginalized women were situated. ‘Structural intersectionality’ further delineated the ‘multilayered and routinized forms of domination’ … in specific contexts such as violence against women.…
           “… ‘Structural intersectionality’ … delineated the ‘multilayered and routinized forms of domination’ … in specific contexts such as violence against women. The analysis of the overlapping structures of subordination revealed how certain groups of women were made particularly vulnerable to abuse and were also vulnerable to inadequate interventions that failed to take into account the structural dimensions of the context ….”
           [Sumi Cho, Kimberlé Williams Crenshaw, and Leslie McCall, “Toward a Field of Intersectionality Studies: Theory, Applications, and Praxis.” Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society. Volume 38, number 4, summer 2013. Pages 785-810.]
           “My law school course, Domestic Violence and Social Justice, is built around a structural intersectional framework … through which students are encouraged to recognize the complex ways in which structural inequality simultaneously informs the types of abuse perpetrated, individual and community responses to abuse, meanings that a victim ascribes to abuse … and factors that increase the risks that abuse will occur …. The course emphasizes the often overlooked importance of economic injustice to the phenomenon of intimate partner violence.” [Donna Coker, “Domestic Violence and Social Justice: A Structural Intersectional Framework for Teaching About Domestic Violence.” Violence Against Women. Volume 22, number 12, 2016. Pages 1426-1437.]
      823. primary accumulation (Judith Whitehead): She considers intersectionality from a class–based Marxist perspective.
           “In order to understand how these processes of primary accumulation operate through local patterns of class and power, the concept of intersectionality is particularly useful. ‘Intersectionality’ emerged as a keyword in academic feminism in the early 1990s, with influential articles by the African-American feminist legal scholar Kimberlé Crenshaw, who used court cases concerning the denial of employment compensation for African-American women, as well as cases of domestic violence involving non-white women, to argue that discrimination against African-American women could not be understood through either purely antiracist or feminist perspectives. She showed how racial variations within feminist theory and gendered variations within critical race theory led to the exclusion of subjects and communities whose identities were multiple and interrelated. Crenshaw further argued that the intersectional experience was more than the sum of racism and sexism. Drawing on earlier ideas of the ‘triple jeopardy’ of gender, race, and class, intersectionality is considered by its advocates as one of feminism’s major contributions to social theory.” [Judith Whitehead, “Intersectionality and Primary Accumulation: Caste and Gender in India under the Sign of Monopoly-Finance Capital.” Monthly Review: An Independent Socialist Magazine. Volume 68, issue 6, November 2016. Pages 37-52.]
      824. standpoint theory (Nancy C. M. Hartsock, Susan Hekman, Sandra Harding, Nancy J. Hirschmann, Mary Jo Neitz, Julia T. Wood, Samuel E. Trosow, Patricia Hill Collins and many others): This framework—which as feminist standpoint theory is closely related to intersectional theory—examines the perspectives of socially marginalized or “othered” peoples. Standpoint theory, sometimes referred to as standpoint epistemology, has a variety of applications. Not all of them are feminist per se. Collins refers to her own specifically intersectional standpoint theory as “shifting the center.”
           “Just thinking about commodities from a feminist standpoint a number of categories become evident as inadequate. To begin with just three:
           • “The market appears to be the fundamental institution of social life—the exchange of commodities. (Note that in recent years, after the fall of communism, we have seen the growth of the faith that the introduction of markets will bring prosperity, democracy, and all the good things of life.)
           • “Social relations both appear to be and are about the exchange of commodities.
           • “Commodities have both use values and exchange values.
           “[Karl] Marx argues that this story is in error because commodities have to be recognized as, or are really in fact, labour in its crystallized or congealed form.”
           [Nancy C. M. Hartsock, “Women and/as Commodities: A Brief Meditation.” Canadian Woman Studies/Les Cahiers de la Femme. Volume 23, numbers 3–4, spring–summer 2004. Pages 14-17.]
           “In the modernist/Enlightenment version, truth has to do with discovering a pre-existing external something which if it meets some criteria can be labeled as true. Moreover, it must be discovered from nowhere in particular so that Truth can retain its pristine qualities. The definition of truth that I rely upon is more complex than this and is heavily indebted to my own reading of [Karl] Marx. I want to refer to Marx in order to suggest in a shorthand way how my version of standpoint theory approaches the question of truth.… Marxism is about political change and social justice, and these concerns are central to any Marxism-influenced dialectical analysis of social relations.” [Nancy C. M. Hartsock, “Marxist Feminist Dialectics for the 21ˢᵗ Century.” Science & Society. Volume 62, number 3, fall 1998. Pages 400-413.]
           “Feminist standpoint theory raises a central and unavoidable question for feminist theory: How do we justify the truth of the feminist claim that women have been and are oppressed? Feminist standpoint theory was initially formulated in the context of Marxist politics. But from the outset, feminist standpoint theorists have recognized that feminist politics demand a justification for the truth claims of feminist theory, that is, that feminist politics are necessarily epistemological. Throughout the theory’s development, feminist standpoint theorists’ quest for truth and politics has been shaped by two central understandings: that knowledge is situated and perspectival and that there are multiple standpoints from which knowledge is produced.” [Susan Hekman, “Truth and Method: Feminist Standpoint Theory Revisited.” Signs. Volume 22, number 2, winter 1997. Pages 341-365.]
           “Feminist standpoint theory has indeed made major contribution to feminist theory and, as she indicates at the end, to late twentieth-century efforts to develop more useful ways of thinking about the production of knowledge in local and global political economies. We can note that feminists are not the only contemporary social theorists to struggle with projects of extricating ourselves from some of the constraints of those philosophies of modernity that began to emerge in Europe three or more centuries ago.” [Sandra Harding, “Comment on Hekman’s ‘Truth and Method: Feminist Standpoint Theory Revisited’: Whose Standpoint Needs the Regimes of Truth and Reality.” Signs. Volume 22, number 2, winter 1997. Pages 382-391.]
           “The standpoint epistemologists—and especially the feminists who have most fully articulated this kind of theory of knowledge—have claimed to provide a fundamental map or ‘logic’ for how to do this: ‘start thought from marginalized lives’ and ‘take everyday life as problematic.’ However, these maps are easy to misread if one doesn't understand the principles used to construct them. Critics of standpoint writings have tended to refuse the invitation to ‘have it both ways’ by accepting the idea of real knowledge that is socially situated. Instead they have assimilated standpoint claims to objectivism or some kind of conventional foundationalism, on the one hand, or to ethnocentrism, relativism, or phenomenological approaches in philosophy and the social sciences, on the other hand.” [Sandra Harding, “Rethinking Standpoint Epistemology: What is ‘Strong Objectivity?’” The Centennial Review. Volume 36, number 3, fall 1992. Pages 437-470.]
           “Essentialism and universalism are the charges most commonly leveled against feminist standpoint theory, though not exclusively by postmodernists by any means.… Such universalist ‘truth claims,’ the criticism goes, are based on ahistorical crosscultural effects that link ‘women’ to each other regardless of other identity aspects of culture, ethnicity race, sexuality, or class … and simply replace one set of universal claims for another, thus repudiating and reinscibing the hegemony it seeks to displace …. At the same time, anti-essentialist critics have accused [Nancy C. M.] Hartsock of basing the standpoint on biology, reproduction, or ‘nature.’” [Nancy J. Hirschmann, “Feminist Standpoint as Postmodern Strategy.” Politics and Feminist Standpoint Theories. Sally J. Kenney and Helen Kinsella, editors. New York and London: The Haworth Press, Inc. 1997. Pages 73-92.]
           “Although the perspective [intersectionality/feminist standpoint theory] originated in an Anglo-American political and intellectual context, postcolonial feminist scholars also contributed to feminist standpoint theory. They criticized the limitations of the ‘women in development’ research with its imposition of Western assumptions about gender, and some saw feminist standpoint as a perspective that could facilitate research for third world women. Feminist discourse that assumed a ‘universal woman’ was extremely problematic for third world writers, and some of these writers argued that standpoint analysis with its starting point in the actualities of women’s lives—particularly in time and place—is a useful methodology for moving the project of decolonialization forward.” [Mary Jo Neitz, “Feminist Methodologies.” The Routledge Handbook of Research Methods in the Study of Religion. Michael Stausberg and Steven Engler, editors. London and New York: Routledge imprint of Taylor & Francis Group, an Informa PLC business. 2011. Page 59.]
           “Feminist standpoint theory is a specific formulation of the broader standpoint theory. All formulations of standpoint theory contend that a standpoint arises when an individual recognizes and challenges cultural values and power relations that contribute to subordination or oppression of particular groups. For instance, a person could understand and reject racist values and power discrepancies between races, knowing that those undergird the subordination of minorities. The specific foci of feminist standpoint theory are (a) identifying cultural values and power dynamics that account for the subordination of girls and women and (b) highlighting the distinct knowledge cultivated by activities that are typically assigned to females.
           “Feminist standpoint theory calls attention to the knowledge that arises from conditions and experiences that are common to girls and women. This focus on experiences draws on Marxist theory’s claim that the work we do—the concrete activity in which we engage—shapes what we know and how we behave. Thus, feminist standpoint theory is interested in skills and knowledge that are cultivated by typically female activities such as domestic work and caregiving.”
           [Julia T. Wood, “Feminist Standpoint Theory.” Encyclopedia of Communication Theory. Thousand Oaks, California: SAGE Publications, Inc. 2009. Pages 396-398.]
           “Standpoint theory is particularly applicable to research problems arising in stratified societies because it assumes that the activities of those at the top of the stratified hierarchy both organize and set limits on what persons in lower positions can understand about themselves and the world around them.” [Samuel E. Trosow, “Standpoint Epistemology as an Alternative Methodology for Library and Information Science.” The Library Quarterly: Information, Community, Policy. Volume 71, number 3, July 2001. Pages 360-382.]
           “Involving much more than consulting existing social science sources, placing the ideas and experiences of women of color in the center of analysis requires invoking a different epistemology considering what type of knowledge is valid. We must distinguish between what has been said about subordinated groups in the dominant discourse, and what such groups might say about themselves if given the opportunity. Personal narratives, autobiographical statements, poetry fiction, and other personalized statements have all been used by women of color to express self-defined standpoints on mothering and motherhood. Such knowledge reflects the authentic standpoint of subordinated groups. Placing these sources in the center and supplementing them with statistics, historical material, and other knowledge produced to justify the interests of ruling elites should create new themes and angles of vision ….
           “… I use the term motherwork to soften the dichotomies in feminist theorising about motherhood that posit rigid distinctions between private and public family and work, the individual and the collective, identity as individual autonomy and identity growing from the collective self-determination of one’s group. Racial ethnic women’s mothering and work experiences occur at the boundaries demarking these dualities. ‘Work for the day to come’ is motherwork, whether it is on behalf of one’s own biological children children of one’s racial ethnic community or children who are yet unborn. Moreover, the space that this motherwork occupies promises to shift our thinking out motherhood itself.…
           “… Examining survival, power, and identity reveals how racial ethnic women in the United States encounter and fashion motherwork. But it also suggests how feminist theorizing about motherhood might be shifted if different voices became central in feminist discourse.…
           “Placing racial ethnic women’s motherwork in the center of analysis recontextualizes motherhood. Whereas the significance of race and class in shaping the context in which motherhood occurs is virtually invisible when white, middle class women’s experiences are the theoretical norm, the effects of race and class stand out in stark relief when women of color are accorded theoretical primacy. Highlighting racial ethnic mothers’ struggles concerning their children’s right to exist focuses attention on the importance of survival.”
           [Patricia Hill Collins, “Shifting the Center: Race, Class, and Feminist Theorizing about Motherhood.” Representations of Motherhood. Donna Bassin, Margaret Honey, and Meryle Mahrer Kaplan, editors. New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press. 1994. Pages 56-74. Also published as: Patricia Hill Collins, “Shifting the Center: Race, Class, and Feminist Theorizing about Motherhood.” Mothering: Ideology, Experience, and Agency. Evelyn Nakano Glenn, Grace Chang, and Linda Rennie Forcey, editors. London and New York: Routledge imprint of Taylor & Francis Group, an Informa PLC business. 2016. Pages 45-65.]
           “Emerging from the women’s liberation movement of the 1960s and 70s, standpoint theory developed as a way for feminists to understand and explain the social world from the vantage point of women’s lives. It has been both deconstructive in exposing the androcentrism within the theory and practice of the sciences and social sciences, and reconstructive in offering alternative explanations of the world informed by women’s experiences and activities.…
           “By the 1980s, feminist standpoint theory had become a ‘staple of feminist theory’ …. Feminists such as Sandra Harding, Nancy Hartsock, Dorothy Smith, Patricia Hill Collins, Hilary Rose and Donna Haraway argued that the lives of marginalised groups such as women, and especially women of colour, provided for a privileged vantage point that challenged mainstream understandings of nature and society.”
           [Christina Ho and Ingrid Schraner, “Feminist Standpoints, Knowledge and Truth.” Working paper number 2004/02. School of Economics and Finance. University of Western Sydney. Penrith, New South Wales, Australia. June, 2004. Pages 1-26.]
      825. loving criticism (Sharon Doetsch-Kidder): She develops an approach to intersectional activism.
           “… I argue that paying attention to the spirit of our work helps us produce knowledge that serves humanity, that is useful to those struggling to survive, and that brings more love, justice, and compassion to the world. Paying attention to spirit, we draw on ancient and internal knowledges that can help us find alternatives to the oppositional thinking that is the root of violence, can help us treat those with whom we disagree with understanding and kindness, and can open up worlds of possibility for creating deep, lasting change. Examples of how intellectuals and activists attend to spirit guide us toward what I call ‘loving criticism,’ a way of organizing and critiquing that honors our roots, accepts our shared humanity and our power to change our lives and the world, and faces conflict with kindness. Through loving criticism, we nourish ourselves through positive action. The examples in this chapter show what social change work can look like when we pay attention to spirit.” [Sharon Doetsch-Kidder. Social Change and Intersectional Activism: The Spirit of Social Movement. New York: St. Martin’s Press imprint of Palgrave Macmillan imprint of St. Martin’s Press LLC. 2012. Page 17.]
           “I build on a legacy of criticism and creative production that seeks to view the behavior of individuals and groups with respect and to interpret cultural texts and artifacts with a sense of human dignity. Integrated into this discussion is data from my study of intersectional activists whose everyday theorizing confirms the insights of multiracial feminist writers. I draw on these oral histories along with other narratives of intersectional activism and feminist, queer, and Buddhist thinking to describe the philosophy of social change that I call ‘loving criticism.’” [Sharon Doetsch-Kidder. Social Change and Intersectional Activism: The Spirit of Social Movement. New York: St. Martin’s Press imprint of Palgrave Macmillan imprint of St. Martin’s Press LLC. 2012. Page 23.]
      826. intellectual activism (Patricia Hill Collins): She examines multiple ways in which people use their ideas to promote social justice.
           “Mari Evans’ poem ‘Speak the Truth to the People’ invokes the social and political upheaval of the Civil Rights and Black Power movements of 1960s and 1970s. As an African American poet influenced by the Black Arts Movement, Evans’ poetry aimed to speak the truth to the public about issues as diverse as racism, poverty, domestic violence, and the power of love as an antidote to oppression. Her 1970 volume I Am a Black Woman constituted one voice in a groundswell of Black feminist intellectual production that saw speaking the truth to African American women as its special mission. This same era produced a broad array of artists and intellectuals from diverse racial, ethnic, class, gender, and sexual backgrounds who, through their scholarship, art, and political activism, questioned prevailing power arrangements. Their creative work contributed to social movements against racism, sexism, militarism,homophobia, age discrimination, and class exploitation. Collectively, their work exemplifies traditions of intellectual activism: namely, the myriad ways that people place the power of their ideas in service to social justice.
           “Just as the themes of intellectual activism are far-reaching, the mechanisms that people use to engage in intellectual activism are similarly broad.”
           [Patricia Hill Collins. On Intellectual Activism. Philadelphia, Pennsylvania: Temple University Press. 2012. Page ix.]
           “There are two primary strategies of intellectual activism. One tries to speak the truth to power. This form of truth telling uses the power of ideas to confront existing power relations. On a metaphorical level, speaking the truth to power invokes images of changing the very foundations of social hierarchy where the less powerful take on the ideas and practices of the powerful, often armed solely with their ideas.…
           “A second strategy of intellectual activism aims to speak the truth directly to the people. In contrast to directing energy to those in power, a focus that inadvertently bolsters the belief that elites are the only social actors who count, those who speak the truth to the people talk directly to the masses.”
           [Patricia Hill Collins, “Truth-telling and Intellectual Activism.” Contexts. Volume 2, number 1, winter 2013. Pages 37-41.]
      827. fourth-wave feminism (Kira Cochrane, Melissa Benn, Ruth Phillips, Viviene E. Cree, Diana Diamond, Pythia Peay, and Jennifer Baumgardner): They focus on a variety of criteria for defining a new feminist “wave.”
           “The one theory embraced by [Laura] Bates and the majority of young grassroots activists I speak to is intersectionality, which seems to be emerging as the defining framework for the fourth wave. Nadia Kamil says this was the driving force for her recent standup show and Jinan Younis considers it the overriding principle for today’s feminists. Kelley Temple says all those on the NUS women’s committee, which she heads, ‘would call themselves intersectional feminists,’ and adds that it was one of the main themes of the NUS women’s conference this year. She only became aware of the concept two or three years ago, but since then has seen it discussed more and more widely.…
           “The term intersectionality was first coined by US academic Kimberlé Crenshaw, in 1989. I ask Crenshaw, now a law professor at UCLA [University of California at Los Angeles] and Columbia, whether she was aware so many young women were using it to define their feminist outlook, and she laughs, genuinely surprised, and says no. She sees the theory as being continuous with discussions that have been taking place within feminism for decades, if not centuries. Before the word intersectionality was used, for instance, people referred to terms like ‘double domination.’ She cites the importance of thinkers such as the Combahee River Collective in Boston, a black feminist lesbian group, who developed a statement in the late 1970s in which they discussed the multiple interlocking oppressions of race, sex, sexuality and class.”
           [Kira Cochrane. All the Rebel Women: The rise of the fourth wave of feminism. London: Guardian Shorts imprint of Guardian Books. 2013. Page 60.]
           “Energised by highly visible, media-friendly issues of sexualisation and representation, new ‘fourth-wave’ feminism must not dismiss concerns of structural inequality as relics of a previous age.…
           “In some ways, it is not hard to understand why the cultural should take pre-eminence among fourth-wave feminists. The question of body image and the pressures of a highly sexualised and commercial society are bound to be felt more sharply by those for whom both body and self are, literally, still forming. Add to this the fact that any campaign that concentrates on sexualised images of women's bodies, rather than the more ‘worthy’ subjects of pay or pensions, will always gain media airtime.…
           “… given that one feature of fourth-wave feminism has been the inclusion of men who share certain social goals, why not develop these cross-gender alliances?”
           [Melissa Benn, “After post-feminism: Pursuing material equality in a digital age.” Juncture. Volume 20, issue 3, winter 2013. Pages 223-227.]
           “Social Media has opened up significant spaces for the rebirth of feminist debates and resistance and it has been argued that this is the birthplace of fourth wave feminism ….
           “This paper positioned us (the authors) in the centre of a response to the fourth wave as teachers of social work, in order to understand and digest the seeming contradictions that are evident in the feminisms that are most likely to be part of current students’ social world. The question of how the current, Internet-based fourth wave reflects a feminism of the ‘now’ stems from how different it is to previous iterations of feminism.”
           [Ruth Phillips and Viviene E. Cree, “What does the ‘Fourth Wave’ Mean for Teaching Feminism in Twenty-First Century Social Work?” Social Work Education. Volume 33, number 7, 2014. Pages 930-943.]
           “The narrative of the fourth wave of feminism, a narrative still in process, must integrate the unfinished issues and contradictions of the last three waves in an overarching vision that combines spiritual practice with political action and economic power and the insights derived from psychoanalytic theory and practice.…
           “… the fourth wave necessitates the use of the interdisciplinary teams with the insights of dynamic psychology to augment our understanding of the intersection between large groups and individual psychology, particularly as they relate to the fate of women ….”
           [Diana Diamond, “The Fourth Wave of Feminism: Psychoanalytic Perspectives.” Studies in Gender and Sexuality. Volume 10, issue 4, February 2009. Pages 213-223.]
           “On September 11, 2001, California psychotherapist Kathlyn Schaaf was overwhelmed by a powerful thought. Watching the violent images on television, she suddenly felt the time had come to ‘gather the women.’ She wasn’t alone. Schaaf and 11 others who shared her response soon created Gather the Women, a Web site and communications hub that 5,000 women have used to chronicle their local events in support of world peace. As women assembled near the pyramids in Egypt and held potluck dinners in Alaska, staged candlelight vigils and other rituals in countries around the world, it confirmed Schaaf’s gut instinct that an untapped reserve of energy ‘lies like oil beneath the common ground the women share.’
           “Since then, the group has organized a series of congresses to connect women’s groups. Their work is one example of a new kind feminism, slowly growing for a decade and now bursting out everywhere. At its heart lies a new kind of political activism that’s guided and sustained by spirituality. Some are calling it the long-awaited ‘fourth wave’ of feminism – a fusion of spirituality and social justice reminiscent of the American civil rights movement and [Mahatma] Gandhi’s call for nonviolent change.”
           [Pythia Peay, “Feminism’s Fourth Wave.” UTNE Reader: Cure Ignorance. March/April 2005. Online publication. No pagination.]
           “… we begin our activism online. Blogs are our consciousness-raising groups. There are a lot of Second and Third Wave feminists who say, ‘Well, they just blog and blog and they don’t do anything else.’ In fact, blogs serve the purpose of helping us figure out our ideology, have disagreements with each other, and figure out what actions might work best without having to all be in the same place. They have equalized feminism, because you don’t have to have the money to be in a women’s studies class or be able-bodied enough to attend a consciousness-raising group every week or to stand on a picket line. I think one of the main contours of the Fourth Wave is that our activism is inseparable from technology.” [Jennifer Baumgardner. F’em!: Goo Goo, Gaga, and Some Thoughts on Balls. Berkeley, California: Seal Press imprint of Perseus Books Group. 2011. Page 110.]
      828. constructivist method of learning (Akanksha Agarwal [Bengali/Bāṅāli, আকাংক্ষা আগরওয়াল, Ākāṅkṣā Āgara'ōẏāla as pronounced in this MP3 audio file]): She explores “Designs for Change” as a transformative initiative.
           “Design for Change (DFC) builds twenty-first century skills in children through their engagement with the design thinking process. It gets educators to interact with their learners on topics drawn from their shared reality of school and the surrounding community. It offers an opportunity for educators and students to collaborate and learn from each other.…
           “The constructivist method of learning transforms a teacher’s role into that of a facilitator as it is requires them to provide students with opportunities to observe, question, compare, and eventually generate their own understanding. The implementation of DFC creates opportunities for students and teachers to learn simultaneously. As such, it ties closely with [Paulo] Friere’s conceptualization of ‘teacher as students and students as teachers,’ where both collaboratively work on a problem and contribute equally in the learning process.…
           “This initiative was quite transformative.”
           [Akanksha Agarwal, “Creating Development 4: Design Thinking for Change.” Creative Development: Transforming Education through Design Thinking, Innovation, and Invention. Robert Kelly, editor. Edmonton, Alberta: Brush Education Inc. Kindle edition.]
      829. creative development (Robert Kelly): He explores the processes involved with educational transformation.
           “Creative Development: Transforming Education through Design Thinking, Innovation, and Invention is designed to equip educators with theory, strategies, and tactics that enable the creation of educational spaces that are conducive to student-instigated original research and production at any level of education and across the discipline spectrum. These educational environments are characterized by a focus on systematic creative development, enabling learners and educators to engage in increasingly more complex levels of creative practice over time.” [Robert Kelly, “The Concept of Creative Development.” Creative Development: Transforming Education through Design Thinking, Innovation, and Invention. Robert Kelly, editor. Edmonton, Alberta: Brush Education Inc. Kindle edition.]
      830. moral motivation (Ulas Kaplan [Turkish, Ulaş Kaplan as pronounced in this MP3 audio file]): He examines “a dynamic developmental process.”
           “I propose that moral motivation is the central process for the generation of both moral judgment and action. If individuals were not morally motivated, they would not be carrying out judgments and actions. Examining and understanding the complexity of moral motivation can help researchers better able to explain the emergence of and variations in moral judgment and action. Considering moral motivation as a developmental process can be useful toward understanding the complexity of real-life moral judgment and action. Judgment and action can be explored as functions of a complex developmental process that unfolds over time. Conceptualizing and exploring moral motivation as it evolves over time can enable researchers to connect long-term moral development with real-time moral cognition and emotion. The present article proposes a new model for the exploration of moral motivation, judgment and action in terms of temporal interactions between multiple cognitive and emotional factors.” [Ulas Kaplan, “Moral Motivation as a Dynamic Developmental Process: Toward an Integrative Synthesis.” Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour. August, 2016. Early View edition. Pages 1-27.]
      831. critical race feminism (Tanya Kateri Hernandez and others): Relating critical race theory and feminist theory.
           “Thus far, empirical research has not formed a large part of the scholarship developed by Critical Race Feminism (‘CRF’): legal scholars who emphasize the legal concerns of Women of Color. To be sure, a few CRF scholars have used an empirical approach to their analysis of how the law affects Women of Color. But those efforts have by and large focused on qualitative research paradigms rather than on quantitative research. This is not so surprising, considering the nonlegal quantitative skills and specialized resources that are required to statistically analyze pre-existing data sets and otherwise collect and code raw data. With the advent of interdisciplinary scholarship, however, there are now greater opportunities for legal scholars to garner the additional skills needed to adequately conduct empirical research. More importantly, incorporating empirical research more directly into CRF jurisprudence can further CRF’s law reform goals.” [Tanya Kateri Hernandez, “Defining the Voices of Critical Race Feminism: A Critical Race Feminism Empirical Research Project: Sexual Harassment & the Internal Complaints Black Box.” University of California at Davis Law Review. March, 2006.]
      832. ecofeminism (Françoise d’Eaubonne as pronounced in this MP3 audio file, Karren J. Warren, and others): Under capitalism, men oppress women. Similarly, corporations run by men oppress nature (“mother nature”). Eliminating capitalism can emancipate both women and the environment.
           “Ecological feminists (‘ecofeminists’) claim that there are important connections between the unjustified dominations of women, people of color, children, and the poor and the unjustified domination of nature. Throughout this book, I refer to unjustifiably dominated groups as ‘Others,’ both ‘human Others’ (such as women, people of color, children, and the poor) and ‘earth Others’ (such as animals, forests, the land). The reference to ‘Others’ is intended to highlight the status of those subordinate groups in unjustifiable relationships and systems of domination and subordination.” [Karen J. Warren. Ecofeminist Philosophy: A Western Perspective on What It Is and Why It Matters. Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers. 2000. Page 1.]
           “Ecofeminists do not buy into a socialist or postmodern future built on commodified relationships. They are trying to discover alternative strategies which help people here and now, without playing into the hands of an ultimately inhuman and unsustainable global economy. For there is no doubt about it, when activists wheel and deal with capital, they affirm its legitimacy.…
           “… [One] premise of ecofeminism is that patriarchal cultures, most recently the technocratic West, tend to identify women with nature and treat both as resources. Mainstream environmental thought has so far shown little interest in ‘the woman question.’”
           [Ariel Salleh, “An Ecofeminist Bio-Ethic and What Post-Humanism Really Means.” New Left Review. Series I, number 217, May–June 1996. Pages 138-147.]
           “The two production systems function on completely different terms. The first, ‘cultivation,’ is dictated by nature according to global climatic zones. The ‘extraction’ or industrial economy is man-made and therefore, its terms can be adapted. The only ‘absolute term’ for the industrial economy is that non-renewable resources and raw materials will finish one day. The real ‘bottom line’ is that living nature is the absolute condition for human life. Human life is totally dependent on other life forms, but not the contrary. To paraphrase U.S. ecofeminist theologian Rosemary Radford Ruether: the plant can happily carry out its processes of photosynthesis without human beings, but we cannot exist without the photosynthesis of plants. Under the neoliberal drive for infinite ‘economic growth,’ this is forgotten—or deliberately ignored.” [Hilkka Pietila in Ariel Salleh, “‘We in the North are the Biggest Problem for the South’: A Conversation with Hilkka Pietila.” Capitalism, Nature, Socialism. Volume 17, number 2, June 2006. Pages 44-128.]
      833. ecosophy (an acronym for ecological philosophy) as pronounced in this MP3 audio file (Félix Guattari as pronounced in this MP3 audio file and Arne Næss as pronounced in this MP3 audio file): A designation utilized for certain ecological approaches to struggles for social liberation.
           “The ‘ecosophic cartographies’ that must be instituted will have, as their own particularity, that they will not only assume the dimensions of the present, but also those of the future. They will be as preoccupied by what human life on Earth will be thirty years from now, as by what public transit will be three years from now. They imply an assumption of responsibility for future generations, what philosopher Hans Jonas calls ‘an ethic of responsibility.’ It is inevitable that choices for the long term will conflict with the choices of short-term interests.” [Félix Guattari. Remaking Social Practices. 1992.]
           “Despite having recently initiated a partial realization of the most obvious dangers that threaten the environment of our societies, they [political groupings and executive authorities] are generally content to simply tackle industrial pollution and then from a purely technocratic perspective, whereas only an athico-political articulation – which I call ecosophy – between the three ecological registers (the environment, social relations and human subjectivity) would be likely to clarify these questions.” [Félix Guattari. The Three Ecologies. Ian Pindar and Paul Sutton, translators. New York: The Continuum International Publishing Group Inc. 2008. Pages 19-20.]
           “The word ‘philosophy’ itself can mean two things: (1) a field of study, an approach to knowledge; (2) one’s own personal code of values and a view of the world which guides one’s own decisions (insofar as one does fullheartedly feel and think they are the right decisions). When applied to questions involving ourselves and nature, we call this latter meaning of the word ‘philosophy’ an ecosophy ….” [Arne Næss. Ecology, community and lifestyle: Outline of an Ecosophy. David Rothenberg, translator. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press. 1989. Page 36.]
           “A philosophical system has many components. Logic, general methodology, epistemology, ontology, descriptive and normative ethics, philosophy of science, political and social philosophy, and general aesthetics are among the most well known. Ecosophy T says this of this diversity: all are intimately interconnected! You will find a view on all of them intimated in this work.” [Arne Næss. Ecology, community and lifestyle: Outline of an Ecosophy. David Rothenberg, translator. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press. 1989. Page 38.]
           “[Arne] Næss’ insistence on environmental ontology opens a critical inquiry into the tacit ‘ultimate premisses’ of our philosophical, religious or cosmological worldviews which, being generally implicit, need to be verbalised. Worldviews, in fact, yield ‘genetic relations’ with our value priorities and principles, namely ‘influences, motivations, inspirations and cause/effect relations.’ On the basis of the latter, we shape our norms, lifestyles and policies with cardinal consequences in relation to the natural and to environmental issues. The starting point of his ecosophy can be summarised by the following passage: ‘I am for what I call a focus on environmental ontology, how you see the world, how you see it, how you can bring people to see things differently.’” [Elisa Cavazza, “Environmental Ethics as a Question of Environmental Ontology: Næss’ Ecosophy T and Buddhist Traditions.” De Ethica: A Journal of Philosophical, Theological and Applied Ethics. Volume 1, number 2, 2014. Pages 23-48.]
      834. kabbalistic theory of embodiment (Elliot R. Wolfson): Using the Kabbalah (Hebrew/ʿIḇəriyṯ, קַבָּלָה, Qạbbālāh), Hebrew for “receiving,” he develops a specifically Jewish approach to feminism.
           “One of the many contributions that feminist scholarship has made to the academic study of culture and society is a heightened emphasis on the body for a proper understanding of the construction of human subjectivities. To be sure, speculation on the body is as ancient as recorded human history, but the approaches sponsored by contemporary feminist theories are distinctive insofar as they insist on the need to consider embodiment from the vantage point of gender and sexual difference. Like other disciplines in the humanities, the study of religion has been transformed by the feminist concern with engendered embodiment. In the specific case of Judaism, there has been significant progress as well in the application of feminist criticism to the study of this complex religious phenomenon, though predictably one can still detect resistance on the part of some Judaic scholars to the adoption of this method as a legitimate critical tool to engage the past; in fact, in some cases, one encounters ignorance laced with outright hostility, a posture that seems to me far worse and morally reprehensible than simple resistance.” [Elliot R. Wolfson, “The Body in the Text: A Kabbalistic Theory of Embodiment.” The Jewish Quarterly Review. Volume 95, number 3, summer 2005. Pages 479-500.]
      835. constructionist materialism (Sandra Harding): She develops a materialist approach to standpoint theory.
           “… standpoint projects try to, need to, avoid the excessive constructionism and consequent damaging relativism that have plagued less materialist-grounded accounts. Standpoint theory promotes what could be thought of as a constructionist materialism. This should be controversial, because we need to work our way into a different network of concepts than those that have required the damaging either/or choices of Liberal theory and its rationalist/empiricist philosophy of science.” [Sandra Harding, “A Socially Relevant Philosophy of Science? Resources from Standpoint Theory’s Controversiality.” Hypatia. Volume 19, number 1, winter 2004. Pages 25-47.]
      836. non-authoritarian theory (Maeve Cooke): He develops a critical social theory for human flourishing.
           “… non-authoritarian theory …
           “Critical social theories look critically at social arrangements from the point of view of the obstacles they pose to human flourishing.…
           “The ability to extend a critical perspective to the ethically significant social and identity-related changes that emerge from processes of change and innovation and to their own guiding normative intuitions and expectations gives context-transcending positions the advantage over radically contextualist ones. However, context-transcending positions encounter a formidable problem of justification: if they are to avoid the disadvantages of radical contextualism, they must find a way of negotiating the tensions between their commitment to an idea of context-transcending validity and their commitment to a non-authoritarian understanding of theory. This is the problem of justification that, I have suggested, is the most fundamental difficulty facing contemporary critical social theories.”
           [Maeve Cooke, “Avoiding Authoritarianism: On the Problem of Justification in Contemporary Critical Social Theory.” International Journal of Philosophical Studies. Volume 13, number 3, September 2005. Pages 379-404.]
      837. human rights enterprise (William T. Armaline, Davita Silfen Glasberg, and Deric Shannon): They develop a sociological approach to “grassroots struggles.”
           “The Human Rights Enterprise as a Struggle Against States and Capital
           “It is important to define what is meant by the ‘human rights enterprise’ as a central concept moving forward. As a uniquely sociological concept, the human rights enterprise refers to any and all efforts to define and/or realize fundamental dignity and ‘right’ for all human beings. More typically, under the dominance of legal studies and political science, human rights are only defined and discussed in relation to HR [human rights] instruments or human rights as they have manifested in international law. Where sociology does not necessarily pre-suppose the relevance or inevitability of the state, HR instruments comprise only one small piece of the larger whole. The human rights enterprise represents this whole, where grassroots struggles outside of and potentially against the formal state arena are seen as equally relevant to interpreting, critiquing, and realizing human rights in practice. The human rights enterprise should be seen as the sum total of all struggles to define and realize universal human dignity and ‘right.’”
           [William T. Armaline and Davita Silfen Glasberg, “What Will States Really Do For Us? The Human Rights Enterprise and Pressure from Below.” Societies Without Borders. Volume 4, issue 3, 2009. Pages 430-451.]
           “Scholars developing a concept they are calling the ‘human rights enterprise’ … note that the values that undergird human rights are often addressed through extra-institutional actors, including social movements from below. This is despite the fact that human rights ‘instruments were designed to work from a liberal social-contract model in which states act to preserve and protect their citizens on the assumption that states respect the human rights of domestic populations’ …. But the state is, quite often, the violator of human rights or, in other cases, neither interested in, nor capable of, guaranteeing basic rights. This creates an untenable situation for those of us who wish to see the values embodied in human rights realized, as well as people who are critical of the state as an institution and vehicle for securing rights.” [Deric Shannon, “Food Justice, Direct Action, and the Human Rights Enterprise.” Critical Sociology. OnlineFirst edition. October 2015. Pages 1-16.]
      838. ethics of conviction (John Roberts): He examines “Marxism, ontology and religion.”
           “Essentially, the return to religious categories out of the return to the ethics of conviction is a ‘return to religion beyond religion’ as the realm of the passionate act as the ground of responsibility. Ethics becomes a site of the passionate political judgement and decision. Consequently, for these writers on either side of the metaphysical divide, before ethics enters the conventionalized, social-democratic site where ‘human rights’ and ‘difference’ are given their pluralist character, it is the archive and space of a less ‘forgiving,’ less accommodating set of moral proscriptions and precepts ….” [John Roberts, “The ethics of conviction: Marxism, ontology and religion.” Radical Philosophy: Philosophical Journal of the Independent Left. Number 121, September/October 2003. Pages 36-47.]
      839. true believer (Eric Hoffer): Hoffer, an American autodidactic social and moral philosopher, wrote about the characteristics of fanaticism.
           “Though there are obvious differences between the fanatical Christian, the fanatical Mohammedan, the fanatical nationalist, the fanatical Communist and the fanatical Nazi, it is yet true that the fanaticism which animates them may be viewed and treated as one. The same is true of the force which drives them on to expansion and world dominion. There is a certain uniformity in all types of dedication, of faith, of pursuit of power, of unity and of self-sacrifice. There are vast differences in the contents of holy causes and doctrines, but a certain uniformity in the factors which make them effective. He who, like [Blaise] Pascal, finds precise reasons for the effectiveness of Christian doctrine has also found the reasons for the effectiveness of Communist, Nazi and nationalist doctrine. However different the holy causes people die for, they perhaps die basically for the same thing.
           “This book concerns itself chiefly with the active, revivalist This book concerns itself chiefly with the active, revivalist phase of mass movements. This phase is dominated by the true believer—the man of fanatical faith who is ready to sacrifice his life for a holy cause—and an attempt is made to trace his genesis and outline his nature. As an aid in this effort, use is made of a working hypothesis. Starting out from the fact that the frustrated1 predominate among the early adherents of all mass movements and that they usually join of their own accord, it is assumed: 1) that frustration of itself, without any proselytizing prompting from the outside, can generate most of the peculiar characteristics of the true believer; 2) that an effective technique of conversion consists basically in the inculcation and fixation of proclivities and responses indigenous to the frustrated mind.”
           [Eric Hoffer. The True Believer: Thoughts on the Nature of Mass Movements. New York: HarperCollins e-books imprint of HarperCollins Publishers LLC. 2011. Ebook edition.]
      840. theory of counter-modernity (Bob Cannon): He examines the implications of the Nazi Holocaust.
           “… we need a theory of counter-modernity to make sense of the [Nazi] Holocaust.…
           “… the Nazis were neither a premodern nor a modern social movement but a counter-modern movement, which opportunistically combined pre-modern ends and modern means to oppose modernity’s progressive social agenda …. Perhaps nothing represents the contradictory hybridity of counter-modernity better than the doctrine of ‘scientific racism.’ …
           “… scientific racism is best understood as a counter-modern response to the struggles of progressive social movements to redeem modernity’s normative promise ….”
           [Bob Cannon, “Towards a Theory of Counter-Modernity: Rethinking Zygmunt Bauman’s Holocaust Writings.” Critical Sociology. Volume 42, number 1, January 2016. Pages 49-69.]
      841. theory of defective cognition (Michael J. Thompson): He examines the Marxian concept of false consciousness.
           “By focusing on cognitive mechanisms and defective epistemic frames, I am distinguishing my approach from the empirically based research that places emphasis on attitudes to identify and define the features of false consciousness. …. This is not to say that attitudes are not also crucial in mapping the structures of false consciousness, but that, in my view, the defective cognitive mechanisms are in fact responsible for the production and maintenance of these attitudes and opinion structures.” [Michael J. Thompson, “False Consciousness Reconsidered: A Theory of Defective Social Cognition.” Critical Sociology. Volume 43, number 3, May 2015. Pages 449-461.]
      842. theory of the ideological as a conceptual hinterland (Jan Rehmann as pronounced in this MP3 audio file): He develops an integrative approach to ideology.
           “Going deliberately against the grain of a predominant tendency in secondary literature, which places [Karl] Marx/[Friedrich] Engels’ and Gramsci’s concepts of ideology on opposite poles of the spectrum, the essay shows that the strength of the respective approaches lies in their particular combination of ideology–critique and ideology–theory. The dichotomy of these strands is misguided and counterproductive and needs to be overcome by the renewal of an ideology–critique which is informed and backed up by a materialist theory of the ideological.…
           “After having learned our postmodern lessons in the domains of epistemology and methodology, we need to again take up the project of an ideology-critique that operates with a theory of the ideological as a ‘conceptual hinterland’ ….”
           [Jan Rehmann, “Ideology-Critique with the Conceptual Hinterland of a Theory of the Ideological.” Critical Sociology. Volume 41, number 3, May 2015. Pages 433-448.]
      843. idealism and materialism (Paul D’Amato): He develops a Marxist critique of idealism.
           “According to their traditional usage in philosophical writing, idealism and materialism represent the two main divergent ways of looking at the world we live in. For the idealist, the mind—or the spirit, sometimes God—is the origin of all material things. The ancient Greek idealist philosopher Plato, for example, argued that the world and the things in it were determined by universal, logical categories.…
           “Idealist thinking permeates much popular thought. For example, the idea that historical change comes about because great men (women don’t usually get any credit) come along with great ideas, is widely accepted. But this doesn’t explain why it is that anyone bothered to follow these leaders, or where the great ideas of these ‘great men’ came from.
           “For the materialist, all of reality is based on matter, including mental activity, which is itself a result of the organization of matter in a particular way. Whereas the idealist places the mind above and outside of nature, the materialist argues that the mind itself is a product of natural developments. Minds cannot exist apart from the material world, and the material world existed long before any mind was able to experience it.”
           [Paul D’Amato. The Meaning of Marxism. Chicago, Illinois: Haymarket Books. 2006. Pages 23-24.]
      844. technosubjectivities (Felicia Caro): She discusses “new emergent subjectivities.”
           “Factors such as colonialism, imperialism and capitalism have all acted as catalysts for the development of these new emergent subjectivities, which might be called, in a word, the technosubject. To be clear, the technosubject, used in the singular, refers to a plurality of subjectivities located within the global society as well as within an individual. The technosubject emerges as those subjectivities begin to define themselves by the ever-changing and fluid materiality of their environment.…
           “… Technosubjectivities are those that realize they are immersed in a world constructed by a pluralistic history – today this is a history usually denoting war (in all its diverse geographies), economic strife, and power struggles between nations. Upon this realization, technosubjectivies begin to feel a crisis of identity – of cultural displacement.”
           [Felicia Caro, “On Emergent Techno-Subjectivities: Convergent/Fragmented Identities in the Era of Globalization.” Cultural Landscapes. Volume 1, number 4, 2010. Pages 132-158.]
      845. critical human ecology (Richard York and Philip Mancus): They propose a historical-materialist and critical-social-theoretical approach to the field of human ecology—a once-prominent area of study within environmental sociology and urban sociology.
           “Despite its early prominence, human ecology has historically been mired in controversy due to its scientific and materialist commitments—criticized from its beginnings and marginalized within sociology because of the discipline’s tendency to equate naturalistic explanations of social phenomena with biological or geographic determinism. Such criticisms were sometimes leveled by those associated with the Marxist critical tradition, which over the 20ᵗʰ century moved increasingly away from materialism. Still, human ecology and some variants of the critical tradition hold much in common, and each tradition provides clear strengths for helping us to understand human societies and their relationship to the natural world. Therefore, an explicit integration of these two perspectives—and, thus, the development of a critical human ecology—could benefit the discipline of sociology, environmental sociology in particular, and the quest to understand human interactions with the natural environment.” [Richard York and Philip Mancus, “Critical Human Ecology: Historical Materialism and Natural Laws.” Sociological Theory. Volume 27, number 2, June 2009. Pages 122-149.]
      846. ecological Marxism (James O’Connor, John Bellamy Foster, Hannah Holleman, and others): They develop an ecological approach to historical materialism.
           “Labor not only humanizes nature but also naturalizes human beings. Physical interactions with nature and the material world have the consequence of modifying not only nature and the world of objects but also human knowledge and sensibility in ways that also make nature more familiar. Nature comes under more human control, hence is more predictable; ecological science, for example, reduces the probability of unintended and unwanted side effects of production. At the limit, human beings are able to make new forms of nature and establish new relationships with nature, for example, horse breeding and bio-engineering, for good or for bad.…
           “… The subjective world becomes more natural, hence more accessible to the natural and social sciences. Today, post-modern accounts of the natural world and socio-biological and human ecological accounts of the social world, however ideological in their present form, appear as two sides of a single historical process.”
           [James O’Connor, “A Prolegomenon to an Ecological Marxism: Thoughts on the Materialist Conception of History.” Capitalism, Nature, Socialism. Volume 10, number 2, June 1999. Pages 77-106.]
           “… [James] O’Connor … has argued that, while Marx recognized the existence of ‘ecologically destructive methods’ within agriculture, ‘he never considered the possibility’ that ecological degradation ‘might threaten economic crisis of a particular type, namely, underproduction of capital,’ due to the impairment of the natural conditions of production. Hence [Karl] Marx, O’Connor states, failed to ‘put two and two together’ so as to develop a theory of how increasing ecological costs contributed to decreasing profitability and accumulation crisis. His analysis thus fell short of the conceptual framework that O’Connor has labeled ‘ecological Marxism.’” [John Bellamy Foster, “II. Capitalism and Ecology: The Nature of the Contradiction.” Monthly Review: An Independent Socialist Magazine. Volume 54, issue 4, September 2002. Pages 6-16.]
           “It would be a serious mistake, I believe, to view ecological Marxism as a replacement for Marxism or as a superior Marxism. Rather the incorporation of ecological-materialist understandings as integral to historical materialism was conceived in broad outline by [Karl] Marx, and is an essential element of the dialectical approach to theory and practice, science and history, that he promoted. This was understood by some of his earlier followers. However, the ecological element within Marxism was largely lost in the early twentieth century. In the Soviet Union thleading ecological Marxists were purged. While in critical Marxist philosophy in the West – in what came to be viewed by many as the defining trait of ‘Western Marxism’ – an extreme revolt against physical science as an embodiment of positivism resulted in an unfortunate divorce between Marxism and the ecological ideas that were developing within science at that time.” [John Bellamy Foster, “Toward a Global Dialogue on Ecology and Marxism: A Brief Response to Chinese Scholars.” Monthly Review: An Independent Socialist Magazine. Volume 64, issue 9, February 2013. Pages 54-61.]
           “Drawing on the insights of [Karl] Marx’s method has allowed contemporary ecological Marxism to integrate a vast range of historical and scientific knowledge. It is therefore able systematically to address a wide range of concerns, playing a leading role in bridging the social and natural sciences, and providing path-breaking ecosocial analyses of critical emerging and persistent issues. I would like to share with you some recent developments in one of the research programs of ecological Marxism. But most importantly, my goal in this talk is to outline key features of the methodology that account for the power and insight of this work.…
           “The commitment to a materialist conception of natural and social history, attention to critical and appropriate uses of abstraction, and the employment of dialectical analysis and an historical approach, has led to path-breaking analyses in ecological Marxism. These analyses are able at once to deal with broad sweeps of human history, shed new light on concrete, emerging problems, and contribute to debates shaping movements for change today. They transcend the divides between the natural and social sciences and between the scholar, practitioner, and activist.”
           [Hannah Holleman, “Method in Ecological Marxism: Science and the Struggle for Change.” Monthly Review: An Independent Socialist Magazine. Volume 67, issue 5, October 2015. Pages 1-10.]
      847. model–dependent realism (Stephen Hawking and Leonard Mlodinow): This relativist approach appears to be highly unusually—especially coming from Hawking.
           “Until the advent of modern physics it was generally thought that all knowledge of the world could be obtained through direct observation, that things are what they seem, as perceived through our senses. But the spectacular success of modern physics … has shown that that is not the case. The naîve view of reality therefore is not compatible with modern physics. To deal with such paradoxes we shall adopt an approach that we call model-dependent realism. It is based on the idea that our brains interpret the input from our sensory organs by making a model of the world. When such a model is successful at explaining events, we tend to attribute to it, and to the elements and concepts that constitute it, the quality of reality or absolute truth. But there may be different ways in which one could model the same physical situation, with each employing different fundamental elements and concepts. If two such physical theories or models accurately predict the same events, one cannot be said to be more real than the other; rather, we are free to use whichever model is most convenient.” [Stephen Hawking and Leonard Mlodinow. The Grand Design. New York: Bantam Books imprint of The Random House Publishing Group, a division of Random House, Inc. 2010. Ebook edition.]
           “In The Grand Design he [Stephen Hawking] embraces a rather odd philosophical position he calls ‘model-dependent realism’ (despite saying on the opening page that philosophy is dead), according to which, he says, it is meaningless to ask which is real since they [imaginary time and real time] both exist only in our minds and it is only a matter of which is the more useful description.
           “With his muddled philosophical reasoning, Hawking is essentially saying that we can believe what we like about imaginary time: we can perfectly well accept only real time in the mathematical sense as ontologically real, and the universe beginning, though not from a singularity, but at the surface where (real) 3-space and real time intersect the Euclidean 4-space where time has become imaginary. Imaginary time is then just a useful calculating device, much as imaginary numbers are elsewhere in physics, serving to give us the radius of the universe at its beginning.”
           [Rodney D. Holder, “Explaining and Explaining Away in Cosmology and Theology.” Theology and Science. Volume 14, number 3, 2016. Pages 234-255.]
           “MDR [model-dependent realism] is really the end result of the Einsteinian Revolution. [Albert] Einstein noted that when making scientific and mathematical equations, one must take into account both the observation and the observer. MDR carries this notion to its logical conclusions. To begin with, our senses evolved to make models out of sensory data in the outside universe. Those models evolved not for the purpose of giving us a clear sense of the workings of the universe, but for evolutionary purposes, such as helping us to survive and reproduce. (Pre-Darwinian Enlightenment philosophes fretted over being limited by their senses, but lacked the insights that evolutionary biology later added.) Ancestors incapable of absorbing the light from a tightly packed group of molecules we call a rock, and forming that light into a model that registers in the mind as ‘rock,’ would likely have found themselves removed from the gene pool.” [Chris Edwards, “Stephen Hawking’s Other Controversial Theory: Model Dependent Realism in The Grand Design.” Skeptic. Volume 16, number 3 spring 2011. Pages 38-40.]
      848. purposive social action (Sarah D. Žabić as pronounced in this MP3 audio file): She engages in a discourse analysis related to the former Yugoslavia.
           “The students’ purposive social action was as much in hope of reaching a future ideal as it was about bringing forth concrete remedies to everyday problems. Undeniably, the students wanted to exercise their own agency, hear their own voices express the very quotidian frustration of a generational glass ceiling in civic participation and economic opportunity. They sought an active role in the political discourse of the day, and the regime determinedly excluded them with hallow promises. Their demands for the autonomy of universities, civil rights, and more social justice in the bureaucracy-bogged self-management were signs of purposive social action. These were signs of a future generation of leaders who saw corruption and mismanagement and went to the barricades to argue their point of view when the regime would not otherwise take notice.” [Sarah D. Žabić. Praxis Student Protest, and Purposive Social Action: The Humanist Marxist Critique of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia, 1964-1975. M.A. thesis. Kent State University. Kent, Ohio. August, 2010. Page 145.]
           “Discourse analysis is the primary methodology of this study and it assumes that words have an unstable, unfixed meaning generally and yet a very precise meaning within a defined historical context.” [Sarah D. Žabić. Praxis Student Protest, and Purposive Social Action: The Humanist Marxist Critique of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia, 1964-1975. M.A. thesis. Kent State University. Kent, Ohio. August, 2010. Page 17.]
      849. realism of qi (Hsu Kuang-Tai [Chinese, 徐光台, Xú-Quāng-Tái as pronounced in this MP3 audio file]): This version of realism is based on the concept of “qi” (Chinese, 氣, qì; breath, air, spirit, or gas).
           “I will focus on my understanding of the Chinese natural philosophy of qi and its implications from a comparative viewpoint of the history of science. One can say that Chinese culture is a kind of culture of qi with many ideas expressed in terms of qi, including fields of natural knowledge or so-called science.
           “According to the natural philosophy of qi, everything, including heaven, earth, the myriad of things, human beings, and so on is composed of qi, which moves everywhere in the cosmos. Thus, qi was seen as the most fundamental reality for Chinese in ancient times. I call this perspective the ‘Realism of Qi’ (Qi Shizhai Lun 氣實在論 [Qì-Shí-zài-Lùn]), a phrase I coined.
           “As for the cosmogony of the world, … the universal dynamic qi will spontaneously form the visible things as we see them without offering any detail. Thus, I call this perspective “Natural Qi-ism,” (Ziran Qi Lun 自然氣論 [Zì-rán-Qì-Lùn]), another term I coined.”
           [Hsu Kuang-Tai, “Science and Confucianism and Retrospect and Prospect.” Zygon: Journal of Religion and Science. Volume 51, number 1, March 2016. Pages 86-99.]
           “In the late Ming [dynasty], Jesuits transmitted western learning into China for the purpose of propagating Christian doctrines, resulting in the encounter of Aristotelian natural philosophy with the Chinese natural philosophy of qi, or the Aristotelian-Ptolemaic worldview held by Jesuits with that of Neo-Confucianism.… In this paper, the author tries to explore the historical background against which [Matteo] Ricci formed a new relationship between the four elements and five phases theories.” [Hsu Kuang-Tai, “Four Elements as Ti and Five Phases as Yong: The Historical Development from Shao Yong’s Huangji jingshi to Matteo Ricci’s Qiankun tiyi.” East Asian Science, Technology, and Medicine. Number 27, 2007. Pages 13-62.]
           “In the Wanli 萬曆 [Wàn-lì] era, Matteo Ricci (1552-1610) came to China to preach Catholicism. He introduced western natural knowledge into China, thereby challenging China’s traditional natural knowledge. Between 1609 and 1610, Ricci and Xie Zhaozhe 謝肇淛 [Xiè-Zhào-zhè] (1567-1624) were both in Beijing. Nevertheless, they seemed not [to] meet each other.” [Hsu Kuang-Tai, “Matteo Ricci and Xie Zhaozhe.” From the English-language abstract to the Chinese-language article. Tsing Hua Journal of Chinese Studies. Volume 41, number 2, June 2011. Pages 259-297.]
      850. existential deterrence (Sverre Lodgaard as pronounced in this MP3 audio file): He considers that nuclear weapons work effectively without being used.
           “Karl Marx wrote that the most effective power is the structural one which functions without being used. Nuclear weapons function this way. Military strength is an important determinant of the international hierarchy of states, and nuclear weapons are the ultimate expression of strength. States are sensitive to the international hierarchy: consciously or subconsciously, they shape their policies and actions with a view to the power that others can wield, accommodating to those who are high in the hierarchy. Nuclear weapons are unique in their destructive capacity, instilling a sense of awe in the minds of opponents and fostering caution and respect in the minds of others. Their structural impact comes down to … ‘existential deterrence’: stripped of sophisticated doctrines and war plans, nuclear weapons influence others by their sheer existence. They function without being used, just by being there.” [Sverre Lodgaard. Nuclear Disarmament and Non-Proliferation: Towards a nuclear-weapon-free world? London and New York: Routledge imprint of Taylor & Francis Group, an Informa PLC business. 2011. Page 53.]
      851. disproportionate elite power in all spheres of life (Michael D. Yates): He examines the implications of of global inequality.
           “What can we conclude from … [our] excursion into statistics? If we can say one thing for certain, it is that the world is structured economically and politically in an extremely unequal way. Wherever we look, whether in the rich capitalist nations, rapidly growing ones like China and India, or the poorest countries, the richest people take the lion’s share of income and wealth, and most of the increases over the past forty years have accrued to them. Everywhere, this translates into disproportionate elite power in all spheres of life. What is more, although many millions of poor people are now a bit less unfortunate, there is no reason to expect sharp increases in equality, either in the near future or many years from now. Given this, without major oppositional efforts by workers, peasants, the unemployed, and the dispossessed, the world will grow increasingly undemocratic and oligarchic.” [Michael D. Yates, “Measuring Global Inequality.” Monthly Review: An Independent Socialist Magazine. Volume 68, issue 6, November 2016. Pages 1-13.]
      852. analysis of food production and food regimes (John Bellamy Foster): He discusses an aspect of Karl Marx’s work which has received little attention.
           “Since [Karl] Marx’s analysis of food production and food regimes was not developed in a single text but integrated into this larger critique, which remained unfinished, and in some cases unpublished, it is understandable that many commentators have missed this aspect of his work altogether. Yet these issues were far from marginal to Marx, as he based his materialist conception of history on the notion of humans as corporeal beings, who needed, as ‘the first premise of human existence,’ to produce their means of subsistence, beginning with food, water, shelter, clothing, and extending to all of the other means of life. ‘All labor,’ he wrote in Capital, ‘is originally first directed towards the appropriation and production of food.’” [John Bellamy Foster, “Marx as a Food Theorist.” Monthly Review: An Independent Socialist Magazine. Volume 68, issue 7, December 2017. Pages 1-22.]
      853. socialist spontaneous order (Theodore Burczak): He asks whether Friedrich Hayek’s focus on “the rule of law to the formation of a spontaneous social order” can be applied to socialism.
           “Given [Friedrich] Hayek’s understanding of the centrality of the rule of law to the formation of a spontaneous social order, is it possible to defend what might be called a socialist spontaneous order? Can there be socialism with the rule of law? Much would depend on what one understands the concept of socialism to entail. I will follow Marx and maintain that socialist society would have at least two fundamental characteristics. First, socialism would abolish the wages system, thereby ending the exploitation of labor (Marx 1965). Second, under socialism the distribution of the fruits of production would take place, to some extent, according to need and not just according to the vagaries of income distribution that result from market processes (Marx 1978). To achieve these objectives, a socialist economy has traditionally been understood to require large amounts of national economic planning and social ownership of productive property, particularly ‘the commanding heights.’ National economic planning, though, concentrates political and economic power in such a manner that it is perhaps impossible for planners to follow the principles of neutrality and universality that the rule of law requires. The goal of this chapter is to show that socialist goals might be achievable, not through national economic planning or the conscious design of outcomes, but by adopting rules and policies consistent with the notion of the rule of law that underlies Hayek’s theory of spontaneous market order. The result will be something that could be called free market socialism, unplanned socialism, or a socialist spontaneous order.” [Theodore Burczak, “A socialist spontaneous order.” Hayek, Mill, and the Liberal Tradition. Andrew Farrant, editor. London and New York: Routledge imprint of Taylor & Francis Group, an Informa PLC business. 2011. Pages 130-147.]
      854. ontological realism (Theodore Sider): He develops a quantitative approach to a realism of objects.
           “I think that there is indeed a single best quantifier meaning, a single inferentially adequate candidate meaning that (so far as the quantifiers are concerned) carves at the joints. That is: I accept ontological realism.…
           “… ontological realism is in fact compatible with scattered objects. Consider the fusion of the coins in our pockets plus the Eiffel tower. It is indeed an ‘unnatural object’ in the sense that it has no very natural properties. But that does not imply that quantifiers have unnatural meanings, or fail to carve at the joints. Intuitively speaking, what is unnatural about this object is its nature, not its being.…
           “Ontological realism is the claim that the world’s distinguished structure includes quantificational structure.…
           “The ontological realist draws the line in a certain place: part of the world’s distinguished structure is its quantificational structure. Those who regard ontological realism as ‘overly metaphysical’ should remember that they too must draw a line.…
           “… my argument for ontological realism—that the track record of standard predicate logic makes its ideology the best bet—is by no means conclusive. But if you remain tempted by one of the alternatives, think about one final thing. Is your rejection of ontological realism based on the desire to make unanswerable questions go away, to avoid questions that resist direct empirical methods but are nevertheless not answerable by conceptual analysis? If so, none of these proposals will give you what you desire.”
           [Theodore Sider, “Ontological Realism.” Metametaphysics: New Essays on the Foundations of Ontology. David Chalmers, David Manley, and Ryan Wasserman, editors. Oxford, England, and New York: Oxford University Press. 2009. Pages 384-423.]
           “… [That] which I offered in my paper ‘Ontological Realism’ and elsewhere, is that i) there are joint-carving meanings that are suitable to be meant by quantifiers; ii) Lewisian reference magnetism is true; and iii) charity is trumped by the eligibility of an interpretation that assigns the joint-carving meanings to the quantifiers.…
           “… although not all realists about joint-carving would follow me in this, I would say that ‘joint-carving’ is a theoretical term, which is intended to, and in fact does, stand for a meaning that itself carves at the joints. Joint-carving carves at the joints …. If ‘joint-carving’ is a theoretical term, there’s no reason to doubt that ‘joint-carving’ will pick out the joint-carving notion of joint-carving–if there is such a notion. A big if!”
           [Theodore Sider, “Hirsch’s Attack on Ontologese.” Noûs. Volume 48, issue 3, September 2014. Pages 565-572.]
           “… [There] is ontological realism, according to which ontological questions are ‘deep,’ ‘about the world rather than language.’ In my view, the most viable form of ontological realism holds that ontological questions are substantive …. I futher think that the best way to assure this substantivity is to hold that ontological questions can be posed in perfectly joint-carving terms. This is the position I will defend (and it is usually what I mean by ‘ontological realism’). It is the doctrine of true believers in ontology.
           “Ontological realism is a claim about ‘metaontology’—a claim about the nature of ontological claims and disputes. As such it is consistent with all positions on a first-order ontology. It is consistent both with the existence and with the nonexistence of holes, with the existence and with the nonexistence of numbers, and so on.… The monistic denial of the existence of nearly every entity of common sense would then be like the claim that [Isaac] Newton’s mistakes were lies. But if ontological realism is true, monism cannot be so quickly dismissed.”
           [Theodore Sider. Writing the Book of the World. Oxford, England, and New York: Clarendon Press imprint of Oxford University Press. 2011. Pages 168-169.]
      855. multi-perspectival realism (William C. Wimsatt): Wimsatt’s approach fcuses on heterogeneity.
           “… multiple rootedness need not lead to ‘anything goes’ perspectival relativism, or an anti-naturalist worship of common sense, experience, or language. It yields a kind of multi-perspectival realism anchored in the heterogeneity of ‘piecewise’ complementary approaches common in biology and the study of complex systems …. Here an overlapping diversity of roots, assumptions, approaches, and methods is fruitful ….” [William C. Wimsatt. Re-engineering Philosophy for Limited Beings: Piecewise Approximations to Reality. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press. 2007. Page 12.]
           “Reality is multi-perspectival and robust. Some systems get so complex (the causal interactions among their variables are sufficiently disordered) that levels and perspectives break down, failing to have the partial dynamical and explanatory closure characteristic of both.” [William C. Wimsatt. Re-engineering Philosophy for Limited Beings: Piecewise Approximations to Reality. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press. 2007. Page 358.]
           “Mechanistic models often start with many aggregative simplifying assumptions, but we add organizational features to increase their realism and explanatory power, and the respects in which they are aggregative disappear.” [William C. Wimsatt, “Reductionism and its heuristics: Making methodological reductionism honest.” Synthese. Volume 151, issue 3, August 2006. Pages 445-475.]
           “Probably the greatest source of potential error in robustness analysis is the failure of the different modes of detection or the different models to be truly independent. Thus, if all of the models share certain simplifying assumptions in common, despite their many differences, the result may be highly sensitive to those assumptions, and the diversity of the models may be a poor indicator of the robustness and realism of the result. So robustness analysis must focus particularly strongly on the search for undiscovered common assumptions whose commonality and unrealism would render the robustness artifactual.” [William C. Wimsatt, “Randomness and Perceived-Randomness in Evolutionary Biology.” Synthese. Volume 43, number 2, February 1980. Pages 287-329.]
      856. integral realism (Kurt Frank Reinhardt as pronounced in this MP3 audio file): He developed a realist version of the Thomistic perennial philosophy.
           “This book deals with the basic concept of Reality as such and with the main problems of philosophic realism as embodied in and elaborated by the philosophia perennis. The author sees the reason for our uncertainties and confusions in the fact that philosophic realism has been exchanged in our time for unrealistic attitudes in thought and life or for a certain false ‘realism’ which takes account only of some aspects of reality, but loses sight of the whole. Out of these unrealistic attitudes grows the tendency to see things and events in isolation, separated from their natural and supernatural context and therefore emptied of their true meaning and significance. Such partial and consequently distorted views of reality are particularly evident in those fields which offer a practical testing ground of philosophic principles, such as, for example, the vast field of moral philosophy, with its subdivisions of political, economic, and educational thought and practice. The author, therefore, pleads for a return to a total view of reality, which includes in particular a total view of man and society. And he tries to demonstrate that only a philosophy of integral realism is capable of working out an intellectual and moral synthesis which duly recognizes the essential values of matter and mind, body and soul, sense and intellect, nature and supernature.” [K. F. Reinhardt. A Realistic Philosophy: The Perennial Principles of Thought and Action in a Changing World. Milwaukee, Wisconsin: The Bruce Publishing Company. 1944. Page ix.]
           “Dr. Reinhardt holds that a rational demonstration of the existence of God, as distinct from comprehension of the essence of God, is provided by the ‘five ways’ of [Thomas] Aquinas. The essence, or ‘whatness,’ of God, he adds, can be known only by the negative way of declaring what He is not. Even if this demonstration is accepted as such, it, none the less, leaves open no passage by which we can cross from the metaphysical to the religious. It proves, or rather indicates, a world ground, but why identify that world ground with the Father in heaven, accepted by the religious consciousness? It is hard to avoid the impression that the demonstration by rational means of the existence of God results in a Pyrrhic victory, and that the term God is used in different senses by philosophy and by religion.” [E. S. Waterhouse, “A Realistic Philosophy: The Perennial Principles of Thought and Action in a Changing World.” Review article. Philosophy. Volume 21, number 80, November 1946. Page 271.]
           “This is one more textbook of Thomism. Its distinctive features seem to be that, while it is relatively simple and elementary, it is nevertheless a complete exposition, in that all major aspects are covered-ethics and political philosophy as well as metaphysics and theory of knowledge. The book is blandly orthodox; in his social views the author is liberal-with the liberalism of the Popes. And he shows scarcely a suspicion of the graver objections which have been made to Thomism, nor of the important metaphysical alternatives which are now available. Thus that any such systems as those of Peirce or Whitehead exist could never be guessed from this book. This is not untypical of Thomists.” [Charles Hartshorne, “A Realistic Philosophy: The Perennial Principles of Thought and Action in a Changing World.” Review article. The Philosophical Review. Volume 54, number 5, September 1945. Pages 521-522.]
      857. sensible realism (Hilary Putnam): Putnam’s views on realism changed throughout his career. However, “a sensible realism” is a term he used to describe his perspective in an article published the year he died (2016). One of Putnam’s earlier (and subsequently abandoned) positions, internal realism, is also referenced in this section.
           “In what follows, my purpose is to summarize some of my own realist views …. What I shall describe is what I think a sensible realism should be in a number of areas, beginning with the ice cubes and the tables, and proceeding to the issues of realism about things very different from tables, for example, physical laws and probability, and closing with the truly contentious subject of ethical properties. In the process, I will also consider some semantical issues that have become central to the discussion of realism, and defend the claim that a realist needs to recognize that the world has many levels of form, and theoretical physics is not the measure of all things.” [Hilary Putnam, “Realism.” Philosophy and Social Criticism. Volume 42, number 2, 2016. Pages 117-131.]
           “… if the ‘scientific realist’ says that theories which are equivalent may have ‘successor theories’ (at a later time) which are no longer equivalent (because of the changed empirical assumptions), and that the successor theory may answer our questions, we must remind him that the one true theory, if there is such, also has infinitely many mathematically and empirically equivalent versions, which possess incompatible relative interpretations. (Since the problem is a conceptual one, I have been imagining we already have the realist’s one true theory, or one of its equivalents.)” [Hilary Putnam, “Three Kinds of Scientific Realism.” The Philosophical Quarterly (1950-). Volume 32, number 128, July 1982. Pages 195-200.]
           “At this point, I think that a natural response would be the following: So metaphysical realism collapses. But internal realism – the empirical theory of ‘Reference and Understanding’ – doesn’t collapse (I claim). Metaphysical realism was only a picture anyway. If the picture is, indeed, incoherent, then the moral is surely not that something is wrong with realism per se, but simply that realism equals internal realism. Internal realism is all the realism we want or need..…
           “Suppose we try to stump the internal realist with the question, ‘How do you know that “cow” refers to cows?’ …
           “The internal realist should reply that ‘“Cow” refers to cows’ follows immediately from the definition of ‘refers.’ In fact, ‘“cow” refers to cows’ would be true even if internal realism were false: although we can revise ‘“Cow” refers to cows’ by scrapping the theory itself (or at least scrapping or challenging the notion of a cow) – and this is how the fact that ‘“Cow” refers to cows’ is not absolutely unrevisable manifests itself – relative to the theory, ‘“Cow” refers to cows’ is a logical truth.”
           [Hilary Putnam, “Realism and Reason.” Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association. Volume 50, number 6, August 1977. Pages 483-498.]
           “… I will opt for verificationism as a way of preserving the outlook of scientific or empirical realism, which is totally jettisoned by Platonism, even though this means giving up metaphysical realism.” [Hilary Putnam, “Models and Reality.” The Journal of Symbolic Logic. Volume 45, number 3, September 1980. Pages 464-482.]
           “… [Hilary Putnam has taken a] long-haul retreat from a compromise form of ‘internal’ (framework-relative) realism to a pragmatist, ‘natural,’ or ‘commonsense’ realist outlook where … [certain] issues are supposedly laid to rest with the help of (among others) William James and [Ludwig] Wittgenstein.” [Chris Norr, “Putnam on Quantum Theory and Three-Valued Logic Is It (Realistically) an Option?” Alethia (subsequently renamed and reestablished as Journal of Critical Realism). Volume 5, issue 1, July 2002. Pages 39-50.]
           “The tension or incompatibility between metaphysical realism and the denial of intrinsic properties has not gone unnoticed by modern materialists. And for this reason we now find many materialists employing a metaphysical vocabulary that smacks of the fourteenth century: materialists who talk of ‘causal powers,’ of ‘built-in’ similarities and dissimilarities between things in nature, even materialists who speak unabashedly of essences.” [Hilary Putnam, “Why There Isn’t a Ready-made World.” Contemporary Materialism: A Reader. London and New York: Routledge imprint of Taylor & Francis Group, an Informa PLC business. 2005. Pages 233-253.]
           “His [Hilary Putnam’s] rejection of metaphysical realism led him to embrace internal realism, which he later abandoned for pragmatic realism, before he arrived at his present view – natural (or direct) realism. It is evident that Putnam’s understanding of realism does not fit the traditional definitions. Moreover, there is no accurate, simple characterization of the varieties of realism in metaphysics, epistemology, the philosophy of science, the philosophy of mind or the philosophy of language, although all these disciplines are in a certain way connected, and all of them are of interest to Putnam, whose views have had a major influence on the current debate about realism.” [Urszula M. Żegleń, “Putnam on realism: Introduction.” Hilary Putnam: Pragmatism and Realism. London and New York: Routledge imprint of Taylor & Francis Group, an Informa PLC business. 2005. Pages 89-95.]
           “At the present stage of the development of his views, [Hilary] Putnam wants to approach as closely as possible the old good realism of the common man by defending some form of direct realism in the theory of perception (or, as he prefers to call it, ‘natural realism’). This move is motivated not just by Putnam’s characteristic ‘and constant dissatisfaction with the former formulations of his own views; besides that it is driven by realising that while being preoccupied with issues in the philosophy of language and mind, he has unduly neglected the more fundamental issues concerning the nature of perception. In his opinion this has been a particularly bad metaphilosophical strategy, since without a satisfactory account of perception one cannot see ‘how thought and language hook on to the world’ and resolve the question of realism.” [Tadeusz Szubka, “The causal theory of perception and direct realism.” Hilary Putnam: Pragmatism and realism. James Conant and Urszula M. Żegleń, editors. London and New York: Routledge imprint of Taylor & Francis Group, an Informa PLC business. 2005. Pages Pages 109-124.]
      858. granular partition theory (Werner Ceusters and Barry Smith): This realist perspective on mental disease along with some similar approaches were developed using Basic Formal Ontology, particularly The Ontology of General Medical Science. The utilization of Basic Formal Ontology is an alternative to the International Classification of Diseases (ICD) of the World Health Organization (WHO) and the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual (DSM) of the American Psychiatric Association (APA).
           “Basic Formal Ontology (BFO) is an upper-level ontology framework encapsulating best practices in the development of ontologies to serve scientific research. BFO is being used as basis for the creation of high-quality shared ontologies especially in the biomedical research domains. BFO is a realist ontology ….
           “Granular partition theory is a framework for understanding the ways in which, when cataloguing, classifying, mapping or indeed diagnosing a certain portion of reality (POR), we divide up or partition this reality at one or more levels of granularity. The resultant partitions are composed of partition units (analogous to the cells in a grid, to which labels may or may not be assigned), and the theory provides a formal account of the different ways in which such units can correspond or fail to correspond to the entities in reality towards which they are directed. It takes account also of the degree to which a partition represents the part-whole structure of the domain onto which it is projected, and of the degree of completeness with which a partition represents this domain.”
           [Werner Ceusters and Barry Smith, “Foundations for a realist ontology of mental disease.” Journal of Biomedical Semantics. Volume 1, issue 10, 2010. Pages 2-23.]
           “The Foundry initiative also serves to align ontology development efforts carried out by separate communities, for example in research on different model organisms. The potential of such research to yield results valuable for the understanding of human disease rests on our ability to make reliable cross-species comparisons.… Some ontologies represent structure, others represent function, yet others represent stages of development, and some draw on combinations of these, in ways that close off opportunities for automatic reasoning.” [Barry Smith et al., “The OBO Foundry: coordinated evolution of ontologies to support biomedical data integration.” Nature Biotechnology. Volume 25, number 11, November 2007. Pages 1251-1255.]
           “The Relation Ontology will be evaluated on two levels. First, on whether it succeeds in preventing those characteristic kinds of errors which have been associated with a poor treatment of relations in biomedical ontologies in the past. Second, and more important, on whether it helps to achieve greater interoperability of biomedical ontologies and thus to improve reasoning about biological phenomena.” [Barry Smith et al., “Relations in biomedical ontologies.” Genome Biology. Volume 6, issue 5, April 2005. No pagination.]
           “BFO [basic formal ontology] is a framework that is designed to serve as basis for the creation of high-quality shared ontologies in the domain of natural science, and that embraces a methodology which is realist, fallibilist, perspectivalist, and adequatist. This implies a view according to which: (1) reality and its constituents exist independently of our (linguistic, conceptual, theoretical, cultural) representations thereof, (2) our theories and classifications can be subject to revision motivated by what we discover about this reality, (3) there exists a plurality of alternative, equally legitimate views on reality, and (4) that these alternative views are not reducible to any single basic view. It is, above all, which is important for us here.” [Werner Ceusters, Peter Elkin, and Barry Smith, “Negative findings in electronic health records and biomedical ontologies: A realist approach.” International Journal of Medical Informatics. Volume 76, 2007. Pages S326-S333.]
           “… medicine calls for an ontology which can allow the simultaneous application of distinct perspectives (of, for example, doctor and patient, of pharmacologist and geneticist) to one and the same reality. Medicine is a domain which can sustain classications reflecting causally relevant distinctions at more than one level of granularity.” [Barry Smith and Werner Cuesters, “Towards industrial strength philosophy: how analytical ontology can help medical informatics.” Interdisciplinary Science Reviews. Volume 28, number 2, 2003. Pages 106-111.]
           “We reviewed the current definitions of terms pertaining to disease and diagnosis in standard terminology resources and found them to capture inadequately the logical relationships between the terms defined, thus providing an inadequate foundation for information integration and reasoning. We created our definitions drawing on best practices in ontology development as promulgated within the OBO [Open Biomedical Ontologies] Foundry.” [Richard H. Scheuermann, Werner Ceusters, and Barry Smith, “Toward an Ontological Treatment of Disease and Diagnosis.” Summit on translational bioinformatics. Volume 2009, 2009. Pages 116-120.]
           “… genomic data processed by computers are useful to our understanding of, say, animal behavior, or human health and disease, only if some way can be found to link these data to theoretical assertions using terms that are intelligible to biologists. Such links are created by means of what biologists call ‘ontologies,’ which are classifications of biological and other phenomena used to annotate (or ‘tag’) genomic and other experimental data in a systematic way that enables computers to gain consistent access even to data that has been collected in highly heterogeneous ways.” [Barry Smith, “Classifying Processes: An Essay in Applied Ontology.” Ratio. Volume XXV, number 4, December 2012. Page 462-488.]
           “In his Physics, Aristotle writes, ‘When the objects of an inquiry, in any department, have principles, conditions, or elements, it is through acquaintance with these that knowledge, that is to say scientific knowledge, is attained.’ Our thesis is that we would do well to keep these words in mind when we seek to design an adequate ontological inventory of those basic elements that belong to the structure of reality.” [Jonathan Simon, Mariana Dos Santos, James Fielding, and Barry Smith, “Formal ontology for natural language processing and the integration of biomedical databases.” International Journal of Medical Informatics. Volume 75, issue 3, 2006. Pages 224-231.]
           “Although application ontologies do not provide an analytic model for the analysis of experimental data, they do provide a platform upon which the analysis of data may proceed, structuring highly complex and diverse data in an electronically accessible and manageable form. Such an approach has already been successfully applied to the biomedical domains of anatomy, disease classification, and functional genomics; however, to date, the subjective mental symptoms that form a large part of the phenomena dealt with in psychiatry has placed this domain beyond the reach of a realist-founded application ontology.” [James M. Fielding and Dirk Marwede, “The Anatomy of the Image: Toward an Applied Onto-Psychiatry.” Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology. Volume 18, issue 4, 2011. Pages 287-303.]
           “In brief, the Gene Ontology Consortium is ‘a community-based bioinformatics resource that classifies gene product function through the use of structured, controlled vocabularies’ …. It is operated by a group of volunteer editors, who are themselves bioinformatics specialists, with input from the wider bioscience research area. This is a largely virtual community, communicating through email exchange, wikis and ontology development tools. The GO [gene ontology] was first defined in 1998, and launched in 2000 and consisted of over 36,000 terms at the end of 2012 …. The terms, in essence, describe what gene products (the substances, usually RNA transcript sequences of proteins, produced by the operation of a gene) do in biological contexts.” [Charlie Mayor and Lyn Robinson, “Ontological realism, concepts and classification in molecular biology: Development and application of the gene ontology.” Journal of Documentation. Volume 70, number 1, 2014. Pages 173-193.]
      859. perspectival realism (Ronald N. Giere): This realist approach rejects “objective realism.” Giere instead argues that scientific statements should be qualified and conditional. He referred to an earlier development of his framework as constructive realism.
           “… in the end, I wish to reject objective realism but still maintain a kind of realism, perspectival realism, which I think better characterizes realism in science. For a perspectival realist, the strongest claims a scientist can legitimately make are of a qualified, conditional form: ‘According to this highly confirmed theory (or reliable instrument), the world seems to be roughly such and such.’ There is no way legitimately to take the further objectivist step and declare unconditionally: ‘This theory (or instrument) provides us with a complete and literally correct picture of the world itself.’” [Ronald N. Giere. Scientific Perspectivism. Chicago, Illinois: The University of Chicago Press. 2006. Page 5.]
           “Perspectival realism is a further development of what I earlier … called constructive realism. My initial thoughts about the possibility of a perspectival realism benefited from discussions with my former student Laura Rediehs and from her dissertation ….” [Ronald N. Giere. Scientific Perspectivism. Chicago, Illinois: The University of Chicago Press. 2006. Page 118.]
           “In previous publications … I have developed a version of what I call ‘perspectival realism’ as a general characterization of much scientific knowledge. Here I will argue that T. [Thomas] S. Kuhn, at least as represented in his later works, can justifiably be characterized as also having been a perspectival realist. I do not mean to imply that Kuhn himself ever held, or even contemplated, such a view. This is a retrospective interpretation, but one which, I would like to think, Kuhn, were he still alive, would welcome.…
           “Perspectival realism can be summarized in two parts. The first is that some claims generated by scientific practice are claims about the world. They are not merely, for example, claims about beliefs about the world. That is the realism part. Second, these claims are not unconditional, but relative to a set of humanly constructed concepts, a ‘conceptual scheme’ if one wishes. That is the perspectival part. The perspectivism is not global, but confined to scientific knowledge, so a scientific perspectivism.”
           [Ronald N. Giere, “Kuhn as Perspectival Realist.” Topoi. Volume 32, issue 1, April 2013. Pages 53-57.]
           “We need only be able to make a comparative judgment as to which perspective generates the overall best fitting models. Here the molecular perspective is clearly superior. We can understand how large numbers of small molecules might behave like a continuous fluid. We cannot understand the phenomenon of diffusion from a fluid mechanics perspective. That asymmetry is all that a perspectival realism requires.” [Ronald N. Giere, “Scientific perspectivism: behind the stage door.” Studies in History and Philosophy of Science. Volume 40, 2009. Pages 221-223.]
           “The recent appearance of numerous articles on visual modes of representation in the science studies literature is evidence that historians, philosophers, and sociologists of science are finally becoming aware of how much of science has been done, and increasingly is being done, using pictorial and diagrammatic modes of representation. Of course some of this literature is cited in support of a constructivist picture of science, but it can equally well be viewed as supporting a more liberal notion of realism, something we might call ‘perspectival realism.’” [Ronald N. Giere, “Viewing Science.” PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association. 1994. Pages 3-16.]
           “… [My] conception of realism … is not dependent in any important way on the concept of truth as direct correspondence between a statement and reality. With intended irony, I call this view ‘constructive realism.’ Models are human constructs, but some may provide a better fit with the world than others, and be known to do so.” [Ronald N. Giere, “The Cognitive Construction of Scientific Knowledge (Response to Pickering).” Social Studies of Science. Volume 22, number 1, February 1992. Pages 95-107.]
           “One must remember … that constructive realism is a doctrine only about the nature of scientific models and hypotheses, that is, only about scientific representations. It is not a doctrine about scientific judgment, that is, about how scientists judge which models best represent the world. Constructive realism is compatible with these judgments being made in accord with a priori rules of rational choice or by means of purely social negotiations. My claim will be that scientific judgment is a natural, cognitive process. The resulting view is a naturalistic, constructive realism.” [Ronald N. Giere. Explaining Science: A Cognitive Approach. Chicago, Illinois: The University of Chicago Press. 1988. Page 94.]
           “What drives the traditional point of view, I think, is a strong sense of realism understood in terms of the truth of hypotheses. Positive evidence is understood as evidence that a hypothesis is true. A scientific community could be seriously mistaken about the hypotheses it regards as possibly true. Thus, if the judgment that there is positive evidence for a particular hypothesis depends on what other hypotheses are regarded as possibly true, the community could easily end up judging there to be positive evidence for hypotheses that are false.” [Ronald N. Giere, “A New Framework for Teaching Scientific Reasoning.” Argumentation. Volume 15, number 1, January 2001. Pages 21-33.]
           “Thus far I have made no distinctions among elements of a model that might be identified with aspects of the real world. Any element might be so designated. In this respect, the account given so far is realist as opposed to empiricist in the sense that claimed similarities between models and the world are restricted to those aspects of the world that are in some sense ‘observable’ …. In general, I think that the distinction between what is observable or not by ordinary humans is not of fundamental importance in any theory of science.” [Ronald N. Giere, “How Models Are Used to Represent Reality.” Philosophy of Science. Volume 71, December 2004. Pages 742-752.]
           “My own solution to this newer problem of scientific realism involves a view which I share with Nancy Cartwright … and Paul Teller … as well as [Bas] van Fraassen. This is that the primary representational media for theoretical claims are models. Models range from actual physical objects, such as [James] Watson and [Francis] Crick’s original metal and cardboard models of DNA, through diagrams, such as Feynman Diagrams, to abstract entities, such as an ideal gas.” [Ronald N. Giere, “Scientific Realism: Old and New Problems.” Erkenntnis. Volume 63, 2005. Pages 149-165.]
           “… an evolutionary perspective provides a program for dealing with norms and the problem of relativism. At some stage in the evolutionary process, the evolution of human organisms and human societies became coextensive. Even modestly complex societies require some social organization. Norms make it possible to maintain the requisite degree of social organization. Nor need the naturalist regard these as mere regularities in social behavior. Norms are taught and enforced by various means of social control. The regularity is a product of these social actions.” [Ronald N. Giere, “Philosophy of Science Naturalized.” Philosophy of Science. Volume 52, number 3, September 1985. Pages 331-356.]
           “… I will be examining a question that arises once one has adopted the perspective of distributed cognitive systems, namely, the role of agency in a distributed cognitive system. Here I will be arguing, contrary to several advocates of distributed cognitive systems, that we should regard the human components of distributed cognitive systems as the only sources of agency within such systems. In particular, we should not extend notions of agency to such systems as a whole.” [Ronald N. Giere, “The Role of Agency in Distributed Cognitive Systems.” Philosophy of Science. Volume 73, number 5, December 2006. Pages 710-719.]
           “… the notion of distributed cognition brings under one category such things as Cartesian coordinates and the telescope, both of which are widely cited as major contributions to the Scientific Revolution.” [Ronald N. Giere, “Distributed Cognition: Where the Cognitive and the Social Merge.” Social Studies of Science. Volume 33, number 2, April 2003. Pages 301-310.]
           “… models are crucial entities in [Ronald N.] Giere’s philosophy of science. He does not stop there however but proceeds to problematize the concepts of theory and observation. Since data are instrument-dependent, we in fact do not employ ‘pure’ data but models of data as empirical evidence. Ergo, representational models do not correspond to reality but rather to models of data; models are related to models. Hence, the ordinary concept of truth as correspondence between a statement and the world becomes dubious.” [Thomas Brante, “Perspectival Realism, Representational Models, and the Social Sciences.” Philosophy of the Social Sciences. Volume 40, number 1, 2010. Pages 107-117.]
      860. constraint realism (Trevor Hussey): This version of realism has been influenced by L. Rom Harré and Ludwig Wittgenstein.
           “First, it [constraint realism] accepts the fundamental premise of metaphysical realism: that there is an objective reality which exists independently of our beliefs, theories or descriptions of it. Second, it makes the claim that we exist as active agents within that objective world and in interaction with it. Third, it claims that the world constrains our activities – some things are empirically possible and others are impossible because of the way we, and the rest of the world, are constituted. We cannot do just as we choose. We can walk, but not through walls, and we can run but not at the speed of sound. When we conduct experiments there are ineluctable constraints on what results we obtain.…
           “These ideas come broadly from [L. Rom] Harré … and [Lutwig} Wittgenstein …, although they are not responsible for the interpretations here.

           “[Trevor Hussey, “Realism and Nursing.” Nursing Philosophy. Volume 1, issue 2, October 2000. Pages 98-108.]

           “… I will not assume the truth of moral realism here. It is sufficient to say that it has at least as much credibility as any theory claiming a supernatural or divine foundation for morality: views which, while popular among the general public, do not have widespread support among moral philosophers – for what that is worth.” [Trevor Hussey, “Naturalistic Nursing.” Nursing Philosophy. Volume 12, issue 1, January 2011. Pages 45-52.]

           “… it is not clear whether the difference between naturalism and scientific realism is significant in the context of interpreting spirituality.” [Trevor Hussey, “Nursing and spirituality.” Nursing Philosophy. Volume 10, issue 2, April 2009. Pages 71-80.]
      861. pragmatic moral realism (Sami Pihlström as pronounced in this MP3 audio file): He develops a version of moral realism informed by William James’ pragmatism, Charles Sanders Peirce’s “pragmaticism,” and Hilary Putnam’s pragmatic realism. Pihlström’s approach, while not a version of critical realism, has been selected for inclusion by Foster.
           “Moral values, or whatever one is ethically (personally) committed to, can be thought of as ‘real’ within the human world …, but because of the distinctive character of this ethical dimension of reality, no metaphysically-realist ‘independence’ need or even can be invoked here. The pragmatic moral realist can hold that moral values and duties are personally real, objective to some extent (that is, not subjective or ‘relative’ in any easy way), though of course not objective in the sense in which sticks and stones and electrons are ‘objective.’ Rather, through this kind of examples, we may end up viewing the notion of objectivity itself as a Wittgensteinian ‘family resemblance’ notion. There is no essence of objectivity uniting the objectivity of electrons and the objectivity of values. The pragmatist can easily accommodate such a pragmatic pluralism about the ways in which things are ‘real’ or ‘objective’ in her or his anti-reductionist world-picture ….” [Sami Pihlström. Pragmatic Moral Realism: A Transcendental Defense. Amsterdam, Netherlands, and New York: Rodopi imprint of Brill. 2005. Page 32.]
           “The deontological streak is … quite clear in [William] James’s few ethical writings …. [H]e declares that the happiness of the entire world with the price of an eternal torment of one single lost soul in some utmost corner of the universe would be simply unacceptable. James is a (pragmatic) moral realist. Some things are right, according to him, and some others are wrong—even though rightness or wrongness of our ways of living are properties of situation-relative human actions rather than immutable, a priori given structures of morality.” [Sami Pihlström, “The prospects of transcendental pragmatism: Reconciling Kant and James.” Philosophy Today. Volume 41, number 3, fall 1997. Pages 383-393.]
           “I am going to argue that transcendental arguments work only if they are sufficiently ‘naturalized’ (which will most naturally be achieved on a pragmatistic basis); however, such a naturalization or pragmatization is at odds with the metaphysical realism inherent in Peircean scholastic realism. Consequently, transcendental argumentation in favor of any view, including scholastic realism, will work only if certain key assumptions of such a realism are given up.” [Sami Pihlström, “Peircean Scholastic Realism and Transcendental Arguments.” Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society. Volume 34, number 2, spring 1998. Pages 382-413.]
           “The continuing debate over scientific realism and truth is, hence, crucial in this tradition—if, indeed, such a tradition is usefully identifiable at all—and it is only from the perspective of this debate, in some of its key dimensions, that I will here try to survey the history of pragmatist philosophy of science. Moreover, the simplified picture of there being two basically different pragmatisms, realistic and relativistic, or objective and subjective …, ought to be enriched by a more nuanced historical narrative.” [Sami Pihlström, “How (Not) to Write the History of Pragmatist Philosophy of Science?” Perspectives on Science. Volume 16, number 1, 2008. Pages 26-69.]
           “[Hilary] Putnam’s references – from his early scientifically realistic phase through his first … substantial defenses of internal realism up to, and including, his more recent treatments of the realism issue … – have been rather critical: together with Paul Feyerabend and ‘French postmodernists,’ [Thomas] Kuhn seems to be, for Putnam, one of those irrationalist relativists or incommensurabilists who sacrifice the objectivity of science. According to Putnam, that objectivity must be maintained, even if metaphysically realist interpretations of it have led philosophers astray.” [Sami Pihlström, “The Transcendental Method and (Post-)Empiricist Philosophy of Science.” Journal for General Philosophy of Science/Zeitschrift für allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie. Volume 36, number 1, 2005. Pages 81-106.]
           “Most emergence theories seem to be based on a strong scientific or metaphysical realism, although weaker vanants of realism would be available – e.g., within a pragmatist framework. The typical question that contemporary emergentists ask is whether there really are emergent properties (however they are defined) in the basic structure of the world independently of our conceptualizations of the world. Strong emergentists try to give a positive answer to this question, whereas weaker emergentists and non-emergentists … prefer a neganve answer.” [Sami Pihlström, “The Re-emergence of the Emergence Debate.” Principia. Volume 6, number 1, 2002. Pages 133-181.]
           “In recent Anglo-American philosophy, simple and straightforward distinctions between "realism" and ‘antirealism’ (in philosophy of science and elsewhere) have often been rejected, usually by thinkers who represent one or another form of ‘neopragmatism’ (by, e.g., W. V. Quine, Hilary Putnam, and Richard Rorty). These thinkers have found out that metaphysical realism, the view that the world has its own ontological basic structure independently of the structuring activity of language-using beings, is deeply problematic, perhaps even incoherent.… Solipsism is, in any event, much more parsimonious than any parsimonious version of realism.” [Sami Pihlström, “A Solipsist in a Real World.” Dialectica. Volume 50, number 4, 1996. Pages 275-290.]
           “… even [Immanuel] Kant himself urged that transcendental idealism and empirical realism are compatible with each other; moreover, for Kant, it was precisely transcendental idealism that made empirical realism possible. Thus, pragmatists can easily be realists without being transcendental realists--in contemporary jargon, metaphysical realists. They just have to be careful about what kind of realists they are. Pragmatic realism, the label used by several pragmatists nowadays, is, I take it, the contemporary pragmatist’s equivalent to Kant’s empirical realism; as much as the latter depends on transcendental idealism, we may say that the former depends on transcendental pragmatism, according to which it is up to us to construct, at the transcendental level, the fundamental formal structure(s) of reality.” [Sami Pihlström, “Pragmatism and the ethical grounds of metaphysics.” Philosophical Topics. Volume 36, number 1, spring 2008. Pages 211-237.]
           “Peircean theology is highly theoretical, speculative, and metaphysical; no religious fundamentalisms can draw any support from [Charles Sanders] Peirce. This sounds so obvious that it would hardly need discussion, as Peirce, after all, is famously the father not only of pragmatism but also of fallibilism, reminding us of the fallible and corrigible character of all human knowledge.” [Sami Pihlström, “Conversations on Peirce: Reals and Ideals.” The Pluralist. Volume 8, number 2, summer 2013. Pages 130-134.]
      862. environmental sociological pedagogy (Alan P. Rudy, Jason Konefal, and many others): They describe the field as a movement against “environmental racism.”
           “Environmental sociological pedagogy has changed quite dramatically since the inception of the field. This is true for three reasons, each related to changes in the environmental movement and the intellectual landscape within which environmental sociology has developed.…
           “… the movement against environmental racism stimulated a reorientation of environmental sociological pedagogy ‘back’ to traditional sociological analyses of the disproportionate representation of oppressed people of color and the poor within the most heavily polluted, toxic, and illegally dumped-on areas of the country.”
           [Alan P. Rudy and Jason Konefal, “Nature, Sociology, and Social Justice: Environmental Sociology, Pedagogy, and the Curriculum.” American Behavioral Scientist. Volume 51, number 4, December 2007. Pages 495-515.]
      863. archaeological analyses of power (Tracy L. Sweely): She discusses changing views of power in the field of archaeology.
           “Prior to the 1980s archaeological analyses of power tended to focus on one of two types of relationships: either those between large, clearly defined social groups in a society and the dominant authority structures within which they operated, or those between two or more such authority structures. The apparent archaeological accessibility of the material culture of social institutions, such as large-scale architecture found in societies considered ‘complex,’ may explain this focus on domination. But, while this focus on larger systems is instrumental in elucidating power as it is visualized in the social conditions and in the overarching social structures within a given society, the resulting definition of power makes it difficult to view the concept outside of a hierarchical, dominance-oriented framework …. A shift in theoretical orientation regarding the analysis of power has been the result of developments in feminist, post-processual, and critical thinking ….” [Tracy L. Sweely, “Introduction.” Manifesting Power: Gender and the interpretation of power in archaeology. London and New York: Routledge imprint of Taylor & Francis Group, an Informa PLC business. 2003. Pages 1-14.]
      864. reflective practice (Gareth Morgan): He develops an approach to “workforce development” in public health.
           “Given the diversity and challenges of public health roles, workforce development requires a multiplicity of approaches, and reflective practice could be considered, perhaps with increasing prominence, as part of this.
           “It has been suggested that the benefits of reflective practice are threefold. The first is to re-define the understanding of professional knowledge; the second to develop personal knowledge or self-awareness; and the third is to evaluate the appropriateness of actions.…
           “Reflective practice and increased self-awareness might be achieved in a variety of different ways. Personal preferences and individual circumstances may determine the most effective way to achieve reflective practice and the benefits of doing so should be considerable at any stage of a professional journey.”
           [Gareth Morgan, “Reflective practice and self-awareness.” Perspectives in Public Health. Volume 129, number 4, July 2009. Pages 161-162.]
      865. liberation sociology (Joe R. Feagin and Hernán Vera as pronounced in this MP3 audio file): They develop a sociology focused upon human rights, participatory democracy, and social justice.
           “In the spring of 1845 one of the founders of the liberation social science tradition, the young Karl Marx, wrote that ‘the philosophers have only interpreted the world, in various ways; the point, however, is to change it.’ Sociologists centrally concerned about human emancipation and liberation take this insight seriously. The point of liberation sociology is not just to research the social world but also to assist in changing it in the direction of expanded human rights, participatory democracy, and social justice.
           “Liberation sociology is concerned with alleviating or eliminating various social oppressions and with creating societies that are more just and egalitarian. An emancipatory sociology not only seeks sound scientific knowledge but also often takes sides with, and takes the outlook of, the oppressed and envisions an end to that oppression. It adopts what Gideon Sjoberg has called a countersystem approach. A countersystem analyst consciously tries to step outside her or his own society to better view and critically assess it. A countersystem perspective often envisions a society where people have empathetic compassion for human suffering and a real commitment to reducing that suffering. It envisions research and analysis relevant to everyday human problems, particularly those of the socially oppressed. The countersystem standard is broader than that of a particular society or nation-state. Using a strong human rights standard, such as the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the liberation social scientist accents broader societal and international contexts and assesses existing social institutions against a vision of more humane social arrangements.”
           [Joe R. Feagin and Hernán Vera. Liberation Sociology. Third edition. London and New York: Routledge imprint of Taylor & Francis Group, an Informa PLC business. 2016. Pages 17-18.]
      866. emancipatory sociology (Michael R. Hill): He advocates a sociology which promotes “emancipation from the hierarchical, patriarchal power structures.”
           “Responsible epistemological/axiological discussions are virtually impossible in American sociology today. Responsible dialogue is replaced by destructive, dichotomizing debate which prevents emancipation from the hierarchical, patriarchal power structures of this society. Responsible emancipatory critique is suppressed by patriarchal power-wielders who control disciplinary structure, graduate departments, and mainstream journals. We must question this situation as we look forward to the close of the Twentieth Century. If we are to leave a responsible discipline to the next generation, we must today throw off the shackles of patriarchy and hierarchical oppression. If we are frustrated and defeated in this attempt, then we must move beyond the discipline to seek and support those few here and there who are working to establish a truly emancipatory sociology.” [Michael R. Hill, “Epistemology, Axiology, and Ideology in Sociology.” Mid-American Review of Sociology. Volume 9, number 2, winter 1984. Pages 59-77.]
      867. liquid modernity as pronounced in this MP3 audio file (Zygmunt Bauman as pronounced in this MP3 audio file): The current age is liquid, or late, modernity, not postmodernity. Bauman, a Polish sociologist who currently lives in England, explores emancipation in this age.
           “Military force and its ‘hit and run’ war-plan prefigured, embodied and portended what was really at stake in the new type of war in the era of liquid modernity: not the conquest of a new territory, but crushing the walls which stopped the flow of new, fluid global powers; beating out of the enemy’s head the desire to set up his own rules, and so opening up the so-far barricaded and walled-off, inaccessible space to the operations of the other, non-military, arms of power.” [Zygmunt Bauman. Liquid Modernity. Malden, Massachusetts: Polity Press. 2000. Page 12.]
           “… I want to suggest that the strength of [Zygmunt] Bauman’s analysis is not so much in the way he sees consumer culture as an all-encompassing reality, but the way in which he suggests to us that if we are prepared to admit that consumerism has become the way of life we are in a better position to learn a great deal about the ‘means and the mechanisms’ of the liquid modern sociality, which means of course that we will also be better equipped to do something about changing the world for the better, for humanity.” [Tony Blackshaw. Zygmunt Bauman. London and New York: Routledge imprint of Taylor & Francis Group, an Informa PLC business. 2005. Page 112.]
      868. critical hermeneutics as pronounced in this MP3 audio file (Anthony King, Jonathan Roberge as pronounced in this MP3 audio file, Anthea H. M. Jacobs, Kristin Zeiler as pronounced in this MP3 audio file, and others): They develops critical approaches to interpretation.
           “CONCLUSION: TOWARDS A CRITICAL HERMENEUTICS …
           “… hermeneutics is able to demonstrate that the beliefs of certain dominant groups are ideological because they consistently mis-represent and obscure their actual relations with subordinate groups but it does this by reference not to objective social structure but to the ways the exploited experience, understand and resist their meaningfully produced but material relationship with their exploiters. [Karl] Marx’s critique of political economy was, in some senses, a hermeneutic programme where he demonstrated the inadequacy of particular capitalist ideas to the reality of capitalism, in the light of the experience of the proletariat. Hermeneutics does not reduce social life to mere solipsistic and subjectivist ideas and, therefore, does not abandon critique.”
           [Anthony King, “The Impossibility of Naturalism: The Antinomies of Bhaskar’s Realism.” Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour. Volume 29, issue 3, September 1999. Pages 267-288.]
           “The development of critical hermeneutics certainly remains a work in progress; a collective enterprise for which what comes before is but a minute part. In this article, it would have thus been necessary to show that the main challenge of critical hermeneutics resides in the fine dialectic, or the articulation of three analytical levels: a theory of meaning, a theory of action, and a theory of experience. First, ideology as a meaning-interpretation-text triptych is what reveals and hides reality – through the permanence of symbolism, but also through the constant possibility of manipulation and distortion. As stated above, this analysis produces in turn a remnant in the form of its somewhat sizeable difficulty of giving off a concrete appearance, i.e. of being relevant in terms of action.” [Jonathan Roberge, “What is critical hermeneutics?” Thesis Eleven. Volume 106, number 1, August 2011. Pages 5-22.]
           “Critical hermeneutics draws on hermeneutics and critical theory. A simple definition of hermeneutics is textual interpretation or, put differently, finding meaning in the hidden word. I regard it as a suitable methodology for exposing the hidden meanings of institutional culture in institutional texts. Critical theory, on the other hand, is an emancipatory approach that enables us to dig beneath the surface of social life and uncover the assumptions that keep us from fully understanding how the world works. Critical hermeneutics thus holds that the meaning we note on the surface makes up the mere periphery of much deeper layers of meaning. It provides a methodology for rigorous interpretation of institutional or university texts related to institutional culture, taking into consideration the historical backgrounds of institutions. In doing so, it seeks for meaning beyond the text, arousing a critical consciousness of institutional culture.” [Anthea H. M. Jacobs, “Critical hermeneutics and higher education: a perspective on texts, meaning and institutional culture.” South African Journal of Philosophy. Volume 33, number 3, 2014. Pages 297–310.]
           “Critical hermeneutics is important in global bioethics, since it provides a theoretical basis for the understanding of the other as both the same and different. This means, for example, that a certain pluralism in terms of ethical standpoints needs to be allowed—but that there also is a core principle of global bioethics: the principle of respect for the other as both the same and different. This principle can serve as a basis for a radical self-reflection and self-criticism. It implies a calling into question of my own particular ethical practices as well as a questioning of others’ practices. The benefit of this kind of global bioethics is that it allows a positive view on cultural differences, without leading to relativism.” [Kristin Zeiler, “Self and other in global bioethics: critical hermeneutics and the example of different death concepts.” Medicine, Health Care, and Philosophy. Volume 12, number 2, 2009. Pages 137-145.]
           “Critical hermeneutics moves beyond simple textual analysis (e.g. attempts to understand the construction of a text in context) to try to understand the power aspects involved (e.g. who or what is privileged and who or what is marginalized) …. Consequently it offers a useful methodological tool to analyze feminist or proto-feminist practice in the context of a different time.” [Niya Peng, Tianyuan Yu, and Albert Mills, “Feminist thinking in late seventh-century China: A critical hermeneutics analysis of the case of Wu Zetian.” Equality, Diversity and Inclusion: An International Journal. Volume 34, number 1, 2015. Pages 67-83.]
      869. hermeneutics of design (John Calvelli): He attempts to bring together philosophy and science.
           “Philosophy in-forms action as deliberation, interpretation and disposition. By bringing philosophy and design together, we create a field of interpretive action. Design is an expression of an iterative conatus: the need to act, and act again, in the face of both infinite possibility and imminent closure. One acts, informed by disposition. To act again, one’s previous actions are interpreted, informing our disposition. We may, through disposition or deliberation, decide to act again. To decide is to put into place a neural algorithm informing disposition, allowing it to act out under the affect of conative force. It is not necessary to decide, however; one’s previous actions and their effects will inform disposition, and thus future action.
           “It is interpretive action, a hermeneutics of design, that has the only chance of meeting our unsustainable world—the world we have created while tarrying in other worlds—with a commensurate response. We may become philosophers committed to action, or designers committed to reflection.”
           [John Calvelli. The Future is an Image: Unsustainability, Plasticity and the Design of Time. New York: Atropos Press. 2015. Page 6.]
      870. sociological Marxism (Michael Burawoy): He proposes an approach using the work of Antonio Gramsci and Karl Polanyi.
           “… the longevity of capitalism guarantees the longevity of Marxism. But longevity also implies reconstruction. As capitalism rebuilds itself so must Marxism. It is after all a theoretical tradition that claims ideas change with the material world they seek to grasp and transform. Thus, every epoch fashions its own Marxism, elaborating that tradition to tackle the problems of the day. In this article I offer the outlines of a Sociological Marxism that emerges from the hitherto unexamined and unexpected convergence of the mid-twentieth-century writings of Karl Polanyi and Antonio Gramsci. That they both, independently, converged on the concept of ‘society’ from very different Marxist traditions suggests they were grappling with something novel and important.” [Michael Burawoy, “For a Sociological Marxism: The Complementary Convergence of Antonio Gramsci and Karl Polanyi.” Politics & Society. Volume 31, number 2, June 2003. Pages 193-261.]
      871. public sociology (Michael Burawoy, Judith Blau, and many others): Taking an approach to public sociology, they advocate for the transformation of sociology into an emancipatory project.
           “Alvin Gouldner … took structural functionalism to task for its domain assumptions about a consensus society that were out of tune with the escalating conflicts of the 1960s. Feminism, queer theory and critical race theory have hauled professional sociology over the coals for overlooking the ubiquity and profundity of gender, sexual, and racial oppressions. In each case critical sociology attempts to make professional sociology aware of its biases, silences, promoting new research programs built on alternative foundations. Critical sociology is the conscience of professional sociology just as public sociology is the conscience of policy sociology.” [Michael Burawoy, ”2004 Presidential Address: For Public Sociology.” American Sociological Review. Volume 70, February 2005. Pages 4-28.]
           “A public sociology that will tackle the public issues of today requires the transformation of sociology as we know it. This is the stirring message of this volume—at the heart of sociology must lie a concern for society as such, the protection of those social relations through which we recognize each other as humans. Thus, the chapters focus on those fundamental human rights that uphold human community, first and foremost, against the colonizing projects of states and markets. In this vision of sociology … society can no longer be taken for granted. The devastation of society—whether in civil war or in famine, in prison or in ghetto—cannot be consigned to some marginal specialty or to some other discipline. Rather it must be the principle focus of our discipline, casting into relief threats to society’s very existence.” [Michael Burawoy, ”Introduction: A Public Sociology for Human Rights.” Public Sociologies Reader. Judith Blau and Keri E. Iyall Smith, editors. Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc. 2006. Kindle edition.]
           “In this era of third-wave marketization, sociology turns toward civil society, above and below the nation state. Below the nation state sociologists forge a public sociology with local communities and even a policy sociology tied to local governments that now have to bear the brunt of the provision of social support—responsibility which the federal state has abdicated. Above the state, public sociology develops in close connection to transnational associations, organizations and movements. Third-wave marketization calls for a public sociology that knits together local publics into a global formation.” [Michael Burawoy, “Third-Wave Sociology and the End of Pure Science.” The American Sociologist. Fall/Winter 2005. Pages 152-165.]
           “We can trace public sociology back to C. Wright Mills, who famously defined the sociological imagination as linking personal troubles to public issues, the foundation of a sociology for publics. Mills cast the sociological imagination in opposition to the professionalization of the time – grand theory (structural functionalism of Talcott Parsons) and abstracted empiricism (market and opinion research of Paul Lazarsfeld). Harking back to the classics Mills propounded the craftworker as the ideal sociologist – an isolated monad bringing together theory and empirical research, and tying social milieu to social structure, micro to macro.” [Michael Burawoy, “Public sociology: Mills vs. Gramsci—Introduction to the Italian Translation of “For Public Sociology” Sociologica. Volume 1, 2007. Pages 7-13.]
           “We are in the process of adopting two technological capabilities – an electronic interface with authors and reviewers, and a web page for on-line posting and publication. We have adopted the software program, JournalTech, and currently using it to track manuscripts and for reviewers to submit their evaluations online, with the expectation that we will soon offer authors with the opportunity to submit their papers on-line. Two important features of our Web page will include a discussion page and a publications page. The first will serve the purpose of continuing discussions that are published in the journal in the section entitled ‘Commentary and Debate’ or ‘Public Sociologies.’” [Judith Blau, “Editor’s Note.” Social Forces. Volume 83, number 1, September 2004. Pages 1-2.]
      872. radical sociology (Alvin Gouldner, Herbert Marcuse, C. Wright Mills, and many others): The left transformation of sociology began during the 1960s and accelerated, in earnest, through the 1970s. The development of modern conflict theories, the increasing popularity of critical social theories, and the founding of critical realism were facilitated by radical sociology.
           “[Alvin] Gouldner argued that the subjective nature of social life should also be recognized by the sociologist as being applicable to sociological knowledge itself. Sociologists should therefore translate their attitudes, their sentiments, their feelings into their work and thereby seek to liberate society and practice a truly radical sociology.
           “The crisis pronouncements of the 1950s and 1960s effectively brought about an activist radicalization of sociology …. Especially the early 1970s, when the 60s generation came off age, witnessed the production of many, more and less radical variations of a new sociology. Some of these developments were intellectual and some of them were waged at the professional level.
           “In matters of scholarship, a slue of radical sociological writings began to be published from the early 1970s onwards. Almost overnight, Karl Marx became one of the founding fathers of sociology … Marxist sociological research began to appear more and more in the established sociology journals, while new specialized journals of an explicitly critical bent were founded as well and major books in the field were influenced by Marxian and otherwise radical thought.
           “On a professional level, there occurred a radicalization of sociologists as well, specifically in the American Sociological Association (ASA).
           [Mathieu Deflem, “The Structural Transformation of Sociology.” Society. Volume 50, number 2, 2013. Pages 156-166.]
           “In many ways, the successes of sociology as an agent of social change in the 1950s, especially in the area of civil rights, contributed to a crisis within sociology. The stasis of the functional [19]50s was not in agreement with the emerging social movements of the 1960s. The new generation of sociologists embraced modern conflict theory as a means to address the inequalities in American society. C. Wright Mills … and later Alvin Gouldner … declared functionalism dead. Sociology’s inability to account for the forces of social change and the social movements of the 1960s and 1970s frequently took sociology out of the classroom and into the streets. With its focus on coercion rather than consensus, the social forces of stratification and inequality fueled the emergence of modern conflict theory.” [Rodger A. Bates, “The Sociological Perspective Revisited.” The Journal of Public and Professional Sociology. Volume 7, issue 1, March 2015. Pages 1-9.]
      873. Luddism (Edward Palmer “E. P.” Thompson): He uses the Luddites to illustrate a reaction to “unrestrained industrial capitalism.”
           “… Luddism can be seen as a violent eruption of feeling against unrestrained industrial capitalism, harking back to an obsolescent paternalist code, and sanctioned by traditions of the working community. But at this point the term ‘reactionary’ comes too easily to some lips. For despite all the homilies addressed to the Luddites (then and subsequently) as to the beneficial consequences of new machinery or of ‘free’ enterprise, – arguments which, in any case, the Luddites were intelligent enough to weigh in their minds for themselves – the machine-breakers, and not the tract-writers, made the most realistic assessment of the short-term effects.” [E. P. Thompson. The Making of the English Working Class. New York: Vintage Books imprint of Random House, Inc. 1991. Page 550.]
      874. dialogic sociology of education as pronounced in this MP3 audio file (Ramón Flecha as pronounced in this MP3 audio file): “… sociology of education is already on the move. It has become dialogic, studying and showing that, actually, there are Successful Educational Actions (SEAs) worldwide that challenge structures and provide all children with the education they deserve to not only have equal chances but also, and more importantly, equal results. This dialogic sociology of education develops in dialogue with social agents and, as a result, has greater chances to improve their lives.” [Ramón Flecha, “The Dialogic Sociology of Education.” International Studies in Sociology of Education. Volume 21, Issue 1, 2011. Pages 7-20.]
      875. creation of the next imperialism (Jayati Ghosh [Hindī, जयति घोष, Jayati Ghoṣa as pronounced in this MP3 audio file]): She considers the emergence of new forms of global capitalist imperialism.
           “… if the lessons of history are to be recognized, it is likely that the emergence of new powers on the world capitalist stage will generate immense new conflicts—economic, political, and military—as the old imperial powers seek to retain their dominance over the world system. The current trade negotiations reflect Washington’s determination to make an economic preemptive attack and lock-in the present power structure based on the U.S.-led triad of the United States/Canada, Western Europe, and Japan. The goal is to create a political-legal superstructure for world trade that will reinforce the advantages of those who currently have the most economic power, including the mega-multinationals centered in the triad.” [Jayati Ghosh, “The Creation of the Next Imperialism: The Institutional Architecture.” Monthly Review: An Independent Socialist Magazine. Volume 67, issue 3, July/August 2015. Pages 146-158.]
      876. socialist triangle (Michael Lebowitz): He describes the unifying factor in all struggles against capitalism as universal right to “full human development.”
           “The socialist triangle is a system of reproduction. Its premises are results of the system, and its products are social ownership of the means of production, social production organized by workers, and a solidarian orientation to communal needs and purposes. Yet the very interdependence of these three specific elements suggests that realization of each element depends upon the existence of the other two. Without production for social needs, no real social property; without social property, no worker decision making oriented toward society’s needs; without worker decision making, no transformation of people and their needs. In socialism as an organic system, ‘every economic relation presupposes every other in its [socialist] economic form, and everything posited is thus also a presupposition; this is the case with every organic system.’” [Michael Lebowitz. The Socialist Alternative: Real Human Development. New York: Monthly Review Press. 2010. Page 62.]
           “… I constantly came back to the Marxist concept of revolutionary practice, that simultaneous changing of circumstance and human activity or self-change – how people transform themselves through their struggles. But not only through struggles; they produce themselves through their daily activity. People are formed by what they do.…
           “… I think that so much of the current struggles (and this is certainly what I’ve being emphasizing in my work) is that these are struggles for people’s right to full development. That transcends particular cases and is a unifying factor. The idea of everyone having the right to full development and to development of their potential means, of course, adequate health facilities, adequate education, adequate food, etc. That is an element which can unify the whole working class.
           “My book The Socialist Alternative: Real Human Development talks theoretically about issue that I’ve learned in this process here. But the book also looks at concrete measures. One of the central measures that has to be part of a struggle for building a socialist alternative is the struggle to expand the commons. What does neoliberalism, what does capitalism, do? Its whole focus is to commodify everything. Health care – commodity it. Schools – commodify them. Commodify everything. So what is the alternative for human beings trying to develop their potential? Decommodify everything and bring things under control.”
           [Michael Lebowitz, “The Unifying Element in All Struggles Against Capital Is the Right of Everyone to Full Human Development.” Monthly Review: An Independent Socialist Magazine. Volume 63, issue 6, November 2011. Pages 46-51.]
      877. the principle of hope (Ernst Bloch as pronounced in this MP3 audio file): He advocates having even bigger daydreams.
           “It is a question of learning hope. Its work does not renounce, it is in love with success rather than failure. Hope, superior to fear, is neither passive like the latter, nor locked into nothingness. The emotion of hope goes out of itself, makes people broad instead of confining them, cannot know nearly enough of what it is that makes them inwardly aimed, of what may be allied to them outwardly. The work of this emotion requires people who throw themselves actively into what is becoming, to which they themselves belong. It will not tolerate a dog’s life which feels itself only passively thrown into What Is, which is not seen through, even wretchedly recognized. The work against anxiety about life and the machinations of fear is that against its creators, who are for the most part easy to identify, and it looks in the world itself for what can help the world; this can be found. How richly people have always dreamed of this, dreamed of the better life that might be possible. Everybody’s life is pervaded by daydreams: one part of this is just stale, even enervating escapism, even booty for swindlers, but another part is provocative, is not content just to accept the bad which exists, does not accept renunciation. This other part has hoping at its core, and is teachable. It can be extricated from the unregulated daydream and from its sly misuse, can be activated undimmed. Nobody has ever lived without daydreams, but it is a question of knowing them deeper and deeper and in this way keeping them trained unerringly, usefully, on what is right. Let the daydreams grow even fuller, since this means they are enriching themselves around the sober glance; not in the sense of clogging, but of becoming clear. Not in the sense of merely contemplative reason which takes things as they are and as they stand, but of participating reason which takes them as they go, and therefore also as they could go better. Then let the daydreams grow really fuller, that is, clearer, less random, more familiar, more clearly understood and more mediated with the course of things. So that the wheat which is trying to ripen can be encouraged to grow and be harvested.” [Ernst Bloch. The Principle of Hope. Volume one. Neville Plaice, Stephen Plaice, and Paul Knight, translators. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press. 1995. Pages 3-4.]
      878. radical history (Howard Zinn and many others): He applies critical social theory to history.
           “A radical history … would expose the limitations of governmental reform, the connections of government to wealth and privilege, the tendencies of governments toward war and xenophobia, the play of money and power behind the presumed neutrality of law. It would illustrate the role of government in maintaining things as they are, whether by force, or deception, or by a skillful combination of both—whether by deliberate plan or by the concatenation of thousands of individuals playing roles according to the expectations around them.” [Howard Zinn. What is Radical History?]
      879. dialectic paradigm (Piotr Sztompka as pronounced in this MP3 audio file): Beginning with the approach taken by Karl Marx, Sztompka develops a dialectical approach to sociological theory.
           “What are the shortcomings of sociological theory? The only way to answer this question is to study sociological theory analytically and critically. In conducting this type of study, I confronted several perennial dilemmas faced by sociological theorists since the beginning of scientific sociology. My attempt to overcome those dilemmas resulted in the clarification and reformulation of traditional assumptions. Then it occurred to me that the new dialectic ‘paradigm’ produced as a synthesis of positivistic and subjectivistic approaches is, after all, not so new; it was already implicitly present in the theoretical works of Karl Marx. The further reading of Marx convinced me that there is still a lot to be learned from the author of Capital, especially if he is treated as a scientific theorist rather than a political prophet.” [Piotr Sztompka. Sociological Dilemmas: Toward a Dialectic Paradigm. New York: Academic Press imprint of Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, Publisbers. 1979. Page xiii.]
           “I shall attempt to show that the most fruitful approach to sociological theory construction is the dialectic approach, particularly in its Marxian implementation. In my view the new paradigm for which contemporary sociology is waiting is, after all, not so new, and exists already. In its rudimentary form it was implicit in the works of [Karl] Marx. Since that time it has been developed more or less consistently—albeit with several distortions, omissions, and additions by the Marxist sociologists—and it has been more or less consistently forgotten by all other schools of sociology. The crisis of sociology is due precisely to the neglect of this vital theoretical tradition, or, co put it more precisely, to the neglect of the scientific, paradigmatic aspects of Marxism, as distinguished from its ideological or political appeal.” [Piotr Sztompka. Sociological Dilemmas: Toward a Dialectic Paradigm. New York: Academic Press imprint of Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, Publisbers. 1979. Page 36.]
      880. structure of scientific revolutions (Thomas S. Kuhn): To Kuhn, the paradigms of “normal science” are puzzle–solving mechanisms.
           “… one of the things a scientific community acquires with a paradigm is a criterion for choosing problems that, while the paradigm is taken for granted, can be assumed to have solutions. To a great extent these are the only problems that the community will admit as scientific or encourage its members to undertake. Other problems, including many that had previously been standard, are rejected as metaphysical, as the concern of another discipline, or sometimes as just too problematic to be worth the time. A paradigm can, for that matter, even insulate the community from those socially important problems that are not reducible to the puzzle form, because they cannot be stated in terms of the conceptual and instrumental tools the paradigm supplies. Such problems can be a distraction, a lesson brilliantly illustrated by several facets of seventeenth-century Baconianism and by some of the contemporary social sciences. One of the reasons why normal science seems to progress so rapidly is that its practitioners concentrate on problems that only their own lack of ingenuity should keep them from solving.
           “If, however, the problems of normal science are puzzles in this sense, we need no longer ask why scientists attack them with such passion and devotion. A man may be attracted to science for all sorts of reasons. Among them are the desire to be useful, the excitement of exploring new territory, the hope of finding order, and the drive to test established knowledge. These motives and others besides also help to determine the particular problems that will later engage him. Furthermore, though the result is occasional frustration, there is good reason why motives like these should first attract him and then lead him on.”
           [Thomas S. Kuhn. The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. 50ᵗʰ anniversary edition. Chicago, Illinois: The University of Chicago Press. 2012. Pages 37-38.]
           “Incommensurability is a notion that for me emerged from attempts to understand apparently nonsensical passages encountered in old scientific texts. Ordinarily they had been taken as evidence of the author's confused or mistaken beliefs. My experiences led me to suggest, instead, that those passages were being misread: the appearance of nonsense could be removed by recovering older meanings for some of the terms involved, meanings different from those subsequently current. During the years since, I’ve often spoken metaphorically of the process by which later meanings had been produced from earlier ones as a process of language change.… The ability to learn a language does not, I’ve emphasized, guarantee the ability to translate into or out of it.” [Thomas S. Kuhn, “The Road since Structure.” PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association. Volume 2, 1990. Pages 3-13.]
           “First, I am not equating meaning with a set of criteria. Second, ‘criteria’ is to be understood in a very broad sense, one that embraces whatever techniques, not all of them necessarily conscious, people do use in pinning words to the world. In particular, as used here, ‘criteria’ can certainly include similarity to paradigmatic examples (but then the relevant similarity relation must be known) or recourse to experts (but then speakers must know how to find the relevant experts).” [Thomas S. Kuhn, “Commensurability, Comparability, Communicability.” PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association. Volume 2, 1982. Pages 669-688.]
      881. multiple paradigm science (George Ritzer): He develops an application of Thomas S. Kuhn’s approach, as formulated in The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, to sociology. Ritzer ends up with three paradigms—social factism, social definitionism, and social behaviorism.
           “The work of Thomas Kuhn has provided an attractive metasystem to sociologists interested in analyzing the status of their field.…
           “Sociology is a multiple paradigm science ….
           “… the paradigm concept is a useful instrument for analyzing sociology; its utility can be demonstrated by identifying and analyzing what I consider to be the three basic sociological paradigms—social facts, social definitions, and social behavior.…
           “… The exemplar for the social factist is clearly the work of Émile Durkheim ….
           “… The exemplar for the social definitionist is a very specific aspect of Max Weber’ work—his analysis of social action.…
           “… Behaviorism has a long and honorable history in the social sciences, in particular in psychology. However, its modern resurgence in all of the social sciences, and in particular in sociology, can be traced to B. F. Skinner, whose work is the exemplar for the sociologists who have endeavored to adapt behaviorism to their discipline.”
           [George Ritzer, “Sociology: A Multiple Paradigm Science.” The American Sociologist. Volume 10, number 3, August 1975. Pages 156-167.]
           “… contemporary sociology is radically divided among three competing paradigms, each of which is striving to achieve dominance within the discipline. At the same time, they are competing for preeminence within nearly every sub-area within sociology. No supporter of a paradigm is immune from criticism from those who accept the others. This has been … emphasized and each of the paradigms has been described in detail.…
           “I have chosen to approach the paradigmatic status of contemporary sociology by considering some of the positive and negative consequences of these paradigmatic differences. As (Robert] Merton has pointed out, it is important to specify the unit examined when conducting such an analysis.…
           “Perhaps the major negative consequences of paradigmatic differences for sociology is that they stand in the way of ‘normal science.’ Remember that during the period of normal science the scientist is able to work on highly specific questions that serve to articulate and expand the dominant paradigm. That is the period of cultivation of knowledge in a science but it is generally lacking in sociology. Because there is no dominant paradigm in sociology, sociologists find it difficult to do the highly specialized work needed for the culmination of knowledge.”
           [George Ritzer. Sociology: A Multiple Paradigm Science. Revised edition. Boston, Massachusetts: Allyn and Bacon, Inc. 1975. Page 201.]
           “This is not the place to go into detail on the nature of an integrated paradigm. The point of this comment is to underscore my view that disciplinary matrices, and not exemplars, tell us the most about both sociology’s current status and future goals.” [George Ritzer, “Paradigm Analysis in Sociology: Clarifying the Issues.” American Sociological Review. Volume 46, number 2, April 1981. Pages 245-248.]
           “The 1960s ushered in a period of substantial change. Sociology came genuinely multiparadigmatic, and each of those paradigms passed two or more theories …. The hegemony macrotheories (especially structural functionalism and conflict ending, even though they remained throughout the decade fluential sociological theories. But a range of other theories, microtheories, were either enjoying a renaissance or emerging time.
           “The ‘social facts’ paradigm took as its focus, following macrolevel material social facts. Within the social facts paradigm, the two most important perspectives continued to be structural-functionalism and conflict theory.…
           “The ‘social definition’ paradigm encompassed four major theories—action theory, symbolic interactionism, ethnomethodology, and phenomenology.…
           “The ‘social behavior’ paradigm was, at least initially, characterized by efforts to adapt behaviorism to sociology. (In contrast, behaviorism now seen as but one of several inputs into this paradigm …). Social behaviorists have a microfocus, but it is very different that of the definitionists. Peoples’ behaviors are seen as determined by the nature of external stimuli, and therefore the behaviorist’s image of people is much more mechanical than the more creative image of the social definitionist.”
           [George Ritzer, “The Recent History and the Emerging Reality of American Sociological Theory: A Metatheoretical Interpretation.” Sociological Forum. Volume 6, number 2, June 1991. Pages 269-287.]
           “The key to an integrated paradigm is the notion of ‘levels’ of social reality. We do not mean to imply that social reality is really divided into levels. In fact, social reality is best viewed as an enormous variety of social phenomena that are involved in continuing interaction and ongoing change. In order to deal with this, given its enormous complexity, sociologists have abstracted out various levels for sociological analysis. Thus the levels are sociological constructs rather than really existing in the social world.
           “For our purposes the major levels of social reality can be derived from the interrelation of two basic social continua—the macroscopic-microscopic and objective-subjective. The macroscopic-microscopic dimension … relates to the magnitude of social phenomena ranging from whole societies to social acts, whereas the objective-subjective continuum … refers to whether the phenomenon has a real, material existence (e.g., bureaucracy, patterns of interaction) or exists only in the realm of ideas and knowledge (e.g., norms and values).”
           [George Ritzer, “Émile Durkheim: Exemplar for an Integrated Sociological Paradigm?” Social Forces. Volume 59, number 4, June 1981. Pages 966-995.]
           “… positivism and post-positivism are conventionally viewed as metatheories. As I see it, these are broader than paradigms and serve to inform one or more paradigms.” [George Ritzer, “The Paradigm Dialog.” Review article. The Canadian Journal of Sociology / Cahiers canadiens de sociologie. Volume 16, number 4, autumn 1991. Pages 446-448.]
           “The key to an integrated paradigm is the notion of levels of social analysis …. As the reader is well aware, the social world is not really divided into levels. In fact, social reality is best viewed as an enormous variety of social phenomena that are involved in continuing interaction and change. Individuals, groups, families, bureaucracies, the polity, and numerous other highly diverse social phenomena represent the bewildering array of phenomena that make up the social world. It is extremely difficult to get a handle on such a large number of wide-ranging and mutually interpenetrating social phenomena. Some sort of conceptual schema is clearly needed, and sociologists have developed a number of such schemas in an effort to deal with the social world. The idea of levels of social analysis employed here should be seen as but one of a large number of such schemas that can be, and have been, used for dealing with the complexities of the social world.” [George Ritzer. Sociological Theory. Eighth edition. New York: McGraw-Hill imprint of The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc. 2011. Pages A-12-A-13.]
           “… I would argue that relative to the … paradigms the experimental method is used most often by social behaviorists, observation by social definitionists, and the interview/questionnaire by the social factists.” [George Ritzer, “Letter: On the Relationship between Paradigms and Methods.” The American Sociologist. Volume 12, number 1, February 1977. Pages 23.]
           “I believe that the theoretical linkage between structure and consciousness could lay the groundwork for a new sociological paradigm. While I see this as an important development for sociology, I do not believe that such a paradigm would subsume those that are extant. There would still be a need for sociologists who focus on more specific areas and issues. However, what we will have less need for in the future are those who engage in paradigmatic imperialism, and in so doing exaggerate the significance of their own paradigm while downgrading the significance of the others. I do not subscribe to a totally relativistic position; some approaches are less useful than others. Some may be useless. However, we can learn at least something from each of the approaches that has achieved, or has the possibility of achieving, paradigmatic status.” [George Ritzer, “Reflections on the Paradigmatic Status of Sociology.” Mid-American Review of Sociology. Volume 3, number 2, winter 1978. Pages 1-15.]
           “… the coming of age of work on the prosumer foretells a paradigm revolution in the study of the economy …. Extant paradigms have taken either production or consumption as their ‘image of the subject matter’ in the study of the economy. What we are witnessing is the emergence of a new, third paradigm for which prosumption is that image. This could mean that the study of the economy will be even more multi-paradigmatic in the future than it has been in the past. However, it is also the case that prosumption, because it encompasses both production and consumption, could be the basis of a more ‘integrated sociological paradigm’ that deals with all three simultaneously …. This would move the study of the economy in the direction of the ‘hard sciences’ where, at least in Kuhn’s view, single paradigms predominate. While this is possible, the more likely outcome, given the history and current status of the social sciences, is one in which multiple paradigms coexist within the field. Paradigms encompass theories and methods and a new paradigm means major theoretical and methodological changes.” [George Ritzer, “Prosumption: Evolution, revolution, or eternal return of the same?” Journal of Consumer Culture. Volume 14, number 1, March 2014. Pages 3-24.]
           “This essay argues that the Las Vegas Casino-hotel is a paradigm for the new means of consumption. The new means of consumption are designed to attract and service large numbers of customers by rationalizing their operations while enchanting their setting. Casino-hotels create a spectacular environment usually by simulating well-known attractions from the past, present, or imagined future. Further, they implode boundaries between gambling, shopping , travel and entertainment thereby making it possible for gamblers to bring their families, to reduce the regrets associated with excessive gambling by normalizing it, and to increase expenditures on things that are peripheral to gambling.…
           “What makes for paradigmatic status? For one thing, the paradigm must be among the earliest of its kind, though it need not be the first.”
           [George Ritzer, “The Modern Las Vegas Casino-Hotel: The Paradigmatic New Means of Consumption.” M@n@gement. Volume 4, number 3, 2001. Pages 83-99.]
           “Since the term paradigm is bandied about by many of the new economists, we are entitled to ask precisely what they mean when that term and whether socio-economics can be seen as a new paradigm theoretical component of a paradigm). Those who use the paradigm leave themselves open to a wide range of criticisms. The basic source problem is ambiguities in [Thomas S.] Kuhn’s … original work on the paradigm concept, … who enumerated different uses of the concept in The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. by the critics, Kuhn … later tried to give the paradigm concept specificity by defining it as an exemplar, or a concrete solution to a puzzle. However, many observers felt that Kuhn had done a disservice basic thrust of his original work by limiting the paradigm concept in Their view was that the truer meaning(s) of the paradigm concept was found in his earlier, more ambiguous work.” [George Ritzer, “A Metatheoretical Analysis of Socioeconomics.” Mid-American Review of Sociology. Volume 14, number 1/2, winter 1990. Pages 27-43.]
           “My integrated paradigm … can be applied directly to the social world, and in many cases such applications have already been made. Thus, while metatheoretical work is removed from the social world, it is far from being irrelevant to our understanding of how that world works. Thus, in my view, metatheorizing is not only a legitimate undertaking in itself, but it is further legitimized by its utility in enhancing our understanding of sociocultural reality.” [George Ritzer, “Reflections on the Rise of Metatheorizing in Sociology.” Sociological Perspectives. Volume 34, number 3, autumn 1991. Pages 237-248.]
      882. theory of recognition (Axel Honneth as pronounced in this MP3 audio file): He refers to eliminating social domination.
           “… a theory of recognition is forced to ask whether social recognition might also occasionally take on the function of securing social domination. In this new context, the concept of ideology loses its merely descriptive significance and becomes a pejorative category, indicating forms of recognition that must be regarded as false or unjustified, because they fail to promote personal autonomy, instead engendering attitudes that conform to practices of domination.” [Axel Honneth. The I in We: Studies in the Theory of Recognition. Joseph Ganahl, translator. Malden, Massachusetts: Polity Press. 2012. Kindle edition.]
           “… the first outlines of an alternative to the language-theoretic version of the communication paradigm are becoming visible. The point of departure for such a theory is found in the notion that the normative presuppositions of social interaction cannot be fully grasped if they are defined solely in terms of the linguistic conditions of reaching understanding free from domination; rather, we must consider above all the fact that social recognition constitutes the normative expectations connected with our entering into communicative relationships. If the communication paradigm is thus extended beyond the language-theoretic framework, it can then indicate the degree to which any harm to the normative presuppositions of interaction must be directly reflected in the moral feelings of those involved. Because the experience of social recognition represents a condition upon which the development of human identity depends, its denial, i.e., disrespect, is necessarily accompanied by the sense of a threatening loss of personality. Unlike [Jürgen] Habermas’s model, this model asserts a close connection between the kinds of violation of the normative assumptions of social interaction and the moral experiences subjects have in their everyday communication. If those conditions are undermined by the fact that people are denied the recognition they deserve, they will generally react with moral feelings that accompany the experience of disrespect – shame, anger or indignation. Thus a communication paradigm conceived not in terms of a theory of language, but in terms of a theory of recognition, can ultimately close the theoretical gap left open by Habermas in his further development of [Max] Horkheimer’s program. The feelings of injustice that accompany structural forms of disrespect represent a pre-theoretical fact, on the basis of which a critique of the relations of recognition can identify its own theoretical perspective in social reality.” [Axel Honneth. Disrespect: The Normative Foundations of Critical Theory. Malden, Massachusetts: Polity Press. 2007. Pages 115-116.]
           “A conception of ethical life in terms of a theory of recognition proceeds from the premise that the social integration of a political community can only fully succeed to the degree to which it is supported, on the part of members of society, by cultural customs that have to do with the way in which they deal with each other reciprocally. For this reason, the basic concepts with which the ethical preconditions for such community-formation are described must be tailored to the normative characteristics of communicative relations. The concept of ‘recognition’ represents a particularly suitable instrument, since this makes it possible to distinguish systematically between forms of social interaction with regard to the pattern of respect for another person that it entails.… [T]he construction of the ethical sphere occurs as a process in which all elements of social life are transformed into components of an overarching State. This generates a relationship of asymmetrical dependence between the State and its members similar to the one that holds fundamentally between [Hegelian] Spirit and the products of its manifestation.” [Axel Honneth. The Struggle for Recognition: The Moral Grammar of Social Conflicts. Joel Anderson, translator. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press. 1995. Pages 58-59.]
           “‘Recognition in the concept,’ the absorption of the different by the same, takes the place of physical adaptation to nature. But the situation in which equality is established, the direct equality of mimesis and the mediated equality of synthesis, the adaptation to the condition of the object in the blind course of life, and the comparison of the objectified thing in scientific concept formation, is still the state of terror. Society continues threatening nature as the lasting organized compulsion which is reproduced in individuals as rational self-preservation and rebounds on nature as social dominance over it.… All that remains of the adaptation to nature is the obduracy against nature.” [Axel Honneth. The Critique of Power: Reflective Stages in a Critical Social Theory. Kenneth Baynes, translator. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press. 1993. Pages 40-41.]
           “This paper pursues two questions derived from psychoanalysis that are central to the theory of recognition: must the image or force of negativity classically derived from Freud necessarily be thought of as an elementary component of human beings equipped with drives? Or, can this image or force of negativity be conceptualised as an unavoidable result of the unfolding processes of internalised socialisation? The first question is pursued in a consideration of its legacy for the older representatives of the Frankfurt School, whilst the second question is pursued for its contribution to the theory of recognition that places the force of negativity within the domain of the social and not in a theory of the drives.
           “… it appears to me that, with all the doubts that have in the meantime been raised empirically against the assumption of endogenous tendencies toward aggression in human beings, it is sensible to renounce an overly strong theory of drives. We lose little for the critical intentions of a theory of society if we abandon the assumption that the human being is constitutionally equipped with a death- or aggression-drive.”
           [Axel Honneth, “The Work of Negativity: A Psychoanalytical Revision of the Theory of Recognition.” Critical Horizons. Volume 7, number 1, 2006. Pages 101-111.]
           “The language of everyday life is still invested with a knowledge – which we take for granted – that we owe our integrity, in a subliminal way, to the receipt of approval or recognition from other persons. Up to the present day, when individuals who see themselves as victims of moral maltreatment describe themselves, they assign a dominant role to categories that, as with ‘insult’ or ‘degradation,’ are related to forms of disrespect, to the denial of recognition. Negative concepts of this kind are used to characterize a form of behavior that does not represent an injustice solely because it constrains the subjects in their freedom for action or does them harm. Rather, such behavior is injurious because it impairs these persons in their positive understanding of self – an understanding acquired by intersubjective means. There can be no meaningful use whatsoever of the concepts of ‘disrespect’ or ‘insult’ were it not for the implicit reference to a subject’s claim to be granted recognition by others.” [Alex Honneth, “Integrity and Disrespect: Principles of a Conception of Morality Based on the Theory of Recognition.” Political Theory. Volume 20, number 2, May 1992. Pages 187-201.]
           “Axel Honneth’s The Struggle for Recognition: The Moral Grammar of Social Conflicts represents at once an intriguing and revealing turn in the post-Habermasian tradition of the Frankfurt School, an important and original development in critical social theory more generally understood, and an ambitious and stimulating, if still inadequate, effort at grounding these theoretical ideas empirically.
           “The Struggle for Recognition is revealing because it shows the extraordinary contemporary influence of Hegelian and communitarian thinking on the most influential neo-Kantian trends in critical social philosophy. It is important and original because Honneth not only connects these movements to one another but offers, following in the footsteps of the later [Jürgen] Habermas but going well beyond him, a way to synthesize them conceptually.”
           [Jeffrey C. Alexander and Maria Pia Lara, “Honneth’s New Critical Theory of Recognition.” New Left Review. Series I, number 220, November–December 1996. Pages 126-136.]
           “This paper attempts to advance the philosophical recognition debate by exploring recognition theory as a means to justify a concrete policy innovation in the form of Universal Basic Income (UBI). The first part of this endeavour involves a comparative evaluation of various theories of recognition so as to ensure an appropriate normative foundation. Having extracted the elements of Axel Honneth’s theory of recognition that are significant for the justification of UBI, I trace the recognition implications of this policy innovation from initial feelings of disrespect under current welfare and employment arrangements to the potential impact of particular modifications.” [Roisin Mulligan, “Universal Basic Income and Recognition Theory – A Tangible Step towards an Ideal.” Basic Income Studies. Volume 8, number 2, 2013. Pages 153-172.]
           “Recognition by others and thus interpersonal personhood (or lack of it) intimately affect the development, exercise and consummation of the features and capacities that make us persons psychologically. It is simply impossible to have authority in the social world in which one lives if others do not respect one as sharing authority or co-authority with them. Also, it is at least very difficult for anyone to act in ways that significantly enhance one’s own happiness or well-being if others around do not even grasp that one is a person capable of happiness and misery. And finally, finding meaning and communion in one’s life by contributing to the lives of others is difficult or impossible if others have no idea that one could have something valuable to contribute and the wish to do so.” [Heikki Ikäheimo, “Personhood and the social inclusion of people with disabilities: A recognition-theoretical approach.” Arguing about Disability: Philosophical perspectives. London and New York: Routledge imprint of Taylor & Francis Group, an Informa PLC business. 2008. Pages 77-92.]
           “… [Axel] Honneth argues that the most important aspects of reification can be understood in the terms of a theory of recognition, as a wholly intersubjective phenomenon whereby human beings lose sight of their originary affective and engaged relation with others in their social world. In this article, I argue that Honneth’s attempt to reorient the critique of reification within the terms of a theory of recognition has done so at the cost of sacrificing the core of the concept, which forged a connection between the socioeconomic structure of capitalist domination and the unengaged, spectatorial stance human beings take toward the social world, showing how they together impede emancipatory social transformation.” [Anita Chari, “Toward a political critique of reification: Lukács, Honneth and the aims of critical theory.” Philosophy and Social Criticism. Volume 36, number 5, 2010. Pages 587-606.]
           “[Axel] Honneth’s … ambitious project is to build a theory of social progress founded on the concept of recognition as a fundamental element in human interaction and individual and group identity. Honneth has also articulated the concept of recognition in a more complex way than other recognition theorists. It is this articulation, perhaps even more than the overarching theory, that makes his model interesting as a way of thinking about children’s position in society ….” [Nigel Thomas, Anne Graham, Mary Ann Powell, and Robyn Fitzgerald, “Conceptualisations of children’s wellbeing at school: The contribution of recognition theory.” Childhood. Volume 23, number 4, November 2016. Pages 506-520.]
      883. revolutionary transformation of human living conditions (Radovan Richta as pronounced in this MP3 audio file): The Czech philosopher and sociologist examines the conditions for a successful revolution.
           “The socialist movement already faced the reversing tendency of political power when it took the first steps of the revolutionary transformation of human living conditions, when it established the dictatorship of the proletariat to expropriate the capitalists and break their power. Directly following the revolution there occurred such a concentration of power over all aspects of man’s life as had never existed in any former social order. At the same time no guarantees were created against the misuse of this power, which soon began to get out of the control of the movement and to contaminate the leadership, by transforming the instruments of revolutionary change into power organs of bureaucratic forces. This experience should lead us to the conclusion that socialist society can only exist as such if alongside the overcoming of class differences it also liquidates step by step those instruments of repression which have lost their justification for existence.” [Radovan Richta, “Models of Socialism.” Australian Left Review. Volume 1, issue 17, February–March 1969. Pages 33-44.]
      884. Transdisciplinary Philosophy–of–Science Paradigm for Research on Individuals (Jana Uher as pronounced in this MP3 audio file and others): This psychological paradigm distinguishes, for instance, between the behavior of an individual and that same individual’s mental conceptions concerning the behavior.
           “The TPS-Paradigm [Transdisciplinary Philosophy-of-Science Paradigm for Research on Individuals] is a paradigm because it comprises interrelated philosophical, metatheoretical and methodological frameworks. It is transdisciplinary, because in these frameworks, concepts, approaches and methods from various disciplines were systematically integrated, advanced and complemented by novel ones. It is a philosophy-of-science paradigm because it is targeted toward making explicit and scrutinising the philosophical assumptions that different disciplines make about research on individuals and that underlie the metatheories and methodologies used for explorations ….
           “In its philosophical foundations, the TPS-Paradigm explicitly considers that all research is done by humans and that, consequently, all scientific endeavours are inextricably entwined with and thus limited by humans’ perceptual and conceptual abilities. It therefore defines as a phenomenon anything that humans can perceive or can make perceptible (e.g., using technical means) and/or that humans can conceive of—a notion that differs from various philosophical traditions of thought ….”
           [Jana Uher, “What is Behaviour? And (when) is Language Behaviour? A Metatheoretical Definition.” Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour. Volume 46, issue 4, 2016. Pages 475-501.]
           “The TPS-Paradigm [Transdisciplinary Philosophy-of-Science Paradigm for Research on Individuals] differentiates from one another four basic kinds of phenomena; these are the phenomena of morphology, physiology, behaviour and the psyche. Importantly, inseparability here refers to the material entity of the healthy and physically intact individual. Inner organs and blood can be separated from the individual’s body only by using invasive methods, thus infringing on his or her physical integrity; physical phenomena removed from the individual’s body no longer belong to his or her material entity. The phenomena of the psyche, in and of themselves, cannot be isolated from the individual’s body, no matter what invasive and advanced technical methods may be used; psychical phenomena can be separated from the individual’s body only conceptually ….” [Jana Uher, “Conceiving ‘personality’: Psychologist’s challenges and basic fundamentals of the Transdisciplinary Philosophy-of-Science Paradigm for Research on Individuals.” Integrative Psychological and Behavioral Science. Volume 49, number 3, September 2015. Pages 398-458.]
           “The TPS-Paradigm [Transdisciplinary Philosophy-of-Science Paradigm for Research on Individuals] emphasises the idea that individuals’ behaviours are different from the ideas, beliefs and mental representations that humans develop of them. These different kinds of phenomena require different methods of exploration; therefore, such methods are not interchangeable …. The behaviours’ momentariness requires real-time recordings, thus observations. But assessments are inherently retrospective and memory-based and therefore cannot be used to explore behaviours. This explains why assessments using two different formats yielded similar results, whereas their relations to the observational measures were much weaker.” [Jana Uher and Elisabetta Visalberghi, “Observations versus assessments of personality: A five-method multi-species study reveals numerous biases in ratings and methodological limitations of standardised assessments.” Journal of Research in Personality. Volume 61, April 2016. Pages 61-79.]
           “For comprehensive research on individual behaviour, an integrative meta-theoretical and methodological framework that provides the necessary conceptual and analytical foundations was therefore elaborated as part of a novel philosophy-of-science paradigm for personality psychology. This framework was derived from established concepts of various disciplines, among them personality psychology, differential psychology, cross-cultural psychology, comparative psychology, and behavioural biology. Because their separate conceptualisation and application hindered comprehensive investigations, these concepts were coherently integrated and expanded by new concepts and approaches that relate individual behaviour to different contexts on various population levels including the species level ….” [Jana Uher, Elsa Addessi, and Elisabetta Visalberghi, “Contextualised behavioural measurements of personality differences obtained in behavioural tests and social observations in adult capuchin monkeys (Cebus apella).” Journal of Research in Personality. Volume 47, issue 4, August 2013. Pages 427-444.]
      885. scientific and technological revolution (Radovan Richta): He examines the changes in production vis–à–vis social relations.
           “The growth of civilisation over the last 150-200 years had its roots in the industrial system of production. Today, however, we can see in those countries where the industrial civilisation is at its peak new processes transcending the boundaries of this civilisation. The future belongs to the scientific and technological revolution, which is laying a new groundwork for civilisation. Although these two historical types of civilisation are interconnected and mutually interactive, they differ in the matter of intrinsic content and, in their social and human connotations, they are even contradictory.
           “Industrialisation, which was accompanied by structural changes in the production base and by corresponding changes in social relations, proceeded on the foundation of two independent, diametrically opposed social productive forces: increasingly more efficient and complex machines, on the one hand, and a steadily growing army of labor, on the other.”
           [Radovan Richta, “The Scientific & Technological Revolution” Australian Left Review. Volume 1, issue 7, June–July 1967. Pages 54-67.]
      886. praxis school (Gajo Petrović as pronounced in this MP3 audio file and others): The praxis (MP3 audio file) school was a Marxist–humanist school of critical social theory which originated in the former Yugoslavia.
           “… we want a journal that would not be philosophical in that sense according to which philosophy is just one of the special areas, one scientific discipline, strictly separated by the rest of them and from the everyday problems of human life. We want a philosophical journal in that sense according to which philosophy is the thought of the revolution, ruthless criticism of all that exists, a humanist vision of the really human world and an inspirational force for revolutionary activity.
           “The title ‘Praxis’ is chosen because ‘praxis,’ that central notion of the [Karl] Marx’s thought, expresses most adequately the conception of philosophy we have sketched. The use of the Greek form of the word doesn’t mean that we understand this notion in the way as it is understood somewhere in the Greek philosophy. We do that because we want to detach ourselves from the pragmatist and vulgar-Marxist understanding of praxis and to state that we are oriented to the original Marx. Moreover, the Greek word, even if it isn’t understood exactly in the Greek sense, can serve as a reminder that, in contemplating, like the ancient Greeks, on the most mundane issues, we don’t overlook what is profound and which is essential.”
           [Gajo Petrović, “Why Praxis?” Anarhosindikalistićka konfederacija. Zdravko Saveski, translator. Praxis. 1964. Retrieved on August 25th, 2015.]
      887. Marxist–Christian dialogue (Roger Garaudy): He considers the importance of this dialogue.
           “Three of the most important events of our era: the overwhelming development of the natural and technical sciences; the socialist revolutions, which have furnished us with historical evidence that capitalism does not represent the only possible form of social relations in our time, nor even the best form; and the irresistible movements of national liberation amongst nations hitherto colonised, which have created new centres of historical initiative and have revealed sources of human value outside the western tradition. These three major events of our period have considerably enlarged the scope of the human horizon, and, in so doing, have led Christians to a clearer realisation of what aspects of their faith are merely the incidental results of the historic conditions of the birth and development of Christianity, and what aspects of their faith are essential.…
           “If Christians and communists are able to find common ground not only in their concern for humanity, but also in their openness I to the absolute future, then it may well come about, as Teilhard de Chardin put it, the only God whom we shall in the future be able to adore will be a synthesis of the (Christian) God of the Above, and the (marxist) God of the Ahead.”
           [Roger Garaudy, “Marxist-Christian Dialogue.” Australian Left Review. Volume 1, issue 10, December 1967. Pages 7-27.]
      888. cocompositions of the real (“Spurse”): According to the article, relationality is what makes things real.
           “Things are what they are because of their relational network. The effect of a thing is relational. The relation is in itself a unique thing. This is a dynamic and emergent logic. We need to ask less what something ‘is,’ and more what it can do—how it links and what emerges from these new relations. Life/action is a question of composition, or better yet, co-composition, because we never act alone. We co-compose with the strangest of things: bacteria, ocean currents, pharmaceuticals circulating in the water supply, cell phones, and fashion trends. This makes reality a question of aesthetics. It is an aesthetics of singularities, alliances, compositions, apparatuses, and systems. There is an art to this that is not of, for, or from the human alone. It proceeds by fusing unlike things to create an assemblage: The evaporation plus crystallization of sea water into salt plus navigation techniques, deep ocean currents, temperature gradients, plus cod, plus religious practices plus metallurgy plus organization of Atlantic slavery, etc.—and one has the early North Atlantic fisheries. The entanglement has agency. One works at the level of the entanglement. Perhaps this too suggests an alternative model of the commons?” [Spurse, “An Aesthetics: Towards Co-Compositions of the Real—A Practice of Problems and Propositions.” Amber Hickey, editor. A Guidebook of Alternative Nows. Los Angeles, California: Journal Press imprint of Journal of Aesthetics and Protest Press. 2012. Pages 61-69.]
      889. global assemblages (Stephen J. Collier, Aihwa Ong as pronounced in this MP3 audio file, and others): They examine various ways in which “expert systems gain significance.”
           “An emerging body of scholarship has grappled with this question by examining what might be called global assemblages …. Global assemblages are the actual configurations through which global forms of techno-science, economic rationalism, and other expert systems gain significance. The global assemblage is also a tool for the production of global knowledge, taken in the double sense of knowledge about global forms and knowledge that strives to replace space, culture, and society-bound categories that have dominated the social sciences throughout their history.…
           “… A global assemblage is the actual and specific articulation of a global form.… [I]t should be clear that the global assemblage is an alternative to the categories of local and global, which serve to cast the global as abstraction, and the local in terms of specificity. In the space of assemblage, a global form is simply one among a range of concrete elements.”
           [Stephen J. Collier, “Global Assemblages.” Theory, Culture & Society. Volume 23, numbers 2–3, March–May 2006. Pages 399-401.]
           “Given this scenario of shifting ‘global assemblages’ …, the sites of citizenship mutations are not defined by conventional geography. The space of the assemblage, rather than the territory of the nation-state, is the site for new political mobilizations and claims. In sites of emergence, a spectrum of mobile and excluded populations articulates rights and claims in universalizing terms of neoliberal criteria or human rights. Specific problematizations and resolutions to diverse regimes of living cannot be predetermined in advance. For instance, in the EU zone, unregulated markets and migrant flows threaten protections associated with liberal traditions. In emerging Asian sites, the embrace of self-enterprising values has made citizenship rights and benefits contingent upon individual market performance.” [Aihwa Ong, “Mutations in Citizenship.” Theory, Culture & Society. Volume 23, numbers 2–3, March–May 2006. Pages 499-505.]
           “As global forms are articulated in specific situations – or territorialized in assemblages – they define new material, collective, and discursive relationships. These ‘global assemblages’ are sites for the formation and reformation of what we will call, following Paul Rabinow, anthropological problems. They are domains in which the forms and values of individual and collective existence are problematized or at stake, in the sense that they are subject to technological, poetical, and ethical reflection and intervention.…
           “… An assemblage is the product of multiple determinations that are not reducible to a single logic. The temporality of an assemblage is emergent. It does not always involve new forms, but forms that are shifting, in formation, or at stake. As a composite concept, the term ‘global assemblage’ suggests inherent tenshions: global implies broadly encompassing, seamless, and mobile; assemblage implies heterogeneous, contingent, unstable, partial, and situated.”
           [Stephen J. Collier and Aihwa Ong, “Global Assemblages, Anthropological Problems.” Global Assemblages: Technology, Politics, and Ethics as Anthropological Problems. Aihwa Ong and Stephen J. Collier, editors. Malden, Massachusetts: Blackwell Publishing Ltd. 2005. Pages 3-21.]
           “Using [Aihwa] Ong and [Stephen J.] Collier’s notion of global assemblage, it is argued that culture and creativity have been rendered technical in relation to the invention and circulation of a number of interlinked global forms, such as the ‘creative industries’ and the ‘creative class’, which are embedded in abstract, placeless, technical systems that provide them with an apparent universality. How this is achieved is examined in detail through a discussion of the work of a London-based consultancy specialising in cultural knowledge.…
           “This paper argues that the rendering of culture and creativity in quantitative terms is central to their policy mobility. More specifically, it argues that these mobile policy forms take shape in what Ong and Collier … call ‘global assemblages’. These are a peculiarly modern form of assemblage associated with the rendering of the world in the technical terms that notionally abstract concepts can be applied to. These abstract concepts take on a universal character as they appear to be applicable anywhere the techniques of the assemblage can be reproduced, enabling them to travel with relative ease.”
           [Russell Prince, “Consultants and the global assemblage of culture and creativity.” Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers. Volume 38, issue 1, January 2014. Pages 90-101.]
           “The scholarship on … earlier periods, with all its debates, produces a far more complex landscape than indicated by models of current social change, which are typically geared toward isolating key variables to create order where none is seen. Detailed historical accounts and debates open up the range of possibilities. Looking at this earlier phase is a way of raising the level of complexity in the inquiry about current transformations. Rather than a model, I am after a finely graded lens that allows me to disassemble what we have come to see as necessary aggregations and to track the formation of capabilities that actually have—whether in medieval times, the Bretton Woods era, or the global era—jumped tracks, that is to say, gotten relodged in novel assemblages. Thus, the divinity of the medieval sovereign represents the formation of an elusive capability whereby power is not just raw power but becomes legitimate authority; this capability in turn I interpret as becoming critical to the later formation of secular sovereignty, albeit with a switch in vocabularies and a novel rhetoricization. The internationalism that states developed through the setting up and implementing of the Bretton Woods agreement is a radically different type of world scale from that of the global era that emerges in the 1980s; nonetheless, critical capabilities for international governance and operations were developed in that process, which eventually became relodged into novel global assemblages.
           “This interpretive stance brings with it a methodological concern about including informal, or not yet formalized, institutional arrangements and practices in the analysis of change. That which has not yet gained formal recognition can often be an indicator of change, of the constituting and inserting of new substantive logics in a particular domain of the social—economic, cultural, political, discursive, subjective—which is thereby altered even though its formal representation may remain unchanged, or, alternatively, altered even though it remains informal, or is not yet formalized. These informal logics and practices, I argue, can be shown to have contributed to historical change even though they are often difficult to recognize as such.”
           [Saskia Sassen. Territory, Authority, Rights: From Medieval to Global Assemblages. Updated edition. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press. 2006. Pages 11-12.]
           “In this paper, we suggest that (1) the Anthropocene is an epoch constituted by drivers of socioecological change that are no longer localized, as they were for most of human history and (2) ‘global assemblages,’ as a conceptual framework, provide a sophisticated multi-scalar approach for analyzing these changes.
           “We show how diverse forms of global assemblages drive these changes – with some forms facilitating, and other forms hindering, socioecological resilience. On the basis of insights from ecology, we understand resilience as the capacity for communities and environments to adapt to changes, whether these changes are biophysical, economic, or sociopolitical …. We base our discussion in the growing discipline of political ecology. Our argument is that only by acknowledging humans as part of ecological systems, with particular attention to global socioecological relations, will we be in a position to fully understand and respond to the Anthropocene’s challenges.”
           [Laura Ogden, Nik Heynen, Ulrich Oslender, Paige West, Karim-Aly Kassam, and Paul Robbins, “Global assemblages, resilience, and Earth Stewardship in the Anthropocene.” Frontiers in Ecology and the Environment. Volume 11, number 7, September 2013. Pages 341-347.]
           “Just as western multinational corporations have found it profitable to shift their production and Outsourcing to developing countries, both to capitalize on the cheap labor power and minimal legislation, so has the reproductive industry found both its resource base and new markets in these countries. Women from less developed countries and from the underclass in the developed world are reproducing for the world market and for the more privileged classes who can afford to pay for their services. Several centers all over the world, not only in the US and Europe, but also in India, are dealing in reproductive body parts and functioning as global assembly points.…
           “… in surrogacy the labor of the woman who carries the baby to term and her embodied subjectivity is erased. In trying to become embodied subjects – as ‘agents’ in control of their own bodies and owners of its parts to dispose at their own will, egg donors and surrogates are becoming disembodied objects. The implications of this second industrial revolution in this era of reproductive outsourcing and global assemblages will be perhaps even more far-reaching than that of the first, in terms of who will bear children, for whom, and what kind of children will be bom. Women all over the world are important stakeholders both as producers and reproducers in the global bioeconomy of reproduction, since most interventions take place in their bodies, as well the fact mat they form half of humanity as citizens of polities. To this end public awareness and engagement through debates and discussions need to be initiated. Feminist scholars and women’s health and rights advocates must take a leading role in this.”
           [Jyotsna Agnihotri Gupta, “Parenthood in the era of Reproductive Outsourcing and Global Assemblages.” Asian Journal of Women’s Studies. Volume 18, issue 1, 2012. Pages 7-29.]
      890. negation of negativity (John Sinclair): He examines Karl Marx’s critical theory.
           “The negation of negativity then, is not inevitable nor is it just a philosophical conception as far as [Karl] Marx is concerned – rather, it needs conscious action to bring it about. Thus, two consequential elements which emerge from Marx’s critical theory are the emphasis on consciousness, and the emphasis on Praxis, both of which are necessary to bring about negation and therefore central to the critical position. For Marx, the conscious and acting men who were to bring this about were the proletariat ….” [John Sinclair, “Critical Theory.” Australian Left Review. Volume 1, issue 38, December 1972. Pages 3-8.]
      891. dialectical thinking (Steve D’Alton): He proposes this methodology as an alternative to both relativism and absolutism.
           “So far relativism has been posed as the mutually exclusive alternative to absolutism. This separation is in the frame of Aristotelian logic and in these terms is not possible to resolve within itself. Resolution of this dilemma is only possible by recourse to an alternative form of reason—dialectical thinking. This provides a transcendent synthesis which retotalises both absolute and relative frames of reference within a new epistemology which is designed to avoid the rigidly oppositional thinking of the Aristotelian system. If the initial assumption is one of change rather than stasis then the law of identity does, not apply. From the assumption of change, reality must be viewed as in constant process, i.e. it is at all times, becoming other than it is. Consequently reality is seen as a becoming totality.” [Steve D’Alton, “Ideology – a Static Definition of Reality.” Australian Left Review. Volume 1, issue 31, July 1971. Pages 37-42.]
      892. neurolinguistic programming (Richard Bandier, John Grinder, and others): This program, abbreviated as “NLP,” claims to incorporate various techniques, including Ericksonian hypnosis. Although Bandler and Grinder originated NLP, other writers, particularly Anthony Robbins, have expanded upon it. Foster was certified—by the Georgia Cooperative Health Manpower Education Program: Area Health Education Center (Dublin, Georgia)—in a version of NLP on May 11th, 1990.
           “Neuro Linguistic Programming is a logical step higher than anything that has been done previously in hypnosis or therapy only in the sense that it allows you to do things formally and methodically. NLP [neurolinguistic programming] allows you to determine exactly what alterations in subjective experience are necessary to accomplish a given outcome. Most hypnosis is a fairly random process: If I give someone a suggestion, that person has to come up with a method of carrying it out. As a Neuro Linguistic Programmer, even if I use hypnosis, I would describe exactly what I want that person to do in order to carry out the suggestion. That’s the only important difference between what we’re doing here and what people have been doing with hypnosis for centuries. It’s a very important difference, because it allows you to predict outcomes precisely and avoid side-effects.” [Richard Bandier and John Grinder. Frogs into Princes: Neuro Linguistic Programming. Steve Andreas, editor. Moab, Utah: Real People Press. 1979. Page 186.]
           “Hypnotic patterning is the same as any skill that can be learned. In order to be learned, it has to be practiced. I assume that most of you here drive automobiles. If you don’t drive automobiles, you can find some comparable perceptual-motor skill that you have mastered, whether it’s riding a bicycle, roller skating, or playing some athletic sport. If you remember the first occasion on which you attempted to master the complex skill of driving a car, there were many things that you had to keep track of. Your hands were doing several things. At least one of them was on the wheel, presumably, and the other one was working the gear shift, if the car you were learning to drive had one. At the same time you were taxed with the task of being able to pay attention to what your feet were doing. There were three things they might do down there, and some of those things had to happen in coordination. You may remember putting the brake on and failing to put the clutch in at the same time, and the disastrous results of that. You had to pay attention to all of this, in addition to having some consciousness of what was going on outside of the car itself.” [John Grinder and Richard Bandler. Trance-formations: Neuro-Linguistic Programming™ and the Structure of Hypnosis. Connirae Andreas, editor. Moab, Utah: Real People Press. 1981. Page 6.]
           “The Meta-model we are presenting is in large part inspired by the formal model developed in transformational linguistics. Since the transformational model was created to answer questions which are not immediately connected with the way that humans change, not all portions of it are equally useful in creating a Meta-model for therapy. Thus, we have adapted the model, selecting only the portions relevant for our purposes and arranging them in a system appropriate for our objectives in therapy.
           “… we will present our Meta-model for therapy. Here, our intention is to give you an overall picture of what is available in the Meta-model and how it works. In the two succeeding chapters, we become specific, showing you in a step-bystep format how to apply the Meta-model techniques. For this chapter, we urge you to read through the discussion and attempt to get the overall image we present.”
           [Richard Bandier and John Grinder. The Structure of Magic I: A Book about Language and Therapy. Palo Alto, California: Science and Behavior Books, Inc. 1975. Page 40.]
           “Milton Erickson is generally recognized as the leading practitioner of medical hypnosis and the use of hypnosis in the psychotherapeutic context. He has consistently urged over the years of his continuing research into the nature of hypnosis and the working of the human mind in altered states of consciousness, that hypnotists, psychotherapists, medical doctors and dentists develop a refined ability to identify and meet the special needs and requirements which their clients bring with them to the specific context. Erickson realizes that full communication between two people at both the conscious and the unconscious levels can occur when there is a sensitivity to the other person’s model of the world. In the therapeutic context, for example, the therapist assumes the responsibility of both making contact and assisting the client to learn the skills of communication necessary to allow any change in his behavior which he needs. Often this may require that the therapist be skilled in teaching the client to develop a new way of representing his experience – literally teaching the client to have new choices behaviorally (either consciously or unconsciously or both) about the way he represents the world.” [Richard Bandier and John Grinder. Patterns of the Hypnotic Techniques of Milton H. Erickson, M.D. Volume I. Cupertino, California: Meta Publications. 1975. Pages 31-32.]
           “… there are many [ways of learning to detect representational systems] …. We have found, for example, that breaming patterns are an excellent indicator of which representational system a person is using at a point in time to organize and represent their experience to them selves. During visualization, for example, the person’s breathing tends to become shallow and high in the chest. Other equally useful indicators in our experience are the shifts in the tonal qualities of the person’s voice, the tempo of speech, the color of the person’s skin…We have presented two specific ways of detecting representational systems in sufficient detail allow the reader to train him or herself to detect the representational system being used by a client at a point in time. Once you have comfortably mastered these two techniques – refined your ability to make these sensory distinctions – we suggest that you explore for yourselves other indicators which allow you to gain the same information. Such exercises in making sensory distinctions will not only increase your ability to be effective and graceful in your hypnotic communication but will increase and refine your ability to have the sensory experience which is, in our experience, the very foundation of effective communication and hypnosis.” {John Grinder, Judith DeLozier, and Richard Bandler. Patterns of the Hypnotic Techniques of Milton H. Erickson, M.D. Volume II. Scotts Valley, California: Grinder & Associates. 1977. Pages 35-36.]
           “Simple learning and problem solving take place within a boundary of assumptions and beliefs about what is possible and necessary For example, a man may get frequent headaches and go to the doctor. The doctor prescribes painkillers. the man goes away happy and the next time he has a headache he takes the painkillers. Simple problem, simple solution. An example from business would be an organization that wants to invest in a more modern and faster manufacturing plant. They try a number of possibilities and settle on the most cost-effective one. Six months later the plant is built and running to full capacity. Simple problem, simple solution.” [John O’Connor. NLP Workbook: A Practical Guidebook to Achieving the Results You Want. London: HarperCollins Publishers. 2001. Page 27.]
           “In a conflict resolution setting, chunking up allows us to ultimately reach an agreement level. Communicating on a meta level of information, agreements might be easier to achieve, which is not only a starting point, but might be used to lead the resolution process towards further agreements. Meanwhile, chunking down sometimes helps when dealing with a big problem, or when looking for leverage with which to make a breakthrough. Further detail shows how this could work in a mediation setting.” [Eduard F. Vinyamata Tubella, “The Neuro-Linguistic Programming Approach to Conflict Resolution, Negotiation and Change.” Journal of Conflictology. Volume 2, issue 1, 2011. Pages 1-5.]
           “Anchoring—The process by which any representation (internal or external) gets connected to and triggers a subsequent string of representation and responses. Anchors can be naturally occurring or set up deliberately. An example of an anchor for a particular set of responses is what happens when you think of the way a special, much loved person says your name.” [Anthony Robbins. Unlimited Power: The New Science. New York: Free Press imprint of Simon & Schuster, Inc. 1986. Page 415.]
           “At the seminars I conduct near my home in Del Mar, California, we’ve created a fun anchor to remind us who is really responsible for our emotions. These seminars are held in an exquisite, four-star resort, the Inn L’Auberge, which sits right on the ocean, and is also near the train station. About four times a day, you can hear the train whistle loudly as it passes through. Some seminar participants would become irritated at the interruption (remember, they didn’t know about Transformational Vocabulary yet!), so I decided that this was the perfect opportunity to turn frustration into fun. ‘From now on,’ I said, ‘whenever we hear that train howl, we’ll celebrate. I want to see how good you can make yourselves feel whenever you hear that train. We’re always waiting for the right person or right situation to come along before we feel good. But who determines whether this is the right person or situation? When you do feel good, who’s making you feel good? You are! But you simply have a rule that says you have to wait until A, B, and C occur before you allow yourself to feel good. Why wait? Why not set up a rule that says that whenever you hear a train whistle, you’ll automatically feel great? The good news is that the train whistle is probably more consistent and predictable than the people you’re hoping will show up to make you feel good!’” [Anthony Robbins. Awaken the Giant Within: How to Take Immediate Control of Your Mental, Emotional, Physical and Financial Destiny. New York: Free Press imprint of Simon & Schuster, Inc. 1991. Ebook edition.]
      893. Creative Process (Robert Fritz): This methodology, which included Technologies for Creating, was previously known as DMA. Foster completed a DMA seminar at the Green Acre Bahá’í School, Retreat and Conference Center in Eliot, Maine.
           “Once a structure exists, energy moves through that structure by the path of least resistance. In other words, energy moves where it is easiest for it to go.
           “This is true not only for cows, but for all of nature. The water in a river flows along the path of least resistance. The wind blowing through the concrete canyons of Manhattan takes the path of least resistance. Electrical currents, whether in simple devices, such as light bulbs, or in the complex circuitry found in today’s sophisticated computers, flow along paths of least resistance.
           “If you watch the flow of pedestrian traffic in time-lapse photography, you can track the patterns of people walking on a busy street, avoiding each other on their way. Sometimes a pedestrian’s path of least resistance is to walk straight ahead, sometimes to move to the right or left, sometimes to walk faster, and sometimes to slow down or wait a moment.
           “You got to where you are in your life right now by moving along the path of least resistance.”
           [Robert Fritz. The Path of Least Resistance: Learning to Become the Creative Force in Your Own Life. Revised and expanded. Newfane, Vermont: Newfane Press. 2010. Kindle edition.]
           “Organizations can be great because through them people can join together and accomplish feats that would be impossible for any individual to achieve alone. Thanks to organizations, miracle drugs are created that save people’s lives, technology is developed that empowers people to communicate and create, services are offered that enable people to accomplish their work, products are made that enrich us all. Through organizations, roads are built, skyscrapers erected, electricity and water distributed, food made available, and economic growth advanced. Organizations are the central civilizing force of our age.
           “But we must remind ourselves that organizations are not an organic phenomenon of nature. They are a refined human invention. We create organizations. Like many creations, once they exist, they begin to have a life of their own. They grow, develop, reach young adulthood, middle age, and even old age. But unlike our own life cycle, they can be reborn, renew themselves, and become young again and start over.
           “So what is the organization’s reason to exist? The answer to that question varies, depending on the organization. Each organization has its own particular purpose in its life. Some organizations have very good purposes. Some organizations have truly great purposes. Some have lackluster reasons to exist. Not all organizational purposes are created equal.”
           [Robert Fritz. The Path of Least Resistance for Managers. Newfane, Vermont: Newfane Press. 2011. Kindle edition.]
           “In 1985, when I discovered The Path of Least Resistance by Robert Fritz, the title put me off. However, the subtitle, Principles for Creating What You Most Want to Create, intrigued me. I was delighted to find that Fritz’s approach was not about taking the easy way out. Nor was it about ‘creative thinking’ or ‘creative problem-solving.’ It was about the act of creating. Fritz showed how, by using a common form—an organizing framework and set of generic skills—creators consistently bring into being real and lasting results, in spite of the problems and circumstances they face.” [Bruce Elkin. Simplicity and Success: Creating the Life You Long For. Victoria, British Columbia: Trafford Publishing. 2003. Page 9.]
      894. development of consciousness (Eric Aarons): He examines the importance of this process to revolution.
           “A growing emphasis in the left is on the priority to be given to the development of consciousness as the key factor in the revolutionary process, and, within this, the building of a body of ideas challenging those prevailing in our society. ‘Revolutionary culture,’ ‘counter-hegemony,’ ‘counter-consensus’ are various terms used. Acceptance of the key place of consciousness in the development of revolution directs attention to the processes by which consciousness develops or may be developed in large numbers of people. It is, clearly, a most intricate subject. Tt involves physiology, psychology, philosophy. It involves the reaction of human beings on each other individually and as ‘classes,’ politically and culturally; the role of social institutions and structures. It involves the different ways in which the process might take place in different groups of people.” [Eric Aarons, “The Development of Consciousness.” Australian Left Review. Volume 1, issue 23, February–March 1970. Pages 51-56.]
      895. myths of the minimal government (David Burchell): He argues for a new model of government.
           “Clearly, the time has come for a new, or renewed, model of government, one which can provide the general philosophical foundation for a more realistic approach to policymaking in the coming decade. This does not mean a return to some of the fantasies of the Left about a commanding role for the state in economy and society, whether along the lines of the old Soviet-style planning or of the much more nebulous radicalism of the ‘new’ Left of the [19]70s and after. Rather, it means a new understanding of the idea of government itself as an activity, one which cannot reasonably hope to shape society along the lines of Left fantasies, but which on the other hand is necessary to the functioning of society, contrary to the myths of the minimal government vogue.” [David Burchell, “The Visible Hand.” Australian Left Review. Volume 1, issue 148, March 1993. Pages 28-30.]
      896. science of man (Adam Schaff): He examines both alienation and the transformation of human existence.
           “It was precisely this problem[‘the breakdown of the existing system of values’], under the comprehensive name of humanism, which was the dominant note in the circles in which Karl Marx moved and which in a sense fashioned his attitudes. [Ludwig] Feuerbach, Moses Hess, Bruno Bauer, Max Stirner and many others, including the young Marx, are all preoccupied with this question which they regard as of the utmost importance: how can man who has been turned into a slave of his alienated products be made the independent creator of his destiny? how to ensure a full and unrestricted development of his personality? how to create the most favorable conditions of human happiness and to transform human existence into something in keeping with the ideal of man, with his ‘essence’ (or, in the language of those days, to transform the real man into the true man)?” [Adam Schaff, “The Science of Man.” Australian Left Review. Volume 1, issue 8, August–September 1967. Pages 45-50.]
      897. Platonic Marxism (Ellen Meiksins Wood): She rescues Plato’s idealism for the rich into a materialism for the poor.
           “Perhaps what I have called ‘Platonic Marxism’ can now spring to the rescue ….” [Ellen Meiksins Wood. The Retreat from Class: A New “True” Socialism. London and New York: Verso imprint of New Left Books. 1998. Page 116.]
           “Since Plato first launched his bitter attack on Athenian democracy, one of the central tenets of conservative political philosophy has been that the life of true citizenship is available only to those whose conditions of life render them free of material necessity. Plato’s so-called philosophical idealism was, in fact, profoundly materialist in its insistence that specific social conditions determine the ability of people to free their souls from the bondage of the material world, the world of necessity and appearances, to reflect on higher things. Or, to put it another way, it was idealism for the rich, materialism for the poor. Virtue is knowledge, and both presuppose material freedom.… Ellen Meiksins Wood. The Retreat from Class: A New “True” Socialism. London and New York: Verso imprint of New Left Books. 1998. Page 123.]
      898. three-font war on science (Shawn Lawrence Otto): He critiques a three-pronged assault on science.
           “The Three-Front War on Science …
           1. “The postmodernist front being fought by academics, activists, and journalists on the secular left, who elevate subjectivity at the expense of objectivity, which they deny exists. Their actions provide philosophical support for:
           2. “The ideological front being fought by religious fundamentalists, who object to the emerging scientific mastery of reproduction and the life cycle, and seek to redefine scientific terms according to their own values and to debate science as if it were an opinion. They are often the foot soldiers for:
           3. “The industry and public-relations front, financed by corporations and conducted by PR experts, shills, and front groups, who take advantage of journalists’ naivety about objectivity and truth in order to manipulate the media, thereby shaping public opinion using “uncertainties,” deception, personal attacks, and outrage to move public policy toward an antiscience position that supports the funders’ business objectives.
           [Shawn Lawrence Otto. The War on Science: Who’s Waging It, Why It Matters, What We Can Do About It. Minneapolis, Minnesota: Milkweed Editions. 2016. Kindle edition.]
      899. critical materialism (Jonathan V. Crewe, Elizabeth J. Bellamy, and others): They critically apply a materialist approach to reading Renaissance texts.
           “The term ‘critical materialism’ is meant to identify a fairly diverse, widespread approach to read (resourcefully continue reading) Renaissance texts in recognizably materialist ways, but without any fixed, prior assumption about the obligatory terms or necessary outcome of such reading….
           “A strong interest in political and other economies, hence in further revisionary application of a ‘classical’ Marxist paradigm is also evident….
           “Critical materialism as I am trying to define it remains strongly conscious of, and committed to, its intellectual antecedents. These antecedents are by no means exclusively Marxist but include philosophical disourses of the material (of materiality) enunciated at least since the Renaissance….
           “What counts in critical materialism, apart from the dazzling economic heuristics of [Karl Marx’s] Grundrisse [MP3 audio file; ‘ground plans’], is Marx’s exemplary ‘critique of political economy.’”
           [Jonathan V. Crewe (editorial introduction), Reconfiguring the Renaissance: Essays in Critical Materialism. Jonathan V. Crewe, editor. Cranbury, New Jersey: Associated University Presses. 1992. Google Play edition.]
           “I would argue that the new historicism, prematurely foreclosing on the unconscious, has allowed itself to be influenced by the recent objectives to psychoanalysis that underwrite so much of current critical theory and, in the process, has recapitulated some of the same oversimplifications that plague these objections.” [Elizabeth J. Bellamy, “Psychoanalysis and the Subject in/of/for the Renaissance.” Reconfiguring the Renaissance: Essays in Critical Materialism. Jonathan V. Crewe, editor. Cranbury, New Jersey: Associated University Presses. 1992. Google Play edition.]
      900. normal common sense (Dick Hebdige): He examines the concealment of “ideological frames of reference.”
           “In the German Ideology, [Karl] Marx shows how the basis of the capitalist economic structure … is hidden from the consciousness of the agents of production. The failure to see through appearances to the real relations which underlie them does not occur as the direct result of some kind of masking operation consciously carried out by individuals, social groups or institutions. On the contrary, ideology by definition thrives beneath consciousness. It is here, at the level of ‘normal common sense’, that ideological frames of reference are most firmly sedimented and most effective, because it is here that their ideological nature is most effectively concealed.” [Dick Hebdige. Subculture: The Meaning of Style. London and New York: Routledge imprint of Taylor & Francis Group, an Informa PLC business. 2002. Page 11.]
      901. transgender studies (Susan Stryker): She explains the scope of the field, including elements of intersexuality, homosexuality, gender diversity, “gender atypicality,” embodiment, law, and public policy.
           “Transgender studies, as we understand it, is the academic field that claims as its purview transsexuality and cross-dressing, some aspects of intersexuality and homosexuality, cross-cultural and historical investigations of human gender diversity, myriad specific subcultural expressions of “gender atypicality,” theories of sexed embodiment and subjective gender identity development, law and public policy related to the regulation of gender expression, and many other similar issues. It is an interdisciplinary field that draws upon the social sciences and psychology, the physical and life sciences, and the humanities and arts. It is as concerned with material conditions as it is with representational practices, and often pays particularly close attention the interface between the two. The frameworks for analyzing and interpreting gender, desire, embodiment, and identity now taking shape in the field of transgender studies have radical implications for a wide range of subject areas. Transgender phenomena have become a topical focus in fields ranging from musicology to religious studies to digital media; a theme in the visual, plastic, and performing arts; and a matter of practical concern in such fields as public health, plastic surgery, criminal justice, family law, and immigration.” [Susan Stryker, “(De)Subjugated Knowledges: An Introduction to Transgender Studies”. The Transgender Studies Reader. Susan Stryker and Stephen Whittle, editors. London and New York: Routledge imprint of Taylor & Francis Group, an Informa PLC business. 2006. Pages 1-17.]
      902. politics of knowledge (Alexander Lyon and Joseph L. Chesebro): They critically examine the ideological dimension of organizational knowledge
           “… knowledge or expertise is often handled interchangeably with ‘intellectual capital’ … as a way to substantiate the value of knowledge. Thus, the way we label, interpret, and position our activities shapes the perception of our work. The other approaches to knowledge notwithstanding, we argue in this chapter that there is a political or ideological side to knowledge in organizations. First, we explore the historic roots of the critical perspective on knowledge and power, examine the ‘politics’ of knowledge, and introduce concerns of research in these areas. Next, we examine some actual struggles faced by members in a knowledge-driven organization. Finally, we offer practical suggestions for practitioners and researchers who share these concerns.” [Alexander Lyon and Joseph L. Chesebro, “The Politics of Knowledge: A Critical Perspective on Organizational Knowledge.” Communication and Organizational Knowledge: Contemporary Issues for Theory and Practice. Heather E. Canary and Robert D. McPhee, editors. London and New York: Routledge imprint of Taylor & Francis Group, an Informa PLC business. 2010. Pages 69-86.]
      903. chronotopology as pronounced in this MP3 audio file (Eduardo Mendieta as pronounced in this MP3 audio file): Establishes a connection between critical social theory and postmodern geography.
           “The most fundamental commonality between space and time, thus, is that both are produced. This is precisely what chronotopology seeks to study: how space and time are produced by society, and how society, in turn, is enabled to produce and reproduce itself through the binding of space and time. A chronotopology is therefore also the science of the spatiotemporal regimes that control the very horizon within which and from which society can visualize itself. To this extent, chronotopology lies at the base of all social theorizing, even when it lies concealed. How space and time are produced and reproduced therefore tells us a lot, if not all, about a society: the parameters, ideals, goals, rules, regulations, norms, and so on of a society. These social interactions, themselves always traces and detritus of space-time regimes, are also the projection of spatiotemporal horizons. Utopian images and projects and critiques of contemporaneity are the means by which a society submits its present spatiotemporal formations to criticism and revision …. In short, then, a chronotopology studies the spatiotemporal regimes that make up the structures that determine and make possible social agency, and the imaginary that projects alternative spatiotemporal horizons.” [Eduardo Mendieta, “Chronotopology: Critique of Spaciotemporal Regimes.” New Critical Theory: Essays on Liberation. William S. Wilkerson and Jeffrey Paris, editors. Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers. 2001. Kindle edition.]
      904. inoperative community (Jean-Luc Nancy as pronounced in this MP3 audio file): He presents a critique of real communism vis-à-vis the communist ideal.
           “… the schema of betrayal is seen to be untenable in that it was the very basis of the communist ideal that ended up appearing most problematic: namely, human beings defined as producers (one might even add: human beings defined at all), and fundamentally as the producers of their own essence in the form of their labor or their work.
           “That the justice and freedom—and the equality—included in the communist idea or ideal have in effect been betrayed in so-called real communism is something at once laden with the burden of an intolerable suffering (along with other, no less intolerable forms of suffering inflicted by our liberal societies) and at the same time politically decisive (not only in that a political strategy must favor resistance to this betrayal, but because this strategy, as well as our thought in general, must reckon with the possibility that an entire society has been forged, docilely and despite more than one forum of revolt, in the mold of this betrayal-or more plainly, at the mercy of this abandonment ….”
           [Jean-Luc Nancy. The Inoperative Community. Peter Connor, Lisa Garbus, Michael Holland, and Simona Sawhney, translators. Peter Connor, editor. Minneapolis, Minnesota: University of Minnesota Press. 1991. Page 2.]
           “[Jean-Luc] Nancy [in The Inoperative Community] … makes it his job to think ‘community’ not as a reach-me-down category of bourgeois democratic politics, but as a living (non-identitarian) communist concept and practice.” [John Roberts, “The two names of communism.” Radical Philosophy: Philosophical Journal of the Independent Left. Number 177, January/February 2013. Pages 9-18.]
      905. Islamic critical theory (Yedullah Kazmi [ʾUrdū, یِداُلله کَاظْمِی, Yidu͗lla̍h Kāẓmī] and Fawzia Gilani-Williams [ʾUrdū, فَوْزِیَہ گِیلَانِی وِلّْیَمْز, Fawziyah Gīlānī Willyamz]): They develop applications of critical theory in Islam.
           “Someone may object that if authenticity of self lies in the realization of our relationship to Allah [Arabic/ʿArabiyyaẗ, ﷲ, ʾAlla̍h, ‘the God’] then it can hardly be historical. On this view, our relationship to Allah is other worldly and not of the stuff of this world and hence ahistorical. Those who hold this view will further argue that the Qurꞌān [Arabic/ʿArabiyyaẗ, قُرْآن, Qurʾân, ‘recitation’] consistently emphasizes the temporary and transient nature of this world in comparison to the world hereafter and thus what is true and real, they say, is ahistorical. No one who is at all familiar with the Qurꞌān will deny that the Qurꞌān describes this world as transient. It will, however, be wrong to conclude from this that this world is, therefore, unimportant. The Qurꞌān in describing the world as temporary is giving an empirically accurate picture of the world and, telling us to see the world as it really is: subject to time and hence changing and temporary.” [Yedullah Kazmi, “Historical Consciousness and the Notion of the Authentic Self in the Qurꞌān: Towards an Islamic Critical Theory.” Islamic Studies. Volume 39, number 3, autumn 2000. Pages 375-398.]
           “[Yedullah] Kazmi’s use of Islamic critical theory is concerned with the struggle of the individual in life within the context of a relationship with God and the world. He emphasises the concept of justice and how it relates to what one has with the fluke of birth, ‘Justice results when human beings realize that life is just a test and try their best to do well in the test.’ Kazmi refers to whatever a person owns or whatever faculties a person processes is his or hers only as a trustee.…
           “Kazmi’s Islamic critical theory is imbedded in the Declaration of Faith or Shahadah [Arabic/ʿArabiyyaẗ, شَّهَادَة, Ššahādaẗ, ‘testimony’] and works on the principle that justice and knowing oneself is relative to God. ‘In Islam the road to social justice and to personal justice are not two separate roads but a single highway. You cannot achieve one without realizing the other’ ….
           “… the critical Islamic theory I will discuss is one type of Islamic critical theory. It is by no means exclusive. Hopefully as academic interest develops in this area more variations will evolve.”
           [Fawzia Gilani-Williams, “Islamic Critical Theory: A Tool for Emancipatory Education.” International Journal of Islamic Thought. Volume 5, June 2014. Pages 16-27.]
           “Islamic school teachers should … be encouraged to adapt popular stories. Muslim children, like any other child, needs to have a positive identity. Muslim children attending state schools have had to grapple with teasing, name calling and attitude. Shackled by demeaning labels, Muslim children feel marginalized from wider society. One eight year old thought that Muslims could not also be Canadians.” [Fawzia Gilani-Williams and Stephen Bigger, “Muslim Pupils, Children’s Fiction and Personal Understanding.” Almas International Research Journal. Volume 12, November 2010. Pages 1-9.]
      906. critical theory of Islam (Ali Hassan Zaidi [Arabic/ʿArabiyyaẗ, عَلِيّ حَسَن الزَايْدِيّ, ʿAliyy Ḥasan ʾal-Zāydiyy]): He emphasizes a focus on the fundamentals of Islam rather than Islamic fundamentalism.
           “… in a critical theory of Islam …, critique overwhelms the initial dialogical moment and the believers’ point of view is discounted in favour of an emancipatory, hence Enlightenment-based, quest for truth.…
           “… a critical approach to Islam and Muslims has only grown stronger since the 1970s, when western academic interest shifted from the relatively humanistic interest in the religion of Islam to social-scientific explanations of Islamic fundamentalism. What has gone largely unremarked in this shift from a perspective informed by the humanities to one informed more by the social sciences is the slippage that occurs by shifting from a focus on the fundamentals of Islam to Islamic fundamentalism ….”
           [Ali Hassan Zaidi, “A Critical Misunderstanding: Islam and Dialogue in the Human Sciences.” International Sociology. Volume 22, number 4, July 2007. Pages 411-434.]
      907. Critical Muslim Studies (The Editorial Board): They introduce the first issue of a journal devoted this subject.
           “Critical Muslim Studies is, then, characterized by a series of epistemological orientations, rather than by substantive properties, permanent categories, or persistent methodologies.… Firstly, there is a critique of Eurocentrism understood in a variety of registers (epistemological, cultural, geopolitical, etc.) that express the way in which Europeanness is deployed as master referent, in relation to which all things are measured and understood.…
           “Secondly, Critical Muslim Studies is informed by an ongoing (but not necessarily consummated) suspicion of positivism.…
           “Thirdly, there is recognition of the significance of the critique of Orientalism. Not the unveiling of bias and prejudice to which the critique of Orientalism is so often reduced but that which opens the possibility of enquires that understand the complex constitutive interplay between power and knowledge, between the ‘Orient,’ orientalizing, and the Occident.
           “Fourthly, there is an embrace of postcolonial and decolonial thinking. Decolonial thought calls for epistemic delinking as the means of delivering on the promise of critical theory in contexts where the dispossessed are not represented by the ‘translation of the proletariat’ …. It is a project that places at its heart the “wretched of the Earth” and follows the consequences of this placement for an understanding of the emergence of the current world order and investigations of obstacles to its replacement.”
           [The Editorial Board, “ReOrient: A Forum for Critical Muslim Studies.” ReOrient. Volume 1, number 1, autumn 2015. Pages 5-10.]
      908. four possible outcomes (Peter Frase): He develops Weberian ideal types of possible futures—two socialisms (communism and socialism) and two barbarisms (rentism and extremism).
           “In this book, I will suggest not two but four possible outcomes—two socialisms and two barbarisms [communism, rentism, socialism, and extremism], if you will. The four chapters that follow can be thought of as what the sociologist Max Weber called ‘ideal types’: simplified, pure models of how society can be organized, designed to illuminate a few key issues that confront us today and will confront us in the future—part social science, part science fiction. Real life, of course, is always much more complicated, but the point of an ideal type is to focus on specific issues, setting others aside.
           “The aim is to develop an understanding of our present moment and map the possible futures that lie ahead in stylized form. The basic assumption is that the trend toward increasing automation will continue in all domains of the economy. Moreover, I will not make the assumption that was made by most economists in the twentieth century: that even as some jobs are eliminated by mechanization, the market will automatically generate more than enough new jobs to make up for the loss.”
           [Peter Frase. Four Futures: Life After Capitalism. London and New York: Verso imprint of New Left Books. 2016. Page 21.]
      909. Anthropocene Crisis (John Bellamy Foster): We are, according to John Bellamy Foster, heading towards human-environmental crises.
           “It is as if the answer to the Anthropocene crisis were a narrowly economic and technological one consistent with the further expansion of the hegemony of capital over Earth and its inhabitants-this despite the fact that the present system of capital accumulation is at the root of the crisis. The result is to propel the world into still greater danger. What is needed, then, is to recognize that it is the logic of our current mode of production—capitalism—that stands in the way of creating a world of sustainable human development transcending the spiraling disaster that otherwise awaits humanity. To save ourselves we must create a different socioeconomic logic pointing to different human-environmental ends: an ecosocialist revolution in which the great mass of humanity takes part.” [John Bellamy Foster, “The Anthropocene Crisis.” Monthly Review: An Independent Socialist Magazine. Volume 68, issue 4, September 2016. Pages 9-15.]
      910. myths of value–free sociology (Steve D’Alton): He critiques this Weberian approach to social research.
           “This guiding myth [value-free sociology], which also finds expression in economics and psychology, serves to force irrelevance onto what are vital human subjects. Objectivity divorces the observer from the thing observed and precise mathematical formulation of the thing observed divorces the abstract formulation from its own active expression. Thus, the whole enterprise is one which alienates, is grounded on alienating principles and affirms alienated methods. It is the distancing that divorces the observer from his own social environment and permits the reification of social processes by making them static entities. Static entities which are related to the observer in much the same way as physical objects are related to the dispassionate research chemist. Thus ‘social engineering’ may be manipulating methods for organising humans as machines for abstract ends like ‘high production’ rather than for human ends which might be ‘to hell with work like this’. ‘Value-freedom’ is, in this context, the value of a specific ideological context, one which affirms the status quo — capitalism and the accompanying property ethic.” [Steve D’Alton, “The myths of ‘value-free’ sociology.” Australian Left Review. Volume 1, issue 32, September 1971. Pages 50-58.]
           “It should be noted … that my use of the term ‘sect’ is completely value free. The term [sect] has quite undeservedly fallen into disrepute in this country [Germany] because it has become associated with the concept of ‘restrictiveness.’ But there is no other way in which specific, clearly defined ideals can first come into being other than by the formation of sects of enthusiatic followers who are striving to realize their potential and therefore join together and keep themselves separate from others.” [Max Weber. Max Weber’s Complete Writings on Academic and Political Vocations. Gordon C. Wells, translator. John Dreijmanis, editor. New York: Algora Publishing. 2008. Page 95.]
      911. praxis of emancipation (Oliver P. Richmond): He develops an eirenist approach—one of harmony through synthesis—to emancipatory praxis.
           “The liberal social contract endeavours to accrue legitimacy for the regulatory institutions of governance required by offering mainly political rights to individuals as sufficient enticement for them to acquiesce to the liberal state project. This works on the assumption that the freedoms derived from political rights are more significant than need or material gain for individuals in post-conflict situations. The emancipatory graduation of liberal peace does offer the potential for reflection on the ethical implications of this but it is in this top-down, institutional format, that liberal peacebuilding fails to adequately consider the requirements for a social contract beyond political rights for grass-roots actors in their everyday context. As a result their consent is often lacking and the legitimacy of the liberal peacebuilding project is undermined. This eirenist [integrative] reading points to a need to return the everyday to the praxis of emancipation.” [Oliver P. Richmond, “A post-liberal peace: Eirenism and the everyday.” Review of International Studies. Volume 35, number 3, July 2009. Pages 557-580.]
      912. collective emancipation (Robin Dunford): He considers an emancipatory approach to Critical Security Studies.
           “Only through such concrete analyses is it possible to demonstrate that there are, indeed, emancipatory alternatives that can lie at the heart of CSS [Critical Security Studies]. Because victims of rendition are literally silenced and remain powerless, they cannot pursue emancipation through involvement in dialogue, and require collective action performed on their behalf. But this case of collective, rights based emancipation on behalf of others, I suggest, only develops one of at least two possibilities for collective rights based emancipation. Moreover, if CSS is developed only through examples of action on behalf of others, elitist tendencies could potentially be reinforced.” [Robin Dunford, “Human rights and collective emancipation: The politics of food sovereignty.” Review of International Studies. Volume 41, number 20, April 2015. Pages 239-261.]
      913. new paradigm of the self (Paolo Diego Bubbio as pronounced in this MP3 audio file): His perspective is informed by the work of Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel and Martin Heidegger.
           “I briefly consider [Georg Wilhelm Friedrich] Hegel and [Martin] Heidegger together, suggesting that their respective reflections on the notion of the ‘I,’ when combined, can fruitfully contribute to the design of a new paradigm of the self. This is clearly an enormous task; thus, I do not intend to reach any conclusion or suggest any ground-breaking solution in the space of this paper. What follows, therefore, is a set of preliminary reflections that introduce a massive research project.…
           “I believe that Hegel’s theory of recognition and Heidegger’s account of mineness and authenticity (or, to use the language of the later Heidegger, ‘subjectity’) are complementary in the development of a more comprehensive account of the ‘I’ by virtue of their emphasis on an intersubjective component according to which the ‘other’ is someone faced in a recognitive relationship.”
           [Paolo Diego Bubbio, “Hegel, Heidegger, and the ‘I’: Preliminary Reflections for a New Paradigm of the Self.” Philosophy Today. Volume 59, issue 1, winter 2015. Pages 73-90.]
      914. critical theory in the Anthropocene (McKenzie Wark): He proposes a new critical theory appropriate for the current era of planetary development.
           “Disparate times call for disparate methods. Let’s just say that this is the end of pre-history, this moment when planetary constraints start really coming to bear on the ever-expanding universe of the commodification of everything. This is the worldview-changing realization that some now call the Anthropocene.…
           “It’s not the end of the world, but it is the end of pre-history. It is time to announce in the marketplace of social media that the God who still hid in the worldview of an ecology that was self-correcting, self-balancing and self-healing—is dead. ‘The Anthropocene represents a new phase in the history of the Earth, when natural forces and human forces became intertwined, so that the fate of one determines the fate of the other. Geologically, this is a remarkable episode in the history of the planet.’ …
           “If critical theory is to grasp what techno-science has made of us in the twenty-first century, then at least a passing understanding of biological science might be an asset, for this is an era in which life itself has been disaggregated and brought under forms of molecular control.…
           “Having something to say about climate science is surely a central test for any viable critical theory in the Anthropocene.”
           [McKenzie Wark. Molecular Red: Theory for the Anthropocene. London and New York: Verso imprint of New Left Books. 2015. Kindle edition.]
      915. bird cage (Marilyn Frye): She develops an elegant model of oppression which is quite similar to intersectional theory.
           “The root of the word ‘oppression’ is the element ‘press.’ The press of the crowd; pressed into military service; to press a pair of pants; printing press; press the button. Presses are used to mold things or flatten them or reduce them in bulk, sometimes to reduce them by squeezing out the gasses or liquids in them. Something pressed is something caught between or among forces and barriers which are so related to each other that jointly they restrain, restrict or prevent the thing’s motion or mobility. Mold. Immobilize. Reduce.…
           “Women are caught like this, too, by networks of forces and barriers that expose one to penalty, loss or contempt ….
           “Cages. Consider a birdcage. If you look very closely at just one wire in the cage, you cannot see the other wires. If your conception of what is before you is determined by this myopic focus, you could look at that one wire, up and down the length of it, and unable to see why a bird would not just fly around the wire any time it wanted to go somewhere. Furthermore, even if, one day at a time, you myopically inspected each wire, you still could not see why a bird would have trouble going past the wires to get anywhere. There is no physical property of any one wire, nothing that the closest scrutiny could discover, that will reveal how a bird could be inhibited or harmed by it except in the most accidental way. It is only when you step back, stop looking at the wires one by one, microscopically, and take a macroscopic view of the whole cage, that you can see why the bird does not go anywhere; and then you will see it in a moment. It will require no great subtlety of mental powers. It is perfectly obvious that the bird is surrounded by a network of systematically related barriers, no one of which would be the least hindrance to its flight, but which, by their relations to each other, are as confining as the solid walls of a dungeon.”
           [Marilyn Frye. The Politics of Reality: Essays in Feminist Theory. Berkeley, California: Crossing Press imprint of Crown Publishing Group, a division of Random House, Inc. 1983. Pages 2-5.]
      916. different mirror (Ronald Takaki): Takaki, a historian, presents history as a mirror. His problematic argument (somewhat conservative or communitarian in my personal view) is that, rather than focusing on the particular histories of different U.S. populations, Americans should, instead, consider their shared history. My objection is that history is not a thing and should not, therefore, be reified. When I was elementary school, the history presented to us was, with few exceptions, of “white” people. Who’s to say that the same problem would not simply resurface in a new, allegedly shared, history?
           “… the accounts given by the people in this study vibrantly re-create moments, capturing the complexities of human emotions and thoughts. They also provide the authenticity of experience. After she escaped from slavery, Harriet Jacobs wrote in her autobiography: ‘[My purpose] is not to tell you what I have heard but what I have seen—and what I have suffered.’ In their sharing of memory, the people in this study offer us an opportunity to see ourselves reflected in a mirror called history. …
           “Carlos Fuentes points out that mirrors have been found in the tombs of Ancient Mexico, placed there to guide the dead through the underworld. He also tell us about the legend of Quetzalcoatl, the Plumed Serpent: when this god was given a mirror by the Toltec deity Tezcatlipoca, he saw a man’s face in the mirror and realized his own humanity. For us, the ‘mirror’ of history can guide the living and also help us recognize who we have been and hence are.…
           “But what is needed in our own perplexing times is not so much a ‘distant’ mirror, as one that is ‘different.’ While the study of the past can provide collective self-knowledge, it often reflects the scholar’s particular perspective or view of the world. What happens when historians leave out many of America's peoples? What happens, to borrow the words of Adrienne Rich, ‘when someone with the authority of a teacher’ describes our society, and ‘you are not in it’? Such an experience can be disorienting – ‘a moment of psychic disequilibrium, as if you looked into a mirror and saw nothing.’
           “Through their narratives about their lives and circumstances, the people of America’s diverse groups are able to see themselves and each other in our common past.”
           [Ronald Takaki. A Different Mirror: A History of Multicultural America. Boston, Massachusetts: Little, Brown and Company. 1993. Ebook edition.]
           “The future is in our hands. The choices we make will be influenced by whether our memory of the past is the Master Narrative of American History or the narrative of ‘a different mirror.’ A history that leaves out minorities reinforces separation, but an inclusive history bridges the divide.” [Ronald Takaki. A Different Mirror: A History of Multicultural America. Revised edition. Boston, Massachusetts: Back Bay Books imprint of Little, Brown and Company. 2008. Page 906.]
      917. everyday struggle (John Holloway): He considers state power in everyday life.
           “The development of new forms of working class struggle is the counterpart of the development of the state itself. The growth of the ‘welfare state’ and ‘state intervention’ and the rise in state employment have meant an increasing permeation of daily life by the state. Over a quarter of the working population in Britain are now employed by the state and are in everyday contact with the state as their employer. For many of these (especially those employed in the public service rather than the nationalised industries), the fact that they are employed by the state (rather than by an individual capital) is of fundamental importance for the nature of their daily activity. But clearly it is not only state employees who are affected: workers not employed by the state come into much more frequent direct contact with the state apparatus than was previously the case. This is most obviously true of the various activities affecting the reproduction of labour power: education, health, social welfare, housing — all these bring the worker into constant direct contact with the various parts of the state apparatus. This is also true of the immediate sphere of production. Although the immediate antagonist for workers employed by individual capitals is still the individual capitalist, the relation between capitalist and worker is increasingly influenced by the state: through pay policy, the granting of subsidies and loans conditional on ‘good behaviour,’ planning agreements, safety regulations etc. For more and more socialists, the state has become a problem of everyday practice.” [John Holloway, “The State and Everyday Struggle.” The State Debate. Simon Clarke, editor. Houndmills, Basingstoke, England: Macmillan Academic and Professional Ltd. 1991. Pages 225-259.]
      918. semantics of historical time (Reinhart Koselleck as pronounced in this MP3 audio file): He develops a critical approach to “the rhythm of temporal experience.”
           “The semantic analyses presented here are not generally conceived in terms of a particular purpose in linguistic history. Rather, they should seek out the linguistic organization of temporal experience wherever this surfaces in past reality. Consequently, these studies continually reach out and take up the sociohistorical context; trace the impulse in the pragmatic or political language of author or speaker; or, on the basis of conceptual semantics, draw conclusions concerning the historico-anthropological dimension present in every act of conceptualization and linguistic performance. It is for this reason that I have included in this volume the study on dreams and terror; this essay involves a degree of methodological risk, considering the manner in which language is reduced to silence and where the dimension of time appears to become reversed.” [Reinhart Koselleck. Futures Past: On the Semantics of Historical Time. Keith Tribe, translator. New York: Columbia University Press. 2004. Page 4.]
           “In his study of the semantics of historical time, Reinhart Koselleck proposes that ‘two specific determinants’ characterize modernity’s ‘new experience of transition: the expected otherness of the future and, associated with it, the alteration in the rhythm of temporal experience: acceleration, by means of which one’s own time is distinguished from what went before.’ …
           “… Acceleration may be the key determinant of modernity’s ‘new experience of transition’, as Koselleck suggests, but an accelerationism remains constitutively unable to think through the full historical–political meanings of modernity itself.”
           [David Cunningham, “A Marxist heresy?: Accelerationism and its discontents.” Radical Philosophy: Philosophical Journal of the Independent Left. Number 191, May/June 2015. Pages 29-38.]
      919. critical peace studies (Johan Galtung as pronounced in this MP3 audio file): The systematic comparison of empirical data, concerning peace studies, with human values.
           “Critical peace studies takes explicit stands. What makes it research is the explicitness not only of data but also of values, specifying what is good/right and bad/wrong, how and why. Very often this will have to be done with reference to the future: what looks like a plausible policy today may turn out to be disastrous; what looks unacceptable today may work in the longer run.” [Johan Galtung. Peace by Peaceful Means: Peace and Conflict, Development and Civilization. Thousand Oaks, California: SAGE Publications, Inc. 1996. Page 11.]
           “… peace studies is in need of a violence typology; much like pathology for health studies.” [Johan Galtung in Johan Galtung and Dietrich Fischer. Johan Galtung: Pioneer of Peace Research. New York: Springer Science+Business Media. 2013. Page 42.]
           “With globalization comes professionalism, also just around the corner, with the concomitant danger of self-righteous narrowness. Thus, the preservation of an independent, critical and emancipatory peace studies, able to analyze and critique the praxeology emerging from within its own ranks, is indispensable.” [Johan Galtung and Charles Webel, “Peace and conflict studies: Looking back, looking forward.” Handbook of Peace and Conflict Studies. Johan Galtung and Charles Webel, editors. London and New York: Routledge imprint of Taylor & Francis Group, an Informa PLC business. 2007. Google Play edition.]
           “… we do not have to accept everything in whatever has once been translated as ‘peace,’ we can also react critically to it and say that this is our interpretation.” [Johan Galtung, “Social Cosmology and the Concept of Peace.” Journal of Peace Research. Volume 18, number 2, 1981. Pages 183-199.]
           “The TRANSCEND method, based on dialogues with all parties to a conflict one at a time, is an effort to expand their spectrum of acceptable outcomes. The method is not based on arguing positions closer to the other parties, that is, compromise. That they can do themselves in a process known as negotiation. Experience shows that direct contact may exacerate conflicts for a number of reasons: because of the verbal violence often used in fact-to-face encounters, because compromise means accepting some of the Other, and because of the absence of creativity when the Other is present. In one-to-one conversation-style dialogues the task is to stimulate creativity, so developing new perspectives. The task is to make the conflict parties ‘ready for the table.’” [Johan Galtung and Finn Tschudi, “On the Psychology of the TRANSCEND Approach.” in Johan Galtung, Carl C. Jacobsen, and Kai Frithjof Brand-Jacobsen. Searching for Peace: The Road to Transcend. London and Sterling, Virginia: Pluto Press. 2002. Pages 153-154.]
      920. conspiratorial thinking (Volker Heins as pronounced in this MP3 audio file and others): Heins, in particular, applies critical social theory to a critique of conspiracies and to the explanations for why some people may subscribe to them.
           “[Sometimes] we find [Max] Horkheimer succumbing to a form of conspiratorial thinking instead of shedding light on it for us.…
           “Important proximate conditions for the spread and acceptability of conspiracy theories is the massive growth in free expression facilitated by online forums and weblogs combined with the erosion of trust in social authorities as the guarantors of legitimate knowledge. Neither governments nor universities, churches, committees of experts or the media enjoy this privilege nowadays. Conspiracy thinking flourishes at the intersection of two major trends: first, the restricted opportunities for the meaningful participation of individuals in a technocratically reduced democracy, and second, the unlimited possibilities of communication that are symbolized by, and available through, the Internet. When sections of the population believe that there is nothing to be gained from political engagement because ‘things don’t change’ anyway; when at the same time more and more can be known, while less and less knowledge seems to be reliable and indisputable, then we have a situation that is conducive to, among other things, conspiracy thinking.”
           [Volker Heins, “Critical theory and the traps of conspiracy thinking.” Philosophy & Social Criticism. Volume 33, number 7, 2007. Pages 787-801.]
           “As in most conspiracy theories, a series of ‘facts’ are presented to support a wider argument that has narrative appeal and a seeming veracity.” [Phil Hubbard and Rob Kitchin, “Battleground Geographies and Conspiracy Theories: A Response to Johnston (2006).” Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers. Volume 32, number 3, September 2007. Pages 428-434.]
           “… the proponents of a conspiracy theory will not simply feel that a dispositional conspiracy theory is better than its nonconspiratorial situational alternative despite its degeneration; they will make efforts to rationalize their preference. One way they can do this is by appealing to the unifying power of conspiracy theories. Dispositional explanations, such as conspiratorial explanations, can appear to exhibit more unifying power than situational explanations, because dispositional explanations can relate the occurrence of events within the context of an intended plan. Because conspiracy theories typically involve highly elaborate plans, they will usually exhibit great unificatory power.” [Steve Clarke, “Conspiracy Theories and Conspiracy Theorizing.” Philosophy of the Social Sciences. Volume 32, number 2, June 2002. Pages 131-150.]
           “The adaptation of sociological insights by conspiracy theorists is a good example of what [Anthony] Giddens … describes as the ‘double hermeneutic.’ This trickling down of academic knowledge in everyday life, and of social critique in particular, may be yet another reason for academics to furiously demarcate their ‘scientific analyses’ from ‘conspiracy theories.’ We argue therefore that this elective affinity posits conspiracy theories not outside of science, but right in the middle of its most fierce battle: the science wars.” [Jaron Harambam and Stef Aupers, “Contesting epistemic authority: Conspiracy theories on the boundaries of science.” Public Understanding of Science. Volume 24, number 4, 2015. Pages 466-480.]
           “Conspiracy theories are widely deemed to be superstitious. To suggest, for example, that New Zealand’s lurch to the right is due to a conspiracy between leading politicians, the Treasury and big business is to invite the shaking of heads and pitying looks from sophisticated colleagues. Everybody knows that that is not the way history works. Yet on the face of it, the evidence points the other way. History is littered with conspiracies successful and otherwise.” [Charles Pigden, “Popper Revisited, or What Is Wrong With Conspiracy Theories?” Philosophy of the Social Sciences. Volume 25, number 1, March 1995. Pages 3-34.]
           “Rightly or wrongly, he [Karl Marx] saw in such phenomena as war, depression, unemployment, and hunger in the midst of plenty, not the result of a cunning conspiracy on the part of ‘big business,’ but the unwanted social consequences of actions, directed towards different results, by agents who are caught in the network of the social system. He looked upon the human actors on the stage of history, including the ‘big’ ones, as mere puppets, irresistibly determined by economic ties, and by historical forces over which they have no control. The stage of history, he taught, is set in a social system which binds us all; it is set in the ‘kingdom of necessity.’” [Karl R. Popper. The Open Society and Its Enemies—Volume II—The High Tide of Prophecy: Hegel, Marx, and the Aftermath. London: George Routledge & Sons, Ltd. 1945. Page 94.]
           “The conspiracy theory of ignorance is fairly well known in its Marxian form as the conspiracy of a capitalist press that perverts and suppresses truth and fills the workers’ minds with false ideologies.…
           “I do not assert that there was never a grain of truth in this conspiracy theory. But in the main it was a myth, just as the theory of manifest truth from which it grew was a myth.
           “For the simple truth is that truth is often hard to come by, and that once found it may easily be lost again. Erroneous beliefs may have an astonishing power to survive, for thousands of years, in defiance of experience, and without the aid of any conspiracy. The history of science, and especially of medicine, could furnish us with a number of good examples. One example is, indeed, the general conspiracy theory itself. I mean the erroneous view that whenever something evil happens it must be due to the evil will of an evil power. Various forms of this view have survived down to our own day.”
           [Karl R. Popper. Conjectures and Refutations: The Growth of Scientific Knowledge. London and New York: Routledge imprint of Taylor & Francis Group, an Informa PLC business. 2002. Pages 9-10.]
      921. stigmatized knowledge (Michael Barkun): He examines and critiques popular conspiratorial beliefs in the context of American culture.
           “By stigmatized knowledge I mean claims to truth that the claimants regard as verified despite the marginalization of those claims by the institutions that conventionally distinguish between knowledge and error—universities, communities of scientific researchers, and the like.… The domain of stigmatized knowledge claims may be divided into five varieties:
           • “Forgotten knowledge: knowledge once allegedly known but lost through faulty memory, cataclysm, or some other interrupting factor (e.g., beliefs about ancient wisdom once possessed by inhabitants of Atlantis).
           • “Superseded knowledge: claims that once were authoritatively recognized as knowledge but lost that status because they came to be regarded as false or less valid than other claims (e.g., astrology and alchemy).
           • “Ignored knowledge: knowledge claims that persist in low-prestige social groups but are not taken seriously by others (e.g., folk medicine).
           • “Rejected knowledge: knowledge claims that are explicitly rejected as false from the outset (e.g., UFO abductions).
           • “Suppressed knowledge: claims that are allegedly known to be valid by authoritative institutions but are suppressed because the institutions fear the consequences of public knowledge or have some evil or selfish motive for hiding the truth (e.g., the alien origins of UFOs and suppressed cancer cures).”
           [Michael Barkun. A Culture of Conspiracy: Apocalyptic Visions in Contemporary America. Berkeley, California: University of California Press. 2003. Pages 26-27.]
      922. new radical right (Michael Barkun): He critiques the Christian Identity movement.
           “The strange story of the Christian Identity movement unfolds in a subculture few and and which fewer still participate, where deviant religion, spurious scholarship, and radical politics intersect.… This new radical right, the media sometimes suggested, was connected in some distant way with a nineteenth-century religious movement called ‘British-Israelism.’
           “I was vaguely aware of British-Israelism, but some casual research on the subject only deepened the mystery about the new radical right. British Israelism was a small but vigorous movement in Victorian English Protestant circles that claimed the British were the descendants of the ten ‘lost tribes’ of Israel. It was a curious notion, typical perhaps of the English love for eccentricity, but unfortunately, knowing what British-Israelism was shed little light on the activities of contemporary American rightists.
           “… Where right-wing groups typically attributed the world’s evils to a Jewish conspiracy, British-Israelites regarded Jews as brother Israelites, the descendants of different but related tribes.… Finally, British-Israelites were staunch defenders of the status quo. They gloried in England’s triumphs and attributed the wisdom of its political institutions to the Israelite heritage, which they believed they had discovered.”
           [Michael Barkun. Religion and the Racist Right. Chapel Hill, North Carolina: The University of North Carolina Press. 1997. Pages ix-x.]
      923. cultural Marxism (John Brenkman, Ian Buchanan, Douglas Kellner, Ioan Davies, Fred Inglis, and others): Buchanan defines cultural Marxism as “the theoretical and interpretive project that approaches culture in its dialectic relation to the social totality.” The term can refer to cultural studies, to critical social theory, or, more broadly, to Western Marxism. The only peripherally related far-right conspiratorial (and morally abhorrent) usage of “cultural Marxism” is comprehensively addressed within the next listing.
           “Cultural Marxism is the theoretical and interpretive project that approaches culture in its dialectic relation to the social totality. This totality, however, is not an achieved unity, but rather an unfulfilled promise or possibility latent within human history. Totality remains obstructed so long as the cultural realm of freedom, as well as the material realm of necessity, is founded upon unfreedom in the relations among human beings.…
           “… cultural Marxism undertakes its theoretical project: to revamp the social, psychoanalytic, and aesthetic elements of theory. These three theoretical fields do not come ready-made in the form of partial inquires that need only to be combined. Nor does cultural Marxism embrace the intellectual ideal of some unified set of concepts that would subsume these distinct inquiries and their in their relation and in their difference, collective experience do not fall into a sense of a system of self-consistent propositions.…
           “… The revolutionary project as a whole intends the whole intends the innovation of new sciences, new moralities, new aesthetics. It is the task of cultural Marxism to construct and preserve the heritage of revolt by making this revolutionary horizon visible within the actual struggles and wishes of the age.”
           [John Brenkman, “Theses on Cultural Marxism.” Social Text. Number 7, spring–summer 1983. Pages 19-33.]
           “… [Western Marxism] started to focus more on cultural rather than economic problems and it is for this reason also known as cultural Marxism.” [Ian Buchanan. A Dictionary of Critical Theory. “Western Marxism.” Oxford, England, and New York: Oxford University Press. 2010. Page 489.]
           “Many different versions of cultural studies have emerged in the past decades. While during its dramatic period of global expansion in the 1980s and 1990s, cultural studies was often identified with the approach to culture and society developed by the Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies, in Birmingham, England, their sociological, materialist, and political approaches to culture had predecessors in a number of currents of cultural Marxism. Many twentieth-century Marxian theorists, ranging from Georg Lukács, Antonio Gramsci, Ernst Bloch, Walter Benjamin, and T. W. Adorno to Fredric Jameson and Terry Eagleton, employed the Marxian theory to analyze cultural forms in relation to their production, their imbrications with society and history, and their impact and influences on audiences and social life. Traditions of cultural Marxism are thus important to the trajectory of cultural studies and to understanding its various types and forms in the present age.” [Douglas Kellner, “Cultural Marxism and British Cultural Studies.” Encyclopedia of Social Theory. George Ritzer, editor. Thousand Oaks, California: SAGE Publications, Inc. 2005. Pages 171-178.]
           “British cultural marxism was born in the late nineteen-fifties, by being liberated from both Stalinism and a regimental base-superstructure model. This required not only a rethinking of Marxist theory but also of the ways that the story of British Society, Politics and Culture had been told, recorded, interpreted. From the founding of the New Reasoner and the Universities and Left Review in 1956 and onwards the debate, theorizing and research on British culture from a more-or-less Marxist perspective assumed remarkable proportions, in which concepts, metaphors, theoretical frameworks, and, above all, social, technological, and political experiences, unthought of in previous Marxisms, became centre-stage, if only in some cases for momentary existences.
           “… By the 1980s, however, British Cultural Marxism became more culturist and less Marxist, carried along by its own academic institutionalization, shadow-boxing with itself and only indirectly contributing to political practice, so that in the end, notably in the pages of Marxism Today and the cultural journals that came into being in the last few years of the decade, it became caught up in the process which it had set out to criticize.…
           “… Like Thatcherism, which had enacted slogans, British cultural marxism ultimately abandoned Raymond Williams' sensibility of feelings, however vague that might have seemed at the time, for the brittlenes the marketplace.”
           [Ioan Davies, “British Cultural Marxism.” International Journal of Politics, Culture, and Society. Volume 4, number 3 spring 1991. Pages 323-344.]
           “… if the cultural Marxism professed by the British New Left was to be any more than a homily intended to keep liberal capitalism up to its own, morally official standards of freedom and justice, it had to make the connections between theoretical understanding and feasible politics; it had to practise the art of the plausible and do so within a social structure which … builds high barriers between practical politics and academic ideation, and makes impossible the enviably direct turning of history into theory which was the privilege of [Georg] Lukács or [Jean-Paul] Sartre, or even the leaders of the anti-Vietnam War movement in the USA, each so vividly active in action.” [Fred Inglis, “The Figures of Dissent.” New Left Review. Series I, number 215, January–February 1996. Pages 83-92.]
           “… for Richard Johnson, in particular, they [various scholars] have been moving away [from a focus on economic forces] towards ‘culturalism,’ or ‘cultural Marxism.’” [Victor Kiernan, “Problems of Marxist History.” New Left Review. Series I, number 161, January–Feruary 1987. Pages 105-118.]
      924. Mizrahism (Nissim Leon [Hebrew/ʿIḇəriyṯ, נִסִּים לֲאוֹן, Nissiym Lăʾōn]): He discusses the application of critical social theory to Mizrahism (Hebrew/ʿIḇəriyṯ, הָמִצרִי hā-Miṣəriy, “the Egyptian”), one of the ethnic divisions of global Jewry.
           “The sources of the category of Mizrahism, and the signified collective, Mizrahim [Hebrew/ʿIḇəriyṯ, מִצְרָיִם Miṣərāyim, ‘Egyptians’], lie in the critical theory developed by Israeli sociologists during the 1980s and 1990s in analysing the ethno- and socioeconomic situation of Jews from Islamic countries in Israel.… According to critical sociological theory, this background explains the cultural and political restlessness accompanying the ethnic identity of Mizrahim and their ongoing desire to organize themselves politically, whether within broader integrative frameworks or in separate ethnic frameworks, with a view to improving their living conditions and advancing their cultural representation within the Israeli collective.” [Nissim Leon, “The Ethnic Structuring of ‘Sephardim’ in Haredi Society in Israel.” Jewish Social Studies: History, Culture, Society. Volume 22, number 1, fall 2016. Pages 130-160.]
      925. dialectic of counter-enlightenment (Martin Jay): Among the more common fare for the conspiratorial genre is the ultra-conservative, anti-Marxist, and occasionally neo-Fascist or neo-Nazi notion of a cultural Marxist “cabal.” It is a hostile, and usually distorted, interpretation of the Frankfurt School, critical social theory, or, sometimes more broadly, Western Marxism. Below, Jay presents his own excellent critique of this unfortunate species of right-wing populism. Although the designation cultural Marxism is occasionally found—albeit absent the inimical bias—in scholarly sources cited in the previous entry, given the reactionary right’s commandeering of the term, leftists may be well-advised to avoid using it.
           White nationalist and proto-alt-rightist (proto-alternative-rightist) Patrick Joseph Buchanan (born in 1938), an adviser to three Republican U.S. presidents, is a former Republican Party presidential contender. Buchanan, who is quite affable and highly intelligent, is one of the major promoters of the cultural Marxism conspiracy theory. He blames “cultural Marxism” for many of the problems which, according to him, are found in modern societies, including multiculturalism, tolerance, and so-called political correctness. Andrew Breitbart (1969–2012), founder of the alt-right Breitbart News Network—which commonly peddles neo-Nazi and white-supremacist propaganda—expressed similar conspiratorial sentiments as Buchanan.
           These YouTube videos are examples of the nonsensical, not to mention counterrevolutionary, cultural Marxist conspiracy theory: Cultural Marxism: The Corruption of America (filled with factual errors), The Triumph of Cultural Marxism, Cultural Marxism in Canadian Society: Ricardo Duchesne and Shawn Dalton on ThatChannel, Indoctrinate U, History of the Frankfurt School Cultural Marxism, Grinding Down America Using Cultural Marxism, The History of Political Correctness (Complete), Cultural Marxism, Olavo de Carvalho 2015 The Triumph of Cultural Marxism, William S. Lind on the Origins of Political Correctness, What is Cultural Marxism?, Andrew Breitbart Explains Cultural Marxism, and Political Correctness: The Control of Thought and Speech.
           The following YouTube videos are explicit about the antisemitic (sometimes neo-Nazi) and “alt right” sources of the cultural Marxist conspiracy theory: History of the Frankfurt School & Cultural Marxism – William Finck & Dr. Kevin MacDonald (from Christogenea), The Frankfurt School Cultural Marxism, Red Ice Radio – Thomas Sheridan – Hour 1 – Cultural Marxism & The Psyop in Europe (from Red Ice Creations), Cultural Marxism Explained What is Cultural Marxism? (note the Star of David), and Minority Rule: The Rise of Political Correctness – Documentary.
           “Talking about the Frankfurt School is ideal for not naming the Jews as a group (which often leads to a panicky rejection, a stubborn refusal to listening anymore and even a ‘shut up’) but naming the Jew by proper names. People will make their generalizations by themselves – in the privacy of their own minds. At least it worked like that with me. It was my lightbulb moment, when confusing pieces of an alarming puzzle suddenly grouped to a visible picture. Learn by heart the most important proper names of the Frankfurt Schoolers – they are (except for a handful of minor members and female ‘groupies’) ALL Jews.…
           “Now that the real origins of political correctness in the cultural Marxism devised by a clever bunch of foreign-born Jews had been revealed, the full extent of the damage they had caused could be spelled out. Here is a list cited verbatim from many of the websites devoted to the question:
           1. “The creation of racism offences
           2. “Continual change to create confusion
           3. “The teaching of sex and homosexuality to children
           4. “The undermining of schools’ and teachers’ authority
           5. “Huge immigration to destroy identity
           6. “The promotion of excessive drinking
           7. “Emptying of churches
           8. “An unreliable legal system with bias against victims of crime
           9. “Dependency on the state or state benefits
           10. “Control and dumbing down of media
           11. “Encouraging the breakdown of the family
           “As the case of Pat Buchanan shows, it [the cultural Marxism conspiracy theory] has entered at least the fringes of the mainstream. Indeed, if you include right-wing radio demagogues with sizeable audiences like the thuggish Michael Savage, it has now become their stock in trade as well. Can it be doubted that if you polled the crowds at Tea Party rallies about the influence of ‘cultural Marxism’ on the decline of American culture, which they want to ‘take back’ from immigrants, recent and otherwise, you would find significant familiarity with this discourse?”
           [Martin Jay, “Dialectic of Counter-Enlightenment: The Frankfurt School as Scapegoat of the Lunatic Fringe.” Salmagundi. Number 168/169, fall 2010. Pages 30-40.]
           “In their faithfulness to [Karl] Marx’s own attitude towards anti-Semitism, [Max] Horkheimer and his colleagues conformed to a pattern that many observers have noted: the more radical the Marxist, the less interested in the specificity of the Jewish question. Of all the members of the German socialist movement in both the Wilhelmian and Weimar eras, the Revisionists were the most attentive to anti-Semitism as a problem in its own right. And of course, the Institute of Social Research had no use for revisionism in any form. Its members tended as well to hold to another pattern that often accompanied this inverse relationship between radicalism and sensitivity to anti-Semitism: those among them with Jewish backgrounds rarely, if ever, found their ethnic identities significant for their work.” [Martin Jay, “The Jews and the Frankfurt School: Critical Theory’s Analysis of Anti-Semitism.” New German Critique. Number 19, special issue 1, winter 1980. Pages 137-149.]
           “Although the Frankfurt School’s critique of anthropomorphism appeared most strongly in its discussions of idealism, traces of it can be found in its treatment of dialectical materialism as well. To Marx and all orthodox Marxists, man’s most characteristic activity, his means of self-realization, was labor. The labor process was understood to be constitutive of the totality of human existence, including the cultural sphere. It was this priority of labor which made the derivative character of the superstructure a necessary component of Marxist thought.” [Martin Jay, “The FrankFurt School’s Critique of Marxist Humanism.” Social Research. Volume 39, number 2, summer 1972. Pages 285-305.]
           “… what strikes the American observer is that the flood of translations and commentaries related to the work of the Frankfurt School that con- tinues to widen in the 1970’s signifies less an end than a beginning of its influence. The impact, to be sure, will not be on politics, as it was in Germany, but rather on scholarship, where the perspectives associated with Critical Theory have begun to make inroads in a number of ways.” [Martin Jay, “Some Recent Developments in Critical Theory.” Berkeley Journal of Sociology. Volume 18, 1973–1974. Pages 27-44.]
           “… [There were] vigorous protestations by several institute [Institute for Social Research in Frankfurt, Germany] members that their ethnic origins were of no importance whatsoever ….” [Martin Jay, “Critical Theory Criticized: Zoltán Tar and the Frankfurt School.” Central European History. Volume 12, number 1, March 1979. Pages 91-98.]
           “Cultural relativism is … not called into question by a naive return to transcendental universalism in which all mediation is overcome, but rather by the inability of images to be relative to a specific culture understood as a boundaried and coherent way of life. In fact, much of the power of images, we might conjecture, comes precisely from their ability to resist being entirely subsumed under the protocols of specific cultures.” [Martin Jay, “Cultural relativism and the visual turn.” Journal of Visual Culture. Volume 1, number 3, 2002. Pages 267-278.]
           “… one immediate result [of 9/11] is that the long-standing assumption of much cultural studies, visual or otherwise, that the hegemony of global capitalist culture must be ‘subverted’ or ‘transgressed’ in the name of a more progressive alternative is now very hard to maintain in its naïve form. Insofar as the hijackers hijacked the vocabulary of anti-globalization for their own not very progressive ends, it is necessary to recognize a new political/cultural landscape in which some of the old conventional wisdom no longer holds.” [Martin Jay, “That visual turn: The advent of visual culture.” Journal of Visual Culture. Volume 1, number 1, 2002. Pages 87-92.]
           “At first the unrest leading to GG [#GamerGate on Twitter] appeared to be just one of several gendered online harassment campaigns. Scholars with a greater focus on gender have been looking at this problem for a while …, but it did not get much attention. But this time the self-identified gamers organized to grab attention. There was no way to ignore this very visible group with members who acted aggressively and hatefully. They adopted ideas from the extreme right wing in the fear of the so-called Cultural Marxism …. Several GG’ers embraced this conspiracy, and claimed Jews and western academics have joined forces to pacify White men, and planned to hand the power of the ‘western world’ to the Jews or Islam by encouraging politically correct digital games ….” [Torill Elvira Mortensen, “Anger, Fear, and Games: The Long Event of #GamerGate.” Games and Culture. OnlineFirst edition. April, 2016. Pages 1-20.]
           “No one on the right ever stops to ask why, even if it were true that far letists had invaded the institutions, they managed to do so with such ease. Where were the gatekeepers? Where were the guardians of traditionalism? The cultural Marxism conspiracy theory doesn’t add up, as can be seen in modern Britain: it is [Prime Minister David] Cameron, a Conservative, who is denuding marriage of its ancient meaning; it was [Rupert] Murdoch, a right-winger, who folded the 168-year-old News of the World; it is the Windsors, even [Queen] Elizabeth herself, who are inviting PR [public relations] men to make them over, to make them ‘relevant.’ These institutions weren’t dented or destroyed by cliques of super-clever letists but by their own internal and profound crises of moral legitimacy.” [Brendan O’Neill, “Britain Abolishes Itself: Traditions working-class and aristocratic fade in Cameron’s UK.” The American Conservative. Volume 11, number 8, 2012. Pages 36-39.]
           “… [As] to the Frankfurt school and its alleged conspiracy of ‘cultural Marxism,’ the overly voluntarist structure of the narrative is a sensible a priori reason for judging it of dubious currency. The notion that agents promulgating a subversive set of ideas can shape the dominant cultural institutions of a modern class society is utterly implausible. The bourgeoisie has never and would never abide the dissemination of ideas or cultural practices inimical to its reproduction as a social class. At best, capitalism can integrate those practices which are neutral to the process of accumulation. What is more, if one carefully dissects the phenomena cultural conservatives sometimes impute to the Frankfurt school from a materialist perspective, it is not difficult to discern how these policies are actually of utility to that imperative.” [Michael E. Acuña, “The Origins and Ideological Function of Cultural Marxism.” Privately published paper. January, 2015. Pages 1-14. Retrieved on September 12th, 2016.]
           “Analyses of the music industry tend to fall into two divergent camps: those that embody the tenets of ‘classical’ Marxism and those that support the propositions of ‘cultural’ Marxism. The former, to generalize for the purpose of discussion, stress the manner in which music is but one of many commodities produced by the ‘culture industry’ to the end of dominating the marketplace and controlling the meanings that marketplace contains.” [David Sanjek, “Funkentelechy vs. the Stockholm Syndrome: The place of industrial analysis in popular music studies.” Popular Music and Society. Volume 21, number 1, spring 1997. Pages 73-92.]
           “… [Anders Behring] Breivik has ‘succeeded’ in making his destructive rampage a spectacular event, one that has gained notoriety for himself and for his political cause, due greatly to the rapid dissemination of his manifesto, 2083: A European Declaration of Independence ….
           “… Breivik accuses cultural Marxists and the ‘political correctness’ of the social democratic establishment for denying any racial differences, and for refuting any difference in value between Muslim culture and European culture for Europeans.”
           [Ellen Mortensen, “Sexuate difference in a time of terror.” Thesis Eleven. Volume 120, number 1, February 2014. Pages 75-89.]
           “Multiculturalism (cultural Marxism/political correctness), as you might know, is the root cause of the ongoing Islamisation of Europe which has resulted in the ongoing Islamic colonisation of Europe through demographic warfare (facilitated by our own leaders). This compendium presents the solutions and explains exactly what is required of each and every one of us in the coming decades. Everyone can and should contribute in one way or the other; it’s just a matter of will.” [Anders Behring Breivik. 2083: A European Declaration of Independence. London: Pauperes commilitones Christi Templique Solomonici. 2011. No pagination. Retrieved on July 1st, 2016.]
           “… the man who was to be charged with the [Norwegian] terror attacks was named as Anders Behring Breivik. The thirty-two-year-old son of a short-lived relationship between the former senior Norwegian diplomat Jens David Breivik (1935–) and the auxiliary nurse Wenche Behring (1946– 2013), Behring Breivik described himself as a ‘conservative Christian.’ However, as was amply illustrated by his deeds and in his tract, he was not in any respects a practising Christian. In his teenage years, he had nourished dreams of becoming a millionaire businessman, and he left high school before attaining his graduation diploma in pursuit of these dreams.” [Sindre Bangstad. Anders Breivik and the Rise of Islamophobia. London: Zed Books. 2014. Page 3.]
           “In Norway, … on July 22, 2011, Andres Behring Breivik killed 77 people in Oslo [Norway] and on Uytola Island.
           “Encompassing the extreme right’s ideological xenophobia, Breivik described his worldview in a compendium of texts entitled 2083: A European Declaration of Independence that he distributed electronically on the day of the attacks. According to these texts, he regards Islam and ‘cultural Marxism’ as the enemy and argues for the violent annihilation of ‘Eurabia’ and multiculturalism as well as the deportation of all Muslims from Europe. While Breivik expresses in these texts what only a small percentage of Europeans feel, the far right of the political spectrum has consolidated its constituency through a clear antiforeigner, anti-Muslim minority message spiced with xenophobia and everyday racism. Racism and xenophobia are a common occurrence in Europe today.”
           [Barbara Franz, “Contextualizing Minority: The Production of Difference and Sameness in Europe.” Becoming Minority: How Discourses and Policies Produce Minorities in Europe and India. Jyotirmaya Tripathy and Sudarsan Padmanabhan, editors. Thousand Oaks, California: SAGE Publications, Inc. 2014. Pages 24-46.]
           “Using Critical Theory … the cultural Marxist repeats and repeats the charge that the West is guilty of genocidal crimes against every civilization and culture it has encountered. Under Critical Theory, one repeats and repeats that Western societies are history’s greatest repositories of racism, sexism, nativism, xenophobia, homophobia, anti-Semitism, fascism, and Nazism. Under Critical Theory, the crimes of the West flow from the character of the West, as shaped by Christianity.” [Patrick J. Buchanan. The Death of the West: How Dying Populations and Immigrant Invasions Imperil Our Culture and Civilization. New York: Thomas Dunne Books imprint of St. Martin’s Press. 2002. Page 80.]
           “I saw that the cultural Marxism of Tulane [University] wasn’t restricted to Tulane— it was everywhere, from the mainstream media to Hollywood to the educational system to the government. And when I began researching the origins of that pervasive cultural Marxism, I realized that this wasn’t a result of America’s suddenly and spontaneously embracing a rebellious counterculture in the 1960s— it started long before that.” [Andrew Breitbart. Righteous Indignation: Excuse Me While I Save the World. New York: Grand Central Publishing. 2011. Pages 106.]
           “When [Max] Horkheimer took over the institute [Institute for Social Research] in 1930, he filled it up with fellow devotees of critical theory like Theodor Adorno, Erich Fromm, and Herbert Marcuse.…
           “… With [Adolf] Hitler’s rise, they had to flee [Germany] (virtually all of them— Horkheimer, Marcuse, Adorno, Fromm— were of Jewish descent). And they had no place to go.
           “Except the United States.”
           [Andrew Breitbart. Righteous Indignation: Excuse Me While I Save the World. New York: Grand Central Publishing. 2011. Pages 114.]
           “… the taboos of our culture are also its totems, and the political arguments that rage around them are symptomatic of both disease and good health, of infection and immunity. They are not simply battlefields in the larger contemporary culture war— they are the culture war, a war that has been raging since the Garden of Eden but that manifests itself today in the unceasing attack of cultural Marxism (which molts and masquerades under many names, including liberalism, progressivism, social justice, environmentalism, anti-racism, etc.) upon what used to be called the Christian West.…
           “The aggressors include the Frankfurt School of (mostly German) Marxist philosophers, theoreticians, and writers, as well as their intellectual descendants and acolytes in the U.S., including the followers of Saul Alinsky, the Marxist ‘community organizer’ whose influence has only waxed in the years since his death in 1972 and has extended even to the Oval Office. Throughout, I refer to this cabal as the Unholy Left, a term unapologetically both descriptive and judgmental. It is a term I suspect they would dearly like to embrace but can’t quite bring themselves to yet, if only for electoral reasons.”
           [Michael Walsh. The Devil’s Pleasure Palace: The Cult of Critical Theory and the Subversion of the West. New York and London: Encounter Books. 2015. Pages 3-4.]
           “Basically, the Frankfurt School believed that as long as an individual had the belief—or even the hope of belief—that his divine gift of reason could solve the problems facing society, then that society would never reach the state of hopelessness and alienation that they considered necessary to provoke socialist revolution. Their task, therefore, was as swiftly as possible to undermine the Judaeo-Christian legacy. To do this they called for the most negative destructive criticism possible of every sphere of life which would be designed to destabilize society and bring down what they saw as the ‘oppressive’ order. Their policies, they hoped, would spread like a virus—‘continuing the work of the Western Marxists by other means’ as one of their members noted.” [Timothy Matthews, “The Frankfurt School: Conspiracy to corrupt.” Catholic Insight. Volume 17, number 3, March 2009. Pages 15-20.]
           “In this volume I will concentrate on Jewish involvement in movements opposed to evolutionary, biological, and genetic findings in the social sciences, radical political ideology, psychoanalysis, the Frankfurt School of Social Research, and the New York Intellectuals. These movements are not specifically Jewish in the sense that they are not intended to rationalize specific aspects of Judaism such as cultural and genetic separatism. A major point will be that Jews were vastly overrepresented in these movements, that a strong sense of Jewish identity characterized the great majority of these individuals, and that all involved alienation from and rejection of gentile culture.” [Kevin MacDonald. The Culture of Critique: Toward an Evolutionary Theory of Jewish Involvement in Twentieth-Century Intellectual and Political Movements. Seattle, Washington: Amazon Digital Services LLC, 2013. Kindle edition.]

           “The line was becoming clear. [Karl] Marx and [Georg Wilhelm Friedrich] Hegel had paved the way for the Progressives, who in turn had paved the way for the Frankfurt School, who had then attacked the American way of life by pushing ‘cultural Marxism’ through ‘critical theory.’ The Frankfurt School thinkers had come up with the rationale for radical environmentalism, artistic communism, psychological deconstruction of their opponents, and multiculturalism. Most of all, they had come up with the concept of ‘repressive tolerance,’ aka political correctness.

           “They had penetrated the academies— my American Studies program at Tulane [University] had far more [Theodor] Adorno and [Antonio] Gramsci and [Max] Horkheimer and [Herbert] Marcuse than [Mark] Twain or [Thomas] Jefferson or [Abraham] Lincoln. There was some trickle-down intellectualism going on— all the college students who worked through these programs and took swigs from the Frankfurt School bottle labeled ‘Drink Me’ shrank mentally and ended up as parts of the Complex.”

           [Andrew Breitbart. Righteous Indignation: Excuse Me While I Save the World. New York: Grand Central Publishing. 2011. Pages 124.]

           “The talk radio host [Rush Limbaugh] may not know what the ‘alternative right’ is—but he gave it a huge endorsement last week.…

           “It began innocently enough, when Limbaugh opened the phone lines for callers. The first call came from a person who identified himself as Roy from Gurnee, Illinois. The caller began by telling Limbaugh about burgeoning excitement among right-wing youth in Europe—and then started promoting the white supremacist alt right movement. As the caller talked, the radio host nodded along, expressing pleasure with the caller’s analysis of the alt right and inadvertently lending legitimacy to that movement—which flirts with neo-Nazism.…

           “… the alt right is a neoreactionary effort comprised of right-wing agitators brought together by their opposition to immigration (in particular, Hispanic and Muslim immigration), animosity to Muslims, and general opposition to multiculturalism (they call it cultural Marxism). They hate political correctness, they like Donald Trump, and they love dubbing their enemies ‘cuckservatives [a portmanteau of “cuckold,” an adulterous woman’s husband, and “conservative”].’”

           [Betsy Woodruff, “Rush Limbaugh’s Favorite New White-Power Group.” The Daily Beast. December 3rd, 2015. Online publication. Retrieved on August 17th, 2016.]

           “A greater proportion of U.S. Southern Jews owned slaves than other Southern whites only because they were concentrated in urban areas, where rates of slave ownership were higher. Moreover, Jewish slaveowners owned fewer slaves per household than the average slaveowner, because urban slaveowners owned fewer slaves than their rural counterparts. And the vast majority of U.S. Jews lived in the non-slaveholding North. Finally, the absolute numbers of Jews involved in U.S. slavery were vanishingly small: the 1830 census records only 120 Jews among the 45,000 individuals owning 20 or more slaves, and it records only 20 Jews among the 12,000 owning 50 or more slaves.” [Elizabeth Anderson, “Knowledge, Human Interests, and Objectivity in Feminist Epistemology.” Philosophical Topics. Volume 23, number 2, fall 1995. Pages 27-58.]
      926. politics of grievance (James Kirchick): He critiques the (unholy) marriage of Donald Trump and the alt-right (alternative-right).
           “‘Free speech activist’ is a curiously prevalent appellation on the medium of Twitter for members of the ‘alt-right,’ short for ‘alternative right,’ a populist movement that has been emboldened and bolstered by the fortunes of the Trump campaign. Existing largely on the Internet, which makes the size of its following difficult to gauge, the alt-right is proudly ethno-nationalist, protectionist, isolationist, and culturally traditionalist. It takes intellectual guidance from publications and websites like American Renaissance, Radix Journal, Occidental Observer, Taki’s Magazine, and, increasingly, the popular news website Breitbart.com.…
           “… Pollsters may need to develop a new category in the wake of the [Donald] Trump phenomenon: ‘resentment voters.’ Within the demographic of lower-middle-class white men, Trump is popular in a variety of misanthropic subcultures, many of which did not really exist until the Internet provided them with a way to communicate and organize.…
           “One doesn’t have to share the normative interpretations of alt-right counter-history to believe that these thinkers have a point in arguing that human societal development is not a process of inexorable progress. Though conservatives have criticized President Barack Obama’s frequent invocation of ‘the right side of history’ to justify his positions on issues ranging from gay marriage to counterterrorism, Americans have become largely inured to the idea, expressed by Ronald Reagan, that their country’s ‘best days are yet to come.’ What if they’re not? What if things are about to get a whole lot worse?
           “In alt-right discourse, ‘white’ is often erroneously conflated with ‘Western civilization,’ so that all of the latter’s achievements can be attributed to the virtues of a particular race rather than a universalist set of ideas. When I once asked on Twitter what constituted ‘white culture’ (in response to a horde of alt-right commenters demanding to know why white people did not have the same right to ‘protect’ their ‘culture’ as other groups), I was instantly bombarded with images obviously found by typing ‘renaissance cathedral’ or ‘Vatican’ into Google Image, along with YouTube videos of Handel’s ‘Messiah.’”
           [James Kirchick, “Trump’s Terrifying Online Brigades: the ‘Alt-Right’ the ‘Neo-Reactionaries,’ and the Politics of Grievance.” Commentary. Volume 141, number 6, June 2016. Pages 13-17.]
      927. epistemic Islamophobia (Ramón Grosfoguel as pronounced in this MP3 audio file): He examines the distortions in knowledge of Islam.
           “The importance of this discussion about epistemic Islamophobia is that the latter is manifested in contemporary debates and public policy. The epistemic racism and its derivative Eurocentric fundamentalism in social theory are manifested in discussions about human rights and democracy today. ‘Non-Western’ epistemologies that define human rights and human dignity in different terms than the West are considered inferior to ‘Western’ hegemonic definitions and, thus, excluded from the global conversation about these questions.” [Ramón Grosfoguel, “Epistemic Islamophobia and Colonial Social Sciences.” Human Architecture: Journal of the Sociology of Self-Knowledge. Open access. Volume VIII, number 2, fall 2010. Pages 29-38.]
      928. unconscious Islamophobia (Gema Martín-Muñoz as pronounced in this MP3 audio file): The article discusses ways in which Islamophobia has been promoted based upon a desire for self-defensive rather than discrimination per se.
           “Since 2002, all national and international sociological studies have reported a growing sense of rejection towards Muslims and a close link between terrorism and Muslim immigration. Since these sentiments are expressions of patriotism and self-defence, the ensuing Islamophobic sentiments are legitimised and forgiven by society. Hence, the term ‘unconscious Islamophobia’ would be correct if that is understood to mean protection and self-defence instead of discrimination. For this reason, many are reluctant to call it by its name.” [Gema Martín-Muñoz, “Unconscious Islamophobia.” Human Architecture: Journal of the Sociology of Self-Knowledge. Open access. Volume VIII, number 2, fall 2010. Pages 21-28.]
      929. campaign of resistance (Donna Nevel): She examines an Islamophobic campaign “orchestrated mostly by Jewish bigots.”
           “I did not know Debbie Almontaser and did not know anything about the Khalil Gibran International Academy (KGIA), but when I learned that a Muslim and Arab principal of an Arabic Dual Language school was the victim of a racist smear campaign orchestrated mostly by Jewish bigots – it hit me in my gut.…
           “We held a number of community events with educators, social justice activists, and with Muslim and Jewish leaders from across the country.… We were able to garner support from academics, educators, community activists, and interfaith leaders from across the country.”
           [Donna Nevel, “The Campaign of Resistance.” Monthly Review: An Independent Socialist Magazine. Volume 63, issue 4, September 2011. Pages 54-57.]
      930. Jewish–Palestinian Arabic–Hebrew State (Udi Aloni [Hebrew/ʿIḇəriyṯ, אוּדִי אַלּוֹנִי, ʾŪḏiy ʾẠllōniy]): He advocates for a solution to the Palestinian–Israeli territorial issue.
           “… we must first recognize that the goal of binationalism is not simply to tear down the ghetto that we have erected for the indigenous Palestinians with whom we share this land. We must also tear down the golden ghetto walls with which we have encircled ourselves. While many believe that history always repeats itself, this does not necessarily mean that we must repeat the same mistakes or reproduce the same injustices so typical of classical colonialist movements in the last century. Binationalism could well be the ultimate source of resolution for a people that was almost annihilated on the altar of racism and ethnic homogeneity. We can offer no greater good to the world than to build a new society on a foundation of multiple ethnic and religious distinctions.…
           “Today no American would dare ask whether it is possible to create a country where blacks and whites are treated equally; the assumption of equality is a given, and the question is now what the necessary preconditions for equality are. The same is true for us. We refuse to accept the possibility that Palestinians will be unequal to Jews throughout the Israeli-Palestinian space. The problems that may result down the road are irrelevant.”
           [Udi Aloni, “A Manifesto for the Jewish-Palestinian Arabic-Hebrew State,” in Udi Aloni with Alain Badiou, Judith Butler, and Slavoj Žižek. What Does a Jew Want?: On Binationalism and Other Specters. New York: Columbia University Press. 2011. Pages 13-18.]
           “… at … [the] very moment the Israeli air force launches an attack on Gaza, and the indiscriminate killing by those ‘Made in the U.S.A.’ angels of Hades begins. The muses are suddenly silenced: ‘Why write about Samson when there is so much death everywhere?’ they ask me. I dress quickly and run out to the streets to demonstrate, as if I had the power to put an end to the destruction and killing and vengeance. Very few people gather to protest. All the rest swoon at the swoosh of the jets overhead as they soar to do battle for the many against the few, for the strong against the weak, for the occupiers against the occupied. The Children of Israel mutter Samson’s own words, ‘Avenge but one of my two eyes!’ but we cannot be the blind Samson when we have night vision goggles and virtual reality goggles and can see from a distance and in the dark. And the jet fighter pilot does not say, ‘Let me die with the Philistines!’ but ‘Let the Palestinians be killed by my smart bomb so that I can get back home in time to catch a show at the national theater.’ On the hills of Ashkelon, the Children of Israel look down on Gaza burning and rejoice.” [Udi Aloni, “Samson the Non-European.” Studies in Gender and Sexuality. Volume 12, number 2, June 2011. Page 124-133.]
      931. house of Zion (Perry Anderson): The article discusses the tangled web, spun through the occupation by the house of Zion (Hebrew/ʿIḇəriyṯ, הָבַּיִת שֶׁל הָצִיּוֹן, hā-Bạyiṯ šẹl hā-Ṣiyōn; Arabic/ʿArabiyyaẗ, البَيْت الصَهْيُون, ʾal-Bayt ʾal-Ṣahyūn; or Persian/Fārsī, خَانِهِ صَهْیُون, H̱ānih-i Ṣahyūn) and poor Palestinian leadership, between the Palestinians and Israelis.
           “Politically, the revisionist wing of Zionism that first broke [Israeli] Labour’s grip on power in the late seventies has consolidated its hegemony. While frontal opposition between the two camps, frequently allied in government, has been rare, a long-term shift in the balance of forces that each can deploy is clear. In the four decades since Begin took office, Likud (Hebrew/ʿIḇəriyṯ, לִכּוּד, Likūḏ, literally ‘unification’ or ‘consolidation’] has ruled for over eighteen years, coalitions of the two headed by Likud or transfuges from it for twelve, and Labour for six. In this period [Benjamin ‘Bibi’] Netanyahu [Hebrew/ʿIḇəriyṯ, בִּנְיָמִין’בִּיבִּי‘ נְתַנְיָהוּ, Binəyāmiyn ‘Biybiy’ Nəṯạnəyāhū], the Likud incumbent, is the only politician to have won three successive elections, and if he completes his current term, will be within a year of [David] Ben-Gurion [Hebrew/ʿIḇəriyṯ, דָּוִד בֶּן־גּוּרִיוֹן Dāwiḏ Bẹn-Gūriyōn] for length of time as Prime Minister of Israel. His ascendancy is, however, more an effect of the crumbling of Labour than of his own standing.…
           “Where does … this now leave the Palestinian struggle for liberation? It is difficult to think of any national movement that has suffered from such ruinous leadership. Once British imperialism had broken the great Palestinian rising of 1936–37, whose repression required more troops than any other colonial revolt between the wars, the Yishuv [Hebrew/ʿIḇəriyṯ, יִשּׁוּב, Yiššūḇ, ‘settlement’] reaped the inheritance of an easy upper hand in the Mandate, which an assortment of ill-led and under-equipped Arab armies was in no position to offset.”
           [Perry Anderson, “The House of Zion.” New Left Review. Series II, number 96, November–December 2015. Pages 5-37.]
      932. critique of Zionism (Judith Butler): Butler, like this writer, comes from a Jewish background. She brilliantly explains the troubling implications of modern political Zionism for Palestinians, while distinguishing her critique from antisemitism.
           “What started as a book seeking to debunk the claim that any and all criticism of the State of Israel is effectively anti-Semitic has become a meditation on the necessity of tarrying with the impossible. I will try to make this clear in what follows, but let me state the risk of this endeavor clearly from the start. If I succeed in showing that there are Jewish resources for the criticism of state violence, the colonial subjugation of populations, expulsion and dispossession, then I will have managed to show that a Jewish critique of Israeli state violence is at least possible, if not ethically obligatory. If I show, further, that there are Jewish values of cohabitation with the non-Jew that are part of the very ethical substance of diasporic Jewishness, then it will be possible to conclude that commitments to social equality and social justice have been an integral part of Jewish secular, socialist, and religious traditions. Though this should come as no surprise, it has become necessary to reiterate this argument over and against a public discourse that assumes any criticism of the Israeli occupation, of internal inequalities within Israel, of land confiscations, and of violent bombardments of trapped populations such as those we saw in Operation Cast Lead—indeed, any objections to the requirements of citizenship in that country—is anti-Semitic or anti-Jewish, not in the service of the Jewish people, or in no way in line with what we might generally call Jewish values. In other words, it would be a painful irony indeed if the Jewish struggle for social justice were itself cast as anti-Jewish.” [Judith Butler. Parting Ways: Jewishness and the Critique of Zionism. New York: Columbia University Press. 2012. Page 1.]
           “… [Judith] Butler [is] reclaiming her Jewishness as distinct from Zionism.…
           “For Butler the operative category on which she bases her ‘Jewishness’ (not necessarily Judaism) is about cohabitation, living with the other, the recognition of alterity, politically and ethically. In her view of Jewishness, Diaspora is not a way station, a temporary state, but the very core of what it means to live as a Jew.… As opposed to earlier diasporic thinkers, Butler is not simply advocating or romanticizing Jewish life in the Diaspora, a Diaspora without a State of Israel. Butler thinks in a Diaspora with a State of Israel, yet a state she believes does not reflect the core values of her Jewishness, values that were born and matured in the Diaspora. Thus she advocates importing that ‘diasporic’ ethic into Israel/Palestine. One does not have to agree with her assessment to allow it to be part of the contemporary Jewish conversation—that is, unless her views have already been excluded by definition due to the equation of Judaism with Zionism.”
           [Shaul Magid, “Butler Trouble: Zionism, Excommunication, and the Reception of Judith Butler’s Work on Israel/Palestine.” Studies in American Jewish Literature. Volume 33, number 2, fall 2014. Pages 237-259.]
           “Scholars who recruit diasporic traditions for the critique of Zionism have been subject to scathing attack and anathema from Israel’s defenders. To advocate for a binational state, these critics contend, is to betray a pathological deficiency in love of and loyalty to the Jewish people. These intemperate polemics only confirm [Judith] Butler’s complaint that ‘the threat of being called ‘anti-semitic’ seeks to control, at the level of the subject, what one is willing to say out loud and, at the level of society in general, to circumscribe what can and cannot be permissibly spoken out loud in the public sphere.’ If polemical accusations of ‘cold-heartedness’ have had a chilling effect on public criticism of Israel, they have also dampened scholarly debate about what diaspora has historically meant, in Jewish traditions, and how to mobilize these traditions to develop non-Zionist trajectories for Jewish political thought.” [Julie E. Cooper, “A Diasporic Critique of Diasporism: The Question of Jewish Political Agency.” Political Theory. Volume 43, number 1, 2015. Pages 80-110.]
           “[Judith] Butler’s work is a radical rejection of Zionism based on Jewishness and the idea of diaspora. This project encounters two difficulties: when confronted with the major conundrums of Jewish thought (e.g. election and the idea of Zion), and with the harsh political reality. The recent public debates around Butler’s position show, however, that despite these problems, and even without our acceptance of its conclusions, Parting Ways succeeds in its main task: to intervene in the political discourse and voice a Jewish concern about the State of Israel and its relation to the other.” [Yaniv Feller, “Parting Ways: Jewishness and the Critique of Zionism.” Review article. Studies in Religion / Sciences Religieuses. Volume 42, number 3, September 2013. Pages 384-386.]
      933. secondary antisemitism (Karin Stoegner as pronounced in this MP3 audio file): She considers a post-Nazi antisemitism.
           “… antisemitism has shown a remarkable flexibility throughout Western civilization, with its particular forms corresponding to a large degree with the respective forms of sociation on the economic and political as well as psychological level.… Likewise, secondary antisemitism is a reaction to the disorder of the system and the shock felt by individuals after the breakdown of the Nazi regime. It is a specific adaptation to the needs of post-Holocaust societies, in the first place to the need for a sense of collective belonging and a relegitimated national unity after Auschwitz …. This is why it frequently intersects with various forms of nationalism.…
           “… ‘secondary’ means here that it is taken over from somebody else, in this case from the parents or grandparents, in order to justify what they did.”
           [Karin Stoegner, “Secondary Antisemitism, the Economic Crisis and the Construction of National Identity in the Austrian Print Media.” Critical Sociology. OnlineFirst edition. August, 2016. Pages 1-14.]
      934. aliyah (Lynne Segal): The word aliyah (Hebrew/ʿIḇəriyṯ, עֲלִיָּה, ʿăliyyāh, “ascent” or “increase”)—a term which refers to Jews migrating to Israel—is critiqued. Jews who move to Israel have greater human rights than the indigenous population of Palestinians.
           “There is … the very best of reasons for Jews to invoke a group identity when affirming opposition to the policies of Israel. After all, it is in ‘our’ name that Israel allows, indeed encourages, Jews to leave their homes elsewhere and emigrate to Israel. It is we who may move to Israel (aliyah), even as that state denies the right of return to the tens of thousands of Palestinians and their children forced out of the only homes they had ever possessed with its foundation in 1948, while withholding equal citizenship from those who remain within Israel. It has to date prevented Palestinians from forming a state of their own in their small residual base in Gaza and the West Bank. This denies them the kind of institutional foundations and legitimacy that could foster alternative forms of political struggle, even combat, which would not automatically be deemed ‘terrorist’ and which would have the authority to thwart the appalling suicide bombing of Israeli civilians now pursued by some militant Palestinian factions.” [Lynne Segal, “Jews in the culture wars.” Radical Philosophy: Philosophical Journal of the Independent Left. Number 116, November/December 2002. Pages 2-6.]
      935. post-Zionist left (Joshua Leifer): He argues that the left must abandon liberal Zionism.
           “The left must move beyond the aging liberal Zionists and the false binary they present, and embrace a post-Zionist politics. This means exchanging the tired language of self-determination for the language of civil rights, and recognizing that nonviolent resistance to the occupation must continue, even without negotiations or a final status agreement on the horizon. It is impossible to predict what any resolution might look like, but no resolution will be possible without an end to the occupation of the West Bank and siege of Gaza.” [Joshua Leifer, “Toward a Post-Zionist Left.” Dissent. Online magazine. Fall, 2015.]
      936. anti-Judaism as a critical theory (David Nirenberg): He presents a critique of the sadly all-too-common hostility to Judaism, and to Jews, in the Western world.
           “… ‘anti-Judaism’ is not simply an attitude toward the actions of real Jews and their religion, but a way of critically engaging the world.…
           “The champions of the traditional Christian order loaded their batteries with the same charge but aimed it against their Enlightenment critics. Their opponents were materialists, literalists, ‘Jews,’ and ‘Pharisees,’ who refused to recognize any god other than human reason and the material world, and treated social and political bonds as if they were commercial contracts. On both sides the critical discourse of anti-Judaism became so important that, by the 1790s, the greatest contemporary thinkers could debate whether the French Revolution represented a victory of ‘Jew brokers,’ in which ‘the glory of Europe is extinguished forever’ (Edmund Burke), or the defeat of a ‘Jewish’ order that turned constitutions into ‘dead books’ of ‘hard inflexible letters’ and reduced subjects to animals ‘in the starkest contradiction of the spirit of mankind’ (Johann Gottlieb Fichte).…
           “… From music to mathematics, every modern field of thought produced its critical discourse of anti-Judaism.”
           [David Nirenberg, “Anti-Judaism as a Critical Theory.” The Chronicle of Higher Education. Volume 59, number 21, February 2013.]
      937. critique of power (Hannah Arendt as pronounced in this MP3 audio file): This term is used by Christian Volk (MP3 audio file) to describe Arendt’s critical theory.
           “From the point of view of critical theorists in the tradition of the Frankfurt School, … Hannah Arendt’s conception of power is unsuited for such a critical enterprise.… Critical theorists concede that Arendt, while embracing the ancient Greek legacy, takes an ostensibly critical perspective on all modern forms of the state, society and politics …. Arendt becomes the ‘victim of a concept of politics that is inapplicable to modern conditions’ …. Arendt’s critics conclude that a critique of social and political order that emerges out of the current times – that is, a critique of power – is not possible with Arendt.…
           “This is a conclusion with which I would fundamentally disagree. The thesis of my article is that Arendt’s consideration of power is, in its broadest sense, actually a critical enterprise. Arendt’s thinking on power is critical, both in the sense that it allows one to criticize identifiable constellations of power and processes of power formation; but also, in its understanding of specific, normatively positive and substantial constellations of power as a means through which to criticize existing social and political orders. In order to explain this thesis, I will work through Arendt’s critique of power in the dimensions of her work on political participation …; socio-economic issues …; political institutions and her critique of ideology …; and her considerations of ethics ….”
           [Christian Volk, “Towards a critical theory of the political: Hannah Arendt on power and critique” Philosophy and Social Criticism. Volume 42, number 6, 2016. Pages 549-575.]
           “Public relations is but a variety of advertising; hence it has its origin in the consumer society, with its inordinate appetite for goods to be distributed through a market economy. The trouble with the mentality of the public-relations man is that he deals only in opinions and ‘good will,’ the readiness to buy, that is, in intangibles whose concrete reality is at a minimum. This means that for his inventions it may indeed look as though the sky is the limit, for he lacks the politician’s power to act, to ‘create’ facts, and, thus, that simple everyday reality that sets limits to power and brings the forces of imagination down to earth.” [Hannah Arendt. Crises of the Republic: Lying in Politics Civil Disobedience On Violence Thoughts on Politics and Revolution. New York: A Harvest Book imprint of Harcourt Brace Jovanovich. 1972. Page 8.]
           “The striking coincidence of the rise of society with the decline of the family indicates clearly that what actually took place was the absorption of the family unit into corresponding social groups. The equality of the members of these groups, far from being an equality among peers, resembles nothing so much as the equality of household members before the despotic power of the household head, except that in society, where the natural strength of one common interest and one unanimous opinion is tremendously enforced by sheer number, actual rule exerted by one man, representing the common interest and the right opinion, could eventually be dispensed with. The phenomenon of conformism is characteristic of the last stage of this modern development.” [Hannah Arendt. The Human Condition. Chicago, Illinois: The University of Chicago Press. 1998. Page 40.]
      938. mass society (Hannah Arendt): She critically examines the concept.
           “The term ‘mass society’ is currently used both negatively and positively in political and journalistic language to indicate an entire population which is seen as an undifferentiated whole or, in other words, a large number of people who present, or who are encouraged to adopt, similar behaviours. Consequently, and in an even more negative sense, it is used to describe a society in which individuals are anonymous. And historians today, who more or less agree with this definition, have presented examples of so-called mass societies created throughout history, in which depersonalization took place, and entertainment activities, as opposed to cultural, were implemented. Historically, one of the challenges for human beings in creating society is to combine aspects of entertainment, including collective forms, with aspects that can be recognized as cultural, that is, pursuing intellectual activities and developing and enriching individual faculties (the individual cannot ‘disappear’), including logic, the activity of thinking.” [Hannah Arendt in Francisco Barros. 106 Master Tweets from beautiful minds. Florence, Italy: goWare. 2015. No pagination.]
      939. scapegoat theory (Hannah Arendt): This German-American political theorist, born into a Jewish family, critiques antisemitism.
           “The theory that the Jews are always the scapegoat implies that the scapegoat might have been anyone else as well. It upholds the perfect innocence of the victim, an innocence which insinuates nof only that no evil was done but that nothing at all was done which might possibly have a connection with the issue at stake. It is true that the scapegoat theory in its purely arbitrary form never appears in print. Whenever, however, its adherents painstakingly try to explain why a specific scapegoat was so well suited to his role, they show that they have left the theory behind them and have got themselves involved in the usual historical research—where nothing is ever discovered except that history is made by many groups and that for certain reasons one group was singled out. The so-called scapegoat necessarily ceases to be the innocent victim whom the world blames for all its sins and through whom it wishes to escape punishment; it becomes one group of people among other groups, all of which are involved in the business of this world. And it does not simply cease to be coresponsible because it became the victim of the world’s injustice and cruelty.
           “Until recently the inner inconsistency of the scapegoat theory was sufficient reason to discard it as one of many theories which are motivated by escapism. But the rise of terror as a major weapon of government has lent it a credibility greater than it ever had before.”
           [Hannah Arendt. The Origins of Totalitarianism. Second enlarged edition. Cleveland, Ohio: The World Publishing Company. 1958. Pages 5-6.]
           “She [Hannah Arendt] argued that the contention that there were more important issues at stake than the trial of a single individual – the political character of modern anti-Semitism, the origins of totalitarianism, the nature of evil, etc. – was no reason not to seek justice in this particular case …. She showed no compunction about the imposition of the death penalty: ‘no member of the human race can be expected to want to share the earth,’ she wrote, with a man who ‘supported and carried out a policy of not wanting to share the earth with the Jewish people and the people of a number of other nations.’ She also acknowledged the positive political effects generated by the trial: not least, after years of relative silence in the West, it publicised the facts of the Final Solution and opened it up as a field of moral, political and historical discussion.” [Robert Fine. Political Investigations: Hegel, Marx, Arendt. London and New York: Routledge imprint of Taylor & Francis Group, an Informa PLC business. 2005. Page 155.]
      940. boycotting Israel (Mandy Merck): She examines the moral duty to participate in the boycott and divestment.
           “There has never been a ‘worst first’ rule for boycotts. Activists urging divestment from apartheid South Africa were not racist because they failed to simultaneously condemn the demonstrably worse Cambodian dictator Pol Pot. Nor were U.S. civil rights protestors required to inventory the world and only protest if our nation exceeded the abuses of others. Boycotts are justified whenever they are necessary and promise results.
           “There are sound reasons that U.S. citizens should respond to the Palestinians’ appeal for support: Our country is Israel’s principal – and often sole – defender in the international area. Our diplomats have vetoed more than 40 U.N. Security Council resolutions critical of Israeli practices, including illegal settlement of the West Bank. Former U.S. ambassador to the U.N. Susan Rice, upon leaving office, described shielding Israel as a ‘huge part’ of her work.”
           [Mandy Merck, “Boycotting Israel: Academia, activism and the futures of American Studies.” Radical Philosophy: Philosophical Journal of the Independent Left. Number 186, July/August 2014. Pages 2-9.]
      941. theory of antisemitism (Heiko Beyer as pronounced in this MP3 audio file and Ivar Krumpal as pronounced in this MP3 audio file): They study “the communication latency of antisemitic attitudes.”
           “Concept and theory of antisemitism
           “Although we can distinguish several theoretical approaches that attempt to explain modern antisemitism before 1945, most of them insisting on its peculiarity both in comparison to the older anti-Judaism and other forms of racism …, the development of a comprehensive theory dealing with antisemitism after the Shoah is still in its infancy. In Germany, the first efforts in this regard were made by the ‘Critical Theory of Antisemitism’ and particularly the empirical studies of the re-emigrated Frankfurt Institute of Social Science, which brought to light not only that antisemitic attitudes have remained present since 1945 on a more private level, although they are seemingly combated on the surface of public decision making …, but also argued that guilt and its suppression forms a new reservoir for aggression against Jews within German society ….”
           [Heiko Beyer and Ivar Krumpal, “The Communication Latency of Antisemitic Attitudes: An Experimental Study.” Global Antisemitism: A Crisis of Modernity—Volume I, Conceptual Approaches. Charles Asher Small, editor. New York: Institute for the Study of Global Antisemitism and Policy. 2013. Pages 85-98.]
      942. critical philosophy of race (Harpal Singh [Guramukhī Pajābī script, ਹਰਪਾਲ ਸਿੰਘ, Harapāla Sigha; or Šāh Mukhī Panǧābī script, ہَرَپَالَ سِنْگْھَ, Harapāla Singha]): He reviews a British conference on this subject.
           “… did the conference achieve its aim? There is no doubt that it was a milestone in British philosophy, albeit one that marks only the first step in a long journey. Students and teachers of philosophy may not want to believe that racism is part and parcel of the Western philosophical tradition, but when African and Asian traditions are consigned to the margins of history, and the people ‘doing’ philosophy still tend to belong to the white middle and ‘upper’ classes, how much longer can this naive view last? … The radical changes that are necessary require a fundamental revision of the philosophical canon to include key texts from African and Asian philosophies.” [Harpal Singh, “Critical philosophy of race: here and now—5–6 June 2014, Senate House, University of London.” Radical Philosophy: Philosophical Journal of the Independent Left. Number 187, September/October 2014. Pages 64-66.]
      943. critique of the race relations paradigm (Robert Miles and Malcolm Brown): They critique a dominant approach in the racial dialogue.
           “… there is racialised consciousness among oppressed racialised groups, but they are groups by virtue of being racialised (socially defined as a ‘race’), not vice versa. They are defined as a ‘race’ by others, acquire a group identity and become oppressed, and then use the idiom of ‘race’ in relation to themselves, their identities and grievances. This is borne out by African-American history, from pre-colonial Africa to slavery to an African-American ‘racial’ consciousness. None of this is denied by our critique of the ‘race relations’ paradigm.” [Robert Miles and Malcolm Brown. Racism. Second edition. London and New York: Routledge imprint of Taylor & Francis Group, an Informa PLC business. 2003. Page 6.]
      944. Marxist critique of Black radical theories of trade-union racism (Satnam Virdee [Hindī, सतनाम वर्दि, Satanāma Vardi as pronounced in this MP3 audio file]): He critiques the view that a trade union represents the entire working class.
           “It is demonstrated that these accounts of trade-union racism are constructed on the mistaken assumption that a trade union represents the interests of all the working class. Instead, an alternative conceptual framework for understanding trade-union behaviour is advanced, rooted in classical Marxist and neo-Marxist theory … and underpinned by the recognition that the response of trade unions towards racialised labour is contingent on a wide range of economic, political and ideological conditions and the type of strategy trade unions adopt in defence of their members’ economic interests. Through an assessment of events that took place between 1945 and 1979 (the period black radical theorists use to develop their argument), this paper challenges the conclusions drawn by black radical theorists regarding the basis of trade-union racism, the significance of ‘black’ self-organisation and the likelihood of ‘inter-racial’ class action developing.” [Satnam Virdee, “A Marxist Critique of Black Radical Theories of Trade-union Racism.” Sociology. Volume 34, number 3, August 2000. Pages 545-565.]
      945. critique of white privilege (Mark Rifkin): He develops a critique of white privilege using Harriet Ann Jacobs’ autobiographical Incidents in the Life of a Slave Girl.
           “In framing its [national ideology of citizenship’s] representation of black families and homemaking in terms of the racialized production of national subjectivity, Incidents in the Life of a Slave Girl connects the quotidian circumstances of African Americans’ lives to the often abstract principles and seemingly distant practices of national governance. It draws on and extends existing black activist discourse by concretizing the critique of white privilege, inverting privacy into an invigorated call for rights, and politicizing ‘home’ by putting it at the center of its mapping of the political economy of race.… In dialectically conjoining black domesticity and national domestic policy, displacing the image of the nation as a ‘political family’ in order to argue for a political commitment to protecting black families, the text gestures toward the adoption of a positive national agenda in which government institutions at every level work to eradicate the effects of racism in all arenas of American life and to make national ideals and belonging locally meaningful across the color line—a project that to this day remains unfinished.” [Mark Rifkin, “‘A Home Made Sacred by Protecting Laws’: Black Activist Homemaking and Geographies of Citizenship in Incidents in the Life of a Slave Girl.” differences: A Journal of Feminist Cultural Studies. Volume 18, number 2, summer 2007. Pages 72-102.]
           “On this occasion, I was warned to keep extremely quiet, because two guests had been invited. One was the town constable, and the other was a free colored man, who tried to pass himself off for white, and who was always ready to do any mean work for the sake of currying favor with white people. My grandmother had a motive for inviting them. She managed to take them all over the house. All the rooms on the lower floor were thrown open for them to pass in and out; and after dinner, they were invited up stairs to look at a fine mocking bird my uncle had just brought home. There, too, the rooms were all thrown open, that they might look in. When I heard them talking on the piazza, my heart almost stood still. I knew this colored man had spent many nights hunting for me. Every body knew he had the blood of a slave father in his veins; but for the sake of passing himself off for white, he was ready to kiss the slaveholders’ feet. How I despised him! As for the constable, he wore no false colors. The duties of his office were despicable, but he was superior to his companion, inasmuch as he did not pretend to be what he was not. Any white man, who could raise money enough to buy a slave, would have considered himself degraded by being a constable; but the office enabled its possessor to exercise authority. If he found any slave out after nine o’clock, he could whip him as much as he liked; and that was a privilege to be coveted. When the guests were ready to depart, my grandmother gave each of them some of her nice pudding, as a present for their wives. Through my peep-hole I saw them go out of the gate, and I was glad when it closed after them. So passed the first Christmas in my den.” [Harriet Ann Jacobs. Incidents in the Life of a Slave Girl. L. Maria Child, editor. Boston, Massachusetts: Boston Stereotype Foundry. 1861. Pages 181-182.]
      946. cost of privilege (Chip Smith): He details the unjustness of “the system of white supremacy and racism.”
           “There is a huge cost to the system of racial privileges. The clearest cost is the mind-numbing record of subjugation of people of color – the millions of native peoples destroyed and the genocidal impact on their ways of life; the countless victimes of the slave trade and the system of lifetime bondage based on race; the dispossession and degradation of Mexican Americans; the racial attacks, along with immigration and marriage restrictions directed at Asian immigrants; the unjustified imprisonment and dispossession of Japanese Americans during World War II; the unnatural isolation and exclusion of all peoples of color from the main currents of natural life; the continuing crimes of poor education and health care, substandard housing, and disproportionate imprisonment. This history – truly an ocean of pain and suffering – have swalllowed up untold years of human energy, beauty and creativity. At the same time, the majority of laboring class recipients of white privilege have led narrow, constricted lives; conspired in the soul-rotting subjugation of their brothers and sisters of color; and gratefully served the white supremacist ruling class, even as they were being bled dry. This vast tally, drawn from both sides of the color line, sums up the shameful, wretched, incalculable costs of white privilege.” [Chip Smith. The Cost of Privilege: Taking on the System of White Supremacy and Racism. Fayetteville, North Carolina: Camino Press. 2007. Page 46.]
      947. outlines of a genocidal scheme (Vahakn N. Dadrian [Armenian, Վահագն Ն Տատրեան, Vahagn N Tatrean]): He examines and critiques the Armenian genocide, at the hands of the Ottoman Empire, in the early twentieth century.
           “… Outlines of a Genocidal Scheme …
           “… [The] Hamidian episode of large-scale massacres in the evolution of the Turko-Armenian conflict was not only significant for the scale of its casualties but also for its aftermath, marked as it was by a total absence of legal or political retribution against the perpetrators, from within or without. As the prior lack of effective deterrence had enabled the Ottoman-Turkish authorities to plan and enact the massacres, the subsequent failure of the Powers to mobilize and apply retributive justice, and, concomitantly, exact indemnification for the victims.… [The] emerging nexus between ethnocide and genocide is the salient feature of the Turko-Armenian conflict, affording a degree of continuity of destructive methods of conflict resolution. Indeed, the dynamics of victimization in intergroup conflicts are such as to produce a transition from limited to maximum victimization, should the conflict be sustained one way or another and at the same time should the absence of external deterrence persist, or be perceived by the perpetrator group to persist.”
           [Vahakn N. Dadrian. Warrant for Genocide: Key Elements of Turko-Armenian Conflict. New Brunswick, New Jersey: Transaction Publishers. 1999. Page 93.]
      948. eulogy for white Christian America (Robert P. Jones): He critiques the failure of white Christian Americans “to acknowledge their newly diminished status.”
           “A Eulogy for White Christian America …
           “The mainline and evangelical branches of White Christian America have each charted their own course through the grieving process. As the first to grapple with the news of WCA’s [White Christian America’s] terminal condition, white mainline Protestants moved the furthest toward acceptance. They have had considerable time to sit both with the loss and the new realities of American demographics, culture, and politics. By contrast, white evangelical Protestants are still struggling to acknowledge their newly diminished status, and few have come to terms with the implications of WCA’s death.…
           “The obituary … [in] this book sketched the general arc of White Christian America’s life. But there is more to say about the meaning of WCA’s life and passing. While eulogies typically emphasize the deceased’s positive contributions, a more balanced approach is in order here, one that speaks to those survivors and friends of White Christian America who feel a deep sense of loss at its departure but also address those who—confident its presence will not be missed—are already rejoicing at WCA’s demise.
           “As the previous chapters have showed, White Christian America’s flaws are all too evident. Surely we should not mourn the disappearance of White Christian America’s arrogant assumption that it spoke for the country or its complicity in racism, its mistreatment of LGBT people and mischaracterization of their lives, and its willingness to compromise its theological integrity for partisan ends.”
           [Robert P. Jones. The End of White Christian America. New York: Simon & Schuster. 2016. Google Play edition.]
      949. invention of the white race (Theodore W. Allen): He examines “the origin of racial oppression in Anglo-America.”
           “The present chapter documents instances of self-activation of bond-laborers as molders of their own fate. In keeping with the basic concern of this work, emphasis will be given to evidence of readiness of European-American bond-laborers to join with African-American bond-laborers in actions and plots of actions against their bondage, and to the readiness of free persons to support the struggles of the bond-laborers, both of which were inconsistent with racial slavery. It is to be hoped that this material will prepare the reader to appreciate the historical significance of the role of bond-laborers in the event called Bacon’s Rebellion, and the relation of that event to the invention of the white race.…
           “In relation to the question of social control and the invention of the white race, the British West Indies differed from the continental plantation colonies in five significant ways. First, because of the narrow absolute limits of land area, and the relatively high capital costs of sugar production, the West Indies was especially inhospitable to non-capitalist farmers or tenants. Second, in the West Indies the attempt to establish a ‘white race’ social control system was seriously and critically complicated by the substantial Irish presence. Third, the central role of the English military and naval forces regularly stationed in the West Indies constituted the most important guarantor of social control. Fourth, the predominance of persons of African descent in the population of the West Indies made it impossible to exclude them altogether from the intermediate stratum. Fifth, the reliance upon persons of African descent in the skilled trades and in the conduct of the internal economy of the West Indies colonies led to the emergence of the ‘free colored’ as the predominant element in the middle class. The remainder of this chapter will be mainly an elaboration of these points.”
           [Theodore W. Allen. The Invention of the White Race—Volume Two: The Origin of Racial Oppression in Anglo-America. London and New York: Verso imprint of New Left Books. 2012. Ebook edition.]
      950. keys to the White House (Allan J. Lichtman): He has developed a reliable system for predicting U.S. presidents, including Donald J. Trump.
           “… [The] new vision of American politics is based on the keys to the White House, a prediction system based on the study of every presidential election from 1860 to 2008. This system also provides insight into party prospects for the 2012 election at a time when polls forecast upcoming election results about as accurately as the flipping of coins. I first developed the keys system in 1981, in collaboration with Vladimir Keilis-Borok, a world renowned authority on the mathematics of prediction models. The system shows that it is possible to predict well in advance the outcomes of presidential elections from indicators that primarily track the performance and strength of the party holding the White House.
           “The keys are thirteen diagnostic questions that are stated as propositions favoring reelection of the incumbent party. When five or fewer of these propositions are false, or turned against the party holding the White House, that party wins another term in office. When six or more are false, the challenging party wins. The keys indicate incumbent party success or failure long before the polls or any other forecasting models are of any value. Unlike many models developed by political scientists, the keys include no polling data, but are based on the big picture of how well the party in power and the country are faring prior to an upcoming election. In addition, the keys do not presume that voters are driven by economic concerns alone. Voters are less narrow-minded and more sophisticated than that; they decide presidential elections on a wide-ranging assessment of the performance of incumbent parties, all of which are reflected in one or more keys.
           “Retrospectively, the keys account for the results of every presidential election from 1860 through 1980, much longer than any other prediction system.”
           [Allan J. Lichtman. Predicting the Next President: The Keys to the White House. 2016 edition. Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield imprint of The Rowman & Littlefield Publishing Group, Inc. 2016. Pages ix-x.]
      951. critique of whiteness (Meredith J. Green, Christopher C. Sonn, William Solomon, and Derek Hook): These three articles critique the social construction of “whiteness” from various perspectives.
           “In this article we identify spaces within white Australians’ discursive negotiations of Reconciliation where the dominance and privilege of whiteness can be examined and critiqued.… To strengthen a shift away from a reductionist view of anti-racism which is exclusively focused on the ‘other,’ i.e. those affected by racist objectification and discourse, we also discuss how engagement with Indigenous knowledges is a necessary part of the critique of whiteness.… To illustrate our arguments … we then present some of the discourses we analysed from discussions with white Australians about their involvement in Reconciliation.” [Meredith J. Green and Christopher C. Sonn, “Examining Discourses of Whiteness and the Potential for Reconciliation.” Journal of Community & Applied Social Psychology. Volume 15, issue 6, November/December 2005. Pages 478-492.]
           “Black humor is less an object with a ‘racial unconscious’ … than a critical interrogation of the process whereby identities are forged through interracial relationships. Black humor’s comic thrust often strikes at the vicissitudes of whiteness, lucidly analyzing the extent to which this social construct takes shape, by and large, in relation to hallucinatory impressions of blackness. The texts in question may well have contributed to our present understanding of the structure and effects of racialized fantasies, helping clarify the function of embodied images of the Other in the acts that enable persons to feel like individuals.” [William Solomon, “Secret Integrations: Black humor and the critique of whiteness.” Modern Fiction Studies. Volume 49, number 3, fall 2003. Pages 469-495.]
           “The moral and philosophical interrogation of white privilege remains an imperative in post-apartheid South Africa. Whereas the critique of whiteness involves both philosophical and psychological scrutiny, subsequent calls for white political silence and withdrawal have yet to be subjected to adequate psychological analysis. This paper offers such an analysis by questioning, firstly, the idea of appropriate emotions for white South Africans (shame, guilt, regret), posing instead the problems of mimed affect and neurotic goodness.…
           “… White approaches to guilt-alleviation and political passivity are queried, secondly, via the claim that such agendas lead all too easily to types of white exceptionalism and condescension, respectively.”
           [Derek Hook, “White privilege, psychoanalytic ethics, and the limitations of political silence.” South African Journal of Philosophy. Volume 30, number 4, 2011. Pages 503-518.]
      952. psychosis of whiteness (Kehinde Andrews): The article invokes “psychosis” as a metaphor to explain a social structural process.
           “This article will argue … that Whiteness is a process rooted in the social structure, one that induces a form of psychosis framed by its irrationality, which is therefore beyond any rational engagement.
           “Psychosis is a psychological disorder hallmarked by delusional thinking and hallucinations …. These delusions give rise to hallucinations, which are believed as real to maintain the psychosis. The metaphor of psychosis is advanced as the perfect way to understand how Whiteness is produced and maintained. This article argues that big budget films present as the historical hallucinations to support the distorted view of reality produced by Whiteness.…
           “Whiteness as a psychosis goes beyond critiquing the irrationality of Whiteness. Rather, Whiteness is defined in itself and at its root as irrational, a discursive psychosis that cannot be tamed through reason. When patients suffer a psychotic break, hallucinations produced by the psychosis reinforce it, convincing the person of their distorted reality ….”
           [Kehinde Andrews, “The Psychosis of Whiteness: The Celluloid Hallucinations of Amazing Grace and Belle.” Journal of Black Studies. Volume 47, number 4, 2016. Pages 435-453.]
      953. white racial dualism (Howard Winant): He critiques color-blind racism as well as claims, by white people, that they are being disadvantaged.
           “I begin from the premise that it is no longer possible to assume a ‘normalized’ North American whiteness, whose invisibility and relatively monolithic character signify immunity from political or cultural challenge. An alternative perspective is demanded, one which begins from a recognition of white racial dualism.…
           “Thus from the late 1960s onwards, white identity has been reinterpreted in a dualistic fashion: both egalitarian and privileged, individualistic and ‘normalized,’ ‘colour-blind’ and besieged. Nowhere is this new framework of the white ‘politics of difference’ more clearly on display than in the reaction to affirmative action policies of all sorts—in hiring, university admissions, federal contracting, and so on. Assaults on these policies, which have been developing since their introduction as tentative and quite limited efforts at racial redistribution, are currently at hysterical levels. These attacks are clearly designed to produce ideological shifts, rather than to shift resources in any meaningful way. They represent whiteness as disadvantage, something which has few precedents in us racial history.”
           [Howard Winant, “Behind Blue Eyes: Whiteness and Contemporary US Racial Politics.” New Left Review. Series I, number 225, September–October 1997. Pages 73-88.]
      954. construction of American whiteness (Eric Lott): In this perspective on cultural studies, Lott examines the socially constructed character of whiteness.
           “… in the largest terms this racial trope obliges us to confront the process of ‘racial’ construction itself, the historical formation of whites no less than of blacks. Our typical focus on the way ‘blackness’ in the popular imagination has been produced out of white cultural expropriation and travesty misses how necessary this process is to the making of white American manhood. The latter simply could not exist without a racial other against which it defines itself and which to a very great extent it takes up into itself as one of its own constituent elements. By way of several rather underhistoricized instances in the history of blackface miming and of imaginary racial transformation, I want to look at some American constructions of whiteness – in particular this curious dependence upon and necessary internalization of the cultural practices of the dispossessed.” [Eric Lott, “Racial Cross-Dressing and the Construction of American Whiteness.” The Cultural Studies Reader. Simon During, editor. Second edition. London and New York: Routledge imprint of Taylor & Francis Group, an Informa PLC business. 2001. Pages 241-255.]
      955. post-white identity (Sherrow O. Pinder, John Raible, and Jason G. Irizarry): They describe a rejection of whiteness by people who conform to the white social construction.
           “It is my fervent hope that we can move beyond the deadlock of ‘whiteness studies’ and ‘antiracist whiteness’ in order to begin the process of denormalizing whiteness and conjure up a post-white identity. Given that the self cannot exists without the presence of the ‘other,’ subjectivity, in this sense, which is produced in the act of naming and being named, is engendered as a vivacious engagement with that which surpasses the self. And in fact, you can never truly understand the self unless you study the ‘other,’ which is embedded in the self.” [Sherrow O. Pinder. Whiteness and Racialized Ethnic Groups in the United States: The Politics of Remembering. Lanham, Maryland: Lexington Books imprint of Rowman & Littlefield Publishing Group, Inc. 2012. Page xiv.]
           “… It is only when whiteness is freed of its anxiety and become secure can we construct and reconstitute a post-white identity. The post-white identity is not a finished process; it must constantly examine itself. Rather than positioning itself as external to America’s racialized culture and practice, the post-white identity would have to constantly work to decenter itself from such a practice without rehegemonizing whiteness by means of becoming its own signifying influence and calling attention to itself.” [Sherrow O. Pinder. Whiteness and Racialized Ethnic Groups in the United States: The Politics of Remembering. Lanham, Maryland: Lexington Books imprint of Rowman & Littlefield Publishing Group, Inc. 2012. Page xvii.]
           “Denormalizing whiteness is a way of rethinking and rearticulting an alternative form of antiracist whiteness that would work to reconstitute a post-white identity. And since the denormalizing of whiteness is an ongoing process, rather than the post-white identity positing itself external to America’s racialized process and practice, a self-reflective whiteness would now be embraced by whites.” [Sherrow O. Pinder. Whiteness and Racialized Ethnic Groups in the United States: The Politics of Remembering. Lanham, Maryland: Lexington Books imprint of Rowman & Littlefield Publishing Group, Inc. 2012. Page 153.]
           “We agree that what we call post-whiteness is not only a matter of choosing antiracism over racism or even becoming a ‘traitor’ to the white race …. Rather we contend that, since all identities, even racial ones, are enacted discursively and in dialogic relationships within the various discourse communities in which we participate, for individual subjects to transform their racialized selves requires the active participation of people of other races.…
           “… we surmise that a long-standing investment in combating racism is a key aspect of post-white or transracialized identifications, in that such an investment signals a break with the norms of racialization.
           “Another important aspect of post-white identifications is a sophisticated recognition (although not necessarily articulated) of the discursive negotiations of socially constructed identities.”
           [John Raible and Jason G. Irizarry, “Transracialized selves and the emergence of post-white teacher identities.” Race Ethnicity and Education. Volume 10, number 2, July 2007. Pages 177-198.]
      956. left critique of normativity (Mark V. Tushnet): He presents a legal critique.
           “… incoherence occurs because describing a position as ‘the left’ connotes values like egalitarianism, which are obviously normative. This essay examines the ways in which some writers associated with the left in the legal academy have tried to resolve the incoherence.…
           “… I have treated the left critique of normativity as an intervention in normative discourse, but there is an obvious alternative characterization: It is a series of law review articles, subject to the constraints of the form and located in a particular historical and disciplinary context.
           “… interesting, perhaps, is the possibility that we could understand the left critique of normativity by considering its primary audience. Treating these works as performances, I believe that their primary audience is other left legal academics, who accept descriptions like beggars and torture without considering the implications of that acceptance.”
           [Mark V. Tushnet, “The Left Critique of Normativity: A Comment.” Michigan Law Review. Volume 90, number 8, August 1992. Pages 2325-2347.]
      957. left critique of multiculturalism (Ben Pitcher): With reference to two sources, Pitcher presents a relatively common left critique. Focusing primarily on multiculturalism may lead to ignoring the deeper structures of domination.
           “One reasonably sustained angle of critical attention might be characterized as a left critique of multiculturalism. Writing in the mid-1990s, and taking as her subject the cultural politics of race in the urban United States, Lisa Lowe set out the ways in which a prevailing aesthetics of diversity can leave untouched issues of disadvantage and inequality. Relatedly, reflexive appraisals have highlighted the class character of the diasporic intellectual, such as Ien Ang’s recognition that a discourse of cosmopolitanism serves to By recognizing the limitations of cultural pluralism as a mechanism of social equality, Lowe and Ang both acknowledge the easy relationship between transnational capitalism and ‘progressive’ positions in the politics of race, despite their historic association with the left.” [Ben Pitcher, “Race and capitalism redux.” Patterns of Prejudice. Volume 46, number 1, February 2012. Pages 1-15.]
           “Narratives of multiculturalism which do not make … connections between historically differentiated forms of disempowerment or which do not make space for oppositional critiques risk denuding racial and ethnic groups of their specificity.… The narratives that suppress tension and opposition suggest that we have already achieved multicuturalism, that we know what it is, and that it is defined simply by the coexistence and juxtaposition of greater numbers of diverse groups; these narratives allow us to ignore the profound and urgent gaps, the inequalities and conflicts, among racial, ethnic, and immigrant groups. The suggestion that multicultural discourses might ultimately emphasize, rather than domesticate, the productive irresolution, opposition, and conflict of these various narratives is neither a call for chaos nor a return to traditional Western notions of art and high culture. It is instead to assert that it may be through contradiction that we begin to address the systemic inequalities built into cultural institutions, economies, and geographies and through conflict that we call our attention to the process through which these inequalities are obscured by pluralist multiculturalism.” [Lisa Lowe. Immigrant Acts: On Asian American Cultural Politics. Durham, North Carolina: Duke University Press. 1996. Page 96.]
           “Multiculturalism in Australia has operated as an ideological discourse designed to provide Australians with a favourable, flattering, even triumphant representation of the national self in two respects. First, in historical terms, it tells the Australian people that with the adoption of multiculturalism the nation has discarded an important part of its shameful, racist past. Second, in symbolic terms, it presents the people of Australia with a public fiction that they live in a harmonious, tolerant, and peaceful country where everyone is included and gets along.” [Ien Ang. On Not Speaking Chinese: Living Between Asia and the West. London and New York: Routledge imprint of Taylor & Francis Group, an Informa PLC business. 2001. Page 98.]
      958. critical moral realism (Wade Rowland and Sidney Callahan): Rowland proposes an approach to moral realism informed by various scholars, including the Frankfurt School’s Erich Fromm, the anarcho-syndicalist Noam Chomsky, and the critical sociologist Zygmunt Bauman. Callahan contrasts moral realism with moral relativism.
           “Whether non-human entities can be moral agents is a very large question …. In my view, the most straightforward and convincing discussion of this very complex subject is that supplied by current critical moral realism as exemplified in the work of such diverse modern authors as Zygmunt Baumann, Noam Chomsky, John Rawles, Erich Fromm, Charles Taylor, Emmanuel Levinas, John Polkinghorne, and Marc Hauser. The basis for moral thought in this broad framework is what has been variously called the moral sense, conscience, or the moral impulse, which supplies an innate moral grammar apparently unique to humans (though there is new evidence of it in other animals), enabling us to distinguish, at a foundational level, good from bad, right from wrong.” [Wade Rowland, “Reflections on Metaphor and Identity in the Cyber-Corporation.” Journal of Business Ethics. Volume 90, number 1, November 2009. Pages 15-28.]
           “I deny the charge that the turn to the subject and a recognition of process, systems, context, and interpretation must inevitably lead to moral relativism and a denial of objective reality. Academic and rigorous psychological inquiries into subjective processes of development do not end up endorsing subjective relativism. Yes, science, including the human sciences, do require methods of skeptical doubt, but this critical testing is employed in order to seek general consensus and increasingly objective, valid, and lawful understandings (a justification by doubt?).
           “Few will deny that high probabilities and virtual certainties can be reasonably achieved in science. I would also claim that critical moral reasoning can achieve highly probable objective results worthy of assent. My confidence in a critical moral realism arises partly from my understanding of common, universal patterns that characterize the reasoning of human subjects. In the midst of dynamic flow, new visions of systemic order and consensus emerge.”
           [Sidney Callahan, “Paradigms in Peril: As Always.” Commonweal. Volume 12, number 17, October 1994. Pages 8-9.]
      959. natural kinds (John Bigelow, Brian Ellis, and Caroline Lierse): They develop a theory to explain the laws of nature.
           “This world is one of a kind. Some philosophers have maintained many other worlds which are spatially, temporally and ours. We are not asserting that there are any such disconnected we assert that there are none. There is at least one world; a natural kind whether or not there are any others of its other world, in addition to this one, or instead of this one, nontrivial question whether that world was of the same We can imagine worlds which would be of the same natural we can also imagine worlds which would not.…
           “When we speak of natural kinds, we have in mind things protons, or electromagnetic fields. They are kinds of things world independently of human knowledge, language and understanding.…
           “… it is beyond the scope of this paper to develop a theory kinds sufficient to support the theory of laws which is being proposed.…
           “Laws of nature, we claim, derive from the attribution of essential properties to things.”
           [John Bigelow, Brian Ellis, and Caroline Lierse, “The World as One of a Kind: Natural Necessity and Laws of Nature.” The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science. Volume 43, number 3, September 1992. Pages 371-388.]
      960. transformation of indexicality (Andrew Fisher): He considers the involution of photography.
           “One might say that photography is undergoing an involution registered by the transformation of indexicality. The historically freighted and politically ambivalent ways in which this might unfold call for close scrutiny.…
           “If photography is undergoing an involution, registered in the concept of indexicality, the importance of photographic art and the socio-historical forms of its testimony, then, … [an] attempt to theorize the openness and complexity of photographic form will prove helpful in scrutinizing the historically freighted and politically ambivalent ways in which its involution might unfold.”
           [Andrew Fisher, “The involution of photography.” Radical Philosophy: Philosophical Journal of the Independent Left. Number 127, September/October 2007. Pages 37-36.]
      961. digital ontotheology (Joel Crombez and Harry F. Dahms): He examines science fiction as critical theory.
           “The object of this essay is to illuminate a rise in industrial priority away from the digital archive, that is, the repository of knowledge in advanced modern societies, to digital analysis, which promises to entail a shift in the surrogacy of the machine, away from its status as subjugated other, to de facto master of the human universe—the universe of humans. What this signals is the need for a digital ontotheology, because this machinic subject, with the prospect of artificial intelligence stretching the science fiction horizon, does not merely act as an alternate subject eroding the space of the human, but rather appropriates concepts that have hitherto been reserved for the divine. In order to reimagine the ‘social’ as a literal science fiction, that is, as a fiction of science, indeed, of social science, we must critically redefine science fiction so as to enable it to attain the specificity needed to serve as the basis of a social theory committed to better understand possible and likely directions for life itself, now, and into the unknown future.” [Joel Crombez and Harry F. Dahms, “Artificial Intelligence and the Problem of Digital Ontotheology: Toward a Critical Rethinking of Science Fiction as Theory.” Bulletin of Science, Technology & Society. Volume 35, numbers 3–4, 2015. Pages 104-113.]
      962. theory of ideology and utopia (Karl Mannheim in German as pronounced in this MP3 audio file, or Károly Mannheim as pronounced in this MP3 audio file in the original Hungarian, Paul Ricœur as pronounced in this MP3 audio file, and others): Mannheim was one of the founders of the sociology of knowledge. In his book, Ideology and Utopia, he distinguishes between ideology, as knowledge which supports oppression or domination (reminiscent of the Marxian false consciousness), and utopia, as transformative knowledge which shatters oppressive systems (recalling the Marxian concept of true or class consciousness). Ricœur, who further developed the theory, argued that ideology and utopia are opposite sides of a social and cultural imagination.
           “The concept ‘ideology’ reflects the one discovery which emerged from political conflict, namely, that ruling groups can in their thinking become so intensively interest-bound to a situation that they are simply no longer able to see certain facts which would undermine their sense of domination….
           “The concept of Utopian thinking reflects the opposite discovery of the political struggle, namely that certan oppressed groups are intellectually so strongly interested in the destruction and transformation of a given condition of society that they unwittingly see only those elements in the situation which tend to negate it. Their thinking is incapable of correctly diagnosing an existing condition of society. They are not at all concerned with what really exists; rather in their thinking they already seek to change the situation that exists.” [Karl Mannheim. Ideology and Utopia: An Introduction to the Sociology of Knowledge. Louis Wirth and Edward Shils, translators. New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co., Inc. 1954. Page 36.]
           “… the position that is argued could be formulated as follows: even though knowledge is ideological, that does not mean that we should not try to control the ideological basis of knowledge. [Karl] Mannheim’s theory of ideology and utopia was constructed to separate the concept of ideology from its political connotation and thus becomes a valuable instrument for the historical analysis of ideas in criminology.” [Arnoldas Zdanevičius. Ideology and Utopia in Criminological Knowledge and Its Relation to Power. Doctoral thesis (U.S. English, dissertation). Vytautas Magnus University, Kaunas, Lithuania. 2001. Page 7.]
           “… the Frankfurt School reacted strongly to what they regarded as the peculiar amalgamation of relativist and absolutist tendencies in [Karl] Mannheim’s usage of the general-total conception of ideology. Despite Mannheim’s pronouncements to the contrary, they charged that he had completely collapsed the distinction between origins and validity. All thought was said to be ideological simply by virtue of its historically situated, perspectivist character. After all, Mannheim actually had declared in Ideology and Utopia that ‘the thought of all parties in all epochs is of an ideological character.’ But such an all-embracing conception of ideology could scarcely avoid blunting all critical distinctions between true and false consciousness. Whatever Mannheim’s intentions, he had tended to replace the substantive evaluation of the truth content of particular forms of knowledge with the blanket a priori claim that all knowledge is perspectivistic, hence ideological. Moreover, the equasion of ideology with perspectivism clearly was linked to the residual absolutism evident in Mannheim’s work. However hesitantly Mannheim had approached the concept of absolute knowledge, the situated, conditioned nature of thought could be considered a failing only in relation to the ideal of an absolute, unconditioned perspective.
           “Against Mannheim’s generalization of the concept of ideology, the Frankfurt School insisted on the need to preserve and develop the critical content of the original Marxian conception. Defending the concept of ideology as ‘false consciousness,’ they emphasized that the critique of ideology was required to concretely demonstrate the falsity of ideological beliefs. Stressing that ideology should be understood as ‘socially necessary illusion,’ they argued that the theory of ideology was also required to concretely explain the process of ideology formation.”
           [Leon Bailey. Critical Theory and the Sociology of Knowledge: A Comparative Study in the Theory of Ideology. New York: Peter Lang Publishing, Inc. 1996. Pages 88-89.]
           “In these lectures I examine ideology and utopia. My purpose is to put these two phenomena, usually treated separately, within a single conceptual framework. The organizing hypothesis is that the very conjunction of these two opposite sides or complementary functions typifies what could be called social and cultural imagination. Thus, most of the difficulties and ambiguities met in the field of a philosophy of imagination, which I am exploring now in a separate set of lectures, will appear here but within a particular framework. In tum, my conviction, or at least my hypothesis, is that the dialectic between ideology and utopia may shed some light on the unsolved general question of imagination as a philosophical problem.
           “Inquiry into ideology and utopia reveals at the outset two traits shared by both phenomena. First, both are highly ambiguous. They each have a positive and a negative side, a constructive and a destructive role, a constitutive and a pathological dimension. A second common trait is that of the two sides of each, the pathological appears before the constitutive, requiring us to proceed backwards from the surface to the depths. Ideology, then, designates initially some distorting, dissimulating processes by which an individual or a group expresses its situation but without knowing or recognizing it. An ideology seems to express, for example, the class situation of an individual without the individual’s awareness. Therefore the procedure of dissimulation does not merely express but reinforces this class perspective. As for the concept of utopia, it frequently has a pejorative reputation too. It is seen to represent a kind of social dream without concern for the real first steps necessary for movement in the direction of a new society. Often a utopian vision is treated as a kind of schizophrenic attitude toward society, both a way of escaping the logic of action through a construct outside history and a form of protection against any kind of verification by concrete action.
           “My hypothesis is that there is a positive as well as negative side to both ideology and utopia and that the polarity between these two sides of each term may be enlightened by exploring a similar polarity between the two terms. My claim is that this polarity both between ideology and utopia and within each of them may be ascribed to some structural traits of what I call cultural imagination. These two polarities encompass what are for me the main tensions in our study of ideology and utopia.
           “The polarity between ideology and utopia has scarcely been taken as a theme of research since Karl Mannheim’s famous book Ideology and Utopia. This book, on which I shall rely heavily, was first published in 1929. I think that Mannheim is the one person, at least until very recently, to have tried to put ideology and utopia within a common framework, and he did this by considering them both as deviant attitudes toward reality. It is within their common aspect of noncongruence with actuality, of discrepancy, that they diverge….
           “… it may be a fruitful hypothesis that the polarity of ideology and utopia has to do with the different figures of noncongruence typical of social imagination. And perhaps the positive side of the one and the positive side of the other are in the same relation of complementarity as the negative and pathological side of the one is to the negative and pathological side of the other.”
           [Paul Ricœur. Lectures on Ideology and Utopia. George H. Taylor, editor. New York: Columbia University Press. 1986. Pages 1-3.]
           “… utopian ideology (or utopian interests) might not necessarily coincide with on-going power relations. A transitional figure here is Paul Ricoeur whose theory of ideology and utopia argues that their relationship concerns the question of legitimization and therefore power…. Ricoeur positions the question of power at the center of both utopia and ideology. In short, Ricoeur extends the debate beyond Marx who positioned ideology/utopia against science and beyond Mannheim who argued that ideology and utopia were both constituted through disjunction with the present.
           “Yet his analysis of power is limited. For instance, in Ricoeur’s model, power only exerts itself in relations of rule (subjective belief) and not in relations of social integration. Thus, below the level of power relations there exists for Ricoeur a more fundamental level through which ideology is not simply concerned with authority claims but rather with social collectivity, with the maintenance of identity. Here at its most elemental level, power is external to the preservation of social traditions. Thus power is locked within a juridical framework between the one (the sovereign) and the many (the people).
           [Tyson Lewis, “Biopolitical Utopianism in Educational Theory.” Educational Philosophy and Theory. Volume 39, number 7, 2007. Pages 683-702.]
           “In order to formulate the distinction between hegemonic and marginalised language games, here we move on to [Paul] Ricoeur’s theory of ideology and utopia. This theory is insightful as it provides us with a framework to deal with the critique of ideology. In the design process, we have to illustrate the ideological dimension of the participants’ appropriation and reification in order to ask participants to rethink their actions. This is important in the context of disagreement and conflicts.” [Denny Ho and Yanki Lee. “The Ingenuity of Ageing: An Experiment to Explore the Role of Designers as a Moral Subject.” Nordic Design Research Conference 2013. Copenhagen-Malmö. June 9th–12th, 2003. Pages 283-292.]
      963. paradise now (Chris Jennings): He explores various American utopian movements.
           “While the Shakers, Owenites, Fourierists, Icarians, and Perfectionists had different visions of the coming paradise, they all shared the belief that some specific, ideal social order exists. Whether or not they saw God or Reason or Passion as the author of that ideal order, they proceeded from the assumption that humankind is somehow meant to live in utopia. Beneath this assumption was the conviction, born out of the intellectual advances of the Enlightenment, that there exists some knowable, universal ‘science’ of human relations. ‘It is our Father’s beautiful garden in which we are,’ wrote John Codman after leaving Brook Farm. ‘I have learned that all is intended for order and beauty, but as children we cannot yet walk so as not to stumble. Natural science has explained a thousand mysteries. Social science—understand the word; not schemes, plans or guessing, but genuine science, as far from guess or scheme as astronomy or chemistry is—will reveal to us as many truths and beauties as ever any other science has done. I now see clearly! Blessed be God for the light!’ The utopians had assumed that the arc of history was short and that it would soon bend toward perfection. The chaotic war years, during which all human ingenuity seemed turned to murder, had a predictable impact on that sort of thinking. Such ceremonies of innocence were no longer possible.” Chris Jennings. Paradise Now: The Story of American Utopianism. New York: Random House imprint of Penguin Random House LLC. 2016. Kindle edition.]
           “Utopianism in politics gets a bad press. The case against the grand-scale, state-directed kind is well known and overwhelming. Utopia, the perfect society, is unattainable, for there is no such thing. Remaking society in pursuit of an illusion not only fails, it leads swiftly to mass murder and moral ruin. So recent history grimly attests.
           “Although true, that is just half the story. Not all modern Utopians aim to seize the state in order to cudgel the rest of the world back to paradise. Plenty of gentler ones want no more than to withdraw from the mainstream and create their own micro-paradise with a few like-minded idealists. Small experiments in collective living swept America, for example, early in the 19ᵗʰ century and again late in the 20ᵗʰ.
           “Most failed or fell short. None lasted. All were laughed at. Yet in this intelligent, sympathetic history, Chris Jennings [in Paradise Now: The Story of American Utopianism] makes a good case for remembering them well. Politics stultifies, he thinks, when people stop dreaming up alternative ways of life and putting them to small-scale test.”
           [Editor, “Short-lived, much loved: How American idealists withdrew from the mainstream to create their own paradise.” The Economist. February 20th, 2016. Pages 74+.]
      964. critical dystopia (Lyman Tower Sargent and others): They consider various negative critiques of civilization’s destructive components, including capitalism.
           “Is a ‘critical dystopia’ plausible? Is it simply an oxymoron because all dystopias are ‘critical‘ in [Tom] Moylan’ sense? Perhaps Marge Piercy’s recent He, She and It (1991) qualifies. At present, I still think that ‘critical Utopias’ in Moylan’s definition were written, are are currently being written, albeit rarely, and may well be written again and that we need to think more seriously about the possibility of a ‘critical dystopia.’ Therefore, we should keep the concept even though it needs to be re-thought.…
           “Dystopia or negative Utopia—non-existent society described in considerable detail and normally located in time and space that the author intended a contemporaneous reader to view as con siderably worse than the society in which that reader lived.”
           [Lyman Tower Sargent, “The Three Faces of Utopianism Revisited.” Utopian Studies. Volume 5, number 1, 1994. Pages 1-37.]
           “The emergence of the category of a ‘critical dystopia’ following on the development of the category of the ‘critical utopia’ made me aware of a label I have used …. That label is the flawed utopia and refers to works that present what appears to be a good society until the reader learns of some flaw that raises questions about the basis for its claim to be a good society. The flawed utopia tends to invade territory already occupied by the dystopia, the anti-utopia, and the critical utopia and dystopia. The flawed utopia is a subtype that can exist within any of these subgenres. Thus, I make no pretence of having discovered a new subgenre.” [Lyman Tower Sargent, “The Problem of the ‘Flawed Utopia’: A Note on the Costs of Eutopia.” Dark Horizons: Science Fiction and the Dystopian Imagination. Raffaella Baccolini and Tom Moylan, editors. London and New York: Routledge imprint of Taylor & Francis Group, an Informa PLC business. 2003. Pages 225-231.]
           “Working the ground of popular sf [science fiction], the bleak energy of cyberyunk and the unyielding utopian imagination of feminist sf sustained the critical imagination in the mid-1980s. Then, in a step beyond those creative initiatives, dystopian narrative turned up on the fictive palettes of sf writers such as Kim Stanley Robinson, Octavia Butler, and Marge Piercy. Although many (in fiction and film) took this dystopian path, I find the work of these authors to be among the most eloquent examples of what Lyman Tower Sargent terms the ‘critical dystopia,’ a textual mutation that self-reflexively takes on the present system and offers not only astute critiques of the order of things but also explorations of the oppositional spaces and possibilities from which the next round of political activism can derive imaginative sustenance and inspiration. Challenging capitalist power as well as conservative rule—and refusing the false ‘utopianism’ of reformist promises from neoliberals and compromised social democrats with their bad-faith exercises in ‘third way’ solutions—the new dystopias have rekindled the cold flame of critique and have thereby become a cultural manifestadan of a broad-scale yet radically diverse alliance politics that is emerging as the twenty-first century commences.” [Tom Moylan. Scraps of the Untainted Sky: Science Fiction, Utopia, Dystopia. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press imprint of the Perseus Books Group. 2000. Page xv.]
           “Critical utopia—a non-existent society described in considerable detail and normally located in time and space that the author intended a contemporaneous reader to view as better than contemporary society but with difficult problems that the described society may or may not be able to solve and which takes a critical view of the utopian genre.” [Tom Moylan. Scraps of the Untainted Sky: Science Fiction, Utopia, Dystopia. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press imprint of the Perseus Books Group. 2000. Page 74.]
           “Interpreting Angel [a television show] as critical dystopia shifts the focus from the more immediately obvious elements of (re)action, vigilante violence, good versus evil, and moral/bodily control found in US hero and superhero stories, to the at times backgrounded elements of resistance, collectivity, power and corporate control. The notion of active hope is the key focus of this discussion and I examine how Angel uses the politically engaged mode of critical dystopia to draw out and develop themes of redemption, power and powerlessness, and the purpose or function of the Champion.” [Lorna Jowett, “Helping the Hopeless: Angel as Critical Dystopia.” Critical Studies in Television. Volume 2, number 1, March 2000. Pages 74-89.]
           “Dystopian narratives are often born out of a reaction against social, national, technological, or environmental trends as observed by the author of the text and seek to depict a world which the author’s contemporaries would identify as considerably worse than the reader’s own …. These narratives can range between the hopeful and the pessimistic, the utopian and the anti-utopian, and the militant and the pacific. Though they are often seen as the progeny of an older utopian tradition in literature and there are undoubtedly not-yet dystopian precursors—such as Samuel Butler’s 1872 novel Erewhon—now more than a century old, the generic form did not take shape until the early twentieth century. As the form has matured, Tom Moylan, Raffaella Baccolini, Lyman Tower Sargent, and others have noted a decidedly critical turn in dystopian media which necessitated the coining of the “critical dystopia” term. In his book Scraps of the Untainted Sky, Moylan establishes the “critical dystopian” framework and applies it to several dystopian texts from the 1980s and 1990s.” [C. Austin Sims. Accidental Dystopias: Apathy and Happenstance in Critical Dystopian Literature. M.A. thesis. Texas State University. San Marcos, Texas. December, 2012. Page 1.]
           “This paper is a cross-genre pilot study in Anarchist thought experiments. It is not an attempt to produce an encyclopedic review of the emergence or function of anarchism in critical dystopias. My objective is not so ambitious; my aim is to plot the evolution of each rebellion within its own context. In the end, I hope to broaden an understanding of Anarchy and Anarchism: not an understanding that congeals and grows more rigid, but rather an understanding that expands and flows, nearing a point of superfluidity. At this point I will explicate two key concepts in my analysis: thought experiment and critical dystopia.” [Taylor Andrew Loy. Anarchy in Critical Dystopias: An Anatomy of Rebellion. M.A. thesis. Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University (Virginia Tech). Blacksburg, Virginia. August, 2008. Page 10.]
           “In critical dystopias, the dystopian force is a more fragmented power that oppresses through its absence more than its presence. This difference results in changes not only in the form of the dystopian novel but also in its effect on the reader.” [Sally Hartin Young. But in the Night We are All the Same. Ph.D. dissertation. University of Missouri. Columbia, Missouri. December, 2004. Pages iii-iv.]
      965. dialectical utopianism (David Harvey): He discusses the importance of pulling together “a spatiotemporal utopianism.”
           “The dialectic is ‘either/or’ not ‘both/and.’ What the materialized utopianism of spatial form so clearly confronts is the problematics of closure and it is this which the utopianism of the social process so dangerously evades. Conversely we find that fragmentation and dispersal cannot work, and that the bitter struggle of the ‘either-or’ perpetually interferes with the gentler and more harmonious dialectic of ‘both-and’ when it comes to socio-ecological choices. We also find that the shadowy forms of spatiotemporal utopianism are not too hard to exhume from a study of our own historical geography as impelled by the geopolitics of capitalism. The task is then to define an alternative, not in terms of some static spatial form or even of some perfected emancipatory process. The task is to pull together a spatiotemporal utopianism – a dialectical utopianism – that is rooted in our present possibilities at the same time as it points towards different trajectories for human uneven geographical developments.” [David Harvey. Spaces of Hope. Edinburgh, Scotland: Edinburgh University Press. 2000. Page 196.]
           “In Spaces of Hope, David Harvey attempts to piece together a ‘Dialectical Utopianism’ based around the continuing relevance of Marxism. This, he says, is what haunts him in his sleep, the idea that the realm of possibility remains open, the implicit closures, which we impose upon the world, are only transitive, historical and cultural constructs in relation to the world itself. Hauntology, it seems, is at work once again.…
           “… The book is eminently readable and highly recommended because the figure that strings together its complex array of concerns and asserts a presence at every possible moment is none other than Marx.”
           [Neil Curry, “Spaces of Hope.” Review article. Capital & Class. Volume 24, number 3, autumn 2004. Pages 238-239.]
      966. utopian vision (Morris Zeitlin): He refers to “the utopian promises implicit in Marxism.”
           “In Marxist literature of the [nineteen-]nineties one notes a growing volume of thought given to changes in the economic structure of contemporary capitalism, less to those in its ideological superstructure, still less to changes in the working class, and least to what has been called the utopian aspect of Marxism—the cinderella of the socialist ball. Yet precisely the utopian vision implicit in Marxian theory had in the past drawn millions of the world’s oppressed to socialist movements.… We need to pierce the seductive bubbles and babble of dominant ideology better than we have. It is long time to make explicit the full brilliance of the utopian promises implicit in Marxism.” [Morris Zeitlin, “In defense of utopia.” Monthly Review: An Independent Socialist Magazine. Volume 48, issue 7, December 1996. Pages 23-28.]
      967. revolutionary-utopian mentality (Leszek Kolakowski [Polish, Leszka Kołakowskiego as pronounced in this MP3 audio file]): He considers three characteristics of a utopia.
           “… I am a utopian, and not because a place of my dream happens not to exist but because it is self-contradictory.…
           “These three characteristics of revolutionary-utopian mentality supply justification for three less innocent political attitudes. A hope for the brotherhood into which an illuminated elite can coerce people by decree provides a natural basis for totalitarian tyranny. Believing in a higher-order reality that is set into the present and, though undiscernible to the naked eye, is the genuine reality, justifies the utter contempt for actually existing people, who scarcely deserve attention when contrasted with the seemingly non-existent but much more important generations of the future. The idea of a new time gives legitimacy to all kinds of cultural vandalism.”
           [Leszek Kolakowski, “The Death of Utopia Reconsidered.” The Tanner Lectures on Human Values. Delivered at the Australian National University. Canberra, Australia. June 22nd, 1982. Pages 227-247.]
      968. typology of utopianism (Mohammad Hossein “Behrooz” Tamdgidi [Persian, مُحَمَّد حُسَیْن “بِهْرُوز” تَمْجِیدِی, Muḥammad Ḥusayn “Bihrūz” Tamǧīdī]): He deconstructs and then reconstructs utopianism in a typology.
           “My aim in this paper is to deconstruct utopianism as a world-historical social movement, and reconstruct a typology of utopianism that allows the interpretation of the historical debunking of utopianism by Marxism (or vice versa) as an expression partly of internal rifts among various types of utopianism ….
           “Type A utopian movements are those in which ordinary humans determine the utopian project.…
           “Type B utopian movements are those in which one or more ‘distinguished’ individuals, elites, wise men, ‘philosopher kings,’ geniuses, etc., are seen as determinants of the utopian project. Type C utopian movements are those in which the primary determinant of the origins, development, and/or realization of the utopian project is perceived to be supernatural forces.… Type D utopian movements are those in which the primary determinants of the utopian project are perceived to be the ‘objective forces’ operating in nature in general and/or in history in particular.”
           [M. H. (Behrooz) Tamdgidi, “De/Reconstructing Utopianism: Towards A World-Historical Typology.” Human Architecture: Journal of the Sociology of Self-Knowledge. Open access. Volume II, number 2, fall 2003/spring 2004. Pages 125-141.]
           “Can we transcend our own ideological and/or utopian biases to scientifically understand and change our social realities? The question Karl Mannheim posed for social science in his Ideology and Utopia … still remains a contested terrain amongst social scientists and cultural relativists alike …. A by-product of this intellectual impasse has been a revival of interest in Mannheim’s original formulations of the problem and ways of resolving it ….” [M. H. (Behrooz) Tamdgidi, “Ideology and Utopia in Mannheim: Towards the Sociology of Self-Knowledge.” Human Architecture: Journal of the Sociology of Self-Knowledge. Open access. Volume 1, number 1, spring 2002. Pages 120-139.]
      969. aesthetics of utopia (Richard Howells): He applies critical social theory to the aesthetics of utopia focused, specifically, on Navajo First-American culture, theology, and design.
           “The Garden of Eden, as described in both the Old Testament and the Torah, could well be the original Utopia. Here, it is widely supposed, Adam, the first man, and his partner Eve enjoyed paradise before earthly temptation got in the way.… So, paradise was lost, and all mankind suffered for ever more. This is, of course, a somewhat partial and negative interpretation of the text …. For the time being, though, this popular interpretation does at least serve to underline the deep-rooted significance of the Utopian myth to Abrahamic culture.…
           “Theory is, of course, a delight in itself, but the article proceeds in the conviction that it is even more illuminating when combined with a case study, each the better to elucidate the other.… We can now proceed to apply the critical theory of Utopia advanced thus far to our illustrative case study of Navajo culture, theology and design.”
           [Richard Howells, “The aesthetics of Utopia: Creation, creativity and a critical theory of design.” Thesis Eleven. Volume 123, number 1, August 2014. Pages 41-61.]
      970. critical theory of utopia (Carl Freedman): He applies critical theory, including the Frankfurt School, to the genre of science fiction.
           “… if science fiction is a privileged object for the critical theory of utopia, it is so largely because the genre functions as a subject of such theory as well; that is, the cognitive estrangements of the genre work in the manner of utopian critique to foreground and demystify the actual, and thereby to point toward some authentic plenitude with which the deprivations of mundane reality are contrasted. Accordingly, we are now in a position to answer the question posed at the end of the preceding section: Would a purely science-fictional text be a strictly utopian text? Just as the logic of Lukácsian genre criticism suggests that a pure product of historical realism could only be produced in the context of pure and perfected utopia, so the same is indeed true—but more complexly so—of the generic tendency of science fiction.” [Carl Freedman. Critical Theory and Science Fiction. Middletown, Connecticut: Wesleyan University Press. 2000. Page 82.]
           “I define critical theory as something broader than Critical Theory in the Frankfurt School usage but not unrelated to it. I use the term to designate the traditions of dialectical and self-reflective thought initiated during the historical moment of [Immanuel] Kant and [Georg Wilhelm Friedrich] Hegel. Insofar as twentieth-century work is concerned, I maintain a certain privilege for specific forms of critical thinking: Marxism above all, but also psychoanalysis and the best work of such postdialectical theorists as [Michel] Foucault and [Jacques] Derrida.” [Carl Freedman. Critical Theory and Science Fiction. Middletown, Connecticut: Wesleyan University Press. 2000. Page 18.]
           “Carried out at a theoretical level, which is still too rare in science fiction criticism and theory, [Carl] Freedman’s book creates much food for thought, and not a few clarion calls to skeptics of his basic argument, that science fiction is the paradigm focus of study for critical theory.… While Freedman’s analysis of a number of ‘classic’ texts, those which many critics agree are the best of the best, is compelling, one must still ask, what good is a definition of a genre that excludes most of its examples?” [Janice M. Bogstad, “Critical Theory and Science Fiction.” Femspec. Volume 5, 2004. Pages 274+.]
           “Many people should buy Critical Theory and Science Fiction: it’s a decent introduction to Critical Theory for the uninitiated. For those who know Critical Theory but not SF [science fiction], it’s a good introduction to science fiction and solid proof that SF is as appropriate for Critical Theory approaches as the Metaphysical Poets were for the New Critics …. Students of utopia interested in Critical Theory might use a library copy or buy the paperback.” [Richard D. Erlich, “Critical Theory and Science Fiction.” Utopian Studies. Volume 12, number 1, 2001. Pages 180-182.]
           “[Carl] Freedman’s argument, simplified, is that real sf [science fiction] is Marxist, and that therefore Marxists should pay more attention to it. He claims an affinity between critical theory and science fiction, summarized in the equivalence relationship: ‘each is a version of the other).’ While he makes no effort to show that critical theory is fictional …, he is prepared to substitute strategically the more euphemistic ‘critical-theoretical’ for ‘Marxist,’ since the work that the book does in many of its pages is literary criticism and the slippages around ‘critical theory’ provide a lot of wiggle room for the argument. While he does not ultimately show much Marxism in sf, he does successfully build a case to show that a number of first-rate sf works can be organized together into a critical intellectual tradition.” [John Fekete, “Doing the Time Warp Again: Science Fiction as Adversarial Culture.” (Review of Critical Theory and Science Fiction.) Science Fiction Studies. Volume 28, number 1, March 2001. Pages 77-96.]
           “I will end by expressing my overall gratitude to Professor [John] Fekete. He took the time and trouble to read Critical Theory and Science Fiction with obvious care, and he has certainly responded in a serious and substantial way. His hostility, moreover, seems to have nothing to do with petty matters of pedantry or jealousy; instead, it is based on issues as consequential as any issues can be. They are, most certainly, issues that will not be definitively resolved soon; but there are those of us who believe that an almost unimaginable degree of human suffering hangs, ultimately, in the balance.” [Carl Freedman, “And Yet It Moves: Still Another Response to John Fekete.” Science Fiction Studies. Volume 28, number 2, July 1001. Pages 321-325.]
      971. critique of utopian socialism (Steve Edwards and Xu Jilin [Chinese, 许纪霖, Xǔ-Jì-lín as pronounced in this MP3 audio file]): They discuss the classical Marxist critique, popularized by Friedrich Engels, of utopian socialism.
           “In much of the … Marxist tradition … the critique of utopian socialism was mistakenly taken to debar socialists from speculating about the future. The term ‘utopianism’ came to be used in the socialist tradition as a pejorative label; consider, for example, that frequently heard phrase: ‘hopeless utopians.’ But as Ernst Bloch has taught us, the last thing utopians can be blamed for is a lack of hope.” [Steve Edwards, “The Colonisation of Utopia.” William Morris. David Mabb, editor. Spokane, Washington: Whitworth University. 2004. Pages 13-40.]
           “In 1980s China, Marxist humanism had launched a critique of utopian socialism and now, in its attempts to transgress or move beyond that style of socialism, a form of neo-enlightenment ideology evolved that sought to incorporate elements of Western capitalist modernity. In this manner, the logic of the Movement to Liberate Thinking, in tandem with the forces of historical development, produced an inexorable outcome, one that resonated with a collective longing for a new kind of enlightenment.” [Xu Jilin, “The Fate of an Enlightenment—Twenty Years in the Chinese Intelligence Sphere (1978-98).” East Asian History. Volume 20, 2000. Pages 169-186.]
           “The solution of the social problems, which as yet lay hidden in undeveloped economic conditions, the Utopians attempted to evolve out of the human brain. Society presented nothing but wrongs; to remove these was the task of reason. It was necessary, then, to discover a new and more perfect system of social order and to impose this upon society from without by, propaganda, and, wherever it was possible, by the example of model experiments. These new social systems were foredoomed as Utopian; the more completely they were worked out in detail, the more they could not avoid drifting off into pure phantasies.” [Friedrich Engels. Socialism: Utopian and Scientific. Edward Aveling, translator. Chicago, Illinois: Charles H. Kerr & Company. 1908. Page 58.]
      972. institutional ethnography (Kevin Walby): He considers “the social relations of research” in this Marxian approach to ethnography.
           “IE [institutional ethnography] draws influence from Marx and his conception of political economy as arising from the activities of actual people but also from ethnomethodology, in that the institutional ethnographer is interested in people and how they know and do in their specific situations. Institutional ethnography, however, departs from ethnomethodology inasmuch as it treats those people and their talk not as the object of analysis but as an entry point into forms of extralocally organized knowledges ….
           “… The actual practice of institutional ethnography is quite diverse in two senses. First, institutional ethnographies vary according to the researcher and the everyday problematics that she or he is explicating. Second, and related, because institutional ethnography is conceptualized as an ongoing process of discovery and explication, the field is always opening itself up as the researcher discovers more about the ‘institutional nexuses’ that shape the local ….”
           [Kevin Walby, “On the Social Relations of Research: A Critical Assessment of Institutional Ethnography.” Qualitative Inquiry. Volume 13, number 7, October 2007. Pages 1008-1030.]
      973. political critique of capitalism (Paul Blokker): He critiques the argument that neoliberal capitalism is somehow “natural.”
           “A political critique of capitalism emerges from the observation that the existing (neo-liberal) capitalist form is not a natural phenomenon, but is a politically constructed one. As Ingerid Straume states, an investigation into the ‘political imaginary’ of capitalism leads one to the insight that the ‘lack of alternatives to capitalism seems to be a problem belonging not to the economic but to the political sphere’ …. The portrayal of capitalism as natural is achieved by a doublemove that represents capitalist relations as natural and that depoliticizes the economy by limiting political control ….” [Paul Blokker, “The European crisis and a political critique of capitalism.” European Journal of Social Theory. Volume 17, number 3, 2014. Pages 258-274.]
      974. radical phenomenology (Peyman Vahabzadeh [Persian/Fārsī, پَیْمَان وَهَابْزَادِه, Paymān Vahābzādih]): He makes a contribution to “the new interpretive sociology.”
           “From a radical phenomenological standpoint, the fact that the social sciences in general and sociology in particular appear at a specific historical period holds an essential truth about the epoch in which we live.…
           “… Radical phenomenology intends to show the epochal character of thinking and acting: metaphysical quest for foundations (i.e. Being as stable presence) has historically tried to reduce thinking to the affirmation of (assumed) pregiven foundations, and action to submission to the normative requirements of such foundations. Our awareness about metaphysics as well as our attunement to the point that thinking and acting are historical-epochal will lead us to the point of refusing foundations and norms that dictate what is to be thought and what is to be done.”
           [Peyman Vahabzadeh, “Ultimate referentiality: Radical phenomenology and the new interpretative sociology.” Philosophy & Social Criticism. Volume 35, number 4, 2009. Pages 447-465.]
      975. meaning making (Neil Ormerod): He critically examines this process as a requirement for a full human life.
           “Meaning making is essential for fully human living—human beings do not live by bread alone—and while it may on occasions be distorted, without meaning our lives would be less than human. The process may, however, be ideological if the practical insights neglect other communal values. Thus with conflictualist approaches such as liberation theology or critical theory we must ask, “Who are the victims of this social change? Who is marginalized? Whose voice has not been heard?’ We must ask whether the practical insight suffers from bias, whether individual, group, or general. All these are possibilities. But on a normative account, new practical insights give rise to cultural shifts that, recognizing their own contingency, can avoid ideological pretensions and distortions. Culture is then a creative, contingent, indeed artistic expression of the human spirit, helping us make sense of our social world.” [Neil Ormerod. Re-Visioning the Church: An Experiment in Systematic-Historical Ecclesiology. Fortress Press imprint of Augsburg Fortress. 2014. Page 80.]
      976. four radical modalities (William K. Carroll): He examines “robust radicalism.”
           “Four radical modalities may be distinguished: the resistant, the analytical, the prefigurative, and the subversive.
           “To be radically resistant is to struggle against domination, and in the process develop counterpower, in concert with those who share common cause.…
           “… Radical analysis not only links across; particularly in its Marxist variant it penetrates downward to unmask surface appearances of isolated problems, each with its own solution. In revealing a deeper reality this second modality operates within a method of ideology–critique.…
           “… Radical prefiguration consciously strives to create from that present an alternative future of human thriving within a context of ecological health.…
           “… To the first three modalities we must add a fourth – the subversive: contesting, reversing, deconstructing, jamming dominant practices, norms, discourses, identities. Radical subversion problematizes the discourses that make us what we are, opening up a politics of self-overcoming and self-transformation ….”
           [William K. Carroll, “What ‘Radical’ Means in the 21ˢᵗ Century: Robust Radicalism.” Review of Radical Political Economics. Volume 47, number 4, December 2015. Pages 663-668.]
      977. normative model of critical theory (Nikolas Kompridis [Greek/Hellēniká, Νικόλαος Κομπρίδης, Nikólaos Komprídēs as pronounced in this MP3 audio file]): He proposes a thoughtful revision to critical social theory, inspired by the work of Immanuel Kant, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, and Jürgen Habermas.
           “It will become clearer in the course of my discussion that although I begin with the Frankfurt School tradition of critical theory, the normative model of critical theory I am working toward is fully pluralistic in its intentions. It is meant to work in partnership, not in competition, with other traditions of critical inquiry. However, it is a conception that remains normatively and historically attuned to the German philosophical tradition from [Immanuel] Kant and [Georg Wilhelm Friedrich] Hegel to [Jürgen] Habermas.” [Nikolas Kompridis. Critique and Disclosure: Critical Theory between Past and Future. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press. 2006. Page 283.]
           “As I have argued at length in Critique and Disclosure, if critical theory is to be more than a proceduralist theory of normative justification, it has to recover and recommit itself to its possibility-disclosing role. No matter how well it might fulfil the first self-defining task, it will be a one-winged enterprise, never able to get off the ground. Of course, the obverse is also true, for without a compelling explanatory-diagnostic account of the present critical theory will be just as one-winged, just as unable to get off the ground. These are interdependent not independent tasks that one brings together at a later stage of theorization. Nonetheless, it is the failure to remain true to its possibility-disclosing task that more than anything else marks the shortcomings of contemporary critical theory. For in the moment it accepts the exhaustion or contraction of possibility, it also accepts the foreclosure of the future, and along with it, a narrow and cramped conception of agency that is inattentive to and forgetful of the human capacity to enlarge the cultural conditions of intelligibility and possibility.” [Nikolas Kompridis, “Re-Envisioning Critical Theory: Amy Allen’s The Politics of Our Selves.” Review article. Critical Horizons. Volume 15, number 1, March 2014. Pages 1-13.]
           “Inspired by [Jürgen] Habermas’s account of the future-oriented time-consciousness of modernity, [Nikolas] Kompridis argues that Habermas’s critique of modern subject-philosophy (often conflated with the ‘philosophy of consciousness’), and argument for the primacy of communicative reason, misses the fundamental dimension of world-disclosure that is [Martin] Heidegger’s true philosophical legacy. Habermas’s aversion to Heidegger – largely for political reasons – taints his assessment of the emancipatory potential of the concept of world-disclosure, which Habermas presents as a dangerously non-normative conception of how meaningful thought and practice acquires its intelligibility.” [Robert Sinnerbrink, “Critique and Disclosure: Critical Theory between Past and Future.” Critical Horizons. Volume 8, issue 2, 2007. Pages 266-271.]
      978. critical revision of Habermasian critical theory (Amy Allen): The name for this perspective is adopted from Nikolas Kompridis.
           “[Amy] Allen’s vision of critical theory [in her book, The Politics of Our Selves: Power, Autonomy, and Gender in Contemporary Critical Theory] is in the first instance a critical revision of Habermasian critical theory. In her meta-theoretical conception of critical theory, she wants to remain true to the two fundamental and complementary tasks considered to be definitive of its identity since [Max] Horkheimer’s original formulation in the 1930s.” [Nikolas Kompridis, “Re-Envisioning Critical Theory: Amy Allen’s The Politics of Our Selves.” Review article. Critical Horizons. Volume 15, number 1, March 2014. Pages 1-13.]
           “[Jürgen] Habermas’s morally autonomous self gives herself the moral law, judges and acts morally, but does so with the expectation that her actions would be approved of by an unlimited communication community. Thus, like [Immanuel] Kant, Habermas holds that the ‘autonomous self is the self who chooses freely not what she or he wants to do but what is right for her or him to do.’ However, two important differences emerge from Habermas’s intersubjective reading of Kant: first, Habermas disagrees with Kant’s claim that autonomy requires the denial or supression of inclination, though it does presuppose the capacity to distance oneself temporarily from one’s needs and desires; second, claims to the rightness of one’s actions are not settled monologically, by the internal deliberations of the the autonomous individual, but only dialogically, in actual moral discourses.” [Amy Allen. The Politics of Our Selves: Power, Autonomy, and Gender in Contemporary Critical Theory. New York: Columbia University Press. 2008. Page 97.]
           “Although [Jürgen] Habermas does not deny the flaws in earlier attempts to defend cognitivism, he maintains that the alternative—an embrace of ethical subjectivism which necessarily, on his view, collapses into skepticism—‘deprive[s] the sphere of everyday moral intuitions of its significance.’ Moreover, he argues that cognitivism can be successfully defended if we give up the strong claim that normative claims are truth candidates and instead adopt the weaker position that normative claims are analogous to truth claims. Habermas notes a prima facie analogy between truth claims—claims about what the objective world is like—and normative rightness claims—claims about how the intersubjective world should be ordered: Truth claims are to facts as normative claims are to legitimately ordered interpersonal relations.” [Amy Allen, “Discourse, Power, and Subjectivation: The Foucault/Habermas Debate Reconsidered.” The Philosophical Forum. Volume 40, number 1, March 2009. Pages 1-28.]
           “With respect to the global public sphere, [Jürgen] Habermas worries that the emerging communicative structures of informal global public spheres cannot be efficacious so long as there are no constitutionally institutionalized mechanisms for translating the public will generated in such spheres into binding political power. The global protests against the start of the Iraq war in 2003 provided a poignant example of this efficacy deficit. Nevertheless Habermas is cautiously optimistic that the opinions and wills generated in such global public spheres could be efficacious if directed at a global institution—a dramatically reformed UN—that would be charged with the limited goals of preventing violence and protecting human rights and empowered with the political muscle to achieve those goals.” [Amy Allen, “The Public Sphere: Ideology and/or Ideal?” Political Theory. Volume 40, number 6, December 2012. Pages 822-829.]

Return to the table of contents.

7. Structuralism and Poststructuralism (Louis Althusser, Gregory Elliott, Alain Lipietz, Joachim Hirsch, Kenneth N. Waltz, John J. Mearsheimer, Jae-wook Jung, William J. Chambliss, Marjorie Sue Zatz, Laurie J. Rodriguez, David E. Barlow, Dan Rothe, Pierre Bourdieu, Nicos Poulantzas, Pierre Bourdieu, Michel Foucault, Jacques Derrida, Jean Baudrillard, Jacques Lacan, Julia Kristeva, Slavoj Žižek, Rastko Močnik, Miran Božovič, Mark Poster, Patricia Harris, Brian Green, V. Spike Peterson, David Tyrer, Ernesto Laclau, Chantal Mouffe, Gilles Deleuze, Félix Guattari, David Harvey, Andrew M. Koch, Saul Newman, Alain Touraine, Eduardo Bonilla-Silva, Johan Galtung, Theda Skocpol, Simon Clarke, Judith Butler, François Laruelle, Gibson Burrell, Sally Tomlinson, Jennifer M. Lehmann, Michael R. Carter, Bradford L. Barham, John Worrall, Anjan Chakravartty, Albert Martin, Ferdinand de Saussure, Yuri Lotman, Roland Barthes, Willard Van “W. V.” Orman Quine, Claude Lévi-Strauss, Maurice Godelier, and many others): Several illustrations of structuralism and poststructuralism—some Marxist or critical theories along with a potpourri of other versions—are examined below. The chapter begins, however, with two approaches developed by Althusser. It closes with critiques of structuralism.
   1. examples of structuralism and poststructuralism
      1. structural Marxism (Louis Althusser as pronounced in this MP3 audio file and others): In the Althusserian (MP3 audio file) school, the proper focus of observation is not considered to be individuals but, rather, structures. The social institutions, or social structure, of the state are regarded as serving the long-term interests of capitalism.
         “… I think that, in its approximation, this metaphorical expression – the ‘inversion’ of the dialectic – does not pose the problem of the nature of the objects to which a single method should be applied (the world of the Idea for [Georg Wilhelm Friedrich] Hegel – the real world for [Karl] Marx), but rather the problem of the nature of the dialectic considered itself; that is, the problem of its specific structures; not the problem of the inversion of the ‘sense’ of the dialectic, but that of the transformation of its structures. It is hardly worth pointing out that, in the first case, the application of a method, the exteriority of the dialectic to its possible objects poses a pre-dialectical question, a question without any strict meaning for Marx. The second problem on the other hand, raises a real question to which it is hardly likely that Marx and his disciples should not have given a concrete answer in theory and practice, in theory or in practice.
         “Let us say, to end this over-extended textual exposition, that if the Marxist dialectic is ‘in principle’ the opposite of the Hegelian dialectic, if it is rational and not mystical-mystified-mystificatory, this radical distinction must be manifest in its essence, that is, in its characteristic determinations and structures. To be clear, this means that basic structures of the Hegelian dialectic such as negation, the negation of the negation, the identity of opposites, ‘supersession,’ the transformation of quantity into quality, contradiction, etc., have for Marx (in so far as he takes them over, and he takes over by no means all of them) a structure different from the structure they have for Hegel. It also means that these structural differences can be demonstrated, described, determined and thought. And if this is possible, it is therefore necessary, I would go so far as to say vital, for Marxism. We cannot go on reiterating indefinitely approximations such as the difference between system and method, the inversion of philosophy or dialectic, the extraction of the ‘rational kernel,’ and so on, without letting these formulae think for us, that is, stop thinking ourselves and trust ourselves to the magic of a number of completely devalued words for our completion of Marx’s work. I say vital, for I am convinced that the philosophical development of Marxism currently depends on this task.”
         [Louis Althusser. For Marx. Ben Brewster, translator. Paris: François Maspero. 1965. Pages 93-94.]
         “In the Thesis taken from the Communist Manifesto, what is put in the front rank is no longer the exploited classes, etc., but the class struggle. This Thesis must be recognized as decisive for Marxism-Leninism. It draws a radical demarcation line between revolutionaries and reformists. Here I have to simplify things very much, but I do not think that I am betraying the essential point.
         “For reformists (even if they call themselves Marxists) it is not the class struggle which is in the front rank: it is simply the classes. Let us take a simple example, and suppose that we are dealing with just two classes. For reformists these classes exist before the class struggle, a bit like two football teams exist, separately, before the match. Each class exists in its own camp, lives according to its particular conditions of existence. One class may be exploiting another, but for reformism that is not the same thing as class struggle. One day the two classes come up against one another and come into conflict. It is only then that the class struggle begins. They begin a hand-to-hand battle, the battle becomes acute, and finally the exploited class defeats its enemy (that is revolution), or loses (that is counter-revolution). However you turn the thing around, you will always find the same idea here: the classes exist before the class struggle, independently of the class struggle. The class struggle only exists afterwards.
         [Louis Althusser. Essays in Self-Criticism. Grahame Lock, translator. London and New York: Verso imprint of New Left Books. 1976. Page 49.]
         “… the Oedipal phase is not a hidden ‘meaning’ which merely lacks consciousness or speech—it is not a structure buried in the past that can always be restructured or surpassed by ‘reactivating its meaning’; the Oedipus complex is the dramatic structure, the ‘theatrical machine’ imposed by the Law of Culture on every involuntary, conscripted candidate to humanity, a structure containing in itself not only the possibility of, but the necessity for the concrete variants in which it exists, for every individual who reaches its threshold, lives through it and survives it. In its application, in what is called its practice (the cure), psychoanalysis works on the concrete ‘effects’ of these variants, i.e., on the modality of the specific nexus in which the Oedipal transition was and is begun, completed, missed or eluded by some particular individual.” [Louis Althusser, “Prefatory Note to ‘Freud and Lacan.’” New Left Review. Series I, number 55, May–June 1969. Pages 49-65.]
         “… if the Marxist dialectic is ‘in principle’ the opposite of the Hegelian dialectic, if it is rational and not mystical-mystified-mystificatory, this radical distinction must be manifest in its essence, that is, in its determinations and specific structures. To be clear, this means that fundamental structures of the Hegelian dialectic such as negation, the negation of the negation, the identity of opposites, ‘sublation,’ the transformation of quantity into quality, contradiction, etc, have for [Karl] Marx (in so far as he uses them, and he uses by no means all of them) a structure different from that which they have for [Georg Wilhelm Friedrich] Hegel.” [Louis Althusser, “Contradiction and overdetermination.” New Left Review. Series I, number 41, January–February 1967. Pages 15-35.]
         “[Karl] Marx founded a new science: the science of history. Let me use an image. The sciences we are familiar with have been installed in a number of great ‘continents.’ Before Marx, two such continents had been opened up to scientific knowledge: the continent of Mathematics and the continent of Physics. The first by the Greeks (Thales), the second by Galileo [Galilei]. Marx opened up a third continent to scientific knowledge: the continent of History.” [Louis Althusser, “Philosophy as a Revolutionary Weapon.” New Left Review. Series I, number 64, November–December 1970. Pages 3-11.]
         “The real: it is structured as a dross of earth containing inside it a grain of pure gold, i.e., it is made of two real essences, the pure essence and the impure essence, the gold and the dross, or, if you like (Hegelian terms), the essential and the inessential. The inessential may be the form of individuality (this fruit, these particular fruits) or materiality (that which is not ‘form’ or essence), or ‘nothingness,’ or anything else; it is unimportant. The fact is that the real-object contains in it, really, two distinct real parts, the essence and the inessential.” [Louis Althusser and Étienne Balibar. Reading Capital. London and New York: Verso imprint of New Left Books. 1970. Page 36.]
         “… [One] condition for seriously discussing the lessons of structuralism is to realize that no unitary position was ever constituted under this name, not even in the sense of the extension of a model. Structuralism does not designate a school, then; it designates a movement, within a given intellectual conjuncture.” [Étienne Balibar, “Structure: Method or subversion of the social sciences?” Radical Philosophy: Philosophical Journal of the Independent Left. Number 165. January/February 2011. Pages 17-22.]
         “Theory is a recurrent word in [Louis] Althusser’s work, and the title of the famous book series he ran at Éditions Maspéro for many years (‘Théorie’). But it is already a kind of maddened theory, as if Althusser’s work was bridging the gap, more or less willingly, between nineteenth-century dialectics and late-twentieth-century anti-dialectical French thought. Theory in his work is not only a superior form of historical knowledge, as when Althusser reinterprets [Karl] Marx as a theoretician (théoricien) of capital – against his then dominant readings, his socio-economic or humanistic (moralistic) interpretations – but it is also the only sustainable way to separate science from ideology, to turn dialectical materialism into a scientific demystification of ideology, to deactivate reversed representations of labour, culture and power relations, and to reveal reality as a product of ideology, or as an ‘effect of structures.’” [François Cusset, “Theory: (Madness of).” Radical Philosophy: Philosophical Journal of the Independent Left. Number 167, May/June 2011. Pages 24-30.]
         “My aim is to show that, far from being a strictly determinist concept, structural causality was the concept through which [Louis] Althusser attempted for the first time to develop a logic capable of including contingency as a structural dimension, and that, far from asserting the timeless reproduction of the structure (i.e. of a certain mode of production), it should be read as the concept through which Althusser tried to propose a non-dialectical theory of structural change.” [Stefano Pippa, “The necessity of contingency: Rereading Althusser on structural causality.” Radical Philosophy: Philosophical Journal of the Independent Left. Number 199, September/October 2016. Pages 15-25.]
         “At strategic points in Reading Capital, Louis Althusser introduces [Baruch] Spinoza’s idea of an immanent cause as the decisive concept that is absent from [Karl] Marx’s discourse. For the Althusser of 1965, Spinoza’s model of causality is the great missing link in Marx’s thought, a philosophical omission and lacuna of symptomatic force. It explains the whole detour that Marx was forced to take through [Georg Wilhelm Friedrich] Hegel’s system of thought.” [Katja Diefenbach, “Is it simple to be a Spinozist in philosophy?: Althusser and Deleuze.” Radical Philosophy: Philosophical Journal of the Independent Left. Number 199, September/October 2016. Pages 26-34.]
         “The reading we have made of [Louis] Althusser shows that the two types of structural analysis he proposes are inadequate as a foundation for the concept of structural causality, since this concept is intended precisely to make them possible by removing the basic deadlocks that have jammed them up. Each analysis by itself admits to its own impossibility and refers to the other for the condition of its possibility. Althusser attempts to save himself by installing between the two his special concept of cause, that obscurely central point from which the whole system is supposed to become legible.” [André Glucksmann, “A Ventriloquist Structuralism.” New Left Review. Series I, number 72, March–April 1972. Pages 68-92.]
         “The potential of [Louis] Althusser’s program for a structural Marxism to provide a resonant hermeneutic of early Christian literature has been demonstrated by his student, Alain Badiou, who draws upon Althusser’s theory of the relative autonomy of the practices in the superstructure and Althusser’s concept of interpellation, in order to argue that Paul’s message of the resurrection functioned as a liberating counter-ideology, with the power to extract subjects from the ‘situated void’ of death in the early Roman Empire ….” [Larry L. Welborn, “Towards Structural Marxism as a Hermeneutic of Early Christian Literature, Illustrated with Reference to Paul’s Spectacle Metaphor in 1 Corinthians 15:30-32.]
      2. aleatory materialism (Louis Althusser): This approach was developed by Althusser late in his career. The adjective aleatory, in aleatory materialism (MP3 audio file), refers to an uncertain or indeterminate outcome.
         “I think that ‘true’ materialism, the materialism best suited to Marxism, is aleatory materialism, in the line of Epicurus [Ancient Greek/Archaía Hellēniká, Ἐπίκουρος, E̓píkouros] and Democritus [Ancient Greek/Archaía Hellēniká, Δημόκριτος, Dēmókritos]. Let me make it clear that this materialism is not a philosophy which must be elaborated in the form of a system in order to deserve the name ‘philosophy.’ There is no need to make it over into a system, even if that is not impossible. What is truly decisive about Marxism is that it represents a position in philosophy.” [Louis Althusser. Philosophy of the Encounter: Later Writings, 1978-87. G. M. Goshgarian, translator. François Matheron and Oliver Corpet, editors. London and New York: Verso imprint of New Left Books. 2006. Page 256.]
         “… Epicurus postulates that the aleatory swerve, not Reason or the first Cause, is at the origin of the world. It must be understood, however, that the encounter creates nothing of the reality of the world, but endows the atoms themselves with their reality, which, without swerve and encounter, would be nothing but abstract elements lacking all consistency and existence. It is only once the world has been constituted that the reign of reason, necessity and meaning is established.” [Louis Althusser. Philosophy of the Encounter: Later Writings, 1978-87. G. M. Goshgarian, translator. François Matheron and Oliver Corpet, editors. London and New York: Verso imprint of New Left Books. 2006. Pages 260-261.]
         “The theory of aleatory materialism is one of [Louis] Althusser’s posthumous surprises, not only because it was formulated in the last decade of his life when he was considered philosophically dead, but also due to the undeniably novel quality of his formulations that differed from, if not contradicted, his early works through which he was known. At the end of his lifelong effort to formulate a philosophy of and for Marxism, Althusser provides the building blocks of a materialism that is nonteleological and not trapped within a logic of necessity, a materialism that takes chance seriously, and that maintains as its ambition the radical transformation of society. As the subterranean current of philosophy that Althusser brings to our attention, aleatory materialism is a subversive and suppressed stream whose force resides in its ability not only to critique but also to intervene in politics.” [Banu Bargu, “In the Theater of Politics: Althusser’s Aleatory Materialism and Aesthetics.” Diacritics: a review of contemporary criticism. Volume 40, issue 3, fall 2012. Pages 86-111.]
         “Aleatory materialism allows [Louis] Althusser to ‘read’ and de-actualize his own theory of structural causality, to pose the problem of that particular theoretical solution. The problem that structural causality resolves—and which could not be posed concurrently with it—is that of the invention of the virtual structure, its singularities and relations, itself. This problem is distinct from the incarnation of the structure, which is a problem resolved by [Karl] Marx and posed by Althusser. Althusser poses the problem of invention by articulating his theory of the aleatory encounter.” [Kyle McGee, “Aleatory Materialism and Speculative Jurisprudence (I): From Anti-Humanism to Non-Humanism.” Law Critique. Volume 23, number 2, July 2012. Pages 141-162.]
         “… the aleatory materialist is conceived of on the metaphor of someone who arrives only at plain after plain, that is, areas bare of topographical determinations. Or, in terms of the other metaphor, the walker in a forest can have no confidence that, by sticking to a definite direction, he will eventually find himself out of it, for it may turn out that he is on a trail leading to a dead-end … within the forest.” [Wal Suchting, “Althusser’s Late Thinking About Materialism.” Historical Materialism. Volume 12, issue 1, 2004. Pages 3-70.]
         “[Louis] Althusser begins his argument for aleatory materialism by going back to the Ancient Greeks, specifically Epicurus’ notion of atoms falling in a void. Epicurus argued that it takes only one ‘swerve’—which Althusser terms a ‘clinamen’—for one atom to hit another and it is from this chance encounter between the two atoms, the ‘deviation from a straight trajectory,’ that creates a series of subsequent random encounters that begin to form basic natural structures. Using an analogy of the formation of ice, Althusser argues that elements are continually moving and coming into contact with one another, but they only form into something new when they ‘take hold’, crystallising (which Althusser terms ‘prise’) into a new structure. And, importantly, it is only after crystallising that the new structures begin to produce effects (a point that will be returned to below). Furthermore, it is the semipermanence of these structures that produces the sense of ‘continuity’ being ‘natural’ and ‘normal.’” [Nick Hardy, “Theory From the Conjuncture: Althusser’s Aleatory Materialism and Machiavelli’s dispositif.” Décalages. Volume 1, issue 3, 2014. Pages 1-32.]
         “… [The] seemingly strange concept of ‘the void’ forms an important part of [Louis] Althusser’s later work on aleatory materialism. Aleatory materialism means ‘chance’ materialism and for the present discussion it is sufficient to understand it as arguing that social structures: (a) originally form through the chance encounters of their elements; (b) have managed to endure in their form(s); and (c) overdetermine other structures, meaning the others develop in a similar form. Althusser’s interest in the void is because it signifies the possibility of aleatory change—i.e. change not expected to be produced from the forces as presently configured in the conjuncture. In aleatory materialist terms, the void is the non-space in which chance is played out and contains the possibility of both formation and of effect: that is, chances of encounter and chances of outcome. The implication/result of the void is the creation of possibilities, which is why Althusser places so much emphasis upon it.” [Nick Hardy, “Alea Capta Est: Foucault’s Dispositif and Capturing Chance.” Foucault Studies. Number 19, June 2015. Pages 191-216.]
      3. Marxism–Althusserianism (Gregory Elliott): He develops an approach which may be used in evaluating the challenges posed by Louis Althusser to the orthodox current of historical materialism.
         “… it should be noted that the single most influential contemporary form of Marxism-Althusserianism – was precisely based upon dissent from Orthodox Historical materialism, with its epic tale of the forward march of the productive forces towards an ineluctable communism, on the grounds that it was a ‘materialist’ inversion of [Georg Wilhelm Friedrich] Hegel’s philosophy of history – starring the Ruse of Economic Reason – which secreted a mystical kernel within a technological shell.” [Gregory Elliott, “The Cards of Confusion: Reflections on Historical Communism and the ‘End of History.’” Radical Philosophy: Philosophical Journal of the Independent Left. Number 64, summer 1993. Pages 3-12.]
         “Drawing on [Karl] Marx’s analysis of the labour process in Capital, [Louis] Althusser dissected ‘society’ into four main practices: economic, political, ideological and theoretical, the ensemble of which constituted the ‘complex unity of “social practice.”’ Each practice was said to have three ‘moments’ – raw material, means of production and product ….” [Gregory Elliott. Althusser: The Detour of Theory. Boston, Massachusetts: Brill. 2006. Page 79.]
         “… if to philosophise morally is ‘to reason on the basis of convictions’ ([Louis] Althusser), this does not warrant the conclusion that there are no good or bad reasons [for the Gulf War] that can be characterised as such.… Even if sometimes for bad reasons, the majority of the Left opposed the Gulf War; it was right to do so.” [Gregory Elliott, “A Just War?: The Left and the Moral Gulf.” Radical Philosophy: Philosophical Journal of the Independent Left. Number 61, summer 1992. Pages 10-13.]
         “Conventionally, [Louis] Althusser’s career has been periodized into three main phases, spanning the years 1960–78, from the elaboration, via the revision, to the destruction of ‘structural’ Marxism. At the very least, this requires supplementation by another two periods of reflection and production – one antecedent, the other subsequent, to the standard chronology.” [Gregory Elliott, “Fateful rendezvous: The young Althusser.” Radical Philosophy: Philosophical Journal of the Independent Left. Number 84, July/August 1997. Pages 36-40.]
         “… he [Louis Althusser] not only mounted a critique of ‘historical’ Marxism and Communism but also deployed [Karl] Marx against himself, inducing the anti-humanist and anti-historicist ‘theoretical revolution’ of the Althusserian reconstruction.” [Gregory Elliott, “Ghostlier demarcations: On the posthumous edition of Althusser’s writings.” Radical Philosophy: Philosophical Journal of the Independent Left. Number 90, July/August 1998. Pages 20-32.]
         “[Louis] Althusser’s commonest term for the advent of historical materialism and psychoanalysis alike is surgissement [MP3 audio file], with its sense of ‘sudden appearance’ or ‘springing up.’ However, this has been partially concealed from an Anglophone readership, since the word has hitherto invariably been translated as ‘emergence,’ with its more genetic-evolutionary connotations.” [Gregory Elliott, “The Necessity of Contingency: Some Notes.” Rethinking Marxism. Volume 10, number 3, fall 1998. Pages 74-79.]
         “In order to grasp the particularity of the oeuvre of a [Jean-Paul] Sartre or an [Louis] Althusser, they must be received ‘as they were intended …: as arguments … contributions to a specifically French political debate’ …; they should neither be abstracted from the terms of that debate, nor reduced (with it) to manifestations of underlying social processes.” [Gregory Elliott, “Contentious Commitments: French Intellectuals and Politics.” New Left Review. Series I, number 206, July–August 1994. Pages 110-124.]
         “… [There] was a revolutionary practice of philosophy—simultaneously political intervention in theory and theoretical intervention in politics—to which Althusser referred by the traditional designation of ‘dialectical materialism’. Its role was the defence of the sciences, including historical materialism, against myriad ubiquitous ideologies.” [Gregory Elliott, “The Odyssey of Paul Hirst.” New Left Review. Series I, number 159, September–October 1986. Pages 81-105.]
      4. regulation school or, in French, l’école de la régulation as pronounced in this MP3 audio file (Alain Lipietz as pronounced in this MP3 audio file and others): This perspective, also called regulation theory or the regulation approach, is an offshoot of structural Marxism.
         “First, I could say that we are the rebel sons of [Louis] Althusser. Of course there are some women working on the sociology of labor and the welfare state using the regulation approach, but as macroeconomists, who are primarily men in France, we are the rebel sons of Marxism, of Althusserian Marxism. What does that mean?
         “During the sixties there was a fantastic upsurge of Marxism in France, a very particular kind of Marxism, structural Marxism…. The main leaders in this upsurge were Althusser, [Étienne] Balibar, and [Bruno] Bettelheim in economics, and they all paid a lot of attention to the reproduction of the capitalist system. Now, the first thesis of the regulation approach is one we learned directly from the Althusserian school. Society is a network of social relations, and social relations are supposed to reproduce. But Althusserian Marxists insisted so much on this reproduction that they forgot that these relations are contradictory and that they are at any moment subject to crisis. The point is not to be émerveillé, to be astounded, by the reproduction of social relations but to be very anxious about why they are not in crisis.
         “Our approach asks instead how can there be regular reproduction, given the contradictory character of social relations? In fact, that’s exactly the meaning we give to regulation. We ask how, despite and through the contradictory character of relations, a unity of relations is reproduced. Of course, we became still more interested in this question when the world crisis started in the early 1970s.”
         [Alain Lipietz, “Rebel Sons: The Regulation School.” Alain Lipietz interviewed by Jane Jenson. French Politics and Society. Volume 5, number 4, September 1987. Pages 17-26.]
         “In the regulation approach, a model of capitalist development permits a relatively stable path of capitalist accumulation, despite the contradictions of its social relations, for a period of time. Such a model may be analysed as follows:
         • “A technological paradigm describes how waged-work is organised.
         • “A regime of accumulation is the stable structure of effective social demand that allows for the smooth realisation (selling) of capitalist supply, and the orienting of profits to new investments.
         • “A mode of regulation is the set of institutions and routines inducing agents to act in accordance with the regime.
         • “An international configuration describes the compatibility between the various national socioeconomic formations following their various models and exchanging of goods and capital on the world market.”
         [Alain Lipietz, “Fears and hopes: The crisis of the liberal productivist model and its green alternative.” Capital & Class. Volume 37, number 1, 2013. Pages 127-141.]
         “The regulation theory is to be understood first as an amendment to structural approaches. But instead of stressing the permanence of structures, and evaluating their effects on the behaviour of agents, one instead questions the very stability of structures. How are structures, despite their contradictory characters, reproduced through the a priori divergent expectations, interests and actions of economic agents? The answer can be found in an analysis of the habits and institutional forms which induce or force agents to behave in ways which are not antagonistic to the reproduction of structures. This unity of ‘rules of the game’ and procedures of resolution varies, in time and space, so that structures ‘function’ in different ways, which are relatively stable between crises. This method of functioning is called ‘the regime of accumulation.’” [Georges Benko and Alain Lipietz, “From the regulation of space to the space of regulation.” GeoJournal. Volume 44, number 4, 1998. Pages 275-281.]
         “What do we mean by ‘regulation’ (of social relations)? To be fair we must warn the reader: this will really be clear only when the concept is put to work. A concept is after all only a way to apprehend reality, a tool of our thought: we construct it with a specific objective in mind, with regard to problems we set ourselves. The problems posed at the beginning of our undertaking were a response to the great crisis of capitalism which burst into the open in the 1970s after a long latency period. To understand why things were no longer working required understanding of what had worked, and why. We call ‘regulation of a social relation’ the way in which this relation is reproduced despite and through its conflictual and contradictory character. Thus the notion of regulation can only be understood within a particular schema: relation–reproduction–contradiction–crisis.” [Alain Lipietz and Michel Vale, “Accumulation, Crises, and Ways Out: Some Methodological Reflections on the Concept of ‘Regulation.’” International Journal of Political Economy. Volume 18, number 2, summer 1988. Pages 10-43.]
         “Regulation Theory aims, on a historicist and institutionalist basis and via a middle-range methodology, to explain capitalist development. However, both its theoretical and methodological perspectives are unfit for this purpose. Middle-range methodology prioritises superficial features of reality, fails to implement dialectical abstraction and, consequently, cannot grasp neither the deeper roots not the actual course of historical evolution. Historicism cannot grasp history’s essential determinations and institutionalism autonomises improperly institutions and politics from socio-economic relations. Therefore, Regulation’s multi-factor intermediate concepts have limited explanatory power. Instead of being able to capture both the essential unity and the formal separation of socio-economic relations, they end up with an inordinate juxtaposition of economics, politics etc. The lack of a general-theoretical framework led Regulation from an initial mild structuralism to an equally mild post-structuralism and post-modernism. This journey created further problems to its already unstable theoretical structure, exacerbated its explanatory inefficiency and led to its present crisis of identity. [Stavros D. Mavroudeas, “Regulation Theory: The Road from Creative Marxism to Post-Modern Disintegration.” Abstract. Science & Society. Volume 63, number 3, fall 1999. Pages 310-337. Retrieved on September 26th, 2015.]
         “The Theory of Regulation responds to the belief, widespread today, that orthodox economics has failed to interpret satisfactorily actual patterns of development, past or contemporary, and that, in particular, its tendency to economic determinism prevents it from taking into account in systematic fashion the powerful ways in which historically developed class relations, institutional forms and, more generally, political action have shaped the evolution of capitalist economies. For their part, then, the Regulationists explicitly seek to go beyond the ahistorical verities of neoclassical economics.” [Robert Brenner and Mark Glick, “The Regulation Approach: Theory and History.” New Left Review. Series I, number 188, July–August 1991. Pages 45-119.]
         “The Parisian regulation approach (PRA) is the body of theory which has most fruitfully tackled the task of explaining the dialectical relationship between capitalism’s abstract tendencies and concrete structures. As we shall explore in greater detail below, the PRA represents an effort to generate an intermediate level analysis of capitalist development that, whilst taking the methodological lead from Marx, employs discrete concepts operating at a lower level of abstraction ….” [Brett Heino, “Capitalism, regulation theory and Australian labour law: Towards a new theoretical model.” Capital & Class. Volume 39, number 3, 2015. Pages 453-472.]
      5. theory of the bourgeois state (Joachim Hirsch as pronounced in this MP3 audio file): A politics of economic emancipation.
         “… the state as it exists today is an historical product, an historically determined form of the organization of domination, which, being historical, has its foundation in the manner of social production and reproduction which characterizes the bourgeois relation of production and in the resulting class relations. This means, however, that one cannot make statements about the way in which the state apparatus functions and about the conditions and possibilities of the political management of the system, before one has worked out consistently from the analysis of the basic laws of the social reproduction process what are the conditions for the constitution of the social form of the bourgeois state and the resulting determinants of its functions. The failure to define the social character of the state apparatus – which, however, can be understood only on the basis of an historical-materialist theory of the state leads to the illusion as to the power of the state characteristic of bourgeois political theory, and the latter’s practical failings as well as its explicitly ideological function.
         “… This question of what distinguishes the bourgeois state from all previous forms of the exercise of power and domination, is a question of the specific social form of the state and not of the particular content of its activity. The ‘functions of the state’ cannot be discussed so long as there is a lack of clarity about the character and the conditions for the constitution of the specifically bourgeois form of political domination. Max Weber correctly pointed out that the ‘state’ cannot be defined from the content of its activity and that there was hardly a function ‘which had not been taken in hand at some time by some political association, and, on the other hand, also no function of which one can say that it has ever and always been exclusively performed by those associations which one designates as political or today as states’ …”
         [Joachim Hirsch, “The State Apparatus and Social Reproduction: Elements of a Theory of the Bourgeois State.” State and Capital: A Marxist Debate. John Holloway and Sol Picciotto, editors. London: Edward Arnold (Publishers) Ltd. 1978. Pages 57-58.]
         “Along with the breakdown of the Soviet Union, which itself must be seen as a part of the crisis of ‘Global Fordism,’ the universalization of capitalist production and market structures, growing cultural linkages, and the gradual democratization of political regimes, all seem to aid in the creation of an increasingly more unified world, namely, a civilized ‘world society.’ Nonetheless, this tendency should not be regarded as a linear trajectory free from tensions and conflicts; the inherent contradictions found within the capital relation itself ensure instability. That is to say, the flexibilization of capital reinforces international competition, and, in doing so, simultaneously undermines the existing relationships of power, domination and dependency. One main effect is the end of US hegemony and the pluralization of world capitalist hegemony.” [Joachim Hirsch, “Globalization of Capital, Nation-States and Democracy.” Studies in Political Economy. Volume 54, fall 1997. Pages 39-58.]
         “Joachim Hirsch’s ‘Globalization of Capital, Nation-States and Democracy’ … supplies a welcome departure from mainstream globalization orthodoxy. While his argument is not particularly unconventional, his account combines an analysis of the impact of globalization with a reconceptualization of a politics of emancipation. It is for this reason that his contribution needs to be taken seriously and its theses and arguments need to be examined in a thorough manner.” [Werner Bonefeld, “Globalization and the State: A Note on Joachim Hirsch.” Studies in Political Economy. Volume 58, spring 1999. Pages 161-175.]
      6. structural realism in political science (Kenneth N. Waltz, John J. Mearsheimer, and Jae-wook Jung [Korean, 정재욱, Chŏng-Jae-Uk as pronounced in this MP3 audio file]): The approaches taken by Waltz, Mearsheimer, and Jung are based upon realism, as that concept is generally understood in the field of political science. This type of structural realism focus upon the structural distribution of power.
         “The revolution in Soviet affairs and the end of the Cold War were not brought by democracy, interdependence, or international institutions. Instead the Cold War ended exactly as structural realism led one to expect. As I wrote some years ago, the Cold War ‘is firmly rooted in the structure of postwar international politics and will last as long as that structure endures.’ So it did, and the Cold War ended only when the bipolar structure of the world disappeared.
         “Structural change affects the behavior of states and the outcomes their interactions produce.…
         “Worries about the future do not make cooperation and institution building among nations impossible; they do strongly condition their operation and limit their accomplishment. Liberal institutionalists were right to start their investigations with structural realism.”
         [Kenneth N. Waltz, “Structural Realism after the Cold War.” International Security. Volume 25, number 1, summer 2000. Pages 5-41.]
         “In a structural theory, states are differently placed by their power and differences in placement help to explain both their behavior and their fates. In any political system, the distribution of the unit’s capabilities is a key to explanation. The distribution of power is of special explanatory importance in self-help political systems because the units of the system are not formally differentiated with distinct functions specified as are the parts of hierarchic orders.” [Kenneth N. Waltz, “Realist Thought and Neorealist Theory.” Journal of International Affairs. Volume 33, 1990. Pages 21-38.]
         “… there are a great many writers who argue with greater sincerity that, while classic in its own terms, Waltzian realism has parted company with classical realism; indeed the name ‘neorealism’ implies discontinuity, and was coined (by Richard Ashley in ‘The Poverty of Neorealism’) precisely to make exactly this point – possibly why [Kenneth N.] Waltz himself prefers the term structural realism.” [Chris Brown, “Structural realism, classical realism and human nature.” International Relations. Volume 23, number 2, 2009. Pages 257-270.]
         “This chapter examines a body of realist theories that argue states care deeply about the balance of power and compete among themselves either to gain power at the expense of others or at least to make sure they do not lose power. They do so because the structure of the international system leaves them little choice if they want to survive. This competition for power makes for a dangerous world where states sometimes fight each other. There are, however, important differences among structural realists. In particular, defensive realists argue that structural factors limit how much power states can gain, which works to ameliorate security competition. Offensive realists, on the other hand, maintain that the system’s structure encourages states to maximize their share of world power, to include pursuing hegemony, which tends to intensify security competition.” [John J. Mearsheimer, “Structural Realism.” International Relations Theories: Discipline and Diversity. Timothy Dunne, Milja Kurki, and Steve Smith, editors. Oxford, England, and New York: Oxford University Press. 2007. Page 71.]
         “In particular, structural realism, which emphasizes parsimony over theoretical depth, fits constructivist criticism due to its failure to address the impact of ideas on power politics. Nevertheless, I argue that the constructivist critique (that realism ignores ideational factors by virtue of being rationalist theory) is not entirely true, because various realist theories have divergent assumptions and conceptualizations, allowing realists to escape from the strictures of rationalist theories. All realist theories cannot be placed in a single rationalist paradigm; instead, they must be placed in different paradigms, although they are all branded as realism.” [Jae-wook Jung, “Making Constructive Realism?: A Reassessment of the Role of Ideas in Realist Theory.” The Korean Journal of International Studies. Volume 11, number 1, June 2013. Pages 1-28.]
         “Structural Realism … as a particular focus within realism recognizes a relative hierarchy among the objects of social reality and recognizes structures in the form of relatively durable social relations as being of a potentially higher causal order. This does not mean that structures are pre-existing to social phenomena; in fact, structures are institutionally mediated and historically as well spatially reproduced through both collective and strategic individual action. Still the conceptual nature of structures, institutions and agency is pre-informed by the theory that has analytically conceived them. This means that within a critical–realist perspective several theories referring to the same or cognate concepts should be confronted and brought into dialogue with each other. A theory privileging the analysis of structures in social reality can also serve as a meta-theoretical framework, which sets in a way the borderlines within which particular objects and their relations can be analysed.” [Frank Moulaert and Abid Mehmood, “Analysing Regional Development and Policy: A Structural–Realist Approach.” Regional Studies. Volume 44, number 1, February 2010. Pages 103-118.]
         “Kenneth Waltz’s name is irrevocably associated with the term structure. Waltz’s theory of international politics, as expounded in the 1970s, is a systemic theory, and for that reason a structural theory. His systemic perspective quickly came to be known as structural realism, and Waltz has himself adopted this label. In an act of sublime flattery, one of Waltz’s most strident critics, Alexander Wendt, went so far as to describe constructivism in the field of international relations (IR) ‘as a kind of “structural idealism.”’ In this paper, I suggest that Waltz’s theory also bears describing as a kind of structural idealism, though hardly the kind that Wendt has espoused.” [Nicholas Onuf, “ Structure? What Structure?” International Relations. Volume 23, number 2, 2009. Pages 183-199.]
      7. theory of structural contradictions (William J. Chambliss, Marjorie Sue Zatz, Laurie J. Rodriguez, David E. Barlow, Dan Rothe, and others): The process of law creation, both nationally and internationally, resolves historically specific structural contradictions.
         “… we have elaborated on theory of structural contradictions to account for the creation of law by applying it to the development of criminal law and crime control in Britain and the United States. Our theory stresses the importance of fundamental contradictions in political, economic, and social relations as the starting point for a sociological understanding of law creation. In our theory people struggle to resolve the contradictions by fighting against existing laws (laws supporting colonialism, wage discrimination, or racism, for example), while other people fight to maintain the status quo through the enforcement of existing laws and the creation of new ones. In the process, ideological justifications develop, shift, and change; these ideologies, in turn, become a force of their own, influencing the development of legal institutions which reflect the interplay between material conditions and ideology.
         “Understanding consists of dividing the world into abstract units that we then use to order our observations. Too early, however, we become enamored of our observations and reify them. ‘Society’—an observation of some use in helping us to understanding what is going on—has become an entity for many otherwise perfectly intelligent social scientists. When this happens, we cease asking the right questions and become mired in abstract disputes rather than carrying on with the sine qua non of social scientific inquiry: the description and explanation of social reality.
         “People lie at the root of the social scientific enterprise. Their decisions make up our data. People construct worlds, create conflicts, adjudicate disputes, and make law….
         “But people do not create their reality on a clean canvas. They, like the painter, must fit their creative efforts to the shape and size of their canvas, the paints they have, and the way they have come to see the world they wish to depict. All these things, and more, result from personal experiences (things like social background, socialization in school, family, and peers), but in the long train of history they also result from larger forces that shape our lives….
         “Every historical era and every economic system contain basic contradictions….
         “People are agents of social change embedded in social structures through roles and ideologies.”
         [William J. Chambliss, “The Creation of Criminal Law and Crime Control in Britain and America.” Making Law: The State, the Law, and Structural Contradictions. William J. Chambliss and Marjorie Sue Zatz, editors. Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press. 1993. Pages 36-64.]
         “[William J.] Chambliss’ … model of structural contradictions that envisions law creation as a process aimed at resolving conflicts and dilemmas stemming from underlying contradictions that are historically specific and inherently set in the structure of a particular political, economic, and social structure…. [L]aw evolves in a dialectical manner. As problematic issues are resolved, new issues emerge that drive new ‘solutions’ that only create new ‘contradictions.’
         “Although Chambliss’ model is focused on analyzing law formation within the context of nation-states, it can be turned toward an international society that is composed of a larger political and social structure that contains its own structural contradictions. Changes in the law do not necessarily mean changes in international societal relations, just as changes in the international societal views or relations do not always lead to changes in laws. These then can also produce conflict or further contradictions. The response to conflicts is not only political it is ideological (the promotion of an international system) and structural (within the system of international law). The underlying contradictions of an international society and system of international law remain unresolved. When conflicts occur, newlaws, a newinternational system of justice, or a new international ideology is created to address these conflicts while ignoring the embedded contradictions: existing inter-state relations based on sovereignty and self-rule.”
         [Dan Rothe and Christopher W. Mullins, “The International Criminal Court and United States opposition: A Structural Contradictions Model.” Crime, Law & Social Change. Volume 45, 2006. Pages 201-226.]
         “[William J.] Chambliss … first proferred the theory of structural contradictions to address weaknesses in the structural Marxist perspective, suggesting that criminal justice policy formation can be better perceived through a greater appreciation of the role of the state in the process of law formation. The obligation of the state to address class conflicts within a capitalist economy is reflected in its legislative development. Capitalist and their representatives routinely urge policy enactment corresponding to their interests, while state actors attempt to mollify working class fears of nonrepresentational rule in order to maintain social order and structural stability.
         “… By relating the development, implementation, and application of the guidelines to structural contradictions theory, this research corroborates the premise that business leaders, industrialists, and pro-business lobbyists strive to manipulate the process of law creation to promote their interests over those of labor, the less powerful, and the poor. The state is then obliged to intercede in the conflicts that arise from this practice by addressing and attempting to resolve inter- and intra-class dissension while ensuring that the wealthy and powerful maintain primacy over the policy formation process…. The state must maintain a certain degree of autonomy in order to take actions which may oppose the short-term interests of specific factions within the capitalist class. Thus, capitalist domination of state policy, mitigated by occasional working class victories both tangible and symbolic, assures the continuation of the capitalist economy ….”
         [Laurie J. Rodriguez and David E. Barlow, “Structural contradictions and the United States Sentencing Commission.” Crime, Law and Social Change. Volume 32, number 2, 1999. Pages 169-202.]
      8. generative structuralism (Pierre Bourdieu as pronounced in this MP3 audio file): This perspective—one of the theories of practice—is also called genetic structuralism, constructivist structuralism, or structuralist constructivism.
         “If I had to characterize my work in two words, that is, as is the fashion these days, to label it, I would speak of constructivist structuralism or of structuralist constructivism, taking the word structuralism in a sense very different from the one it has acquired in the Saussurean or Lévi-Straussian tradition. By structuralism or structuralist, I mean that there exist, within the social world itself and not only within symbolic systems (language, myths, etc.), objective structures independent of the consciousness and will of agents, which are capable of guiding and constraining their practices or their representations. By constructivism, I mean that there is a twofold social genesis, on the one hand of the schemes of perception, thought, and action which are constitutive of what I call habitus, and on the other hand of social structures, and particularly of what I call fields and of groups, notably those we ordinarily call social classes.” [Pierre Bourdieu, “Social Space and Symbolic Power.” Sociological Theory. Volume 7, number 1, spring 1989. Pages 14-25.]
         “… an inevitable moment in scientific knowledge – and to bring to light the theory of theory and the theory of practice inscribed (in its practical state) in this mode of knowledge, [is] that we can integrate the gains from it into an adequate science of practices. The critical break with objectivist abstraction ensuing from inquiry into the conditions of possibility, and thereby, into the limits of the objective and objectifying standpoint which grasps practices from outside, as a fait accompli [MP3 audio file, i.e., accomplished fact], instead of constructing their generative principle by situating itself within the very movement of their accomplishment, has no other aim than to make possible a science of the dialectical relations between the objective structures to which the objectivist mode of knowledge gives access and the structured dispositions within which those structures are actualized and which tend to reproduce them.” [Pierre Bourdieu. Outline of a Theory of Practice. Richard Nice, translator. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press. 1977. Page 3.]
         “The true status of kin relationships, principles of structuration of the social world which, as such, always fulfil a political function, is most clearly seen in the different uses which men and women can make of the same field of genealogical relationships, and in particular in their different ‘readings’ and ‘uses’ of genealogically ambiguous kinship ties (which are relatively frequent on account of the narrow area of matrimonial choice).” [Pierre Bourdieu. Outline of a Theory of Practice. Richard Nice, translator. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press. 1977. Page 41.]
         “The specific potency of the explicit statement that brings subjective experiences into the reassuring unanimity of a socially approved and collectively attested sense imposes itself with the authority and necessity of a collective position adopted on data intrinsically amenable to many other structurations.” [Pierre Bourdieu. Outline of a Theory of Practice. Richard Nice, translator. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press. 1977. Page 167.]
         “If it is true that the relation an individual maintains with the School and with the culture it transmits is more or less ‘effortless,’ ‘brilliant,’ ‘natural,’ ‘laboured,’ ‘tense’ or ‘dramatic,’ according to the probability of his survival in the system, and if it is also the case that in their verdicts the School and ‘society’ take as much account of the relation to culture as of culture, then it is clear how much remains unintelligible until one goes to the principle underlying the production of the most durable academic and social differences, the habitus – the generative, unifying principle of conducts and opinions which is also their explanatory principle, since at every moment of an educational or intellectual biography it tends to reproduce the system of objective conditions of which it is the product.” [Pierre Bourdieu and Jean-Claude Passeron. Reproduction: In Education, Society and Culture. Richard Nice, translator. Newbury Park (now in Thousand Oaks), California: SAGE Publications, Inc. 1990. Page 161.]
         “The reading of Sentimental Education [the French-language novel, L’Éducation sentimentale, by Gustave Flaubert] is more than a simple preamble aiming to prepare the reader to enter into a sociological analysis of the social world in which it was produced and which it brings to light. It requires the interrogation of the particular social conditions which are at the origin of Flaubert’s special lucidity, and also the limits of that lucidity. Only an analysis of the genesis of the literary field in which the Flaubertian project was constituted can lead to a real understanding of both the generative formula at the core of the book and Flaubert’s craftsmanship in putting it to work [fa mettre en oeuvre], objectifying in one fell swoop this generative structure and the social structure of which it is the product.” [Pierre Bourdieu. The Rules of Art: Genesis and Structure of the Literary Field. Susan Emanuel, translator. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press. 1995. Pages 47-48.]
         “How many times, to sum up some ‘work’ or other destined to take its place for a few weeks on the bestseller list, do you not find that all you need to know is that its roots lie in a quarrel between some petty media masters about the end of ‘structuralism,’ the return of the ‘subject’ or the threat of cultural relativism, the nth version of a challenge to the social sciences?” [Pierre Bourdieu. Political Interventions: Social science and political action. London and New York: Verso imprint of New Left Books. 2008. Page 192.]
         “… how … is … [the] work [by Pierre Bourdieu] to be summarised? His own most recent characterisation is to describe his project as ‘genetic structuralism,’ the attempt to understand how Objective, supra-individual social reality (cultural and institutional social structure) and the internalised ‘subjective’ mental worlds of individuals as cultural beings and social actors are inextricably bound up together, each being a contributor to—and, indeed, an aspect of—the other. This is Bourdieu’s place in the debate on structure and agency.
         “Another way of looking at Bourdieu’s work is to return to his roots as a philosopher. Looked at from that perspective, his research activity is ‘fieldwork in philosophy.’”
         [Richard Jenkins. Pierre Bourdieu. London and New York: Routledge imprint of Taylor & Francis Group, an Informa PLC business. 2006. Page 8.]
         “One characterisation of [Pierre] Bourdieu’s intellectual trajectory might point to his initial rejection of authoritarian Marxism and existentialism, followed by a further, longer-term move away from structuralism—although he arguably never deserted it altogether—toward his own theoretical and epistemological synthesis of [Karl] Marx, [Max] Weber, [David ‘Émile’] Durkheim, and [symbolic] interactionism. This synthesis involved a rejection of analytical models that invoked rules supposedly governing behaviour, and an exploration of the generation and pursuit of strategies.” [Richard Jenkins, “Bourdieu, Pierre.” Encyclopedia of Social Theory. George Ritzer, editor. Thousand Oaks, California: SAGE Publications, Inc. 2005. Pages 67-72.]
         “According to [Pierre] Bourdieu, sociologists must not be simply satisfied with the description of how agents’ self-understanding of their institution and society is displayed in their interaction. Rather, they must go beyond the self-understanding of the agents and should offer a critique of current practice so that the social agents can liberate themselves from the grip of the legitimated social classification. Underlying such a conception of the relationship of theory to practice is the ‘Hegelian dialectic’ in which the so-called ‘labor of the negative’ plays a pivotal role in the transformation of the practice in question.” [Kyung-Man Kim, “Can Bourdieu’s Critical Theory Liberate Us From the Symbolic Violence?” Cultural Studies ↔ Critical Methodologies. Volume 4, number 3, 2004. Pages 362-376.]
         “Pierre Bourdieu is now regarded as one of the foremost social philosophers of the twentieth century. Born in a small village in the French Pyrenees, his extraordinary academic trajectory took him to the leading academic training schools of Paris. Eventually, he was nominated as ‘Chair’ at the Collège de France, that most prestigious institution which groups together fifty-two leading French academics, philosophers and scientists.” [Michael Grenfell, “Introduction.” Pierre Bourdieu: Key Concepts. Michael Grenfell, editor. Durham, England: Acumen. 2008. Pages 1-6.]
         “I argue that [Pierre] Bourdieu’s approach highlights the objectifying relation between subjects and objects of study at the expense of bypassing knowledge and the epistemological gains its structuring may enable. In short, Bourdieu’s emphasis on the objectifying relation of knowledge contributes greatly to notions of reflexivity but comprises an objectifying reflexivity rather than an epistemic reflexivity. Thus, he highlighted something of great significance and pointed the way; what is now required is to continue his work in the direction he has shown and so fully realise its potential.” [Karl Maton, “Pierre Bourdieu and the Epistemic Conditions of Social Scientific Knowledge.” Space & Culture. Volume 6, number 1, February 2003. Pages 52-65.]
         “The first theory I address is Pierre Bourdieu’s practice theory, because it offers perhaps the clearest opposition to the social psychologist’s conceptualization of discrete, individual categories called attitudes that drive behavior. Bourdieu had a background in philosophy …, and this contributed to his eagerness and aptitude in stepping back from individual action to take a broader and more critical view of the human subject.” [James A. Shaw, “Reflexivity and the ‘Acting Subject’: Conceptualizing the Unit of Analysis in Qualitative Health Research.” Qualitative Health Research. Volume 26, number 13, November 2016. Pages 1735-1744.]
         “But what questions did Bourdieu pose on the subject of history? Are they the same as those asked by social historians? Yes and no. I think history had a double function for him. It was, first of all, the principal tool of that ‘reflexive criticism’ through which thinkers could become aware of the specificity—not to say the subjectivity—of the viewpoint of any observer of society, and of any discipline claiming to be a ‘social science.’ Every researcher who tries to understand the social world does so on the basis of what Bourdieu calls ‘objectivist presuppositions,’ the only ones that allow us to judge the veracity of our observations, to legitimate our methodology, to justify our generalizations. These presuppositions took on a particular importance in the eyes of a sociologist like Bourdieu, for whom scientific theory ‘reveals itself only in the empirical work in which it is realized.’” [Eric Hobsbawm, “Pierre Bourdieu: Critical Sociology and Social History.” New Left Review. Series II, number 101. September–October 2016. Pages 37-47.]
      9. critique of the judgment of taste (Pierre Bourdieu): He develops a sociological approach to the subject of taste.
         “Sociology is rarely more akin to social psychoanalysis than when it confronts an object like taste, one of the most vital stakes in the struggles fought in the field of the dominant class and the field of cultural production. This is not only because the judgement of taste is the supreme manifestation of the discernment which, by reconciling reason and sensibility, the pedant who understands without feeling and the mondain [worldly or, in effect, mundane] who enjoys without understanding, defines the accomplished individual.…
         “Here the sociologist finds himself in the area par excellence of the denial of the social. It is not sufficient to overcome the initial self-evident appearances, in other words, to relate taste, the uncreated source of all ‘creation,’ to the social conditions of which it is the product, knowing full well that the very same people who strive to repress the clear relation between taste and education, between culture as the state of that which is cultivated and culture as the ptocess of cultivating, will be amazed that anyone should expend so much effort in scientifically proving that self-evident fact. He must also question that relationship, which only appears to be self-explanatory, and unravel the paradox whereby the relationship with educational capital is just as strong in areas which the educational system does not teach. And he must do this without ever being able to appeal unconditionally to the positivistic arbitration of what are called facts.”
         [Pierre Bourdieu. Distinction: A Social Critique of the Judgement of Taste. Richard Nice, translator. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press. 1984. Pages 11-12.]
      10. Eurocommunism (Nicos Poulantzas [Greek/Hellēniká, Νίκος Πουλαντζάς, Níkos Poulantzás as pronounced in this MP3 audio file] and others): This Althusserian tradition, which includes parts of the SÝRIZA (Greek/Hellēniká, ΣΎΡΙΖΑ) or SYRIZA (Greek/Hellēniká, ΣΥΡΙΖΑ) coalition in Greece, was also influenced by Antonio Gramsci. SÝRIZA or SYRIZA (MP3 audio file) is an acronym for Synaspismós Rizospastikḗs Aristerás (Greek/Hellēniká, Συνασπισμός Ριζοσπαστικής Αριστεράς), radical-left coalition.
          “Nicos Poulantzas, writing from 1968 until the mid 1980s was considered as the preserver of Althusserian thought in Europe. Poulantzas soon moved into the emerging Eurocommunist tradition. By the 1980s he was writing openly reformist books and championing the Euro-Communist agenda. A brief look at the origins of Eurocommunism might help matters here. It marked the beginning of final evolution of Stalinism as a political movement into social democracy.” [Simon Hardy. Structuralist Marxism. Retrieved on August 16th, 2015.]
          “… it is important to understand that Althusser was an important figure to Eurocommunism, and a vocal critic of the Left.” [Gussel Sprouts, “Communism is the Ascension of Humanity as the Subject of History: A Critique of Althusser and the Affirmation of Marx.” Unity and Struggle. July 30th, 2014. Retrieved on August 16th, 2015.]
          “Syriza comprises a coalition between a Eurocommunist bloc, Synaspismos, which has roots in a breakaway from the Communist Party (KKE) in 1968, and various Maoist and Trotskyist groups.” [Richard Seymour, “The Challenge of SYRIZA.” International Socialist Group. June 7th, 2012. Retrieved on August 16th, 2015.]
          “… an over-rigid epistemological position … [is] one that I shared with [Louis] Althusser at the time. By concentrating the main weight of our attack against empiricism and neo-positivism, whose condensates, in the Marxist tradition, are economism and historicism, we rightly insisted on the specificity of the theoretical process, that of the production of knowledge which, with its own specific structures, occurs in the thought process.” [Nicos Poulantzas, “The Capitalist State: A Reply to Miliband and Laclau.” New Left Review. Series I, number 95, January–February 1976. Pages 63-83.]
          “For Marx, the dictatorship of the proletariat was a notion of applied strategy, serving at most as a signpost. It referred to the class nature of the State and to the necessity of its transformation in the transition to socialism and the process of withering away of the State. Now, although the object to which it referred is still real, the notion has come to play a precise historical role: it obscures the fundamental problem of combining a transformed representative democracy with direct, rank-and-file democracy. It is for these reasons, and not because the notion eventually became identified with Stalinist totalitarianism, that its abandonment is, in my opinion, justified. Even when it took on other meanings, it always retained the historical function in question—both for Lenin, at the beginning of the October Revolution, and, nearer our own time, for [Antonio] Gramsci himself.” [Nicos Poulantzas, “Towards a Democratic Socialism.” New Left Review. Series I, number 109, May–June 1978. Pages 75-87.]
          “… the French Communist Party, one of the most backward of European Communist parties with respect to Eurocommunism, whose recently published theses for its up-coming congress represent, from that point of view, an actual step back from its earlier positions, has abandoned the expression ‘Marxism-Leninism’ to denote its official theory, and replaced it with the expression ‘scientific socialism.’” [Nicos Poulantzas, “Is There a Crisis in Marxism?” The Poulantzas Reader: Marxism, Law and the State. James Martin, editor. London and New York: Verso imprint of New Left Books. 2008. Pages 377-386.]
          “Two problems can be dealt with here. The less important of the two is whether the main resistance organizations of the popular masses, and the Communist Parties in particular, were correct to accept, as they all did do, an alliance with the domestic bourgeoisies, either explicitly formulated or at least de facto, with the precise and limited objective of overthrowing the dictatorships? The answer to this is an incontestable ‘yes.’ To defeat fascism, as [Leon] Trotsky well said, one must make alliance with the devil himself. In point of fact, however, the divergences that arose within the major wing of the resistance came increasingly to bear, not on whether a tactical alliance of this kind should be made, but rather on whether it could be, in other words if this was not just chasing after phantoms. Could the domestic bourgeoisie be an ally, even on this precise and limited objective? Did its interests really lead it to support the overthrow of the regime? The answer to this was very far from dear to everyone involved, but the facts have shown that, in the particular conjuncture in these countries, this was in fact the case.” [Nicos Poulantzas. The Crisis of the Dictatorships. David Fernbach, translator. Atlantic Highlands, New Jersey: Humanities Press. 1976. Pages 59-60.]
          “The Eurocommunist phenomenon should be examined against the background of a wider historical process: the process of sociopolitical adaptation to environmental realities that has been developing—gradually, unevenly and in greatly varying degrees—among communist parties operating in advanced capitalist democracies over the past two decades (although its origins can be traced even further back, in the case of the Italian CP [Communist Party]). And the first and most fundamental characteristic of that gradual, uneven process was the abandonment by these Western communist parties, at first in practice and then increasingly also in theory, of revolutionary Leninism.” [Kevin Devlin, “Eurocommunism: Between East and West.” International Security. Volume 3, number 4, spring 1979. Pages 81-107.]
          “Eurocommunism is [Louis] Althusser’s habitat — that jumble of massive but unorthodox Communist Parties who defy the Soviet Union, discard proletarian dictatorship as an anachronism, drop Leninism from their vocabularies, join bourgeois governments, and, in Italy, hunt down revolutionaries and jail them. From within the French CP [Communist Party] Althusser criticizes much of this, yet he not only has stayed in, but frequently has beaten theoretical retreats through self-criticism which, so far at least, has kept his party membership intact.” [Jasper Collins, “The politics of Louis Althusser: a symposium—Introduction.” Urgent Tasks. Number 4, summer 1978. Pages 8-32.]
          “Focusing on the problem of class rule and the transition to socialism, I shall attempt to present a systematic analysis of the theoretical relationship between [Antonio] Gramsci and Eurocommunism. The most elementary point that I wish to establish is that this relationship is a complex one: it is neither a relationship of one-to-one correspondence, Gramsci being nothing but a precursor of Eurocommunism, nor one of complete discontinuity, Eurocommunism being the negation of Gramsci’s legacy. This complexity is in part due to the fact that Gramsci’s primary theoretical concerns are different from those of the Eurocommunists, reflecting a different historical context, and it is necessary to define these differences in a preliminary fashion in order to set the stage for the comparative analysis that will follow.” [Jonas Pontusson, “Gramsci and Eurocommunism: A Comparative Analysis of Conceptions of Class Rule and Socialist Transition.” Berkeley Journal of Sociology. Volume 24/25, 1980. Pages 185-248.]
      11. poststructuralism or “post-structuralism” (Michel Foucault as pronounced in this MP3 audio file, Jacques Derrida as pronounced in this MP3 audio file, Jean Baudrillard as pronounced in this MP3 audio file, Jacques Lacan as pronounced in this MP3 audio file, Julia Kristeva [Bulgarian Cyrillic, Юлия Кръстева, Ûliâ Krʺsteva as pronounced in this MP3 audio file], Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe as pronounced in this MP3 audio file, Jean-Luc Nancy as pronounced in this MP3 audio file, and many others): This perspective—which developed as a critique, or perhaps an extension, of structuralism—focuses upon the alleged problems associated with attributing independent causal power to structures. Stated in another way, the project of poststructuralism, in its various forms, was undertaken as a reaction to the perceived rigidity of various forms of structuralism, including structural Marxism.
          Notably, several individuals to whom the moniker of “poststructuralist” is frequently attached have rejected it. Foucault, for instance, regarded his area of study as neither poststructuralism nor structuralism. Instead, and this is just a speculation, he might have preferred the designation of discourse analysis.
          “… the major effect of the Panopticon: to induce in the inmate a state of conscious and permanent visibility that assures the automatic functioning of power. So to arrange things that the surveillance is permanent in its effects, even if it is discontinuous in its action; that the perfection of power should tend to render its actual exercise unnecessary; that this architectural apparatus should be a machine for creating and sustaining a power relation independent of the person who exercises it; in short, that the inmates should be caught up in a power situation of which they are themselves the bearers. To achieve this, it is at once too much and too little that the prisoner should be constantly observed by an inspector: too little, for what matters is that he knows himself to be observed; too much, because he has no need in fact of being so. In view of this, [Jeremy] Bentham laid down the principle that power should be visible and unverifiable. Visible: the inmate will constantly have before his eyes the tall outline of the central tower from which he is spied upon. Unverifiable: the inmate must never know whether he is being looked at at any one moment; but he must be sure that he may always be so. In order to make the presence or absence of the inspector unverifiable, so that the prisoners, in their cells, cannot even see a shadow, Bentham envisaged not only Venetian blinds on the windows of the central observation hall, but, on the inside, partitions that intersected the hall at right angles and, in order to pass from one quarter to the other, not doors but zig-zag openings; for the slightest noise, a gleam of light, a brightness in a half-opened door would betray the presence of the guardian. The Panopticon is a machine for dissociating the see/being seen dyad: in the peripheric ring, one is totally seen, without ever seeing; in the central tower, one sees everything without ever being seen.” [Michel Foucault. Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison. Alan Sheridan, translator. New York: Vintage Books imprint of Random House, Inc. 1977. Pages 201-202.]
          “… I’d like to underline the fact that the state’s power (and that’s one of the reasons for its strength) is both an individualizing and a totalizing form of power. Never, I think, in the history of human societies—even in the old Chinese society—has there been such a tricky combination in the same political structures of individualization techniques and of totalization procedures.” [Michel Foucault, “The Subject and Power.” Critical Inquiry. Volume 8, number 4, summer 1982. Pages 777-795.]
          “It is absolutely true that the analysis of the specific structures of those discourses which claim to be and are accepted as true discourse is both interesting and important. Broadly speaking, we could call the analysis of these structures an epistemological analysis. On the other hand, it seemed to me that it would be equally interesting to analyze the conditions and forms of the type of act by which the subject manifests himself when speaking the truth, by which I mean, thinks of himself and is recognized by others as speaking the truth. Rather than analyzing the forms by which a discourse is recognized as true, this would involve analyzing the form in which, in his act of telling the truth, the individual constitutes himself and is constituted by others as a subject of a discourse of truth, the form in which he presents himself to himself and to others as someone who tells the truth, the form of the subject telling the truth. In contrast with the study of epistemological structures, the analysis of this domain could be called the study of ‘alethurgic’ forms. I am using here a word which I commented on last year or two years ago. Etymologically, alethurgy would be the production of truth, the act by which truth is manifested.” [Michel Foucault. The Courage of the Truth: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1983-1984. Frédéric Gros, editor. Graham Burchell, translator. Palgrave Macmillan imprint of St Martin’s Press LLC. 2011. Pages 2-3.]
          “Each visibly distinct part of a plant or an animal is … describable in so far as four series of values are applicable to it. These four values affecting, and determining, any given element or organ are what botanists term its structure. ‘By the structure of a plant’s parts we mean the composition and arrangement of the pieces that make up its body.’ Structure also makes possible the description of what one sees, and this in two ways which are neither contradictory nor mutually exclusive. Number and magnitude can always be assigned by means of a count or a measure; they can therefore be expressed in quantitative terms. Forms and arrangements, on the other hand, must be described by other methods: either by identification with geometrical figures, or by analogies that must all be ‘of the utmost clarity.’ In this way it becomes possible to describe certain fairly complex forms on the basis of their very visible resemblance to the human body, which serves as a sort of reservoir for models of visibility, and acts as a spontaneous link between what one can see and what one can say.” [Michel Foucault. The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences. A translation of Les Mots et les choses. London and New York: Routledge imprint of Taylor & Francis Group, an Informa PLC business. 2005. Pages 146-147.]
          “… it [history] intersects at certain points problems that are met with in other fields – in linguistics, ethnology, economics, literary analysis, and mythology, for example. These problems may, if one so wishes, be labelled structuralism. But only under certain conditions: they do not, of themselves, cover the entire methodological field of history, they occupy only one part of that field – a part that varies in importance with the area and level of analysis; apart from a number of relatively limited cases, they have not been imported from linguistics or ethnology (as is often the case today), but they originated in the field of history itself – more particularly, in that of economic history and as a result of the questions posed by that discipline; lastly, in no way do they authorize us to speak of a structuralism of history, or at least of an attempt to overcome a ‘conflict’ or ‘opposition’ between structure and historical development: it is a long time now since historians uncovered, described, and analysed structures, without ever having occasion to wonder whether they were not allowing the living, fragile, pulsating ‘history’ to slip through their fingers. The structure/development opposition is relevant neither to the definition of the historical field, nor, in all probability, to the definition of a structural method.” [Michel Foucault. The Archaeology of Knowledge and the Discourse on Language. A. M. Sheridan Smith, translator. New York: Pantheon Books. 1972. Page 11.]
          “… when one is reasoning only in order to use one’s reason, when one is reasoning as a reasonable being (and not as a cog in a machine), when one is reasoning as a member of reasonable humanity, then the use of reason must be free and public. Enlightenment is thus not merely the process by which individuals would see their own personal freedom of thought guaranteed. There is Enlightenment when the universal, the free, and the public uses of reason are superimposed on one another.…
          “I have been seeking, on the one hand, to emphasize the extent to which a type of philosophical interrogation—one that simultaneously problematizes man’s relation to the present, man’s historical mode of being, and the constitution of the self as an autonomous subject—is rooted in the Enlightenment. On the other hand, I have been seeking to stress that the thread that may connect us with the Enlightenment is not faithfulness to doctrinal elements, but rather the permanent reactivation of an attitude—that is, of a philosophical ethos that could be described as a permanent critique of our historical era.”
          [Michel Foucault, “What Is Enlightenment?” Catherine Porter, translator. The Foucault Reader: An Introduction to Foucault’s Thought, with Major New Unpublished Material. Paul Rabinow, editor. New York: Pantheon Books. 1984. Pages 32-50.]
          “… logocentric repression is not comprehensible on the basis of the Freudian concept of repression; on the contrary, logocentric repression permits an understanding of how an original and individual repression became possible within the horizon of a culture and a historical structure of belonging.…
          “The necessity of an immense labor of deconstruction of the metaphysical concepts and phrases that are condensed and sedimented within [Sigmund] Freud’s precautions. The metaphysical complications of psychoanalysis and the so-called human (or social) sciences (the concepts of presence, perception, reality, etc.). Linguistic phonologism.
          “The necessity of an explicit question concerning the meaning of presence in general: a comparison of the undertakings of [Martin] Heidegger and of Freud. The epoch of presence, in the Heideggerian sense, and its central support, from [René] Descartes to [Georg Wilhelm Friedrich] Hegel: presence as consciousness, self-presence conceived within the opposition of consciousness to unconsciousness. The concepts of archi-trace and of différance: why they are neither Freudian nor Heideggerian.”
          [Jacques Derrida. Writing and Difference. Alan Bass, translator. London and New York: Routledge imprint of Taylor & Francis Group, an Informa PLC business. 2005. Page 248.]
          “Here we have the tower of Babel: each item speaks its own idiom. Yet at the same time, through calculated differences and combinatorial variations, serial production demarcates significations, establishes a repertoire and creates a lexicon of forms and colors in which recurrent modalities of ‘speech’ can be expressed: nevertheless, is this language? This immense paradigm lacks a true syntax. It neither has the rigorous syntax of the technological level, nor the loose syntax of needs: floating from one to the other like an extensive repertoire, reduced, at the level of the quotidian, to an immense combinatorial matrix of types and models, where incoherent needs are distributed (ventiler) without any reciprocal structuration occurring. Needs disappear into products which have a greater degree of coherence.” [Jean Baudrillard, “The System of Objects.” Jean Baudrillard: Selected Writings. Mark Poster, editor. Palo Alto, California: Stanford University Press. 2002. Pages 10-28.]
          “You know the nonsense they’ve come up with now. There is structure, and there is history. The people they’ve put in the ‘structure’ category, which includes me — it wasn’t me who put me there, they put me there, just like that — supposedly spit on history. That’s absurd. There can obviously be no structure without reference to history. But first, you have to know what you are talking about when you talk about history. I will try to tell you something about it.
          “It is always difficult to pin down what is going on in the field of what we are really cogitating without any misunderstandings. The words have often been surrounded by all sorts of confusion for a little too long. That is what now allows some people to use historical reduction, which has nothing to do with historical rights, so to speak, with the function of history. So they come out with questions that have to do with, not structure, but what they call structuralism.”
          [Jacques Lacan. My Teaching. David Macey, translator. London and New York: Verso imprint of New Left Books. 2008. Pages 68-69.]
          “… let me put forth some advice about structure, which is the subject matter of our meeting. It may happen that there will be mistakes, confusion, more and more approximative uses of this notion, and I think that soon there will be some sort of fad about this word. For me it is different because I have used this term for a very long time—since the beginning of my teaching. The reason why something about my position is not better known is that I addressed myself only to a very special audience, namely one of psychoanalysts. Here there are some very peculiar difficulties, because psychoanalysts really know something of what I was talking to them about and that this thing is a particularly difficult thing to cope with for anybody who practises psychoanalysis. The subject is not a simple thing for the psychoanalysts who have something to do with the subject proper.” [Jacques Lacan, “Of Structure as an Inmixing of an Otherness Prerequisite to Any Subject Whatever.” The Structuralist Controversy: The Languages of Criticism and the Sciences of Man. Richard Macksey and Eugenio Donato, editors. Baltimore, Maryland: The Johns Hopkins University Press. 1972. Pages 186-195.]
          “If the abject is already a wellspring of sign for a non-object, on the edges of primal repression, one can understand its skirting the somatic symptom on the one hand and sublimation on the other. The symptom: a language that gives up, a structure within the body, a nonassimilable alien, a monster, a tumor, a cancer that the listening devices of the unconscious do not hear, for its strayed subject is huddled outside the paths of desire. Sublimation, on the contrary, is nothing else than the possibility of naming the prenominal, the pre-objectal, which are in fact only a trans-nominal, a trans-objectal. In the symptom, the abject permeates me, I become abject. Through sublimation, I keep it under control. The abject is edged with the sublime. It is not the same moment on the journey, but the same subject and speech bring them into being.” [Julia Kristeva. Powers of Horror: An Essay on Abjection. Leon S. Roudiez, translator. New York: Columbia University Press. 1982. Page 11.]
          “Let us not seek to solidify, to turn the otherness of the foreigner into a thing. Let us merely touch it, brush by it, without giving it a permanent structure. Simply sketching out its perpetual motion through some of its variegated aspects spread out before our eyes today, through some of its former, changing representations scattered throughout history. Let us also lighten that otherness by constantly coming back to it—but more and more swiftly. Let us escape its hatred, its burden, fleeing them not through leveling and forgetting, but through the harmonious repetition of the differences it implies and spreads.” [Julia Kristeva. Strangers to Ourselves. Leon S. Roudiez, translator. New York: Columbia University Press. 1991. Page 3.]
          “If the efficacy of scientific approach in ‘human’ sciences has always been challenged, it is all the more striking that such a challenge should for the first time be issued on the very level of the structures being studied – structures supposedly answerable to a logic other than scientific. What would be involved is the logic of language (and all the more so, of poetic language) that ‘writing’ has had the virtue of bringing to light. I have in mind that particular literary practice in which the elaboration of poetic meaning emerges as tangible, dynamic gram. Confronted with this situation, then, literary semiotics can either abstain and remain silent, or persist in its efforts to elaborate a model that would be isomorphic to this other logic; that is, isomorphic to the elaboration of poetic meaning, a concern of primary importance to contemporary semiotics.” [Julia Kristeva. The Kristeva Reader. Toril Moi, editor. Multiple translators. New York: Columbia University Press. 1986. Page 35.]
          “Power is conceived [by Michel Foucault] to be relational, something that is exercised from a variety of points in the social body, rather than something that is ‘acquired, seized, or shared.’ Relations of power are not considered to be secondary to other relationships ‘(economic processes, knowledge relationships, sexual relations) but are immanent in the latter.’ Furthermore, power is not conceived to be imposed from the apex of a social hierarchy, nor derived from a foundational binary opposition between a ruling and ruled class, rather it operates in a capillary fashion from below. Thus confrontations in the form of massive binary divisions constitute merely a temporary and exceptional state of accumulation of the multiplicity of cleavages and resistances arising from the plurality of power relations in the social body.” [Barry Smart. Michel Foucault. Revised edition. London and New York: Routledge imprint of Taylor & Francis Group, an Informa PLC business. 2004. Page 119.]
          “Deconstruction in large part means facing the contradiction rather than trying to eliminate it. All concepts are contradictory for [Jacques] Derrida. If sentences in language are indeterminate, and therefore contradictory, then the concept of the sentence is contradictory, since the sentence must both be what conveys meaning and what cannot convey meaning. The sentence cannot be isolated as a meaning unit from its context, so that is does not exist in a stable self-identical way, as the same sentence may have different meanings in different contexts. The sentence must both be what it is and not what it is. The same applies to all aspects of meaning.” [Barry Stocker. Routledge Philosophy GuideBook to Derrida on Deconstruction. London and New York: Routledge imprint of Taylor & Francis Group, an Informa PLC business. 2006. Page 67.]
          “Once binary thinking becomes dominant it is difficult to think of otherness or difference as anything other than a relation of binary opposition to what is known or similar. The linear calculation of time produces the ‘cyclical’ as no more than its binary opposition: as imaginary, phantasmal, irrational or lost rather than real. Or, to take the example of religion, the ritual practices of polytheist or ‘pagan’ religions are not opposed to monotheistic religious codes but come to seem so from the perspective of the latter. Other binary oppositions – the opposition of male and female, of good and evil, order and disorder, individual and society, workers and their labour – flow from the separation of life and death, [Jean] Baudrillard asserts. The production of the binary opposition of life and death is nothing less than the foundation of Western civilisation.” [William Pawlett. Jean Baudrillard: Against Banality. London and New York: Routledge imprint of Taylor & Francis Group, an Informa PLC business. 2007. Page 56.]
          “The question of the continuing value of varying kinds of materialism is central to much work in Continental philosophy today. The materialist legacy in political philosophy continues to provide a rich source for the analysis of contemporary capitalism, while Slavoj Žižek, Adrian Johnston and others are seeking to ‘materialise’ the legacy of German idealism through an attention to the psychoanalytic theory of Jacques Lacan, and in particular through his theory of the subject. This paper argues, through a reading of a number of early texts by Lacan, that it is only through an attention to the conceptual genesis of the category of the Real that the materialist potential of Lacanian theory may be fully realised. The Real, I argue, is to be taken not as something extra-Symbolic, but as an overdetermining function that is materialised only through the particularity of the Symbolic and Imaginary registers. Further, I argue that it is through Lacan’s complex philosophy of language, and especially through his insistence on the withdrawal of signifiers from networks of relation, that the Real becomes material, as constitutive as it is disruptive of the subject.” [Tom Eyers, “Lacanian Materialism and the Question of the Real.” Cosmos and History: The Journal of Natural and Social Philosophy. Volume 7, number 1, 2011. Pages 155-166.]
          “… it is not difficult to arrive at the derivatives of … [certain] romantic texts, which still delimit our horizon. From the idea of a possible formalization of literature (or of cultural productions in general) to the use of linguistic models (and a model based on the principle of the auto-structuration of language); from an analytic approach to works based on the hypothesis of auto-engendering to the aggravation of the problematic of a subject permanently rejecting subjectivism (that of inspiration, for example, or the ineffable, or the function of the author, etc.); from this problematic of the (speaking or writing) subject to a general theory of the historical or social subject; from a belief that the work’s conditions of production or fabrication are inscribed within it to the thesis of a dissolution of all processes of production in the abyss of the subject. In short, we ourselves are implicated in all that determines both literature as auto-critique and criticism as literature. Our own image comes back to us from the mirror of the literary absolute. And the massive truth flung back at us is that we have not left the era of the Subject.” [Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe and Jean-Luc Nancy. The Literary Absolute: The Theory of Literature in German Romanticism Intersections. Albany, New York: State University of New York Press. 1988. Page 16.]
          “Poststructuralist inquiry requires we notice how the ‘signs’ of ‘woman’ and ‘feminine’ function as general limits in our discourse and institutions …. Poststructuralist insights of HRD [human resource development] would thus mean unravelling the ways in which the language of HRD and dominant understandings of HRD themes produced gendered effects, and how HRD research is underpinned by masculinist constructions of knowledge. The way in which women predominantly occupy HR [human resources] and personal development may communicate strong signifiers of a feminized profession, and associated ‘lesser than’ status.” [Beverly Dawn Metcalfe, “A feminist poststructuralist analysis of HRD: why bodies, power and reflexivity matter.” Human Resource Development International. Volume 11, number 5, November 2008. Pages 447-463.]
      12. Ljubljana Lacanian School (Slavoj Žižek, Rastko Močnik as pronounced in this MP3 audio file, Miran Božovič as pronounced in this MP3 audio file, and others): The Ljubljana (MP3 audio file) Lacanian (MP3 audio file) School (Slovenian, Ljubljanska lacanovska šola) has focused upon Marxism, poststructuralism, and, in particular, the poststructuralist, or discursive (“discoursive”), perspective on Freudian psychoanalysis psychoanalytic developed by Jacques Lacan.
          “[Jacques] Lacan’s point is … that [Martin] Heidegger misses the properly traumatic impact of the very ‘passivity’ of being caught in language, the tension between human animal and language: there is ‘subject’ because the human animal doesn’t ‘fit’ language, the Lacanian ‘subject’ is the tortured, mutilated, subject. Insofar as the status of the Lacanian subject is real, i.e., insofar as the real Thing is ultimately (the impossible core of) the subject itself, one should apply to the subject Lacan’s definition of the Thing as ‘that /part, aspect/ of the real which suffers from the signifier’ – the most elementary dimension of the subject is not activity, but passivity, enduring.” [Slavoj Žižek, “Language, Violence and Non-Violence.” International Journal of Žižek Studies. Volume 2, number 3. Pages 1-12.]
          “If the Freudian name for the ‘unknown knowns’ is the Unconscious, the Freudian name for the ‘unknown unknowns’ is trauma, the violent intrusion of something radically unexpected, something the subject was absolutely not ready for, something the subject cannot integrate in any way. [Catherine] Malabou proposed a critical reformulation of psychoanalysis along these lines; her starting point is the delicate echoing between internal and external Real in psychoanalysis: for [Sigmund] Freud and [Jacques] Lacan, external shocks, brutal unexpected encounters or intrusions, due their properly traumatic impact to the way they touch a pre-existing traumatic ‘psychic reality.’” [Slavoj Žižek, “Descartes and the Post-Traumatic Subject.” Filozofski vestnik. Volume XXIX, number 2. September. Pages 9-29.]
          “As Jacques Lacan indicated, the lack of tragedy proper in the modern condition renders this condition even more horrifying: the fact is that, in spite of all the horrors of the Gulag and the Holocaust, from capitalism onwards there are no longer tragedies proper—the victims in concentration camps or the victims of the Stalinist show trials were not in a properly tragic predicament, their situation was not without comic or at least ridiculous aspects, and, for that reason, are all the more horrifying—there is a horror so deep that it can no longer be ‘sublimated’ into tragic dignity, and is, for that reason, approachable only through an eerie imitation/doubling of the parody itself.” [Slavoj Žižek, “When the Party Commits Suicide.” New Left Review. Series 1, number 238, November–December 1999. Pages 26-47.]
          “Prosopopoeia [Ancient Greek/Archaía Hellēniká, προσωποποιία, prosōpopoiía] is defined as ‘a figure of speech in which an absent or imaginary person is represented as speaking or acting:’ The attribution of speech to an entity commonly perceived to be unable to speak (nature, the commodity, truth itself …) is for [Jacques] Lacan the condition of speech as such, not only its secondary complication. Does not Lacan’s distinction between the ‘subject of the enunciation’ and the ‘subject of the enunciated’ point in this direction?” [Slavoj Žižek. Less than Nothing: Hegel and the Shadow of Dialectical Materialism. Brooklyn, New York: Verso imprint of New Left Books. 2012. Page 515.]
          “‘Psychoanalytic essentialism’ is paradoxical in so far as it is precisely psychoanalysis – at least in its Lacanian reading – which presents the real break with essentialist logic. That is to say, Lacanian psychoanalysis goes a decisive step further than the usual ‘post-Marxist’ anti-essentialism affirming the irreducible plutality of particular struggles – in other words, demonstrating how their articulation into a series of equivalences depends always on the radical contingency of the social-historical process: it enables us to grasp this plurality itself as a multitude of responses to the same impossible-real kernel.” [Slavoj Žižek. The Sublime Object of Ideology. London and New York: Verso imprint of New Left Books. 2008. Page xxvii.]
          “The vulgar, egotistical bourgeois everyday life is the actuality of freedom, equality and brotherhood; freedom of free trade, formal equality in the eyes of law, etc. The illusion proper to the ‘vanishing mediators’ – Protestants, Jacobins – is precisely that of the Hegelian ‘beautiful soul.’ They refuse to acknowledge in the corrupted reality over which they lament the ultimate consequence of their own act, i.e., as Lacan would put it, their own message in its true, inverted form.” [Slavoj Žižek, “Why Should a Dialectician Learn to Count to Four?” Radical Philosophy: Philosophical Journal of the Independent Left. Number 58, summer 1991. Pages 3-9.]
          “The key feature of metapolitics is that, to put it in the terms of Jacques Lacan’s matrix of four discourses, the place of the agent is occupied by knowledge. Marx presented his position as scientific materialism, which is to say that metapolitics is a politics that legitimizes itself by means of a direct reference to the scientific status of its knowledge. (It is this knowledge that enables metapolitics to draw a line of distinction between those immersed in politico-ideological illusions and the party, which grounds its historical intervention in knowledge of effective socioeconomic processes.)” [Slavoj Žižek, “A Leftist Plea for ‘Eurocentrism.’” Critical Inquiry. Volume 24, number 4, summer 1998. Pages 988-1009.]
          “Maybe we can use … the Shakespearean triad of lunatic, lover and poet as a tool to propose a classification of events based on the Lacanian triad of Imaginary, Symbolic and Real: a lunatic dwells in the imaginary dimension, confusing reality and imagination; a lover identifies the beloved person with the absolute Thing in a symbolic short-circuit between signifier and signified which nonetheless maintains the gap that for ever separates them (the lover knows very well that, in reality, his/ her beloved is an ordinary person with all his or her failures and weaknesses); a poet makes a phenomenon emerge against the background of the void of the Real.” [Slavoj Žižek. Event: A Philosophical Journey Through A Concept. Brooklyn, New York: Melville House Publishing. 2014. Kindle edition.]
          “As [Jacques] Lacan pointed out apropos of his deployment of the structural homology between surplus-value and surplus-enjoyment, what if the surplus-value does not simply hijack a preexisting relational field of affects? What if what appears an obstacle is effectively a positive condition of possibility, the element that triggers and propels the explosion of affective productivity? What if, consequently, one should precisely throw out the baby with the bath water and renounce the very notion of erratic affective productivity as the libidinal support of revolutionary activity?” [Slavoj Žižek, “The Ongoing ‘Soft Revolution.’” Critical Inquiry. Volume 30, number 2, winter 2004. Pages 292-323.]
          “… [An] ideological presupposition, (i.e., the pretense that language is not a historical product of class struggle) paradoxically becomes the epistemological precondition of the constitution of linguistics as a science. Its function may be viewed as analogous to the role of the notion of ‘abstract labor’ in political economy: abstract labor, as a historically produced abstraction, is ‘factually’ true only of the labor-process in its capitalist mode, but can nevertheless be used as the key to an analysis of all social formations. Accordingly, it became the basic notion upon which classical political economy was able to establish itself as science.” [Rastko Mǒcnik, “Toward a Materialist Concept of Literature.” Cultural Critique. Number 4, autumn 1986. Pages 171-189.]
          “Let us briefly recall some typical difficulties concerning the dead human body in medieval philosophy. If the rational soul is the only substantial form of the human body, then after death, that is, after the separation of body from soul, Christ’s body can no longer be called his. If, however, the dead body on the cross cannot be said to be identical with Christ's body, then it cannot be a fit object of worship.” [Rastko Mǒcnik, “Auto-Iconicity and Its Vicissitudes: Bentham and Plato.” Helios. Volume 31, number 1–2, 2004. Pages 223-245.]
          “Prisoners in the panopticon would wear masks, the grimaces of the masks expressing the gravity of their offenses: the prisoners would thus stage their own guilt. They would wear these masks on ‘the only occasion on which their eyes will have to encounter the public eye),’ that is, during the divine service attended by out side worshippers. Since on this occasion the prisoners would know that they were exposed to public gaze, this ‘perpetual pillory’ could in time harden them and render them insensitive, ultimately imped ing their rehabilitation.” [Miran Božovič, “‘An Utterly Dark Spot’: The Fiction of God in Bentham’s Panopticon.” Qui Parle. Volume 8, number 2, spring/summer 1995. Pages 83-108.]
          “One of the case-studies in the famous Hippocratic Corpus, or, more precisely, the treatise entitled Airs, Waters, Places, attempts to explain an unusual malady called anandria, meaning literally unmanliness or want of manhood, which was widely spread among the Scythians, a nomadic people who lived somewhere in the surroundings of what was once Lake Maeotis, now The Sea of Azov …. The author—it cannot be determined who the author is, Hippocrates or one of his disciples—begins by stating that a great number of men among the Scythians were like eunuchs, i.e., impotent; the impotent Scythians—as a rule, only rich and never poor Scythians—were even transvestites, for they dressed as women, and behaved and talked like women. The Scythians themselves saw this disease as a divine visitation; this is because, they supposed, they had in one way or another sinned against the gods. They believed it was a disease of supernatural, divine origin.” [Miran Božovič, “The God of the Transvesites.” The American Journal of Semiotics. Volume 9 number 2–3, 1992. Pages 91-103.]
          “[Slavoj] Žižek’s intervention proposes that the unconscious subject is the unruly by-product of ideological interpellation. He combines this reconstructed theory of ideology with Hegelian philosophy, to create a remarkable social theory based in ‘Lacanian dialectics’ …. At the same time, he makes strenuous efforts to escape the metaphysical implications of the historicist problematic…. Žižek’s intervention identifies the missing link in post-Althusserian theories of ideology—the unconscious subject as the unruly by-product of ideological interpellation—while making strenuous efforts to escape the gravitational field of the historicist problematic of postmarxian discourse analysis.” [Geoff Boucher. The Charmed Circle of Ideology: A Critique of Lacau & Mouffe, Butler & Žižek. Open access and Creative Commons. Melbourne, Victoria, Australia: re.press. 2008. Page 165.]
          “Jacques Lacan (1901-1981) was a French psychoanalyst who controversially rewrote the ideas of the founder of psychoanalysis, Sigmund Freud (1856-1939). Part of that controversy stems from the fact that Lacan’s work is a notoriously tortuous read, full of mind-bending puns, obscure allusion and slippery conceptual interplay. Indeed, it is often said, that you have to understand Lacan before you read his books. As this is just the kind of paradoxical challenge that [Slavoj] Žižek likes, he has taken it upon himself to provide that understanding to Lacanian novices. Part of the remit for many of Žižek’s books is, therefore, to explain Lacan’s theories. In doing so, Žižek has done much to popularize the particular brand of psychoanalysis practised by Lacan.” [Tony Myers. Slavoj Žižek. London and New York: Routledge imprint of Taylor & Francis Group, an Informa PLC business. 2003. Page 19.]
          “… there is a brand of nontraditional psychoanalytic theory that is beginning to make its way into the undergraduate English curriculum: that of French psychoanalyst Jacques Lacan (1901–1981). Lacan’s work is rather abstract, often ambiguous, and almost always difficult to understand. In fact, he claimed that writing about the unconscious should be ambiguous and difficult to understand because the unconscious is itself ambiguous (its manifestations in our dreams, our behavior, and our artistic production, for example, usually have multiple meanings), and the unconscious is difficult to understand. Furthermore, there is a good deal of disagreement among interpreters of Lacan concerning what he actually intended by many of his statements. Finally, Lacan sometimes changed the meanings of some of his key terms over time. Despite these challenges, however, I think we need at least to take an introductory look at some of the main concepts of Lacanian psychoanalysis because these concepts are beginning to show up in students’ writing, and all too often they are being used incorrectly.” [Lois Tyson. Critical Theory Today: A User-Friendly Guide. Second edition. London and New York: Routledge imprint of Taylor & Francis Group, an Informa PLC business. 2006. Page 26.]
          “Language is the key to [Jacques] Lacan, and Lacan’s basic project is to provide a linguistic version of [Sigmund] Freud. There are two major concerns for Lacan: the nature of language and its relationship to the unconscious; the way in which the individual acquires language, the model for which is the fort/da [gone/there] game alluded to earlier. For Lacan, language substitutes a sign for reality, so ‘it is the world of words that creates the world of things.’ The mechanisms involved in this substitution are precisely the same as those which Freud saw as basic to the workings of the unconscious.” [John Bird, “Jacques Lacan – the French Freud?” Radical Philosophy: Philosophical Journal of the Independent Left. Number 30, spring 1982. Pages 7-14.]
          “We wish to make … an application of Eco-Marxism to supplement and inform an approach based on Žižekian theory. Eco-Marxist theory is provided to supply the backdrop from which a lack in nature emerges under current political and economic conditions. [Karl] Marx provides a materialist analysis that outlines a split with nature, a ‘metabolic rift’ that emerges through alienation and commodity fetishism. The potentials for confronting this rift, ‘the traumatic limit of symbolization,’ are explored through [Jacques] Lacan’s concept of the Gaze, and through sightseeing, the potential for recognition (or ignorance) of the indeterminacy of natures is revealed.” [Greg Dash and Carl Cater, “Gazing awry: Reconsidering the Tourist Gaze and natural tourism through a Lacanian–Marxist theoretical framework.” Tourist Studies. Volume 15, number 3, 2015. Pages 267-282.]
          “As [Slavoj] Žižek states, ‘the structure of the universe of commodities and capital in Marx’s Capital is not just of a limited empirical sphere, but a kind of sociotranscendental a priori, the matrix which generates the totality of social and political relations’ …. Thus, Žižek transcodes the Marxist concepts of ‘commodity fetishism’ and ‘class struggle’ into the Lacanian notion of the Real. Where the older Marxist terms have long since been confused with empirical entities like the ‘working class’ and actual commercial goods, the Lacanian Real has the benefit of emphasizing the purely formal, and therefore universal, status of capitalism and its overdetermination of the totality of social relations.” [Kirk Boyle, “The Four Fundamental Concepts of Slavoj Žižek’s Psychoanalytic Marxism.” International Journal of Žižek Studies. Volume 2, number 1, 2008. Pages 1-21.]
          “Through analytic discourse, the subject manifests himself in his gap, namely, in that which causes his desire. Were that not the case, I could not summarize it with a topology that does not involve the same mainspring, the same discourse, but rather a different one, one that is so much purer and that makes so much clearer the fact that there is no genesis except on the basis of discourse. Doesn’t the fact that that topology converges with our own experience, to the extent that it allows us to articulate it, justify what, in what I put forward, is lent support and or-worsened (se s’oupire) by the fact that it never resorts to any substance, never refers to any being, and breaks with everything smacking of philosophy?” [Jacques Lacan. On Feminine Sexuality: The Limits of Love and Knowledge. Bruce Fink, translator. Jacques-Alain Miller, editor. New York: W. W. Norton & Company, Inc. 1999. Page 11.]
          “… an act of communication may give the impression at which theorists too often stop: of allowing in its transmission but a single meaning, as though the highly significant commentary into which he who understands integrates it, could, because unperceived by him who does not understand, be considered null.” [Jacques Lacan and Jeffrey Mehlman, “Seminar on ‘The Purloined Letter.’” Yale French Studies. Number 48, 1972. Pages 39-72.]
          “… [A] dimension arises when something from the imaginary structure of the fantasy is placed in communication with something that normally reaches the level of the message, i.e., the image of the other subject, in the case in which that image is my own ego. Moreover, some authors … note with great precision the necessary correlation between the feeling of the subject’s own body and the strangeness of that which arises in a certain crisis, a certain rupture, when the object as such is attained.” [Jacques Lacan, Jacques-Alain Miller, and James Hulbert, “Desire and the Interpretation of Desire in Hamlet.” Yale French Studies. Number 55/56, 1977. Pages 11-52.]
          “It is in concrete, intersubjective communication (‘evocation’) that man discovers his desire and the law of his being—his place in truth, as Lacan calls it. Man is born to and into language but this does not ensure that he can, or that he will, truly speak, that is to say unfold himself to an other, and discover in the return of the ‘gift’ the true nature of his original gift. The imaginary and the symbolic being close correlates, there is always a possibility of a regression in man to the imaginary mode, with its hankering after the super-real, permanent object. When this happens there is a withdrawal from the open exchange of truth in human discourse, and the word becomes the representation of a petrified thing at the service of the hallucinatory satisfaction of a primal desire.” [Jean Roussel, “Introduction to Jacques Lacan.” New Left Review. Series I, number 51, September–October 1968. Pages 63-70.]
      13. mode of information (Mark Poster): Poster, as a self-defined poststructuralist, develops a critical social theory informed by the work of Michel Foucault. It is critiqued by Kevin Walby using a Marxian perspective on “modes of production.”
          “This paper outlines a theoretical perspective, ‘the mode of information,’ that might be useful for opening new interpretive strategies for critical social theory in relation theory to these new developments [electronic communications].…
          “In this project I also hope to contribute to a reconstruction of critical social theory by bringing poststructuralist theory to bear on the phenomena of electronically mediated communication.…
          “The first obstacle to the constitution of the field of the mode of information is theoretical. I refer to the tendency among social theorists to objectify meanings, to limit words to single meanings, and to treat language as a transparent for action. As an intellectual historian I trace the problem back to its origins.… Within this theoretical economy, electronic communications crease the representational power of language by reducing the spatial distancing of meaning.”
          [Mark Poster, “Words without Things: The Mode of Information.” October. Volume 53, summer 1990. Pages 62-77.]
          “… the mode of information initiates a rethinking of all previous forms of language. Just as for [Karl] Marx the anatomy of apes becomes intelligible only after the evolutionary development of human beings, so we can retrospectively reconstruct the ‘development’ of language from the vantage point of the mode of information. The mode of information undermines the time/space coordinates that have been employed to fix language in various contexts. It thereby opens up an understanding of language and society that has no reference in the grid of Renaissance perspective or in the mimetic realism of Enlightenment reason. Subject no longer stands opposed to object, man to nature, or essence to existence.…
          “In order to make intelligible the ways mode of information generate new structures analysis must turn from the foundational liberalism and Marxism, moving instead to a Foucauldean variant of poststructuralism.”
          [Mark Poster, “Foucault and Data Bases.” Discourse. Volume 12, number 2, spring–summer 1990. Pages 110-127.]
          “The broad purpose of this study is to explore the theoretical conditions for understanding the new configurations of the subject. Important limits of the study must be explicitly stated. The term ‘the mode of information’ is not intended as a totalizing or essentializing category to control or inscribe a figure of the present age. It must be understood in the first instance as multiple: there are many modes of information each with its historical particularities and there are continuities and breaks between modes of information. In this study I do not attempt to generate a formal theory of the field of modes of information. I do not delineate concepts as [Karl] Marx did with the mode of production and as [Max] Weber did with the theory of legitimate authority, in each case specifying and controlling areas of empirical investigation, or providing explanatory models to account for changes from one mode of information to another, or offering periodizing taxonomies. The reason for this theoretical modesty derives from cautions imposed by the theoretical strategies that seemed most appropriate and most suggestive to my study, theoretical strategies that are known as poststructuralist. This book then is a preliminary study that posits in a rudimentary fashion a mode of information in the current situation. It is an experiment that hopes to promote further theoretical development and empirical research.” [Mark Poster. The Mode of Information: Poststructuralism and Social Contexts. Malden, Massachusetts: Polity Press. 1990. Page 23.]
          “In the mode of information, electronically mediated communication has transfigured language and images in startlingly new ways. No rhetoric of realism captures the new communication situation. The sense of being there was figured through powerful framing devices that subverted realism as they enacted doubling message system if ever there were one. First, television coverage of the war gave the impression of newspeople as pants, hurriedly donning their gas masks to the effect that illusion of realism was forced into suspension. In previous World War II, Korea, and Vietnam—newspeople strove voice of the omniscient narrator or Olympian observer, removing themselves as much as possible from presenting to the their plight as that of vulnerable targets of enemy bullets, nades, and artillery fire, from presenting news gathering itself. Not in Iraq. Here the messengers were the messages.” [Mark Poster, “War in the Mode of Information.” Cultural Critique. Number 19, autumn 1991. Pages 217-222.]
          “… we need to account for the role of information machines or media – what I call ‘the mode of information’ – in the process. Such a double strategy of interpretation allows ‘identity’ to emerge as a historical process, one neither naturalized nor universalized within the ideology of liberalism and its insistence on the always already given figure of identity within the individual. The innovation of identity theft as the materialization of identity appears then not as a fall from the grace of interior identity, as some malign feature of new media, but as the potential of every construction of identity, as the dangerous supplement to the positing of identity as the core of the self.” [Mark Poster, “The Secret Self: The case of identity theft.” Cultural Studies. Volume 21, number 1, January 2007. Pages 118-140.]
          “The standard Western notion of machines as tools, with users as subjects and machines as objects, with a utilitarian ethic presumed for the subject and a privilege given to the subject’s intentionality or consciousness—this longstanding framework for fitting tools into culture does not do justice to the complexity of the practice of humans with information machines. Since the introduction of print, each generation has confronted the issue of media, taking as given the media that existed in its youth, and responding variously with anxiety or joy to the placement of new media in society.” [Mark Poster, “Everyday (Virtual) Life.” New Literary History. Volume 33, number 4, autumn 2002. Pages 743-760.]
          “Television, print, and the Internet are institutions, in this sense, different from each other but also ons in that they construct subjects, define identities, position and configure cultural objects. True enough, media do arrangements in the manner of workshops and prisons, but fixed in space and time, at the computer, in front of the television ing or bicycling through city streets or on a subway with an mp3 player or a cell phone. I refer to this configuration tion of the subject as a ‘superpanopticon’ to indicate its modern institutions.” [Mark Poster, “The Information Empire” Comparative Literature Studies. Volume 41, number 3, 2004. Pages 317-334.]
          “The purpose of this paper is not to wade into the historical power struggles and ideological divisions between the various Marxisms. One purpose is, however, to argue for a retrieval of anti-capitalist praxis in critical social theory, which at the outset entails a look at Karl Marx’s criticism of the capitalist mode of production.…
          “For [Mark] Poster there has been a shift of ontological proportions from the mode of production to a mode of information, and this shift encompasses all of the political, economic, and socio-cultural changes that come from the computerization and digitization of the human condition.… I argue Poster’s mode of information thesis needlessly obliterates a focus on modern subject formation processes, suffers from a hi-technological determinism and lacks a theory of struggle.”
          [Kevin Walby, “Mode of Production versus Mode of Information: Marx, Poster, and an Argument for Anti-Capitalist Praxis.” Critical Sociology. Volume 33, issue 5–6, September 2007. Pages 887-912.]
      14. Lacanian–inspired psychoanalytic feminism (Patricia Elliot): Elliot examines a version of feminism inspired by the work of Jacques Lacan.
          “First, it is necessary to point out that Lacanian-inspired psychoanalytic feminism does not deny the existence of socially and historically specific structures oppressive to women which are challenged through the women’s movement. What it does contest is the notion of an uncontaminated psychic space that becomes, or is, the mere repository of oppressive social relations. Such a notion casts women as pure victims of an unmediated process of social determinism, a process that renders invisible subjective agency, conflict, and fantasy ….
          “Second, the alternative proposed by Lacanian-inspired feminism is not the inverse of social determinism of which it is accused. It does not propose a theory of psychic determinism that shares the same problems as the socially determined view. That is, it does not construe women as pure victims of an unmediated process of psychic determinism, precluding the concepts of subjective agency, conflict, and fantasy. Instead, what is offered is an alternative theory that considers the contribution of both psychical (transhistorical) and social (historically specific) factors to female subjectivity. ”
          [Patricia Elliot, “Politics, Identity, and Social Change: Contested Grounds in Psychoanalytic Feminism.” Hypatia. Volume 10, number 2, spring 1995. Pages 41-55.]
      15. critical poststructuralism (Patricia Harris, Brian Green, V. Spike Peterson, Deborah P. Dixon, John Paul Jones III, and others): They develop approaches to poststructuralism within the critical social theoretical tradition.
          “This article is based on the premise that post-structuralism is part of the ‘critical’ tradition in social inquiry: that is, the tradition which seeks to question, articulate and disrupt practices which repress, silence or exploit subject groups. The term (‘critical’) is intended to carry a slightly wider meaning than ‘radical’ as it does not necessarily have the same implications for fundamental critique and change. My references to the ‘critical tradition in social work’ and ‘critical social work’ are similarly broad, incorporating the social democratic as well as the more obviously ‘radical’ traditions.…
          “On the side of importance lies the imperative of challenging the entire neo-liberal frame and its consequences for economically and socially subordinated groups. Social workers may find themselves increasingly caught up in this task if current trends continue and deepen. My suggestion is that critical post-structuralism assists in this struggle as it allows one to stand back, deconstruct, suggest alternatives, relativise, question and refuse.”
          [Patricia Harris, “Towards a critical post-structuralism.” Social Work Education. Volume 20, number 3, June 2011. Pages 335-350.]
          “… critical post-structuralism … re-opened and deepened a method of analysis which had been abandoned by the traditional Left. In particular, it sought to interrogate not the specific manifestations of culturally- and materially-produced difference, but the very nature of difference itself – its role in producing and reproducing inequality, its presumed essentialism, its pervasive deployment in social interaction as gender, as race, as sexuality …. The production of binary systems of classification and hierarchy was revealed to be a point of commonality across categories of identification and analysis which had previously been considered distinct.” [Brian Green, “Classing Identity, Identifying Class: Locating Materialist / Deconstructionist Convergence.” Critical Sociology. Volume 32, issue 4, 2006. Pages 603-616.]
          “Through a critical poststructuralist lens I analyze actually existing – ‘real’ – conditions of GPE [global political economy] to reveal that neoliberal hegemony is not what it claims in theory or practice, and simultaneously generates exclusions and marginalizations that belie its purported stability, in theory and practice.…
          “… the primary focus here is specifying, through a critical poststructuralist lens, actually existing conditions of today’s GPE, that is, phenomena conventionally regarded as ‘real.’ Insofar as this exposes the excesses and contradictions of neoliberalism, it undermines the latter’s claims to accurately represent reality. At the same time, it reveals the ‘costs’ of favoring this stabilization at the expense of others. The objective is to expose how thoroughly inadequate conventional accounts are, and how necessary critical poststructuralism is not only but especially at this juncture and for analyzing GPE.”
          [V. Spike Peterson, “Getting Real: The Necessity of Critical Poststructuralism in Global Political Economy.” International Political Economy and Poststructural Politics. Marieke de Goede, editor. New York: Palgrave Macmillan imprint of St. Martin’s Press, LLC. 2006. Pages 119-138.]
          “In essentializing scientific geography, critics in effect relinquish responsibility for analyzing the wider constitutive context of social power that organizes the relationships between epistemological categories and disciplinary systems. This can present significant problems for critique in general, since essentialist deployments of designations such as regressive and progressive pose a severe threat to our ability to deploy them to effect. If such designations are targeted repeatedly to a stabilized system of thought, then they become empty categories that hover outside of context, revealing merely the non-reflexive character of their deployment. In an ironic twist that reverses the charge of relativism often directed toward postmodern thought, critical poststructuralism remains sensitive to the context in which and toward which such designations are launched.” [Deborah P. Dixon and John Paul Jones III, “Editorial: For a Supercalifragilisticexpialidocious Scientific Geography.” Annals of the Association of American Geographers. Volume 86, number 4, December 1996. Pages 767-779.]
          “A recent editorial in the Annals of the Association of American Geographers … presented an entertaining deconstructive reading of scientific geography. This innovative essay, titled ‘For a Supmalifragilisticexpialidodous Scientific Geography’ demonstrates how a popular deconstructive method adapted from the humanities might be deployed to facilitate the ‘self-redemption’ of scientific geography from its constraining positivist closure, perhaps paving the way for its alignment with the open-ended and pluralistic world-view of an emerging critical poststructuralism.” [David J. Nemeth, “Extreme Geography.” California Geographer. Volume 37, 1997. Pages 11-30.]
      16. non–philosophy (François Laruelle as pronounced in this MP3 audio file, Katerina Kolozova [Greek/Hellēniká, Κατερίνα Κολόζοβα, Katerína Kolózoba as pronounced in this MP3 audio file]), Ray Brassier as pronounced in this MP3 audio file, and others: This approach, originally developed by Laruelle, offers a realist approach to poststructuralism. The scholarly association, «Organisation Non-philosophique Internationale» (French language only), is associated with his perspective.
          “Non-philosophy is a discipline born from reflection upon two problems whose solutions finally coincided: on the one hand, that of the One’s ontological status within philosophy, which associates it, whether explicitly or not, to Being and to the Other whilst forbidding it any measure of radical autonomy; on the other, that of philosophy’s theoretical status, insofar as philosophy is practise, affect, existence, but lacking in a rigorous knowledge of itself, a field of objective phenomena not yet subject to theoretical overview.” [François Laruelle, “A Summary of Non-Philosophy.” Ray Brassier, translator. Pli. Volume 8, 1999. Pages 138-148.]
          “Non-philosophy is surprised not by Being, which has at least two faces, and is not surprised that there would be beings, but is surprised that there would be the One and that it shows itself in the subject, not at the same time that it hides within it, but while it shows itself as what will be explained ‘partially’ or by a single face.” [François Laruelle, “Principles for a Generic Ethics.” Anthony Paul Smith, translator. Angelaki: Journal of the Theoretical Humanities. Volume 19, number 2, June 2014. Pages 13-23.]
          “There is … the thesis, like the thesis within Marxism, of a non-philosophical practice, here Christian, of philosophy. Stated thus, our maxim is susceptible of innumerable equivocations to the extent that, nevertheless, a rigorous concept of Christ cannot be established apart from philosophy. We thus understand this maxim as a maxim of the non-philosophical practice of philosophy, and as an obligation to establish a Christian science that is not neutral, but rather is engaged in the practical affairs of Christianity, and thus not merely in the manner of a hermeneutic or in simply scientific terms.” [François Laruelle, “A Science of [En] Christ.” Aaron Riches, translator. Angelaki: Journal of the Theoretical Humanities. Volume 19, number 2, June 2014. Pages 25-33.]
          “Nothing can, except through illusion, substitute itself for man and for his identity. And man cannot, except through illusion, substitute himself for philosophy, for the Other, etc. Man is an inalienable reality. There is no reversibility between man and philosophy.” [François Laruelle, “Theorems on the Good News.” Alexander R. Galloway, translator. Angelaki: Journal of the Theoretical Humanities. Volume 19, number 2, June 2014. Pages 41-43.]
          “Non-philosophy is constituted under a double aspect: doctrinal, with the objective appearance of a philosophical type of thought; methodical and disciplinary, with a more theoretical than systematic will of extending its modes of argumentation and its vocabulary to all fundamental knowledges. For these two reasons, it appealed to a dictionary destined to form the pinnacle of theoretical acquisitions, to present the essentials of the technique, and to distinguish parallel, neighboring, or variant thoughts in the midst of which it has developed. In terms of dictionaries, this one has the benefits, insufficiencies, and illusions which are attached to this genre of works—nothing here is added from this order.” [François Laruelle. Dictionary of Non-Philosophy. Taylor Adkins, translator. Minneapolis, Minnesota: Univocal Publishing. 2013. Page 1.]
          “Non-philosophy is regarded by philosophy either as the state of immediacy of naive and sensible opinions (the judgments of common sense), or as its other which it remains to think (sciences, technologies, politics, the arts….) that is to say as the presuppositions of philosophy itself (the innumerable ‘non-thoughts’ [impensés]) which are in turn philosophizable).” [François Laruelle. Dictionary of Non-Philosophy. Taylor Adkins, translator. Minneapolis, Minnesota: Univocal Publishing. 2013. Page 44.]
          “Following François Laruelle, I concede the idea of the ‘Stranger’ is necessary for a rigorous and non-philosophical theorizing of the Self since it overcomes the dualistic split created by the dyad of the ‘Real’ and the ‘Subject.’ Here, I would propose that resurrecting the figure of the ‘Stranger’ is a necessary radicalization of the idea of human subjectivity.” [Katerina Kolozova, “The Figure of the Stranger: A Possibility for Transcendental Minimalism or Radical Subjectivity.” Journal for Cultural and Religious Theory. Volume 11, number 3, fall 2011. Pages 59-64.]
          “François Laruelle’s realism is grounded in his claim that philosophy itself is the source of contemporary thought’s self-circumscription and its paralysis in addressing reality, which would fundamentally change it or at least explain it with rigor.… Laruelle’s non-philosophy or non-standard philosophy does not aspire to cancel philosophy altogether or replace it with science. The goal of non-philosophy is to rid philosophy of its dictatorship of the transcendental vis-à-vis the real, which again only leads to its narcissistic self-sufficiency. The first gesture toward this goal is the unilateral positioning of thought vis-à-vis the instance of the real. The Thought correlates with the real as the authority in the last instance rather than with a system of thought. In this way it operates with concepts that have been radicalized and that are then used non-philosophically.” [Katerina Kolozova. Cut of the Real: Subjectivity in Poststructuralist Philosophy. New York: Columbia University Press. 2014. Page 3.]
          “[François] Laruelle’s non-standard philosophy proffers a conceptual apparatus and the possibility for a critical positioning of thought that enables me to undertake a radical critique of the mainstream legacy of poststructuralist feminist philosophy without abandoning it as a whole.” [Katerina Kolozova. Cut of the Real: Subjectivity in Poststructuralist Philosophy. New York: Columbia University Press. 2014. Page 7.]
          “… a non-philosophical reconceptualization of ‘pure violence’ is the product of a ‘Vision-in-One’ which is attuned to the singularity of the event rather than to its relations to other concepts and frameworks of thought the concepts belong to and within which/in terms of which they are thought (philosophical or theoretical systems, schools of thought, doctrines). It is a concept which has been extracted from a philosophy, from a universe of thought and, thereupon, divested of its transcendental status determined within a particular framework of thought.” [Katerina Kolozova, “Violence: The Indispensable Condition of the Law (and the Political).” Angelaki: Journal of the Theoretical Humanities. Volume 19, number 2, June 2014. Pages 99-111.]
          “[François] Laruelle provides me with conceptual or methodological possibilities of producing theoretical work without adherence to any philosophical legacy in particular, and to do so without being arbitrary or voluntaristic. His non-standard philosophy enables one to take recourse to conceptual material derived from philosophy without the endorsement of the explanatory frame a philosophical school or authority creates for the concepts produced within it. Non-philosophy offers methods to rigorously think realities and discuss philosophical ideas.” [Katerina Kolozova, “Interview with Katerina Kolozova.” Figure/Ground. April 22nd, 2013. Pages 1-5.]
          “… [François] Laruelle suggests that the ‘non’ in the expression ‘non-philosophy’ be understood as akin to the ‘non’ in the expression ‘non-Euclidian’ geometry: not as a negation or denial of philosophy, but as suspending a specific structure (the philosophical equivalent of Euclid’s fifth axiom concerning parallels) which Laruelle sees as constitutive of the traditional practice of philosophy. New possibilities of thought become available once that structure has been suspended and non-philosophy is an index of those philosophically unenvisageable possibilities.” [Ray Brassier, “Axiomatic heresy: The non-philosophy of François Laruelle.” Radical Philosophy: Philosophical Journal of the Independent Left. Number 121, September/October 2003. Pages 24-35.]
          “We are repeatedly enjoined by [François] Laruelle’s advocates to assess … [the] practice, what non-philosophy can do. My guiding hypothesis and question will be: it has always been possible to use philosophical materials to construct a personal philosophy or world-view, but how far does Laruelle get beyond an individual project, given the abundant solipsisms in his method? I argue that it is precisely as a practical philosophical orientation that the project is best understood, rather than through its self-presentation as a science of theoretical reason.” [Andrew McGettigan, “Fabrication defect: François Laruelle’s philosophical materials.” Radical Philosophy: Philosophical Journal of the Independent Left. Number 175, September/October 2012. Pages 33-42.]
          “Casting his [François Laruelle’s] own theory against that of the thinker who informed him most, Laruelle disfigures [Jacques] Derrida in order to raise the heretical possibility that, perhaps, the global susceptibility of any given ideology, metaphysics, or text to displacement and deconstruction is itself a kind of universality—one decisional in nature. Non-philosophy can be regarded as the mature offspring of this wager.” [Andrew Resziknyk, “Wonder without Domination: An Introduction to Laruelle and Non-Philosophy.” Chiasma. Issue 1, 2014. Pages 24-53.]
      17. discourse theory (David Tyrer): He applies this poststructuralist theory to a critique of Islamophobia.
          “This book is informed not by discourse analysis, but rather by a strand of post-structuralist political theory known as discourse theory. A set of approaches influenced by the works of Jacques Derrida, Jacques Lacan, Julia Kristeva, and Judith Butler, the emergence of theory as a political analytic was informed in particular by the work of Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe (1985). Discourse theory in this sense does not provide a structured methodology for social and political investigation, but rather it provides an ensemble of analytic tools which can be brought to bear on the analysis of meanings and political practices in a contingent and radically contested social terrain.
          “Discourse theory posits a broader understanding of discourse than does critical discourse analysis, recognising all meaning bearing practices, customs, beliefs, and activities as reflecting a discursive logic. Discourse theory therefore rejects superficial assumptions concerning a distinction between the discursive and the extra discursive, instead concerning itself with the articulation of linguistic and non-linguistic elements in discourse …. The starting point for discourse theory is that the meanings of all social phenomena are bestowed through discourse …. This does not validate the facile rejections of anti-foundationalism (‘everything is socially constructed’), because discourse theory is not in fact based on the idea that things are constructed through language. Rather, discourse theory recognises that the only ways in which events and entities can be accessed is through the use of language ….”
          [David Tyrer. The Politics of Islamophobia: Race, Power and Fantasy. New York: Palgrave Macmillan imprint of St. Martin’s Press LLC. 2013. Kindle edition.]
          “Simply to assume ‘they are Muslims’ or to attempt to divine whether they are Muslims or members of some other, assumed primordial group, is not an analytical task but a normative one. The analytical task is actually to uncover the politics at stake in the tensions that such questions imply, the ways in which they reveal the contingency of prior namings and racialisation, how this plays out against a wider racial politics, and the different social relations and political practices that are made possible through the different ways in which the category of Muslim is constructed through Islamophobia, as well as in response to the emergence of a phenomenon increasingly organised under its naming as Islamophobia. Discourse theory is a helpful approach to the study of such phenomena precisely because it rejects essentialism.” [David Tyrer. The Politics of Islamophobia: Race, Power and Fantasy. New York: Palgrave Macmillan imprint of St. Martin’s Press LLC. 2013. Kindle edition.]
      18. post–Marxism also known as poststructural or poststructuralist Marxism (Ernesto Laclau, Chantal Mouffe, Alain Badiou, Stuart Sim, Philip Goldstein, Dennis Carlson, Félix Guattari, Étienne Balibar, Samuel Bowles, Herbert Gintis, and others): Domination (or oppression) is constructed by language. Since capitalist domination is linguistic or textual, a fixed or unchanging structure of domination does not apply. Rather, capitalists maintain their domination over the lower classes by controlling the topics of conversation.
          Post-Marxism was informed by the structural Marxism of approaches of Louis Althusser and Michel Foucault. Moreover, the perspective of post-Marxism (and of poststructuralism more generally) has been strongly influenced by the writings of Michel Foucault and Jacques Derrida.
          Specifically, the post-Marxist perspective developed by Samuel Bowles and Herbert Gintis combines radical democracy (a term popularized by Laclau and Mouffe) with liberal social theory and social science. According to Bowles and Gintis, some writers misinterpreted their early work as a version of “structural-functionalism.” Perhaps it was structuralist instead. All of the quotations provided here, by and about these two authors, are intended to illustate their intellectual evolutions.
          “We know from [Ludwig] Wittgenstein that there is no such thing as the ‘application of a rule’ – the instance of application becomes part of the rule itself. To reread Marxist theory in the light of contemporary problems necessarily involves deconstructing the central categories of that theory. This is what has been called our ‘post-Marxism.’ We did not invent this label – it only marginally appears (not as a label) in the Introduction to our book. But since it has become generalized in characterizing our work, we can say that we do not oppose it insofar as it is properly understood: as the process of reappropriation of an intellectual tradition, as well as the process of going beyond it.
          “… There is a process of mutual feedback between the incorporation of new fields of objects and the general ontological categories governing, at a certain time, what is thinkable within the general field of objectivity. The ontology implicit in Freudianism, for instance, is different and incompatible with a biologist paradigm. From this point of view, it is our conviction that in the transition from Marxism to post-Marxism, the change is not only ontic but also ontological. The problems of a globalized and information-ruled society are unthinkable within the two ontological paradigms governing the field of Marxist discursivity: first the Hegelian, and later the naturalistic.”
          [Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe. Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Towards a Radical Democratic Politics. Second edition. London and New York: Verso imprint of New Left Books. 2001. Pages ix-x.]
          “The guiding thread of our analysis has been the transformations in the concept of hegemony, considered as a discursive surface and fundamental nodal point of Marxist political theorization. Our principal conclusion is that behind the concept of ‘hegemony’ lies hidden something more than a type of political relation complementary to the basic categories of Marxist theory.” [Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe. Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Towards a Radical Democratic Politics. Second edition. London and New York: Verso imprint of New Left Books. 2001. Page 3.]
          “Emancipation presupposes the elimination of power, the abolition of the subject/object distinction, and the management – without any opaqueness or mediation – of communitarian affairs by social agents identified with the viewpoint of social totality. It is in this sense that in Marxism, for instance, communism and the withering away of the state logically entail each other.” [Ernesto Laclau. Emancipation(s). New York: Verso imprint of New Left Books. 2007. Page 1.]
          “There is a rhetorical displacement whenever a literal term is substituted for a figural one.” [Ernesto Laclau. On Populist Reason. London and New York: Verso imprint of New Left Books. 2005. Page 71.]
          “I see the transformation today of the discourses informing both political theory and political practice (in fact, the separation between the two is largely an artificial operation). Theoretical categories which in the past were considered as bearers of a univocal sense become deeply ambiguous once that sense is seen as the actualization of only some of the possibilities opened by their internal structure.” [Ernesto Laclau, “Introduction.” The Making of Political Identities. London and New York: Verso imprint of New Left Books. 1994. Page 2.]
          “… we shall defend the thesis that it is this moment of continuity between the Jacobin and the Marxist political imaginary which has to be put in question by the project for a radical democracy. The rejection of privileged points of rupture and the confluence of struggles into a unified political space, and the acceptance, on the contrary, of the plurality and indeterminacy of the social, seem to us the two fundamental bases from which a new political imaginary can be constructed, radically libertarian and infinitely more ambitious in its objectives than that of the classic left. This demands, in the first place, a description of the historical terrain in which it emerged, which is the field of what we shall call the ‘democratic revolution.’” [Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe. Hegemony and Socialist Strategy Towards a Radical Democratic Politics. Second edition. London and New York: Verso imprint of New Left Books. 2001. Page 152.]
          “… a revolution, conceived by [Karl] Marx as a political truth, is the affirmative revelation of the hidden laws of society: class struggle, contradictions, economic power. But it is also the destructive transgression of all these laws: collective economy, dictatorship of the proletariat. But how is it possible for a negation, above all, for a destructive one, to be also the most affirmative knowledge of the very essence of society? The question finally is: What sort of negation is involved in transgression? What sort of immanent negation is represented by the process of a truth in a world? In what sense is the distance between Event and Law thinkable in the form of negation?” [Alain Badiou, “The Three Negations.” Cardozo Law Review. Volume 29, number 5, 2008. Pages 1877-1883.]
          “… what best explains the ‘relation between racism and national oppression on the one hand and exploitation … on the other’ is poststructuralist Marxism or post-Marxism, a theory that I derive from the work of Louis Althusser and Michel Foucault and which, thanks to their extraordinary influence, has acquired philosophical, economic, historical, feminist, literary, and cultural versions.’ [Philip Goldstein. Post-Marxist Theory: An Introduction. Albany, New York: State University of New York Press. 2005. Page 2.]
          “[Louis] Althusser’s development of a structural Marxism nevertheless played its part in encouraging the growth of post-Marxism – if against the grain of the author’s intentions…. Structural Marxism is one of the more successful attempts to create a ‘hybrid’ Marxism that can take on board recent theoretical developments, and that suggests an unfinished character to Marxist theory.” [Stuart Sim. Post-Marxism: An Intellectual History. London and New York: Routledge imprint of Taylor & Francis Group, an Informa PLC business. 2000. Page 94.]
          “… one must ask what the efficacious structures of the double articulation might be. What, in the last instance, is the motor of science (in the sense in which the class struggle is the motor of history)? Accordingly, these questions call not for a philosophy of knowledge, but a theory of structural causality, which interrogates science as a practical effect and not as a representation.” [Alain Badiou. The Concept of Model: An Introduction to the Materialist Epistemology of Mathematics. Zachary Luke Fraser and Tzuchien Tho, editors and translators. Melbourne, Australia: re.press. 2007. Open sccess. Page 15.]
          “On the one hand, the particular cannot exist outside of the general, the general structures the nature and the essence of the particular. However, the general is also inseparable from the particular: it manifests itself through the latter, it traverses the latter, the general comprises itself through the particular, it has the particular as content. All generality seized outside of the particular is empty and not real.” [Alain Badiou. The Rational Kernel of the Hegelian Dialectic. Tzuchien Tho, editor and translator. Melbourne, Australia: re.press. 2011. Open access. Page 25.]
          “How might we weave a neo-Marxist and Foucauldian [Michel Foucault] analysis of technical control and the curriculum? One possibility is suggested by the poststructural Marxist Félix Guattari. He observes that ‘capitalism does not seek to exercise despotic power over all the wheels of society…. It is even crucial to its survival that it manages to arrange marginal freedoms, relative spaces for creativity.’ What gives its ability to reorder various heterogeneous activities and domains of cultural production, to maintain control not through centralization of power, but through the decentralization of power to the point of production. Control is much more invested, consequently, in microtechnologies, which Guattari refers to as ‘machines.’ He does so by way of emphasizing a poststructural concern with processes and the technologies that guide processes, rather than with structure. Schools may then be approached as sites where teachers and students use what Guattari calls ‘semiotization machines’ to decode texts and produce certain objectified and quantifiable outcomes or truths. On the other side of the dominant machines of public education today are the reform discourses and interests of transnational capitalism. These discourses are engaged, according to Guattari, in ‘de-territorializing’ economic machines and information technologies and ‘re-territorializing’ them by applying them to the reorganization of all public institutions.” [Dennis Carlson, “Are We Making Progress? Ideology and Curriculum in the Age of No Child Left Behind.” Ideology, Curriculum, and the New Sociology of Education: Revisiting the Work of Michael Apple. Lois Weis, Greg Dimitriadis, and Cameron McCarthy, editors. London and New York: Routledge imprint of Taylor & Francis Group, an Informa PLC business. 2013. Google Play edition.]
          “Poststructural Marxism … is concerned more with hegemony and discourse and how people come to believe that capitalism is a natural way of life rather than laws or truths of history that govern capitalist development.” [Mark Balnaves, Stephanie Hemelryk Donald, and Brian Shoesmith. Media Theories and Approaches: A Global Perspective. New York: Palgrave Macmillan imprint of St. Martin’s Press LLC. 2009. Page 105.]
          “In delivering us from that task [the need for an in-depth struggle with the minute particulars of our experience], poststructural Marxism … may have canceled the possibility of genuine liberation.” [Walter Albert Davis. Inwardness and Existence: Subjectivity In/and Hegel, Heidegger, Marx, and Freud. Madison, Wisconsin: University of Wisconsin Press. 1989. Page 187.]
          “A first sense of our post-Marxism thus becomes clear. It consists in a deepening of that relational moment which [Karl] Marx, thinking within a Hegelian and, in any case, nineteenth-century matrix, could only take so far. In an age when psychoanalysis has shown that the action of the unconscious makes all signification ambiguous; when the development of structural linguistics has enabled us to understand better the functioning of purely differential identities; when the transformation of thought—from [Friedrich Wilhelm] Nietzsche to [Martin] Heidegger, from pragmatism to [Ludwig] Wittgenstein—has decisively undermined philosophical essentialism, we can reformulate the materialist programme in a much more radical way than was possible for Marx.…
          “We believe that, by clearly locating ourselves in a post-Marxist terrain, we not only help to clarify the meaning of contemporary social struggles but also give to Marxism its theoretical dignity, which can only proceed from recognition of its limitations and of its historicality. Only through such recognition will Marx’s work remain present in our tradition and our political culture.”
          [Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe, “Post-Marxism Without Apologies.” New Left Review. Series I, number 166, November–December 1987. Pages 79-106.]
          “… an appeal to theoretical work that carries on the project of the texts in some measure can be helpful; that modern materialism was reworked by French structural and poststructural Marxism has been invaluable to me ….” [Margaret Cohen. Profane Illumination: Walter Benjamin and the Paris of Surrealist Revolution. Berkeley, California: University of California Press. 1993. Pages 13-14.]
          “Our thinking about democracy and domination represents a fusion of three quite distinct strands of thought. One is the radical democratic tradition and its expression in the social movements of the 1960s. The second is liberal social theory and social science. The third is Marxism. Or perhaps more correctly put, out thinking has evolved through a sustained encounter between the hope and rage of the radical democratic movements of our time and the two now-dominant intellectual traditions.” [Samuel Bowles and Herbert Gintis. Democracy and Capitalism: Property, Community, and the Contradictions of Modern Social Thought. New York: Basic Books imprint of the Perseus Books Group. 1987. Page xvii.]
          “… the failure of progressive educational reforms stems from the contradictory nature of the objectives of its integrative, egalitarian and developmental functions in a society whose economic life is governed by the institutions of corporate capitalism. Both the democratic and technocratic versions of liberal education theory focus on the relationships into which individuals enter upon adulthood. In Dewey’s democratic version, political life is singled out as central, while for the technocratic version, the technical aspects of production hold the honored position. Both have been blind to—or at least treated in quite unrealistic manner—the social relationships of capitalist production. Dewey’s overall framework seems emminently correct. His error lies in characterizing the social system as democratic, whereas, in fact, the hierarchical division of labor in the capitalist enterprise is politically autocratic.
          “In corporate capitalist society, the social relations of production conform, by and large, to the ‘hierarchical division of labor,’ characterized by power and control emanating from the top downward through a finely gradated bureaucratic order. The social relationships of the typically bureaucratic corporate enterprise require special attention because they are neither democratic not technical….
          “Had the technocratic school looked at the social rather than the technical relations of production, it might have been more circumspect in asserting the compatibility of the integrative, egalitarian, and developmental functions of schooling. Indeed, it might have found that the way in which the school system performs its integrative function—through its production of a stratified labor force for the capitalist enterprise—is inconsistent with its performance of either developmental or egalitarian functions. Focusing on cognitive variables, it cannot even entertain the idea that the correspondence between the social relations of production and the social relations of education—the essential mechanism of the integrative function of schooling—might preclude an egalitarian or truly humanistic education….
          “The educational system serves—through the correspondence of its social relations with those of economic life—to reproduce economic inequality and to distort personal development. Thus under corporate capitalism, the objectives of liberal educational reform are contradictory: It is precisely because of its role as producer of an alienated and stratified labor force that the educational system has developed its repressive and unequal structure. In the history of U.S. education, it is the integrative function which has dominated the purpose of schooling, to the detriment of the other liberal objectives.
          “… When education is viewed as an aspect of the reproduction of the capitalist division of labor, the history of school reforms in the United States appears less as a story of an enlightened but sadly unsuccessful corrective and more as an integral part of the process of capitalist growth itself.”
          [Samuel Bowles and Herbert Gintis. Schooling in Capitalist America: Educational Reform and the Contradictions of Economic Life. Chicago, Illinois: Haymarket Books. 2011. Pages 45-48.]
          “In this work I argue that relating these putatively discrete approaches [post-Marxism and cultural studies] is eminently justified and actually even called for, because both post-Marxism and cultural studies in a strong sense came into existence in response to a certain deconstructive ‘crisis’ in (and about) politics and knowledge. As will be argued, both post-Marxist theory and cultural studies as institutions initially and constitutively orientated themselves as interventional efforts, as wanting to challenge, dislodge, or at least develop, existing and often broadly Marxist models of political causality, of intervention, and of what determines the character of conjunctures, identities and objects.” [Paul Bowman. Post-Marxism versus Cultural Studies: Theory, Politics and Intervention. Edinburgh, Scotland: Edinburgh University Press. 2007. Page xii.]
          “It follows that the hierarchical division of labor affects inequality not only through wage differentials, but also through the divergent patterns of consciousness and motivation to which it gives rise. These patterns, as we will point out, tend to be transmitted through the family and impose severe limits on the functioning of the educational system.” [Samuel Bowles and Herbert Gintis. Schooling in Capitalist America: Educational Reform and the Contradictions of Economic Life. Chicago, Illinois: Haymarket Books. 2011. Page 96.]
          “… there are fundamental contradictions among the integrative, egalitarian, and personal development functions of education in capitalist society.” [Samuel Bowles and Herbert Gintis. Schooling in Capitalist America: Educational Reform and the Contradictions of Economic Life. Chicago, Illinois: Haymarket Books. 2011. Page 109.]
          “Over the years Schooling in Capitalist America has received a considerable amount of critical attention, for which we are grateful. One reading of our book—that it presented a functionalist argument—is sufficiently misguided to deserve a brief comment here. A functionalist argument explains something, such as the structure of schooling, by the benefits it confers on some group, for instance, the profits accruing to employers from a well-socialized labor force, without providing any causal explanation of the manner in which these consequences account for the thing to be explained. We devoted three chapters of Schooling in Capitalist America to the history and evolution of education precisely to illuminate the process by which the correspondence principle and other aspects of the structure of schooling came about. The benefits (correctly) anticipated by employers loom large in this account. But this does not make the argument functionalist.” [Samuel Bowles and Herbert Gintis, “Schooling in Capitalist America Revisited.” Sociology of Education. Volume 75, number 1, January 2002. Pages 1-18.]
          “In North America, the best-known application of Marxist functionalism in education is by [Samuel] Bowles and [Herbert] Gintis [referencing, Schooling in Capitalist America: Educational Reform and the Contradictions of Economic Life] ….” [David Post, “Political Goals of Peruvian Students: The Foundations of Legitimacy in Education.” Sociology of Education. Volume 61, number 3, July 1988. Pages 178-190.]
          “The prominent ‘post-Marxist’ American political economists, Samuel Bowles and Herbert Gintis … argue that Marxist theory should not turn away from economically driven conceptions of crisis.” [Robert J. Antonio, “The Decline of the Grand Narrative in Emancipatory Modernity: Crisis or Renewal in Neo-Marxian Theory?” Frontiers of Social Theory: The New Syntheses. George Ritzer, editor. New York: Columbia University Press. 1990. Page 102.]
          “The work of Michel Foucault is not easily assimilated into the concepts and fields of inquiry defined and delimited by the human sciences. Indeed, Foucault’s comments on his work, namely that he was not a Freudian, a Marxist, or a structuralist, nor concerned with elaborating a phenomenological philosophy of the subject, but rather with presenting a ‘genealogy of the modern subject as a historical and cultural reality,’ are suggestive of a significant difference in conceptualization and approach from those forms associated with the human sciences. However, to argue that Foucault’s analyses need to be differentiated from the history of ideas, philosophical inquiry, and sociological investigation is not to imply that the historian, the philosopher, and the sociologist, amongst others, will find nothing of interest or relevance in the work. Foucault most certainly was not a sociologist, but there is much of sociological relevance in his work.” [Barry Smart. Michel Foucault. Revised edition. London and New York: Routledge imprint of Taylor & Francis Group, an Informa PLC business. 2004. Page 8.]
          “Barry Smart … makes the contentious point that Michel Foucault’s theoretical insights can be labelled as ‘neo-Marxist’ in highlighting how surveillance is a critical feature of modern education policy and schools. Whilst traditional Marxist scholarship has an awareness of economics and ideology in the context of social relationships in education; a neo-Marxist perspective grounded in Foucault’s work can illustrate how surveillance and discourses of power impact the positioning of children as educational objects of control, domination and subordination. It would be wrong to deny the impact of ‘subjectivity’ as a core concept in the process of education …. However, in offering an alternative and critical exploration of ERA we can address C.W. Wright Mills … powerful argument that sociological theorising must focus on how individual biographies are shaped by the wider social forces within a particular period in history and culture. Similarly, [Norman] Fairclough … suggests that a critical perspective opens up ‘common sense assumptions’ that lie at the heart of western culture about social institutions. Fairclough … further suggests that Foucault’s … work on ‘discourse’ has similarities with the Gramscian concept of ‘hegemony.’ This assertion is evidenced by Foucault … himself, when he states, ‘Discourse in not simply that which translates struggles or systems of domination, but is the thing for which there is struggle. Discourse is the power to be seized.’
          “Nevertheless, there are certainly tensions between Foucault’s neo-Marxism and variants of structuralist Marxism. Foucault side-steps the binary relationship set up by the Marxist educational theory of [Samuel] Bowles and [Herbert] Gintis … for example, between true and false realities, ways of knowing and political consciousness. Foucault has the theoretical reflexivity of loosening knowledge, ideas and subject positions from categories of social totality, such as social formation, the mode of production, history, economy and society …. Thus suspended from their ostensible connections, social ideas are re-articulated in Foucault’s thought to historical and societal features ignored in Marxist models of social reality based on the labour process and modes of economic exploitation. Hence, Foucault’s neo-Marxist perspective on discourse, power and surveillance provides a rich seam of theorizing as an addition to Marxist scholarship …. Indeed, whereas Marxism has focused on the ‘macrophysics of power’ …, Foucault’s … work complements such an approach by focusing on the ‘microphysics of power’; relationships between social actors and institutions. Coupled with this, [Mark] Granovetter … stressed the importance of linked socially embedded networks as a way of theorizing relations between macrostructures and microlevels of action.”
          [Jason L. Powell and Margaret Edwards, “Surveillance and Morality: Revisiting the Education Reform Act (1988) in the United Kingdom.” Surveillance & Society: The International, Interdisciplinary, Open Access, Peer-Reviewed Journal of Surveillance Studies. Volume 3, number 1. Pages 96-106. Retrieved on October 6th, 2015.]
          “Faced with this problem [‘the modern will to fully know, order, and control the natural world, the individual, the social order’], a common post-Marxist response has been to reject Marxist determinism, to emphasise the limitations on what human beings can know and do, and to underscore, to greater or lesser degrees, the contingency of social life. And a common theoretical alternative to the conceptual apparatus of historical materialism has been the post-Marxist turn to culture, meaning, discourse, and language.” [Chamsy el-Ojeili, “After Post-Socialism: Social Theory, Utopia, and the Work of Castoriadis in a Global Age.” AntePodium: Online Journal of World Affairs. Victoria University. Wellington, Australia. 2011. Pages 1-33.]
          “The post-Marxist approach has been used in political ecologism to reframe ecologism in ideological terms … and to challenge political subjectivity in light of ecological discourse …. In recognising the aim of post-Marxism to provide an ‘anchorage’ from which contemporary social struggles (including ecologism) are ‘thinkable in their specificity,’ I maintain that post-Marxism provides an alternative series of categories and emphases that augment extant considerations of ecological praxis ….” [John Mackenzie, “What is to be (Un)Done? Praxical Post-Marxism and Ecologism.” Dialogue. Volume 1, number 2, 2003. Pages 31-54.]
          “The omnipresence of power: not because it has the privilege of consolidating everything under its invincible unity, but because it is produced from one moment to the next, at every point, or rather in every relation from one point to another. Power is everywhere; not because it embraces everything, but because it comes from everywhere. And ‘Power,’ insofar as it is permanent, repetitious, inert, and self-reproducing, is simply the over-all effect that emerges from all these mobilities, the concatenation that rests on each of them and seeks in turn to arrest their movement. One needs to be nominalistic, no doubt: power is not an institution, and not a structure; neither is it a certain strength we are endowed with; it is the name that one attributes to a complex strategical situation in a particular society.” [Michel Foucault. The History of Sexuality—Volume I: An Introduction. Robert Hurley, translator. New York: Pantheon Books imprint of Random House, Inc. 1978. Page 93.]
          “A general system of oversight and confinement penetrates all layers of society, taking forms that go from the great prisons built on the panopticon model to the charitable societies, and that find their points of application not only among the delinquents, but among abandoned children, orphans, apprentices, high school students, workers, and so on.” [Michel Foucault. Ethics: Subjectivity and Truth. Paul Rabinow, editor. Robert Hurley and others, translators. New York: The New Press. 1997. Page 32.]
          “… he [Michel Foucault] writes ‘Power’ in scare quotes, thus taking distance from it as an analytical concept. Instead of creating an ontology of power, he suggests a nominalistic approach ….” [Pertti Alasuutari, “The nominalist turn in theorizing power.” European Journal of Cultural Studies. Volume 13, number 4, 2010. Pages 403-417.]
          “The post-Marxist authors’ project takes root in the idea that the Marxist theoretical system collapsed once and for all with the Berlin Wall. Although some attempts to reconstruct Marxian and Marxist thought exist, they claim that we are presently experiencing a ‘post-Marxist’ period, following the ‘Marxist’ period of the 1960s and 1970s, which were two decades of great class struggles. For Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe, classical Marxist categories such as ‘class interests,’ ‘revolution’ etc., have become unsuitable for explaining the changes which have taken place in the social and political spheres of contemporary capitalist societies. Indeed, according to these authors, classical Marxist categories have become inadequate to ‘the task of understanding the radical openness of the social and the rise of new, non-class-based actors and social movements’ ….” [Hélène Samanci. The political ontology of post-Marxism. Master of Philosophy thesis. Queen Mary University of London. London, England. September, 2012. Page 8.]
          “One of my overarching themes is to suggest that post-Marxist critiques of historical materialism and class analysis tend to be couched as rejections of the type of theory that Marxism is thought to represent, or as drastic temperings of its explanatory scope, rather than being outright dismissals of substantive Marxist propositions and analytic concerns. That is why the arguments for post-Marxism tend to hang more on pejorative characterizations of general conceptual effects/strategies such as Marxism’s alleged ‘reductionism,’ ‘functionalism,’ ‘essentialism,’ and ‘universalism,’ than on the denial of particular historical materialist postulates, such as the systematically capitalist nature of the modern industrial order, which few post-Marxists seriously question.” [Gregor McLennan, “Post-Marxism and the ‘Four Sins’ of Modernist Theorizing.” New Left Review. Series I, number 218, July–August 1996. Pages 53-74.]
          “They [post-Marxists] encounter a mutated capitalism and ‘actually existing socialism’ with descriptive language which emphasizes their trendiness: ‘post-modernism’ is only the latest version of ‘advanced industrial society,’ ‘post-industrial society,’ or ‘post-scarcity society.’ Those among them who retain the radical political impulse lack the clear, simple sense of the whole that ‘capitalism’ gave.” [Ronald Aronson, “Historical Materialism, Answer to Marxism’s Crisis.” New Left Review. Series I, number 152, July–August 1985. Pages 74-94.]
          “Despite the sense of critical engagement that the ‘post’ connotes, neo-Gramscian post-Marxism was in many ways a flight from Marxian problematics. Certainly it marked a movement from the politics of production to the politics of democracy and civil society.… Times … change, and with the current prominence of questions of globalization, commodification, the intensification of work, and the knowledge economy, the post-Marxist trajectory looks a little less secure, and a possibility seems to have arisen for a re-engagement with the Marxian problematic of production.” [Nicholas Thoburn. Deleuze, Marx and Politics. London and New York: Routledge imprint of Taylor & Francis Group, an Informa PLC business. 2003. Page 11.]
          “Alain Badiou avowedly owes much of his radical philosophy to his ‘master,’ Jacques Lacan. It is puzzling, therefore, that psychoanalytical critics have painstakingly sought to defend and preserve Jacques Lacan’s thought against, rather than through, that of Badiou. In fact, by bringing these two anti-humanists together under their shared articulations of the irreducible, inassimilable real, it is possible to see how Badiou provides his contemporaries with a means of expanding and extending, rather than contracting and restricting, Lacanian theory.…
          “Herein emerges the principal difference between Lacan and Badiou: whereas for Lacan, the void inhabits and founds the desiring subject, for Badiou, it constitutes being-as-being. Although Lacan’s act and Badiou’s event both involve a subject, the Badiousian subject is dialectically intertwined with the truth: the truth results from a process driven by the fidelity of the subject; yet the subject is not a given structure that pre-exists the event, but rather, as Badiou explains, ‘induced’ by the truth-process itself.”
          [Lucy Bell, “Articulations of the Real: from Lacan to Badiou.” Paragraph. Volume 34, number 1, 2011. Pages 105-120.]
          “The inverventions of poststructuralist Marxists into economic and political thought show a provocative, but also troubling, orientation toward play. Their thinking emphasizes the openness of possibilities; it questions restraints, and denies inherent connections between causes and effects. This approach is appealing when it sets itself against intellectual rigidity. It asks whether there might not be more possibilities than have been considered, more paths to explore than allowed for in existing theory. Yet skepticism is not a sufficient basis for radicalism, nor is playfulness. An intellectual practice so grounded will tend to sail off into the stratosphere losing any connection with actual or possible social struggles, and with the goal of egalitarian social change as a whole. Poststructuralism (whether Marxist or otherwise) is playful at its best, sectarian at worst; and the slide from one to the other can take place very quickly. Antiessentialism is hardly the only dogma to plague the left intellectual world; but it does seem to be the leading contender today. And if those who are in positions of power and influence have clear, coherent, explicit goals, while the left understands politics as a game of escalating skeptical questioning, it is not hard to figure out who is going to prevail.” [Barbara Epstein, “Interpreting the World (Without Necessarily Changing It).” New Politics. Volume 6, number 4, winter 1998. Online publication. No pagination.]
          “The fundamental problem that contemporary Marxism faces, explained [Alaine] Badiou back in 1975, is not the metaphysical assertion of the transcendence of timeless truths and therefore the denial of change. Rather, philosophical revisionism’s latest strategy involves embracing Mao’s emphasis on scissional process, but with the proviso that process be thought only on the parliamentary model just invoked, as a law of formal alteration within a given reality composed of self-identical elements. For Badiou, this formalism is the latest avatar of a metaphysical invariant.” [Colin Wright. Badiou in Jamaica: The Politics of Conflict. Victoria, Australia: re.press. 2013. Page 37.[
          “… the allegedly post-Marxist ‘renovation’ of the theory of hegemony has much more in common with Hegelian idealism than with the Marxist tradition, and it remains to be seen how far a theory thus framed may go. Up to now, what post-Marxism has done is arbitrarily select certain themes of Gramscian thought, ‘reinterpret’ them in an idealistic key, and use them as the cornerstones of a social theory that is in the antipodes with regard to Marxism and, far from ‘superseding’ Marxism, ends up in a theoretical regression to the Hegelian concepts of the state and politics. [Ernesto] Laclau is right when he joins numerous Marxist theorists who have proposed a radical reevaluation of the crucial role of ideology and culture, factors for which vulgar Marxism has demonstrated an unjustifiable disdain. However, his attempt founders on the rocks of a ‘new reductionism’ when his criticism of the classist essentialism and the economism of the Marxism of the Second and Third Internationals ends in the exaltation of the discursive as a new Hegelian deus ex machina of history. There is no such a thing as a virtuous reductionism.” [Atilio A. Boron, “Embattled Legacy ‘Post-Marxism’ and the Social and Political Theory of Karl Marx.” Latin American Perspectives. Issue 113, volume 27, number 4, July 2000. Pages 49-79.]
      19. Oedipal triangulation (Gilles Deleuze as pronounced in this MP3 audio file and Félix Guattari): They develop an “Oedipal” critique of capitalism.
          “As [Karl] Marx observes, in the beginning capitalists are necessarily conscious of the opposition between capital and labor, and of the use of capital as a means of extorting surplus labor. But a perverted, bewitched world quickly comes into being, as capital increasingly plays the role of a recording surface that falls back on (se rabat sur) all of production.” [Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari. Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia. Minneapolis, Minnesota: University of Minnesota Press. 1983. Page 11.]
          “From the very beginning Oedipus exists in one form and one form only: open in all directions to a social field, to a field of production directly invested by libido. It would seem obvious that parents indeed make their appearance on the recording surface of desiring-production. But this is in fact the crux of the entire Oedipal problem: What are the precise forces that cause the Oedipal triangulation to close up? Under what conditions does this triangulation divert desire so that it flows across a surface within a narrow channel that is not a natural conformation of this surface? How does it form a type of inscription for experiences and the workings of mechanisms that extend far beyond it in every direction? It is in this sense and this sense only that the child relates the breast as a partial object to the person of his mother, and constantly watches the expression on his mother’s face.” [Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari. Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia. Minneapolis, Minnesota: University of Minnesota Press. 1983. Pages 47-48.]
      20. the rhizome (Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari): They define this term as the subtraction of uniqueness from multiplicity.
          “Subtract the unique from the multiplicity to be constituted; write at n - 1 dimensions. A system of this kind could be called a rhizome. A rhizome as subterranean stem is absolutely different from roots and radicles. Bulbs and tubers are rhizomes. Plants with roots or radicles may be rhizomorphic in other respects altogether: the question is whether plant life in its specificity is not entirely rhizomatic. Even some animals are, in their pack form. Rats are rhizomes. Burrows are too, in all of their functions of shelter, supply, movement, evasion, and breakout. The rhizome itself assumes very diverse forms, from ramified surface extension in all directions to concretion into bulbs and tubers. When rats swarm over each other. The rhizome includes the best and the worst: potato and couchgrass, or the weed. Animal and plant, couchgrass is crabgrass. We get the distinct feeling that we will convince no one unless we enumerate certain approximate characteristics of the rhizome.” [Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari. A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia. Minneapolis, Minnesota: University of Minnesota Press. 2005. Pages 6-7.]
          “The codename for this [‘strongest’] programme [‘transdisciplinarity in its most critical relation to philosophy’] is ‘rhizome.’ But this does not forbid – rather it calls for – the development of the philosophical foundation in science and the (badly named) human sciences, to which the programme of transdisciplinary research arising from structuralism is attached. ‘No longer to relate one’s activity to oneself as an agent,’ [Gilles] Deleuze thus stated in 1956, so as to submit oneself to a foundation that will present itself as a third – the ‘third foundation’, like the French ‘Third Estate.’ Deleuze explains that ‘the foundation is the third because it is neither the pretender, nor what it pretends to, but the instance that makes what is pretended docile enough for the pretender.’” [Éric Alliez, “Rhizome: (With no return).” Radical Philosophy: Philosophical Journal of the Independent Left. Number 167, May/June 2011. Pages 36-42.]
          “… the main question for ISIL [Islamic State in the Levant] will be how to organize their administration in the long run—in the ‘tree’ or the ‘rhizome’ way. The answer cannot lie in using totalitarian control—the sheer size of conquered territory alone makes delegation a necessity in and of itself. In other words, ISIL has to be able to assure its non-ideological employees and allies of its purpose and place in the Middle East ….” [Tuomas Kuronen and Aki-Mauri Huhtinen, “Organizing Conflict: The Rhizome of Jihad.” Journal of Management Inquiry. Volume 26, number 1, January 2017. Pages 47-61.]
      21. difference and repetition (Gilles Deleuze): He critically examines these concepts, including a focus on “eternal return.”
          “As the movement of life shows, difference and repetiition tend to become interiorised in signal-sign systems both at once. Biologists are right when, in posing the problem of heredity, they avoid allocating distinct functions, such as variation and and reproduction, to these systems, but rather seek to show the underlying unity or reciprocal conditioning of these functions. At this point, the theories of heredity necessarily open on to a philosopphy of nature. It is as if repetition were never the repetition of the ‘same’ but always of the Different as such, and the object of difference in itself were repetition. At the moment when they are explicated in a system (once and for all) the differential, intensive or individuating factors testify to their persistence in implication, and to eternal return as the truth of that implication. Mute witnesses to degradation and death, the centres of envelopment are also the dark precursors of the eternal return. Here again, it is the mute witnesses or dark precursors which do everything – or, at least, it is in these that everything happens.” [Gilles Deleuze. Difference and Repetition. Paul Patton, translator. New York: Columbia University Press. 1994. Page 256.]
          “… Difference and Repetition constitutes a metaphysical repetition of the structuralist zeitgeist. This becomes clear if one notes the definite correspondence between the arguments of Difference and Repetition and the article, presumed to be written in 1967, ‘How Do We Recognize Structuralism?,’ which first appeared in a 1972 volume on the History of Philosophy edited by François Châtelet. Indeed, it could be shown that the structuralist metaphysics presented in Difference and Repetition conforms exactly to the claims advanced in that article.” [Frédéric Fruteau de Laclos, “Common senses: Deleuze and Lyotard between ground and form.” Radical Philosophy: Philosophical Journal of the Independent Left. Number 197, May/June 2016. Pages 13-23.]
      22. historical–geographical materialism (David Harvey and others): Harvey applies his post-Marxist version of historical materialism to geography.
          “… any historical-geographical materialist worth his or her salt, must surely recognize that radically different socio-ecological circumstances imply quite different approaches to the question of what is or is not just.… [S]uch [socio-ecological and political-economic] processes are constitutive of the very standards of social justice that may be used to evaluate and modify their own operation. It is my foundational aim to provide a solid conceptual apparatus to enquire into the justness of such relations and how the sense of justice in turn gets historically and geographically constituted. Coincidentally, I also consider this work to be an enquiry into the foundational principles for an adequate historical-geographical materialism in the Marxist tradition.” [David Harvey. Justice, Nature & the Geography of Difference. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Blackwell Publishers Inc. 1996. Page 6.]
          “My aim is to look at the current condition of global capitalism and the role that a ‘new’ imperialism might be playing within it. I do so from the perspective of the long duree and through the lens of what I call historical-geographical materialism. I seek to uncover some of the deeper transformations occurring beneath all the surface turbulence and volatility, and so open up a terrain of debate as to how we might best interpret and react to our present situation.” [David Harvey. The New Imperialism. Oxford, England, and New York: Oxford University Press. 2003. Page 1.]
          “We can … interpret neoliberalization either as a utopian project to realize a theoretical design for the reorganization of international capitalism or as a political project to re-establish the conditions for capital accumulation and to restore the power of economic elites. In what follows I shall argue that the second of these objectives has in practice dominated. Neoliberalization has not been very effective in revitalizing global capital accumulation, but it has succeeded remarkably well in restoring, or in some instances (as in Russia and China) creating, the power of an economic elite. The theoretical utopianism of neoliberal argument has, I conclude, primarily worked as a system of justification and legitimation for whatever needed to be done to achieve this goal. The evidence suggests, moreover, that when neoliberal principles clash with the need to restore or sustain elite power, then the principles are either abandoned or become so twisted as to be unrecognizable. This in no way denies the power of ideas to act as a force for historical-geographical change. But it does point to a creative tension between the power of neoliberal ideas and the actual practices of neoliberalization that have transformed how global capitalism has been working over the last three decades.” [David Harvey. A Brief History of Neoliberalism. Oxford, England, and New York: Oxford University Press. 2007. Page 19.]
          “… I want to re-emphasize the value of the geographical standpoint in understanding contemporary processes of globalization.… A well-grounded historical-geographical materialism teaches us that globalization is the product of these distinctive processes of the production of space on the ground under capitalism. The question is not, therefore, what can an understanding of globalization tell us about geography but what can an understanding of geographical principles tell us about globalization, its successes and its failures, its specific forms of creative destruction, and the political discontents and resistances to which it gives rise. Above all, a better understanding of those geographical principles can surely help bring together the vast array of oppositional movements, currently geographically fragmented as well as unevenly developed, that offer hope for and aspire to some alternative.” [David Harvey, “Globalization and the ‘Spatial Fix.’” Geographische Revue. Open access. Volume 3, issue 2, 2001. Pages 23-30.]
          “Value internalizes the whole historical geography of innumerable labour processes set up under conditions of or in relation to capital accumulation in the space-time of the world market. Many are surprised to find that [Karl] Marx’s most fundamental concept is ‘immaterial but objective’ given the way he is usually depicted as a materialist for whom anything immaterial would be anathema. This relational definition of value, I note in passing, renders moot if not misplaced all those attempts to come up with some direct and essentialist measure of it. Social relations can only ever be measured by their effects.” [David Harvey, “Space as a Keyword.” David Harvey: A Critical Reader. Noel Castree and Derek Gregory, editors. Malden, Massachusetts: Blackwell Publishing Ltd. 2006. Page 289.]
          “What I really wanted to do was to take some very basic geographical concepts – space, time, place, environment – and show that they are central to any kind of historical-geographical materialist understanding of the world. In other words, that we have to think of a historical-geographical materialism, and that we need some concept of dialectics for that.” [David Harvey. Spaces of Capital: Towards a Critical Geography. New York: Routledge. 2001. Page 17.]
          “[David] Harvey continues to argue for a revised ‘post-Marxist’ approach in human geography which remains based on Hegelian-Marxian principles of dialectical thought. This article develops a critique of that stance, drawing on the work of Jacques Derrida, Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari. I argue that dialectical thinking, as well as Harvey’s version of ‘post-Marxism,’ has been undermined by the wide-ranging ‘post-’ critique. I suggest that Harvey has failed to appreciate the full force of this critique and the implications it has for ‘post-Marxist’ ontology and epistemology. I argue that ‘post-Marxism,’ along with much contemporary human geography, is constrained by an inflexible ontology which excessively prioritizes space in the theory produced, and which implements inflexible concepts.” [Andrew Jones, “Dialectics and difference: against Harvey’s dialectical ‘post-Marxism.’” Abstract. Progress in Human Geography. Volume 23, number 4. Pages 529-555.]
          “For [Karl] Marx, the basis of historical geographical materialism resides in the ontological (foundational) view that ‘production’ is the basis of all social life and of history. ‘Production’ has to be understood here in the broadest possible sense. It refers to any human activity of formation and transformation of nature and includes physical, material, and social processes as well as the human ideas, views, and desires through which this transformation takes place. In this sense, human beings produce (change) their own lives as well as their social and physical environment.” [Erik Swyngedouw, “The Marxian Alternative: Historical-Geographical Materialism and the Political Economy of Capitalism.” A Companion to Economic Geography. Eric Sheppard and Trevor J. Barnes, editors. Malden, Massachusetts: Blackwell Publishers Ltd. 2000. Page 44.]
          “It is … with great pleasure that I accompany Professor Cox … into the attic as he sets out to recover an issue that sparked considerable debate in the 1980s, namely the relationship between historical geographical materialism (HGM) and critical realist geographies. He is to be congratulated for recovering this debate and reminding us in systematic fashion of some crucial ontological and epistemological distinctions.” [Michael Samers, “Stirrings in the attic: On the distinction between historical geographical materialism and critical realism.” Dialogues in Human Geography. Volume 3, number 1, 2013. Pages 40-44.]
          “… it becomes clear that, as David Harvey argues, it’s not just what we do to reproduce society, but where we do it that matters in an imperial capitalist world. Harvey laments social theory’s neglect of space and geography, and calls for a ‘historical-geographical materialism’ … in which considerations of space and place are ‘thoroughly integrated into [its] theoretical formulations’ ….” [Susan Ferguson, “Canadian Contributions to Social Reproduction Feminism, Race and Embodied Labor.” Race, Gender & Class. Volume 15, number 1-2, 2008. Pages 42-57.]
          “Drawing on the emerging literature on energy in historical–geographical materialism, I argue that the electricity system in NC [North Carolina] developed, working in conjunction with the state, by finding ways to encourage the mass consumption of electricity to match its increasing production. What emerged as a stable configuration between electric utilities, consumers, and the state began to unravel in the 1970s, and a new arrangement developed that ultimately led to higher electricity prices and high levels of debt in some Eastern NC towns. What remained, however, was an infrastructure geared towards mass production of electricity, and a group of customers whose electricity consumption had been cultivated and encouraged for many years.” [Conor Harrison, “The historical–geographical construction of power: electricity in Eastern North Carolina.” Local Environment: The International Journal of Justice and Sustainability. Volume 18, number 4, 2013. Pages 469-486.]
          “Local socio-ecologies were at once transformed by human labor power (itself a force of nature) and brought into sustained dialogue with each other. The historical-geographical specificity of this dialogue and this transformation, as we shall see, was decisively shaped by capitalism’s peculiar crystallization of wealth—especially the centrality of monetary accumulation—and its related town-country antagonism.” [Jason W. Moore, “Capitalism as World-Ecology: Braudel and Marx on Environmental History.” Organization & Environment. Volume 16, number 4, December 2003. Pages 431-458.]
          “The state looms large in recent writings on globalization and geographically uneven development. From a historical materialist standpoint, one of the more interesting features of this literature has been the way in which it has secreted a particular version of the relation between the political and the economic and also a particular understanding of the world’s changing political geography. This view, however, has assumed a number of different forms.” [Kevin R. Cox, “Globalization, uneven development and capital: reflections on reading Thomas Friedman’s The World Is Flat.” Cambridge Journal of Regions, Economy and Society. Volume 1, number 3, 2008. Pages 1-22.]
          “In the final part of the article, I argue that [Murray] Bookchin’s more salvageable insights, particularly his more qualified position developed in recentworks, need to be drawn into dialogue with the increasingly rich dialogue that has opened up of late between ‘historical-geographical-materialism’ and poststructuralism ….” [Damian Finbar White, “Hierarchy, Domination, Nature: Considering Bookchin’s Critical Social Theory.” Organization & Environment. Volume 16, number 1, March 2003. Pages 34-65.]
          “David Harvey has established himself as one of the most insightful and politically relevant social scientists on the left. By extending Marxian political economy into new spheres of social reality – such as the urban environment and space – he has been able to make significant contributions to our understanding of the ways that capitalism shapes everyday life.” [Michael J. Thompson, “A Brief History of Neoliberalism.” Review article. Democratiya. Volume 3, winter 2005. Pages 22-27.]
      23. postanarchism or poststructuralist anarchism (Andrew M. Koch, Saul Newman, Todd May, Michael Truscello, Richard J. F. Day, Hakim Bey [Arabic/ʿArabiyyaẗ, حَكِيم بَاي, Ḥakīm Bāy, the pen name of Peter Lamborn Wilson], Jason Adams, and others): Somewhat analogous to post-Marxism, Koch, Newman, May, Truscello, and Day apply the philosophy of poststructuralism to anarchism. Other versions of postanarchism are also referenced. The term, hyphenated as “post–anarchism,” was coined by Bey.
          “Those who base their attacks on post-structuralism in the claim that the denial of a singular subjectivity makes the formulation of an ethics of resistance impossible misunderstand the focus of the post-structuralist argument. Resistance is formulated against a background of plurality. It is plurality that cultural and political institutions oppose as they promote one form of subjectivity over another. This is precisely why post-structuralism can support liberation movements even though a specific definition of power remains elusive. The struggle for liberation has the character of political resistance to a process of semantic and metaphorical reductionism that serves the interests of control and manipulation.
          “Ultimately, post-structuralism offers a new opportunity to reformulate the claims of anarchism. By demonstrating how political oppression is linked to the larger cultural processes of knowledge production and cultural representation, post-structuralism conveys a logic of opposition. By defending uniqueness and diversity, post-structuralism stands against any totalizing conception of being. Its liberating potential derives from the deconstruction of any concept that makes oppression appear rational.”
          [Andrew M. Koch, “Post-Structuralism and the Epistemological Basis of Anarchism.” Post-Anarchism: A Reader. Duane Rousselle and Süreyyya Evren, editors. London and New York: Pluto Press. 2011. Pages 23-40.]
          “For [Saul] Newman …, postanarchism is a project that promises to radicalize and renew anarchism, a kind of deconstructive enterprise that works at the limits of anarchism. Insisting on the always ‘heterodox’ and ‘diffuse’ character of anarchism, Newman … nevertheless charges that certain predominant tendencies found within the anarchist tradition need to be decisively abandoned – the essentialism of the subject, the universality of reason, the dialectical view of history, the positivism, the naive approach to power, the attachment to necessity in history and to the idea of progress – in short, an Enlightenment humanism that can no longer withstand the strong questioning provided by postmodernism.” [Chamsy el-Ojeili, “Anarchism as the Contemporary Spirit of Anti-Capitalism? A Critical Survey of Recent Debates.” Critical Sociology. Volume 40, number 3, May 2014. Pages 451-468.]
          “… I have given a brief summary of the main implications of poststructuralist and psychoanalytic theory for classical anarchism, implications that, I would argue, should be taken into account in any attempt to renew anarchism as radical politics. What emerges here is an understanding of anarchism that retains a political and ethical commitment to equal liberty, anti-authoritarianism and solidarity, but that is no longer reliant on ontological foundations in science, biology, human nature or universal rationality. What emerges through this deconstruction, then, is a post-foundational understanding of anarchism: anarchism, no longer as a science, but as a politics. This is what I propose we call postanarchism.” [Saul Newman, “Postanarchism: a politics of anti-politics.” Journal of Political Ideologies. Volume 16, number 3, October 2011. Pages 313-327.]
          “… anarchism—as a form of political theory and practice—is becoming increasingly important to radical struggles and global social movements today, to a large extent supplanting Marxism. Postanarchism seeks to revitalise anarchist theory in light of these new struggles and forms of resistance. However, rather than dismissing the tradition of classical anarchism, postanarchism, on the contrary, seeks to explore its potential and radicalise its possibilities. It remains entirely consistent, I would suggest, with the libertarian and egalitarian horizon of anarchism; yet it seeks to broaden the terms of anti-authoritarian thought to include a critical analysis of language, discourse, culture and new modalities of power. In this sense, postanarchism does not understand post to mean being ‘after’ anarchism, but post in the sense of working at and extending the limits of anarchist thought by uncovering its heterogeneous and unpredictable possibilities.” [Saul Newman, “Editorial: Postanarchism.” Anarchist Studies. Volume 16, number 2, autumn–winter 2008. Pages 101-105.]
          “I propose that if indeed we are to take anarchy seriously, then we have to entertain the possibility of an ontological anarchism rather than merely a political anarchism. Anarchism, in other words, should not see itself as a science of social relations based on the firm foundations of humanity, reason and morality. Rather, I maintain that an anarchist approach to IR [international relations] finds its strongest affinity with post-positivist, post-foundational and poststructuralist perspectives. Thus, the project of taking anarchy in IR seriously is given theoretical expression through what I call postanarchism, which affirms a contingent space of political action without ontological guarantees.” [Saul Newman, “Crowned Anarchy: Postanarchism and International Relations Theory.” Millennium: Journal of International Studies. Volume 40, number 2, 2012. Pages 259-278.]
          “… [A] new form of politics demands a certain reconsideration of anarchism. I would like to understand anarchism – or as I conceive of it, postanarchism – as a new way of thinking about the politics of space and planning, one that I see as becoming more relevant today. This no doubt appears a strange undertaking. Anarchism is usually associated with a kind of wild disordering of space, as a politics and practice of disruption and spontaneous insurgency – the very opposite of planning. Should we not recall the nineteenth-century anarchist Mikhail Bakunin’s dictum about the ‘urge to destroy’? However, we should remember that, for Bakunin, this ‘urge to destroy’ was also a ‘creative urge.’ Anarchism is as much a project of construction and creation as it is about destruction.” [Saul Newman, “Postanarchism and space: Revolutionary fantasies and autonomous zones.” Planning Theory. Volume 10, number 4, 2011. Pages 344-365.]
          “Postanarchism, in contrast to much of the political theory tradition, is a politics and ethics of indifference to Power. Indeed, I insist on a fundamental distinction between politics and power here. And, rather than seeking to establish new kinds of political institutions or normative foundations, postanarchism affirms the immanent capacity for autonomous life and the ever-present possibility of freedom.” [Saul Newman. Postanarchism. Malden, Massachusetts: Polity Press. 2016. Page 12.]
          “Postanarchism is anarchism that starts, rather than necessarily ends, with anarchy. This means that it does not have a specific ideological shape and that it may take different forms and follow different courses of action. It might resist and contest specific relations of power at localized points of intensity, on the basis of their illegitimacy and violence; it might work against certain institutions and institutional practices through creating alternative practices and forms of organization. In other words, taking anarchy or non-power as its starting point, postanarchism, as a form of autonomous thinking and acting, can work on multiple fronts, in a variety of different settings, producing reversals and interruptions of existing relations of domination.” [Saul Newman. Postanarchism. Malden, Massachusetts: Polity Press. 2016. Page 23.]
          “Postanarchism is not a specific form of politics; it offers no actual programme or directives. It is not even a particular theory of politics as such. Nor should it be seen as an abandonment or movement beyond anarchism; it does not signify a ‘being after’ anarchism. On the contrary, postanarchism is a project of radicalising and renewing the politics of anarchism – of thinking anarchism as a politics. Let us understand postanarchism as a kind of deconstruction. Deconstruction is, for [Jacques] Derrida, a ‘methodology’ aimed at interrogating and unmasking the conceptual hierarchies, binary oppositions and aporias in philosophy – its moments of inconsistency and self-contradiction.” [Saul Newman. The Politics of Postanarchism. Edinburgh, Scotland: Edinburgh University Press. 2010. Pages 4-5.]
          “These … are the four main criticisms of classical anarchism by postanarchism: it focuses too much on the state; it offers an inadequate theory of power; it relies too heavily on a humanist ontology; and it misunderstands the nature of politics. I will argue … that each of these criticisms of classical anarchism had already been articulated in certain (but not identical) ways by Marxism—and, hence, rather than dismissing Marxism, postanarchists should turn to it for insights.” [Simon Choat, “Politics, power and the state: a Marxist response to postanarchism.” Journal of Political Ideologies. Volume 18, number 3, October 2013. Pages 328-347.]
          “[Saul] Newman’s book was published within the post-Seattle ‘New Anarchism’ euphoria which granted immediate and almost unconditional interest to anything hyped as ‘anarchist’ and ‘new’; and (3) Newman had come up with a fancy and intriguing label for his position, namely that of ‘postanarchism’ – a label he continues to promote and has most recently defined as indicating ‘a project of renewing the anarchist tradition through a critique of essentialist identities and the assertion instead of the contingency of politics’ ….” [Gabriel Kuhn, “Anarchism, postmodernity, and poststructuralism.” Contemporary Anarchist Studies: An introductory anthology of anarchy in the academy. Randall Amster, Abraham DeLeon, Luis A. Fernandez, Anthony J. Nocella, II, and Deric Shannon, editors. London and New York: Routledge imprint of Taylor & Francis Group, an Informa PLC business. 2009. Pages 18-25.]
          “More recently, postanarchists, such as Saul Newman, have highlighted important meta-ethical differences between the various anarchist constellations. In particular there is tension between the universalism of moral realism (that moral statements are objectively verifiable based on universal standards) and narrow subjectivist positions (right and wrong are based on individual opinion). The strengths and weaknesses of these competing meta-ethical presuppositions are assessed to show that neither moral realism nor subjectivism are a sufficient to ground anti-hierarchical ethics. In their place a multi-functionalist alternative (that values can be assessed in relation to particular arenas, which intersect, and whose standards adapt) is proposed.” [Benjamin Franks, “Postanarchism and Meta-Ethics.” Anarchist Studies. Volume 16, number 2, autumn–winter 2008. Pages 135-153.]
          “If the foregoing account is correct, we have established two claims: 1) that poststructuralist anarchism does indeed possess ethical commitments undergirding its political analyses; and 2) that those commitments are not foreign to contemporary ethical discourse (although, if accepted with the seriousness that poststructuralists propose, they would introduce significant changes into our current ethical practice). As yet, though, the deeper question remains unanswered. Does poststructuralist political theory allow for the possibility of ethical judgment at all? The Critical Theorists’ answer is in the negative, in good part because they see the necessity for ethical commitments beneath all practice rather than within the network of practices. What must be accomplished, then, if poststructuralism is to be redeemed as a political theory, is the construction of a view of ethics as a practice, with its own power relationships, and yet one that allows for the possibility of judging other practices. The metaethical considerations that follow provide a ground for those practices called ‘ethics‚ by [Michel] Foucault (practices of the self) and [Gilles] Deleuze (the affirmation of life), yet avoid the problem of the domination of one monolithic practice that concerns [Jean-François] Lyotard in his attempt to offer an ethics.” [Todd May. The Political Philosophy of Poststructuralist Anarchism. University Park, Pennsylvania: The Pennsylvania State University Press. 1994. Page 76.]
          “The attributes of the bazaar software development model share theoretical homologies with what Todd May calls ‘tactical poststructuralist anarchism,’ and an examination of some prominent forms of poststructuralist anarchism will provide the necessary bridge in this analysis from the discourse of software engineering to the political philosophy of poststructuralist anarchism.” [Michael Truscello, “The Architecture of Information: Open Source Software and Tactical Poststructuralist Anarchism.” Postmodern Culture. Volume 13, number 3, May 2003. Online publication. No pagination.]
          “… the radical impulse of post-1968 French theory—the impulse to create alternatives to the state and corporate forms rather than just work within them—seems to have been lost. I see myself as contributing to a small but growing body of work in postanarchism and autonomist marxism that seeks to recover this impulse, by articulating how a non-reformist, nonrevolutionary politics can in fact lead to progressive social change that responds to the needs and aspirations of disparate identities without attempting to subsume them under a common project.
          “As valuable as the dissemination of poststructuralist critique has been, its insights are often presented in language that is accessible only to academics, and then only to those academics who have steeped themselves in some rather difficult texts and traditions. In recognition of this problem I have set out to write a book that will be of interest to activist-minded academics while remaining accessible to theoretically-minded activists. I see this effort as an attempt at creating what Gilles Deleuze and Michel Foucault have called ‘relays.’”
          [Richard J. F. Day. Gramsci is Dead: Anarchist Currents in the Newest Social Movements. London and Ann Arbor, Michigan: Pluto Press. 2005. page 10.]
          “The despatialization of post-Industrial society provides some benefits (e.g. computer networking) but can also manifest as a form of oppression (homelessness, gentrification, architectural depersonalization, the erasure of Nature, etc.) The communes of the sixties tried to circumvent these forces but failed. The question of land refuses to go away. How can we separate the concept of space from the mechanisms of control? The territorial gangsters, the Nation/States, have hogged the entire map. Who can invent for us a cartography of autonomy, who can draw a map that includes our desires?” [Hakim Bey. Post-Anarchism Anarchy. Berkeley, California: The Anarchist Library imprint of Open Guild Organization. 1987. Page 4.]
          “Postanarchism is today found not only in abstract radical theory but also in the living practice of such groups as the No Border movements, People’s Global Action, the Zapatistas, the Autonomen and other such groups that while clearly ‘antiauthoritarian’ in orientation, do not explicitly identify with anarchism as an ideological tradition so much as they identify with its general spirit in their own unique and varying contexts, which are typically informed by a wide array of both contemporary and classical radical thinkers.
          “Interestingly enough, all of this is to a surprising degree quite in line with the very origin of the term in Hakim Bey’s 1987 essay ‘Post-Anarchism Anarchy.’ In this essay, he argues that the thing that is keeping anarchism from becoming relevant to the truly excluded of society, which is also the thing driving so many truly anti-authoritarian people away from anarchism, is that it has become so caught up in its own tightly bordered ideologies and sects that it has ultimately mistaken the various doctrines and ‘traditions’ of anarchism for the lived experience of anarchy itself.”
          [Jason Adams. Postanarchism in a Nutshell. Berkeley, California: The Anarchist Library imprint of Open Guild Organization. 2003. Page 5.]
          “[The] epistemological characterization of post-anarchism has held sway for far too long. It is not by chance that post-anarchism, as a concept, was first formulated by Hakim Bey as an ‘ontological anarchism,’ and subsequently repressed by the canon of post-anarchist authors. Perhaps Bey’s ontological anarchism also lacked the ‘rigour’ required of today’s scholarly audience and for these two reasons (at least) he has received very little credit for his inaugurating efforts into post-anarchism. In any case, I want to challenge this reluctance and revive the roots of post-anarchism.” [Duane Rousselle, “What Comes After Post-Anarchism? Reviewing The Democracy of Objects.” continent. Volume 2, number 2, 2012. Pages 152-154.]
      24. sociology of action (Alain Touraine as pronounced in this MP3 audio file): Societies determine their own futures through social struggles against structural mechanisms.
          “My main initial interest in social movements came from trying to rescue these kinds of studies from an economic determinism. It was important to incorporate them or to rebuild them as part of a sociology of action, in the broadest sense of the word.…
          “If you consider the present day, many observers and analysts would say the main countries, the main collective actions and the main production of ideas are located around the idea of globalization. By this I mean a transformation of capitalism and not the transformation of civil society or economic society.”
          [Alain Touraine, “The Importance of Social Movements.” Social Movement Studies. Volume 1, number 1, 2002. Pages 89-95.]
          “We observe that social actors are no longer characterized by social or economic categories, by class, skill, level of education, by which they were defined and which were supposed to give a central meaning to their behavior.
          “A growing number of sociologists recognize the radical importance of such a rupture with classical social theory. Its most dramatic result is that there is no more correspondence between social organization and personal or collective action. In a strict sense, social actors are disappearing. The only way to go out of such a purely negative definition of our situation is to introduce the idea that actors can no longer define themselves by their social situation and must do it by their relation to themselves, by their capacity to refer to themselves as subjects.”
          [Alain Touraine, “The Subject Is Coming Back.” International Journal of Politics, Culture, and Society. Volume 18, 2005. Pages 199-209.]
      25. racialized social systems theory (Eduardo Bonilla-Silva as pronounced in this MP3 audio file): He examines the structural grammar of racism.
          “I contend that the central problem of the various approaches to the study of racial phenomena is their lack of a structural theory of racism.… I advance a structural theory of racism based on the notion of racialized social systems.…
          “Rather than viewing racism as an all-powerful ideology that explains all racial phenomena in a society, I use the term racism only to describe the racial ideology of a racialized social system. That is, racism is only part of a larger racial system.…
          “… If racism, viewed as an ideology, were seen as possessing a structural foundation, its examination could be associated with racial practices rather than with mere ideas and the problem of circularity would be avoided.”
          [Eduardo Bonilla-Silva, “Rethinking Racism: Toward a Structural Interpretation.” American Sociological Review. Volume 62, number 3, June 1997. Pages 465-480.]
          “… I argue that races exist as a social phenomenon wherever a racial structure is in place-that is, wherever there are social, political, and ideological practices that produce differential status between racialized social groups (races). Racial (and class or gender) consciousness is always a contingent matter in all social collectivities. Consciousness thus cannot be taken as the factor determining whether races have a social existence.”
          [Eduardo Bonilla-Silva, “The Essential Social Fact of Race.” American Sociological Review. Volume 64, number 6, December 1999. Pages 899-906.]
          “First, if racial ideology furnishes the material that is spoken and argued, the racial grammar provides the ‘deep structure’ or the ‘logic’ and ‘rules’ for proper composition of racial statements and, more importantly, what can be seen, understood, or even felt about racial matters. Second, although we learn ‘proper grammar’ in school, grammar is truly acquired through social interaction and communication …. Accordingly, we absorb what I call ‘racial grammar’ mostly through social intercourse.” [Eduardo Bonilla-Silva, “The Invisible Weight of Whiteness: The Racial Grammar of Everyday Life in America.” Michigan Sociological Review Volume 26, fall 2012. Pages 1-15.]
          “[U.S. President Barack H.] Obama eschewed the need for structural solutions to racial problems. Instead, he proposed an abstract liberal resolution to racial inequality: ‘to bind our particular grievances—for better health care, and better schools, and better jobs—to the larger aspirations of all Americans—the white woman struggling to break the glass ceiling, the white man who’s been laid off, the immigrant trying to feed his family.’ He also challenged blacks to step up morally: ‘It means taking responsibility for our own lives by demanding more from our fathers and spending more time with our children.’” [Eduardo Bonilla-Silva, “The Sweet Enchantment of Color-Blind Racism in Obamerica.” The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science. Volume 634, March 2011. Pages 190-206.]
          “… although ‘honorary Whites’ will probably serve as a buffer for social conflict and even as agents in the reproduction of the logic of White supremacy, it is important to point out their structural vulnerability. Thus, activists must do politics with them.We must make them conscious that no matter how hard they work to be White-like, their near-Whiteness is totally dependent upon the whims of the dominant White strata. Hence, under certain conditions, this structural vulnerability can be exploited by politically savvy organizers to develop solidarity between honorary Whites and the collective Black.” [Eduardo Bonilla-Silva, “Where is the love?: A rejoinder by Bonilla-Silva on the Latin Americanization thesis.” Race & Society. Volume 5, 2002. Pages 103-114.]
          “First, I make a strong case for shifting the paradigm for examining actors’ racial views from the individualistic framework of the prejudice paradigm to the group-based framework of the racial ideology paradigm. Second, … I propose a conceptual apparatus to explicate how we ought to conceive and study racial ideology. I anchor my theorization on a structural interpretation of ‘racism’ and the work on ideology and discourse …. Third, I illustrate the components and primary social functions of racial ideology with contemporary examples of ‘colour blind racism’ ….” [Eduardo Bonilla-Silva, “Racial attitudes or racial ideology?: An alternative paradigm for examining actors’ racial views.” Journal of Political Ideologies. Volume 8, number 1, 2003. Pages 63-82.]
      26. structural theory of imperialism (Johan Galtung): He examines the structural violence of economic imperialism.
          “… imperialism and dominance will fall like dominoes when the capitalistic conditions for economic imperialism no longer obtain. According to the view we develop here, imperialism is a more general structural relationship between two collectivities, and has to be understood at a general level in order to be understood and counteracted in its more specific manifestations – just like smallpox is better understood in a context of a theory of epidemic diseases, and these diseases better understood in a context of general pathology.
          “Briefly stated, imperialism is a system that splits up collectivities and relates some of the parts to each other in relations of harmony of interest, and other parts in relations of disharmony of interest, or conflict of interest.”
          [Johan Galtung, “A Structural Theory of Imperialism.” Journal of Peace Research. Volume 8, number 2, 1971. Pages 81-117.]
      27. theory of state autonomy (Theda Skocpol as pronounced in this MP3 audio file): Social revolutions can be explained by social structures and their states.
          “State organizations necessarily compete to some extent with the dominant class(es) in appropriating resources from the economy and society. And the objectives to which the resources, once appropriated, are devoted may very well be at variante with existing dominant-class interests. Resources may be used to strengthen the bulk and autonomy of the state itself—something necessarily threatening to the dominant class unless the greater state power is indispensably needed and actually used to support dominant-class interests. But the use of state power to support dominant-class interests is not inevitable. Indeed, attempts of state rulers merely to perform the state’s ‘own’ functions may create conflicts of interest with the dominant class. The state normally performs two basic sets of tasks: It maintains order, and it competes with other actual or potential states. As Marxists have pointed out, states usually do function to preserve existing economic and class structures, for that is normally the smoothest way to enforce order. Nevertheless, the state has its own distinct interests vis-à-vis subordinate classes. Although both the state and the dominant class(es) share a broad interest in keeping the subordinate classes in place in society and at work in the existing economy, the state’s own fundamental interest in maintaining sheer physical order and political peace may lead it—especially in periods of crisis—to enforce concessions to subordinate-class demands. These concessions may be at the expense of the interests of the dominant class, but not contrary to the state’s own interests in controlling the population and collecting taxes and military recruits.” [Theda Skocpol. States and Social Revolutions: A Comparative Analysis of France, Russia, and China. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press. 1979. Page 30.]
          “… the recent Marxist debate on the state stops short on the problem of the autonomy of the state, since most participants in the debate tend either to treat the state in a completely functionalist manner, or to regard it as an aspect of class relations and struggle. It is unquestionably an advance to establish (or reestablish, since this surely was the classical Marxist position) that states are not simply created and manipulated by dominant classes. Nevertheless, it is still essential for Marxists to face more directly the questions of what states are in their own right, and how their structures vary and their activities develop in relation to socioeconomic structures. So far, virtually all Marxists continue simply to assume that state forms and activities vary in one-to-one correspondence with modes of production, and that state rulers cannot possibly act against the basic interests of a dominant class. Arguments remain confined to issues of how states vary with, and function for, modes of production and dominant classes, so that still hardly anyone questions this Marxist version of the enduring sociological proclivity to absorb the state into society.” [Theda Skocpol, “Old Regimes and Revolutionary Crises in France, Russia, and China.” Theory and Society. Volume 7, number 1/2, January–March 1979. Pages 7-95.]
      28. class–struggle theory (Simon Clarke): Class struggle is the very reason for the state’s existence.
          “The central theme of this work is the argument that the subordination of the worker to the capitalist in the labour process is not imposed by capitalist technology, however much the attempt to impose such subordination is a consideration in the design of that technology, but is only imposed through a constant struggle over the subordination of the productive activity of the ‘collective labourer’ to the expanded reproduction of capital. This is not simply an ‘economic’ struggle, but is more fundamentally a social struggle, a struggle over the reproduction of the worker as a worker for capital, a struggle on the part of capital to decompose the ‘collective labourer’ as the self-consciously organised subject of the labour process and to recompose it as the object of capitalist exploitation. This struggle extends far beyond the factory, to embrace all aspects of the social reproduction of the working class. In this sense struggles around housing and urban planning, patterns of consumption, gender relations and the family, transport, leisure and the state are all aspects of the struggle over the reproduction of capitalist class relations. This generalisation of the class struggle, in the attempt to secure the subordination of the working class to capital beyond the workplace, has developed historically in response to the attempt of the working class to preserve its social autonomy, to the extent that the autonomists referred to society as the ‘social factory.’” [Simon Clarke, “The State Debate.” The State Debate. Simon Clarke, editor. Houndmills, Basingstoke, England: Macmillan Academic and Professional Ltd. 1991. Pages 1-108.]
          “Simon Clarke moves the class struggle theory [branch of structural Marxism] even further. The raison d’être [MP3 audio file] of the state lies in class struggle.” [Raju J. Das, “State Theories: A Critical Analysis.” Science & Society. Volume 6, number 1, Spring 1996. Pages 27-57.]
          “A problem of these debates on state power and structure was that its generally high level of abstraction went at the cost of historical precision and empirical operationalization. The ‘new class struggle’ approach ([of Simon] Clarke …) tried to compensate by placing class and state at different levels of abstraction, as respectively general and historical forms of domination, while holding that social democracy and the welfare state were means to fragment and demobilize class struggle.” [Guglielmo Meardi, “The strange non-retreat of the state: implications for the sociology of work.” Work, Employment & Society. Volume 30, number 4, August 2016. Pages 559-572.]
      29. third-wave feminism (Judith Butler and many others): This approach to feminism, which draws upon poststructuralism, is sometimes referred to as post-feminism or post-structuralist feminism.
          “Even as I opposed what I took to be the heterosexism at the core of sexual difference fundamentalism, I also drew from French poststructuralism to make my points. My work in Gender Trouble turned out to be on U.S. theories of gender and the political predicaments of feminism. If in some of its guises, poststructuralism appears as a formalism, aloof from questions of social context and political aim, that has not been the case with its more recent American appropriations. Indeed, my point was not to ‘apply’ poststructuralism to feminism, but to subject those theories to a specifically feminist reformulation.Whereas some defenders of poststructuralist formalism express dismay at the avowedly ‘thematic’ orientation it receives in works such as Gender Trouble, the critiques of poststructuralism within the cultural Left have expressed strong skepticism toward the claim that anything politically progressive can come of its premises. In both accounts, however, poststructuralism is considered something unified, pure, and monolithic. In recent years, however, that theory, or set of theories, has migrated into gender and sexuality studies, postcolonial and race studies. It has lost the formalism sexuality studies, postcolonial and race studies. It has lost the formalism of its earlier instance and acquired a new and transplanted life in the domain of cultural theory.” [Judith Butler. Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity. London and New York: Routledge imprint of Taylor & Francis Group, an Informa PLC business. Pages viii-ix.]
          “… a third wave feminist definition of femininity can be characterised as one that begins with an assumption that femininity is a set of cultural or social ideals concerning what a girl or woman should be. Femininity is not so much imposed on women or embodied by women as a result of their subordination, but instead, available to and can be embodied by anyone. This third wave definition of femininity draws on Judith Butler’s … conceptualisation of gender [in her book, Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity] as discursive, relational, and performative. For Butler, gender identities are a discursive construction of what women and men should be.…
          “Third wave definitions of femininity acknowledge that, in a male or masculine dominant social system, most available discourses on femininity situate the feminine as subordinate to the masculine. Third wave feminist perspectives view femininity not as an outward, bodily expression of subjugation, but instead as a corporeal performance of a discursively produced and contested set of criteria for being a woman within the structural conditions of gender inequality.”
          [Mimi Schippers and Erin Grayson Sapp, “Reading Pulp Fiction: Femininity and power in second and third wave feminist theory.” Feminist Theory. Volume 13, number 1, 2012. Pages 27-42.]
          “In post-feminist discourse, … the fear of the feminist arises from the fact that, at some level, an identification with the feminist has in fact already been made. Thus, the tendency to think of third wave feminism as a specifically young feminism separate from the second wave could be seen as tying in with a logic of disidentification with second wave feminism which is in fact complicit with dominant post/anti-feminist discourses. In this sense, the characterization of second wave feminism as domineering, prescriptive and constraining invokes the very same mythical figure of the (hairy, dungaree-clad) feminist invoked in post/anti-feminist discourse.” [Jonathan Dean, “Who’s Afraid of Third Wave Feminism?: On the Uses of the ‘Third Wave’ in British Feminist Politics.” International Feminist Journal of Politics. Volume 11, number 3, September 2009. Pages 334-352.]
          “… like other third wavers, I seek a way of being in the world, of being feminist in the world that allows more room for stretching and spreading my feminism. Like other third wavers, I seek to negotiate my own space in this modern, global, technology-driven, dauntingly pluralistic world. For me, that space is located somewhere between second- and third-wave feminism. For many of them, that space is located somewhere between the rock that has been second-wave feminism [‘liberal’ feminism], and the hard place that feminism and its dissidents have led us to.” [Amber E. Kinser, “Negotiating Spaces for/through Third-Wave Feminism.” NWSA Journal (renamed in 2010 to Feminist Formations). Volume 16, number 3, autumn 2004. Pages 124-153.]
          “Contrasting with the liberal ‘politics of reform’ framework, the structuralist ‘politics of revolution’ and the post-structuralist ‘politics of reinscription’ framings, have, in contrast, presented much richer, albeit varied, accounts of resistance, power and agency in explanations of women’s oppression and struggles for emancipation. In general, those falling within the politics of revolution frame view ‘woman’ as a socially and politically constructed category, the ontological basis of which lies in a set of experiences rooted in the material world. It is this shared experience of oppression that unites women and acts as the catalyst for collective action by women.…
          “Rather than ringing the death knell for feminism, however, post-structuralist feminism emphasizes the importance of recognizing multiple voices.”
          [Robyn Thomas, “What Have the Feminists Done for Us?: Feminist Theory and Organizational Resistance.” Organization. Volume 12, number 5, September 2005. Pages 711-740.]
      30. radical structuralist paradigm (Gibson Burrell, Sally Tomlinson and others): The perspective applies structural Marxism within organizational analysis, organizational theory, and, later, additional subject areas. The other “paradigms” are the functionalist, the interpretivist, and the radical humanist.
          “Gibson Burrell sees himself as a radical structuralist. Clearly, you [Gareth Morgan] seem to have pursued a radical humanist approach. Is this the sort of magic that made those paradigms come alive in both a critical and appreciative sense?” [Albert Mills (interviewer), “Aurora Online with Gareth Morgan: Sociological Paradigms and Organizational Analysis.” Aurora. Issue 1990 (year).]
          “The radical structural paradigm takes a large-scale or macroscopic, objective, and realist view of the social world, assuming that there is a real social world in which conflict, coercion and domination predominate. … [A]ll [radical structural] approaches have in common the belief that society of characterized by fundamental social, political and economic conflicts, which have the potentiality, as they are worked through, to generate radical social change. Optimistic radical structuralists believe that if people can better understand the social structures and forces they live with, they will be better able to emancipate themselves from unfair discrimination and the influence of the powerful.” [Sally Tomlinson. The Politics of Race, Class and Special Education: The Selected Works of Sally Tomlinson. London and New York: Routledge imprint of Taylor & Francis Group, an Informa PLC business. 2014. Pages 75-76.]
          “The radical structuralist paradigm has, like the functionalist paradigm, an objectivistic assumption of the social science. However, unlike the functionalist paradigm, it is concerned with man’s emancipation. The same goes for the radical humanist paradigm, which, however, has a subjectivist standpoint. Thus, researchers in this paradigm seek to emancipate through changing cognition and consciousness, while the radical structuralist paradigm seeks to change structural relations.” [Anders Örtenblad, “Organizational learning: a radical perspective.” International Journal of Management Reviews. Volume 4, issue 1. Pages 87-100.]
          “The radical structuralist paradigm assumes that reality is objective and concrete. It uses scientific methods to find the order that prevails in the phenomenon. It views society as a potentially dominating force. This paradigm is based on four central notions. First, there is the notion of totality, i.e., the phenomenon as a whole. This notion emphasizes that the totality shapes and is present in all its constituent parts. Second, there is the notion of structure. The focus is upon the configurations of social relationships, called structures. The third notion is that of contradiction. Structures, or social formations, contain contradictory and antagonistic relationships within them which act as seeds of their own decay. The fourth notion is that of crisis. Contradictions within a given totality reach a point at which they can no longer be contained. The resulting political and economic crises indicate the point of transformation from one totality to another, in which one set of structures is replaced by another of a fundamentally different nature.” [Kavous Ardalan, “Globalization and Global Governance: Four Paradigmatic Views.” American Review of Political Economy. Volume 8, number 1, June 2010. Pages 6-43.]
          “The reality defined by the radical structuralist paradigm is predicated upon a view of society as a potentially dominating force. However, it is tied to a materialist conception of the social world, which is defined by hard, concrete, real structures. Reality is seen as existing on its own account independently of the way in which it is perceived and reaffirmed by people in everyday activities. Emphasis is placed upon the importance of praxis as a means of transcending this domination. Each of these four paradigms defines the grounds of opposing modes of social analysis and has radically different implications for the study of organizations. Here organizations are instruments of domination and schismatic.” [Douglas K. Peterson, “Paradigms Found: Phronesis and Pragmatic Humanism for International and Domestic NGOs.” International Business Research. Volume 3, number 4, October 2010. Pages 36-42.]
          “… [The radical structuralist] paradigm owes its major intellectual debt to the work of the mature [Karl] Marx, after the so-called ‘epistemological break’ in his work. It is the paradigm to which Marx turned after a decade of active political involvement and as a result of his increasing interest in Darwinian theories of evolution and in political economy. Man’s basic ideas have been subject to a wide range of interpretations in the hands of theorists who have sought to follow his lead. Among these [Friedrich] Engels, [Georgi] Plekhanov, [Vladimir] Lenin and [Nikolai] Bukharin have been particularly influential. Among the leading exponents of the radical structuralist position outside the realm of Russian social theory, the names of [Louis] Althusser, [Nicos] Poulantzas, [Lucio] Colletti and various Marxist sociologists of the New Left come to mind. Whilst the influence of Marx upon the radical structuralist paradigm is undoubtedly dominant, it is also possible to identify a strong Weberian [i.e., Max Weber] influence.” [Gibson Burrell and Gareth Morgan. Sociological Paradigms and Organisational Analysis: Elements of the Sociology of Corporate Life. Burlington, Vermont: Ashgate Publishing Company. 1992. Page 34.]
          “A more macro focus on existing societal class or industry structures is of prime concern [in the radical structuralist paradigm]. Such structures, however, are seen as objectively real and are taken as instruments of domination … for higher members of the social hierarchy over lower ones. For radical structuralists, organizational conditions are historically specified. Societal and organizational functioning is seen as constrained by social forces stemming from existing dysfunctional structural relationships, which can only be changed through some form of conflict. Because of the asymmetry of these social forces, people are said to have lost control of the means of production (and reproduction) of the material, social, and cultural worlds ….” [Dennis A. Gioia and Evelyn Pitre, “Multiparadigm Perspectives on Theory Building.” Academy of Management Review. Volume 15, number 4, 1990. Pages 584-602.]
          “The paradigm of radical structuralism is concerned in, not only understanding the world, but trying to change it. Its goal is to analyze the structural conflict, the existing modes of domination, contradictions and deprivations. It emphasizes the need for destruction or transcendence of the limitations imposed on the social and organizational arrangements ….” [Cibeli Borba Machado and Nathália Helena Fernandes Laffin, “The Theory of Formal Organization from the Perspective of Burrell and Morgan’s Paradigms.” International Journal of Advances in Management and Economics. Volume 3, issue 1, January–February 2014. Pages 200-207.]
      31. critical structuralism (Jennifer M. Lehmann): This quasi-Durkheimian and quasi-poststructuralist, but not Althusserian, theory develops a perspective on cultural studies at the intersection of structuralism and deconstruction.
          “Unlike deconstruction, critical structuralism suggests that social structures do in fact exist and determine individual behavior, both negatively and positively. Further, social structures are intelligible, social science is possible. Unlike Durkheimian structural functionalism, critical structuralism views these structures as social rather than natural, as structures rather than organisms, and as questionable and mutable rather than necessary and beneficial. Further, knowledge of social structures is problematic and political.…
          “Critical structuralism is located between [David ‘Émile’] Durkheim and deconstruction. It represents a break with subjectivism – collective as well as individual – naturalism, organicism, idealism, essentialism, individualism, voluntarism, mysticism, positivism, empiricism, etc. ” in short, all of the ‘metaphysical’ ideologies of pre-structuralist theory. Yet critical structuralism does not ‘go all the way’ to become post-structuralism.
          “Ontologically, critical structuralism retains the concept of structure – as relational rather than substantial, as complex and contradictory rather than expressive, as specifically social rather than natural, as differentially deleterious rather than beneficial, as mutable rather than necessary, as social structure rather than organism. Epistemologically, critical structuralism retains the concept of science – as production rather than perception, as problematic rather than automatic, as political rather than neutral or objective. Knowledge is an approximate model of structural reality. It is distinguished from ideology by a recognition of the existence of determinative structures, and a criticism of specific social structures, as opposed to either the defense of any structures which exist, or the denial of the existence of any structures.…
          “… Certainly structuralism can recognize the desirability, and the possibility, of deconstructing specific structures – in texts, in reality, and in the relation between ‘texts’ and ‘reality.’ I have called this conjuncture critical structuralism. Another way of describing the conjuncture of structuralism and deconstruction, as well as the orientation of the present work, is the rubric of cultural studies.”
          [Jennifer M. Lehmann. Deconstructing Durkheim: A Post-Post Structuralist Critique. London and New York: Routledge imprint of Taylor & Francis Group, an Informa PLC business. 1993. Pages 5-7.]
          “It is true that, in each society or nation, there are dominant social theories. It is also true that these social theories tend to be conservative and to reproduce the social structures in which they predominate. For this reason, they are canonized, institutionalized, and legitimized. However, while hegemonic, they are not exclusive. There is no dominant social theory without subordinate social theories, theoretical alternatives, and theoretical opposition. To demarcate the dominant social theory within a particular society, to identify it as the ‘sociological tradition’ in that society, can be to support its hegemony, which depends in part on the exclusion of alternative, opposing, critical, transformative social theories.” [Jennifer M. Lehmann, “A Dialectical Response to Levine’s ‘French Tradition.’” The Sociological Quarterly. Volume 42, number 1, winter 2001. Pages 79-84.]
          “[David ‘Émile’] Durkheim counsels that ‘woman should seek for equality in the functions which are commensurate with her nature.’ Along these lines, he establishes the fact of structural sexual difference and describes the contrasting structures of men and women. Given that men and women have different structures, and given that the nature of these structures is known, it becomes possible to specify the appropriate functions that correspond naturally to each, masculine or feminine, structure.” [Jennifer M. Lehmann, “Durkheim’s Response to Feminism: Prescriptions for Women.” Sociological Theory. Volume 8, number 2, autumn 1990. Pages 163-187.]
      32. neostructuralism (Michael R. Carter and Bradford L. Barham): The article focues upon the longitudinal reproduction of economic inequality.
          “In its exploration of the linkages between growth, inequality and poverty in the specific context of Latin American agricultural sectors, this paper faces up to two challenges. The first is to explore the real microeconomic linkages between distribution and growth which drive the possible reproduction of rural poverty over time. The result of this exploration is what might be termed a neostructuralist perspective which argues that actually existing laissez faire agrarian economies do not in general present a level playing field as one moves across the wealth spectrum, and that low-wealth farms face a number of disadvantages in key factor markets. Moreover, the economic importance of those disadvantages may be magnified by the underlying inequality of the land and asset distribution. As a consequence, growth may take an exclusionary form which bypasses and perhaps renders worse off the rural poor, especially in inegalitarian economies.” [Michael R. Carter and Bradford L. Barham, “Level Playing Fields and Laissez Faire: Postliberal Development Strategy in Inegalitarian Agrarian Economies.” World Development. Volume 24, number 7, 1996. Pages 1133-l149.]
      33. Structural Scientific Realism (John Worrall, Anjan Chakravartty, Steven French, Harold Kincaid, and many others): There are numerous approaches to structural scientific realism in the philosophy of science, including ontic structural realism and epistemic structural realism. For instance, Kincaid’s perspective begins with John Worrall’s framework, which is grounded in physical science.
          “In earlier work I explored the attractions of a view called Structural Scientific Realism (hereafter: SSR). This holds that it is reasonable to believe that our successful theories are (approximately) structurally correct (and also that this is the strongest epistemic claim about them that it is reasonable to make).…
          “SSR may well be more modest than many who have sought to defend some version or other of scientific realism might like. But the modesty involved in SSR is far from undue. No stronger version of scientific realism is either compatible with the facts about theory-change in science or compatible with any truly defensible epistemological view of how our best theories are likely to ‘link up with reality.’ If SSR isn’t realism then nothing defensible is.”
          [John Worrall, “Miracles and Models: Why reports of the death of Structural Realism may be exaggerated.” Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement. Volume 61, October 2007. Pages 125-154.]
          “Structural realism has been a lively research program in philosophy of science since [John] Worrall’s … revival of the idea.…
          “Social scientists frequently appeal to something they call ‘social structure’ in explaining both microphenonema and macrophenomena. However, the term seems to have many meanings and often goes completely undefined. The most useful notion of social structure for my purposes is exemplified by this quotation from Karl Marx: ‘To prevent possible misunderstandings, a word. I paint the capitalist and landlord in no sense coleur de rose. But here the individuals are dealt with only in so far as they are the personifications of economic categories, embodiments of particular class relations and class interests’ …. The key idea here is that structure consists in a relation not between individuals but between positions or statuses and roles.”
          [Harold Kincaid, “Structural Realism and the Social Sciences.” Philosophy of Science. Volume 75, number 5, December 2008. Pages 720-731.]
          “The central question addressed in this paper is whether there is some reasonable way to have the best of both worlds: to give the argument from scientific revolutions its full weight and yet still adopt some sort of realist attitude towards presently accepted theories in physics and elsewhere. I argue that there is such a way – through structural realism, a position adopted by [Henri] Poincaré, and here elaborated and defended.” [John Worrall, “Structural Realism: The Best of Both Worlds?” Dialectica. Volume 43, number 1/2, 1989. Pages 99-124.]
          “In the contemporary literature, SR [structural realism] comes in two flavours: epistemic SR, and ontic SR. Epistemic versions place a restriction on scientific knowledge; proponents hold that one can know structural aspects of reality, but nothing about the natures of those things whose relations define structures in the first place. The natures of the entities are beyond the proper grasp of our quest for knowledge. Ontic versions, more radically, do away with entities altogether; proponents hold that at best we have knowledge of structural aspects of reality, because there is in fact nothing else to know.
          “I will contend that the most reasonable form of SR is both epistemic and ontic, but in ways different from what is suggested by current pro ponents of epistemic and ontic SR. In particular, the putative distinction between a knowledge of the structure of reality and a knowledge of its nature is difficult to maintain and profitably collapsed. In what follows, I will briefly review the epistemic tradition of SR en route to offering what I take to be a more promising proposal for a non-naïve or sophisticated realism. Epistemic SR faces fatal difficulties, I believe, but gives genuine insight into the promise of selective scepticism as a strategy for the realist.…
          “… I will argue that the worries motivating ontic SR are insufficient to recommend it, and furthermore, these worries are better addressed in other ways. The precise metaphysics of objects, I believe, remains an open question for the realist, and the idea that they comprise a genuine ontological category is hardly moribund. And as we shall see, fending off the challenge of ontic SR is not merely a negative task, but yields something positive also.”
          [Anjan Chakravartty. A Metaphysics for Scientific Realism: Knowing the Unobservable. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press. 2010. Google Play edition.]
          “Let me come back to my main line of thought. That structures should be considered as global structures provides us with an even stronger argument against special science OSR [ontic structural realism]. It is just highly implausible to assume that higher-level structures reflect genuinely higher-level holistic or global world features. At least, I’ve never seen arguments in favour of such a view. And notice that a structuralist about higher-level science must show that all levels and, accordingly, all special sciences must be interpreted like this: all levels must then consist of all and only structures and, in order not to collapse structuralism into a bundle view, such structures must be considered as global and holistic structures.” [Holger Lyre, “Must Structural Realism Cover the Special Sciences?” The European Philosophy of Science Association Proceedings: Volume 2. Friedrich Stadler, editor. New York: Springer International Publishing imprint of Springer Science5Business Media. 2013. Pages 383-390.]
          “Motivated in large part by a concern to accommodate the metaphysical implications of modern physics, so-called ‘ontic’ structural realism defends the claim, as we noted in the introduction, that it is not just the case that all that we know of the world are its structural features, but that all the world is, fundamentally speaking, can be articulated in terms of these structural features ….” [Angelo Cei and Steven French, “Getting Away from Governance: A Structuralist Approach to Laws and Symmetries.” Methode: Analytic Perspectives. Issue 4. Pages 25-48.]
          “… an epistemological structural realism meant to vindicate and not to revise the ontological commitments of scientific realism. On this view the objective world is composed of unobservable objects between which certain properties and relations obtain; but we can only know the properties and relations of these properties and relations, that is the structure of the objective world.” [James Ladyman, “What is Structural Realism?” Studies in History and Philosophy of Science. Volume 29, number 3, 1998. Pages 409-424.]
          “Since James Ladyman asked, ‘What is Structural Realism?’ … a doctrine known as ontic structural realism (OSR) has achieved a degree of notoriety, but many people remain confused as to what exactly the doctrine amounts.… Ladyman’s claim is that the reason that we can only know the structure of the objective world is because there is nothing else to know; the world just is a structure.” [Peter Mark Ainsworth, “What is ontic structural realism?” Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics. Volume 41, 2010. Pages 50-57.]
          “Two versions of Structural Realism are defended within the contemporary literature. Epistemic Structural Realists, for example [John] Worrall …, argue that we can acquire knowledge only of structural aspects of reality, not of non-structural aspects. Ontic Structural Realists agree that we can have knowledge only of structure, but for them it is because there is nothing other than structure ….” [David Harker, “Two arguments for scientific realism unified.” Footnote. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science. Volume 41, 2010. Pages 192-202.]
          “Whereas epistemic structural realism posits a set of entities and structures in the real world, with a set of representing objects and mirroring structures in the phenomenal realm, ontic structural realism commits only to structures existing in the real, mind-independent world. Those structures are mirrored in the perceptual world, but perceptual objects are merely heuristics, shorthand, useful ‘bookkeeping’ devices for cognizing agents such as ourselves ….” [David Brooke Struck. The Critical Stance: Ernst Cassirer and the Realist–Empiricist Dispute in the Philosophy of Science. Ph.D. thesis (U.S. English, dissertation). Department of Philosophy, The University of Guelph. September, 2015. Retrieved on December 4th, 2015.] Page 35.]
          “… Epistemic Structural Realism (ESR) and Ontic Structural Realism (OSR) both refer to informational structures as being the main instruments of knowledge acquisition. ESR implies that only through observing the informational interfaces between structures and systems can we understand reality. OSR, by the same token, states that we can only reach the essence of a given object via its informational structure. According to OSR, all structures are informational. Therefore, reality is about structure and structure is about information.” [Renata Lemos and Lucia Santaella, “Levels of Convergence.” Transdisciplinarity in Science and Religion. Number 4, 2008. Pages 95-116.]
          “The basic idea behind structural realism is that our experience of secondary qualities conveys only relational information to us about the world. An experience of this much warmth does not convey an absolute value of this much temperature. Rather, it conveys to us the difference in temperature between the warmth inducing stimulus and some baseline. This insight motivates a novel interpretation of some well-known phenomena. For example, if one hand is cooled while the other is warmed, then both hands are thrust into a lukewarm bucket of water, the cool hand will sense the water as warm, while the warm hand will sense the water as cool. On the account developed here, these apparently ‘contradictory’ sensations may both be veridical.” [Alistair M. C. Isaac, “Structural Realism for Secondary Qualities.” Erkenn. Volume 79, 2014. Pages 481-510.]
          “… structural scientific realists are wrong when they claim that there is a kind of continuity between theories separated by a scientific revolution, i.e. that there are some links connecting together two sometimes contradictory theories. Thus I do not see how structural realism can avoid the force of pessimistic meta-induction.
          “… John Worrall’s attempt to bring scientific realism back to life in the form of structural scientific realism has failed. Scientific realism is indeed dead.”
          [Andrés Rivadulla, “Two Dogmas of Structural Realism. A Confirmation of Philosophical Death Foretold.” Crítica: Revista Hispanoamericana de Filosofía. Volume 42, number 124, April 2010. Pages 3-29.]
          “Rather than distinguishing between the natural and social sciences on the basis of their subject matter, it is often philosophically fruitful to start with the fact that most social phenomena are not amenable to investigation by laboratory experimentation. One can, in some cases, use randomized experimental designs to investigate causal relationships between social phenomena, but ethical and practical difficulties often preclude the use of such techniques. In the absence of these two empirical approaches, two principal alternatives are often used: causal models and quasi-experimentation. I shall focus on the former here, because the techniques involved offer an interesting example of how the context of investigation can affect the structural form of mathematical models used to describe phenomena.” [Paul W. Humphreys, “Quantitative Probabilistic Causality and Structural Scientific Realism.” PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association. Volume 2, 1984. Pages 329-342.]
      34. semirealism (Anjan Chakravartty [Hindī, अंजन चक्रवर्ती, Aṃjana Cakravartī as pronounced in this MP3 audio file): He develops a version of realism—informed partially by structural realism in the philosophy of science—which is concerned with causal properties.
          “One important feature of semirealism is that the central thesis of epistemic SR [structural realism], that one can have knowledge of structures without knowledge of the intrinsic natures of things, cannot be maintained. Epistemic SR commits to abstract structures and not the intrinsic, but semirealism rejects this prescription, for a knowledge of concrete structures contains a knowledge of intrinsic natures. Concrete structures are identified with specific relations between first-order properties of particulars, and first order properties are what make up the natures of things. So on this view, to say that two sets have the same structure is ipso facto to say something about the intrinsic natures of their members. Furthermore, concrete structures arise as a consequence of the dispositions conferred by these first-order properties. Natures are thus intimately connected to the relations into which properties and particulars enter.” [Anjan Chakravartty. A Metaphysics for Scientific Realism: Knowing the Unobservable. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press. 2007. Page 40.]
          “What if it could be demonstrated that some particular aspect of each theory within a succession of theories in some domain was retained throughout? The identification of such retained elements with the truth of empirically successful theories about the natural world is the proposal of semirealism. Semirealism is committed to the truth—but of a restricted subset of claims made by particular theories. This position thus defines the aim of scientific inquiry in terms of preserving and increasing truth content by way of preserving restricted truth claims, and increasing their number. This is what it means for there to be cumulative scientific progress, and for there to be continuity in the practice of scientific theorizing.” [Anjan Chakravartty, “Semirealism.” Studies in History and Philosophy of Science. Volume 29, issue 3, September 1998. Pages 391–408.]
          “A Metaphysics for Scientific Realism aims to do two things. The first is to develop a viable realist position that capitalizes on insights offered by entity realism and structural realism while transgressing them. Semirealism comes out as a form of selective skepticism (or selective optimism) that restricts epistemic commitment only to those parts of theories that can be interpreted as describing aspects of the world (i.e., detection properties) with which scientists have managed to be in causal contact. The second aim is to develop a metaphysical framework proper for semirealism: a non-Humean framework based on a dispositional account of causal properties and a network of de re necessities.” [Dimitris Papayannakos and Stathis Psillos, “A Metaphysics for Scientific Realism: Knowing the Unobservable.” Review article. Isis. Volume 100, number 1, 2009. Pages 204-205.]
          “[Anjan] Chakravartty develops his own selectively sceptical position, ‘semirealism,’ which synthesises ‘the best insights of’ entity realism and structural realism (on the basis of mutual entailments he claims hold between them); and he argues that entity realism and structural realism both lead to semirealism when pressure is applied. The vital link is provided by ‘detection properties’: causal properties leading entity realists to believe in their entities.” [Dean Rickles, “Keeping it Semireal.” Review article. Metascience. Volume 18, 2009. Pages 261-264.]
          “In A Metaphysics for Scientific Realism, Anjan Chakravartty attempts the difficult task of bringing metaphysical debates about properties, causation, and natural kinds into a meaningful engagement with epistemological debates about scientific realism. Overall, he does an excellent job, and for that reason alone, this book is worth reading.” [Toby Handfield, “A Metaphysics for Scientific Realism: Knowing the Unobservable.” Review article. Mind. Volume 118, number 472, October 2009. Pages 1118-1121.]
          “[Anjan] Chakravartty’s semirealism has many attractive qualities. To take one example, because his realism is ultimately about (well-detected) causal properties, his notion of natural kinds is deflationary. The concept of natural kinds, despite being a very important metaphysical foundation, is importantly conventional according to semirealism: it is we who group objects into kinds, and such groupings are helpful, to the extent that they are, only because of the way causal properties happen to be distributed (and not because such groupings track some great Order of Nature that exists completely independent of us).” [J. Michael Steiner, “A Metaphysics for Scientific Realism: Knowing the Unobservable.” Review article. University of Toronto Quarterly. Volume 79, number 1, winter 2010. Pages 409-410.]
      35. mechanisms of dialectical change and model of dialectical leadership structures (Albert Martin): Martin’s mechanistic perspectives focus on productive and dialectical structures of leadership.
          “A famous concept in the social sciences that deals with the question of fundamental social change is the concept of ‘dialectics.’ The idea of this concept is easy to grasp: contradictory social conditions set in motion forces to overcome the unsatisfactory social situation and the induced social processes (normally) lead to the overcoming of the underlying conflict and (hopefully) to social betterment, whereby the new situation ironically will breed new contradictions.…
          “Structural contradictions will not unavoidably lead to far-reaching changes. Quite the opposite, they may contribute to the stabilization of the given conditions. Furthermore dialectical processes are not always processes of progress. It was Karl Marx who noticed, that societal progress is no necessity, so capitalism may not be transformed to socialism but also can fall back in barbarism.”
          [Albert Martin, “Mechanisms of Dialectical Change.” Management Revue. Volume 20, number 2, 2009. Pages 149-157.]
          “This article introduces a model of productive leadership structures. It is based on the idea that structures should stimulate dialectical processes which activate functional and simultaneously restrict dysfunctional behavioural tendencies of the management team. The structural dialectics are part of a more comprehensive concept called ‘tensegrity,’ which, besides the dialectic part, embraces the socio-political conditions in the leadership system which enable dialectic structures to unfold their positive energy. In the second part of the article I present the results of an empirical study conceived to test some basic hypotheses of the theoretical approach.…
          “… I introduce a model of dialectical leadership structures. The core concept in this model is ‘tensegrity.’ Tensegrity is a term that is used in architecture and biology to designate self-supporting dynamic structures. Leadership structures have tensegrity if they stimulate dynamical conflicting forces on the one hand and give them direction and stability on the other. It is, in other words, the dialectical process which is driven by structures that is of interest here. Of course structures do not have the power to determine behaviour in an absolute sense. But they can stimulate and suppress behaviour and give behaviour a certain direction, (more often than not without the people involved being conscious of it). Structures are ‘action generators.’”
          [Albert Martin, “Dialectical Conditions. Leadership Structures as Productive Action Generators.” Management Revue. Volume 17, number 4, 2006. Pages 420-447.]
      36. Lotmanian structuralism (Yuri Mikhailovich Lotman [Russian Cyrillic, Ю́рий Миха́йлович Ло́тман, Û́rij Mihájlovič Lótman as pronounced in this MP3 audio file]): He develops an approach to semiotic structuralism.
          “Over the last few decades semiotics and structuralism in the Soviet Union as in the West have lived through testing times. Of course the experiences have been different. In the Soviet Union these disciplines had to endure a period of persecutions and ideological attacks, and this was followed by a conspiracy of silence or embarrassed semi-recognition on the part of official science. In the West these disciplines endured the test of fashion. They became a craze which took them far outside the bounds of science. Yet neither persecution nor fashion, both of which seem so crucial in the eyes of the watching public, have a determining effect on the fate of scientific ideas. The decisive factor is rather the profundity of the actual ideas themselves. For the profundity and significance of scientific ideas are determined first, by their capacity to explain and marshal facts which had previously been scattered and unexplained, that is by their capacity to combine with other scientific ideas; and second, by their capacity to reveal problems needing solutions, especially in areas where earlier opinion had seen no problems. This second feature is an indication of their capacity to combine with future scientific ideas. In consequence the ideas that have a long scientific life are those which are capable, while preserving their initial premises, of going through a dynamic transformation and evolving together with the world that surrounds them.” [Yuri Lotman. Universe of Mind: A Semiotic Theory of Culture. Ann Shukman, translator. London and New York: I. B. Tauris & Co. Ltd. 1990. Page 4.]
          “Lotmanian structuralism …
          “In his proposals, [Yuri] Lotman does much more than just combine the procedures of structural analysis with a semiotic approach. In the background we also have Marxism, which additionally played in this particular historical moment the role of the national ideology. This is why Marxist phraseology must have made its way into the preliminary parts of Lotman’s reflections, although it had no substantial influence on the quality of his theoretical findings.
          “… Structuralism, like semiotics, is oriented more towards searching for general regularities, norms and conventions.… Structures are present in historical societies, but their whole impetus is oriented towards crossing and discovering new lands in various spheres of culture. They have their ‘cold’ areas (folklore, canonical art, widely understood classics), but they generally were (and still are) geared towards creating novelty. The structuralists themselves, aware of these limitations, said that ‘events’ elude their research procedures.”
          [Bogusław Żyłko, “Notes on Yuri Lotman’s structuralism.” International Journal of Cultural Studies. Volume 18, number 1, 2015. Pages 27-42.]
          “[Yuri] Lotman’s research on the semiosphere is almost exclusively concerned with texts and codes generated by secondary modeling systems.…
          “Defined as a secondary modeling system, too much is excluded from the semiosphere that has meanwhile been discovered to be part of it. The dichotomous view of culture and nature as two opposed spheres appears to carry the burden of the heritage of a semiotic structuralism that sought to explain semiosis in terms of oppositions even where gradations and transitions between the opposites prevail, as we have learned from [Charles Sanders] Peirce’s synechistic semiotics.”
          [Winfried Nöth, “Yuri Lotman on metaphors and culture as self-referential semiospheres.” Semiotica. Volume 161, number 1/4, 2006. Pages 249-263.]
      37. semiology (Ferdinand de Saussure as pronounced in this MP3 audio file): He is the one who first proposed this new field.
          “A science that studies the life of signs within society is conceivable; it would be a part of social psychology and consequently of general psychology; I shall call it semiology (from Greek sēmeîon [σημεῖον, sēmeîon] ‘sign’). Semiology would show what constitutes signs, what laws govern them. Since the science does not yet exist, no one can say what it would be; but it has a right to existence, a place staked out in advance. Linguistics is only a part of the general science of semiology; the laws discovered by semiology will be applicable to linguistics, and the latter will circumscribe a well-defined area within the mass of anthropological facts.
          “To determine the exact place of semiology is the task of the psychologist. The task of the linguist is to find out what makes language a special system within the mass of semiological data. This issue will be taken up again later; here I wish merely to call attention to one thing: if I have succeeded in assigning linguistics a place among the sciences, it is because I have related it to semiology.”
          [Ferdinand de Saussure. Course in General Linguistics. Wade Baskin, translator. Charles Bally and Albert Reidlinger, editors. New York: Philosophical Library. 1959. Page 16.]
          “In the Course [Course in General Linguistics] Saussure predicted a new science, the science of semiology.… Saussure, who was impressed by the work of [David ‘Émile’] Durkheim in sociology, emphasized that signs must be studied from a social view-point, that language was a social institution which eluded the individual will. The linguistic system—what might nowadays be called the ‘code’—pre-existed the individual act of speech, the ‘message.’ Study of the system therefore had logical priority.” [Lee Russell, “Cinema—Code and Image.” New Left Review. Series I, number 49, May–June 1968. Pages 65-81.]
      38. new structuralism (Michael Lounsbury, Marc Ventresca, Paul M. Hirsch, Paul J. DiMaggio, and Walter W. Powell): They develop new approaches to structuralism in the field of organizational theory.
          “… [The] new structuralist sensibility in organizational theory draws inspiration from a rich conceptual and methodological toolkit, energized by contemporary social theorists such as [Pierre] Bourdieu …, and is taking shape at the interface of a number of sociological subfields including research on organizations, stratification, culture and politics …. In organizational theory, this new structuralism has become most evident in the work of institutional scholars who view organizational action as fundamentally shaped by broader social and cultural processes ….
          “… [The] new structuralist directions involve a shift towards richer conceptualizations of social structure and process that have taken shape at the intersection of the sociology of culture, stratification and politics, and institutional analysis …. Contemporary practice theorists reject ‘older’ structuralist lines of investigation … that suggest that discourse can be studied as a cultural phenomenon that is discrete and separate from social interaction ….”
          [Michael Lounsbury and Marc Ventresca, “The New Structuralism in Organizational Theory.” Organization. Volume 10, number 3, 2003. Pages 457-480.]
          “[Paul J.] DiMaggio and [Walter W.] Powell’s … essay [quoted immediately below] clarifies and makes explicit much of what has developed in the field of organizational sociology. It helps line things up. So far, so good. But DiMaggio and Powell’s essay also goes far beyond this analytical contribution. Its larger purpose and agenda are to celebrate and advocate the new structuralist perspective. Although we disagree with much of the argument in the most recent installment of DiMaggio and Powell’s journey to clarify and develop institutional theory, we strongly commend those authors for straightforwardly mapping the field and taking a position. In so doing, they have contributed to defining important issues, taking a stance, and throwing down a gauntlet that enables the field to acknowledge conflicting perspective and engage in an important debate.” [Paul M. Hirsch and Michael Lounsbury, “Ending the Family Quarrel: Toward a Reconciliation of ‘Old’ and ‘New’ Institutionalisms.” American Behavioral Scientist. Volume 40, number 4, February 1997. Pages 406-418.]
          “Although there are as many ‘new institutionalisms’ as there are social science disciplines, this book is about just one of them, the one that has made its mark on organization theory, especially that branch most closely associated with sociology. In presenting the papers assembled here, we hope to accomplish three things. First, by publishing together for the first time … four often-cited foundation works, we provide a convenient opening for readers seeking an introduction to this literature. Second, the papers that follow … advance institutionalism’s theoretical cutting edge by clarifying ambiguities in the paradigm and defining the processes through which institutions shape organizational structure and action. These papers consolidate the work of the last decade and suggest several agendas for further investigation.” [Paul J. DiMaggio and Walter W. Powell, “Introduction.” The New Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis. Chicago, Illinois: The University of Chicago Press. 1991. Pages 1-38.]
      39. narrative codes (Roland Barthes as pronounced in this MP3 audio file]): He develops approaches to analyzing texts.
          “After presenting each segment of text, [Roland] Barthes identifies which of the codes are operative in that segment, that is, by means of which codes the reader processes the story to derive meaning from it. Barthes formulates five codes, each of which has roots in a different aspect of literary analysis. The first of these codes is the hermeneutic circle, which governs the proposing, sustaining and resolution of enigmas. Small enigmas might be solved quickly, while major enigmas, those which are integral to maintaining suspense in the text’s plot, are prolonged through various means. The semic code is the code of character. Through it, the writer unfolds the personalities of the characters of the story. The symbolic code refers to the symbolic antitheses which are so prevalent in classical literature: for example, references to life and death, hot and cold, youth and age, etc. The proairetic code is the most basic of the codes: it is the sequence of events and actions that make up the plot of story as it unfolds. Finally, the referential or cultural code governs entities of science, literature, history, and art.” [John K. Novak, “Barthes’s Narrative Codes as a Technique for the Analysis of Programmatic Music: An Analysis of Janáček’s ‘The Fiddler’s Child.’” Indiana Theory Review. Volume 18, number 1, spring 1997. Pages 25-64.]
          “Sarrasine’s [referring to the title of a novella authored by Honoré de Balzac] genius is, three times over, necessary (‘credible’): according to the cultural (romantic) code, it makes Sarrasine a singular being, outside the norms; according to the dramatic rode, it exposes the wicked fate which ‘exchanges’ a great artist’s death for a castrato’s life, that is, everything for nothing; according to the narrative code, it justifies the perfection La Zambinella’s statue [i.e., the statue of de Balzac’s fictional opera star] will have, the source of the desire transmitted to the Adonis.” [Roland Barthes. S/Z. Richard Miller, translator. Malden, Massachusetts: Blackwell Publishing. 1990. Page 97.]
          “I was buried in one of those profound reveries to which everybody, even a frivolous man, is subject in the midst of the most uproarious festivities. The clock on the Elysee-Bourbon had just struck midnight. Seated in a window recess and concealed behind the undulating folds of a curtain of watered silk, I was able to contemplate at my leisure the garden of the mansion at which I was passing the evening. The trees, being partly covered with snow, were outlined indistinctly against the grayish background formed by a cloudy sky, barely whitened by the moon. Seen through the medium of that strange atmosphere, they bore a vague resemblance to spectres carelessly enveloped in their shrouds, a gigantic image of the famous Dance of Death. Then, turning in the other direction, I could gaze admiringly upon the dance of the living! a magnificent salon, with walls of silver and gold, with gleaming chandeliers, and bright with the light of many candles. There the loveliest, the wealthiest women in Paris, bearers of the proudest titles, moved hither and thither, fluttered from room to room in swarms, stately and gorgeous, dazzling with diamonds; flowers on their heads and breasts, in their hair, scattered over their dresses or lying in garlands at their feet. Light quiverings of the body, voluptuous movements, made the laces and gauzes and silks swirl about their graceful figures. Sparkling glances here and there eclipsed the lights and the blaze of the diamonds, and fanned the flame of hearts already burning too brightly. I detected also significant nods of the head for lovers and repellent attitudes for husbands.” [Honoré de Balzac. Sarrasine. Clara Bell and others, translators. Paris, France: Feedbooks. August, 2005 (originally, 1830). Page 3.]
          “… for … other ‘evident truths’: they are already interpretations, for they imply a pre-existing choice of psychological or structural model; this code—for it is a code—can vary; all the objectivity of the critic will depend then, not on the choice of code, but on the rigour with which he applies the model he has chosen to the work in question. This is not a minor consideration; but since new criticism has never claimed anything else, basing the objectivity of its descriptions on their coherence, it was hardly worth the trouble of starting a war against new criticism. Critical verisimilitude usually chooses the code of literalness, which is a choice like any other. Let us see, however, what the consequences of that are.” [Roland Barthes. Criticism and Truth. Katrine Pilcher Keuneman, translator. London and New York: Continuum. 2007. Page 6.]
          “Difference is not what makes or sweetens conflict: it is achieved over and above conflict, it is beyond and alongside conflict. Conflict is nothing but the moral state of difference; whenever (and this is becoming frequent) conflict is not tactical (aimed at transforming a real situation), one can distinguish in it the failure-to-attain-bliss, the debacle of a perversion crushed by its own code and no longer able to invent itself: conflict is always coded, aggression is merely the most worn-out of languages. Forgoing violence, I forgo the code itself ….” [Roland Barthes. The Pleasure of the Text. Richard Miller, translator. New York: Hill and Wang imprint of Farrar, Straus and Giroux, Inc. 1975. Page 15.]
          “Portrait of Lao-tzu [Chinese, 老子, Lǎo-Zi] by himself: ‘I am as if colorless … neutral as the newborn who has not yet felt his first emotion, as if without project and without goal.’ (a) The baby without emotion? The metaphor doesn’t work today: the baby is stuffed with intense, searing emotions, but what Lao-tzu might perhaps be saying: these are not ‘cultural’ emotions, coded by the social. (b) Without and without goal = without will-to-possess.…
          “… [There is] Lao-tzu’s declaration: ‘I am as though colorless and undefined…’ etc.: the thought of the Neutral is in fact a borderline on the edge of language, on the edge of color, since it’s about thinking language, the noncolor (but not the absence of color, transparency) → and the coded practices that flow from it always reframe the Neutral as my little apologue at the outset.”
          [Roland Barthes, “From the Neutral: Session of March 11, 1978.” Rosalind Krauss, translator. October. Volume 112, spring 2005. Pages 3-22.]
          “In the voice of the reciter come together exaggerated declaration, tremolo, overly shrill feminine tone, broken intonations, tears, paroxysms of anger, of pity, of supplication, of astonishment, indecent pathos, in short, all the cuisine of emotion, overtly elaborated on the level of this internal, visceral body for which the larynx is the mediating muscle. Still, this overflowing is expressed only through the very code of overflowing: the voice moves through some discontinuous signs of tempest; and the vocal substance, pushed out of an immobile body, triangulated by the costume, connected to a book which, from its stand, guides it, drily studded by the slightly out of phase (and by the same token, impertinent) strokes of the shamisen player, this vocal substance remains written, discontinuous, coded, submitted to an irony (if one divests the word of all caustic meaning).” [Roland Barthes, “The Dolls of Bunraku.” Diacritics. David Savran, translator. Volume 6, number 4, winter 1976. Pages 44-47.]
          “Eye, object, symbol, the [Eiffel] Tower is everything man puts into it – and that everything is infinite. An observed and observing spectacle, a useless and irreplaceable edifice, a familiar world and heroic symbol, a witness to an age and an eternally new monument, an inimitable object that is endlessly reproduced, it is a pure sign, open to all weathers, to all images and all senses, unbridled metaphor; through the Tower, men exercise that great power of the imagination which sets them free, since no story, no matter how dark, can ever take it away from them.” [Roland Barthes, “The Eiffel Tower.” AA Files. Number 64, 2012. Pages 112-131.]
      40. realistic view of nature (Willard Van “W. V.” Orman Quine): Quine’s realism include a non-ontological “global structuralism.”
          “In thus contrasting the underdetermination of natural science with the indeterminacy of translation I have taken a realistic view of nature, which indeed I hold. But I have elsewhere drawn the contrast without the realism, in the following way. Natural science, we again assume, is underdetermined by all possible observation. However, suppose that we have settled for one of the many over-all theories of nature that fit all possible observation. Translation remains indeterminate, even relative to the chosen theory of nature. Thus the indeterminacy of translation is an indeterminacy additional to the underdetermination of nature.“ [W. V. Quine, “Indeterminacy of Translation Again.” The Journal of Philosophy. Volume 84, number 1, January 1987. Pages 5-10.]
          “… there is an absolutism, a robust realism, that is part and parcel of my naturalism. Science itself, in a broad sense, and not some ulterior philosophy, is where judgment is properly passed, however fallibly, on questions of truth and reality. What is affirmed there, on the best available evidence, is affirmed as absolutely true.” [W. V. Quine, “Relativism and Absolutism.” The Monist. Volume 67, number 3, July 1984. Pages 293-296.]
          “… naturalism would … counsel us that reality is to be grasped only through a man-made conceptual scheme, albeit any of various.
          “My global structuralism should not, therefore, be seen as a structuralist ontology. To see it thus would be to rise above naturalism and revert to the sin of transcendental metaphysics. My tentative ontology continues to consist of quarks and their compounds, also classes of such things, classes of such classes, and so on, pending evidence to the contrary. My global structuralism is a naturalistic thesis about the mundane human activity, within our world of quarks, of devising theories of quarks and the like in the light of physical impacts on our physical surfaces.”
          [W. V. Quine, “Structure and Nature.” The Journal of Philosophy. Volume 89, number 1, January 1992. Pages 5-9.]
          “We are tempted … to dismiss the whole issue between nominalism and realism as a metaphysical pseudoproblem.… [O]n what grounds can we take issue with the nominalist? On what grounds, indeed, can we take issue with someone who even outdoes the nominalist and repudiates everything, the concrete as well as the abstract, by construing all words indiscriminately as syncategorematic expressions designating nothing? …
          “… Words of the abstract or general sort, say ‘appendicitis’ or ‘horse,’ can turn up in nominalistic as well as realistic languages; but the difference is that in realistic languages such words are substituends for variables—they can replace and be replaced by variables according to the usual laws of quantification—whereas in nominalistic languages this is not the case. In realistic languages, variables admit abstract entities as values; in nominalistic languages they do not.”
          [Willard V. Quine, “Designation and Existence.” The Journal of Philosophy. Volume 36, number 26, December 1939. Pages 701-709.]
      41. macrostructural theory (Peter M. Blau): It is an expansion, and clarification, of his earlier exchange theory.
          “… we finally arrive at the macrostructural theory I have developed in accordance with the criteria of theorizing outlined above. My central interest is the influence of the social structure of a population on people’s life chances, not only the opportunities in their careers but also their other opportunities, such as their chances to make certain friends or marry certain spouses. Population structures are characterized by the population distributions in different dimensions, such as ethnic distributions or occupational distributions. Three generic population distributions are distinguished: heterogeneity, the distribution among nominal categories, such as ethnic affiliation; inequality, the distribution among graduated differences, such as education or income; and intersection, which is the opposite of the degree to which differences in various respects are highly correlated in a population.” [Peter M. Blau, “A Circuitous Path to Macrostructural Theory.” Annual Review of Sociology. Volume 21, 1995. Pages 1-19.]
          “There are a variety of approaches to the study of social structure, and implicit in them are different ways of conceptualizing social structure. The focus may be on the class structure or value orientations, on networks of social relations or institutional integration, on the division of labor or the construction of social reality, on status sets and role sets or the ecosystem. Yet certain elemental properties of social structure are recognized by most social scientists, notwithstanding differences in approach and focus. What- ever else may be encompassed by social structure, it nearly always includes the concepts that there are differences in social positions, that there are social relations among these positions, and that people’s positions and corresponding roles influence their social relations. Typically, however, theories of social structure extend the concept beyond these elemental properties. Thus, [Karl] Marx explains the class structure and the conflicting relations between classes on the basis of the dialectical interplay of pro- ductive forces with productive relations.” [Peter M. Blau, “A Macrosociological Theory of Social Structure.” American Journal of Sociology. Volume 83, number 1, July 1977. Pages 26-54.]
          “The implicit assumption [in this book] is that macrosociological theory rests on the foundation of microsociological theory. This is the assumption I have come to question. My assumption now is that macrosociological and microsociological analysis involve different theoretical approaches and employ different concepts. They entail quite different perspectives on social life which, although not directly translatable into each other, are by no means contradictory or incompatible. In the foreword to this edition I shall first explain how I became interested in the exchange theory presented here; next, briefly outline the main points of the macrostructural theory I have more recently developed; and conclude by indicating the connection between the two theoretical schemes.” [Peter M. Blau. Exchange and Power in Social Life. New Brunswick, New Jersey: Transaction Publishers. 1986. Page viii.]
          “Exchange theory takes the broader social structure within which exchange processes occur as given, and in this respect it requires supplementation by macrostructural theory. Thus, an increase in intergroup relations resulting from newly developed structural conditions alters the nature of the prevalent exchange transactions, because social exchange in intergroup relations differs from that in ingroup relations. Exchange theory would dissect the new exchange processes and compare them with the old ones, but it could not explain why the change in social relations has occurred, whereas macrosociological theory can explain it in terms of the different new structural conditions.” [Peter M. Blau. Exchange and Power in Social Life. New Brunswick, New Jersey: Transaction Publishers. 1986. Page xvi.]
          “Objective structural contexts that govern people’s opportunities cannot be accounted for by the rational decisions of individuals. The fallacy of trying to do so can be illustrated by the assumption of classical economic theory that laissez faire will produce markets that maximize public welfare because free markets motivate rational independent sellers to try to outbid others by selling at the lowest possible price. This atomistic conception of a market of independently acting and equally informed sellers ignores the great differences in resources, market share, and power among firms and corporations, and the coalitions that rational actors form to further their economic interests by opposing competition.” [Peter M. Blau, “On Limitations of Rational Choice Theory for Sociology.” The American Sociologist. Volume 28, number 2, summer 1997. Pages 16-21.]
      42. social–structural theory (Jeffrey C. Alexander): He argues that a focus on constraint will reformulate, rather than eliminating, voluntarism.
          “The greatest theorist of social structure in the instrumentalist tradition, however, was [Karl] Marx. If his critique followed the general lines of [Jeremy] Bentham’s, carried the logic much further; indeed, it translated the general social-structural argument into an empirically specific theory, or examplar, which, in one form or another, would dominate this strand of structural thinking throughout the 20ᵗʰ century. Marx refuted the argument that society is the product of individual exchange.…
          “… social-structural theory continues to be bound by the issues that individualistic theory has raised. Structural analysis must evolve so that its emphasis on constraint will reformulate the conditions of voluntarism, rather than completely eliminate it. This involves two different kinds of tasks. First, externality and constraint must be defined symbolically, as well as materially, for only in this way can the actor be viewed as producing social order and not just responding to it. Second, the conceptualization of these symbolic and material structures must be historically specific and, equally important, must be conceived in a manner that recognizes the continual possibility for their fundamental reformulation. These tasks should set the research program for structural analysis for years to come.”
          [Jeffrey C. Alexander, “Social-Structural Analysis: Some Notes on Its History and Prospects.” The Sociological Quarterly. Volume 25, number 1, winter 1984. Pages 5-26.]
      43. French structuralism or alliance theory (Claude Lévi-Strauss as pronounced in this MP3 audio file): He develops a structural approach to sociocultural anthropology.
          “… a preferential system is prescriptive when envisaged at the model level; a prescriptive system must be preferential when envisaged on the level of reality, unless it is able to relax its rule to such an extent that, if one persists in preserving its so-called prescriptiveness (instead of paying heed, rightly, to its preferential aspect, which is always apparent), it will finally mean nothing. One of two things can happen: either change the ‘giver’ group, and a former alliance will be renewed and consideration of the preferred degree will remain pertinent (e. g., the new wife will be a daughter of great-grandmother’s brother’s great-grandson, consequently of the same kind as a matrilateral cousin) or else there will be an entirely new alliance. Two cases can then arise: either this alliance foreshadows other alliances of the same type, and, by the same reasoning as above, becomes the cause of future preferences, expressible in terms of degree, or it remains short-lived, simply the result of a free and unmotivated choice. Accordingly if the system can be called prescriptive it is in so far as it is preferential first. If it is not also preferential its prescriptive aspect vanishes.” [Claude Lévi-Strauss. The Elementary Structures of Kinship. James Harle Bell and John Richard von Sturmer, translators. Rodney Needham, editor. Boston, Massachusetts: Beacon Press. 1969. Page xxxiii.]
          “Probably there is something deep in my own mind, which makes it likely that I always was what is now being called a structuralist. My mother told me that, when I was about two years old and still unable to read, of course, I claimed that actually I was able to read. And when I was asked why, I said that when I looked at the signboards on shops—for instance, boulanger (baker) or boucher (butcher)—I was able to read something because what was obviously similar, from a graphic point of view, in the writing could not mean anything other than ‘bou,’ the same first syllable of boucher and boulanger. Probably there is nothing more than that in the structuralist approach; it is the quest for the invariant, or for the invariant elements among superficial differences.…
          “Structuralism, or whatever goes under that name, has been considered as something completely new and at the time revolutionary; this, I think, is doubly false. In the first place, even in the field of the humanities, it is not new at all; we can follow very well this trend of thought from the Renaissance to the nineteenth century and to the present time. But it is also wrong for another reason: what we call structuralism in the field of linguistics, or anthropology, or the like, is nothing other than a very pale and faint imitation of what the ‘hard sciences,’ as I think you call them in English, have been doing all the time.”
          [Claude Lévi-Strauss. Myth and Meaning. London and New York: Routledge imprint of Taylor & Francis Group, an Informa PLC business. 2005. Page 2.]
          “What structuralism tries to accomplish in the wake of Rousseau, [Karl] Marx, [David ‘Émile’] Durkheim, [Ferdinand de] Saussure, and [Sigmund] Freud, is to reveal to consciousness an object other than itself; and therefore to put it in the same position with regard to human phenomena as that of the natural and physical sciences, and which, as they have demonstrated, alone allows knowledge to develop. Recognition of the fact that consciousness is not everything, nor even the most important thing, is not a reason for abandoning it, any more than the principles professed a few years ago by the Existentialist philosophers obliged them to lead a life of debauchery in the cellars of Saint-Germain-des-Prés. Quite the opposite, in fact, since consciousness is thus able to gauge the immensity of its task and to summon up the courage to embark upon it, with the hope at last that it will not be doomed to sterility.” [Claude Lévi-Strauss, “Structuralism and Myth.” The Kenyon Review. Volume 3, number 2, spring 1981. Pages 64-88.]
          “Structuralism implies that we can abstract from the individual himself. If you have a microscope with various magnifications, and you use a low-power one to look at a droplet of water, you will see little creatures feeding, copulating, growing fond of each other, hating each other, and for all of them freedom exists. If you use a higher magnification, you will no longer see the creatures themselves, but the molecules of which their bodies consist. The question of freedom then ceases to have any meaning. It only applies on another level of reality.” [Claude Lévi-Strauss, “The Setting Sun.” New Left Review. Series II, number 79, January–February 2013. Pages 71-83.]
          “… in The Elementary Structures of Kinship, I had chosen a domain which might appear at first sight to be characterized by incoherence and contingency, and which I tried to show could be reduced to a very small number of significant propositions. However, this first experiment was insufficient, because the constraints in the domain of kinship are not of a purely internal order. By this, I mean that it is not certain that their origin is drawn exclusively from the structure of the mind (esprit); they might arise from the exigencies of social life, and the way the latter imposes its own constraints on the exercise of thought.” [Claude Lévi-Strauss, “A Confrontation.” New Left Review. Series I, number 62, July–August 1970. Pages 57-74.]
          “We conceive of the opposition between classes as a form of struggle or tension, as though the original—or ideal—situation corresponded to a resolution of these antagonisms. But here the term tension loses all meaning. There is no tension; anything which might have been tense snapped a long time ago. The ‘break’ is at the beginning, and this absence of a golden age to which one might refer, to seek its traces or to long for its return, leaves one a prey to this single conviction: all these people one passes in the street are slipping towards extinction.” [Claude Lévi-Strauss, “Crowds.” New Left Review. Series I, number 15, May–June 1962. Pages 3-6.]
          “For [Claude] Lévi-Strauss, the strength of the linguistic model was to bring to light such syntactic and morphological laws. The task of anthropology, too, must be to derive from the most diverse forms of social life ‘systems of behaviour that are each a projection onto conscious, socialized thought; universal laws which govern the mind’s unconscious activity.’ The force of structural analysis rests ultimately upon the ‘presumed identity both of laws of the world, and those of thought.’ What interests the anthropologist here is unconscious laws, determining men’s behaviour without their knowledge. The goal is ‘to construct a social model whose systematic nature has hitherto been unperceived in that society,’ by penetrating the ‘conscious models’ that mask society’s fundamental structure from the collective consciousness.” [Alain Supiot, “Ontologies of Law.” New Left Review. Series II, number 13, January–February 2002. Pages 107-124.]
          “… ‘alliance theory’ … gives substance to the alleged ‘social equivalence’ in the form of the ‘wife-giving’ versus ‘wife-taking’ relationship between the respective lineages as such.” [Harold W. Scheffler, “The Elementary Structures of Kinship by Claude Lévi-Strauss: A Review Article.” American Anthropologist. Volume 72, number 2, April 1970. Pages 251-268.]
          “… [One] way of drawing sense from [Claude Lévi-Strauss’] Elementary Structures, then, has been to say that marriage is not ‘about’ reproduction, sexuality, or the nuclear family, but about political alliance; that the most important relationship forged by marriage is not the connection between the minimal pair (or threesome, or what have you), but between a far-flung network of in-laws; and that an accounting of the varied ways people have forged kin connections proves the irreducibility of marriage and kinship to the supposed heterosexual imperatives of biological reproduction. Back in its heyday, [Claude Lévi-Strauss’] alliance theory was … mobilized famously by Marshall Sahlins … to rebut the bioreductive, essentialist, and (in modern parlance) unmistakably heteronormative gist of sociobiology’s theory of kin selection.” [Roger N. Lancaster, “Text, Subtext, and Context: Strategies for Reading Alliance Theory.” American Ethnologist. Volume 32, number 1, February 2005. Pages 22-27.]
      44. structural theory of the functions and modes of articulation in social structures (Maurice Godelier as pronounced in this MP3 audio file): Informed by Claude Lévi-Strauss’ French structuralism, Godelier develops a Marxist approach to anthropology.
          “It is not my intention to present here a textual analysis of [Karl] Marx and [Friedrich] Engels on religion. Rather, I wish to give an example of how Marxist anthropologists can proceed to analyze religion in the precapitalist societies which are their concern.” [Maurice Godelier, “Toward a Marxist Anthropology of Religion.” Dialectical Anthropology. Volume 1, number 1, November 1975. Pages 81-85.]
          “… we must pursue our researches until we can determine the specific causality of each structure or structural level. However, this requires that we first recognize the relative autonomy of each level, exploring the connection between the form and content of the structures. If we are able to show that linear organisation constitutes the general form of social relations in two (or more) types of societies characterized by different modes of production, it is of extreme importance because it demonstrates the relative autonomy of structural levels and emphasises the need to go beyond a structural analysis of forms, the kind of structural morphology used by [Claude] Lévi-Strauss, and utilise a structural theory of the functions and modes of articulation in social structures. The ultimate problem lies in determining the hierarchy of these functions within societies, the differential causal effects of each structure on other structures and on the reproduction of their functions and their interconnections.
          “If a differential causality does exist, the decisive problem in the comparative theory of societies, of structures as well as their histories, is to establish the cause; the determining cause in the final analysis and, therefore, the prior one in reality, even if it is not the unique or exclusive one in these structural arrangements and their transformations.”
          [Maurice Godelier. Perspectives in Marxist Anthropology. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press. 1977. Pages 92-93.]
          “Is it possible to analyse the relations between an event and a structure, or to explain the genesis and evolution of that structure, without being forced to abandon a structuralist viewpoint? These two questions are topical, and some have already hazarded an affirmative reply. A new situation is emerging, one of the aspects of which is the resumption of a dialogue between structuralism and Marxism. This is hardly surprising, as [Karl] Marx himself, a century ago, described the whole of social life in terms of ‘structures,’ advanced the hypothesis of the necessary existence of correspondences between infrastructures and superstructures characterizing different ‘types’ of society, and, lastly, claimed the ability to explain the ‘evolution’ of these types of society by the emergence and development of ‘contradictions’ between their structures….
          “… A mode of production is the combination of two structures, irreducible to one another: the productive forces and the relations of production….
          “For Marx, the scientific understanding of the capitalist system consists in the discovery of the internal structure hidden behind its visible functioning.
          “Thus, for Marx, as for Claude Lévi-Strauss, ‘structures’ should not be confused with visible ‘social relations’ but constitute a level of reality invisible but present behind the visible social relations. The logic of the latter, and the laws of social practice more generally, depend on the functioning of these hidden structures and the discovery of these last should allow us to ‘account for all the facts observed.’ …
          “When Marx assumes that structure is not to be confused with visible relations and explains their hidden logic, he inaugurates the modern structuralist tradition. And he is fully in accord with this tradition when he proposes the priority of the study of structures over that of their genesis and evolution….
          “Structure is part of reality for Lévi-Strauss as well, but not of empirical reality. A structure cannot therefore be opposed to the theoretical model built to represent it. The structure only exists in and through the human mind …, and this is a rejection equally of the idealist and of the formalist structuralisms that lay claim to Lévi-Strauss….
          “… the appearance of new structures modifies the conditions of existence and role of older structures which are obliged to transform themselves. Our analysis closes with the emergence of the notion of a limit to the functional compatibility of different structures. We have once again arrived at the problem of the genesis of new structures and of Marx’s notion of contradiction….
          “For [Louis] Althusser the specific difference of Marx’s dialectic is to be found in the fact that the latter’s contradictions are ‘overdetermined’ in principle. This answer does not seem to me to grasp the essential point, although it provides valuable positive elements at another level. To take up the problem from another angle, Marx describes two kinds of contradiction. One of these, within the structure of the relations of production, appears before the other which is produced little by little between the two structures of the capitalist mode of production, the relations of production and the productive forces. The first contradiction appears and disappears with the mode of production. The second appears with the development of the system as an effect of the functioning of the first contradiction, but it is this second one which creates the material conditions for the disappearance of the system; it is the fundamental contradiction. The relation between the two contradictions thus shows that the first contradiction, within the relations of production, does not contain within itself the set of conditions for its solution. The material conditions of this solution can only exist outside it as the productive forces are a reality completely distinct from the relations of production and irreducible to them, a reality which has its own internal conditions of development and its own temporality.
          [Maurice Godelier, “System, Structure and Contradiction in Capital.” Ben Brewster, translator. The Socialist Register. Ralph Miliband and John Saville, editors. London: The Merlin Press. 1967. Pages 91-119.]
          “The set of relations of consanguinity and alliance which serve as the means of expression of social life and serve as the terms of the symbolic language of kinship will then appear. Here kinship is both a particular content of social life and serves as the mode of appearance and expression of all other contents.
          “… Everyone knows that the set of biological relations of consanguinity and alliance is not kinship, as kinship is always a particular ‘group’ of these relations within which descent and alliance are socially regulated. Because these relations are selected and ‘retained,’ real kinship is not a biological fact, but a social one.”
          [Maurice Godelier, “System, Structure and Contradiction in Capital.” Ben Brewster, translator. The Socialist Register. Ralph Miliband and John Saville, editors. London: The Merlin Press. 1967. Pages 91-119.]
          “To me, and this is against many Marxists, violence is not the main force in the implementation of caste and class and dominant structures. Consent is. But consent means the sharing of the same representations, even with different interpretation of the same ideas, with opposed interpretations. But if you live within the same circle of ideas, you reproduce them even with an opposite attitude, so that dialectic of opposed interpretations of the same representations is crucial to the understanding of many things in our own society, of many conflicts between genders, between classes, between groups. And so it needs a very complex theory of what is a representation and what is a sharing of representation, conscious and unconscious, so when you say unconscious sharing it’s difficult to analyze and investigate.” [Maurice Godelier interviewed in Paul Eiss and Thomas C. Wolfe, “Deconstruct to Reconstruct: An Interview with Maurice Godelier.” The Journal of the Institutional Institute. Volume 1, Issue 2, summer 1994. Online publication. No pagination.]
          “What can be perceived behind … [the] identity of sociological armature and … [the] diversity of formal transformation of myths, what explains them, is a common property, a structural correspondence, an inner relationship between forms of mythical thought and forms of primitive society. For if kinship relations play the role of an organizatory schema within the mythical discourse and representation of the world, this is because in reality itself, in primitive societies, kinship relations constitute the dominant aspect of the social structure. We are dealing here with a structural correspondence which cannot be deduced from the ‘pure’ categories of savage thought or find its origin in nature, but whose basis is located in the very structure of primitive societies. But if the content of myths only consisted in these objective, transposed elements of nature or culture, it would be impossible to understand how and why myths are what they are: an illusory representation of man and the world, an inaccurate explanation of the order of things. How is it, then, that the objective materials of natural or social reality which are found transposed in the mythical discourse take on their imaginary character, are transmuted into an illusory representation of the world?” [Maurice Godelier, “Myth and History.” New Left Review. Series I, number 69, September–October 1971. Pages 93-112.]
          “… there is a world of difference between ideas that sustain opposition and those which propose a radical change in social organization. To paraphrase Marx, we might say that the dominant ideas in most societies are the ideas of the dominant sex, associated and mingled with those of the dominant class. In our own societies, a struggle is now under way to abolish relations of both class and sex domination, without waiting for one to disappear first.” [Maurice Godelier, “The Origins of Male Domination.” New Left Review. Series I, number 127, May–June 1981. Pages 2-17.]
          “For a Marxist, an enquiry into ideology, the conditions of its formation and transformation, its effects on the motion of societies, should apparently be an enquiry into the relation between infrastructure, superstructures and ideology. Must these realities be baptized ‘instances’ as [Louis] Althusser does? Should they be considered as ‘levels’ of social reality, as distinctions within social reality which are in some sense substantive, as institutional divides in its substance? I think not. For a society does not have a top or a bottom, or in any real sense levels at all. This is because the distinction between infrastructure and superstructures is not a distinction between institutions. It is essentially a distinction between functions.” [Maurice Godelier, “Infrastructures, Societies and History.” New Left Review. Series I, number 112, November–December 1978. Pages 84-96.]
          “It is from [Karl] Marx’s pen, in Capital, that there comes the idea, not original to Marx or the Marxists for that matter, that modern industry based on the direct application of science to production had ‘torn away the veil which hid from man his own social process of production and which rendered the different branches of production which had been spontaneously divided, into so many enigmas, even for those within the production process itself.’ He pointed out in the same passage that until the 18ᵗʰ century the different trades had been considered ‘mysteries’ requiring the initiation of apprentices into the secrets of production.” [Maurice Godelier and Michael Ignatieff, “Work and Its Representations: A Research Proposal.” History Workshop. Number 10, autumn 1980. Pages 164-174.]
          “[Maurice] Godelier derives the properties of primitive thought through an application of [Karl] Marx’s understanding of religious ideas and Lévi Strauss' thesis on the use of analogical representations in myth. For Marx religious ideas were the projection of human qualities onto the forces of nature which were beyond human understanding; as such they were the dominant mode of thought of primitive communities, whose level of productive forces and control over nature were rudimentary. Godelier adapts this view to picture religious ideas as the prototype of ‘ideologies,’ false conceptions of the ‘real’ which historically, in their further elaboration, serve to mask the complex and opaque realities of class domination.” [Jeffery A. Atlas, “Concepts of ‘history’ and ‘ideology’ in historical dialectics: Epistemological implications and relevance to the notion of ‘primitive mentality.’” Dialectical Anthropology. Volume 12, number 4, 1987. Pages 421-434.]
   2. critiques of structuralism
      1. Althusser’s orrery (Edward Palmer “E. P.” Thompson): Thompson, a Marxist and socialist, critiques, primarily, Althusserianism and, secondarily, all other versions of structuralism. The term orrery (MP3 audio file)—which literally refers to a mechanical model of the solar system, such as a planetarium— is obviously being used by Thompson metaphorically or facetiously.
         “… [Louis] Althusser’s structuralism is, like all structuralisms, a system of closure …. It fails to effect the distinction between structured process, which, while subject to determinate pressures, remains open-ended and only partially-determined, and a structured whole, within which process is encapsulated. It opts for the latter, and goes on to construct something much more splendid than a dock. We may call it Althusser’s orrery, a complex mechanism in which all the bodies in the solar system revolve around the dominant sun. But it remains a mechanism, in which, as in all such structuralisms, human practice is reified, and ‘man is in some way developed by the development of structure.’ So inexorable is this mechanism, in the relation of parts to the whole within any mode of production, that it is only by means of the most acrobatic formulations that we can envisage the possibility of transition from one mode of production to another.” [E. P. Thompson. The Poverty of Theory: or an Orrery of Errors. London: Merlin Press. 1995. Page 137.]
         “The critique of the [Louis] Althusser texts themselves points hit home. The distinction between persistently conflated, is succinctly dealt demonstration of its inherently idealist criticism of this idealism has appeared [E. P.] Thompson will, as a matter of principle, that history need not be historicism the slow accretion of ambiguities begin to mount.” [Bill Schwartz, “The Poverty of Theory: or an Orrery of Errors.” Review article. Sociology. Volume 13, number 3, September 1979. Pages 544-547.]
         “In the title essay of his new book, E. P. Thompson seeks to make explicit the theoretical and methodological bases of his work, and he does this in the classic Marxist fashion, through a passionate critique of an alternative theory of history: the structural Marxism of Louis Althusser.…
         “Thompson argues that history must be understood as the product of human activity. Capitalist society is not determined by the inherent logic of capital; rather it develops as people in different classes consciously seek to comprehend and shape their own lives. Ethical and political considerations cannot be separated from the analysis of these conflicts.”
         [Jonathan M. Wiener, “The Poverty of Theory: or an Orrery of Errors.” Review article. Social History. Volume 5, number 3, October 1980. Pages 455-458.]
         “[E. P.] Thompson is by temperament too much of a dissenter, or as he might regard it, a radical, with roots deep in what he sees as the English popular tradition. Not that he is a populist, as he rightly disclaims; far from it: indeed, one of the problems facing any theory which also aspires to be a praxis is how to translate one into the other. Thompson, for all his adherence to that indigenous tradition, gives no sign, in these essays or in his other writings so far, of showing how it is to be done. His Marxism is none the less too infused with the tones of many other kinds of voices, speaking the language of poetry and imagination and personal experience as much as of politics, to become just another echo of [Karl] Marx’s or any other voice.” [Gordon Leff, “Theory or Practice?—The Poverty of Theory: or an Orrery of Errors.” Review article. The Cambridge Quarterly. Volume 9, number 2, 1980. Pages 173-176.]
         “For [E. P.] Thompson the political sterility of Althusserianism is a direct consequence of its ‘theoreticism.’ Characterised by empty categories rather than substantive analysis, Althusserianism is, he claims, essentially scholastic and reductionist: all knowledge is generated within the parameters of theory in a self-perpetuating circle. [Karl] Marx’s texts are stripped of their humanist-historicist significance which [Louis] Althusser sees as alien to science.… [An] inability to deal with history is the result of a basic confusion on Althusser’s part of ‘empiricism’ with ‘empirical.’” [Susan M. Easton, “The Poverty of Theory: or an Orrery of Errors.” Review article. Studies in Soviet Thought. Volume 24, number 4, November 1982. Pages 318-323.]
         “By the late 1960s, the excessive zeal with which certain strands in Western Marxist theory continued to dichotomize social structures into an infra/suprastructural opposition, along with Soviet misbehavior in Czechoslovakia, helped foster a Gramscian turn where concerns over cultural hegemony and counterhegemony overshadowed issues of economic determinism. Such concerns, as one observer put it, encouraged such questions as: ‘If culture was essentially that which was experienced, then a central issue was who did the experiencing and how was the experiencing in part masterminded by those who claimed a more lofty experience than others?’ …. And such concerns were soon to find their most influential expression in E. P. Thompson’s The Poverty of Theory, which sought to counter the perceived determinism of Althusserian structuralism by appealing to the subversive specificity of English working-class experience.” [Craig Ireland, “The Appeal to Experience and Its Consequences: Variations on a Persistent Thompsonian Theme.” Cultural Critique. Number 52, autumn 2002. Pages 86-107.]
         “His [E. P. Thompson’s] recent attacks on Althusserian Marxism have been directed equally against what he perceives to be its theoretical deformations and against the political practice he finds inscribed in them.” [Ellen Meiksins Wood, “The Politics of Theory and the Concept of Class: E.P. Thompson.” Studies in Political Economy: A Socialist Review. Volume 9, issue 1, 1982. Pages 45-75.]
      2. critique of structuralism and structural Marxism (Allen H. Berger): He argues, among other points, that the claims of structuralists—and structural Marxists—are not unique to them.
         “… the problem is that structuralism puts few empirical reins upon the observer: it is subject neither to replication nor to falsification. There can be no observation and data collection for the purpose of testing hypotheses, since … structuralists offer us no operational rules for ‘negating’ the empirical level.…
         “… Equally disturbing … is the structuralists’ claim to exclusivity in the attempt to probe beneath apparent reality.…
         “… structuralism’s interest in underlying realities and systemic interdependencies is shared by many other strategies, including cultural materialism.…
         “… progressive science requires ‘explanations of concrete phenomena that are precise enough to be falsified’—exactly the argument of my paper and the basis of my critique of structuralism and structural Marxism.”
         [Allen H. Berger in Allen H. Berger, M. E. F. Bloch, A. de Ruijter, I. C. Jarvie, John O’Neill, Ino Rossi, Marshall Sahlins, William W. Stein, and Anton C. L. Zwaan, “Structural and Eclectic Revisions of Marxist Strategy: A Cultural Materialist Critique [and Comments and Reply].” Current Anthropology. Volume 17, number 2, June 1976. Pages 290-305.]
      3. poststructuralist critique of structuralist texts (Thomas C. Heller): He examines various aspects of this poststructuralist critique.
         “… [This article] introduces the poststructuralist critique of structuralist texts and suggests that the status of the subject is now the most interesting and pressing issue for all Critical theories.…
         “Poststructuralism begins in the inadequacies of structuralism.… Any particular structuralist constructed to explain the unity of diverse phenomena can deconstructed to expose the contingent nature of its claims. All is indeterminate to the poststructuralist critic. The passages from practice to theory and from theory to practice invite the critic to postulate some putative author or reader to among alternative constructions of structure or alternative interpretations of theory. Poststructuralist critique thus seems to enable return of free creativity.…
         “The essence of the problem of poststructuralism is determining how to treat structuralism. One possibility is to regard structuralism as one example of the generalized form of the claim to knowledge. If explanation is to be more than the narration travels, it should reduce the vagaries of consciousness to cause.”
         [Thomas C. Heller, “Structuralism and Critique.” Stanford Law Review. Volume 36, number 1/2, January 1984. Pages 127-198.]
      4. poststructuralist critique of structuralism (Ann Curthoys): He considers the relevance of this critique for historians.
         “Where structuralist approaches, Marxist and otherwise, tend to make a great deal of the distinction between underlying or hidden structures, and the surface reality we see and experience, and thereby posit deeper ιreal’ meanings to events, experiences, politics, and practices, poststructuralists oppose this distinction for the singular meanings it strives for and produces. For historians, in my view, the poststructuralist critique of structuralism is welcome and indeed liberating: instead of having to find and fix the ‘real’ meaning of any event, period, or practice, a search which becomes ever more frantic, elusive, authoritarian, and reductive, one can instead explore a diversity of meanings and perspectives, and their complexity and inter-relationships. For historians structuralism as an analytical strategy is a confining straitjacket, a closing of possibilities, an illusory end to the analytical rainbow.” [Ann Curthoys, “Labour History and Cultural Studies.” Labour History. Number 67, November 1994. Pages 12-22.]
      5. dialectical and dialogical critique of Deconstruction (Peter V. Zima as pronounced in this MP3 audio file): He critiques, without dismissing, deconstruction.
         “… the aim of this chapter is neither a wholesale rejection nor a blind exaltation of Deconstruction, for it ought to be preserved from the fate of theoretical schools such as Marxism, psychoanalysis and Existentialism which were used unscrupulously for ideological purposes by friends and foes alike.…
         “A dialectical and dialogical critique of Deconstruction will not lead to a global rejection of this theory …. A dialectical argument which in some respects relies on Critical Theory of the Frankfurt School type will attempt to distinguish the insights of the Deconstructionists from errors and difficulties which in some cases may turn out to be inevitable. For after all, even the theories of the Frankfurt School have produced moments of truth along with contradictions and aporias. Despite its critical distance, Kritische Theorie [critical theory] should recognize in Deconstruction a sometimes close, sometimes distant relative.”
         [Peter V. Zima. Deconstruction and Critical Theory. London and New York: Continuum. 2002. Pages 165-166.]

Return to the table of contents.

8. Power–Elite Theories of the State (Ralph Miliband, Jun Ikegami, and others): These approaches are sometimes referred to as state theories or, perhaps controversially, instrumental Marxism. Power in Western democratic nation states is centralized in their ruling classes. They use their positions in the capitalist order, intentionally, to maintain their power and influence.
   “… the managerial perspective … is analogous to power-elite theories of the state. Its home domain of explanation is that of organizational structures and interorganizational networks. The level of analysis focuses on bureaucratic structures, and the state is explicitly conceptualized as the dominant bureaucratic structure in society. The associated world view focuses on the structure of organized power internal and external to the state. It is only within this perspective that the state as an entity is conceptualized explicitly.” [Beth A. Rubin, “Powers of Theory: Capitalism, the State and Democracy.” Book review. Administrative Science Quarterly. Volume 32, number 2, June 1987. Pages 318-320.]
   “Just as a society-centred view of the state is not distinctively Marxist, the same can be said of instrumentalism. Indeed it can be claimed that instrumentalism is at the heart of conventional currents in state theory, such as pluralism and elite theory. It can also be said to be at the heart of mainstream political strategy and action. For example ‘parliamentarism’ conceives winning a majority in the legislative assembly as securing control of the state and, thus, winning power. In effect it conceives the state as an instrument that can be controlled by a Parliamentary majority. Thus it is logical to begin with instrumentalism in general before going on to distinguish its particular Marxist variant. In fact, as we will see, there is more than one Marxist version of the instrumentalist approach.” [Paul Wetherly. Marxism and the State: An Analytical Approach. New York: Palgrave Macmillan imprint of St. Martin’s Press LLC. 2005. Pages 28-29.]
   1. state theory (Ralph Miliband): He discussed this subject in the book, The State in Capitalist Society.
      “… state intervention in every aspect of economic life is nothing new in the history of capitalism. On the contrary, state intervention presided at its birth or at least guided and helped its early steps, not only in such obvious cases as Germany; and Japan but in every other capitalist country as well; and it has never ceased to be of crucial importance in the workings of capitalism, even in the country most dedicated to laissez faire and rugged individualism. Nevertheless, the scale and pervasiveness of state intervention in contemporary capitalism is now immeasurably greater than ever before, and will undoubtedly continue to grow; and much the same is also true for the vast range of social services for which the state in these societies has come to assume direct or indirect responsibility.” [Ralph Miliband. The State in Capitalist Society: The Analysis of the Western System of Power. London: Merlin Press. 2009. Page 9.]
      “In no field do the claims of democratic diversity and free political competition which are made on behalf of the ‘open societies’ of advanced capitalism appear to be more valid than in the field of communications. For in contrast to Communist and other ‘monolithic’ regimes, the means of expression in capitalist countries are not normally monopolized by, and subservient to, the ruling political power. The importance and value of the freedom and opportunity of expression is not to be underestimated. For the agencies of communication and notably the mass media are, in reality, and the expression of dissident views not-withstanding, a crucial element in the legitimation of capitalist society. Freedom of expression is not thereby rendered meaningless. At the core of the commitment lies a general acceptance of prevailing modes of thought concerning the economic and social order and a specific acceptance of the capitalist system, even though sometimes qualified, as natural and desirable.” [Ralph Miliband, “Communications in Capitalist Society.” Abstract. Monthly Review: An Independent Socialist Magazine. Volume 65, issue 3, July/August 2013. Pages 75-91.]
      “Ralph Miliband’s recently published work, The State in Capitalist Society, is in many respects of capital importance. The book is extremely substantial, and cannot decently be summarized in a few pages: I cannot recommend its reading too highly…. For the specificity of this theory compared with other theoretical problematics lies in the extent to which Marxist theory provides itself, in the very act of its foundation, with the means of its own internal criticism.” [Nicos Poulantzas, “The Problem of the Capitalist State.” New Left Review. Series I, number 58, November–December, 1969.]
      “… although he [Miliband] emphasises that the state is not at all a unitary thing but instead comprises a number of institutions which interact as parts of a ‘state system,’ it is the activities of the people who occupy the leading positions in these institutions and thus constitute the ‘state elite’ that are said to determine the class nature of state power …. In later chapters [of The State in Capitalist Society], however, Miliband emphasises the veto power of ‘business confidence’ entailed in the institutional separation of the economic and political – a power that is independent of interpersonal connections – and also discusses the role of ideological practices rooted in civil society in shaping the political agenda …. In this way Miliband points beyond institutionalism and instrumentalism and adumbrates an analysis of the ‘form–determination’ of state power that stops well short of ascribing an a priori, essentially capitalist character to the state in capitalist societies.” [Bob Jessop. The Capitalist State: Marxist Theories and Methods. Oxford, England: Martin Robertson & Company Ltd. 1982. Page 22.]
      “Marxist state theory and, increasingly, the state as an analytical object have been the victims of an improper burial. They have been buried by a conservative shift inside and outside of the academy. They have been buried by an assumed decline of the state in the face of globalizing and localizing forces. They have been buried by a shift of emphasis, within the left, away from the study of ‘political power’ to a more disaggregated vision of power as a dispersed and undifferentiated phenomenon (from [Michel] Foucault and [Jürgen] Habermas to [Gilles] Deleuze and [Félix] Guattari).
      “The main goal of the essays collected here is to assist state theory in its resurrection from the dead. The essays are organized around three broad themes: to introduce readers to some foundational aspects of Marxist state theory, to evaluate the relevance of state theory in relation to contemporary political phenomena and theoretical tendencies, and to identify the limits to state theory that must be overcome for its continued development. All three themes are developed while focusing on the contributions of Ralph Miliband and Nicos Poulantzas. Focusing on Miliband and Poulantzas allows us to frame and understand state theory as a whole because they occupy the methodological extremes within the range of theorists particular to state theory and because their debate is more often than not the point of departure for subsequent attempts to produce a Marxist theory of the state. To understand the utility and limits of Miliband and Poulantzas is thus to understand the utility and limits of state theory in a broader sense.”
      [Stanley Aronowitz and Peter Bratsis, “State Power, Global Power.” Paradigm Lost: State Theory Reconsidered. Stanley Aronowitz and Peter Bratsis, editors. Minneapolis, Minnesota: University of Minnesota Press. 2002. Pages xi-xii.]
      “Many, if not most, of the criticisms directed at (Ralph] Miliband’s political theory during the 1970s state debate were actually straw men created by political adversaries who introduced an analytic construct called ‘instrumentalism’ that Miliband himself never embraced, and for good reason, as an accurate conceptualization of his published work. G. William Domhoff … has even argued previously that Miliband’s instrumentalism was willfully distorted and misrepresented for the purely political purpose of exaggerating the theoretical originality of ‘new’ theories of the state that claimed to be ‘more Marxist’ and ‘more revolutionary’ than Miliband’s theory. From this perspective, the instrumentalism that so many state theorists sought to move beyond since the Miliband-Poulantzas debat (1969-76) is merely an abstraction that was steadily, artificially, and often deliberately constructed over the course of a polemic that accomplished little more than the fracturing of state theory….
      “Prior to Ralph Miliband’s The State in Capitalist Society, the instrumentalist theory of the state had been most prominently, if cryptically, articulated by Paul Sweezy …, who asserts that the state is ‘an instrument in the hands of the ruling class for enforcing and guaranteeing the stability of the class structure itself.”
      [Clyde W. Barrow, “Ralph Miliband and the Instrumentalist Theory of the State: The (Mis)Construction of an Analytic Concept.” Class, Power and the State in Capitalist Society: Essays on Ralph Miliband. Paul Wetherly, Clyde W. Barrow, and Peter Burnham, editors. New York: Palgrave Macmillan imprint of St. Martin’s Press LLC. 2008. Page 84.]
   2. state–monopoly capitalism (Jun Ikegami [Japanese, いけがみ じゅん or 池上 順, Ikegami Jun as pronounced in this MP3 audio file] and others): In this system, monopoly capitalism is fused with state capitalism.
      “… it is because the very management of the finance of the social overhead capital acts as an agent for the process to multiply value, or the process of construction acts as an agent for the process to multiply value that the strengthening of labour and rationalisation in the process to produce surplus value comes to have a close relation to the contribution to the budget or economy. Such is the reason why the element of ‘rationalisation’ has been found so closely connected with the finance of the social overhead capital.
      “The recent system of state-monopoly capitalism has added new conditions to this background. The first condition is the financial expansion and financial crisis (its basic cause arising out of the permanent and military economic system) on the one hand and the super-abundance of capital and labour, that is, the existence of the financial capital that has lost the opportunity to multiply value (the so-called private fund and foreign capital) on the other.…
      “The second condition is that the elastic use of funds is necessitated because the administrative authorities that are tied to the loan capital are in reality in such distressing situation that no emergency measures can be successfully disposed, having no smooth control over the [Japanese legislative] Diet.…
      “The third condition is that, once the fund that could collect returns has been formed, any activity would come to be regarded as the source of profit, even if it may not produce any surplus in reality, and it would try to gain returns by making use of such fund even from houses or roads for use by individuals.”
      [Jun Ikegami, “Social Overhead Capital and Public Finance.” The Kyoto University Economic Review: Memoirs of the Faculty of Economics in the Kyoto University. Volume 36, number 1, April 1966. Pages 39-71.]
      “… on the part of the working class were provided a common ground to make public contention of their own right of existence being supported with their right to form their own organisation and on the part of capitalists were provided a common ground to execute accumulation and centralisation of capital on a greater and greater scale through their centralised control over the working class, thus leading to pave the way to a greater social collision between the said two hostile classes. The legal restriction placed on a working day, if viewed from a laborer’s angle, was a development of new democratism not necessarily backed up by the property-right but backed up by the right to form their own organisation and if viewed from a capitalist’s angle, it provided an impetus to place a partial restriction on ‘free competition’ of the medium- or small-scaled capitalists through the national monopoly of the right to determine a working day, thus enabling them not only to guarantee a rapid development of large capital but at the same time to execute a standardised control over the working class. It may well be concluded that the former is what gave a prospect for socialism as pointed out by Engels and the latter is an indication of very fragile buds of the lifelong control now practiced in these days over the labor power or the labor control through the state monopoly capitalism.” [Jun Ikegami, “State Monopoly Capitalism and Organisation of Struggles for Survival.” The Kyoto University Economic Review: Memoirs of the Faculty of Economics in the Kyoto University. Volume 41, number 2, October 1971. Pages 46-83.]
      “While cooperation and division of labour in capitalistic society and its large-scale mechanized industry produce detail labourers as well as control and synthesis and monopoly of all mental functions by the capitalists (or those who have authority delegated by the capitalists), ‘in order to make the collective labourer, and through him capital, rich in social productive power, each labourer must be made poor in individual productive powers.’ In other words, ‘what is lost by the detail labourers, is concentrated in the capital that employs him. It is a result of the division of labour in manufactures, that the labourer is brought face to face with the material production process the intellectual potencies of material process of production, as the property of another, and as a ruling power. This separation begins in simple cooperation in which the capitalist represent to the single workman, the openess and the associated labour. It is developed in manufacture which cuts down the labourer into a detail labourer. It is completed in modern industry, which makes science a productive force distinct from labour and presses it into the service of capital.’” [Jun Ikegami, “Competition for Survival among Inhabitants and Fully Developed Human Beings.” The Kyoto University Economic Review: Memoirs of the Faculty of Economics in the Kyoto University. Volume 46, number 1/2, April–October 1976. Pages 19-34.]
      “The State Monopoly Capitalism theory takes instrumentalist control farthest. According to this approach, competition among capitalists necessarily leads to the centralization and concentration of capital and hence to the development of monopoly capital. Monopoly capitalism becomes state monopoly capitalism as monopolies and the state are fused together. State intervention is necessary to offset the tendency for the rate of profit to fall, and may include the nationalization of basic industries, state provision of basic services, the creation of a large market for commodities, etc. State intervention is possible because the state is an instrument of the dominant monoplies, as can be seen in the class background and class affiliation of state personnel, etc.” [Raju J. Das, “State Theories: A Critical Analysis.” Science & Society. Volume 6, number 1, Spring 1996. Pages 27-57.]

Return to the table of contents.

9. Compilation of Conflict Theories (C. Wright Mills, Ralf Dahrendorf, Lewis A. Coser, Derek Sweetman, Robert Heiner, Alvin W. Gouldner, and others): There is a constant struggle over scarce resources, such as power, privilege, prestige, and wealth. The possessors of such resources attempt to keep them. The oppressed struggle to acquire them. Mills, Dahrendorf, and Coser were among the originators of modern conflict theory. Georg Simmel’s formal sociology and Willard Waller’s value–conflict theory—neither of which is generally deemed to be a neo–Marxist approach—are considered here as conflict theories.
   Here is a brief listing.
   1. power–elite theories (C. Wright Mills and G. William Domhoff): The particular version of conflict theory used by Mills is power-elite theory. It is a nonconspiratorial perspective on three American elites (the Fortune 500 companies, the executive branch of government, and the Department of Defense). Mills also introduced the concept, the sociological imagination. Domhoff’s version of power-elite theory, which he has termed a class-based theory of power, was, at least partially, inspired by Mills’ work. Domhoff has clearly and consistently stated that he does not regard himself as either a Marxist or a neo–Marxist.
      “Within each of the most powerful institutional orders of modern society there is a gradation of power. The owner of a roadside fruit stand does not have as much power in any area of social or economic or political decision as the head of a multi-million-dollar fruit corporation; no lieutenant on the line is as powerful as the Chief of Staff in the Pentagon; no deputy sheriff carries as much authority as the President of the United States.” [C. Wright Mills. The Power Elite. Oxford, England, and New York: Oxford University Press. 1956. Page 18.]
      “Using a wide range of systematic empirical findings, this book shows how the owners and top-level managers in large companies work together to maintain themselves as the core of the dominant power group. Their corporations, banks, and agribusinesses form a corporate community that shapes the federal government on the policy issues of interest to it, issues that have a major impact on the income, job security, and well-being of most other Americans. At the same time, there is competition within the corporate community for profit opportunities, which can lead to highly visible policy conflicts among rival corporate leaders that are sometimes fought out in Congress. Yet the corporate community is cohesive on the policy issues that affect its general welfare, which is often at stake when political challenges are made by organized workers, liberals, or strong environmentalists. The book therefore deals with another seeming paradox: How can a highly competitive group of corporate leaders cooperate enough to work their common will in the political and policy arenas?…
      “Corporate owners and their top executives enter into the electoral arena as the leaders of a corporate-conservative coalition, which they shape through large campaign contributions, the advocacy of policy options developed by their hired experts, and easy access to the mass media. They are aided by a wide variety of middle-class patriotic, antitax, and single-issue organizations that celebrate the status quo and warn against ‘big government.’ These opinion-shaping organizations are funded in good part by the corporate community, but they have some degree of independence due to direct-mail appeals and modest donations by a large number of middle-class conservatives. The corporate leaders play a large role in both of the major political parties at the presidential level and succeeded in electing a pro-corporate majority to Congress throughout the twentieth century. Historically, this majority in Congress consisted of Northern Republicans and Southern Democrats, but that arrangement changed gradually after the Voting Rights Act of 1965 made it possible for a coalition of African-Americans and white liberals to push the most conservative Southern Democrats into the Republican Party.”
      [G. William Domhoff. Who Rules America?: Power, Politics, and Social Change. Fifth edition. New York: McGraw-Hill imprint of The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc. 2006. Pages xi-xiii.]
      “Clarence Lo … graciously wrote that he no longer believed that the label ‘instrumentalist’ [i.e., instrumental Marxist] applied to me. I have no ax to grind with Lo, whose empirical work I admire.” [G. William Domhoff. The Power Elite and the State: How Policy is Made in America. Hawthorne, New York: Aldine de Gruyter imprint of Walter de Gruyter, Inc. 1990. Page 41.]
      “… now I was known as an instrumental Marxist. I was mad. I wrote saying, ‘I am not an instrumentalist.’” [G. William Domhoff. The Adventures and Regrets of a Professor of Dreams and Power. Sarah Rabkin, interviewer. Irene Reti, editor. Santa Cruz, California: University of California, Santa Cruz. 2014. Page 239.]
      “… I don’t think the American state happens to be very autonomous for numerous historical reasons …. In my case, the emphasis on potential autonomy derives from [C. Wright] Mills, who said the same thing quite clearly in The Power Elite.” [G. William Domhoff, “Class, Power, and Parties in the New Deal: A Critique of Skocpolʾs State Autonomy Theory.” Berkeley Journal of Sociology. Volume 36, 1991. Pages 1-49.]
      “… it will be the purpose of this essay to show that my class-based theory of power in America is more useful in understanding the origins of major New Deal initiatives than her [Theda Skocpol’s] theory of state autonomy…. In focusing on the influence of a power elite rooted in large corporations I will not be denying a role to the experts, political parties, and government officials emphasized by Skocpol, but showing how they are part of or shaped by the power elite….
      “Skocpol begins by assuming I am a neo-Marxist. This is a matter of judging some of the people I cite rather than looking at the substance of my work or respecting my own labels for myself (‘power structure researcher’ until the late 1970s, but lately ‘a political sociologist who emphasizes the class in his studies of the American power structure’).”
      [G. William Domhoff, “Class, Power, and Parties in the New Deal: A Critique of Skocpol’s State Autonomy Theory.” Berkeley Journal of Sociology. Volume 36, 1991. Pages 1-49.]
      “The reason is that three decades of accelerating inequality have produced a deformed social order and a set of elites who cannot help but be dysfunctional and corrupt. Most of us don’t see it that way, because we get elites wrong. We don’t acknowledge that our most fundamental, shared beliefs about how society should operate are deeply elitist. We have accepted that there will be some class of people that will make the decisions for us, and if we just manage to find the right ones, then all will go smoothly.” [Christopher Hayes. Twilight of the Elites: America After Meritocracy. New York: Crown Publishers imprint of Crown Publishing Group, a division of Random House, Inc. 2012. Kindle edition.]
      “At the end of the book [The Power Elite] you juxtapose your mass society, seduced by consumerism, indoctrinated by the media, distracted by celebrities, to a democratic republic in which publics express their views openly, debate with one another, have their expressed needs realized under the assumption that this public sphere is autonomous from dominant institutions such as state and economy. This is harking back to a bygone period of Jeffersonian democracy rather than pointing forward to new possibilities.” [Michael Burawoy, “Open Letter to C. Wright Mills.” Antipode. Volume, 40, number 3, 2008. Pages 365-375.]
   2. theory of the institutional isolation of industrial conflict (Ralf Dahrendorf as pronounced in this MP3 audio file): According to Dahrendorf, Marx developed a “theory of class conflict.” Dahrendorf refers to his own perspective as the theory of the institutional isolation of industrial conflict. He describes it as a reformulated theory of class conflict. Dahrendorf’s theoretical framework is sometimes called dialectical conflict theory.
      “In the last two chapters of this study the analytical usefulness of the reformulated theory of class conflict will be subjected to a test by its application to the structure of post-capitalist societies.”
      [Ralf Dahrendorf. Class and Conflict in Industrial Society. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press. 1959. Page 119.]
      “A special case of the matter formulated in this proposition [that ‘consumption roles’ are ‘the central determinant of all patterns of behavior instead of class status’] and a further consequence of the theory of the institutional isolation of industrial conflict can be found in the hypothesis that the participants of industry, upon leaving the factory gate, leave behind them with their occupational role their industrial class interests also. The manifest contents of industrial class interests are no longer identical with those of political class interests.”
      [Ralf Dahrendorf. Class and Conflict in Industrial Society. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press. 1959. Pages 273-274.]
      “… [Ralf] Dahrendorf’s theory has been referred to as dialectical conflict theory. Institutionalization is a cyclical or dialectical process producing a shifting pattern of social stability and conflict. As one group gains authority, another group resists it with opposing interests seeking to gain comparable but superior power. Conflict is dialectical since the resolution of one conflict pattern creates an opposing set of interest producing another basis for conflict and so on. The result is social change, often unobserved and uncontrolled as society moves into new forms of social structure.” [Russell Heddendorf and Matthew Vos. Hidden Threads: A Christian Critique of Sociological Theory. Lanham, Maryland: University Press of America, Inc. 2010. Page 79.]
   3. formal sociology (Georg Simmel as pronounced in this MP3 audio file): Although Simmel’s formal sociology, the sociological study of social forms, is not a particularly neo-Marxian perspective, I am including it. Simmel addressed the subject the subject of social conflict, and he influenced the pioneers of critical social theory (the Frankfurt school) as well as Lewis A. Coser’s functional conflict theory (below).
      “The contrast between unity and antagonism is perhaps most visible where both parties really pursue an identical aim – such as the exploration of a scientific truth. Here any yielding, any polite renunciation of the merciless exposure of the adversary, any peace prior to the wholly decisive victory would be treason against that objectivity for the sake of which the personal character has been eliminated from the fight. Ever since Marx, the social struggle has developed into this form, despite infinite differences in other respects. Since it has been recognized that the condition of labor is determined by the objective conditions and forms of production, irrespective of the desires and capacities of particular individuals, the personal bitterness of both general and local battles has greatly decreased.” [Georg Simmel. Conflict And The Web Of Group Affiliations. Reinhard Bendix and Everett C. Hughes, translators. New York: The Free Press. 1955. Kindle edition.]
      “The extent and combination of antipathy, the rhythm of its appearance and disappearance, the forms in which it is satisfied, all these, along with the more literally unifying elements, produce the metropolitan form of life in its irresolvable totality; and what at first glance appears in it as dissociation, actually is one of its elementary forms of sociation. [Georg Simmel. Conflict And The Web Of Group Affiliations. Reinhard Bendix and Everett C. Hughes, translators. New York: The Free Press. 1955. Kindle edition.]
   4. functional conflict theory (Lewis A. Coser): Taking Simmel’s formal sociology as a jumping-off point, Coser attempts to reconcile conflict theory with structural-functionalism through an examination of the alleged functions of social conflict.
      “… we intended to identify in Simmel’s extensive account only those propositions that seem relevant for a contemporary theory of the functions of social conflict.” [Lewis A. Coser. The Functions of Social Conflict. New York: The Free Press. 1956. Page 30.]
      “… conflict is a component of all social relationships and … it fulfills positive functions inasmuch as it leads to the re-establishment of unity and balance in the group.” [Lewis A. Coser. The Functions of Social Conflict. New York: The Free Press. 1956. Page 73.]
      “Next I will explore—as contradictory as it sounds—Lewis A. Coser’s functional conflict theory.” [Jonathan H. Turner, Contemporary Sociological Theory. Thousand Oaks, California: SAGE Publications, Inc. 2013. Kindle edition.]
   5. critical conflict theory (Derek Sweetman): He creates a synthesis between conflict theory and critical theory.
      “One of the goals of Unrest [Magazine] is to investigate the theoretical spaces not commonly addressed in our analysis of contemporary conflict and our attempts to address it. We hope to contribute to the development of Critical Conflict Theory (CCT), which has the opportunity to provide insights traditional conflict theory cannot. This essay argues that heterogeneous conflicts should be a fertile ground for critical work and, in so doing, hopes to point at least some of the CCT work toward this underrepresented area.” [Derek Sweetman, “Heterogeneous Conflicts: One Role for Critical Conflict Theory.” UNREST MAGAZINE: Engaging Systems of Violence. January 15, 2011. Creative Commons.]
   6. critical constructionism (Robert Heiner): This theory is unrelated, substantively, to the critical constructionist approaches of Stanley L. Witkin et al. (which were discussed earlier). Heiner’s approach combines symbolic interactionism with conflict theory. Although I previously used Heiner’s well-written text, Social Problems: An Introduction to Critical Constructionism, in my social problems classes, since I am neither a symbolic interactionist nor a conflict theorist, I eventually moved on to other textbooks.
      “Critical constructionism is largely a synthesis of two very influential theories in sociology—namely, conflict theory and symbolic interactionism….
      “Conflict theories are concerned mostly with inequality. Those interested in social problems usually attribute them to inequality and to the use and abuse of power. Power is the ability to influence the social structure. Those with power—the elite—influence the social structure in ways that will enhance their power. Generally, the elite tend to use their power to prevent social change and maintain the status quo….
      “Unlike conflict theory, which focuses on the broader social strucure, symbolic interactionism focuses on the day-to-day interactions between people. Symbolic interactionism is considered a branch of [sociological] social psychology because it focuses on the ways people think and give meaning to the world. Virtually all human interaction involves the act of interpretation….
      “… Social constructionism is concerned with how the meanings of social problems are constructed…. Critical constructionism is different from social constructionism only in that it emphasizes the role of elite interests in the process of problem construction. Borrowing from conflict theory, the critical constructionist argues that the way social problems are constructed, conceived, and presented to the public, more often than not, reflects the interests of society’s elite more than those of the mainstream and often at the expense of those with the least power.”
      [Robert Heiner. Social Problems: An Introduction to Critical Constructionism. Third edition. Oxford, England, and New York: Oxford University Press. 2010. Pages 9-12.]
      “We will use Robert Heiner’s (2012) term ‘critical constructionism’ …. Those who adopt this approach seek to engage the social world in a reflexive rather than in an instrumental way. They understand how social structures can shape opportunities. But they share the symbolic interactionist assumption that these structures are reproduced or resisted in situations, and it is at this level that the living operate.” [James R. Pennell and Tim Maher, “Whom Will Sociology Serve? Transforming the Discipline by Engaging Communities.” Humanity & Society. 2015, Volume 39, number 1, 2015. Pages 47-63.]
      “Historically there have been, and there are now, two social psychologies (ignoring variations within each). Occasionally, these touch and influence one another; more often, they proceed essentially independently of one another.1 One is a social psychology written by psychologists, the other a social psychology written by sociologists. Neither is totally remote from the influence of the other, nor isomorphic with professional pedigree, but the two tend to differ in definition and in execution. For psychological social psychology, the field is defined by its focus on psychological processes of individuals; the task is to understand the impact of social stimuli on individuals. For sociological social psychology, the field is defined by the reciprocity of society and individual; and the fundamental task is the explanation of social interaction. Although some fascinating methodological developments are occurring in each, psychological social psychology has been primarily experimental in method, and sociological social psychology has relied on naturalistic observation and on surveys.” [Sheldon Stryker, “Developments in ‘Two Social Psychologies’: Toward an Appreciation of Mutual Relevance.” Sociometry. Volume 40, number 2, 1977. Pages 145-160.]
   7. general theory of group tensions (Alvin W. Gouldner): Examines group, not individual, tensions.
      “… [I develop] the framework of a general theory of group tensions.
      “… it must be stressed that, as this will be a theory of group rather than individual tensions, the focus will be on strains in social systems rather than those in personality systems. It is unnecessary to belabor the obvious point that the two are connected, and that there is no tangible gulf between personal and social disorganization. Assuredly, the characteristics of individuals in a group contribute to and express group tensions. In some way, too, the disturbances of the individuals who comprise the group reflect and contribute to the development of group tensions, as well as to the attempts which are made to cope with them. In focussing on group tensions, however, the individual’s neuroses or character deformations are treated as a ‘given’; disciplined concentration is instead directed to the tensions in the relationship between individuals….
      “The examination of symptoms institutes a problem in which the generic question is always: Under what conditions is it possible for the aggrieved party’s expectations to have been frustrated?…
      “In sum, the analysis of tensions requires study both of the expectations which have been frustrated, and the conditions frustrating them; and each of these may be commenced by the analysis of symptomatic complaints. Stated differently, analysis of symptoms may lead to hypotheses about things which the complainant is defending, the things which are threatening, and the specific defense which is being employed against the threat….
      “Clearly, not all complaints have relevance to a theory of group tensions. Stated positively, only insofar as complaints do have bearing on the relationships among group members are they of interest here. Often, however, complaints are formulated in a way that obscures their implications for a system of interpersonal relationships….
      “A complaint is a grievance about someone’s behavior verbalized by someone else. In what terms shall these persons be identified and characterized? Since the task is one of analyzing a social system, the biological or psychological attributes ascribed to people as individual organisms are beside the point. What is needed is an intrinsically social basis for viewing people, one which directly focusses on their inter-relatedness. For this purpose, the most suitable and elementary notion is that of ‘social status.’
      [Alvin W. Gouldner. Wildcat Strike: A Study in Worker-Management Relationships. New York: Harper Torchbooks imprint of Harper & Row, Publishers. 1965. Pages 124-129.]
   8. value-conflict theory (Willard Waller and others): I am including value-conflict theory. It is rooted in Waller’s approach to symbolic interactionism. He was strongly influenced by the perspectives of University of Michigan sociologist Charles Horton Cooley. Value-conflict theory is not a specifically neo-Marxian approach.
      “Social problems are social conditions of which some of the causes are felt to be human and moral. Value judgments define these conditions as social problems. Value judgments are the formal causes of social problems, just as the law is the formal cause of crime. Value judgments originate from the humanitarian mores, which are somewhat in conflict with the organizational mores. Social problems are moral problems; they are like the problems of a problem play. The existence of some sort of moral problem is the single thread that binds all social problems together. Any important social problem is marked by moral conflict in the individual and social conflict in the group. It is thus that the strain for consistency in the mores expresses itself.” [Willard Waller, “Social Problems and the Mores.” American Sociological Review. Volume 1, number 6, December 1936. Pages 922-933.]
      “… value conflict theorists … define social problems as ‘conditions that are incompatible with group values’ …. According to value conflict theory, social problem occur when groups with different values meet and compete. Such problems are normal, since in a complex society, there are many groups whose interests and values are bound to differ and/or conflict. From the value conflict viewpoint, many social problems need to be understood in terms of which groups hold which values and have the power to enforce them against the wishes of other groups.” [Ogaga Ayemo Obaro “Sociological Theorising and Contemporary Social Problems in Nigeria.” Mediterranean Journal of Social Sciences. Volume 5, number 2, January 2014. Pages 541-548.]
      “[Willard] Waller’s enthusiasm for [Charles Horton] Cooley was contagious. His students caught it and were often able to pass it along.” [Ruth Mallay, “In Memoriam: Willard Waller, 1899-1945.” Sociometry. Volume 8, number 3/4, August–November 1945. Pages 312-313.]

Return to the table of contents.

10. Marxist Functionalist Frameworks (David Lockwood, Neil J. Smelser, Phillip J. Wood, and Trevor J. Barnes): The first two functionalist perspectives on Marxism are separated by three decades from the third.
    1. Marxist structural-functionalism (David Lockwood): Combines a Marxian theory of conflict with Talcott Parsons’ structural-functionalism.
       “a stabilized social system is one in which behaviour is regulated …, and, as such, is a major point of reference for the sociological analysis of the dynamics of social systems. It is necessary in sociology, as in biology, to single out relatively stable points of reference, or ‘structural’ aspects of the system under consideration, and then to study the processes whereby such structures are maintained. This is the meaning of the ‘structural-functional’ approach to social system analysis. Since the social system is a system of action, and its structural aspects are the relatively stable interactions of individuals around common norms, the dynamic processes with which the sociologist is concerned are those which function to maintain social structures, or, in other words, those processes whereby individuals come to be motivated to act in conforlnity with normative standards….
       “It is unnecessary to argue that all conflicts, interests, facilities and powers are ‘economic’ in the sense of being related to the ownership of productive means, in order to appreciate that some such generic concepts are indispensable in analysing the dynamics of social systems. The Marxian system of economic materialism is a specific case of a more general sociological materialism which has never been given anything like the careful analysis to which [Talcott] Parsons has subjected the concept of the normative….
       “It is evident, then, that the distinction between order and conflict is one that needs only to be maintained in so far as it illustrates the dimensions of the present problem. Order and conflict are states of the social system, indices of its operation, and to talk of the determinants of order should therefore be to talk of the determinants of conflict. It is only because the problem of order has become bound up with the functioning of the normative system in Parsons’ work, that it is necessary to press for the analysis of conflict as a separate task, and especially for the recognition of those aspects of conflict which are nonnormative…. Certain kinds of normative order are more conducive to the development of conflict than others. For instance, the labour-capital conflict in its classical manifestation arose out of the actual situation of the classes under capitalistic production, but it was greatly intensified and sharpened by the existence of a dominant value system, the cardinal features of which, ‘freedom’ and ‘opportunity,’ contrasted radically with the factual order of events. The generation of conflict, which may be taken as an index of social instability, is never a simple matter of a conflict of material interest but also involves the normative definition of the situation.”
       [David Lockwood, “Some Remarks on the ‘Social System’.” The British Journal of Sociology. Volume 7, number 2, June 1956. Pages 134-146.]
       “It might seem curious that Engels should put forward such a frank account of autonomous state interests dominating society, including the bourgeoisie, when Marxism would seem to demand that the state was subordinate to capital, even if only to its ‘general interests.’ But the peculiarity remains only for as long as the state is regarded as part of the ‘superstructure’—produced and determined by the economic structure which in turn is dependent on the level of development of the productive forces. But if the state is regarded instead as one of the production relations, part of the economic structure, that vies with other production relations for domination within the economic structure, then a state-dominated economy and society (that dominates capital, its rival production relation, as well) ceases to be such a problem for orthodox historical materialism. And it helps to explain why disentanglement from the national state is such a necessity for the completion of the bourgeois revolution, and why the massive increase in the power of states after 1914 made that completion, at that time, impossible.” [David Lockwood, “War, the State and the Bourgeois Revolution.” War & Society. Volume 25, Number 2, October 2006. Pages 53-78.]
       “[Margaret S.] Archer draws on David Lockwood’s Marxist functionalism and Roy Bhaskar’s critical realism to develop a sophisticated morphogenetic theory of the emergence, reproduction and transformation of cultural systems and social structures.” [Frédéric Vandenberghe, “Margaret S. Archer: Structure, Agency and the Internal Conversation.” Book Review. European Journal of Social Theory. Volume 8, May 2005. Pages 227-237.]
    2. model of structural differentiation (Neil J. Smelser): Another attempt to combine structural-functionalism with certain Marxian concepts.
       “In my application of the model of structural differentiation, I have not denied that the working classes were the victims of exploitation in the Marxist sense. I should like to reject the notion, however, that ‘exploitation,’ which existed in certain measure all through the industrial revolution, can be converted into a satisfactory explanatory principle governing the attitudes and behaviour of the working classes. In many cases it simply misses the facts; in other cases it must be stretched to include the facts; and above all, its categories are so general and inclusive as to occasion a weakening of the explanatory power of the scheme. It seems to me that it is less embarrassing analytically to interpret cases of outright conflict between the classes as disturbed reactions to specific structural pressures rather than as the manifestations of a permanent state of war between them.” [Neil J. Smelser. Social Change in the Industrial Revolution: An Application of Theory to the British Cotton Industry. Chicago, Illinois: The University of Chicago Press. 1959. Page 394.]
       “In many respects, both Neil Smelser and the social sciences matured together in the last half of the last century. Smelser expanded his areas of research to include sociology, psychology, economics, and history, at the same time that newly synthetic cross-disciplinary programs, area studies, and applied programs appeared. Through his work with commissions and foundations and as a spokesperson for the social sciences, he sought a greater public role for sociology, and helped to foster the gradual infiltration of their findings and methods into other disciplines, practical settings, and popular culture. Smelser’s early interest in comparative international studies anticipated their expansion, an increase in international collaboration, and greater awareness of globalization issues. His move from optimism about positivist approaches and functionalism in the 1950s, to a more guarded optimism and plurivocality today has paralleled broader doubts within the academy and greater tolerance for other ways of knowing.” [Jeffrey C. Alexander and Gary T. Marx, “Smelser, Neil.” Encyclopedia of Social Theory. George Ritzer, editor. Thousand Oaks, California: SAGE Publications, Inc. 2005. Pages 709-713.]
    3. functional Marxism (Phillip J. Wood and Trevor J. Barnes): Uses a functionalist approach to critique analytical Marxism.
       “Since the onset of sustained economic crisis in most Western capitalist countries beginning in the late 1960s, there has been a tremendous growth in the literature on the capitalist State, much of which emerges from Marxist the analysis of the role of the State in capitalism have been obscured or lost altogether. In their place, there has emerged an approach to the State that relies on a fusion of Marxist terminology with the kind of reasoning used in functionalist sociology and political science rather than in historical materialism. From this perspective the State is seen as an authoritative structure that performs, for capital, a series of functions that are defined as being essential for the reproduction of the capitalist system. In order for the state to be able to perform these functions—which usually involve the regulation of economic and social relationships in order to promote capital accumulation and social cohesion—the State must be ‘relatively autonomous’; that is, in order to be able to further the long-term interests of capital in general, the State must be able to act independently of particular capitals and, when necessary, of the economic level as a whole.
       “This perspective is inadequate for a number of reasons. First, in an effort to construct a Marxist political theory, (that is, a theory of capitalist states generally) the functional requirements of capital are usually derived from an analysis of the capitalist mode of production at its most abstract level, rather than from a consideration of capitalist production in real historical situations. The possibility that different social contexts can give rise to variations in strategies of exploitation and accumulation and in patterns of class conflict, and that these may in turn give rise to variations in the extent and content of State intervention, is ignored in the interest of deriving theoretical generalizations. The price of this approach is ‘conceptual stretching.’ The categories of functional Marxism (accumulation, legitimation, coercion, and social cohesion) become so broad that it is often very easy to fit a specific State action into any or all of them, with the result that they become analytically useless.
       “Second, the concept of relative autonomy effectively severs the links between the State and even this abstract model of capitalist development. Once the functional requisites of capitalist reproduction have been derived, the relationship between the State and capital is relegated to the status of a defensive covering generalization that, following Engels, ‘on the whole the economic movement gets its way.’ The problem of the capitalist State is thus abstracted from its social context and treated as a specifically political problem, thus duplicating the fragmentation of capitalist social relations that is characteristic of bourgeois social thought.
       “Third, to define the capitalist State in terms of the functional requirements of capitalist reproduction does not explain the role of the State. To begin with, it does not even adequately define the role of the State unless it can be shown that only the State can perform such functions, that all its acts are functional, and that without them capitalism will suffer unpleasant consequences. Yet the success with which the State carries out its functions will presumably vary with historical conditions. The degree of functional success needed to maintain capitalism must therefore be specified, or the the reproduction of capitalism, while the persistence of capitalism must mean that the State is performing its required functions. Further, it seems entirely possible that certain States under certain conditions may be dysfunctional; that is, for a variety of reasons they may be incapable of, or even impede, action necessary to ensure capitalist reproduction. In these cases, their structure and functions may have to be transformed, or, if this is not possible, other entities, such as class organizations, cartels, or international organizations, may be required to pick up the slack.
       “More important than these problems, however, is the fact that to define the functions of the State is not to explain them, even if all the above conditions are met. Functional analysis cannot explain how the State develops, or why its forms, structures, and practices differ in different capitalist societies.
       “In general, this radical functionalism fails because it closes off the very kind of historical analysis that is necessary to analyze the relationship between capitalism and the State in concrete social situations. It diverts attention away from historical questions and toward abstract questions of functional logic such as those mentioned above. As a result, it confines empirical Marxist research on the State to the task of filling functional pigeonholes with the relevant examples of State action, occasionally amending a functional category, or perhaps adding a new one. Consequently, like the competitive market model, it cannot generate categories that permit the conceptualization and explanation of variations in State policy either over time or in different social contexts.”
       [Phillip J. Wood. Southern Capitalism: The Political Economy of North Carolina, 1880-1980. Durham, North Carolina: Duke University Press. 1986. Google Play edition.]
       “[David R.] Reynolds unaccountably suggests that I am rejecting functional Marxism for the merits of rational-choice Marxism. Rather, I spent six pages of the chapter outlining the inconsistencies in the physical metaphor that underlies analytical Marxism (it is the same one employed by neoclassicism, as I make clear); and the book that Eric Sheppard and I wrote … that Reynolds cites as evidence for his claim is concerned precisely with exposing the inherent logical difficulties faced by rational-choice analysts in dealing with geography ….” [Trevor J. Barnes, “Functional metaphors: a reply to Richard Peet and David R. Reynolds.” Economic Geography. Volume 70, number 3, July 1994. Pages 308-313.]
       “… [One] strand pushing the culture of work in geography, and again one in which Massey was also central, was feminism. In the early 1980s feminist geographers attracted to political economy followed the larger socialist feminist literature that at the time was preoccupied with the question of female domestic labor and household reproduction. That literature identified the household as a site of (re)production. The household produced workers, and future workers (children), ensuring that they were clothed, fed, and sheltered, ready to turn up to work (or school) the next day. But how should the unpaid domestic work of women, and who (re)produced the central commodity of capitalism, labor, be treated conceptually? On the surface it appeared as if the work women did in the home was different from laboring in a factory. It was different culture. Work disappeared. But the classical economistic and functional Marxist interpretation reduced domestic labor, women, and the political ends of feminism only to class position. Culture disappeared.” [Trevor J. Barnes, “Cultures of work.” Privately published paper. Undated. Pages 1-13.]
       “Turning to the Marxist ‘interpretive community,’ [Trevor J.] Barnes argues that economic rationality is couched at the level of the structure of the economy as a whole, which is rational providing crisis-free reproduction occurs. Here the key metaphor ‘reproduction’ underlying radical geography’s concept of capitalist landscapes is drawn from biology. This forces Marxists into using functional arguments: specifically, Marx’s schema of reproduction recasts the regulative idea from biology (i.e., the structural behavior of an organism is explained by its reproductive benefits)…. Barnes evaluates the appropriateness of the biological metaphor: the two processes of reproduction (biological and social) have similarities in the sense that new commodities, like individuals, are reproduced; but biological functionalism cannot deal with human individuals, while the reproduction metaphor derogates human reflexivity; and the mechanisms relating the beneficial consequences of reproduction to the specifics of human action are different in the biological and social worlds, while functionalist explanations are teleological.” [Richard Peet, David R. Reynolds, and Trevor J. Barnes, “Discourse, text, location theory—Comment/reply.” Economic Geography. Volume 70, number 3, July 1994. Pages 297-302.]

Return to the table of contents.

11. Analytical Marxism and Anarchism (Gerald A. Cohen, John E. Roemer, John Elster, Roberto Veneziani, Alan Carling, Philippe Van Parijs as pronounced in this MP3 audio file, Raimo Blom as pronounced in this MP3 audio file, Markku Kivinen as pronounced in this MP3 audio file, Alan Carling, Jeffrey P. Carpenter, Peter Hans Matthews, Peter King, Bruce Philip, Norman Geras, Alan Carter, and many others): Analytical Marxists—using the research methods of the social sciences and history, formal logic, and mathematics—have developed and tested hypotheses in the context of Marxism. Carter developed a comparable framework for anarchism.
    “Analytical Marxism represents an important turning point in Western Marxism. It is an attempt to tackle the classical problems using new theoretical tools, primarily the state-of-the-art methods of analytical philosophy and ‘positivist’ social science….
    “Analytical Marxists like to stress the point that they are unorthodox, but in fact their starting-points are in many respects very traditional. For analytical Marxism, Marx is above all a theorist of history. This means that the tradition fails to take into account the most important results of the ‘capital-logical’ research of the 1970s, according to which traditional Marxism – which evolved after Marx’s death within the Second International – seriously deforms Marx’s thought. The hard core of Marx’s theorizing, which is contained in Capital and various preliminary works, is largely ignored.”
    [Raimo Blom and Markku Kivinen, “Analytical Marxism and Class Theory.” Abstract. Organization Theory and Class Analysis: New Approaches and New Issues. Stewart Clegg, editor. Berlin, Germany: Walter de Gruyter & Co. 1989. Page 75.]
    “For a few years following 1979, … our work was very Marxism-centred. Bob Brenner wrote about issues of transition from feudalism to capitalism (and he has continued to be very Marxist, even in his most recent extraordinarily ambitious books about contemporary capitalism). Van der Veen was writing about exploitation, so was Philippe Van Parijs, so was I – and so, of course, was John Roemer. And everybody was committed to the application of analytical standards to the corpus of and the development of Marxist and left-wing thought. In some cases that meant analytical philosophy, in other cases it meant neo-classical economic techniques (without the neo-classical ideology). I suppose that the people in the group looked inward to the Marxist heritage itself and outward to the world and to issues that engaged people other than Marxists in all kinds of different ways. Gradually a great deal of the Marxian corpus was eroded by careful attempts to decide what could be kept and what had to go.” [Gerald Cohen in Simon Tormey, “Simon Tormey interviews Gerald Cohen.” Contemporary Political Theory. Volume 8, 2009. Pages 351-362.]
    “The resolute option for an analytical mode of thought does, however, imply that the research programme stemming from Marx should by no means be conceived as the development of an alternative “logic,” or of a fundamentally different way of thinking about capitalist development, or about social reality in general. It rather consists in practising the most appropriate forms of standard analytical thought – using conventional conceptual analysis, formal logic and mathematics, econometric methods and the other tools of statistical and historical research – in order to tackle the broad range of positive and normative issues broached in Marx’s work.” [Philippe Van Parijs, Analytical Marxism. 1994. Retrieved on September 13th, 2015. Originally published, in Dutch, as Philippe Van Parijs, “Analytisch marxisme.” Vlaams Marxistisch Tijdschrift. Volume 21, number 1, March 1987. Pages 41-44. Then published, in German, as Philippe Van Parijs, “Analytischer Marxismus.” Kritisches Wörterbuch des Marxismus Band 1. Wolfgang Fritz Haug, editor. Berlin, Germany: Argument Verlag GmbH. 1994. Pages 202-205.]
    “If the rejection of [Georg Wilhelm Friedrich] Hegel is a premise of Analytical Marxism on the theory side, its premise on the political side is a rejection of [Vladimir] Lenin. In terms of the scheme above, Leninism is a relatively low level variant of Marxism, which introduces a particular technology of power: the proletarian social vehicle becomes effective through the vanguard party, and the centrally planned economy is the means for realizing the values of equality and community (the latter in the form of a certain projection of proletarian solidarity), accompanied by, how shall we put it, a tendency to de-emphasize the present possibilities of self-realization. Although the rejection of the vanguard party and central planning have been long-standing themes of Analytical Marxism – in particular, these commitments predated the collapse of Communism – the rejections had their nuances. More to the point: these rejections left a space open for reconstruction, which different authors would fill in characteristically different ways.” [Alan Carling, “Analytical and Essential Marxism.” Political Studies. Volume 45, issue 4, September 1997. Pages 768-783.]
    “Just as [Karl] Marx and [Friedrich] Engels conceived historical materialism as a new, superior methodology for the critique of capitalism, [Gerald A.] Cohen can be said to have consciously sought a new scholarly approach, only this time informed by some of the methods and standards of analytical philosophy, and moreover producing a form of analysis critically to bear on the claims of Marxism itself. Cohen himself invited the analogy with Marx and Engels on the matter of being scientific. Cohen notes Engels’s tribute to Marx as the founder of ‘scientific socialism’ which, like Cohen and his colleagues, used ‘the most advanced resources of social science—within the frame of a socialist commitment,’ and which ‘exploited … what was best in the bourgeois social science of his day’ …. Indeed, Cohen laments that if analytical Marxism had been called instead ‘scientific socialism,’ then Left-wing critics of analytical Marxism would not have been disposed to ask the ‘unproductive question’ of whether analytical Marxism is Marxist ….” [Christine Sypnowich, “G. A. Cohen’s Socialism: Scientific but also Utopian.” Socialist Studies. Volume 8, number 1, winter 2012. Pages 20-34.]
    “Despite their differences, Althusserian and analytical Marxism shared a common enemy – historicism. Marxist philosophy had always been, to some degree, historicist. This is not surprising inasmuch as Hegel’s philosophy was one of Marxism’s sources; and [Georg Wilhelm Friedrich] Hegel, more than anyone, brought historicist thinking into its own.” [Andrew Levine. A Future for Marxism?: Althusser, the Analytical Turn and the Revival of Socialist Theory. Sterling, Virginia: Pluto Press. 2003. Page 65.]
    “… contrary to what was the conventional view before analytical Marxism, that socialism’s historical rival is not liberalism at all. It is what might be called nostalgic premodernism, epitomized in the various ‘fundamentalisms’ that identify with the world’s religions. In recent decades – thanks to disingenuous and ill-conceived Western meddling, the dissolution of the old bipolar world order, and the collapse of a genuinely Left alternative to endemic oppression – this plague has been loosed upon the world. The danger is plain. Unlike liberalism and even (post-French Revolutionary) conservatism, these ideologies – and that is what they are, however much they may present themselves as something unworldly and therefore extrapolitical – are not merely inadequate for realizing the emancipatory project that engaged the historical Left. They are detrimental to it.” [Andrew Levine. A Future for Marxism?: Althusser, the Analytical Turn and the Revival of Socialist Theory. Sterling, Virginia: Pluto Press. 2003. Page 168.]
    “The anticapitalist and communist objectives of Marxism are relaxed and received with extreme skepticism by analytical Marxism. Analytical Marxists suggest a number of possible nonworking-class solutions for workers under capitalism. Cohen argues that exploitation and proletarian unfreedom are not necessary conditions of capitalism. In other words, there are several means by which individual workers or groups of individual workers can realize their class objectives under capitalism. Elster ultimately argues that traditionally defined class struggle will not be the route to communism. It is, he insists, the achievement of a qualitatively different state of rationality that creates the conditions for assurance games and reciprocity—the basis of communism ….
    “Thus the concerns of analytical Marxism with respect to social transformation and revolution shift away from the class struggle and socialism and to the possibilities of gradual evolution under capitalism. This evolution is oriented to issues of the elevation of human rationality.
    [Anthony Monteiro, “A Dialectical-Materialist Critique of Analytical Marxism.” Nature, Society and Thought: A Journal of Dialectical Materialism. Volume 3, number 2, 1990. Pages 214-215.]
    “AM [analytical Marxism] is distinguished from the narrower approach also known as Rational Choice Marxism (hereafter, RCM). They have different implications: RCM contributions to Marxist social theory are mainly negative and do suggest that the role of Marxism in the social sciences is exhausted. Instead, according to scholars adopting a broader AM approach, AM has reconstructed a set of core propositions that can provide the foundations of a fertile, distinctive Marxist research programme in explanatory social science. The two approaches have also had different trajectories: whereas RCM has been abandoned by all of its most prominent practitioners, several important contributions in the AM tradition have continued to appear …. Critics often illegitimately proceed from the critique of RCM to the rejection of AM.” [Roberto Veneziani, “Analytical Marxism.” Journal of Economic Surveys. Volume 26, number 4, 2012. Pages 649-673.]
    “… while commentary on [Karl] Marx’s treatment of the division of labor has often been a major theme in non-Analytical accounts of his thought, Analytical Marxists have by and large shown little interest in this topic. G. A. Cohen’s work is, in this regard, no exception.” [Renzo Llorente, “Analytical Marxism and the Division of Labor.” Science & Society. Volume 70, number 2, April 2006. Pages 232-251.]
    “Unfortunately, the development of Analytical Marxism has rendered capitalism inert: the stimulus for social transformation, such as it is, is no longer to be sought within history, but outside of it – in the realm of ‘timeless’ principles. Having concluded that the prospects for working-class radicalization in the advanced capitalist countries are between dim and nil, and having abandoned the special theory of capitalism wholesale, [G. A.] Cohen is, it seems, here making a last-ditch attempt to forge some kind of tenuous connection between the development of human industry within capitalism, and the emergence of the agents of – or, at least, a constituency more amenable to – the transition to some form of socialism.” [Marcus Roberts, “Analytical Marxism – an ex-paradigm?: The odyssey of G. A. Cohen.” Radical Philosophy: Philosophical Journal of the Independent Left. Number 82, March/April 1997. Pages 17-28.]
    The following quotations illustrate some approaches, or perspectives, within the analytical Marxist school and analytical anarchism:
    1. rational-choice Marxism (Alan Carling and others): It applies rational-choice theory to analytical Marxism.
       “The rational-choice argument … runs, very briefly, as follows. Under capitalism, actors specialize etc. because (1) they have no options outside the market and (2) the logic of competitive price equilibrium makes survival in the marketplace depend on a constant stream of cost-cutting specializations, innovations and accumulations. Under feudalism, on the other hand, peasants do not specialize etc. because markets are too unreliable, and their subsistence needs are met outside the market. But neither do feudal lords specialize etc. because they have the non-market option of increasing their revenues by stepping up their coercive exactions from the peasantry. Since no significant feudal actor has the incentive to specialize etc., no systematic technological development occurs under feudalism.” [Alan Carling, “In Defence of Rational Choice: A Reply to Ellen Meiksins Wood.” New Left Review. Series I, number 184, November–December 1990. Pages 97-109.]
       “… [One] line of thought might suggest ‘neo-classical Marxism’ as an appropriate title for the new tendency. Other suggestions already in the field include ‘Analytical Marxism,’ ‘Game-theoretic Marxism,’ and—stretching a point—Post-post-classical Marxism. To the extent that a name is important, I would prefer the term Rational-Choice Marxism to collect the new work under a single heading, and to suggest why a single heading may be appropriate. For if there is one distinctive presupposition of the intended body of work, it must be the view that societies are composed of human individuals who, being endowed with resources of various kinds, attempt to choose rationally between various courses of action.” [Alan Carling. “Rational Choice Marxism.” New Left Review. Series I, number 160, November–December 1986. Pages 25-26.]
       “Not all rational actions are selfish. The assumption that agents are selfishly motivated does, however, have a methodological privilege, for the following reason. For non-selfish behavior, e.g., altruism, to be possible, some other agents must be selfishly motivated but not vice versa. Nonselfish behavior is logically parasitic on selfishness, since there can be no pleasures of giving if there are no selfish pleasures of having. Or again, if I am concerned about your welfare the latter cannot solely be made up of your concern for mine.” [Graeme Kirkpatrick, “Philosophical foundations of analytical Marxism.” Science & Society. Volume 58, number 1, Spring 1994. Pages 34-52.]
       “What is lost with rational choice Marxism is, principally, teleology. One cannot assert that those things happen which are optimal for the preservation of the capitalist system; or, on the contrary, that the system will destroy itself. Perhaps these events may happen, but the mechanisms at the level of the preference formation and solution processes must be shown to bring them about. The heritage of Marxism, as an idea, is a set of powerful descriptive insights. These descriptions must not be assumed true, but rather shown to emerge as theorems in models whose postulates are elementary and compelling.” [John E. Roemer, “‘Rational Choice’ Marxism: Some Issues of Method and Substance.” Economic and Political Weekly. Volume 20, number 34, August 1985. Pages 1439-1442.]
       “It is, indeed, possible to show that under certain conditions the class structure polarises over time, so that the ‘middle classes’ in my model are eliminated, and we end up with only pure capitalists and proletarians. Under other intitial conditions the opposite happens, and the class structure homogenises. But I hasten to add, even in this exercise class struggle does not appear. The dynamics I describe are simply a path of market-clearing equilibria over time. I indicated in my article ‘Rational Choice Marxism’ some general directions one could follow to incorporate class struggle into economic models.” [John E. Roemer, “Rational Choice Marxism.” Letter to the editor. Economic and Political Weekly. Volume 21, number 29, July 1986. Pages 1239-1240.]
       “… Analytical Marxism is not Marxism – and that, indeed, it is in essence anti-Marxist.
       “There are several alternative labels which have been attached to Analytical Marxism and its practitioners; they include Neo-classical Marxism, Game-Theoretic Marxism and Rational-Choice Marxism. Consideration of these labels themselves provides a good point of entry into an examination of Analytical Marxism….
       “It would be quite easy (but, at the same time, quite wrong) to conclude from the above discussion that Analytical Marxism has little to offer Marxists. In fact, these writers pose important questions and challenges. They reject, in particular, teleological reasoning in Marx; it should be rejected. Similarly, functional explanations are viewed as suspect. They are – and, where they appear, they should be scrutinized. Analytical Marxism, in this respect, can keep us on our toes….
       “… What makes Analytical Marxism anti-Marxist is that the beliefs and insights once absorbed from Marx have been incorporated within an anti-Marxist framework, and the parts have acquired properties from that whole.
       [Michael A. Lebowitz, “Is ‘Analytical Marxism’ Marxism?” Science & Society. Volume 52, number 2, summer 1988. Pages 191-214.]
       “A sensible way to proceed, then, might be to begin with a specific definition of RCM [rational choice Marxism], which recognizes the distinctiveness of its game-theoretic models and their methodological individualism, but without prejudging the capacity of this paradigm to enter into a fruitful alliance with a theory of social change and historical process from outside its distinctive methodological boundaries. This leaves us, in the first instance, with three obvious major candidates for inclusion: John Roemer, Jon Elster, and (lately) Adam Przeworski.…
       “The essential feature of this theory is its focus on what Roemer calls ‘property relations.’ What he means by ‘property relations’ is the distribution of assets or endowments, not the social relations of production and appropriation as Marxism commonly understands them. Indeed, it is the object of this focus on ‘property relations’ to shift the criterion of exploitation away from the direct relations between producers and appropriators and locate it in distributional factors.”
       [Ellen Meiksins Wood, “Rational Choice Marxism: Is the Game Worth the Candle?” New Left Review. Series I, number 177, September–October 1989. Pages 41-88.]
       “She [Ellen Meiksins Wood] is … right to set Rational Choice Marxism (RCM) alongside post-structuralism as the two main intellectual tendencies which, in the past decade or so, have provided the reaction against Marxism with a ‘left’ guise. Wood sought, however, not merely to demolish RCM [rational choice Marxism], but to do so in part by demonstrating the existence of another, better version of historical materialism. And here the difficulties begin. For while I share most of her criticisms of RCM (indeed, I’ve made quite a few of them myself), her own account of what is distinctive to, and worth defending in, Marxism seems to me seriously inadequate.” [Alex Callinicos, “The Limits of ‘Political Marxism.’” New Left Review. Series I, number 184, November–December 1990. Pages 110-115.]
    2. behavioral Marxism (Jeffrey P. Carpenter and Peter Hans Matthews): Provides an account of purposeful observed behavior in an analytical Marxian context.
       “… we believe that the recent literature in experimental economics (together with previous behavioral work outside economics which economist now take seriously) has moved the discipline (much) closer to [the Carles] Muntaner … ideal, and that observed behavior in the lab is (much) closer to Marx’s conception of ‘economic man’ than homo economicus. This does not mean, of course, that the individuals involved are not purposeful, as opposed to ‘hard nosed’ … rational, or often self-interested. Furthermore, we believe that it is, or soon will be, possible to rationalize ‘class rational’ behavior in these terms, and that much of this behavior is consistent with evolutionary game theory. We call this research project behavioral Marxism.” [Jeffrey P. Carpenter and Peter Hans Matthews, “Behavioral Marxism I: Collective Action.” Privately published paper. Undated. Retrieved on October 5th, 2015.]
    3. neoclassical Marxism (Philippe van Parijs, Peter King, and others): Examines the ways in which analytical Marxism has borrowed from neoclassical microeconomics or, as it is sometimes referred to, neoliberal microeconomics.
       “… it is worth examining what he [Patrick Clawson] considers to be my most fundamental mistake, i.e., my commitment to what he calls ‘neoclassical Marxism.’ …
       “‘Neoclassical Marxism’ is … any Marxist approach ‘which begins its analysis from the utility-maximizing individual rather than from the self-expansion of value.’ The ‘methodological foundation of this school’ … consists in ‘deducing aggregate economic effects from the behavior of individual economic units.’ …
       “… The discussion of ‘neoclassical Marxism’ can … conveniently be broken down into two steps. Firstly, does Marxist economics need microfoundations? Secondly, what kind of microfoundations (if any) does it need?”
       [Philippe van Parijs. Marxism Recycled. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press. 1993. Pages 78-80.]
       “‘Neo-classical Marxism,’ as Patrick Clawson described Phillipe van Parijs’s article on the falling-rate-of-profit controversy, would appear on the face of things to be an oxymoron. How could such a construct exist? After all, neoclassical economic theory begins from the atomistic individual – conceived as ontologically prior to the whole, the particular society….
       “In neoclassical analysis, we have atomistic individuals who, with exogeneously given assets and techniques, enter into relations of exchange with each other in order to satisfy exogeneously given wants; and society is the sum-total of these arrangements of exchange.
       “Nothing could be further from Marx’s perspective….
       “… there is absolutely no compatibility between the atomistic approach of neoclassical economics and Marxism. ‘Neo-classical Marxism’ is either not neoclassical or it is not Marxism.”
       [Michael A. Lebowitz. Following Marx: Method, Critique and Crisis. Boston, Massachusetts: Brill. 2009. Pages 42-43.]
       “… the distinctive use of neoclassical microeconomics has given rise to the generic label ‘Neoclassical Marxism’ for the whole movement. There is much that is valuable in this enterprise: its insistence on high standards of rigor and conceptual clarity, too often absent from Marxism; its integration of contemporary philosophical and economic thought into areas once considered beyond the fringe; its informed critical stance, which also manages to be sympathetic.” [Peter King, “A World to Win: The Political Economy of Neoclassical Marxism. Privately published paper. Undated. Retrieved on October 5th, 2015.]
       “A specter is haunting Marxism, the specter of respectability. Led by the economist John Roemer, a group of social scientists, philosophers, and historians have begun to think of themselves as a ‘school’ and to advertise their work as ‘Analytica Marxism’ …. They argue that traditional Marxist thought is lacking in rigor and clarity and that it will gain these qualities only to the that that it draws on the methods and perspectives of modern bourgeois social science, particularly of neoclassical economics. They therefore urge radical scholars to modernize their methods while keeping their progressive values intact.” [W. H. Locke Anderson and Frank W. Thompson, “Neoclassical Marxism.” Science & Society. Volume 52, number 2 summer 1988. Pages 215-228.]
    4. game-theoretic Marxism (Bruce Philip, Jon Elster, Scott Lash, and John Urry): Applies non-cooperative game theory, from neoclassical economics, to analytical Marxism.
       “… to use game theory in a Marxian setting requires more that simply adopting the tools and methods of non-cooperative game theory, root and branch. One of the features of the application of non-cooperative game theory in neoclassical economics has been the adoption of methodological individualism which Marxists (other than analytical Marxists) are generally hostile to. Therefore, an important precursor to applying game theory to Marxian economics, if we reject the microfoundations approach often adopted by analytical Marxists, is to extract those aspects of strategic interaction pertinent to Marxian analyses of capitalism, from the underlying, and deeply problematic assumptions of neoclassical theory.” [Bruce Philip. Reduction, Rationality and Game Theory in Marxian Economics. Routledge imprint of Taylor & Francis Group, an Informa PLC business. 2005. Page 3.]
       “How should Marxist social analysis relate to bourgeois social science? The obvious answer is: retain and develop what is valuable, criticize and reject what is worthless. Marxist social science has followed the opposite course, however. By assimilating the principles of functionalist sociology, reinforced by the Hegelian tradition, Marxist social analysis has acquired an apparently powerful theory that in fact encourages lazy and frictionless thinking. By contrast, virtually all Marxists have rejected rational-choice theory in general and game theory in particular. Yet game theory is invaluable to any analysis of the historical process that centers on exploitation, struggle, alliances, and revolution….”
       “… The income distribution that would emerge under perfect competition can serve as a baseline for comparison with the distributions that result when one or both of the main classes behave in an organized and strategic manner. Whether the classes will so behave is itself a question to be decided by game-theoretic analysis.”
       [Jon Elster, “The Case for Methodological Individualism.” Theory and Society. Volume 11, number 4, July 1982. Pages 453-482.]
       “[Jon] Elster uses game-theoretic notions to ground to ground … [his] anti-naturalism…..
       “Elster argues that game theory has a particular contribution to make to Marxist theory, ‘because classes crystalize into collective actors that confront each other over the distribution of income and power, as well as over the nature of property relations; and as there are also strategic relations between the members of a given class, game theory is needed to explain these complex interdependencies’ ….
       “In this paper we have argued that there is a new theoretic paradigm in sociology, that of game-theoretic Marxism. We have … suggested that this theory is an integral feature of a more general shift from a focus on structure to an increased emphasis on agency in Western sociology. We have identified a number of fundamental problems in the theory, but most importantly we have adumbrated the beginnings of a positive critique, of a revised version which preserves certain basic tenets of the original. These include the focus on collective and individual agency, the primacy of causation, and a rather more circumscribed use of game-theoretic notions to understand struggles.”
       [Scott Lash and John Urry, “The New Marxism of Collective Action: A Critical Analysis.” Sociology. Volume 18, number 1, February 1984. Pages 33-50.]
       “… we have suggested that evolutionary game theory reveals several insights with respect to social life which sound quite like observations that Marxists might make: the importance of taking collective action if one wants to change a convention; how power can be covertly exercised; how beliefs (particularly moral beliefs) may become endogenous to the conventions we follow; how property relations might develop functionally; and so on.” [Shaun P. Hargreaves Heap and Yanis Varoufakis. Game Theory: A Critical Introduction. London and New York: Routledge imprint of Taylor & Francis Group, an Informa PLC business. 2003. Page 229.]
    5. sober moral realism (Norman Geras): Geras, an analytical Marxist, explains why Karl Marx was not a moral relativist but, instead, a realist. He also discusses other subjects, including a critical presentation of an Althusserian approach to social transformation.
       “[Karl] Marx’s seemingly relativist statements in this area are not, in fact, what many have taken them to be. They are statements not of moral relativism but rather, as we may call this, of moral realism. That standards of right are, for him, sociologically grounded or determined means that the norms people believe in and live by will be powerfully influenced by the nature of their society, their class position in it, and so on. It means, more particularly, that what standards of right can actually be implemented effectively and secured—this is constrained by the economic structure and resources of the given society. It does not mean that the standards to be used in evaluating or assessing a society must necessarily also be constrained by the same economic configuration; that the only valid criteria of assessment are those actually prevalent, those harmonious with the mode of production.…
       “The argument, in particular, that the proposition, ‘Right can never be higher than the economic structure of society,’ signifies rather a sober moral realism, seems to me from the details of the proposition’s context to be a cogent one, in any case no less plausible than the common relativist interpretation of these words.”
       [Norman Geras, “The Controversy About Marx and Justice.” New Left Review. Series I, number 150, March–April 1985. Pages 47-85.]
       “[Karl] Marx is not committed to what one might call a ‘pure’ ethical relativism; in which moral standards are strictly internal to each mode of production or social order. He does assess, and condemn, capitalism by reference to standards, including standards of justice, other than its own. However, although not purely relative, these are not transhistorical standards either. That is a false dichotomy—of analytical Marxists like myself. Marx’s moral critique is made, instead, in the light of a conception of stages of historical development, these stages together constituting a progress.” [Norman Geras, “Bringing Marx to Justice: An Addendum and Rejoinder.” New Left Review. Series I, number 195, September–October 1992. Pages 37-69.]
       “It is enough to consult any standard commentary on [Karl] Marx to see that this notion is not free from ambiguity or confusion, and, to some extent, this is also true of Marx’s own exposition in the first chapter of Capital. It seems necessary, therefore, to adopt an analytic procedure, in an attempt to isolate different aspects of the concept and to examine them separately, even if such a procedure runs the risk of fragmenting what Marx conceived to be a unified phenomenon. For, if it enables us to clarify the aspects, taken separately, the chances of understanding their relations to one another, that is to say, of reconstituting them as a whole, are thereby enhanced.” [Norman Geras, “Essence and Appearance: Aspects of Fetishism in Marx’s Capital.” New Left Review. Series I, number 65, January–February 1971. Pages 69-85.]
       “Is it really possible for anyone attached to the hope of human progress, more particularly to a socialist version of this hope, to take seriously a conception of human progress in which the aim of prevailing over realities like these is not an important component? I think this question answers itself. Whatever else the goal of socialism might be held to be about, I do not believe it would be worthy of the commitment of morally mature people if it did not include as a central feature the aim of conquering—of radically reducing and eventually, if possible, getting rid of—the kind of evils I have begun here by enumerating.” [Norman Geras, “Human Nature and Progress.” New Left Review. Series I, number 213, September–October 1995. Pages 151-160.]
       “… I outline briefly [Richard] Rorty’s pragmatist, anti-realist philosophical positions. One link to the theme just sketched is this. Rorty, affirming that socialization ‘goes all the way down’, would discourage us from thinking of the human being as ‘an ahistorical natural kind with a permanent set of intrinsic features.’.The effort so to discourage us is expressive of a wider ‘anti-essentialist’ ambition. For according to him not only is human nature not a natural kind, there are no natural kinds. There are no ‘intrinsic natures’ of things, simply there as it were, primitively given. Just as, with us humans, socialization goes all the way down, so also for things generally does language go all the way down.” [Norman Geras, “Language, Truth and Justice.” New Left Review. Series I, number 209, January–February 1995. Pages 110-135.]
       “I simply meet here the effort to belittle or minimize the part played by universalist moral attachments, setting down what I have found. Nor does setting it down imply any claim that, as a matter of ethico-sociological generalisation, universal moral attachments might on their part be a sufficient condition of rescue. The point is only that it is a complicated question just what combination of reasons, motives and other factors—temperamental, situational and so on—does, and just what combination does not, move people to act under risk for other people; a question to which no one, so far as I know, has the answer, if indeed there is an answer. All I do is report that a universalist moral outlook appears to have had a very significant part in motivating Jewish rescue [in Nazi Germany]. Many rescuers give voice to it and few do not. At the same time, no rescuer I have come across overtly repudiates it. To be sure, there were such people about also, at that time. They seem not to have been heavily involved in helping Jews is all. We know what some of them were doing.” [Norman Geras, “Richard Rorty and the Righteous Among the Nations.” Journal of Applied Philosophy. Volume 12, number 2, 1995. Pages 151-173.]
       “That the general, natural characteristics of human beings are not found in a pure state, so to speak, but only socially mediated; that they do not form a separate reality, ontologically distinct from qualities that are culturally induced – this is not germane to the validity of the concept of human nature. It is no argument against the reality or existence of what the latter denotes. Consider what is entailed by the view that it is a compelling argument. We should have always to reject a concept, as we are advised in the present case to reject that of a human nature, when what it was the concept of could not be isolated ontologically and found standing ‘on its own’. A clear analytical distinction would be insufficient; existential separateness would always be required as well. We should have then, in the first place, to reject (as the proponents of this view do not and nor, for obvious reasons, is it logically open to them to) the concept of the relations of production. These do not exist in ontological isolation, separate from other social realities, legal, political, ideological, and so on. Existentially, they are themselves most thoroughly interrelated with such other realities. It scarcely makes sense to talk of relations of production as an isolated reality or existing on their own. This is, therefore, an abstraction. But it is a valid one and denotes a definite reality. If that were to be denied, how could one meaningfully claim the relations of production have real effects? It is exactly the same with the idea of a human nature. It is an abstraction but a valid one, denoting some common, natural characteristics of humankind. These may not be a separate reality, ontologically distinct and what have you, but they are a reality. One cannot sensibly deny this and speak simultaneously of natural or biological ‘determinants’ with real effects.” [Norman Geras. Marx and Human Nature: Refutation of a Legend. London and New York: Verso imprint of New Left Books. 2016. Page 70.]
       “Socialist thought is faced, today, with two broad kinds of difficulty. On the one hand, and as is only to be expected in consequence of the breadth and immensity of socialism’s objectives, it is faced with problems of theory, of understanding; analytical and empirical questions, whether about the changing nature of capitalism, the forms and principles of a socialism worthy of the name, the movements, the moralities and the strategies that might have a chance of constituting it. It is now widely recognized, and amongst socialists of the most different persuasions, that answers are not so easy to come by. They are a long haul. The practice of producing or discovering them, as is also widely recognized, must inevitably be a many-headed, collective effort, in which open debate, a careful weighing of other viewpoints, innovation, revision and emendation, take their place beside commitment and enthusiasm. But socialist thought presently also confronts, on the other hand, a singularly hostile political and intellectual environment. It is pressed in from all directions by those ready to write it off, deride it, belittle both its hopes and its achievements as illusion or dross.” [Norman Geras, “Ex-Marxism Without Substance: Being A Real Reply to Laclau and Mouffe.” New Left Review. Series I, number 169, May–June 1988. Pages 34-61.]
       “We are not at square one. After the horror of what happened in Nazi-occupied Europe was exposed – what happened in the ghettos, the shooting pits, the death camps – the principle was formally established by the Nuremberg Trials that there are constraints on what governments may permissibly do to people under their jurisdiction. This was established, be it noted, as a legal principle, a principle of international law – although not de novo. The idea had had a long pre-history within the traditions of moral, political and legal thought. But here it became, officially, part of the law of nations, and was backed up by an actual juridical process (whatever the shortcomings of this may have been). The Nuremberg Trials announced that state sovereignty was no longer sacrosanct, that there is an international code of law, and states themselves can be in violation of it.” [Norman Geras, “Social Hope and State Lawlessness.” Critical Horizons: A Journal of Philosophy and Social Theory. Volume 9, number 1, May 2008. Pages 90-98.]
       “… men are the products of their social circumstances, unfit to found society anew so long as they are corrupted by imperfect institutions; they can only recognize the need for, and acquire the ability to sustain, social change if they have already benefitted from the influences of such change. They are caught in a vicious circle which closes to them the prospect of self-emancipation.…
       “… for [Karl] Marx, the agent of social transformation in the current epoch, the vehicle of socialist revolution, is not, abstractly, man-in-general, but the proletarian masses. If there is any validity in Althusserian anti-humanism, this seems to me to be it and to exhaust it. The problem of the transformation and emancipation of man is, in the first instance, the problem of the transformation and emancipation of the proletariat.”
       [Norman Geras, “Marxism and proletarian self-emancipation.” Radical Philosophy: Philosophical Journal of the Independent Left. Number 006, winter 1973. Pages 20-22.]
       “… in his concern to stress the scientificity of Marxism, [Louis] Althusser fails to provide any account of what distinguishes this particular science from the other sciences.” [Norman Geras, “Althusser’s Marxism: An Account and Assessment.” New Left Review. Series I, number 71, January–February 1972. Pages 57-86.]
       “My contention will be that at the heart of this post-Marxism there is an intellectual vacuum, a term I use advisedly: both a theoretical and a normative void, with some very old viewpoints, prejudices and caricatures around it.” [Norman Geras, “Post-Marxism?” New Left Review. Series I, number 163, May–June 1987. Pages 40-82.]
    6. analytical anarchism (Alan Carter): He develops an approach to anarchism which is informed by analytical Marxism.
       “… the seminal work of G. A. Cohen … gave birth to the fecund school of analytical Marxism.…
       “My aim has been to indicate how it might be possible for an analytical version of anarchism to evolve in opposition to analytical Marxism by providing the necessary conceptual groundwork for such an evolution. Central to any such project would be the development of a theory of history that supports anarchist, rather than Marxist, claims about the process of revolutionary change.…
       “… the flaws in Marxist theory are most clearly revealed from an anarchist perspective. And the perspective that most clearly reveals the inadequacies of analytical Marxism is that of analytical anarchism.”
       [Alan Carter, “Analytical Anarchism: Some Conceptual Foundations.” Political Theory. Volume 28, number 2, April 2000. Pages 230-253.]
       “Marxism and anarchism are two theoretical traditions with a long and celebrated history of mutual engagement.…
       “Given the reaction that most people have to [Gerald A.] Cohen’s argument for the technological thesis – that it doesn’t work – it seems somewhat surprising that [Alan] Carter, who we have seen shares that view, decides that, rather than dropping the concept of primacy, what analytical anarchists must do is imbue another force with the capacity to make the productive forces constantly develop. It might be true, Carter tells us, that the productive forces do not have an autonomous tendency to develop, but there is no reason to imagine that they don’t always develop due to the permanent interests of political forces. This is the state-primacy thesis.”
       [Stuart Ingham, “Analytical anarchism? A critique of Alan Carter’s anarchist theory of history.” Capital & Class. Volume 40, number 1, 2016. Pages 111-127.]

Return to the table of contents.

12. Heterodox or Alternative Economics (Frederic S. Lee, Frank Stilwell, and many others): This broad field, which is also referred to as “new economic thinking,” includes some critical or Marxist approaches to economics. The first part of the section will discuss heterodox economics in general. However, the second part will focus—largely but not exclusively—on more radical or critical approaches to the field. As noted in one of the references below, the notion of “heterodoxy” is rarely found outside of economics. Conservative religions have their heresies. A conservative social science has its heterodoxies. See the Institute for New Economic Thinking.
    1. general information
       “… heterodox economics refers to specific economic theories and community of economists that are in various ways an alternative to mainstream economics in explaining the provisioning process, thereby making economics a contested scientific discipline. It is a multi-level term that refers to a group of broadly comparable economic theories—specifically Post Keynesian/Sraffian, Marxist/radical, institutional/evolutionary, social, feminist, and ecological economics—that holds non-comparable alternative positions vis-àvis mainstream economics; to a community of heterodox economists who engage with and are associated with one or more of the heterodox approaches; and finally to the development of a coherent heterodox economic theory that draws upon various theoretical contributions by heterodox approaches and from which heterodox economic policy recommendations can be drawn.” [Frederic S. Lee, “The Pluralism Debate in Heterodox Economics.” Review of Radical Political Economics. Volume 43, number 4, December 2011. Pages 540-551.]
       “Heterodox economics refers to economic theories and communities of economists that are in various ways an alternative to mainstream economics. It is a multi-level term that refers to a body of economic theories developed by economists who hold an irreverent position vis-à-vis mainstream economics and are typically rejected out of hand by the latter; to a community of heterodox economists whom identify themselves as such and embrace a pluralistic attitude towards heterodox theories without rejecting contestability and incommensurability among heterodox theories; and to the development of a coherent economic theory that draws upon various theoretical contributions by heterodox approaches which stand in contrast to mainstream theory.…
       “Theoretical segregation involves the isolation of a particular theoretical approach and its adherents from all other approaches and their adherents; that is to say, theoretical segregation occurs when there is no engagement across different theoretical approaches. However it does not exist within heterodox economics currently and nor has it existed in the past among the various heterodox approaches. From the 1960s through the 1980s heterodox economists engaged, integrated or synthesized Institutional, Post Keynesian, and Marxist-radical approaches, Institutional and Post Keynesian approaches, Post Keynesian and Marxian-radical approaches, Post Keynesian and Austrian, Austrian and Institutionalists, Feminist and Marxist-radical approaches, Institutional and Marxist-Radical Approaches, Institutional and Social Economics, ecological and Marxian-radical approaches, and social and Marxian economics.”
       [Frederic S. Lee and Tae-Hee Jo, “Introduction to Heterodox Economics.” Heterodox Economics Directory. Jakob Kapeller and Florian Springholz, editors. Steyr, Austria: Heterodox Economics Newsletter. March, 2016. Pages 22-30.]
       “In this paper, I offer a constructive reformulation of [Frederic S.] Lee’s proposal. Lee’s laudable attempt to expand heterodox economists’ academic rights is vitiated, I argue, by his narrow conception of pluralism as tolerance. While retaining Lee’s ultimate goal, I propose a concept of academic pluralism that is more consistent with the epistemological assumptions and ethical requirements of academic freedom, and more conducive to the flourishing of heterodox economics—and economics at large—as a scholarly community.…
       “In contrast [to Lee’s position], the concept of academic freedom posits academic disciplines as the basic epistemic units …. Through the lens of academic freedom, the term pluralism refers to both a philosophy and outcome of scholarly inquiry ….”
       [Robert F. Garnett, Jr., “Pluralism, Academic Freedom, and Heterodox Economics.” Review of Radical Political Economics. Volume 43, number 4, December 2011. Pages 562-572.]
       “To the heterodox economist, agency cannot be captured or analyzed by this simple rendering of the individual. Rather, agency must be examined by its own internal logic and responses to external forces; how it came to be and how it evolves. The argument set forth is that the conceptualization of agency as a product of the individual’s mental models and interaction with the surrounding structural environment unites otherwise seemingly disparate heterodox groups of thought. The procedure is simple: the concept of interactive agency is explored from the perspectives of five different heterodox groups of thought with an eye toward possible common ground.” [Mary V. Wrenn, “Agency and Mental Models in Heterodox Economics.” Journal of Economic Issues. Volume 40, number 2, June 2006. Pages 483-491.]
       “The entrenched orthodoxy that characterizes economics and cripples its ability to anticipate major events emerging outside its paradigm is often portrayed as monolithic and impenetrable by outsiders and the natural order of things by its practitioners. There is an understandable tendency for subdisciplines, particularly heterodox perspectives, to stick to their own. But this study has demonstrated that there is an ordering to the different perspectives within economics, with some perspectives more engaged with some than others. This provides the basis for strategy, the alignment of interests, and the strengthening of a counter-paradigm.” [Bruce Cronin, “The Diffusion of Heterodox Economics.” The American Journal of Economics and Sociology. Volume 69, number 5, November 2010. Pages 1475-1494.]
       “… self-identifying as heterodox economists signals our concern that non-mainstream views should get a better hearing as alternative analyses of how the world actually works. In practice, it means confronting the dominant mainstream neoclassical economics with critical alternatives, including various strands of post-Keynesian economics, Marxist economics, institutional economics and analyses from feminist, ecological and various other perspectives. Indeed, this is what heterodox economists do. Moreover, a ‘heterodox economics’ label fits well with claims about pursuing academic practices that are conducive to an ‘open society’ in which freedom of expression exists and innovation and creativity flourish. It is also an antidote to right wing politicians’ claims that ‘there is no alternative.’” [Frank Stilwell, “Heterodox economics or political economy?” Real-World Economics Review. Issue 74, 2016. Open access. Pages 42-48.]
       “One overarching theme in heterodox economic theorizing is the view that the consideration of social wholes is important for understanding of socio-economic processes and outcomes. This general perspective implies that wholes are more than a mere sum of their parts, since they exhibit nontrivial properties and carry effects of various sorts, which that cannot be conjectured from looking solely on their constituent parts. However, this idea has also been subject to different specific interpretations and applications within heterodox economics leading to a series of distinct vantage points on the role of aggregates and aggregation in economics.” [Claudius Gräbner and Jakob Kapeller, “The Micro-Macro Link in Heterodox Economic.” Working paper number 37. Institute for Comprehensive Analysis of Economy. Johannes Kepler University. Linz, Austria. July, 2015. Pages 1-22.]
       “The student movement has invigorated heterodox economics. And it is vital that heterodox economists maintain support for the student movement, in particular by providing a coherent alternative set of curriculum items, and putting further pressure on mainstream departments for a meaningful reform. The development of a new set of teaching tools is essential, since one of the main advantages of mainstream economics education is its consolidated monopoly particularly in the textbook market, which makes it very difficult to design heterodox teaching modules.” [Engelbert Stockhammer and Devrim Yilmaz, “Alternative economics: A new student movement.” Radical Philosophy: Philosophical Journal of the Independent Left. Number 189, January/February 2015. Pages 2-8.]
       “It is not easy being a heterodox economist. The profession does little to encourage heterodoxy and questions the legitimacy of heterodox views. Because of this, heterodox economists generally tend to focus on methodology, since through methodology they can question the legitimacy of the assumptions, scope, and methods that mainstream economists take as given. A problem faced by almost all heterodox groups is that of moving beyond methodology to establish their own analysis and provide a viable competing research program. There is truth in the saying that a theory can be replaced only by another theory.
       “Another problem faced by heterodox groups is that people attracted to heterodox theory are often individualistic; they are as little prone to compromise with their heterodox colleagues as with mainstream economists. Consequently, the body of heterodoxy is almost inevitably riddled with dissension. Heterodox thinkers, in fact, often save their most vituperative invective for their fellow heterodox economists.”
       [Harry Landreth and David C. Colander. History of Economic Thought. Fourth edition. Boston, Massachusetts: Houghton Mifflin Company. 2001. Page 8.]
       “For dissident economists to label themselves as heterodox is academically respectable but may be strategically weak. The big plus of heterodoxy is its association with pluralism, indicating aversion to dogma and openness to alternative ways of seeing. A ‘heterodox economics’ label fits well with claims about pusuing academic practices that are conducive to an ‘open society’ in which freedom of expression exists and innovation and creativity flourish. On the other hand, heterodoxy is only a critical position where orthodoxy is entrenched: almost by definition, therefore, it is consigned to the outer. It tends to be ‘on the back foot,’ contesting a dominant orthodoxy and providing shelter for an array of different views, whatever their coherence or relationship to each other.” [Frank Stilwell, “Heterodox Economics and Political Economy.” Journal of Australian Political Economy. Number 75, winter 2015. Pages 5-10.]
       “… there has been a lot of expansion and a lot of change within the field of economic methodology during the last few decades. During these years the field has changed its general philosophical focus from universal rules borrowed from the shelf of scientific philosophy to local practical advice grounded in the interests and concerns of particular sub-fields; and it has changed its domain of inquiry from neoclassical and heterodox economics in general to the more pluralistic microeconomic approaches at the edge of the current research frontier. Since interests always matter in the developmental path of any research program—within a particular science or within the study of a particular science—these changes will, and to some extent already have, contributed to the re-alignment of interests behind the field of economic methodology. My guess is that these changes will contribute to the steady growth and increased health of the field, but one never knows. Economic theorists have recently re-discovered path-dependency and the significance of context; we should not forget that these things matter to the future of economic methodology as well.” [D. Wade Hands, “Orthodox and heterodox economics in recent economic methodology.” Erasmus Journal for Philosophy and Economics. Volume 8, issue 1, spring 2015. Pages 61-81.]
       “… heterodox economics is not a monolith. Heterodox economics may be better conceived of as a fuzzy set or as an open, complex system.” [Andrew Mearman, “Who Do Heterodox Economists Think They Are?” American Journal of Economics and Sociology. Volume 70, number 2, April 2011.]
       “Although many commentators decry liberal domination of the Ivory Tower, the dominant paradigm in most disciplines is typically methodological. In economics the dominant methodology combines formal (mathematical) modeling and econometric testing. The method marginalizes social forces not amenable to mathematical analysis, like entrepreneurship, institutions, transactions costs, social capital, and class relations. The dominant methodology also reduces other forms of inquiry to insignificance, such as qualitative research, historical research, and case studies. As a consequence, scholars working in Austrian, property rights, transactions costs, Marxist, and other heterodox traditions face methodological discrimination in publishing in mainstream journals and often have to publish in specialized journals.” [Daniel Sutter, “Different but Equal? On the Contribution of Dissident Economists.” American Journal of Economics and Sociology. Volume 71, number 5, November 2012. Pages 1143-1156.]
       “Among the terms considered here, heterodox economics is possibly the most difficult to define. One possible approach would be to define heterodox economics negatively, as that which it is not—that is, as that which is different from something else. Another approach would be to define heterodox economics positively, on the basis of features other than, or in addition to, a set of differences in relation to another category. Heterodox would still be something different from orthodox, but not defined exclusively in these terms; the differences could be seen in part as a consequence of the definition, rather than being the sole basis of the definition.
       “It is especially in relation to mainstream economics that the concept of heterodox economics may become complicated and controversial, if mainstream economics is not taken to be synonymous with orthodox economics. The tricky question is the following: How does one classify that part of mainstream economics that one allows to be different from the orthodoxy? Is that also a part of heterodox economics? As a result, is part of heterodox economics mainstream?”
       [David Dequech, “Neoclassical, mainstream, orthodox, and heterodox economics.” Journal of Post Keynesian Economics. Volume 30, number 2, winter 2007–2008. Pages 279-302.]
       “For challenging orthodox economics (as modern heterodoxy is aimed at doing), it needs to set forth the foundations of a methodology more appropriate to social reality than those of logic-formal and natural sciences and offering an equally wider perspective; a methodology that conjugates a constructivist substance (as required by a reality which is the result of men’s work and genius) to realism, being and doing … and, on this basis, trying to understand becoming.” [Angelo Fusari, “The Contrast between Mainstream and Heterodox Economics: A Misleading Controversy—‘Necessary’ System versus ‘Natural’ System.” Journal of Business and Economics. Volume 5, number 7, July 2014. Pages 1077-1091.]
       “What was it like to be a heterodox economist in the United States in the 1960s and 1970s? First, with the decline of McCarthyism and the rise of the civil rights and anti-war movements, it was now possible to become a heterodox economist and even find a teaching position without being immediately fired. But the possibility of existence brought with it a contested environment in which neoclassical economists attempted to keep the heterodox at bay.” [Frederic S. Lee, “To Be a Heterodox Economist: The Contested Landscape of American Economics, 1960s and 1970s.” Journal of Economic Issues. Volume XXXVIII, number 3, September 2004. Pages 747-763.]
       “I want to start by saying that if you look at what heterodox economics is, it seems to be largely defined at least in terms of ‘departures’ from some aspect of orthodox economics. The orthodoxy furnishes the core assumptions and heterodoxy focuses on departures from them. Core assumptions: selfish behavior; departure: social behavior. Core assumption: optimal outcomes; departure: non-optimal outcomes. Perfect knowledge: imperfect and asymmetric knowledge; rational choice: bounded rationality; perfect competition: imperfect competition; rational expectations: adaptive expectations; stochastically determinate futures: non-ergodic futures; passive interactions: strategic interactions (game theory); automatic full employment: possible unemployment; all outcomes internal to the market: some outcomes may involve externalities; the ideal function of the state is to protect property rights and free markets: the state should regulate some market outcomes.” [Anwar Shaikh, “Heterodox Economics as a True Alternative: Going Beyond the Opposition Between ‘Perfect’ and ‘Imperfect’ Behaviors.” New School Economic Review. Volume 6, January 2014. Pages 36-39.]
       “The production of basics by means of basics is financed by banks. The Central Bank, as an important organ of the State, is able to generate and retain confidence in the monetary circuit. The flow of new capital goods, on the other hand, depends on the expectations of the future which are not stationary. The State, with its non-private decision-making processes and time horizons, can effect long-term investments in basics investment. Secondly, the time-honored practice of building firewalls between different financial entities must be restored. In our case, the money-basics subsystem and hedge fund-nonbasics subsystem must be separated. The dizzying pace of financial innovation can continue without brakes in the latter case, throwing up winners and losers. Recalling [John Maynard] Keynes in conclusion, speculation ‘could do no harm as bubbles on a steady stream of enterprise.’ However, the situation ‘is serious when enterprise becomes the bubble on a steady stream of speculation.’” [Romar Correa and D. Tripati Rao, “A Heterodox Economics Critique of Financial Liberalization.” Journal of Heterodox Economics. Volume 1, issue 1, 2014. Pages 79-99.]
       “… there has been a divergence in the use of methodological individualism within economics, and this chasm is one of the defining characteristics of a unique paradigm of Austrian economics. It is also important to realize that the development of economics has not been uniform, and that a number of influential scholars have used a weaker concept of methodological individualism than the dominant mainstream.” [Anthony J. Evans, “Only individuals choose.” Handbook on Contemporary Austrian Economics. Northampton, Massachusetts: Edward Elgar Publishing, Inc. 2010. Pages 3-13.]
       “There has been a revival of interest in Austrian economics in the last ten years by a small but growing group of economists. The modern Austrian ‘research program’ is many-faceted. It is in part a doctrinal exegesis of the masters. Besides the obvious value of such work to historians of thought, some of it also sheds light on certain modern debates (e.g. in capital theory), as well as suggests that certain early Austrians (in particular, [Friedrich] Hayek) were as aware of the problems of expectations, costly information, and knowledge dissemination as the revisionist Keynesians claim that [John Maynard] Keynes was. Another aspect of their program is the reintroduction of a thoroughly subjectivist viewpoint into economics, and the tracing out of the implications of that reintroduction in such fields as consumer and demand theory and the theory of costs. Other work has focused on the crucial role of the entrepreneur in a market economy, and the development of the notion of market process to replace the idea of market equilibrium.” [Bruce J. Caldwell. Beyond Positivism: Economic Methodology in the Twentieth Century. Revised edition. London and New York: Routledge imprint of Taylor & Francis Group, an Informa PLC business. 2003. Page 117.]
       “In my 2007 interview he [Kurt Rothschild] described ‘the present situation in economics’ as ‘unlike that in any other science. Look up “Heterodox Economics” and “Dissenting Economics” on Google. You get 49,900 hits. If you ask for “Heterodox Sociology” or “Heterodox Psychology” you get five or six. You have a mainstream in other disciplines, too, but there isn’t this idea that there’s one special theory’ …. In similar vein the head of the Department of Politics and International Relations at Oxford University recently described his department in these terms: ‘We are self-avowedly pluralist in our teaching and research with enough of us to operate on the “zoo principle” – two of everything’ …. I doubt whether the same could be said in 2014 of any economics department, anywhere in the world.” [John E. King, “Remembering Kurt Rothschild.” Economics as a Multi-Paradigmatic Science. Wilfried Altzinger, Alois Guger, Peter Mooslechner, and Ewald Nowotny, editors. Vienna, Austria: Oesterreichische Nationalbank. October, 2014. Pages 20-37.]
       “By adopting a capabilities-oriented pluralism … heterodox economists would better position themselves to exercise leadership in the movement toward a genuinely pluralistic, multi-perspectival (hetero-doxa) economics.… Such an approach would give heterodox economists a stronger foothold within our disciplinary discourse.” [Robert F. Garnett, Jr., “Paradigms and Pluralism in Heterodox Economics.” Review of Political Economy. Volume 18, number 3, October 2006. Pages 521-546.]
       “In spite of the dominance of mainstream economics, challengers in the U.S. arose in the 1960s and 1970s alongside of the social upheavals at the same time—the Institutional economics (Association for Evolutionary Economics, 1965), radical/Marxian economics (Union for Radical Political Economics, 1968), social economics (Association for Social Economics, 1970), and Post Keynesian Economics (early 1970s). Although separately formed, some of their members and adherents were broader in that they engaged with more than one of the challengers. By 2000, these challengers, plus additional ones that emerged in the 1980s and 1990s, became known collectively as heterodox economics and had the status as the primary challenger to mainstream economics.” [Frederic S. Lee, “Heterodox Economics.” The Long Term View: A Journal of Informed Opinion. Volume 7, number 1, 2008. Pages 23-30.]
       “At the micro level, alternative economics demands responsible economizing while at macro level it argues for economic policies which serve real development. In the context of economizing, responsibility can be defined as a combination of rationality and morality ….” [Laszlo Zsolnai, “A framework of alternative economics.” International Journal of Social Economics. Volume 20, number 2, 1993. Pages 65-75.]
       “… [Joan] Robinson expressed a widespread methodological dissatisfaction with the traditional comparative static models of trade in the mid-twentieth century that did indeed motivate many of the newer models, both mainstream and heterodox, beginning in the 1970s.” [Robert A. Blecker, “International Economics after Robinson.” Joan Robinson’s Economics: A Centennial Celebration. Bill Gibson, editor. Northampton, Massachusetts: Edward Elgar. 2005. Pages 309-349.]
       “… heterodox institutionalism advanced by the old institutional economics recognizes that various social institutions ‘impose different constraints on what constitutes acceptable [economic] behavior’ …. According to such institutionalism, economic phenomena like markets, including the labor market …, represent social institutions (Schumpeter, 1950). By contrast, orthodox institutionalism found in the new institutional economics tends to neglect such institutional properties of and influence on economic phenomena, and to treat social institutions as aggregate effects of rational individual actions, particularly optimizing behavior. By over-stressing the efficiency solution to the problem of institutional origin and evolution, such institutionalism seems to conflates this issue with that of how social institutions affect the operation of market economies ….” [Milan Zafirovski, “Orthodoxy and heterodoxy in analyzing institutions: Original and new institutional economics reexamined.” International Journal of Social Economics. Volume 30, number 7/8, 2003. Pages 798-826.]
    2. The following are some specific versions of heterodox or alternative economics.
    1. critical realism in economics (Tony Lawson and others): This application of Bhaskarian critical realism to economics is sometimes referred to as the Cambridge school or, officially, as the Cambridge Social Ontology Group. It is explored more comprehensively in the book, In Reality™: An Integrative Review of Critical Realism.
       “The question I want to pursue, of course, is which economic theories are we talking about? All possible? Those formulated in heterodox approaches? Economists who have contributed to, or who have been informed by, the project of critical realism in economics have, in their more substantive contributions, generated economic theories that posit a variety of novel entities which in large part at least are unobservable. These include particular social relations (gender, race, employer/ employee, student/ teacher, money), other structures of power, social processes, social positions, social rules, evolving totalities, specific institutions, etc.…. This research, like that of others on industrial districts, regions, collective learning and so on, is constantly positing new categories, relations, processes and totalities, etc., many (albeit not all) of which are (or possess essential aspects that are) inevitably unobservable. Indeed, human society itself can only be known, and not seen, to exist.” [Tony Lawson. Reorienting Economics. London and New York: Routledge imprint of Taylor & Francis Group, an Informa PLC business. 2003. Pages 68.]
       “… I do not think that the failure of mainstream economics is a consequence of an unfathomable, overly complex and dynamic social reality, nor even of the infeasibility of meaningful experimental control. Rather, the continuing failure of the discipline must be put down to the often quite irrelevant, typically formalistic, methods and techniques which economists naively and unthinkingly wield in a forlorn hope of thereby gaining illumination of a social world that they do not ‘fit.’” [Tony Lawson, “Economic Science Without Experimentation.” Critical Realism: Essential Readings. Margaret Archer, Roy Bhaskar, Andrew Collier, Tony Lawson, and Alan Norrie, editors. London and New York: Routledge imprint of Taylor & Francis Group, an Informa PLC business. 1998. Pages 144-185.]
    2. radical economics, radical political economics, or radical political economy (David M. Gordon, Samuel Bowles, Herbert Gintis, Zoran Stefanović, Branislav Mitrović, Richard D. Wolff, Edward J. Martin, Matthew S. Pimentel, John M. Gowdy, Leslie Armour, Frederic S. Lee, James H. Weaver, Raymond S. Franklin, William K. Tabb, Ann E. Davis, Michael Zweig, Howard J. Sherman, and others): They examine the relationships between capitalism and class conflict. Various economic critiques of capitalism are developed. This approach is supported by the Union for Radical Political Economics.
       “The greater equality of wealth under a democratic socialism would be a much firmer basis for political democracy. When we the people control the corporations, then the corporations cannot control us. Only then will our formal rules about equality in voting and freedom of speech have a far greater democratic content. Of course, democratic socialism means an on-going struggle for the fullest democratic participation in government and democratic collective control of the economy; it does not simply mean government ownership, where the government is run by a self-selected elite as in the Soviet Union.” [Howard Sherman, “In Defense of Radical Political Economy.” Journal of Economic Issues. Volume 10, number 3, September 1976. Pages 697-699.]
       “Perhaps the utility-max postulate could be replaced by a different axiom—one asserting that the ultimate factors controlling economic activity are the shifting power relationships within the social system. Radicals emphasize the difference between neo-classical economics which deals in market relationships (i.e., those determined by utility maximization) and Marxian economics which emphasizes power. Perhaps today’s radical political economy can bring the economics profession to a paradigm shift whereby ‘power conflicts’ come to be considered the basic force which governs the play of economic variables.” [Stephen T. Worland, “Radical Political Economy as a ‘Scientific Revolution.’” Southern Economic Journal. Volume 39, number 2, October 1972. Pages 274-284.]
       “Radical political economy is articulated as a school of economic thought in the late 1960’s and 1970’s in the United States and Western Europe. The term ‘radical’ is interpreted as a theoretical and practical rejection of capitalism, while ‘political economy’ refers to return to tradition of classics and [Karl] Marx. This economic doctrine is focused on Marxist-based analysis and critique of contemporary capitalism, while the influence of other doctrines, such as Keynesianism, neo-Ricardian economics and institutional economics, is noticeable. Radical political economy encompasses a wide range of ideological orientations: anarchism, reformism, environmental, feminist, ethnic, social democratic and communist movements. As the common denominators of supporters of radical political economy, regardless of their ideological orientation, may be indicated.” [Zoran Stefanović and Branislav Mitrović, “The Contribution of Radical Political Economy to Understanding the Great Recession.” Facta Universitatis. Volume 8, number 4, 2011. Pages 345-356.]
       “It would appear on the surface … that feminists view the state as a beneficent entity whose effect has been, for the most part, to try to alleviate gender inequity wrought by the market and society. This superficial perspective on feminism and the state can arouse suspicion among radical political economists who, in contrast, have often emphasized a critical perspective on the role of the state in capitalist economies. In fact, feminist empirical studies of the state have emphasized an ambivalent role. First, the macroeconomic development literature has presented sophisticated analyses of the impact of state policy on women’s lives and women’s agency in shaping the direction of policy initiatives.… Second, labor market policies, especially in advanced industrialized countries, has been an important topic.… Finally, feminists have extensively examined the gendered construction of social welfare policies in advanced industrialized and developing countries.” [Ellen Mutari, “Radical Political Economy and the State: Lessons from Gender Theory.” Review of Radical Political Economics. Volume 35, number 3, summer 2003. Pages 296-303.]
       “There have been numerous ‘offshoot’ Neo-Marxist schools which have taken on many of the themes and conclusions of the Marxian school, although they should not be considered rigorous applications of classical Marxian theory. We note only the related ‘Dependency School’ of development associated with Raul Prébisch and Andre Gunder Frank, the ‘World Systems’ school associated with Immanuel Wallerstein and the work on radical political economy of David M. Gordon, Samuel Bowles, Herbert Gintis and others. A separate (and unrelated) school is the ‘Analytical Marxian’ school, normally associated with the work of John E. Roemer and John Elster, which attempts to reduce some of the Marxian propositions to conventional, methodological individualism (i.e. with utility-maximizing rational agents, etc.).” [The New School. The Neo-Marxian Schools (“Radical Political Economy”). Retrieved on May 1st, 2009. The original link is now dead.]
       “The Union for Radical Political Economics (URPE) is an interdisciplinary association devoted to the study, development and application of radical political economic analysis to social problems.
       “Founded in 1968, URPE presents a continuing critique of the capitalist system and all forms of exploitation and oppression while helping to construct a progressive social policy and create socialist alternatives.”
       [Union for Radical Political Economics. Undated membership form. Retrieved on September 28th, 2015.]
       “The new reading of Capital in the US finds there a new concept of class different from the concepts of class that prevailed before [Karl] Marx, as well as during his lifetime and that have persisted as if they were Marx’s ever since …. Stated briefly, the prevailing concepts have defined class as a noun; classes are specific groups of people. Most often, such classes refer to groupings according to the property they do or do not own: rich versus poor, owners of means of production versus those without such means, the propertied versus the propertyless. From social critics in ancient Greece and Rome through traditional Marxists writing today, class is defined as a matter of the social distribution of property.” [Richard D. Wolff, “The new reading of Karl Marx’s Capital in the United States.” History of Economics Review. Volume 45, 2007. Pages 26-40.]
       “One major recent focus has been on [Karl] Marx’s stress in Capital on the production and distribution of surplus located in productive enterprises. This micro-level focus suggests that the alternative to capitalism – where one group of people produces a surplus while a different group appropriates and distributes it – would be enterprises in which the producers of the surplus are also collectively its appropriators and distributors.” [Richard D. Wolff, “Alternatives to Capitalism.” Critical Sociology. Volume 39, number 4, July 2013. Pages 487-490.]
       “First, Marxian theory does not see that economy as a unified entity. Instead it sees divisions: prosperity for some is recession for others, government policies hut some and help others, inflations bring pain to some, profits to others. Secondly, it focuses attention on a particular division in society because neoclassical theory simply refuses to see or analyze it and because that refusal blinds neoclassical theory to important aspects of U.S. economic and social problems.” [Richard D. Wolff, “Economic problems and Marxian analysis.” Monthly Review: An Independent Socialist Magazine. Volume 30, issue 2, June 1988. Pages 38-42.]
       “As [Karl] Marx taught, capitalism is cyclical: highly unstable as an economic system. Typically,its prosperous times collapse into recessions and depressions, while depressions eventually give way to economic upswings. The post-World War II boom came to an end in the serious economic downturn of the mid-1970s. The initial hegemony of the U.S. gave way to the rise of Japanese and European capitalisms that became temporarily more profitable than their U.S. counterparts. By the 1970s, a crisis of capitalist enterprise faced the U.S.” [Richard D. Wolff, “The U.S. Economic Crisis: A Marxian Analysis.” Theoria: A Journal of Social and Political Theory. Number 97, June 2001. Pages 82-98.]
       “For liberals, freedom refers to an absence of constraints on individuals’ behavior, but according to [Karl] Marx and radical economists, freedom is a freedom to, not a freedom from. Thus Marx was critical of the liberal negative concept of freedom, because for him the distinctive character of humanity lies in the ability to plan conscious activity directed towards satisfying basic human needs. Consequently, the extent to which a society is free is directly reflected to the extent to which a society controls its economy and directs itself in serving the needs of people. Consequently, the obligation of government institutions and related policies is to ensure that basic economic rights and welfare be given highest priority.” [Edward J. Martin and Matthew S. Pimentel, “Viewing the Great Recession through Radical Economics: Social Class, Inequality, and the Social Safety Net.” Global Virtue Ethics Review. Volume 7, number 1, 2014. Pages 70-94.]
       “In general, radical economists tend to underestimate the resource scarcity problem. Some radicals even echo the neoclassical dogma of technological utopianism. Furthermore, this optimistic view has been reinforced by an emphasis on the importance of the social relations of production to the exclusion of the resource base of economic systems.…
       “There is a widespread view in the radical literature that more or less unlimited abundance will be possible under socialism.”
       [John M. Gowdy, “Radical Economics and Resource Scarcity.” Review of Social Economy. Volume 39, number 2, October 1981 Pages 165-180.]
       “‘Radical economics’ has two basic meanings. One employs the basic sense of ‘radical,’ whatever goes to the roots of the matter. The other common meaning of radical has to do with whatever diverges from the orthodoxy of the time. This issue examines radical economics in both senses.…
       “… The philosophical bases of the economic theories in circulation are often more than two centuries old. But some important ideas from the past have been forgotten, the distinction between wealth and riches is one. Social change also plays a part in the problems. Community friendly capitalism, ridiculed and attacked by some economists, has faded. At a deeper level the tendency for the rich to get much richer while the poorest people in the world are only slightly better off has produced more instability and uncertainty, which economists have not successfully addressed.”
       [Leslie Armour, “Introduction: Radical economics and our current predicament.” International Journal of Social Economics. Volume 37, number 1, 2010. Pages 168-178.]
       “Once the heterodox community emerges, its history becomes one of growth, change, and evolution within the context of a hostile environment. Of particular interest are the histories of subgroups and the forces that affect their growth and divergence or convergence within the community. Consequently, the history of heterodox economics is not just the history of heterodox economic theory; nor is it only the history of networks and institutions. Rather, since networks and institutions affect the development of theory, and since theory has an impact on the type of networks and institutions that emerge, the history of heterodox economics draws on both networks and theories and is thus an emergent synthesis of both.…
       “In spite of the McCarthyite repression of the postwar years, scholarly discourse on Marxian and radical economics continued.…
       “By the mid-1960s, the young radical economists found that the existing outlets and activities did not provide the specialist forums at which they could discuss topics of particular interest to them or provide the academic base that would support their academic careers.”
       [Frederic S. Lee, “History and Identity: The Case of Radical Economics and Radical Economists, 1945-70.” Review of Radical Political Economics. Volume 36, number 2, Spring 2004. Pages 177-195.]
       “Radicals are dedicated to constructing alternative theories which will help us create and maintain a decent society — which is the proper goal for theory. Other criteria than efficiency must be added to theory with which to judge a society — individual development, responsiveness of social institutions — democracy, equity, community. Clearly some preference structures are preferable to others — in that people with those preference structures would be happier than with alternative preferences. What kinds of institutions would create those preference structures? What kinds of institutions would allow people to be happy? No one has definitive answers to these questions. What is known is that capitalism is not such a system and to develop a preference structure that places a premium on interpersonal relations, aesthetics, spirituality and sensuality within a capitalist society is a revolutionary act. Radical political economists are involved in that process.” [James H. Weaver, “Toward a Radical Political Economics.” The American Economist. Volume 14, number 1, spring 1970. Pages 57-61.]
       “While the development of radical economics as a distinct approach was related to the radicalization process which occurred on the campuses in the mid- and late 1960s, it is also part of a more extensive intellectual tradition which can be traced to the contributions of Karl Marx. The immediate intellectual progenitors of the current crop of radical political economists are a handful of older Marxists. Among the Americans there are Paul Baran, Paul Sweezy, and Harry Magdoff; the main influences from abroad are Maurice Dobb, Joan Robinson, and Ernest Mandel. In addition, Herbert Marcuse (philosopher), William Appleman Williams (historian), and C. Wright Mills (sociologist), all rooted in the Marxian tradition, have had an important influence on many young radical economists. Thus, the current character of radical political economy has been shaped by young and old scholars from a variety of disciplines writing from within and without the orthodox Marxian framework.” [Raymond S. Franklin and William K. Tabb, “The Challenge of Radical Political Economics.” Journal of Economic Issues. Volume 8, number 1, March 1974. Pages 127-150.]
       “This paper is clearly not the place fully to develop or defend the scope and method of radical political economics, which is the central function of the Union for Radical Political Economics. But it is clear that the subject matter is vital to an understanding of the economic system and can be integrated with more orthodox material in an introductory course which will be attractive to students and analytically sound. In addition to subject matter, the quality of teaching is important. The results are consistent with the hypothesis that radical political economists and good teachers have a useful role in departments of economics.” [Michael Zweig, “Teaching Radical Political Economics in the Introductory Course.” The American Economic Review. Volume 62, number 1/2, March 1972. Pages 434-438.]
       “This article discusses the predecessors of contemporary radical economics, the social origins of radical economics, the radical critique of neoclassical economics, the general radical paradigm, and some specific applications of radical economics.…
       “Although some American radicals are influenced by Thorstein Veblen by various other U.S. dissident economists, most are heavily indebted Karl Marx for their inspiration, the questions they ask, and the method use. Very few accept all of [Karl] Marx’s analyses or conclusions. Radical economists stress the need for everyone to think independently, so they will not blindly follow Marx or anyone else.…
       “… Marx … recognized that there is no social science separate from ethical values; every significant statement in the social sciences is a combination of fact and value. Marxist social science should reflect the ethical values of oppressed and exploited groups.”
       [Howard J. Sherman, “Contemporary Radical Economics.” The Journal of Economic Education. Volume 15, number 4, autumn 1984. Pages 265-274.]
       “Economic radicalism is the product of forces external to the discipline as well as internal First, the external forces. Our hypothetical radical economist was a student activist in college and was raised in a home characterized by a high level of political interest. This background led him/her to develop a left of center political perspective as an important part of the primary belief system. Experience as a student activist reinforces these beliefs and contributes to an adult radical perspective. A low level of religiosity and a modest income are associated with economic radicalism, a prediction consistent with traditional Western political alignments and philosophies. Concerning the effect of factors internal to the discipline, the student activism experience leads the activist to seek postgraduate education in economics. While in graduate school the individual finds role models who reinforce a radical perspective. Professional socialization and radicalism will be com patible with a conventional life style.” [Carol Copp, “Scholarly Belief and Attitude Formation: The Case of the Radical Economics Paradigm.” Sociological Focus. Volume 25, number 2, May 1992. Pages 121-138.]
       “The proposition examined in this paper is that the public/private divide, a frequent issue in advanced capitalist countries, can be understood by applying [Karl] Marx’s concept of commodity fetishism. That is, according to commodity fetishism, the social character of production is invisible to individual producers and consumers. By extension, the value resulting from that social cooperation and division of labor is also attributed to private firms and their products, legitimating their claim to the surplus. Along with authorizing claims regarding income distribution, the notion that commodities and money have intrinsic value leads to distorted economic policies and ineffective social control of capitalist production.” [Ann E. Davis, “The New ‘Voodoo Economics’: Fetishism and the Public/Private Divide.” Review of Radical Political Economics. Volume 45, number 1, 2002. Pages 42-58.]
       “The purpose of this article or note is threefold: (1) to point out several inconsistences in Mr. [James H.] Weaver’s article; (2) to raise some questions for Mr. Weaver and his fellow ‘radical political economists’ (even if they are not sure what they are) (x) and; (3) to suggest that orthodox economics can be employed to deal with some of the problems which trouble the ‘radical political economists.’ In connection with this last point it should suffice to say at this time that the LM-IS model will be the application of orthodoxy.” [Peter B. Webb, “Toward a Radical Political Economics.” The American Economist. Volume 15, number 1, spring 1971. Pages 108-111.]
       “What of the merits of a radical political economics? As a system to provide for the needs of mankind?very little. True, many of their observations have numerous grains of truth. We, as did Keynes, do not contend that capitalism is perfect, but we do assert that it produces the wherewithal to sustain the popu lace. Where wrinkles exist, they must be ironed out. But this does not mean we should discard the baby with the water. It means that the basic principles of self-interest, competition, and private property must be maintained, but tempered whenever inequities result.” [B. Haroian and P. Grimaldi, “Toward a Radical Political Economics.” The American Economist. Volume 14, number 2, fall 1970. Pages 90-92.]
    3. political economy of universal basic income (Lucian T. Butaru as pronounced in this MP3 audio file): The article considers the morality of this approach to political economy.
       “… it [universal basic income] is more moral because it eliminates paternalism and other forms of social control caused by the welfare state and because it lays on thorough checking before granting assistance or other social benefits. Secondly, it is more moral because it is universal in the sense that no criterion of discrimination operates in providing the income. Therefore, unlike the forms of support focused exclusively on the poor, the universal basic income does not generate the shame accompanying like a shadow the privilege of being granted a benefice.…
       “… If we compare today’s fears and reluctance to proposals on universal basic income with those from the dawn of capitalism we see how much they are similar, although, in the meantime two hundred years of technological progress had passed. The only plausible explanation for today’s reluctance, which could also emphasize the coexistence of old and new fears, is demagogy – a demagogy that uses the contradictions present at the time in the cultural system called ‘common sense’ to legitimize a greater degree of social control.”
       [Lucian T. Butaru, “Beyond or Besides Neoliberalism?: The Political Economy of Universal Basic Income.” Studia Universitatis Babes-Bolyai. Volume 60, number 1, March 2015. Pages 9-21.]
    4. radical political economy of consumption (Bruce Pietrykowski): He considers three different perspectives to consumer theory in radical political economy.
       “Postmodern Marxist, SCOT [social construction of technology], and feminist approaches to consumer theory serve to foreground social, cultural, and political practices in which both production and consumption activities are interwoven in complex and contradictory ways. The market—no longer an empty space within which suppliers and consumers interact with one another—comes to be seen as a place in which individuals, occupying multiple subject positions as consumers, retail workers, producers, supervisors, interact in such a way that identities (individual, group, and class) are reproduced or transformed. A signal feature of radical political economy is the belief that economic actions are embedded in relations of power and conflict, domination and resistance. I argue that this is no less true in sites of consumption and in the spaces that disrupt the clear distinction between production and consumption.” [Bruce Pietrykowski, “Exploring New Directions for Research in the Radical Political Economy of Consumption.” Review of Radical Political Economics. Volume 39, number 2, spring 2007. Pages 257-283.]
    5. political economy of peacebuilding (Michael Pugh): He applies critical theory to political economy.
       “In applying a critical approach, this analysis focuses on the politics of the economic projects within the liberal peace framework, drawing examples from south-east Europe. First, it deals with the orthodox rationale of the political economy of peacebuilding. Next, the article notes the virtual death of the Washington Consensus and identifies a millennial revisionist agenda that emerged internationally during the course of 2004–05. This interrogation, then, allows reflection about the objectification of war-torn societies as well as reflection on the essentialist rationale of the political economy of peacebuilding and its dysfunctional and normative/ethical contradictions. The article contends that, although the depiction of an aggressive, undifferentiated liberal peacebuilding has been refined, the millennial revisionist project ultimately fails to address these contradictions. An inclusive/emancipatory participation of local actors and structural diversity in political economies indicates alternative options to the revisionist ideology that is embedded in a liberal structuring of global political economy.” [Michael Pugh, “The Political Economy of Peacebuilding: A Critical Theory Perspective.” International Journal of Peace Studies. Volume 10, number 2, autumn/winter 2005. Pages 23-42.]
    6. political economy of unhappiness (William Davies): He describes “the spirit of capitalism” as delivering workers an incomplete fulfillment in their work.
       “The spirit of capitalism regulates the political economy of unhappiness, aiming to ensure that individuals find partial fulfilment in work and consumption. If they found no fulfilment, there would be a risk that they might opt out; yet if they found too much fulfilment, this could signify a satisfaction of desire that is anathema to an economic system that depends on desire remaining inexhaustible. Real happiness, [Theodor] Adorno reminds us, would mean no longer seeking ever more and ever newer sources of satisfaction. Real progress would mean abandoning the obsession with technical and economic progress. Far safer, therefore, for the capitalist to promise substantive eudaimonia, but to deliver only a taste of it, or substitute it for a more instant hedonic experience that leaves the individual still wanting more. During periods of stability, capitalism successfully regulates this distribution of happiness and unhappiness. That unhappiness is now appearing as a costly and threatening negative externality to be tackled by the state suggests that this equilibrium is breaking down.” [William Davies, “The Political Economy of Unhappiness.” New Left Review. Series II, number 71, September–October 2011. Pages 65-80.]
    7. Japanese domestic political economy (Gavan McCormack): He examines Japanese economic growth in the 1990s.
       “… as Japanese economic influence spreads, naturally the patterns of the Japanese domestic political economy are reproduced through a widening regional and global sphere of influence. Throughout the 1980s the level of capital flowing out of Japan into tourism and real-estate development around the region grew steadily, stimulated by the accumulation of trade surplus, the inflation of domestic land and stock assets, and the availability of cheap credit (commonly around 4 per cent) against the collateral of land.… In aggregate terms, too, Japan seems likely to become ‘number one’ in the near future.” [Gavan McCormack, “The Price of Affluence: The Political Economy of Japanese Leisure.” New Left Review. Series I, number 188, July–August 1991. Pages 121-136.]
    8. Kenyes–Marx theory of investment (Jonathan P. Goldstein): They develop a version of heterodox economics focused on investment.
       “In this section, I outline a Keynesian–Marxian theory of the firm’s investment decision. The Keynesian aspects of the model include true/Keynesian uncertainty and the possibility of financially fragile outcomes in such an environment, the illiquid nature of capital, endogenous expectations and preferences, and the potential for misaligned interests between firm management and shareholder/owners and creditors. The Marxian attributes include the Marxian competitive environment, as distinct from the neoclassical concept of competition, including critical regime shifts in the form of competition, transitions between different modes of accumulation, the imperative to accumulate capital through the progressive maximization of surplus value/profits and endogenous expectations and preferences.” [Jonathan P. Goldstein, “A Keynes–Marx theory of investment.” Heterodox Macroeconomics: Keynes, Marx and globalization. Jonathan P. Goldstein and Michael G. Hillard, editors. London and New York: Routledge imprint of Taylor & Francis Group, an Informa PLC business. 2009. Pages 112-126.]
    9. zombie economics (Turan Subaşat as pronounced in this MP3 audio file): He presents a critique of liberal (or classical) economics.
       “Since the 1980s, liberal economists have labelled non-liberal economists as ‘dinosaurs.’ Especially with the global financial crisis that started in 2008, liberal economists themselves are now described as ‘zombies.’ According to this description, under the influence of neoliberal dogma, economics is intellectually dead. This does not however mean that it is perishing. On the contrary, the zombies roam the streets and infect healthy economists and other social scientists ….
       “… ‘perfect competition’ and ‘monopoly’ in zombie economics is a mutually exclusive dichotomy. Since competition is reduced to the price competition of identical firms, competition negates monopoly and monopoly negates competition. The political economists such as [Karl] Marx, however, consider competition and monopoly as a dialectical process where they enforce and complement each other. In this view, competition goes beyond the price competition between identical firms but is considered as a struggle between firms to survive and capture larger markets, particularly via productivity increases.…
       “One of the most significant peculiarities of the globalization process has been the widening gap between the rich and the poor …. Zombie economics normalizes and justifies this inequality by arguing that factors of production get income according to their contribution to the output.”
       [Turan Subaşat, “Zombie Economics.” Izmir Review of Social Sciences. Volume 2, number 2, January 2015. Pages 41-55.]
    10. feminist economics (Jill Rubery, Diana Strassmann, and others): They develop an approach which strives to eliminate the “gender-blindedness” of mainstream economics.
        “This article reviews the experience of gender mainstreaming within the European Employment Strategy (EES) …. This experience merits evaluation not only for what it has and has not done to foster equal opportunities within Europe, but also for the implicit lessons it provides in applying feminist economics in practice.… It has to be said at the outset that one of the lessons we have to learn is that policy-makers, and indeed economists, do not yet have the tools or the understanding for a full implementation of a feminist economics approach and, even more importantly, may well lack the political will to move far along that path. Nevertheless, the experience provides insight into both the current obstacles to the application of a feminist economics approach and into what progress can nevertheless be made along that road.” [Jill Rubery, “Reflections on Gender Mainstreaming: An Example of Feminist Economics in Action?” Feminist Economics. Volume 11, number 3, November 2005. Pages 1-26.]
        “During its fifteen years of publication Feminist Economics has worked to broaden participation in economic debates to include scholars with different life experiences and training and from different parts of the world. In pursuing this aim, Feminist Economics has welcomed contributions not just from economists but also from activists, policy makers, and scholars from many other fields of inquiry. Equally important, the journal has sought to include contributions from scholars who hail from all regions of the world and to require the papers it publishes to speak to a global audience. These efforts reflect our commitment to inclusivity and our belief that broader representation of scholars will lead to a more rigorous and useful economics, better serving the interests of all people.” [Diana Strassmann, “Editorial: Toward a More Inclusive Feminist Economics.” Feminist Economics. Volume 16, number 1, January 2010. Pages 1-2.]
        “Over the past half-century, feminist economists have transformed our understanding of how the world economy functions. They have critiqued the gender-blindness of traditional economic models and challenged analytic descriptions of development and globalization that ignore much of women’s economic activity. Feminist economists have developed analytical frameworks for examining gender relations that permeate political, social, and economic institutions including markets, governments, households, and firms. They have produced new methodologies that incorporate women’s experiences in economic models, statistics, and the evaluation of economic phenomena. Their research has pushed the boundaries of knowledge by challenging conventional paradigms and concepts, ideas and categories that were engrained and therefore rarely scrutinized.” [Maria Sagrario Floro and John Willoughby, “Feminist Economics and the Analysis of the Global Economy: The Challenge That Awaits Us.” The Fletcher Forum of World Affairs. Volume 40, number 2, summer 2016. Pages 15-27.]
        “Early feminist economists criticized Marxist analyses of labour by arguing that they universalized the male worker in industrialized economies as representative of all workers; thereby foreclosing a more complex, gendered analysis – one that is grounded in the lived realities of women and men, and of uneven power relations within the labour market, the household and the economy. Feminist analysis moved beyond situating the economic man as the norm in definitions of economics to considerations of humans in relation to the world ….
        “They built on the Marxist category of class to bring in sex and gender relations in order to better understand women’s and men’s positions, roles and responsibilities in the labour market and society as a whole. In particular, feminists argue that power in economic relations is erased by standard theories and models that de-emphasize difference as constraints or differences in natural endowments, while erasing variables such as distinct capabilities and access to resources between and among women and men. This focus also enables analyses of those commodities and processes that are necessary for capital accumulation, including the reproduction of the labour force.”
        [Radhika Balakrishnan and Savitri Bisnath, “Feminist economics.” The Elgar Companion to Marxist Economics. Ben Fine and Alfredo Saad Filho, editors. Northampton, Massachusetts: Edward Elgar Publishing, Inc. 2012. Pages 125-130.]
    11. Marxist, radical, or critical institutionalism and institutional political economy (Phillip Anthony O’Hara, Howard Jay Sherman, William M. Dugger, Adil H. Mouhammed [Arabic/ʿArabiyyaẗ, عَادِل حَسَن مُحَمَّد, ʿĀdil Ḥasan Muḥammad], Kirsten Ford, William McColloch, Graham Cassano, Geoffrey M. Hodgson, and others): They develop a fascinating critical economic synthesis of the work of Karl Marx and Norwegian-American economist and sociologist Thorstein Bunde Veblen (MP3 audio file), one of the originators of the institutionalist perspective in heterodox economics. Veblen also coined and developed the commonly used sociological concept, “conspicuous consumption.”
        “[Phillip Anthony] O’Hara has fashioned a new synthesis of institutionalism and Marxism, which may be called Marxist Institutionalism. What is Marxist Institutionalism? It is an integration or synthesis of [Karl] Marx and [Thorstein] Veblen, though different people may emphasize more of one than the other.…
        “The Marxist-Institutionalist theory of the [business] cycle argues the following propositions, compatible with either Marx or Vehlen. First, the business cycle appears only in the capitalist business economy because it has institutions of market exchange, money and credit, and production for private profit. Within those institutions, the internal dynamics of capitalism have thus far turned every expansion into a slowdown, recession, or deep depression, depending on many variables. The institution of the labor market is such that wages always lag behind profits in every expansion, causing an eventual limitation on consumer demand. The institution of the commodity market is such that the prices of raw materials rise faster than other prices in almost every expansion. The institutions of finance capital are such that interest rates rise in every expansion. All of these reasons—and others—cause an eventual leveling off and decline of profit. Given the institutions of capitalism, a decline in profit inevitably leads to a decline in investment.”
        [Howard J. Sherman, “Marxist Institutionalism.” Review of Social Economy. Volume 60, number 4, December 2002. Pages 603-608.]
        “Howard Sherman’s … [article] is mostly positive since we share the vision of a unified political economy, drawing on some of the heterodox approaches. We both draw inspiration from [Karl] Marx, [Thorstein] Vehlen and [John Maynard] Keynes; contemporary neo-Marxian, neo-institutionalist, feminist, post Keynesian and social political economy; but more than anything we want to comprehend the dynamic motion of capitalism, as well as draw up a framework for democratic socialism. We both take a historical-relational view of capitalism; applying a dialectical method to institutional transformation; and especially trying to comprehend the cyclical or wave motion of capitalism. In this we share a holist method with other political economists, and are close intellectually to Bill Dugger, Ron Stanfield, the late David Gordon, Sam Bowles, Michal Aglietta, Rick Wolff and Steven Resnick.” [Phillip Anthony O’Hara, “The Role of Institutions and the Current Crises of Capitalism: A Reply to Howard Sherman and John Henry.” Review of Social Economy. Volume 60, number 4, December 2002. Pages 609-618.]
        “The capital-labor accord of the 1950s and 1960s was based on the purging of militant unionists from positions of authority and on the institutionalization of numerous agreements in which union members allowed control of production to be left in the hands of management in return for distributive benefits, better work conditions, and more job security. A more docile work force and a relatively high rate of technological change enabled productivity gains to be distributed between capital and labor.” [Phillip Anthony O’Hara, “An Institutionalist Review of Long Wave Theories: Schumpeterian Innovation, Modes of Regulation, and Social Structures of Accumulation.” Journal of Economic Issues. Volume 28, number 2, June 1994. Pages 489-500.]
        “The cultural contradictions of global capitalism … must be holistically engrained in the system. They are complex, following the general lines of cultural evolution of the times, forever changing yet always emanating from the complex interactions that are the hallmark of global capitalism. They must be able to penetrate the dominant institutions, interact with other aspects of culture, and manifest to varying degrees through historical time. It is in this vein that we investigate the contemporary cultural contradictions of global capitalism.” [Phillip Anthony O’Hara, “Cultural Contradictions of Global Capitalism.” Journal of Economic Issues. Volume 38, number 2, June 2004. Pages 413-420.]
        “It is our view that Marxism and institutionalism have much in common—and that it is useful in the United States to stress the common ground among all critical economists. We also recognize that there are different viewpoints within each of these paradigms. There are liberal and radical institutionalists, but there are also official and independent, critical Marxists. By official Marxism, we mean that version of Marx that was held by the Soviet Union and all of the Communist parties during the Stalin era (1928-1953). We recognize that liberal institutionalists and official Marxists have little or nothing in common, but we believe that modern, radical institutionalists and modern, critical (nonofficial) Marxists have much in common. It should be stressed that the dichotomy mentioned within each school is a drastic over- simplification. In reality, there is a wide spectrum of views within each school. We use a dichotomy only to highlight certain differences within each school.” [William M. Dugger and Howard J. Sherman, “Comparison of Marxism and Institutionalism.” Journal of Economic Issues. Volume 28, number 1, March 1994. Pages 101-127.]
        “For students working in the heterodox tradition of political economy, where the respective works of Karl Marx and Thorstein Veblen form part of the canon, numerous ostensible parallels between the works of these authors present themselves. Despite this common intuitive supposition, even a cursory glance at the existing literature reveals little consensus. Far from an on-going discussion, much of the literature more closely resembles the intermittent trading of shots between firmly entrenched camps. It would therefore be folly to think we could resolve this century-long deliberation in the context of the present paper; we hope merely to add a new dimension to the debate. Here, we maintain that the striking similarities that emerge in the analysis and conclusions of both thinkers follow from a commonality in method. While we do not argue that methodologies of Marx and Veblen are, by any means, identical, or attempt to deny distinctions between the two, we insist, in line with the radical institutionalist literature, that the rift between them has been greatly overstated. Specifically, we argue that a parallel can be drawn between Marx and Veblen in terms of their chosen starting points; a parallel only reinforced by their shared perception of the nature of economic life.” [Kirsten Ford and William McColloch, “Thorstein Veblen: A Marxist Starting Point.” Journal of Economic Issues. Volume 46, number 3, September 2012. Pages 765-777.]
        “[Thorstein] Veblen’s radical economic analysis deepens our understanding of capitalism in a way which the analysis of [Karl] Marx does not. This is because Veblen’s theory provides complementary sources to Marx’s analysis of capitalism; among the most important are the following. Veblen analyzes in detail microeconomic phenomena such as monopoly, monopsony [a single buyer], reserve capacity, and markup pricing that Marx does not analyze in his theory of competition among capitals (firms) because Marx is interested in the whole economic system, the macroeconomy. In this respect, Veblen’s economic theory does lead to the analysis of industrial duality under capitalism.” [Adil H. Mouhammed, “Veblen’s Economic Theory: A Radical Analysis.” Review of Radical Political Economics. Volume 32, number 2, 2000. Pages 197-221.]
        “[Thorstein] Veblen believes that the system of private property, i.e. capitalism, must be abolished and replaced by a revolution in order to establish a new system based on the instinct of workmanship, although some of Veblen’s scholars think that Veblen really does not put much store on being constructively persuasive. Veblen emphasizes this conclusion because he does not believe in policy economics, nor is he interested in saving capitalism from breakdown because of the economic problems it creates.” [Adil H. Mouhammed, “Veblen and Keynes: On the Economic Theory of the Capitalist Economy.” Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE)/Zeitschrift für diegesamte Staatswissenschaft. Volume 155, number 4, December 1999. Pages 594-609.]
        “… [Thorstein] Veblen believes that the private property must be abolished in order to establish a system based upon the instinct of workmanship, the instinct of cooperation. Veblen emphasizes this conclusion because he does not believe in policy, nor is he a policy economist. Veblen points out, ‘Science creates nothing but theories. It knows nothing of policy or utility, of better or worse’ …. In other words, for Veblen, capitalism must be replaced.” [Adil H. Mouhammed, “Veblen and Keynes.” International Journal of Politics, Culture and Society. Volume 13, number 2, December 1999. Pages 169-186.]
        “… [Thorstein] Veblen’s political economy is a structure of power relations. The most useful economic indicators are found to be determined by such relations. For Veblen, power is actually reflecting social relationships between vested interests and common man. Very specifically, the vested interests, as represented by large corporations and businesses, seek domination and control over other social groups for the essential reason of obtaining sufficient profits.” [Adii Mouhammed, “Thorstein Vehlen: Political Economy and Power.” International Social Science Review. Volume 66, number 4 autumn 1991. Pages 147-157.]
        “What one student called [Thorstein] Veblen’s ‘admiration for Marx’ reflects the solidarity of two thinkers working upon a common project and toward a common goal. On the other hand, within economics, Phillip O’Hara, Howard J. Sherman, William M. Dugger, Adil Mouhammed, and a number of other radicals, forge a Marxist institutionalism based upon a dialogue between Veblenian and Marxian strands of radical analysis …. Thus, for Bill Dugger, the ‘real Thorstein Veblen was not a humorist. He was a radical and a Marxist. Like any good Marxist he did not follow his intellectual mentor slavishly, but … critically’ …. But even among heterodox economists (already a minority within the profession), institutionalists are a militant minority within a minority. And radical institutionalists represent a minority within that minority ….
        “In the early 20ᵗʰ century, however, Veblen’s influence across the social sciences was considerable. The approach to sociology, anthropology, and economics that he inspired came to be called institutionalism. Institutionalists took from Veblen his emphasis upon the economy as a social institution and much of his terminology; but only a handful of early followers incorporated his radical, anti-capitalist framework into a radical institutionalism. As Dugger puts it, ‘the red threads woven throughout Veblen’s thought’ embarrassed ‘institutionalists’ …. His work was normalized, de-fanged. When not entirely forgotten, his texts were re-interpreted, often read as parody without politics.”
        [Graham Cassano, “Choosing our Ancestors: Thorstein Veblen, Radical Institutionalism and Sociology.” Critical Sociology. Volume 35, number 3, May 2009. Pages 367-377.]
        “While [Thorstein] Veblen’s view that nationalism subverts class struggle has parallels elsewhere in Marxian discourse, his articulation of the mechanism through which this nationalist consensus establishes itself represents a fundamental theoretical innovation. A community ruptured by class division, and economic inequality, survives precisely because the common people accept an immaterial wage in return for symbolic allegiance to their exploiters. The conditions of economic exploitation are secured by this status wage in symbolic prestige.” [Graham Cassano, “Symbolic Exploitation and the Social Dialectic of Desire.” Critical Sociology. Volume 35, number 3, 2009. Pages 379-393.]
        “Much is often made of the dialectics of [Karl] Marx versus the opaque cause and effect of [Thorstein] Veblen, but I think the principal difference between Marx and Veblen is that Marx constructed a labor theory of value to explain how capitalists grew rich through exploiting the workers while Veblen constructed a theory of business enterprise to show how business people grew rich at the expense of the underlying population. Their theories do not contradict each other but focus on different aspects of the same problem. Marx emphasized the exploitation of the working class through the capitalist class’s control of the production process; while Veblen emphasized the exploitation of the underlying population through the control of the market system by big business and big government. There is a difference, but no contradiction between the two. In fact, when combined, Marx and Veblen yield a more complete explanation of how the minority grow rich at the expense of the majority and how they get away with it even under modern conditions of science and enlightenment.” [William M. Dugger, “Veblen the Red.” MRzine. Online magazine. August 12th, 2007. Retrieved on August 1st, 2016.]
        “[Phillip Anthony] O’Hara systemizes the work of many authors who have pioneered an analysis of capital that is much broader than the narrow concept held by traditional economists. Ecological capital, social capital, and human capital are far more important than private business capital, which is perhaps as little as 20 percent of the total capital stock. The relationship between the forms of capital need much more study. For example, ecological capital is under attack from the expansion of private business capital, yet control of government policies, dominated by business capital interests, suggests that the dominance of business capital will continue. O’Hara summarizes the limited knowledge available without taking the argument much further.” [David R. Fusfeld, “Marx, Veblen, and Contemporary Institutional Political Economy: Principles and Unstable Dynamics of Capitalism.” Review article. Journal of Economic Issues. Volume 35, number 4, December 2001. Pages 1033-1035.]
        “When speaking of institutionalism in this paper, we refer to a critical institutionalism with mainly Marxist roots that encompasses different interpretations such as radical institutionalism … and institutional political economy …. Although the aim of this paper is not to differentiate between the two critical institutionalisms, it should be noted that many of their differences stem from the fact that while radical institutionalism has clear Marxist and Veblenian roots, institutional political economy does not link its theoretical developments to the field of development economics.” [Fernando García-Quero and Jorge Ollero-Perán, “Is Neoclassical Economics Scientific Knowledge Detached from Ethics? A Kantian Answer, an Institutionalist Alternative.” Review of Radical Political Economics. Volume 47, number 1, 2015. Pages 56-69.]
        “Interest in developing institutional explanations of political and economic behavior has blossomed among social scientists since the early 1980s. Three intellectual perspectives are now prevalent: rational choice theory, historical institutionalism and a new school of organizational analysis. This paper summarizes, compares and contrasts these views and suggests ways in which cross-fertilization may be achieved. Particular attention is paid to how the insights of organizational analysis and historical institutionalism can be blended to provide fruitful avenues of research and theorizing, especially with regard to the production, adoption, and mobilization of ideas by decision makers.” [John L. Campbell, “Recent Trends in Institutional Political Economy.” The International Journal of Sociology and Social Policy. Volume 17, number 7/8, 1997. Pages 15-56.]
        “The neo-institutionalist movement has taken much from both [John Maynard] Keynes and [Karl] Marx, but its proponents do not believe that this borrowing has eliminated the identity or significance of their movement as an interdisciplinary social science that presents a formidable challenge to both orthodox micro and macro economics. The neo-institutionalists do not regard neo-Marxism or neo-Keynesianism as satisfactory substitutes for their cultural version of economics. Consequently they reverse the proposals of both the neo-Marxians and the neo-Keynesians, to eliminate or absorb the neoinstitutionalist movement. It is the neo-institutionalists who take what is worthwhile from both neo-Marxian and neo-Keynesian economics with the aim of creating a satisfactory challenge to orthodox economics.” [Allan G. Gruchy, “Neo Institutionalism, Neo-Marxism, and Neo-Keynesianism: An Evaluation.” Journal of Economic Issue. Volume XVIII, number 2, June 1984. Pages 547-556.]
        “In order to understand the present and outline the possibilities for the future, we must look beyond the narrow formalisms and equilibrium-oriented theorising of mainstream economics. Our search must involve economic heretics as diverse as Karl Marx, Thorstein Veblen, John Maynard Keynes, Joseph Schumpeter and Friedrich Hayek, all of whom have made major and enduring contributions to our understanding of the structure and dynamics of real economies. Marx enhanced our understanding of socio-economic systems, Veblen addressed economic evolution and institutional change, Keynes diagnosed the pathologies of money and employment, Schumpeter broke the bonds of equilibrium in mainstream theory and highlighted innovation and entrepreneurship, and Hayek analysed the nature and role of knowledge in market economies. Yet the works of such authors do not receive the prominence they deserve. The direct and detailed study of their writings is widely neglected even in the most prestigious university departments of economics. This book attempts to show the value of their ideas for both the dissection of the present and the prognostication of the future.” [Geoffrey M. Hodgson. Economics and Utopia: Why the learning economy is not the end of history. London and New York: Routledge imprint of Taylor & Francis Group, an Informa PLC business. 2001. Page xvii.]
        “It would be … fruitful to cast socialist political economy … [as]: a general analysis of capitalist relations of production and their inbuilt exploitation, a particular analysis of the concrete politico-economic situation, and an analysis of the structures and institutions of the state. Such a comprehensive analysis would provide a far more worthy theoretical foundation than that species of revolutionary opinion which draws its strength from the secret conviction that nothing can be changed.” [Geoff Hodgson, “On the Political Economy of the Socialist Transformation.” New Left Review. Series I, number 133, May–June 1982. Pages 52-66.]
        “I must emphasise that this [article] is not an attempt to undermine the genuine achievements of the NIE [new institutional economics], or a move to promote the original institutionalism as an alternative. Instead, one of the most important arguments raised below is that the identities and boundaries of both the NIE and the original institutionalism are now unclear; there is a sizeable overlap between them.Hence this comment is not divisive: it is an appeal for mutual understanding of both traditions, recognising the merits of each, so that these may be jointly deployed in future enquiry.” [Geoffrey M. Hodgson, “On fuzzy frontiers and fragmented foundations: some reflections on the original and new institutional economics.” Journal of Institutional Economics. Volume 10, number 4, December 2014. Pages 591-611.]
        “Any attempt to define institutionalism in terms of policy outputs would run into severe difficulties. Consider some possible policies. Can institutionalism be defined, in part, in terms of a critique of market solutions to economic problems?
        “Many institutionalists have criticized pro-market policies and have proposed various forms of economic intervention and planning. However, so too have neo-classical economists. (Neoclassical economics is defined as the type of economics invoking the standard textbook principles of rationality, maximization and equilibrium.) The problem of using a disposition towards planning and against markets to define institutionalism would be that many neoclassical economists would then be institutionalists.”
        [Geoffrey M. Hodgson, “What Is the Essence of Institutional Economics?” Journal of Economic Issues. Volume 34, number 2, June 2000. Pages 317-329.]
        “[Geoffrey M.] Hodgson’s interest in Darwinism has two distinct points of origin. First, on an abstract level, his disappointment of the early 1980s with Marxism’s ‘teleological’ and ‘determinist’ tendencies led him to search for a new philosophical standpoint. [Thorstein] Veblen’s concept of history as a continuous process with no legitimate-predetermined end appeared to him as the best alternative for replacing Marxism. Second, on a more concrete level, the triumph of … [an] evolutionary alternative to neoclassical economics … led Hodgson to seriously consider biology for the theorization of a new paradigm in economics.” [George Liagouras, “From Heterodox Political Economy to Generalized Darwinism: Geoffrey Hodgson’s Tensions in Retrospect.” Review of Radical Political Economics. Volume 48, number 3, 2016. Pages 467-484.]
        “… little detailed reference has been made by leading exponents of the ‘new’ institutional economics to this predecessor. Two factors may help to explain this oversight. The first is that the history of economic thought is currently a much neglected subdiscipline, and there is now widespread unfamiliarity with the ‘old’ American institutionalism, despite its favored geographic location and accessible language. The second reason is that since its decline in America after 1930 the ‘old’ institutionalism has been repeatedly written off, and is dismissed for failing to provide a systematic and viable approach to economic theory. It is also widely—and wrongly—believed that institutionalism was essentially anti-theoretical and descriptive.” [Geoffrey M. Hodgson, “The Approach of Institutional Economics.” Journal of Economic Literature. Volume 36, number 1, March 1998. Pages 166-192.]
        “There is no question of the legality of absentee ownership, nor of its moral right. It is a settled institution of civilised life, embedded in law and morals, and its roots run through the foundations of European civilisation. Legality and morality are a matter of statute, precedent, and usage; and absentee ownership is quite securely grounded in the Common Law and deeply ingrained in the moral sense of civilised men. In the American commonwealth such ownership is also covered by the constitutional provision which declares that men must not be deprived of their property except by due process of law. And the legal precedents, interpretations and refinements which have been set up and worked out by jurists under this constitutional provision have in the main been concerned with fortifying and extending the security and implied rights of absentee ownership in one bearing and another; with the result that these rights are, legally and morally, more secure and more extensive today than ever before. Indirectly too, the provision for ‘due process of law’ has greatly reinforced the dominant position of absentee ownership as against any claims of another kind or against claimants of any other class. Litigation as conducted according to the rules and precedents which govern the ‘due process’ has in recent times become too costly to be carried to a conclusion by any litigant who is not an absentee owner of large means. This will hold true in America perhaps in a more conclusive fashion than in any other civilised nation. In effect, due process of law as it concerns property has become an appliance for the regulation of relations between absentee owners.” [Thorstein Veblen. Absentee Ownership—Business Enterprise in Recent Times: The Case of America. New Brunswick, New Jersey: Transaction Publishers. 2004. Pages 11-12.]
        “Any knowledge that runs in such out-worn terms turns out to be futile, misleading, meaningless; and the habit of imputing qualities and behavior of this kind to everyday facts will then fall into disuse, progressively as experience continues to bring home the futility of all that kind of imputation. And presently the habit of perceiving that class of qualities and behavior in the known facts is therefore gradually lost. So also, in due time the observances and the precautions and provisions embodied in law and custom for the preservation or the control of these lost imponderables will also fall into disuse and disappear out of the scheme of institutions, by way of becoming dead letter or by abrogation. Particularly will such a loss of belief and insight, and the consequent loss of those imponderables whose ground has thereby gone out from under them, take effect with the passing of generations.” [Thorstein Veblen. The Vested Interests and the Common Man. New York: B. Huebsch, Inc. 1919. Page 8.]
        “… [Certain] ancient norms differ from the modern norms given by the machine in that they rest on conventional, ultimately sentimental grounds; they are of a putative nature. Such are, e.g., the principles of (primitive) blood relationship, clan solidarity, paternal descent, Levitical cleanness, divine guidance, allegiance, nationality. In their time and under the circumstances which favored their growth these were, all and several, powerful factors in controlling human conduct and shaping the course of events. In their time each of these institutional norms served as a definitive ground of authentication for such facts as fell under its particular scope, and the scope of each was very wide in the day of its best vigor. As time has brought change of circumstances, the facts of life have gradually escaped from the constraint of these ancient principles; so that the dominion which they now hold over the life of civilized men is relatively slight and shifty.” [Thorstein Veblen. The Theory of Business Enterprise. New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons. 1932. Page 68.]
        “… there are groups – some of them apparently not the result of retrogression – which show the traits of primitive savagery with some fidelity. Their culture differs from that of the barbarian communities in the absence of a leisure class and the absence, in great measure, of the animus or spiritual attitude on which the institution of a leisure class rests. These communities of primitive savages in which there is no hierarchy of economic classes make up but a small and inconspicuous fraction of the human race. As good an 1nstance of this phase of culture as1 may be had is afforded by the tribes of the Andamans, or by the Todas of the Nilgiri Hills. The scheme of life of these groups at the time of their earliest contact with Europeans seems to have been nearly typical, so far as regards the absence of a leisure class.” [Thorstein Veblen. The Theory of the Leisure Class: An Economic Study of Institutions. New York: The Macmillan Company. 1912. Page 6.]
        “The habits of thought induced by workday life impose themselves as ruling principles that govern the quest of knowledge ; it will therefore be the habits of thought enforced by the current technological scheme that will have most (or most immediately) to say in the current systematization of facts. The working logic of the current state of the industrial arts will necessarily insinuate itself as the logical scheme which must, of course, effectually govern the interpretation and generalizations of fact in all their commonplace relations. But the current state of the industrial arts is not all that conditions workmanship. Under any given institutional situation, — and the modern scheme of use and wont, law and order, is no exception, — workmanship is held to a more or less exacting conformity to several tests and standards that are not intrinsic to the state of the industrial arts, even if they are not alien to it; such as the requirements imposed by the current system of ownership and pecuniary values. These pecuniary conditions that impose themselves on the processes of industry and on the conduct of life, together with the pecuniary accountancy that goes with them — the price system — have much to say in the guidance and limitations of workmanship. And when and in so far as the habituation so enforced in the traffic of workday life goes into effect as a scheme of logic governing the quest of knowledge, such principles as have by habit found acceptance as being conventionally salutary and conclusive in the pecuniary conduct of affairs will necessarily leave their mark on the ideals, aims, methods and standards of science and scholarship. More particularly, those principles and standards of organization, control and achievement, that have been accepted as an habitual matter of course in the conduct of business will, by force of habit, in good part reassert themselves as indispensable and conclusive in the conduct of the affairs of learning. While it remains true that the bias of workmanship continues to guide the quest of knowledge, under the conditions imposed by modern institutions it will not be the naive conceptions of primitive workmanship that will shape the framework of the modern system of learning; but rather the preconceptions of that disciplined workmanship that has been instructed in the logic of the modern technology and sophisticated with much experience in a civilization in whose scheme of life pecuniary canons are definitive.” [Thorstein Veblen. The Higher Learning in America: A Memorandum on the Conduct of Universities by Business Men. New York: B. W. Huebsch. 1918. Pages 6-7.]
        “The pastoral-nomadic institutions … appear to have best made their way in those regions of Europe where this brachycephalic brunet stock has been present in some force if not as a dominant racial factor. The evidence is perhaps not conclusive, but there is at least a strong line of suggestion afforded by the distribution of the patriarchal type of institutions within Europe, including the tribal and gentile organisation. There is a rough concomitance between the distribution of these cultural elements presumably derived from an Aryan source on the one hand, and the distribution past or present of the brachycephalic brunet type on the other hand. The regions where this line of institutions are known to have prevailed in early times are, in the main, regions in which the Alpine racial type, is also known to have been present in force, as, e.g., in the classic Greek and Roman republics.” [Thorstein Veblen, “The Blond Race and the Aryan Culture.” The University of Missouri Bulletin. Volume 2, number 3, December 1913. Pages 39-57.]
        “The behavior of small groups interested in collective goods can sometimes be quite complex …. There are certain institutional arrangements and behavioral assumptions that will not always lead to the suboptimality and disproportionality that the preceding paragraphs have described. Any adequate analysis of the tendency toward suboptimal provision of collective goods, and toward disproportionate sharing of the burdens of providing them, would be too long to fit comfortably into this study, which is concerned mainly with large groups, and brings in small groups mainly for purposes of comparison and contrast. The problem of small groups seeking collective goods is of some importance, both theoretically and practically, and has not been adequately treated in the literature.” [Mancur Olson. The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press. 1971. Pages 29-30.]
        “… what would the Marxist tradition have to cede in order to incorporate ideas from the radical institutionalist tradition? With these questions in mind, the intention of this paper is to provide a critical evaluation of [Thorstein] Veblen’s political economy, particularly looking at the internal limitations that prevent the extension of his theories into a systematic analysis of capitalism analogous to [Karl] Marx’s critique of capitalism. The central argument made here is that Marxist supporters of Veblen are right in suggesting that he puts forward many ideas that are, at face value, parallel to Marx’s ideas; however, there is an underlying tension between the core elements in Veblen’s and Marx’s theories, which makes it unclear whether Veblen’s concepts can ‘update’ Marx. This tension, I argue, can be traced back to a fundamental difference between Veblen and Marx: their methods.” [Devin Penner, “The Limits of Radical Institutionalism: A Marxian Critique of Thorstein Veblen’s Political Economy.” Review of Radical Political Economics. Volume 43, number 2, June 2011. Pages 154-161.]
    12. evolutionary economics (Geoffrey M. Hodgson and others): This approach, which is closely associated with institutional economics, is partially inspired by the work of the “neo-Marxist” economist and sociologist Thorstein Veblen. He focused upon the importance of developing Darwinian approaches to economics.
        “Thorstein Bunde Veblen (1857-1929) is the father of institutional economics and a critical influence in the formation and development of AFEE [the Association for Evolutionary Economics]. He established an indigenous branch of radical economics in the United States—institutionalism—and many argue he adapted certain Marxian themes to U.S. conditions …. He recognized the importance of contradictory processes, collective wealth, and interdisciplinary methods in a manner similar in many ways to the method of Karl Marx …. A major theme of Veblen which has Marxian overtones is that capitalism operates in a contradictory environment where business is in conflict with industry, while the concerns of the common people are in contradistinction to those of the leisure and business classes. He developed an evolutionary and materialistic understanding and critique of capitalism in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries while developing certain socialistic policies and perspectives for improving human welfare ….” [Phillip Anthony O’Hara and Howard Jay Sherman, “Veblen and Sweezy on Monopoly Capital, Crises, Conflict, and the State.” Journal of Economic Issues. Volume 38, number 4, December 2004. Pages 969-987.]
        “Since its early development, institutions have been part and parcel of evolutionary economics. Veblen, one of its founding fathers, emphasised the importance of habits, conventions and norms in economics …. He laid the foundations of what is now called ‘old’ institutionalism, and which has affinities with evolutionary economics as this has developed since the 1980s.” [Ron Boschma and Ron Martin, “The aims and scope of evolutionary economic geography.” The Handbook of Evolutionary Economic Geography. Ron Boschma and Ron Martin, editors. Northampton, Massachusetts: Edward Elgar Publishing, Inc. 2010. Page 3-39.]
        “… [One] view of change is that of the radical institutionalist. Even basic institutions have changed in the past, so evolution includes both incremental change and drastic institutional change. Furthermore, the key dichotomy is between business and industry or, more broadly, between institutions and technology. The institutions include the vested interests of the elite, which engender resistance to anything that threatens their wealth and power. Thus the Great Depression resulted from business institutions sabotaging the economic system and causing industrial contraction. The Civil War resulted when the institutions of slavery were holding back industrial progress. Finally, the vested interests clash with those who want change, as in the Civil War.” [Howard J. Sherman, “Evolutionary Economics from a Radical Perspective.” Journal of Economic Issues. Volume 37, number 1, March 2003. Pages 75-83.]
        “… ‘evolutionary economics’ means much more than an acceptance of human evolution. It means an emphasis on change, and on technology as one of the main drivers of economic development. In addition, when Veblen proposed that economics should be an evolutionary science, he specifically mentioned the role of Darwinism.
        “For [Thorstein] Veblen …, Darwinism involved the rejection of teleological reasoning in favor of a detailed analysis of cause and effect. Accordingly, Veblen followed pragmatist philosophers such as William James and John Dewey in rejecting explanations of human conduct based on reason and deliberation alone. These too had to be explained, and this was partly through the psychological concept of habit.”
        [Geoffrey M. Hodgson, “Toward an Evolutionary and Moral Science: Remarks upon Receipt of the Veblen-Commons Award.” Journal of Economic Issues. Volume XLVI, number 2, June 2012. Pages 265-275.]
        “By taking a fully procedural and systemic view, involving the multiple feedbacks between individuals, institutions and rules, a more rigorous evolutionary approach may eventually offer a viable alternative to models incorporating global rationality with given individuals. At the very minimum we should recognize that a more acceptable notion of rationality and human action involves tiered and selective processes of cognition, in which both habit and social conditioning are preponderant.” [Geoffrey M. Hodgson, “Calculation, Habits and Action.” The Economics of Rationality. Bill Gerrard, editor. London and New York: Routledge imprint of Taylor & Francis Group, an Informa PLC business. 2006. Pages 26-36.]
        “The term ‘evolutionary economics’ is currently applied to a confusingly wide variety of approaches within the subject. At least six main uses of the phrase can be identified:
        • “A century ago Thorstein Veblen … argued for an ‘evolutionary’ and ‘post-Darwinian’ economics. Institutionalists in the tradition of Veblen and John Commons frequently describe their approach as ‘evolutionary economics,’ often using the terms ‘institutional’ and ‘evolutionary’ as virtual synonyms ….
        • “Joseph Schumpeter … famously described capitalist development as an ‘evolutionary process.’ Work influenced by Schumpeter is also described as ‘evolutionary economics’ ….
        • “The approach of the Austrian School of economists if often described as ‘evolutionary,’ as portrayed in Carl Menger’s theory of the evolution of money and other institutions, and by the extensive use of an evolutionary metaphor from biology in the later works of Friedrich Hayek, especially in relation to the concept of spontaneous order.
        • “In addition, the economics of assorted writers such as Adam Smith, Karl Marx, Alfred Marshall and others is also sometimes described as ‘evolutionary’ in character.
        • “Evolutionary game theory is a prominent recent development in mathematical economics and has been inspired by related mathematical work in theoretical biology.
        • “The word ‘evolutionary’ is sometimes attached to work in what is also described as ‘complexity theory,’ such as developed by the Santa Fe Institute in the United States. This involves chaos theory, replicator dynamics, genetic algorithms, genetic programming, and various types of computer simulation.”
        [Geoffrey M. Hodgson, “The Challenge of Evolutionary Economics.” Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE) / Zeitschrift für diegesamte Staatswissenschaft. Volume 152, number 4, December 1996. Pages 697-706.]
        “In biology and elsewhere, the word ‘evolution’ is used in a confusing variety of ways, and the term ‘evolutionary economics’ replicates this confusion ….” [Geoffrey M. Hodgson, “The Evolution of Evolutionary Economics.” Scottish Journal of Political Economy. Volume 42, number 4, November 1995. Pages 469-488.]
        “… evolutionary economists and evolutionary game theorists inhabit different academic spheres, with little conversation between them.…
        “This state of affairs does not encourage fruitful research collaboration between these two research communities. This article explores the possibility that these barriers may be overcome and greater conversation may emerge between evolutionary game theorists and evolutionary economists.”
        [Geoffrey M. Hodgson and Kainan Huang, “Evolutionary game theory and evolutionary economics: are they different species?” Journal of Evolutionary Economics. Volume 22, number 2, April 2012. Pages 345-366.]
        “This book is … interested in a … radical strand of economics; radical because it approaches the economy from a completely different starting point. It focuses on evolutionary economics (which draws on the work of Joseph Schumpeter) and complexity science (which has its roots in the natural sciences). It touches also on closely related fields, including behavioural science and the study of networks. While each of these schools has its differences and nuances, they share many similarities; so, when referring to them we use ‘heterodox economics’ and ‘new economic thinking’ as catch-all terms.
        “What each of these schools has in common is a shared critique of the core tenets of neoclassical economic theory, in particular the notion of static equilibrium. This suggests that markets are generally stable and that, while external shocks to the system can occur, the inherent tendency is for markets to move back into equilibrium. This happens because economic actors are rational and self-interested and possess all the information necessary to make optimal decisions in the marketplace. Following the laws of supply and demand, market transactions are processed at which point the market is said to ‘clear.’ According to the models used by neoclassical economists, such clearing takes place instantaneously, leaving no time for market lag. Although they incorporate discount rates and scenarios to account for uncertainties, their models are essentially rigid and linear and are based on the notion that economic transactions are a zero sum game.”
        [David Nash, “Introduction.” Complex New World: Translating new economic thinking into public policy. Tony Dolphin and David Nash, editors. London: Institute for Public Policy Research. August, 2012. Pages 7-17.]
        “Central to many Marxist and institutionalist perspectives of the economy is (1) the need for a collectivist ethos in which people recognize and reinforce the societal nature of production, distribution, and exchange, and the social generation of wealth; (2) where democracy goes far beyond (but includes) the ballot box to the active involvement of people in decision-making structures, backed up with the ability to make informed judgments; and (3) where education is treated as a social good, and knowledge is distributed freely throughout the population to reduce concentrations of socioeconomic power.” [Phillip Anthony O’Hara, “The Association for Evolutionary Economics and the Union for Radical Political Economics: General Issues of Continuity and Integration.” Journal of Economic Issues. Volume 29, number 1, March 1995. Pages 137-159.]
        “… three strands of heterodox economics are discussed in some detail: complexity, evolutionary and behavioural economics.….
        “Complexity economics considers the economy to be a ‘complex adaptive system’ in which constant interaction plays a significant role. A complex adaptive system allows for a wide set of interactions between individuals and recognises that an economic actor’s preferences are diverse ….
        “Like complex systems theory, evolutionary economics emphasises the crucial role of history in shaping the future. Past interactions and decisions have major impacts on the economy – a characteristic known as path dependence – and any initial small changes in an economy can produce drastic downstream effects, partially driven by networks and cross-cutting hierarchical organisation. Economic outcomes are determined not only by current conditions but also by previous decisions and initial conditions ….
        “If adaptation and innovation are central to the evolutionary economics critique of neoclassical economics, then the psychology of human beings is central to that of the behavioural economists. In short, behavioural science is a combination of psychology and economics that has led to a debunking of the traditional economic assumption of rational, self-interested individuals. This approach explores the limits to human rationality in decision-making. It argues that human agents do not possess the flawless ability to maximise utility or profits by weighing all available alternatives presented to them and that there are flaws and imperfections associated with decision-making ….”
        [Amna Silim, “What is New Economic Thinking?” Complex New World: Translating new economic thinking into public policy. Tony Dolphin and David Nash, editors. London: Institute for Public Policy Research. August, 2012. Pages 18-27.]
        “The early development of evolutionary game theory in economics was motivated primarily by theoretical concerns: the justification of traditional game-theoretic solution concepts, and the development of methods for equilibrium selection in games with multiple stable equilibria. More recently, evolutionary game theory has been applied to concrete economic environments, in some instances as a means of contending with equilibrium selection problems, and in others to obtain an explicitly dynamic model of the phenomena of interest. Of course, these applications are most successful when the behavioral assumptions that underlie the evolutionary approach are appropriate, and when the time horizon needed for the results to become relevant corresponds to the one germane to the application at hand.” [William H. Sandholm, “Evolutionary Game Theory.” November 12th, 2007. Privately published. Pages 1-65. Retrieved on September 1th, 2016.]
        “Quite a few biological games turned out to have the same structure as games that had been studied by economists, usually under another name: the biologists’’Hawk-Dove’ game, for example, has the same structure as the economists’’Chicken’-game. Evolutionary game theory has found a large number of applications in economic interactions ….” [Karl Sigmund, “Introduction to Evolutionary Game Theory.” Proceedings of Symposia in Applied Mathematics. Volume 69, 2011. Pages 1-25.]
        “… the theory of an institution or a phase of life may be stated in conventionalized terms of the apparatus whereby life is carried on, the apparatus being invested with a tendency to an equilibrium at the normal, and the theory being a formulation of the conditions under which this putative equilibrium supervenes. In this way we have come into the usufruct of a cost-of-production theory of value which is pungently reminiscent of the time when Nature abhorred a vacuum. The ways and means and the mechanical structure of industry are formulated in a conventionalized nomenclature, and the observed motions of this mechanical apparatus are then reduced to a normalized scheme of relations.…
        “It may or may not be a teleological process in the sense that it tends or should tend to any end that is conceived to be worthy or adequate by the inquirer or by the consensus of inquirers. Whether it is or is not is a question with which the present inquiry is not concerned; and it is also a question of which an evolutionary economics need take no account. The question of a tendency in events can evidently not come up except on the ground of some preconception or prepossession on the part of the person looking for the tendency. In order to search for a tendency, we must be possessed of some notion of a definitive end to be sought, or some notion as to what is the legitimate trend of events. The notion of a legitimate trend in a course of events is an extra-evolutionary preconception, and lies outside the scope of an inquiry into the causal sequence in any process. The evolutionary point of view, therefore, leaves no place for a formulation of natural laws in terms of definitive normality, whether in economics or in any other branch of inquiry.”
        [Thorstein Veblen, “Why is Economics not an Evolutionary Science?” The Quarterly Journal of Economics. Volume 12, number 4, July 1898. Pages 373-397.]
    13. evolutionary realism (Kurt Dopfer as pronounced in this MP3 audio file and Jason Potts): Dopfer developed an ontological perspective on evolutionary economics. He contrasts it with Tony Lawson’s critical realism in economics.
        “The axioms of evolutionary realism are, by construction, empirical generalizations that serve as analytical ‘meta-truths.’ From the evolutionary perspective, all existences are bimodal-associative-processes; no existence is not composed in all three ontological dimensions.…
        “Axiom 1: All existences are matter-energy actualizations of ideas (bimodality).
        “Axiom 2: All existences associate.
        “Axiom 3: All existences are processes.”
        [Kurt Dopfer and Jason Potts, “Evolutionary realism: a new ontology for economics.” Journal of Economic Methodology. Volume 11, number 2, June 2004. Pages 195-212.]
        “… there are some important fundamental differences in approach in which … our ontology of ‘evolutionary realism’ differs substantially from the transcendental ‘critical’ realist ontology (e.g. [Tony] Lawson …) that gathers under the ‘Cambridge school’ of social ontology …. We all want more ontology in economic analysis; but we differ as to what that ontology should be and what function it serves in relation to (evolutionary) economic theory and analysis.” [Kurt Dopfer and Jason Potts, “Why evolutionary realism underpins evolutionary economic analysis and theory: A reply to Runde’s critique.” Journal of Institutional Economics. Volume 6, number 3, 2010. Pages 401-413.]
        “The purpose of evolutionary economic policy … is to facilitate the flow of ‘generic profit’ to the originators of generic ideas and the ongoing flow of ‘generic rent’ to the adopters and retainers of these generic rules. Generic policy is therefore focused only about the creation of opportunity space (zeroth-order policy) and the creation of the capabilities to explore that space (second-order policy) and not at all about the operational space of first-order generic rules.” [Jason Potts, “Exchange and evolution.” The Review of Austrian Economics. Volume 20, 2007. Pages 123-135.]
        “Building on the ontology of evolutionary realism recently …, we develop an analytical framework for evolutionary economics with a micro–meso–macro architecture.…
        “… Adoption of a more explicit micro–meso–macro framework enables us to conceive more clearly how complex systems theory and self-organization theory fit together with population-based thinking to provide evolutionary economists with an analytical apparatus that can embrace the emergence of generic novelty in structured open systems.”
        [Kurt Dopfer, John Foster, and Jason Potts, “Micro–meso–macro.” Journal of Evolutionary Economics. Volume 14, 2004. Pages 263-279.]
        “… the widespread belief in ‘hard’ environmental constraints may be obscuring the important role of entrepreneurship in co-evolutionary interactions between the economy and the environment. If this is the case, it may have distorted the analytic focus of ecological economics in a way that has limited the range of policy options explored for achieving sustainable economic development.” [Jason Potts, John Foster, and Anna Straton, “An entrepreneurial model of economic and environmental co-evolution.” Ecological Economics. Volume 70, 2010. Pages 375-383.]
        “The conventional view of innovation also regards the production of technology as something that happens mainly within the isolated firm. A more realistic view embraces the concept of innovation as a social process involving many participants. The production of new technology often depends on the flow of technological information between firms. This is especially so in rapidly changing, highly innovative industries. It is a process whereby bits of information are gathered from a variety of sources, mostly outside the individual firm, to be assembled in new pattern within the firm or a group of firms.” [Jason Potts and Tom Mandeville, “Toward an Evolutionary Theory of Innovation and Growth in the Service Economy.” Prometheus. Volume 25, number 2, June 2007. Pages 147-159.]
        “[Kurt] Dopfer and [Jason] Potts … commence their overview by arguing that there is a need for ‘empirical generalization’ of evolutionary realist methodology with the aim of refining analytical research. The authors set out three ‘ontological axioms,’ suggesting that these axioms will help to illuminate the ontological commitments of Evolutionary Economics. In turn, the latter is viewed as a ‘nascent analytical framework’ approaching the economy as an open system. This ‘theoretical hybrid’ supposedly weaves together ‘evolutionary theory, complex systems theory, self-organization, and agent-based computational theory,’ while merging the methodologies of ‘Austrian, Behavioural, Institutional, Post-Keynesian and Schumpeterian economics.’” [James Juniper, “A Critique of Dopfer and Potts’s Evolutionary Realism.” Australasian Journal of Regional Studies. Volume 15, number 1, 2009. Pages 27-43.]
    14. alternative economics of health care (Geoffrey M. Hodgson): He challenges the utility of neoclassical approaches.
        “Sadly, economics today is a relatively monolithic discipline. It is typically defined in terms of one set of assumptions and approaches, rather than in terms of an object of analysis – the economy, which could in principle be analysed from different perspectives. Taking inspiration from some alternative traditions in economics, this essay questions the adequacy of orthodox analyses of health care systems and points to a different approach.
        “Health care provision and expenditure are attracting increasing attention from economists, but alternative approaches within economics have received relatively little consideration.… It is argued here that the peculiar features of the health sector and the special requirements of health policy limit the viability of a neoclassical approach even more severely than in other typical areas of its application.”
        [Geoffrey M. Hodgson, “Towards an alternative economics of health care.” Health Economics, Policy and Law. Volume 4, issue 1, January 2009. Pages 99-114.]
    15. cultures of resistance (Mario Campana as pronounced in this MP3 audio file, Andreas Chatzidakis [Greek/Hellēniká, Ανδρέας Χατζηδάκης, Andréas Chatzēdákēs as pronounced in this MP3 audio file], and Mikko Laamanen as pronounced in this MP3 audio file): They use this term to characterize alternative economices.
        “Alternative economies represent an essential part of ‘cultures of resistance’ … to the increasing commodification of social life and the monolithic nature of global capitalism.… Yet, various alternative spheres of economic activity exist where exchange is not necessarily monetized and/or underpinned by motivations for profit.
        “Alternative economies constitute responses to the precarious conditions in everyday lives of individuals, and their lack of access to and scarcity of resources and competences …. Alternative economic models rest on shared commitments to minimize economic domination and exploitation and thereby alleviate the subordinated position of local subjects …. Specifically, alternative economies have (re-) emerged in local communities where various groups and movement actors work towards localized development and are driven by their hope to improve human conditions.”
        [Mario Campana, Andreas Chatzidakis, and Mikko Laamanen, “Special Issue on Alternative Economies: Journal of Macromarketing, 2017.” Journal of Macromarketing. Volume 34, number 3, 2014. Pages 408-409.]
    16. local scientific realism (Uskali Mäki as pronounced in this MP3 audio file): Mäki—who critiques critical realism in economics—develops a philosophically and scientifically realist economics. He also argues against economic imperialism and for an explanatory ecumenism in economics. Here are a couple of Mäki’s English-language YouTube videos—Prof. Uskali Mäki (University of Helsinki): The Risky Business of Modelling and Professor Uskali Mäki: Trends and Tensions in Intellectual Integration.
        “My philosophical intuitions are uncompromisingly realist, but I have pursued a middle of the road line of accommodating, in my conception of scientific realism, a number of apparently antirealist ideas (such as those related to social constructivism, relativism, error, and deliberate falsehood in scientific theories). I have also sought to distinguish between numerous different kinds of realism so as to help clarify the issues in the ongoing debates. The project is one of local scientific realism that proceeds in a bottom-up manner and is sensitive to the peculiarities of particular scientific disciplines.” [Uskali Mäki, “Uskali Mäki: Research interests and publications.” Personal website. Undated. Retrieved on September 4th, 2016.]
        “I must confess I was influenced by Roy Bhaskar’s first two books …. I even used some of their vocabulary when I started teaching undergraduate courses in the philosophy of the social sciences in the last years of the 1970s. But as I tried to apply Bhaskar’s ideas in my emerging realist philosophy of economics, within a few years I abandoned them as too simplistic for the purpose (as you know, some years later Bhaskar’s ideas were discovered by Tony Lawson and used in arguments that I think distort facts about economics).
        “This early disappointment with Bhaskar helped me realize there was nothing available in the philosophical literature that would be directly applicable to such a complex and peculiar subject as economics ….
        “… The arguments for local scientific realism provide an instructive case against the popular practice of borrowing ideas from general philosophical literature and applying them directly to economics or any other specific discipline.…
        “… we are likely to have a number of local scientific realisms tailored for specific disciplines and fields, and perhaps theories ….”
        [Uskali Mäki, “Realism from the ‘lands of Kaleva’: an interview with Uskali Mäki.” Erasmus Journal for Philosophy and Economics. Volume 1, issue 1, autumn 2008. Pages 124-146.]
        “The issue of resemblance is the hottest methodological issue in and about theoretical economics. Models and their assumptions are being criticised for being unrealistic and defended as sufficiently realistic or inconsequentially unrealistic.” [Uskali Mäki, “Models are experiments, experiments are models.” Journal of Economic Methodology. Volume 12, number 2, June 2005. Pages 303-315.]
        “Ontological unification is a factual discovery concerning the actual degree of unity in the world, and an ontologically unifying theory represents this unity in a truthful fashion.” [Uskali Mäki, “Economics Imperialism: Concept and Constraints.” Philosophy of the Social Sciences. Volume 39, number 3, September 2009. Pages 351-380.]
        “… the purpose of the article has been to use a reconstruction of one school of economic thought as an example to give a rough idea of how economics based on realism and explanatory ambitions would look, as opposed to economics based on instrumentalism and predictive aims. Secondly, I outlined a version of scientific realism which, for instance, allows essences and mental objects the ‘right’ to existence among scientific objects. Thirdly, I demonstrated how this version can be used to illuminate and reconstruct the Austrian way of explaining economic phenomena and institutions. For this purpose I introduced the notions of reductive redescription, identification and ontological unification. I also pointed out how the emerging conception of explanation can be made consistent with a sceptical attitude towards predictive capabilities in economics, and also how inferential and pragmatic concerns might be incorporated into the conception. Fourthly, I showed the way in which common sense plays a crucial role in Austrian realism.” [Uskali Mäki, “Scientific realism and Austrian explanation.” Review of Political Economy. Volume 2, number 3, November 1990. Pages 310-44.]
        “The notion of ontological unification has one advantage over the notion of derivational unification. The advantage is this: the power of a theory to unify may be thought to have limits that are based on the degree of ontic unity of its domain. In this picture, factual inquiry into this domain and its boundaries adopts a special role. As the conclusion of such factual inquiry, we may draw such boundaries variously. Naturally, scientists are inclined to generalize on past discoveries and take those generalizations as guidelines for future inquiries.” [Uskali Mäki, “Explanatory Unification: Double and Doubtful.” Philosophy of the Social Sciences Volume 31, number 4, December 2001. Pages 488-506.]
        “The degree of flexibility or revisability … varies from field to field or discipline to discipline and their stage of development. Casual observation suggests that there is more flexibility in young and interdisciplinary (open) fields and less flexibility in old and monodisciplinary (closed) fields. Compared to economics, neuroscience is young, interdisciplinary, and flexible in its conventions.” [Uskali Mäki, “When economics meets neuroscience: hype and hope.” Journal of Economic Methodology. Volume 17, number 2, June 2010. Pages 107-117.]
        “Among the conclusions are the following three. First, while causal relevance is important for understanding explanatory relevance, it is not sufficient. Considerations of pragmatic relevance have to be added to get a more complete account. Second, there are other accounts of causal relevance besides the particular small grain one: those formulated in terms of property–property relations. Without modification, the particular grain view may not be able to account for actual social explanations by social scientists. Third, the ontological and pragmatic constraints that have emerged in the foregoing discussion appear to be such that, at most, supplementary versions of economics imperialism have a chance of meeting them, in the spirit of explanatory ecumenism.” [Uskali Mäki, “Symposium on Explanations and Social Ontology 2: Explanatory Ecumenism and Economics Imperialism.” Economics and Philosophy. Volume 18, number 2, October 2002. Pages 235-257.]
        “Considering the location of the present paper in current philosophy, I take it to address issues that have suffered from a relative neglect. First, the growing body of literature on scientific models and representations has given relatively little systematic attention to issues and concepts of truth. Second, the debates around scientific realism have made strong claims about truth in science, but the specific units of science that might or might not bear those truths have been left obscure. Third, the recent literature on theories of truth has paid relatively little critical and systematic attention to the issues of truth bearers. What follows can be read as an attempt to start putting these issues on the agenda in connection to one another.” [Uskali Mäki, “Models and the locus of their truth.” Synthese. Volume 180, number 1, May 2011. Pages 47-63.]
        “What we seem to need now is a positive analysis, in the context of economics, of two things: 1) scientific realism as the major alternative to instrumentalism in the sciences and in philosophy; and 2) notions of explanation that satisfy the canons of realism. By performing these two inter-related tasks, we may acquire a non-instrumentalist and realist understanding of economics (what it is or is not, and/or what it could or should be). Understandably, only initial steps in this direction will be taken in this paper.” [Uskali Mäki, “Scientific realism and Austrian explanation.” Review of Political Economy. Volume 2, number 3, November 1990. Pages 310-344.]
        “One can use a special social science such as economics as one such test case. How does scientific realism fit with economics? At this point it is important to see that we can approach examining the relationship between economics and realism from two points of view. One may adopt a top down approach: Fix a version of scientific realism as the right one; check whether economics fits; if it does, say ‘hooray!’; if it fails to fit, blame economics and insist on its revision so as to improve the fit. One may also adopt a bottom-up approach: Identify a set of generic key features of economics as a science; check this set against a large variety of realist ideas; depending on the outcome, make such realist ideas subject to rejection, adjustment, or replacement by new realist ideas, so as to improve the fit.” [Uskali Mäki, “Aspects of Realism about Economics.” Theoria: An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science. Volume 13, number 2, May 1998. Pages 301-319.]
        “The exposition is in three moves. I begin with discussing versions of what I call the apparent challenge of (misunderstood) scientific realism to economics.… I then discuss the challenge of economics to scientific realism, neglected by the apparent challenge. My revisionist argument will point out some of the consequences of making scientific realism sensitive to disciplinary peculiarities. Finally, on the basis of such a revised economics-sensitive notion of scientific realism, I will be prepared to outline some real challenges of (properly understood) scientific realism to economics.” [Uskali Mäki, “Scientific realism as a challenge to economics (and vice versa).” Journal of Economic Methodology. Volume 19, number 1, March 2011. Pages 1-12.]
        “Scientific realism has mostly been conceived as a global doctrine about science. Under the pressures of anti-realist arguments, there have recently been attempts to turn scientific realism into a more selective account sensitive to the nature and performance of particular theories or disciplines. This has resulted in a shrinking scope for realism: those parts of science that do not fit with some canons of realism are being excluded and given over to anti-realist interpretations …. In contrast, this essay sets out to contribute to the anti-global movement in order to give scientific realism a chance more broadly: it is thereby also a contribution to a sort of re-globalization, It outlines a strategy that seeks to re-globalize scientific realism by going local in a more penetrating manner than has been done by selective realists.” [Uskali Mäki, “Reglobalizing Realism by Going Local, or (How) Should Our Formulations of Scientific Realism be Informed about the Sciences?” Erkenntnis. Volume 16, number 2, September 2005. Pages 231-251.]
        “To get rid of an unrealistic methodology that is out of touch with real scientific practice, we need to look at what really happens in economics. And we need to expand our conceptual toolbox needed for understanding the complexities of actual scientific inquiry. I will offer a very brief and selective outline, bringing in just two themes: scientific modelling, and the institutions of inquiry.” [Uskali Mäki, “Mark Blaug’s unrealistic crusade for realistic economics.” Erasmus Journal for Philosophy and Economics. Volume 6, issue 3, winter 2013. Pages 87-103.]
        “… the aim of this paper is to compare and contrast the positions of two of the main exponents of realism in economics, Uskali Mäki and Tony Lawson. Although they share some basic notions of realism, their approach and contributions to the realist project in economics differ fundamentally. Indeed they may be regarded as advancing two different if overlapping projects. The aim here is not a comprehensive critical evaluation as such, but primarily to clarify their interpretation and use of realist philosophy in economics. Although there are some explicit and implied criticisms in the text, close attention is paid to the work of the authors themselves rather than to what various critics have had to say about it. Needless to say, given the extensive publications by the two authors in this area, this review is necessarily selective in describing the main ideas and arguments in each case and the basic differences between them.” [Duncan Hodge, “Economics, realism and reality: a comparison of Mäki and Lawson.” Cambridge Journal of Economics. Volume 32, number 2, March 2008. Pages 163-202.]
        “Uskali Mäki has been the most consistent defender of philosophical realism among those contributing to the literature on economic methodology during the last twenty or so years. There are others who have written extensively about realism, such as Tony Lawson …, but, unlike Mäki, Lawson, and others have tended to focus on just one particular version of realism in Lawson’s case critical realism – rather that examining the broader set of questions associated with a realist account of economic science.” [D. Wade Hands, “Realism, commonsensibles, and economics: The case of contemporary revealed preference theory.” Economics for Real: Uskali Mäki and the Place of Truth in Economics. Aki Lehtinen, Jaakko Kuorikoski and Petri Ylikoski, editors. London and New York: Routledge imprint of Taylor & Francis Group, an Informa PLC business. 2012. Pages 156-178.]
        “Uskali Mäki has been one of the major thinkers in economic methodology during the last decades and devoting a book to his philosophy of economics is a natural and appropriate step. Let me already at this stage admit that I am not really neutral about Mäki’s work. On several occasions I have myself applied it to contemporary issues in economics. From my own experience I know that Mäki’s ideas about realism, realisticness, isolation, commonsensibles, ontology, and so forth, have the potential to be successfully communicated to practicing economists, other social scientists and even politicians. This kind of potential is noteworthy and not common in economic methodology.” [Fredrik Hansen, “Economics for Real: Uskali Mäki and the Place of Truth in Economics.” Review article. Erasmus Journal for Philosophy and Economics. Volume 5, issue 2, autumn 2012. Pages 113-117.]
    17. practical precepts for ethical consumption (Mark Peacock): He discusses four precepts.
        “… we … issue practical precepts for ethical consumption:
        “Precept 1: Inform yourself first about those commodities the consumption of which, ceteris paribus, has the highest probability of giving rise to a moral wrong.…
        “Precept 2: Reduce your ignorance about those commodities the consumption of which, ceteris paribus, risks engendering or sustaining the most severe moral consequences.…
        “Precept 3: Obtain information first about those commodities about which, ceteris paribus, reliable information is relatively easily gathered.…
        “Precept 4: Gather information about commodities you might consider purchasing up to the point at which the cost of further information gathering involves a moral sacrifice that outweighs the moral harm avoided by collecting more information.”
        [Mark Peacock, “Market Processes and the Ethics of Consumption.” SAGE Open. Volume 2, number 2, April–June 2015. Creative Commons. Pages 1-12.]
    18. gridlock economy (Michael A. Heller): In the “tragedy of the anticommons,” as contrasted with the commons, the tragedy is in underuse, not overuse.
        “Empty Moscow storefronts are a stark example of anticommons property, a type of property regime that may result when initial endowments are created as disaggregated rights rather than as coherent bundles of rights in scarce resoures. More generally, one can understand anticommons property as the mirror image of commons property. In a commons, by definition, multiple owners are each endowed with the privilege to use a given resource, and no one has the right to exclude another. When too many owners have such privileges of use, the resource is prone to overuse—a tragedy of the commons. Canonical examples include depleted fisheries, overgrazed fields, and polluted air.
        “In an anticommons, by my definition, multiple owners are each endowed with the right to exclude others from a scarce resource, and no one has an effective privilege of use. When there are too many owners holding rights of exclusion, the resource is prone to underuse—a tragedy of the anticommons. Legal and economic scholars have mostly overlooked this tragedy, but it can appear whenever governments create new property rights. This Article proposes empty Moscow storefronts as a canonical example of the tragedy of underuse.”
        [Michael A. Heller, “The Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in the Transition from Marx to Markets.” Harvard Law Review. Volume 111, number 3, January 1998. Pages 621-688.]
        “… [There is] a principle I call the tragedy of the anticommons. What’s that? Start with something familiar: a commons. When too many people share a single resource, we tend to overuse it— we overfish the oceans and pollute the air. This wasteful overuse is a tragedy of the commons. How do we solve such a tragedy? Often, by creating private property. Private owners tend to avoid overuse because they benefit directly from conserving the resources they control.
        “Now imagine twenty or two hundred owners. If any one blocks the others, the resource is wasted. That’s gridlock writ large—a hidden tragedy of the anticommons. I say ‘hidden’ because underuse is often hard to spot. For example, who can tell when dozens of patent owners are blocking a promising line of drug research? Innovators don’t advertise the projects they abandon. Lifesaving cures may be lost, invisibly, in a tragedy of the anticommons.”
        [Michael Heller. The Gridlock Economy: How Too Much Ownership Wrecks Markets, Stops Innovation, and Costs Lives. New York: Basic Books imprint of the Perseus Books Group. 2010. Pages 1-2.]
    19. sequential model (James Bessen, Eric Maskin, and Yi Zhou [Chinese, 易周, Yì-Zhōu as pronounced in this MP3 audio file]): Bessen and Maskin develop an approach to sequential innovation. Zhou extends the model, as developed in Bessen and Maskin’s article, to a discussion of the commons and the anticommons.
        “… when innovation is sequential and complementary, standard conclusions about patents and imitation may get turned on their heads. Imitation becomes a spur to innovation, whereas strong patents become an impediment.…
        “… we introduce a static (nonsequential) model that, we claim, underlies the traditional justification for patents. We emphasize the point that, besides helping an inventor to cover his costs, an important role of patents is to encourage innovative activity on the part of others who would otherwise be inclined merely to imitate.…
        “… we assume as in the static model that, in a setting without patents, firms can costlessly imitate each sequential innovation and that firms incurring the investment cost have an equal probability of developing the next innovation (so that the current invention’s discoverer has no real advantage). However, we suppose that, absent licenses, a patent on an invention is sufficiently broad to block the next innovation in the sequence.”
        [James Bessen and Eric Maskin, “Sequential innovation, patents, and imitation.” RAND Journal of Economics. Volume 40, number 4, winter 2009. Pages 611-635.]
        “I will construct a simple model based on [James] Bessen and [Eric] Maskin’s … sequential model, as a metaphor for how the comedy of the knowledge commons, the ideal solution to the tragedy of the anticommons in knowledge works. The comedy seems romantic in a society today where even an unrecognizable one-and-a-half-second sound clip is copyright-protected …, but it can be realistic.…
        “The anticommons in knowledge is distinct from the anticommons in physical objects. The former is always tragic, while the latter is not necessarily so. For society at large, the tragedy of the former will be much more tragic than the tragedy of the latter.
        “The neoliberal argument that single ownership is the socially optimal solution to the tragedy of the knowledge anticommons is misleading. Actually, intellectual property per se is the very source of the tragedy of the knowledge anticommons, and the tragedy is unavoidable so long as the intellectual property regime exists. The only epistemically and socially beneficial solution to the tragedy of the knowledge anticommons is to create, expand, and protect the knowledge commons. The comedy of the knowledge commons comes from the positive meta-externalities of performance of the knowledge commons. Some heterodox formal models can be constructed as metaphors for how the comedy works.”
        [Yi Zhou, “The Tragedy of the Anticommons in Knowledge.” Review of Radical Political Economics. Volume 48, number 1, March 2016. Pages 158-175.]
    20. complexity economics (Sue L. T. McGregor, W. Brian Arthur, and others): They question “steady-state” approaches to economics through the application of complexity theory.
        “Complexity economics calls into question the entire premise of equilibrium (a balanced state), which is the centrepiece of conventional economics; instead, it assumes emergence, tension and chaos are key characteristics of economic systems and processes …. Complexity economics assumes that economic patterns are always emerging, are seldom in a steady state and are ever-changing, exhibiting perpetually novel behaviour – multiple equilibria ….
        “Consumer educators now have the opportunity to gain deep insights from recent efforts to reconceptualize economics so that it moves away from the basic neoclassical principles of individualism, reductionism, rationality (reason), homogeneity, linearity, equilibrium (balance), maximization of utility and optimization (Arnsperger, 2010). Complexity economics introduces a new set of assumptions that can underpin consumer education initiatives: complexity, change and evolution, adaptation, self-organization, emergence, non-equilibrium, chaos and tensions, patterns and networks, and holistic, synergistic interconnections and relations between individual and aggregate agents ….”
        [Sue L. T. McGregor, “Complexity economics, wicked problems and consumer education.” International Journal of Consumer Studies. Volume 36, issue 1, January 2012. Pages 61-69.]
        “Rational expectations economics asks what forecasts (or expectations) are consistent with (are on average validated by) the outcomes these forecasts and expectations together create. Conventional economics thus studies consistent patterns: patterns in behavioral equilibrium that would induce no further reaction. Economists at the Santa Fe Institute, Stanford, MIT, Chicago, and other institutions are now broadening this equilibrium approach by turning to the question of how actions, strategies, or expectations might react in general to (might endogenously change with) the aggregate patterns these create …. The result—complexity economics—is not an adjunct to standard economic theory but theory at a more general, out-of-equilibrium level.” [W. Brian Arthur, “Complexity and the Economy.” Science. Volume 284, number 5411, April 1999. Pages 107-109.]
    21. political ecology (Roger Keil, David V. J. Bell, Peter Penz, Leesa Fawcett, Tim Hayward, and others): They develop an approach based on political economy and cultural studies.
        “… what is political ecology? For us it is simply a new approach rooted in political economy and cultural studies and critically branching out to understand relationships between society and the natural world. Political ecology is a relatively new area of critical exploration, and at present it raises more questions than it answers. But these are timely, and in some cases unique questions. Attempts to come to grips with the environmental crisis have opened up previously unseen landscapes, and the theorizing has begun. Our conference attempted to expand the boundaries of theoretical frameworks and research paradigms in political ecology.” [Roger Keil, David V. J. Bell, Peter Penz, and Leesa Fawcett, “Editors’ Introduction: Perspectives on global political ecology.” Political Ecology: Global and local. Roger Keil, David V. J. Bell, Peter Penz, and Leesa Fawcett, editors. London and New York: Routledge imprint of Taylor & Francis Group, an Informa PLC business. 2005. Pages 1-16.]
        “In this article I shall suggest that there are good reasons for seeing the project of political ecology as being premised on a materialist conception of history much as [Karl] Marx sought to develop. However, I shall also argue, there are respects in which Marx’s radicalisation of classical political economy does not go far enough. In particular, both classical political economy and its Marxian critique effectively consider the human metabolism with nature almost exclusively in the dimension of human intention – labour – while all but disregarding unintentional effects, and the input of nature itself.” [Tim Hayward, “The Meaning of Political Ecology.” Radical Philosophy: Philosophical Journal of the Independent Left. Number 66, spring 1994. Pages 11-20.]
    22. critical economics (Isaac Knowles, Michael R. Krätke, Antonio Gramsci, and others): They apply critical social theory to economics.
        “Critical economics recognizes that the favor its mainstream brethren enjoys with Western governments and corporations arises as much from its willingness to promote the interests of the powerful as from its explanatory power; indeed, the causation runs both ways, and critical economics is both humbled by, and fascinated with untangling, this interplay between politics and economics.” [Isaac Knowles, “Critical Economics.” Philosonomics: My Economics Research and Critique, and other Mental Meanderings. Blog. April 10th, 2007. Retrieved on September 19th, 2015.]
        “[Antonio] Gramsci uses the term ‘critical economics’ to characterise Marx’s critique of political economy, in opposition to what he describes as ‘pure’ economics, under which term he includes also ‘orthodox’ or ‘liberal’ economics. Occasionally, he speaks of Marx as the ‘founder of critical economics.’” [Michael R. Krätke, “Antonio Gramsci’s Contribution to a Critical Economics.” Historical Materialism. Volume 19, number 3, 2011. Pages 63-105.]
        “Where in particular does the emphasis lie in scientific research in classical economy and where, as against that, does it lie in critical economy? Why is this the case, i.e. with a view to reaching what practical goals or resolving what given theoretical and practical problems? For critical economy, it would seem sufficient to define the concept of ‘socially necessary labour’ in order to arrive at the concept of value, since one must take as one's starting point the labour of all working people to arrive at definitions both of their role in economic production and of the abstract, scientific concept of value and surplus value, as well as one of the role of all capitalists considered as an ensemble For classical economy, on the other hand, the important thing is not the abstract, scientific concept of value (which it attempts to reach by other means, but only for the formal reasons of having a logically and verbally consistent system. arriving there – or thinking it has arrived there – using marginal utility by way of psychological research), but the more concrete and more immediate concept of the profit of the individual or the firm. What is therefore of importance is a study of the dynamic of ‘socially necessary labour,’ a dynamic that assumes various theoretical formulations – the theory of comparative costs. of static and dynamic economic equilibrium.” [Antonio Gramsci. Further Selections from the Prison Notebooks. Minneapolis, Minnesota: University of Minnesota Press. 1995. Pages 168-169.]
    23. socialist economics (Frederic S. Lee, Nancy Fraser, John Holloway, and others): They develop various socialist alternatives to capitalism.
        “The evolving view from the New Left was that socialism meant more than simply material well-being; it also meant social equality and an improved quality of life. This intellectual ferment produced a growing disenchantment with the traditional presentation of Marxian economic theory as well as with the arguments that Keynesian techniques could produce a more humane capitalism; but at the same time it produced a renewed interest in Marxism and more particularly in socialist economics.” [Frederic S. Lee, “Conference of Socialist Economists and the emergence of heterodox economics in post-war Britain.” Capital & Class. Volume 25, number 3, autumn 2001. Pages 15-39.]
        “I have argued here that socialist economics combined with deconstructive cultural politics works best to finesse the dilemma for the bivalent collectivities of gender and ‘race’—at least when they are considered separately. The next step would be to show that this combination also works for our larger sociocultural configuration. After all, gender and ‘race’ are not neatly cordoned off from one another. Nor are they neatly cordoned off from sexuality and class. Rather, all these axes of injustice intersect one another in ways that affect everyone’s interests and identities.” [Nancy Fraser, “From Redistribution to Recognition? Dilemmas of Justice in a ‘Post-Socialist’ Age.” New Left Review. Series I, number 212, July–August 1995. Pages 68-93.]
        “At the beginning of the’[19]90s we proposed to a group of the revolutionary left in Europe the idea of undertaking a common research project on the situation of the working class.… Some comrades from other countries, however, thought that, in view of the world-historical change, it was more urgent to examine our theoretical concepts. At that time we ourselves still approached the collapse of really existing socialism very optimistically.…
        “Prevous revolutionary concepts and certainties were thoroughly shaken. Struggles in the factories had now only a defensive character. even stooping to begging for jobs. The left was concentrating on racism, fascism and nationalism, without either wanting to or being able to connect these with the class character of capitalism and the question of it,s revolutionary overcoming. That is why more and more influence in political lscussion was gained by those theories which had already in the 1980s, departed from the rahcal critique of class society ….”
        [Wildcat and John Holloway, “Wildcat (Germany) reads John Holloway – A Debate on Marxism and the Politics of Dignity.” Common Sense: Journal of the Edinburgh Conference of Socialist Economists. Number 24, 1999. Pages 58-75.]
    24. market socialist economics (Diane Elson, James A. Yunker, Guinevere Nell, and others): Market socialism refers to various attempts to fuse socialism and market economics.
        “The virtues of the market and the deficiencies of central planning have become common sense for many socialist economists, both in the capitalist countries and in those of ‘actually existing socialism.’ Some spirited defences have recently been made of non-market forms of economic co-ordination, … but in my view these do not provide fully satisfactory responses to the advocates of market socialism.” [Diane Elson, “Market Socialism or Socialization of the Market?” New Left Review. Series I, number 172, November–December 1988. Pages 3-44.]
        “Several … things are required if we are interested in a serious evaluation of market socialism. First, lest the analysis be excessively nebulous, it should focus on a specific form of market socialism rather than on the concept as a whole. There have been several institutional proposals for market socialist economies, and clearly there might be major differences in the performance of various institutional forms. Second, the analysis should compare market socialism not with a hypothetical ideal economy but to the existing real-world capitalist economy. Specifically, it is not necessarily a sound argument against market socialism that it would be inefficient according to theoretical criteria—unless it could also be established that the real-world capitalist economy is indeed efficient (or at least less inefficient) according to these same criteria.” [James A. Yunker, “A Comprehensive Incentives Analysis of the Potential Performance of Market Socialism.” Review of Political Economy. Volume 19, number 1, January 2007. Pages 81-113.]
        “Market socialists represent the economists who have taken the Austrian arguments against central planning most seriously. Unlike Austrian economists, market socialists continue to argue for sometimes radical interventions to correct perceived inequities in a pure laissez-faire economy. Some of these proposals are still subject to Austrian criticism, but others may actually correct the market in ways that clear-headed Austrian analysis can support. The distinction between willingness to pay and ability to pay has been ignored by many Austrian economists. When taken into account, and joined with other insights that Austrian economists and market socialist economists agree on, this insight points toward potential policy solutions that the two schools might accept.” [Guinevere Nell, “Bridging Austrian and Market Socialist Economics.” Challenge. Volume 54, number 4, July/August 2011. Pages 50–64.]
        “Prior to the systematic study of centrally planned economies, most blueprints of the socialist economy emphasized three theoretical features …. First, central planning achieves balance between inputs and outputs by coordinating decisions at levels of economic activity that are consistent with state preferences, including full employment. Second, though planning proceeds chiefly on the basis of physical magnitudes, money cannot be dispensed with altogether. Planning therefore ensures balancing of nominal and real flows, with monetary instruments serving essentially to facilitate plan implementation at stable prices. Finally, prices are flexible to clear markets, although such adaptability may be guided administratively on an intermittent basis.” [Jozef M. van Brabant, “Socialist Economics: The Disequilibrium School and the Shortage Economy.” The Journal of Economic Perspectives. Volume 4, number 2, spring 1990. Pages 157-175.]
        “Only a socialist economy can distribute incomes so as to attain the maximum social welfare. In any system with private ownership of the means of production, the distribution of incomes is determined by the distribution of ownership of the ultimate productive resources. This distribution is an historical datum which originates independently of the requirements of the maximisation of social welfare. For instance, the distribution of landed property is different in countries where the big landed estates of the feudal epoch have been broken up by bourgeois and peasant revolutions than where they have been left intact. Under capitalism the distribution of the ownership of the ultimate productive resources is a very unequal one, a large part of the population owning only their labour power.” [Oskar Lange, “On the Economic Theory of Socialism: Part Two.” The Review of Economic Studies. Volume 4, number 2, February 1937. Pages 123-142.]
        “In the socialist system as described [here] we have a genuine market (in the institutional sense of the word) for consumers’ goods and for the services of labour. But there is no market for capital goods and productive resources outside of labour. The prices of capital goods and productive resources outside of labour are thus prices in the generalised sense, i.e. mere indices of alternatives available, fixed for accounting purposes.… It seems … convenient to regard the income of consumers as being composed of two parts: one part being the receipts for the labour services performed and the other part being a social dividend constituting the individual’s share in the income derived from the capital and the natural resources owned by society.” [Oskar Lange, “On the Economic Theory of Socialism: Part One.” The Review of Economic Studies. Volume 4, number 1, October 1936. Pages 53-71.]
    25. Marxist political economy or Marxist economics (Zhang Yibing [Chinese, 张一兵, Zhāng-Yī-bīng as pronounced in this MP3 audio file], Costas Lapavitsas [Greek/Hellēniká, Κώστας Λαπαβίτσας, Kṓstas Lapabítsas as pronounced in this MP3 audio file], Simon Mohun, Jason Unruhe, and others): They examine one of the major contributions made by Karl Marx.
        “… [Karl] Marx was able to make … [a] great discovery — the founding of Marxist political economy — not only because of his efforts in the study of economics, but also because he carried out a complete revolution in terms of philosophical methodology. It was precisely the ‘definite’ or ‘certain’ historical philosophical context that allowed him to fundamentally surpass classical economics. Classical economics is natural, empirical social materialism, but only Marx’s historical materialism truly lays a scientific path; this allowed him to experience a profound shift in all the realms of his thought. At the same time, only in Marx’s great political economic revolution was his historical materialism first truly able to become a real science. This was a two-sided process of construction. More importantly, in Marx’s process of facing the economic development of social history, he was able to combine the critical reason of philosophy with fact-based research of real economics; this formed his most unique scientific, critical, historical phenomenology.” [Zhang Yibing. Back to Marx: Changes of Philosophical Discourse in the Context of Economics. Oliver Corff, editor. Thomas Mitchell, translator. Göttingen, Germany: Göttingen University. 2014. Creative Commons. Page 389.]
        “There is no generally agreed definition, or even understanding, of financialization. This article critically reviews some of the relevant literature in light of the current crisis. It subsequently puts forth a theoretical analysis of financialization that is situated within classical Marxist political economy. Financialization is posited as a systemic transformation of mature capitalist economies that comprises three fundamental elements: first, large non-financial corporations have reduced their reliance on bank loans and have acquired financial capacities; second, banks have expanded their mediating activities in financial markets as well as lending to households; third, households have become increasingly involved in the realm of finance both as debtors and as asset holders.” [Costas Lapavitsas, “Theorizing financialization.” Work, employment and society. Volume 25, number 4, December 2011. Pages 611-626.]
        “Productive labour is labour that creates value and surplus value; unproductive labour does not. The definition is simple, but deceptively so, for whether to make the distinction, and if so how, are among the most controversial issues in Marxist economics. Partly this is because, as with so much else, [Karl] Marx both built on and transformed the categories of productive and unproductive labour that he had inherited from his predecessors (primarily Adam Smith). Partly it is because Marx never developed a systematic treatment in his own work, so that the category has to be recovered and interpreted from widely scattered sources among writings put together for publication after his death by [Friedrich] Engels … and [Karl] Kautsky …. And partly it is because capitalist economies have changed since Marx’s day, so that what is unproductive has a historical specificity that writings in the late nineteenth century could not anticipate.” [Simon Mohun, “Productive and unproductive labour.” The Elgar Companion to Marxist Economics. Ben Fine and Alfredo Saad Filho, editors. Northampton, Massachusetts: Edward Elgar Publishing, Inc. 2012. Pages 277-282.]
        “Marxist political economy experiences a rhythm and evolution in terms of both its prominence and (perceptions of) its substantive content. There can be no doubt, for example, that the global crisis that broke from the end of 2007 has raised the profile and the perceived relevance of Marxism, but this is necessarily different from the Marxisms that were prominent before 1917, in the interwar period, after 1956 or post- 1968. Influential social theories are moulded by, just as they mould, their own social and historical context. But, in contrast with mainstream approaches, Marxism offers a theoretical and conceptual apparatus that can be used to review its own evolution and historical experiences, and that can support the emergence of new generations of progressive movements and thought.” [Ben Fine and Alfredo Saad Filho, “Introduction.” The Elgar Companion to Marxist Economics. Ben Fine and Alfredo Saad Filho, editors. Northampton, Massachusetts: Edward Elgar Publishing, Inc. 2012. Pages 1-4.]
        “Marxist economics is a difficult subject for many people, including myself. It is not something simple one can merely pick up from a book and become an expert in right away. It takes time, practice, research, and hard work, to learn our economic craft. This is not Austrian economics, which requires merely reading Econ 101 and blaming the state for all problems that arise. We seek to investigate the causes of the contradictions of capitalism.” [Jason Unruhe. Marxist Economics Made Simple. Niagra Falls, Ontario: MRN Publishing. 2016. Page 2.]
        “[Karl] Marx’s critique of capitalism doesn’t alter the way in which good are mechanically produced, only the way in which they are distributed and social relations that arise from them. Investigated is also the political environment and the mechanics of it that result from the capitalist mode of production. As well as analyzing the source of wealth.” [Jason Unruhe. Marxist Economics Made Simple. Niagra Falls, Ontario: MRN Publishing. 2016. Page 8.]
    26. queer economics (Steven Maynard, Felicity Grace, and others): They develop a heterodox approach to economics based upon queer theory.
        “Queer economics and bank lending practice …
        “A queer reading is needed rather than a gendered one because hero narratives of straight masculinity also highlight the homo-social heterosexuality of acceptable risk. Metaphors and the norms associated with them have the power to displace ‘others.’ Thus (heterosexual) women and minority groups may be associated with each other, and relegated on the assumption that they are not tough, strong, or visionary enough and are therefore (somewhat ironically) too high risk. Obviously in a battle between the sexes over space and access to public life, the ‘pioneer’ whose narrative was produced long after the historical events, helped to (re)produce femininity as dependent and tied to the domestic sphere, she keeping home as he blazes a new trail, she demanding intimacy and monogamy as he strives for independence and self-sufficiency. This narrative may help to explain why family is only clearly figured as a burden or a risk for women and not for men seeking loans.”
        [Felicity Grace, “Risky Business: Heterosexual Credit and Lending Practice.” Sexualities. Volume 2, number 4, November 1999. Pages 322-449.]
        “Queer studies, with its poststructuralist underpinnings, has, for all its enabling energies, not been particularly hospitable toward materialist analyses. But the time may now be right for a reincorporation of capitalism into our historical work. Queer theory is facing up to the fact that material constraints stemming from oppressed race, gender, and class positions mean that for many working-class people and people of color, queer notions such as ‘fluidity’ have as much to do with transnational flows of labor and capital as they do with the free play of genders and sexualities. Work in the burgeoning field of queer economics, which unravels the often messy entanglements of queer life with capitalist markets, bodes well too. It may also prove profitable to revisit a prequeer and pre-post-Marxist moment in lesbian/gay history’s development as a field.” [Steven Maynard, “‘Without Working?’: Capitalism, Urban Culture, and Gay History.” Journal of Urban History. Volume 3, number 3, March 2004. Pages 378-398.]
    27. ecological or sustainability economics (Clive L. Spash, John Gowdy, Jon D. Erickson, and others): They examine the interrelationships between economics and the environment.
        “The contention of this paper is that ecological economics requires solid foundations in the philosophy of science to clarify how natural and social sciences can cooperate and the extent to which they can combine in a way which meaningfully advances knowledge. Ecological economics must clarify its position on such issues as the use of mathematical formalism, the role of empiricism and the meaning of pluralism. A distinct and radical synthesis is called for in order to establish new foundations. This can be seen as relating to various calls for developing a preanalytic vision ….” [Clive L. Spash, “New foundations for ecological economics.” Ecological Economics. Volume 77, May 2012. Pages 36-47.]
        “Following the Second World War, resource and then environmental economics also became established areas of study. However, the ability of these sub-disciplines to explore environmental critiques was restricted because they remained within the neo-classical framework and therefore tended to defend that paradigm. The emphasis on a mono-disciplinary approach also discouraged pluralism. Ecological economics has therefore become the latest attempt to take seriously the concern that aspects of the world such as the diversity of life in the wild, ecosystems structure and functioning, and the resources humans build into their cultures are all something more than a useful component of a welfare generating economic system.” [Clive L. Spash, “The Development of Environmental Thinking in Economics.” Enviromental Values. Volume 8, number 4, November 1999. Pages 413-435.]
        “A perhaps inevitable struggle has then been on-going between this Social Ecological Economics approach and those engaged in legitimizing economics as an objective technical means for engineering society, where the environment is something external to the economy.
        “This paper explores that struggle and some of the resulting confusion it has created for understanding the meaning and content of Ecological Economics. The central contention of the current paper is that the institutionalized power of mainstream theory has played an important role in delimiting the field of environmental research.
        “Understanding the discourse surrounding the work that has been appearing as Ecological Economics involves more than merely focussing on the academic technical debates. This requires historical analysis, exploration of conflicts and probing of the ideological and methodological differences.”
        [Clive L. Spash, “Social Ecological Economics: Understanding the Past to See the Future.” American Journal of Economics and Sociology. Volume 70, number 2, April 2011). Pages 340-374.]
        “The policy dilemma is this: given the fact that a significant part of our well-being is derived from money flows from the market economy—an economy isolated from direct influences of the natural world—how do we create policies to preserve the life support systems of the planet? Ecological economics is still struggling with this question, and there are no satisfactory answers yet. But of all the conventional and heterodox schools of economic thought, ecological economics is the only one poised to address the problems of human survival in the coming centuries. It is the school of thought that explicitly recognises the interconnections and interdependence of the economic, biophysical and social worlds. We offer no grand theory, but rather a flexible approach recognising the uniqueness of specific cultures and ecosystems.” [John Gowdy and Jon D. Erickson, “The approach of ecological economics.” Cambridge Journal of Economics. Volume 29, number 2, 2005. Pages 207-222.]
        “One of the major challenges of ecological economics has been how to understand and examine the design of environmental policies and governance institutions. Institutional economics in all its guises has been an influential source of ideas for ecological economics. Ecological economics has turned to institutional economics for sophisticated models and understanding of human behaviour …. Institutional economics has also been a source of alternative views regarding policy analysis and the normative basis of policy prescriptions …. While the influence of institutional economics has been profound, we believe that a comprehensive review of the conceptual foundations of institutional economics can provide new insights and important new directions for ecological economics.” [Jouni Paavola and W. Neil Adger, “Institutional ecological economics.” Ecological Economics. Volume 53, issue 3, May 2005. Pages 353-368.]
        “… a coevolutionary research agenda has not taken off within ecological economics (EE). The epistemological and methodological challenges of coevolutionary research are formidable …. This special section presents a diverse collection of contributions that aim to reinvigorate the coevolutionary analysis of ecological–economic change. This opening article positions these contributions within the growing literature of (co)evolutionary approaches in environmental studies and economics …. Our ambition is to map a tentative coevolutionary research agenda for EE.” [Giorgos Kallis and Richard B. Norgaard, “Coevolutionary ecological economics.” Ecological Economics. Volume 69, issue 4, February 2010. Pages 690-699.]
        “… [The] varied intellectual and social roots of ecological economics put ecological economists in a unique position, which holds the potential for the sorts of creative insight that can only come about from opposites held in tension. Yet good outcomes will not necessarily follow: Working from this liminal space also has its hazards. The purpose of this essay is to suggest how insights from feminist economics might help ecological economists put this unique position to its best use.” [Julie A. Nelson, “Between a rock and a soft place: Ecological and feminist economics in policy debates.” Ecological Economics. Volume 69, issue 1, November 2009. Pages 1-8.]
        “Ecological Economics can be defined as economics for sustainable development or more simply ‘sustainability economics.’ This may include neoclassical environmental economics but is broader in scope and has partly emerged as a criticism of neoclassical economics …. Some argue that neoclassical economics, while being useful for some purposes, is not very helpful in tackling present social and environmental challenges, and is part of a mental map that has brought us to the present precarious situation.” [Peter Söderbaum, “Towards Sustainability Economics: Principles and Values.” Journal of Bioeconomics. Volume 9, number 3, 2007. Pages 205-225.]
        “… ecological economics … attracted a combination of older academics disenchanted with the failure of environmental economics, younger socio-economists seeking new ideas and more radical social scientists. In general, this group appears to have been looking for interdisciplinary interactions with open-minded natural scientists and others. This socially oriented ecological economics grouping wanted new theory within economics, not just some political realisation that the environment was as important as other economic topic areas. The point was that understanding economic systems requires understanding the natural environment within which it is embedded, and that this fundamentally changes the way in which economics should be conducted both in theory and practice. This group formed a practical desire for policy to change the institutional arrangements whereby daily life is conducted; the aim being to address power relationships and social inequity because they are integrally related to environmental degradation. The group might be thought of as a revolutionary and radical branch ….” [Clive L. Spash and Anthony Ryan, “Economic schools of thought on the environment: investigating unity and division.” Cambridge Journal of Economics. Volume 36, number 5, 2012. Pages 1091-1121.]
        “Many academic economists produce and utilize representations of the economy other than the supply-and-demand conception of markets. They are often referred to as heterodox economists, or sometimes political economists, and work within theoretical traditions other than the neoclassical-Keynesian one. A short list of these would include Marxian, classical, post Keynesian, radical, institutionalist, feminist, Austrian, and postcolonial approaches. If I had the space, I would give a detailed example from each. However, for the purposes of this discussion, let me invoke but one example, from the Marxian tradition. Certainly, one can find references in [Karl] Marx’s texts, including Capital, to many of the terms that are used in the neoclassical and Keynesian stories. Markets, prices, supply, demand, even equilibrium all play a role in the Marxian representation of the economy. But the basic story is quite different. For Marx, the commodities that are bought and sold on markets have exchange-values that can be understood in terms of two key elements: (a) the characteristics that economic agents have that make them capable of exchanging commodities and (b) the amount of society’s labor that is embodied in the commodities during the course of production and for which the commodities exchange. The first entails Marx’s discussion of ‘commodity fetishism,’ his theory of how economic agents come to be constituted socially and historically such that commodity exchange can take place. The second leads to his theory of surplus labor and, in a capitalist economy, the theory of surplus-value, that is, the idea that part of a capitalist commodity‘s value is the extra value created in and through the exploitation of the direct producers.” [David F. Ruccio, “Introduction: What are economic representations and what’s at stake?” Economic Representations: Academic and everyday. London and New York: Routledge imprint of Taylor & Francis Group, an Informa PLC business. Pages 1-31.]
        “The simple truth is that we must look beyond law itself. If we do no more than weigh the latest judgment of the courts in terms of how consistently it matches earlier precedent, then we may develop a highly consistent common law (no bad thing), but one which is inward looking and treats law as an entirely autonomous entity existing in some juridical vacuum. The advantage of both environmental economics and environmental ethics is not that either of them should tell us what the law is, but that both of them offer a paradigm from which the workings of legal rules can be viewed. It is the capacity of these disciplines to ask some fundamental questions about the entire enterprise of environmental regulation that makes the exploration of them so valuable.” [Julian Boswall and Robert Lee, “Economics, Ethics and the Environment.” Economics, Ethics and the Environment: Papers from the UKELA Cardiff Conference, June 2001. Julian Boswall and Robert Lee, editors. London and New York: Cavendish Publishing Limited imprint of Taylor & Francis Group, an Informa PLC business. 2002. Pages 1-8.]
        “The problem of who decides when the market mechanism has failed is very much a political issue. For in many cases of ‘failure’ of the market mechanism, with serious ecological effects, there exists a flourishing market which would have to be stopped by regulation before the ‘rational’ decision-making processes could begin.” [David Evans, “Ecology and Economics.” Australian Left Review. Volume 1, issue 36, July 1972. Pages 30-32.]
        “Ecological economics is moving towards the construction of a more general theoretical framework, part of which is a new ecological macroeconomics …. Within it, an ecological monetary economics has started to emerge. The monetary analysis of some ecological economists (but not all) appears to bemostly articulated around the following core: a stationary economy (and a fortiori a degrowth economy) is incompatible with a system in which money is created as interest-bearing debt ….” [Louison Cahen-Fourot and Marc Lavoie, “Ecological monetary economics: A post-Keynesian critique.” Ecological Economics. Volume 126, June 2016. Pages 163-168.]
    28. radical ecological-economic critique of total-factor-productivity analysis (Paul Burkett): He develops a Marxist approach informed by ecological economics.
        “Total factor productivity (TFP) is a central concept in the mainstream analysis of economic growth. Using aggregate production functions, economists estimate the shares of economic growth explained by increases in capital, labor, and (in some applications) natural resource inputs. The residual of unexplained growth is then ascribed to ‘disembodied’ technological advance or TFP. This article develops a radical ecological-economic critique of TFP analysis. The critique uses Marxist theory to synthesize relevant nonmainstream perspectives ….
        “This article develops an ecological critique of a central concept in the mainstream analysis of economic growth: total factor productivity (TFP). The main theoretical basis of TFP is the aggregate production function, which expresses, in mathematical form, the relationship between the quantity of output that can be produced by an economy and different amounts of factor inputs employed in production. TFP growth is defined as the amount of output growth that cannot be explained by growth of the individual factor inputs in the aggregate production function.”
        [Paul Burkett, “Total Factor Productivity: An Ecological-Economic Critique.” Organization & Environment. Volume 19, number 2, June 2006. Pages 171-190.]
    29. feminist ecological economics (Patricia E. “Ellie” Perkins, Edith Kuiper, and others): They explain the connections between feminist ecological economics and feminist economics.
        “A close look at the development of feminist ecological economics reveals similarities between its premises and challenges and those of feminist economics.…
        “By linking … two concerns – theoretical and practical gender and ecological perspectives – a feminist ecological economics provides theoretical justification and impetus for those concerned with economic sustainability or the economic contribution of women to revisit their research priorities.”
        [Ellie Perkins and Edith Kuiper, “Introduction: Exploring Feminist Ecological Economics.” Feminist Economics. Volume 11, number 3, November 2005. Pages 107-109.]
        “Currently the feminist environmental discussion is in deadlock. It is politically weak and wears itself out in an antagonism similar to the one described above: either distributive justice or environmental protection and resource preservation. But these alleged contradictions must be conceptualized in their mutual dependency and combined with a feminist-emancipatory perspective. I believe one reason for the current weakness of feminist environmental movements is that the mediation between a deconstructivist understanding of gender and a materialist understanding of nature is as yet theoretically and practically difficult to grasp. A feminist conception of environmental policies faces the challenge of conceiving the relationship between humans and nature as a material relationship without perpetuating the discourse of women’s more intimate connection with nature.” [Christine Bauhardt, “Rethinking gender and nature from a material(ist) perspective: Feminist economics, queer ecologies and resource politics.” European Journal of Women’s Studies. Volume 20, number 4, 2013. Pages 361-365.]
    30. green economics (Brian Milani, Donald N. Merino, Payman Ahi [Persian/Fārsī, پَیْمَان آهِی, Paymān ʾÂhī], Cory Searcy, Anjali Appadurai [Hindī, अंजलि अप्पादुराई, Aṃjali Appādurāī as pronounced in this MP3 audio file], and others): They examine economic approaches to renewable energy.
        “Green economics is the economics of the real world—the world of work, human needs, how they mesh together most harmoniously. It is primarily about ‘use value,’ not ‘exchange value’ or money. It is about quality, not quantity, for the sake of it. It is about regeneration—of individuals, ecosystems—not about accumulation, of either money or material.…
        “… Ecological development requires an unleashing of human development and an extension of democracy. Social and ecological transformation go hand in hand.”
        [Brian Milani, “What Is Green Economics?” Race, Poverty & the Environment. Volume 13, number 1, summer 2006. Pages 42-44.]
        “So what is Green Economics? One definition of Green Economics is the economic analysis and evaluation of alternatives (technologies, projects, systems, etc.) that reduce carbon emissions (green house gases) that contribute to global warming. This definition includes the study and evaluation of renewable energy sources such as wind, solar/sun, wave, water, and others, as well as the economics of energy conservation efforts such as LEED (Leadership in Energy and Environmental Design).” [Donald N. Merino, “Some Observations on Green Economics.” Engineering Management Journal. Volume 22, number 3, September 2010. Page 1.]
        “… models for measuring sustainability must more explicitly address the fundamental importance of environmental issues at all levels of society, including individual companies …. This is further supported by the green economics paradigm, which recognizes that the economy operates within social relationships that are embedded in nature …. Societies cannot continue indefinitely with a deteriorating environment and natural resources. Signs of a deteriorating environment abound, with global warming, ozone layer depletion and ocean pollution among the prominent examples.” [Payman Ahi and Cory Searcy, “A stochastic approach for sustainability analysis under the green economics paradigm.” Environmental Research and Risk Assessment. Volume 28, number 7, October 2014. Pages 1743-1753.]
        “As described in the green economics paradigm …, the economy operates within social relationships, which are embedded within nature. Moreover, according to the concept of strong sustainability …, human activity is enclosed within the confines of the limits of the environmental carrying capacity. Therefore, focusing on the sustainability objectives, economic growth as well as quality of life improvements are constrained by the boundary of ecological limits …. [T]he economy is a part of society, which is nestled inside of the environment. In this view, both economy and society are dependent on the environment and thus are constrained by the environmental limits.” [Payman Ahi. Sustainability Analysis and Assessment in the Supply Chain. Ph.D. dissertation. Ryerson University. Toronto, Ontario. 2014. Page 108.]
        “Intended to be a paradigm-shifting reallocation of capital, the green economy concept seeks to dispel the preconceived notion that environmental sustainability must come at the expense of economic productivity and progress, and vice versa. Under this framework, a zero-emission and socially inclusive economic model would also give ample value to natural resources.” [Anjali Appadurai, “The Brown Baggage of Green Economics.” Alternatives Journal. Volume 38, number 4, July/August 2012. Page 6.]
    31. postmodern economics (Paul G. Hull, Daniel T. Ostas, and Jim Merod): They propose various economic applications of postmodernism.
        “Much has been written about whether endowments help or hurt congregations [in Unitarian Universalism]. Such questions are asking, in effect, are their intrinsic factors in endowments that help or hurt a congregation? From a postmodern perspective, such questions are asking whether and how endowments include irreducible economic factors? There are strong opinions on either side of the question: Some say endowments hurt congregations, and others say they help. This diversity of opinion was found in the literature and was expressed by the responders in this study. Some say that the endowment hurts like an addiction if it is used for operating budgets …. Some observers say that whether it helps or hurts depends upon the quality of congregational leadership.” [Paul G. Hull. The sacred money of church endowments for church growth and revitalization from a postmodern economic perspective. Doctor of Ministry dissertation. Lancaster Theological Seminary. Lancaster, Pennsylvania. February, 2007. Page 229.]
        “The important point is that a postmodern approach to EAL [economic analysis of law] would open the inquiry to all possible instrumental ends sought-including distributional ends. It would keep the dialogue open and avoid dogmatism. Many economists today argue that interpersonal utility comparisons are not appropriate. Contending that value is wholly subjective, they would deny the assertion that a pauper would value his last dollar more than the billionaire. Others of a libertarian ilk might argue that any scheme to redistribute wealth violates one’s natural rights to private property. But a pragmatic approach to ends does not require unanimity of opinion, only consensus among people with common sense and good faith. In this light, one might suspect that many policy makers would find the arguments favoring redistribution of wealth palatable.” [Daniel T. Ostas, “Postmodern economic analysis of law: Extending the pragmatic visions of Richard A. Posner.” American Business Law Journal. Volume 36, number 1, fall 1998. Pages 193-238.]
        “Our society and its economy and culture have perpetuated a massive transfer of capital—by which I mean human effort, human hope and energy, as much as the abstract economic ability to buy and sell. That transfer has been not merely from the underclasses through the professionalized middle class, squeezed as it has been, bringing enormous lines of credit to an ever shrinking portion of the Fortune 500. The transfer of capital has been not simply from the ravaged inner city to the 1.5 percent who control approximately 50 percent of the gross national product. The transfer of human hope and effort into increasingly complex patterns of ownership and control has been, throughout the years since the last devastation of our city landscapes, a transfer of our national heritage, from distress to something that resembles despair.” [Jim Merod, “The Wisdom of Our Violent Knowledge: Postmodern Economics and Academic Cyberspace.” boundary 2. Volume 21, number 3, autumn 1994. Pages 231-246.]
    32. postcolonial economics (Jane Pollard, Cheryl McEwan, Alex Hughes, and others): They bring postcolonial theory to economics.
        “Heterodox scholars are now starting to explore how postcolonial theory may inform Keynesian, institutionalist, feminist and Marxian economic traditions … and, while much has been made of the mutual antipathy between postcolonial approaches and economic theory, these chapters illustrate some of the empirical, theoretical and political work underway by scholars – in a variety of contexts – looking for productive possibilities at the intersections of the postcolonial and the economic.
        “The book has its origin in an Economic and Social Research Council ([the British] ESRC)–funded seminar series on Postcolonial Economies, which ran from January 2006 to October 2007. The seminar series stimulated interdisciplinary debate and knowledge sharing around postcolonial critiques of ‘the economic’ by facilitating discussion of the genealogies and geographies of economic knowledges in academic and policy debates, of how, and on what terms, postcolonial approaches and economic theory might enrich each other, and of what postcolonial economic understandings might look like in terms of policy and pedagogy. The book is designed to make two main contributions. First, the volume brings together, for the first time, dispersed social science researchers who are building cross-disciplinary dialogue about postcolonialism and its treatment of ‘the economic’ as a means to explore the uneven material and social realities of capitalism. Second, the chapters that follow seek to critique and enrich contemporary efforts to re-think economy, which tend to be rooted, empirically and theoretically, in Western-centred conceptions of what constitutes ‘diverse’ or ‘alternative’ economic practices ….” [Jane Pollard, Cheryl McEwan, and Alex Hughes, “Introduction: Postcolonial Economies.” Postcolonial Economies. Jane Pollard, Cheryl McEwan, and Alex Hughes, editors. London and New York: Zed Books. 2011. Pages 1-20.]
        “References to and adaptations of different aspects of postcolonial critique have appeared in the work of feminist, institutionalist, post-development, postmodernist, post Keynesian and Marxian economists. This is not to say that most heterodox economists are familiar with postcolonial theory. However, key contributions such as [Edward W.] Said’s on the European construction of Othering and [Satya P.] Mohanty’s analysis of ‘third world’ feminism are widely enough seen in the literature that my present discussion does not exhaust all texts containing references to them. Needless to say, various strands of heterodoxy are not mutually exclusive; postcolonial work in Economics draws on more than one heterodox tradition.” [Eiman O. Zein-Elabdin, “Postcolonial theory and economics: orthodox and heterodox.” Postcolonial Economies. Jane Pollard, Cheryl McEwan, and Alex Hughes, editors. London and New York: Zed Books. 2011. Pages 37-62.]
    33. materialistic political economy (Andrea Micocci as pronounced in this MP3 audio file): He develops a materialistic, anti–Hegelian approach to political economy inspired by the work of Adam Smith and Karl Marx.
        “The goal of the present discussion is to contribute towards a ‘dynamic’ approach to the identification and use of the economic ― and, given the multidisciplinary character of materialistic political economy ― social, political and anthropological variables that are needed to represent and change reality. It shall be argued that in ‘capitalism as we know it’ such variables are understood in theory, and used in practice, as metaphysical concepts deriving from the dominant culture and as simulacra of the material items themselves. If [David] Hume’s scepticism is correct, it shall be shown that what was just said implies that the participants to, and students of, the economy do not know, nor indeed can they know, whether they are ever able to directly grasp the actual material: the concrete. This paradox is the central concern of the present paper, for its methodological consequences on political economy.…
        “… Materialistic political economy, rather than a positive or normative discipline, becomes a dynamic tool to continuously understand in novel fashion and, as a consequence, continuously challenge social and economic reality.…
        “The conclusions emphasize the cultural fetters capitalism poses upon all intellectual endeavours of understanding. Only a dynamic political economy can be a revolutionary tool that frees us from such capitalist fetters, compelling us to be creative.”
        [Andrea Micocci, “Unusual Humean issues in materialistic political economy.” The Journal of Philosophical Economics. Volume VII, issue 2, spring 2014. Creative Commons. Pages 2-26.]
        “My main concern … [has been] to overcome what I see as the typical problem of economic theories: they mix up capitalism in theory and ‘capitalism as we know it’ in practice. This is the result of the logical flaws of economic theory and of capitalism in general, which constitute the general subject of my book. By political economy I therefore mean the materialistic study of the economic activities of the capitalist era. It comprises what we term economics, political economy in the Marxist sense, political science, sociology, psychology and history. As I explain in the book, it is a Classical approach only in the sense that is inspired by Adam Smith and Karl Marx (with his ‘critique of political economy’). But this is only the beginning of a theoretical reasoning that leads to a proposed ‘historical’ political economy, which differs from everything hitherto devised even in the role it can play in practice.” [Andrea Micocci, “A historical political economy of capitalism—an interview with Andrea Micocci.” Stuart Birks, interviewer. World Economics Association Newsletter. Volume 6, issue 4, August 2016. Pages 2-3.]
        “In capitalism as we know it, in other words, no revolution is possible. Only subversions that reshuffle the known items of reality into a new configuration within the general framework are allowed. This way the intrinsic violence and prevarication of the capitalist mode of production … is also preserved, in practical as well as in academic politics. If all ideas have the same power vis-à-vis each other, then only material force (academic, political or military might, for three typical instances) can solve the contradictions by pushing them in one direction. Peaceful radical changes are ruled out and replaced by slow, boring and violent conformity. That this is only a temporary arrangement goes without saying.” [Andrea Micocci, “Alternative Economic Strategies and the Practice of Economics.” Presented at Political Economy, Activism and Alternative Economic Strategies: Fourth Annual Conference in Political Economy. International Initiative for Promoting Political Economy. The Hague, the Netherlands. June 9th–11th, 2013. Pages 1-9. Retrieved on November 2tth, 2016.]
        “Capitalism as we know it … is not based on economic categories but on (flawed) intellectual, cultural and institutional logic that makes it possible for value to be understood, used and institutionalized. Because this possibly Marxian argument is alternative to what most Marxists say, I call it •materialistic.’

        “Valorization is a metaphysical, intellectual mechanism that needs the simplest, most straightforward way to express itself, which monetary denomination provides. Due to the limits of economic theory, however, economics conceives of production as material, and production and circulation seem to blend with each other through intermediate, impalpable sectors (Micocci 2011). But finance is not a sector: It is the very essence of capitalism as we know it, and material production is a satellite sector.”

        [Andrea Micocci, “Marx and the Crisis: A Necessary Theoretical Premise.” International Journal of Political Economy. Volume 40, number 3, fall 2011. Pages 72-87..]

        “In an anti-Hegelian Marxist framework the dynamic view that we must have in order to rebuild economics can be envisaged as a genealogy of the material. Let me be clear on this basic issue. We are not dealing with nature, but with manmade objects and human relationships. These, although originated from human efforts at whose core there is nothing but the natural laws of the rest of the material world, are often transcended (e.g., by economics) into activities and facts with a logic, and laws of motion, of their own. Therefore we have to find the economic laws of motion themselves. This is dependent upon a preliminary classification of all the relevant categories, and on the working out of the relationships between the various families of facts and phenomena classified. The second thing to do is then to find the relationship between the working of the economic system studied and the laws of motion of the material in general.” [Andrea Micocci, “Critical Observations on Economics, Taxonomy, and Dynamism.” Rethinking Marxism. Volume 16, number 1, January 2004. Pages 73-94.]

        “We are dealing with an impalpable (not immaterial, mind you) world of monetary items, exemplified by, but not limited to, services and finance. Money-denominated capitalism is neither abstract (like mathematics or logic) nor material (like production plants or the purchase/sale of commodities), but lies in between; we shall call it metaphysical. It stands up as long as capitalist relationships of property, exchange, and the legal and institutional apparatuses are in place and thoroughly practised. The point is not so much believing in, or sharing any of, the modalities of action you are presented with, but to play along following the tide. Of course, each tide leads to a crisis: each cycle of multiplication must, in the end, reckon with the fact that financial deals operate independently from, but have influence on, the productive sector, whose multiplicative powers, being tied to natural resources (first of all, labour power), are severely limited.” [Andrea Micocci, “The Preponderance of Finance and the Present Crisis.” Studies in Political Economy: A Socialist Review. Volume 87, issue 1, 2011. Pages 49-64.]
    34. socioeconomics or social economics (Amitai Etzioni, John P. Tiemstra, Gary D. Lynne, James Ronald Stanfield, James Ronald Stanfield, Michael C. Carroll, Edward J. O’Boyle, Walter Block, Zohreh Emami [Persian/Fārsī, زُهْرِه اِمَامِی, Zuhrih ʾImāmī], and many others): This approach, originated by Etzioni, focuses upon social justice and examines the relations between the economy and society.
        “The founder of socio-economics is a sociologist, Amitai Etzioni …, and many of the products of socio-economics aire either produced by sociologists or are sociological in nature ….” [Richard Swedberg, “New Economic Sociology: What Has Been Accomplished, What Is Ahead?” Acta Sociologica. Volume 40, number 2, 1997. Pages 161-182.]
        “This is a time of change. Criticisms of neoclassical economics and other social sciences that draw on the same ethical (utilitarian) assumptions are giving way to a constructive effort to encompass the neoclassical paradigm in a broader framework. A new paradigm of socioeconomics is emerging from the old model’s assumptions about the goals people pursue, the ways they pursue them, and whether the decisionmaker is a solitary individual or part of a community.” [Amitai Etzioni, “A New Kind of Socioeconomics.” Challenge. Volume 33, number 1, January/February 1990. Pages 31-32.]
        “A core assumption of socioeconomics is that all economies are nestled within a society which contains specific ethical and political institutions. Their specific attributes determine both whether the market forces are accorded sufficient range for the economy to be able to flourish (for instance, via legitimation of commerce and of entrepreneurship) and whether anti-market forces are contained. These forces not only emanate from the societal-political realm but are also generated by powerful economic actors using both intraeconomic means (e.g., predatory pricing to block the entry of new competitors) and political (e.g., lobbying for tariffs, quotas, tax exemptions) and unethical means, violating the trust which lies at the root of all transactions.” [Amitai Etzioni, “Founding a New Socioeconomics.” Challenge. Volume 29, number 5, November/December 1986. Pages 13-17.]
        “In response to the argument for working to modify values and preferences, neoclassicists raise another objection, an ethical one. They state that individuals, and not the government, ought to determine their own conduct, and that those who object to consumer sovereignty and seek to influence individual tastes are elitist snobs who wish to impose their values on others. Socioeconomics takes a different normative stance, arguing that some tastes clearly ought to be modified, for instance, those that cause harm to others (e.g., smoking and reckless driving) and those that demonstrate open disregard for community needs (e.g., dumping toxic wastes into lakes).” [Amitai Etzioni, “Policy Implications of Socioeconomics.” Bulletin of the New York Academy of Medicine. Volume 66, number 1, January–February 1990. Pages 5-17.]
        “Although the United States and Western Europe do have fairly expansive welfare-state programs in place, it is not clear that such programs represent a recognition of socioeconomic rights. For example, the move from ‘welfare’ to ‘workfare’ across the Western world renders many economic benefits conditional; even a basic standard of living is not guaranteed by virtue of inherent rights, but, rather, is conceded only insofar as individuals fulfill some obligation of labor—an arrangement that is much closer to a private contract than a state-sponsored entitlement ….” [Amitai Etzioni, “Socioeconomic Rights: A Dialogue With Islam.” Digest of Middle East Studies. Volume 22, number 2, fall 2013. Pages 348-360.]
        “The Association for Social Economics was founded in 1941 seeking to promote high quality research in the broadly defined area of social economics. Social economics is the study of the ethical and social causes and consequences of economic behavior, institutions, organizations, theory, and policy. The fields of research promoted by ASE [Association for Social Economics] include the mutual relationships among ethics, social values, concepts of social justice, and the social dimensions of economic life. Social Economics investigates the relationships between the economy and society. Social economists address such questions as: what economic conditions are requisite for a good society and how can they be achieved; how do social and moral values influence economic behavior; how does social interaction affect economic outcomes; what are the ethical implications of economic theory and policy; and how do different social institutions contribute to a sustainable, just, and efficient economy. The ASE welcomes academics and practitioners who regard human behavior to be the result of complex social interactions with ethical consequences.” [Editor, “Welcome to the Association for Social Economics.” The Association for Social Economics. Website. Undated. Retrieved on September 11th, 2016.]
        “The globalization of the economy has been a prominent topic of public debate at least since the 1999 Seattle meeting of the World Trade Organization filled the streets with protest demonstrations by environmental, labor, consumer, religious, and other civil society groups.…
        “How are we to understand the current state of this debate? In the social economics tradition, we look first at the moral values that are at stake. These values are important not just for normative insight into economic policies, but also for the light they shed on the behavior of different parties in the economy, and the arguments of different advocates in the debate.”
        [John P. Tiemstra, “The Social Economics of Globalization.” Forum for Social Economics. Volume 36, issue 2, October 2007. Pages 143-159.]
        “The exercise of socially structured agency is no denial of individual freedom, merely recognition that the individual emerges from and at all times acts within a social setting. As [Thorstein] Veblen put it, the realistic economic agent has both antecedence and consequence: the individual has a history and makes history …. Social relationships are meaningful categories of social economic life. Dignity and the quality of relationships matter ….” [James Ronald Stanfield, “Some Social Economics Concepts for Future Research.” Forum for Social Economics. Volume 30, issue 1, April 2011. Pages 7-17.]
        “The recent period of intensive and extensive development of global economic integration, or globalization, has reached a crossroads. The regime of the neoliberal Great Capitalist Restoration is not sustainable and fundamental governance changes must be made. This paper adds perspective to the choices that must be made at this critical juncture of the global social economy ….
        “The place of economy in society is then the manner by which a society solves its substantive economic problem of integrating its division of labor. Some normalized and reasonably repetitive patterns of behavior must be established. Individuals must be enabled and motivated to perform productive tasks using tools and materials that must be somehow assigned to these tasks. The real income thus generated must be meted out in some fashion that is perceived as more or less legitimate and ultimately sanctioned by force. Governance structures are systems of communication and sanction ….”
        [James Ronald Stanfield and Michael C. Carroll, “The Social Economics of Neoliberal Globalization.” Forum for Social Economics. Volume 38, issue 1, April 2009. Pages 1-18.]
        “The Catholic Economic Association [CEA] was re-named the Association for Social Economics in 1970 in order to attract new members who supported CEA aims and objectives but were not Catholics. Among those who joined ASE were Bill Dugger, John Elliott, Wally Peterson, George Rohrlich, Warren Samuels, and Ron Stanfield, all of whom eventually were awarded the Thomas Divine Award for contributions to social economics and the social economy.” [Edward J. O’Boyle, “Origins of the Association for Social Economics.” Forum for Social Economics. Volume 43, issue 2, June 2014. Pages 104-106.]
        “In order to analyze the case of the mother abandoning her infant, we must hark back to the issue of property (for in the libertarian view babies are but a form of property), how it gets to be owned in the first place, how it can be transferred, and how it can be abandoned. That is, since libertarianism defends ‘justly acquired property,’ not any old property rights, if we are to be thorough we must first delve into the theory of how man attains property in the first place We will trace down the implications of property theory for children’s rights in general, and then apply these to the question of abandoning children without notification.” [Walter Block, “Libertarianism, positive obligations and property abandonment: children’s rights.” International Journal of Social Economics. Volume 31, issue 4, 2004. Pages 275-286.]
        “The arguments that openness to trade contributes to economic growth and that this can, in turn, be beneficial for poverty reduction and food security, are well grounded in conventional economic theory and have been supported by a number of empirical studies. However, some commentators caution that in studying the correlation between more trade and higher economic growth, researchers need to be careful about implying causality.
        “Trade policy reform involves a combination of: domestic support measures; export subsidies and tariffs. In each case, there are complications that must be taken into account.”
        [Krishna Chikhuri, “Impact of alternative agricultural trade liberalization strategies on food security in the Sub-Saharan Africa region.” International Journal of Social Economics. Volume 40, issue 3, 2013. Pages 188-206.]
        “This article reviews the main contributions of models of cultural transmission, from theoretical and empirical perspectives. It presents their implications regarding the long-run population dynamics of cultural traits, and discusses the links between the economic and other approaches to cultural evolution in the social sciences as well as in evolutionary biology. Furthermore, it discusses how to extend the economic theory of cultural transmission to the analysis of several important aspects of the dynamics and propagation of beliefs and values.” [Alberto Bisin and Thierry Verdier, “The Economics of Cultural Transmission and Socialization.” Handbook of Social Economics. Volume 1A. Jess Benhabib, Alberto Bisin, and Matt Jackson, editors. Amsterdam, the Netherlands: Elsevier Science imprint of Elsevier. 2011. Pages 339-416.]
        “Defining the social economy broadly as the complex intersection of markets, governments, and communities, my goal in this paper is to explore the place of learning in the interactions between and evolution of these three social domains. Learning is seen here not only as a link between these domains, but also as a process through which individual thought and action is affected by and in turn affects the evolution of these social domains and the relationships between them. More specifically, this paper focuses on communication and conversation as key generative and adaptive mechanisms through which individual and social learning occurs.” [Zohreh Emami, “Presidential Address: Social Economics and Evolutionary Learning.” Review of Social Economy. Volume LXX, number 3, December 2012. Pages 401-420.]
        “Our findings suggest that no assumption or investigation tool used alone seems to be sufficient to fully explain the respondents elicited preferences. Hence, no simple pattern of relationships should be expected between theory and true data.” [Daniel Franco and Luca Luiselli, “A procedure to analyse the strategic outliers and the multiple motivations in a contingent valuation: A case study for a concrete policy purpose.” International Journal of Social Economics. Volume 40, issue 3, 2013. Pages 246-266.]
    35. metaeconomics (Gary D. Lynne): Lynne operationalizes the moral vision—as discussed by Amitai Etzioni—of socioeconomics
        “Amitai Etzioni, the founder of socioeconomics, offered the vision of the moral dimension as a component of the self. Metaeconomics operationalizes this vision by making explicit the Strict Father moral dimension in the invisible hand and recognizing interdependence of self when Nurturant Parent morality is operant.…
        “In socioeconomics, the Nurturing Parent morality system is perhaps already duly visible. Seemingly analysts who favor socioeconomics could use metaeconomics (once it is fully elaborated: Much work remains) to enhance precision in the analysis, to frame questions to test empirically. Perhaps we could shift more attention to developing a specific theoretical model that socioeconomists will eventually find to be the standard model from which each starts, much like microeconomics is now the standard model in most economic analysis, especially of the neoclassical variety.”
        [Gary D. Lynne, “Divided self models of the socioeconomic person: the metaeconomics approach.” Journal of Socio-Economics. Volume 28, issue 3, May 1999. Pages 267-288.]
        “Metaeconomics acknowledges that microeconomics takes the analyst a considerable way toward understanding economic behavior. Self-interest is one of the main tendencies in human nature, and more times than not dominates the other tendency represented in the other-interest. As a result, metaeconomics is designed to show microeconomics as the default case that still explains a substantive part of behavior at least for the segment of the population oriented mainly to the self-interest. Metaeconomics goes beyond it by recognizing there are other segments of the population who are mainly oriented to their internalized other-interest. Most importantly, metaeconomics posits that a majority of individuals struggle with the integration of these two interests, perhaps even switching back and forth (a kind of preference reversal), with the ultimate economic goal of finding the peace of mind that comes from finding a particular orientation in these internalized interests that suits the individual.” [Gary D. Lynne, “Toward a dual motive metaeconomic theory.” Journal of Socio-Economics. Volume 35, issue 4, August 2006. Pages 634-651.]
    36. Left and Right neoliberalism (Walter Benn Michaels): He discusses the underlying unity between these two approaches to neoliberalism.
        “The differentiation between Left and Right neoliberalism doesn’t really undermine the way it which it is deeply unified in its commitment to competitive markets and to the state’s role in maintaining competitive markets. For me the distinction is that ‘left neoliberals’ are people who don’t understand themselves as neoliberals. They think that their commitments to anti-racism, to anti-sexism, to anti-homophobia constitute a critique of neoliberalism. But if you look at the history of the idea of neoliberalism you can see fairly quickly that neoliberalism arises as a kind of commitment precisely to those things.” [Walter Benn Michaels, “Let Them Eat Diversity.” Jacobin. Issue 1, winter 2011. Pages 17-22.]
    37. new economy of knowledge (Richard Levins): He critiques the capitalist economy of knowledge and argues that a new economy of knowledge cannot be created using the old system.
        “We are now in a prolonged period of global transition in which social forms zigzag between advances and retreats. As Rosa Luxemburg warned, we are trying to construct the new with the materials of the old, including ourselves. Even the builders of socialism are products of capitalism and are guided by perspectives and values derived from both systems. During this epoch, different forms of society coexist in conflict and mutual dependence. The economy of knowledge was initiated by a capitalism that cannot contain this new context of production. Therefore, rather than see the world as the sum of two independent competing systems, we have to look at it as the result of strong interactions between them as they change each other’s dynamics.” [Richard Levins, “A New Economy of Knowledge.” Monthly Review: An Independent Socialist Magazine. Volume 67, issue 11, April 2016. Pages 38-46.]
    38. transformative political economy (Romand Coles): He considers a transformational reconstruction of the political economy—while resisting attempts at assimilation by corporate capitalism—through community organizing.
        “My sense is that the hopefulness in [certain] texts … will remain rather abstract and insufficiently powerful unless and until it is brought into relation with the work of intentional and reflective grassroots organizing efforts which appear to me to be crucial in the following ways: First, as a locus of the reflexive political judgment, imagination, and experimentation that might produce specific initiatives for nurturing … democratic potential … (and resist assimilative captures by corporate capitalism); second, as a locus of an attentive and powerful public that can be brought to bear in these struggles; and third, insofar as this imagination and power combine to initiate a rich experimental field that could nurture and provoke further political economic reflection. Thus, imaginative scholarship in transformative political economy needs an engaged dialogue and political relationship with the theory and practice of grassroots organizing. Indeed, this need is as great as is the latter for the former.
        “… My sense is that community organizing today is in a similar phase, largely beneath the radar of broader public attention and memory. To move beyond these persistent confines and toward something we might—with little sarcasm—call progress, we will undoubt edly need the synergy between transformative political economy and grassroots community organizing. This begins by each remembering, calling, and responding to the other—establishing relationships.”
        [Romand Coles, “Awakening to the Call of Receptive Democratic Progress.” The Good Society. Volume 17, number 1, 2008. Pages 43-51.]
        “In this essay, I engage one of the more promising modes of democratic organizing in cities and states across the U.S., namely those associated with the Industrial Areas Foundation (IAF), founded in 1940 by Saul Alinsky.…
        “… [A] danger concerns pragmatic politics. The IAF is remarkably successful when it comes to cultivating relationships and receptivity in their pragmatic work. At the same time, pragmatic demands can risk overwhelming some of the deepest and farthest ranging elements of this action. Hence, as organizers and activists get swept up in struggles around immediate issues, time and focus constraints make it is easy for the deeper relation building work to be set aside—especially when a coalition is already sufficiently powerful to win on issues concerning relatively small infrastructural improvements in poor neighborhoods, small job training programs, etc. Forming working relationships with powerful political and economic actors enhances efficacy, but it can dampen efforts to discern paths toward more radical change with respect to these very powers.”
        [Romand Coles, “Moving Democracy: Industrial Areas Foundation Social Movements and the Political Arts of Listening, Traveling, and Tabling.” Political Theory. Volume 32, number 5, October 2004. Pages 678-705.]
    39. economic reasoning (Marcel Mauss as pronounced in this MP3 audio file): Mauss (1872–1950) was a French anthropologist and sociologist. David Graeber refers to his perspective as ‘transactional logics.”
        “Economic reasoning is a recent type of reasoning.… The category ‘economic’ is a modern category. Modern man is always in a market. We have almost reached the absolute end of the closed domestic economy. owing to the primacy of the monetary factors of capital accumulation and credit distribution. to the development of mechanical mass production requiring considerable capital, and to the reduction even of agriculture to economic forms. Moreover, we think on a national scale of values and even an international one. The problem of distribution, which in the past used to take place within the clan and the family according to fixed rules, is now resolved in the public market.
        “The question of the priority of communism over individualism does not arise.… In reality everything happens as if each individual and each social group were in a constant state of endosmosis and exosmosis relative to all the others.
        “If one really wants, societies can be defined by their communism or individualism, or more precisely by the degree of communism and individualism that they show. Both are always present; the task is to determine their respective proportions.
        “If it is really desired, we can define the category ‘economic’ in the thinking of a society as being the whole set of values and institutions relating to those values, acknowledged by that society. Thus, we shall say that rural property in the neighbourhood of Paris belongs to a capitalist economic regime. Here we have large farms requiring massive financial investments; the work is done by paid employees. not by the owner. But the technology is that of an industrial enterprise, and the organisation also is of an industrial nature.”
        [Marcel Mauss. Manual of Ethnography. Dominique Lussier, translator. N. J. Allen, editor. New York: Durkheim Press/Berghahn Books. 2007. Pages 98-99.]
        “… the individual must work. He should be forced to rely upon himself rather than upon others. On the other hand, he must defend his interests, both personally and as a member of a group. Over-generosity, or communism, would be as harmful to himself and to society as the egoism of our contemporaries and the individualism of our laws.…
        “Thus we can and must return to archaic society and to elements in it. We shall find in this reasons for life and action that are still prevalent in certain societies and numerous social classes: the joy of public giving; the pleasure in generous expenditure on the arts, in hospitality, and in the private and public festival. Social security, the solicitude arising from reciprocity and cooperation, and that of the occupational grouping, of all those legal entities upon which English law bestows the name of ‘Friendly Societies’—all are of greater value than the mere personal security that the lord afforded his tenant, better than the skimpy life that is given through the daily wages doled out by employers, and even better than capitalist saving—which is only based on a changing form of credit.”
        [Marcel Mauss. The Gift: The form and reason for exchange in archaic societies. W. D. Halls, translator. London and New York: Routledge imprint of Taylor & Francis Group, an Informa PLC business. 2002. Pages 88-89.]
        “The gift is not a uniform economic category, since gifts are structured by different economic principles or moral rules which co-exist in all societies. [Marcel] Mauss showed that dominant economic forms, like capitalist markets or the heroic gift, often elevate one principle above the others, but ordinary people must combine them in order to get by. There are three moral grounds for economic relations: communism, exchange and hierarchy. Everyday communism is basic to living in society. It is presumptively eternal, a permanent sense of being mutually indebted. Exchange or reciprocity strives to achieve equivalence, so that indebtedness is temporary and should ideally be cancelled. Hierarchy is a permanent relationship between unequal parties. The rhetoric of reciprocity disguises the working principle, which is precedent. Debt here is irrevocable and transfers pass only one way. Ethnography allows us to conceive of making new societies where the balance of economic principles is different from our own.…
        “Whether ‘gifts’ are seen as a matter of generosity, a lack of calculation, creating social relations or a refusal to distinguish between generosity and self-interest, the possibility that they operate according to different transactional logics is often overlooked.”
        [David Graeber, “On the moral grounds of economic relations: A Maussian approach.” Journal of Classical Sociology. Volume 14, number 1, February 2014. Pages 65-77.]
    40. cultural economy or cultural economics (Sarah Hinde, and Jane Dixon, Ash Amin [ʾUrdū, آش امِین, ʾš ʾAmīn], Nigel Thrift, and many others): This approach to heterodox economics and to human geography has had a variety of influences, including Karl Marx, Friedrich Engels, and Walter Benjamin.
        “… [There have been] numerous sociological luminaries as contributors to the theoretical hybrid [cultural economy]: [Karl] Marx, [Friedrich] Engels, [Thorstein] Veblen, [Max] Weber, [Michel] Foucault, [Georg] Simmel, [Walter] Benjamin and [Georges] Bataille.” [Sarah Hinde and Jane Dixon, “Reinstating Pierre Bourdieu’s contribution to cultural economy theorizing.” Journal of Sociology. Volume 43, number 4, 2007. Pages 401-420.]
        “A … cultural-economy register draws attention to particular practices of power scripted into an everyday machinery of organization and control that acts not only to safeguard and advance particular economic interests (as Marxian analysis has so effectively shown), but also to authenticate, authorize, and compel in the economic domain ….
        “… [Another] register relates to the power and reach of symptomatic or emblematic readings of the economy. The cultural-economy approach, following a long lineage of thought on general models of economic development (eg, [Karl] Marx’s projection of the English experience as the global standard of intensive accumulation, or travels in time and space across the Muslim world of strict Islamic rules on borrowing), pays considerable attention to the role of ideal types of the economy in setting a world standard.”
        [Ash Amin with Nigel Thrift, “Cultural-economy and cities.” Progress in Human Geography. Volume 31, number 2, April 2007. Pages 143-161.]
        “This book can be seen as both a contribution to this growing body of heterodox economic knowledge, and also as an extension of it.…
        “… we want to trace out some of the possible approaches to cultural economy that are currently circulating.…
        “… [One] approach focuses on symptoms. Interpretations of Euro-American economies as symptoms of general economic modes or models have been a constant of cultural life since at least the time of Adam Smith. These economic readings have had powerful cultural effects. One only has to think of the work of [Karl] Marx and [Friedrich] Engels to see the way in which such readings are able to reinscribe how cultures see themselves as a single functioning economic system, which, in turn, is returned to these cultures as an established economic and cultural fact. This is exactly how Marx and Engels were able to project nineteenth-century English capitalism – despite all its peculiarities – as a world economic standard and its class culture as the only culture.”
        [Ash Amin and Nigel Thrift, “Introduction.” The Blackwell Cultural Economy Reader. Ash Amin and Nigel Thrift, editors. Malden, Massachusetts: Blackwell Publishing Ltd. 2004. Pages x-xxx.]
        “‘Cultural economy’ has been used in multiple ways. We examine four approaches, the difficulties associated with their use, and their implications for research agendas. These four are the sectoral delineation of cultural economy, the labour market and organization of production approach, the creative index definition, and the convergence of formats as a defining feature ofthe cultural economy.” [Chris Gibson and Lily Kong, “Cultural economy: a critical review.” Progress in Human Geography. Volume 29, number 5, 2005. Pages 541-561.]
        “… [An] obvious sociological influence on contemporary theories of cultural economy has been the sociology of culture literature, with Pierre Bourdieu’s work being highly significant here …. In positing a relationship between cultural consumption and the reproduction of social class relations, and in proposing that this occurred at least in part through the denial of ‘material’ concepts such as that of class being relevant to the domains of art and culture, Bourdieu established a relationship between the distribution of economic capital and that of cultural capital which places socio-economic relations at the heart of considerations of culture. In championing Bourdieu’s work as a contribution to the sociology of culture, Raymond Williams and Nicholas Garnham observed that ‘the cultural field serves as a marker and thus a reinforcer of class relations … [as] a field in which par excellence the struggle is governed by a pure logic of difference or distinction … [and] because the creation of art as a special social object and practice … objectively depends upon the distance from economic necessity provided by the possession of economic capital’ ….” [Terry Flew, “The Cultural Economy Moment?” Journal of Cultural Science. Volume 2, number 1, 2009. Pages 1-11.]
        “… if some local/regional cultures are under serious threat at the present time, others are finding widening and receptive audiences. In fact some places, and nowhere more so than in the heartlands of modern world capitalism — places like New York, Los Angeles, London, Paris and Tokyo, to mention only a few of the most obvious examples — continue to be unique and highly creative generators of culture, and above all, to function as the bulwarks of a new cultural economy of capitalism. Whatever the political consequences of this predicament-laden situation may be, it does not so much herald a trend to absolute cultural uniformity across the world as it does an alternative and subtle kind of regional cultural differentiation articulated with an expanding structure of national and international cultural niches (adolescents, environmentalists, art collectors, nuclear physicists and so on).” [Allen J. Scott, “The Cultural Economy of Cities.” International Journal of Urban and Regional Research. Volume 21, issue 2, June 1997. Pages 323-329.]
        “During the last 40 years cultural economics has attracted researchers from a wide variety of backgrounds such as public economics, employment economics and industrial economics. They subscribe to the idea that markets for cultural goods cannot function optimally as they are subject to a number of problems.…
        “It is not our intention here to assess the cultural economy on the basis of Welfare Economics ….
        “The cultural economy has always acknowledged the fact that the production of innovative goods involves the use of specific skills.”
        [Xavier Greffe, “From culture to creativity and the creative economy: A new agenda for cultural economics.” City, Culture and Society. Volume 7, issue 2, June 2016. Pages 71-74.]
        “The impact of cultural economics on the development of economic theory only begins to show in a few instances, as in the case of the ‘Cost disease.’ Most of the contributions discussed are rather recent, and their more general relevance is rarely recognized.… The horizon of cultural economics is wide. The discipline may be exotic with respect to the items which constitute the markets studied. But it is at the center of the issues that economic theory has to be able to deal with in order to be relevant to the problems of post-industrialist economies in the information age.“ [Michael Hutter, “The Impact of Cultural Economics on Economic Theory.” Journal of Cultural Economics. Volume 20, number 4, December 1996. Pages 263-268.]
        “I think one can say without exaggeration that in the last five years or so, more has changed in the economics of culture than in any comparably short period in human existence. Probably ever. I think it goes beyond the invention of the printing press in the West, which took some time to have an impact. However, in the United States and in a lot of the world, cultural economics has in my view been completely upended, mostly by new technologies, and I think of our topic as changing very rapidly and that we are all living in a very exciting and in some ways frightening time.” [Tyler Cowen, “Why everything has changed: the recent revolution in cultural economics.” Journal of Cultural Economics. Volume 32, number 4, December 2008. Pages 261-273.]
        “A common dualistic couplet deployed in the analysis of the cultural economy is that of culturalisation–economistation. As a dualism this is, on one hand, presented as economic activities being increasingly inflected with cultural topes and performance etc. rather than simple differentiation of value. This has been taken as an account for the deployment of culture to increase market segmentation and develop niche markets in a circumstance of oversupply, or market saturation. Some writers make a link with flexible specialisation and what they term a reflexive turn, that is indexed to growing demand from consumers for an ever differentiated product market (by design) and the organisational and productive means to satisfy it (flexible specialisation). Hence, it is argued, culturalisation is endemic in late capitalism.– [Andy Pratt, “Cultural Economy.” International Encylopedia of Human Geography. Volume Two. Rob Kitchin and Nigel Thrift, editors. Amsterdam, the Netherlands: Elsevier Science imprint of Elsevier. 2009. Pages 407-410.]
        “Exploring and assessing the explanatory reach of this ‘economics as culture’ or ‘cultural economy’ perspective provides one of the central themes of this volume, as a brief examination of the individual chapters makes clear. It does not, however, provide the sole focus. For our term ‘cultural economy’ is also designed to carry another register of meaning or signify another set of debates. This second strand refers to certain epochal claims – often associated with terms such as ‘economies of signs,’ ‘the network society,’ ‘ the knowledge economy,’ and so on and so forth – that we are living through an era in which economic and organizational life has become increasingly ‘culturalized’ ….” [Paul du Gay and Michael Pryke, “Cultural Economy: An Introduction.” Cultural Economy: Cultural Analysis and Commercial Life. Paul du Gay and Michael Pryke, editors. Thousand Oaks, California: SAGE Publications, Inc. 2002. Pages 1-19.]
    41. political economy of commons (Yochai Benkler [Hebrew/ʿIḇəriyṯ, יוֹחַאי בֶּנְקְלֶר Yōḥạʾy Bẹnəqəlẹr]): He develops a political economic approach to shared public spaces.
        “Commons are institutional spaces, in which we can practice a particular type of freedom – freedom from the constraints we normally accept as necessary preconditions to functional markets.…
        “Commons are a particular type of institutional arrangement for governing the use and disposition of resources. Their salient characteristic, which defines them in contradistinction to property, is that no single person has exclusive control over the use and disposition of any particular resource. Instead, resources governed by commons may be used or disposed of by anyone among some (more or less well defined) number of persons, under rules that may range from ‘anything goes’ to quite crisply articulated formal rules that are effectively enforced.…
        “What the commons makes possible is an environment in which individuals and groups can produce information and culture for their own sake. It allows for the development of a substantially more expansive role both for nonmarket production and for radically decentralized production. Already we are seeing nonprofit organizations using the World Wide Web to provide information or points of cultural exchange with much greater reach and efficacy than was ever before possible.”
        [Yochai Benkler, “The Political Economy of Commons.” Upgrade: The European Journal for the Informatics Professional. Volume IV, number 3, June 2003. Pages 6-9.]
    42. pluralist heterodox economics (John E. King): He emphasizes the importance of a diverse, heterodox economic approach, including critical realism in economics.
        “In this lecture, I shall present a case for pluralism in economics, derived from the complex and ceaselessly changing nature of the world in which we live.…
        “Before moving to the second part of my argument, the principle of historical specificity, I will mention two of the important issues that the monolithic mainstream cannot satisfactorily deal with but a pluralist heterodox economics can. The first is the diversity of markets ….
        “The second theme is the importance (and complexity) of power in economics, viewed much more broadly than it is in the narrow conception of ‘market power’ that exhausts the mainstream treatment of the subject.…
        “If this lecture was being given by feminist economists like Gillian Hewitson or Therese Jefferson, they would have stressed two additional questions: the gender dimension to economic activity, which I have only touched on, and the methodological issues that are implicit in what I have been arguing, especially the questions of ontology stressed by thinkers in the post-structuralist and critical realist traditions ….”
        [John E. King, “A case for pluralism in economics.” The Economic and Labour Relations Review. Volume 24, number 1, March 2013. Pages 17-31.]
    43. epistemological communities (Barbara E. Hopkins): She proposes a way of examining pluralism in heterodox economics.
        “Economics is made up of many smaller and overlapping epistemological communities. There are many epistemological communities within mainstream economics. These groups can be defined by fields, but they can also be separated by perspectives, such as rational expectations, monetarism, and mainstream Keynesianism. But these groups recognize a shared identity as economists because they adhere to a set of social norms or rules that determine the acceptance or validity of argument. These norms require formal mathematical modeling or the use of econometric statistical techniques. Although one can consider mainstream economics a unified epistemological community, it is useful to consider the role that fields of study play in the process of critical scrutiny. Fields of study are recognized as specialties. In other words, reviewers with a specialty in industrial organization, for example, do not consider themselves qualified to evaluate research in labor economics.” [Barbara E. Hopkins, “The Institutional Barriers to Heterodox Pluralism.” Review of Radical Political Economics. Voluem 42, number 3, 2010. Pages 338-343.]
    44. public utility finance system (Robin Blackburn): He considers ways to finance this system.
        “A public utility finance system would have at its core publicly owned and publicly accountable banks. regulatory agencies and social funds. The latter would inform and empower individual citizens, and regional or local networks. The neo liberal model, by contrast, hands over public assets and social programmes to private corporations and promotes a pervasive commodification of health, education, pensions and access to the natural environment. Indeed, commodification goes so deep today that it seeks to convert every citizen into a two legged calculating machine, making their own lives into a financial cost and profit centre. Students are encouraged to take on debt, householders to take out mortgages, consumers to buy on credit and citizens to use commercial entities to insure their own life course risks rather than sharing and spreading them according to a scheme of intergenerational solidarity and justice.” [Robin Blackburn. Age Shock: How Finance is Failing Us. London and New York: Verso imprint of New Left Books. 2011. Pages xxxii-xxxiii.]
        “It [the Left] must reach out to alternatives, and these should centrally include the establishment of a public utility finance system, the levying of taxes on capital, the building of local networks of democratically controlled social funds and a programme of diversified development.…
        “The banks have been so dependent on the taxpayer and public support that there is an overwhelming case for large public stakes. The banks – large and small – could be obliged to issue shares equivalent to 40 per cent of their annual profits to a regional network of social funds. Using these funds as their security the regional funds could then draw up – in association with local elective bodies – a ten-year programme of productive investment, embracing both public and private ventures. Such a programme might include public universities and research institutes, Green energy schemes, and universal access to broadband and other informational systems.
        “While I believe that this is the best way to finance the emergence of a public utility finance system, other sources of capital might come from a land tax on commercial real estate and a general share levy on large corporations.”
        [Robin Blackburn, “Alternatives to austerity: The need for a public utility finance system.” Radical Philosophy: Philosophical Journal of the Independent Left. Number 165, January/February 2011. Pages 10-13.]
    45. integral or full-spectrum economics (Christian Arnsperger as pronounced in this MP3 audio file): He develops an approach to heterodox economics informed by Ken Wilber’s integral theory.
        “Economics is essential in today’s world, and yet mainstream economists are increasingly under criticism for not taking into account sufficiently many dimensions of real life, such as political and moral values, human development, spirituality, and people’s widely shared aspiration to live more liberated lives. This book offers a critical assessment of contemporary mainstream economics by showing that the discipline has become much too narrow and misses out on the full spectrum of human existence.“ [Christian Arnsperger. Full-Spectrum Economics: Toward an Inclusive and Emancipatory Social Science. London and New York: Routledge imprint of Taylor & Francis Group, an Informa PLC business. 2010. Page 3.]
        “The expression full spectrum is a synonym for integral. I have used it in order for Full-Spectrum Economics to be accessible to economists who have never heard of Ken Wilber or the Integral approach, and who would find such an epithet rather grandiose.…
        “… Integral Economics … must aim to understand:
        • “The economic system’s existential performance: how do agents experience their deeper existential dimensions within the system?
        • “The economic system’s critical performance: to what extent does the system allow the agents within it to develop, and act upon, critical abilities?”
        [Christian Arnsperger, “Spelling Out Integral Economic Science: The Full-Spectrum Project.” Journal of Integral Theory and Practice. Volume 5, number 3, September 2010. Pages 175-193.]
    46. emancipatory economic geography (Paul Plummer and Eric Sheppard): They develop this anti-capitalist approach as “a critique of mainstream economic thinking.”
        “At the heart of any emancipatory economic geography must be a critique of mainstream economic thinking ….
        “An emancipatory economic geography must also move beyond critique, both to provide a deeper understanding of the spatial dynamics and social consequences of capitalism as we know it and to use this understanding as a basis for thinking about other possible worlds.…
        “Our point here is simple: quantitative approaches to economic geography can and should be liberated from their needless association with mainstream economics and its own vision of science, truth, and evidence, and be made part of an emancipatory economic geography.”
        [Paul Plummer and Eric Sheppard, “Must Emancipatory Economic Geography be Qualitative?” Antipode. Volume 33, issue 2, March 2001. Pages 194-199.]
    47. post Keynesian economics (John Maynard Keynes and many others): This interpretation of Kenyes’ views is one of the more dominant heterodox economic schools. A few variants are provided in subsequent listings.
        “The outline of our theory can be expressed as follows. When employment increases, aggregate real income is increased. The psychology of the community is such that when aggregate real income is increased aggregate consumption is increased, but not by so much as income. Hence employers would make a loss if the whole of the increased employment were to be devoted to satisfying the increased demand for immediate consumption. Thus, to justify any given amount of employment there must be an amount of current investment sufficient to absorb the excess of total output over what the community chooses to consume when employment is at the given level. For unless there is this amount of investment, the receipts of the entrepreneurs will be less than is required to induce them to offer the given amount of employment. It follows, therefore, that, given what we shall call the community’s propensity to consume, the equilibrium level of employment, i.e. the level at which there is no inducement to employers as a whole either to expand or to contract employment, will depend on the amount of current investment. The amount of current investment will depend, in turn, on what we shall call the inducement to invest; and the inducement to invest will be found to depend on the relation between the schedule of the marginal efficiency of capital and the complex of rates of interest on loans of various maturities and risks.” [John Maynard Keynes. The General Theory of Employment, Interest, and Money. New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company. 1935. Ebook edition.]
        “Perhaps the reader feels that … [the] general, philosophical disquisition on the behavior of mankind is somewhat remote from the economic theory under discussion. But I think not. Tho this is how we behave in the market place, the theory we devise in the study of how we behave in the market place should not itself submit to market-place idols. I accuse the classical economic theory of being itself one of these pretty, polite techniques which tries to deal with the present by abstracting from the fact that we know very little about the future.” [John Maynard Keynes, “The General Theory of Employment.” The Quarterly Journal of Economics. Volume 51, number 2, February 1937. Pages 209-223.]
        “Twenty years ago, Tony Thirlwall … summarised Post Keynesian macroeconomics in terms of six core propositions. First, employment and unemployment are determined in the product market, not the labour market. Second, involuntary unemployment exists, and is caused by deficient effective demand; it is not the result of labour market imperfections, and it would not be eliminated if such imperfections were removed. Third, the relationship between aggregate investment and aggregate saving is fundamental to macroeconomic theory, and causation runs from investment to saving, and not vice versa.… Fourth, a monetary economy is quite different from a barter economy: money is not neutral, finance is important and debt matters. Fifth, the Quantity Theory of Money is seriously misleading …. Sixth, capitalist economies are driven by the ‘animal spirits’ of investors, which determine investment.” [J. E. King, “A Brief Introduction to Post Keynesian Macroeconomics.” Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft. Volume 39, number 4, 2013. Pages 485-508.]
        “… since [John Maynard] Keynes’s whole work is centred about the concept of full employment, it is important to get our notions about that clear. Most people by this time understand that he used this phrase in a peculiar sense. He did not mean by it, as the words in their natural sense imply, a state of things in which the number of persons actually employed is equal to the number of would-be employees. He meant by it this latter number minus ‘frictional unemployment’ associated with imperfections of mobility. It will be convenient to follow his usage here subject to an emendation. I shall regard employment as full when the number of persons actually employed is equal to the number of would-be employees minus frictional unemployment and when there are no unfilled vacancies (except frictional unfilled vacancies). When the number of persons actually employed is equal to the number of would-be employees minus frictional unemployment, and there are unfilled vacancies (over and above frictional unfilled vacancies), I say that there is over-full employment; the degree of over-fullness being measured by the number of unfilled vacancies other than frictional ones.” [A. C. Pigou. Keynes’s ‘General Theory’: A Retrospective View. London: Macmillan & Co. Ltd. 1950. Pages 4-5.]
        “The growth of the Post Keynesian community did not come at the expense of the other heterodox communities. Rather, as heterodox economists became more aware of Post Keynesian theory and Post Keynesians became more involved with the other heterodox communities, heterodox economists in general became members of two or more of the communities. Moreover, because of the overlap of community membership, conferences ceased to be specifically identified with a single community, and community journals published articles by economists who were also members of other heterodox communities.” [Frederic S. Lee, “Mutual Aid and the Making of Heterodox Economics in Postwar America: a Post Keynesian View.” History of Economics Review. Volume 35, issue 1, 2002. Pages 45-63.]
        “Perhaps the most fundamental tenet common to all Post Keynesians is the principle of effective demand. This expression has been given a few different meanings …, but it is often associated with three interrelated ideas: the determination of income by expenditure; the determination of employment and output by the producers’ expectations of costs and proceeds; and the possibility of persistent involuntary unemployment, due to a low level of aggregate demand.…
        “Another important unifying feature of Post Keynesianism is the emphasis on institutions.…
        “Closely related to the emphasis on money is an emphasis on what can be generically, albeit somewhat imprecisely, called Keynesian uncertainty or uncertainty in a strong sense.”
        [David Dequech, “Post Keynesianism, Heterodoxy and Mainstream Economics.” Review of Political Economy. Volume 24, number 2, April 2012. Pages 353-368.]
    48. structure of post Keynesian economics (Geoffrey Colin Harcourt): He explains his own approach to post Keynesian economics.
        “… much effort has been devoted in post- Keynesian circles (and others, of course) to describing non-competitive (or imperfectly competitive) market structures and their implications for pricing and the investment decision. Much of this work is microeconomic in character and the systemic effects have at best only been sketched. Nevertheless, there are some disquieting aspects that need to be thought about. Before doing so, let me conjecture that with the increase in international competitiveness of the past three decades, in both goods and services, especially financial services, the world economy may be closer to the competitive model, albeit a ruthless jungle red in tooth and claw, than it was when the writings referred to above were first developed. If so, our minds may be put more at ease on that score.” [G. C. Harcourt. The Structure of Post-Keynesian Economics: The Core Contributions of the Pioneers. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press. 2006. Page 155.]
        “When writing the book [The Structure of Post-Keynesian Economics: The Core Contributions of the Pioneers], I had in mind two sets of readers: first, undergraduate and graduate students who may be looking for alternative approaches to thinking about theoretical, applied and policy issues in economics. By presenting a structure of the thought (and its origins) that I have found so helpful over my working life I hope to at least interest and possibly even enthuse this first set. Secondly, I also hope that what I have written may interest teachers and researchers in economics, not so much perhaps for the details of the analysis, with which many would be familiar, but for the way in which one person at least sees the interconnections and interrelationships which have emerged as our discipline has evolved and developed.” [G. C. Harcourt, “The Structure of Post-Keynesian Economics: The Core Contributions of the Pioneers.” Review of Current Issues in Economics. Volume 52, special issue, 2006. Pages 5-10.]
        “Why post-Keynesian economics and who were its Cambridge pioneers? Maynard Keynes, Richard Kahn, Richard Goodwin, Nicholas Kaldor, Luigi Pasinetti, Joan Robinson and Piero Sraffa all started initially, at least in some degree, within the mainstream of their time. They all moved well and truly outside it, attempting to create either a revolutionary alternative or to rehabilitate the classical Marxian tradition, in most cases in the light of the Keynesian revolution. The one exception is Michal Kalecki, whose personal history and independent mind combined to place him virtually always outside the mainstream. The book, though, is not principally concerned with why and how the discontents that led them to change their minds arose. Rather, its principal object is to set out the structures of their alternative approaches in order to suggest modes of thinking about theoretical and policy issues in political economy.” [G. C. Harcourt, “The Structure of Post-Keynesian Economics: The Core Contributions of the Pioneers.” History of Economics Review. Volume 45, winter 2007. Pages 95-105.]
    49. post Keynesian socialism (Howard J. Sherman): With the qualification that most post Keynesians are not socialists, he explains the perspective.
        “Most Post Keynesians are not socialists. But almost all are reformers, who advocate major reforms of capitalism, designed not only to help stability, but also to increase equality. There is nothing incompatible between advocating major reforms in the short run and advocating a complete change to socialism in the long run. So a minority of Post Keynesians are also socialists.…
        “All Post Keynesian socialists are agreed that any socialist society must be democratic. To understand the issue fully, however, the long and convoluted history of this issue must be briefly mentioned. Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels fought in the 1848 revolution for democracy in Germany and they supported every movement for democracy in their lifetime. European socialist parties, from the German Social Democrats to the British Labour party grew up in a struggle for the extension of democracy, including suffrage rights for male workers and for women.”
        [Howard J. Sherman, “Socialism.” The Elgar Companion to Post Keynesian Economics. J. E. King, editor. Northampton, Massachusetts: Edward Elgar Publishing, Inc. 2003. Pages 313-317.]
    50. gendered post Keynesianism (Colin Danby): Informed by feminist theory, Danby develops a radical version of post Keynesian economics.
        “The concept of gender used throughout this paper is social-structural, not individual ….
        “… theoretical schools are not simply bundles of abstract principles: they are also sociological entities, with institutionalized practices, shared cultures, and characteristic rhetorical strategies.…
        “Once we begin to think about material life diachronically, intertemporally, we open up the possibility of a much more interesting subjectivity. The neoclassical subject, who seeks only pleasure in the instant, cannot worry, hope, regret, care, or feel responsibility for anyone else.… Post Keynesian subjects reflect, learn, and make moral distinctions.…
        “To this Post Keynesian approach, it is possible to begin counterposing feminist literatures that also stress subjects who are situated and reflective, constrained by a particular place and time, but still capable of projects, efforts, and hope. We thus open a path to considering the ways in which sentiment, conversation, and the thought that emerges from conversation and reflection might be part of material life …. In the feminist–Post Keynesian synthesis suggested here, we are inevitably in a world in which meanings matter.”
        [Colin Danby, “Toward a Gendered Post Keynesianism: Subjectivity and Time in a Nonmodernist Framework.” Feminist Economics. Volume 10, number 3, November 2004. Pages 55-75.]
    51. circular cumulative causation (Irene van Staveren as pronounced in this MP3 audio file): She develops a feminist approach to Post Keynesian macroeconomics.
        “When we accept the feminist understanding of the economy as including unpaid work and caring, and take this to the Post Keynesian tradition of macroeconomics, we find a possible connection through the idea of circular cumulative causation. This is the view that all sectors in the economy link together through feedbacks and interdependencies, in which demand is the primal moving force …. Once we recognize that provisioning can be supported not only by paid work and motivations of self-interest and power, but also by unpaid work and caring motivations, unpaid work and caring may be perceived as responses to needs that are not expressed in market demand, either because these needs lack purchasing power, or because markets and states fail to provide the relational aspect that the fulfilment of some needs requires. This makes it possible to analyse links between the monetized economy and unpaid work and caring through feedbacks, spill-over effects, substitution effects, and agency effects ….” [Irene van Staveren, “Post-Keynesianism meets feminist economics.” Cambridge Journal of Economics. Volume 34, number 6, November 2010. Pages 1123-1144.]
    52. new economics of sustainable development (James Robertson): Robertson made this report to the European Commission.
        “The interconnections between the changes needed for a shift to sustainability in different areas also constitute an ecology of change, (and a corresponding ecology of inertia). Change achieved in one area (e.g. energy) will help to ease change in others (e.g. agriculture, transport), and change frustrated in one area can help to frustrate it in others. This creates great scope (and also great need) for synergy in the design and implementation of new policies. Unfortunately the conventional departmental structure of governments and government agencies makes it difficult for them to capture this synergy. The departmentalization of faculties and disciplines in universities and research institutes creates comparable difficulties for them too. This is one reason why so much of the innovative policy work on the new economics of sustainable development has hitherto come – and, to be realistic, will probably continue to come — from outsiders and NGOs [nongovernmental organizations], and not from within professional staffs in government and academe.” [James Robertson. The New Economics of Sustainable Development: A Briefing for Policy Makers. London: Kogan Page. 1999. Page 31.]
    53. death economy (John Perkins): Perkins examines the war–based economy created by modern globalized American capitalism.
        “… [American] strategies have created a ‘death economy’ — one based on wars or the threat of war, debt, and the rape of the earth’s resources. It is an unsustainable economy that depletes at ever-increasing rates the very resources upon which it depends and at the same time poisons the air we breathe, the water we drink, and the foods we eat. Although the death economy is built on a form of capitalism, it is important to note that the word capitalism refers to an economic and political system in which trade and industry are controlled by private owners rather than the state. It includes local farmers’ markets as well as this very dangerous form of global corporate capitalism, controlled by the corporatocracy, which is predatory by nature, has created a death economy, and ultimately is self-destructive.” [John Perkins. The New Confessions of an Economic Hit Man. Oakland, California: Berrett-Koehler Publishers, Inc. 2016. Page 19.]
        “Instead of speculating about China, we must repent and reform. We need to take a long, hard look at what we in the United States — and our corporations, now gone global — have done. China is trying to emulate a system that is a failure.…
        “We in the United States and across the globe must stop using ‘them’ as scapegoats. Just as we must not fear ‘them,’ we must not blame ‘them’ or expect ‘them’ to solve the problem — the global problem of predatory corporate capitalism, a death economy. We need to recognize that ‘they’ are us. We ourselves — each and every one of us — must take responsibility. We must create a new model — one that the Chinese, the Brazilians, the Indians, our own president, our corporate and government leaders, and everyone else can follow.
        “It isn’t about changing the mechanics of economics. It is about changing the ideas, the dogmas that have driven economics for centuries: debt and fear, insufficiency, divide and conquer. It is about moving from ideas about merely being sustainable to ones that include regenerating areas devastated by agriculture, mining, and other destructive activities. It is about revolution. The transition from a death economy to a life economy is truly about a change in consciousness — a consciousness revolution.”
        [John Perkins. The New Confessions of an Economic Hit Man. Oakland, California: A BK Currents book imprint of Berrett-Koehler Publishers, Inc. 2016. Page 261.]
        “… in many cases helping an economy grow only makes those few people who sit atop the pyramid even richer, while it does nothing for those at the bottom except to push them even lower. Indeed, promoting capitalism often results in a system that resembles medieval feudal societies. If any of my professors knew this, they had not admitted it—probably because big corporations, and the men who run them, fund colleges. Exposing the truth would undoubtedly cost those professors their jobs—just as such revelations could cost me mine.” [John Perkins. Confessions of an Economic Hit Man. San Francisco, California: A BK Currents book imprint of Berrett-Koehler Publishers, Inc. 2004. Page 26.]
        “… I became more familiar with the circumstances surrounding the 1997 Asian economic collapse, also known as the ‘IMF [International Monetary Fund] crisis.’ This debacle began in Asia, where it impacted hundreds of millions of people and resulted in thousands—possibly millions—of deaths from disease, starvation, and suicides, and then spread across the globe. For those willing to listen, it sent a strong message about the true intent of the IMF and the World Bank, a lesson in how not to manage an economy, unless the goal is to further enrich the corporatocracy at the expense of everyone else.” [John Perkins. The Secret History of the American Empire: Economic Hit Men, Jackals, and the Truth about Global Corruption. New York: Dutton imprint of Penguin Group (USA) Inc. 2007. Ebook edition.]
    54. theory of moral economy (Ralph Barton Perry, Edward Palmer “E. P.” Thompson, James C. Scott, Charles Tripp, Timothy Gorman, Victoria Bernal, Lorraine Daston, Salah El-Sheikh [Arabic/ʿArabiyyaẗ, صَلَاح الشَيْخ, Ṣalāḥ ʾal-Šayḵ], and others): They develop various ethical approaches to the economy.
        “There is … [a particular] source of overindulgence in the ever-increasing complexity of the moral economy. The more numerous the interests, the more difficult the task of attending to their connections and managing their adjustment. Not only is the need of prudence never out grown; it steadily acquires both a greater urgency and a greater difficulty.
        “If incapacity may be said to be the metaphysical evil, the taint of the cosmos at large, over indulgence may be said to be the original sin, the taint of life itself. It is life’s offence against itself, the denial of greater life for the sake of the little in hand. It is the perennial failure of the individual interest to unite itself with that universal enterprise of which it is the microcosmic image.…
        “The simplest moral economy is that in which two or more interests are reciprocally adjusted without being subordinated. The principle of organization which defines such an economy is prudence. Prudence becomes necessary at the moment when interests come into such contact with one another as provokes retaliation. Thus, for example, interests react on one another through being embodied in the same physical organism. Each bodily activity depends on the well-being of co-ordinate functions, and if its exercise be so immoderate as to injure these, it undermines itself. Moderation gains for special interests the support of a general bodily health.”
        [Ralph Barton Perry. The Moral Economy. New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons. 1909. Pages 86-87.]
        “The food riot in eighteenth-century England was a highly-complex form of direct popular action, disciplined and with clear objectives. How far these objectives were achieved – that is, how far the food riot was a ‘successful’ form of action – is too intricate a question to tackle within the limits of an article; but the question can at least be posed (rather than, as is customary, being dismissed unexamined with a negative), and this cannot be done until the crowd’s own objectives are identified. It is of course true that riots were triggered off by soaring prices, by malpractices among dealers, or by hunger. But these grievances operated within a popular consensus as to what were legitimate and what were illegitimate practices in marketing, milling, baking, etc. This in its turn was grounded upon a consistent traditional view of social norms and obligations, of the proper economic functions of several parties within the community, which, taken together, can be said to constitute the moral economy of the poor. An outrage to these moral assumptions, quite as much as actual deprivation, was the usual occasion for direct action.” [E. P. Thompson, “The Moral Economy of the English Crowd in the Eighteenth Century.” Past & Present. Number 50, February 1971. Pages 76-136.]
        “A study of the moral economy of peasants can tell us what makes them angry and what is likely, other things being equal, to generate an explosive situation. But if anger born of exploitation were sufficient to spark a rebellion, most of the Third World (and not only the Third World) would be in flames. Whether peasants who perceive themselves to be exploited actually rebel depends on a host of intervening factors— such as alliances with other classes, the repressive capacity of dominant elites, and the social organization of the peasantry itself— which are not treated except in passing here. Instead, I deal with the nature of exploitation in peasant society as its victims are likely to see it, and what one might call the creation of social dynamite rather than its detonation.” [James C. Scott. The Moral Economy of the Peasant: Rebellion and Subsistence in Southeast Asia. New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press. 1976. Page 4.]
        “… [There is] clandestine and anonymous resistance in Sedaka. It finds expression in the killing of small and, more rarely, large livestock by the poor. Most of the village’s ragtag collection of chickens, ducks, geese, goats, water buffalo, and three beef cattle are owned by well-to-do households. They pose a considerable nuisance to the poor in many ways. Although barriers and chicken wire are often used to bar them, they frequently forage into the nursery beds, paddy fields, and small gardens of the poor, doing considerable damage. The poor are, of course, not the only ones affected (the livestock have, as yet, no class loyalties themselves), but they are the ones most deeply angered. Their anger does not merely stem from the fact that they can least afford the loss; it grows from something that might be called a ‘moral economy of diet.’” [James C. Scott. Weapons of the Weak: Everyday Forms of Peasant Resistance. New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press. 1985. Page 271.]
        “Much of the history of social struggle from, say, 1830 to 1950 could, in fact, be written as the attempt to create, in place of the wreckage of local moral-economies, an analogous ‘moral-economy state’ to provide national social insurance along comparable lines-no longer seen as a matter of local reciprocity but as right of citizenship.” [James C. Scott, “Afterword to ‘Moral Economies, State Spaces, and Categorical Violence.’” American Anthropologist. Volume 107, number 3, September 2005. Pages 395-402.]
        “… [Some people who not particularly] enchanted by the potential of capitalist development, feared the effects of capitalism on the moral economy. Acquisitiveness, centred on the commodification of goods and relationships, and based upon individual property rights, sanctioned by the pursuit of individual self-interest, were being reproduced by an expanding capitalist economy and threatened the pre-existing ethical framework of economic life. These concerns in the Islamic world followed lines similar to those visible in the writings of Christian socialists and others during the nineteenth century. For a number of Muslim writers, the preoccupation with the moral economy took two forms. Firstly, the ethical regulation of human transactions was seen as part of God’s purpose, and a necessary bulwark against the fracturing of society. Secondly, and specific to the discourse of those concerned about a distinctively Islamic society, there were fears about the particular identity of a society undergoing these changes. Both in the nineteenth and in the twentieth centuries, this fear raised the question of the price that a Muslim community might have to pay for success in a world not of its making, seeking to benefit without succumbing to its corruption.” [Charles Tripp. Islam and the Moral Economy: The Challenge of Capitalism. Camridge, England: Cambridge University Press. 2006. Pages 31-32.]
        “In the paper, I seek, first, to ground the development of this particular moral economy in the history of settlement, production and political struggle in the Mekong Delta and, second, to show how the articulation of this moral economy has shaped not just the distribution of land, but the overall trajectory of economic and social development in the region. In doing so, I aim to fill a gap in the existing literature, providing a bridge between micro-level accounts of local politics and macro-level accounts of political and economic change, both in the Mekong Delta and in Vietnam more broadly.” [Timothy Gorman, “Moral Economy and the Upper Peasant: The Dynamics of Land Privatization in the Mekong Delta.” Journal of Agrarian Change. Volume 14, number 4, October 2014. Pages 501-521.]
        “… the moral economy of Africa has obstructed the development of capitalism while the moral economy of Japan has taken the lead in promoting it? This suggests that there is some crucial difference in the form of moral economy between the two regions. It is necessary, therefore, to examine carefully what the cultural particularity of the African peasant economy is and how it is functioning in daily life.…
        “Studies of peasant moral economy have drawn attention to the meanings and values inherent in the economic behavior of peasants. Their behavior is often implicitly contrasted with Western economic behavior, which is assumed to be guided by rational calculation and narrowly economic goals …. Rationality and calculation, moreover, are revealed to function not as the principles governing colonial actions, but rather as tropes through which the colonizers represented Western culture and distinguished themselves from those they colonized. Colonial discourse on agricultural development can be read as cultural assertions having as much to do with the social relations of empire as with the cultivation of crops.” [Victoria Bernal, “Colonial Moral Economy and the Discipline of Development: The Gezira Scheme and ‘Modern’ Sudan.” Cultural Anthropology. Volume 12, number 4, 1997. Pages 447-479.]
        “What I mean by a moral economy is a web of affect-saturated values that stand and function in well-defined relationship to one another. In this usage, ‘moral’ carries its full complement of eighteenth- and nineteenth-century resonances: it refers at once to the psychological and to the normative.… A moral economy is a balanced system of emotional forces, with equilibrium points and constraints. Although it is a contingent, malleable thing of no necessity, a moral economy has a certain logic to its composition and operations. Not all conceivable combinations of affects and values are in fact possible. Much of the stability and integrity of a moral economy derives from its ties to activities, such as precision measurement or collaborative empiricism, which anchor and entrench but do not determine it.” [Lorraine Daston, “The Moral Economy of Science.” Osiris. Volume 10, 1995. Pages 2-24.]
        “In this article, I attempt to sketch out a verbal ‘model’ of the ‘classical’ economy of historical Islam, one that assembles what is known of its basic ‘building blocks’ in a coherent system that highlights its moral and legal philosophy, and encapsulates its fundamental principles and ‘laws of motion’ in theory as well as its modus operandi in practice.…
        “Viewed in its totality, the idealized world of the classical jurists ensures a complete knowledge (of exchanged objects), one that negates avoidable risks and uncertainties (hence potential deceits) regarding performance. As such, their world — it seems — is akin to the perfect-knowledge and perfect-foresight requirements of perfect competition, the central concept of the idealized market system of modern economics …. In both worlds the community’s economic welfare is sought, notwithstanding the difference in their respective moral justification.”
        [Salah El-Sheikh, “The Moral Economy of Classical Islam: A FiqhiConomic Model.” The Muslim World. Volume 98, issue 1, January 2008. Pages 116-144.]
        “‘Moral economy’ in Africa is characterized by networks of kinship, friendship and neighbourhood based on the norm of ‘generalized reciprocity,’ in which counter-obligations are not always necessary. Another unique aspect is that accumulation of wealth is mainly done in spheres of consumption and social reproduction. It is on this internal logic that we have to contemplate the future development of rural Africa.”
        [Kazuhiko Sugimura, “Africain [sic; African] Peasants and Moral Economy.” PEKEA Newsletter. Number 9, January–March 2007. Pages 1-6.]
        “The conceptual framing of the research builds upon the notion of moral economy. The theory of moral economy assumes that economic activities are defined and legitimized by moral beliefs, values, and norms …. In particular, agrarian communities are said to share a set of normative attitudes concerning the social relations that surround their local economies. Social networks and culturally legitimized dealings tend to prevail over market-efficient behavior, as they promote the survival of the community under the conditions of scarcity ….” [Katarzyna Cieslik, “Moral Economy Meets Social Enterprise Community-Based Green Energy Project in Rural Burundi.” World Development. Volume 83, July 2016. Pages 12-26.]
        “… [There is an] economy of the moral values and norms of a given group in a given moment. I will retain this meaning here in the analysis of the values and norms by which immigration and asylum are thought and acted on and, in a broader sense, which define our moral world …. This moral economy defines the scope of contemporary biopolitics considered as the politics that deals with the lives of human beings.” [Didier Fassin, “Compassion and Repression: The Moral Economy of Immigration Policies in France.” Cultural Anthropology. Volume 20, issue 3, 2005. Pages 362-387.]
        “The ‘moral economy’ used by Slow Food is not so far from the sense that scholars give to this notion in other movements. Indeed it is a growing presence in scientific debates …. The spaces of political action permitted in alternative moral economies allow a renewed commitment. Positive proposals, ‘for’ something – pleasure and conviviality or local economies for example – … now include the movement being ‘against’ something else more explicitly – whether it is industrial agriculture or GMOs [genetically modified organisms].” [Valeria Siniscalchi, “Environment, regulation and the moral economy of food in the Slow Food movement.” Journal of Political Ecology. Volume 20, 2013. Pages 295-305.]
        “… we noticed the slippage between national, economic and moral values and how they combine on the person.11 A slippage that we attempted to unpack by examining where and how they cohered or not: for instance, a fat, smoking, drinking, body was repeatedly coded and read as a sign of an unproductive, lazy, non-disciplined, non-self-investing person who was likely to be a drain on the nation through health costs.” [Beverley Skeggs, “The Moral Economy of Person Production: the Class Relations of Self-Performance on ‘Reality’ Television.” Sociologia: Revista do Departamento de Sociologia da FLUP. Volume XX, 2010. Pages 67-84.]
        “… I reconstruct the collectively shared repertoire that constitutes the ‘moral economy of inequality’ in Germany. Specifically, I ask which reasons underlie the acceptance of income differentiation based on merit and at which point acceptable income differences turn into objectionable inequalities. My results show that while people agree with abstract inegalitarian principles—in particular the idea of merit—for functional and normative reasons, they are at the same time critical of specific instances of inequality, especially poverty and wealth. These are considered problematic because they are seen as preventing the poor from participating in a way of life seen as the societal norm and enable the rich to set themselves further apart from the rest of society, thereby straining sentiments of community and societal integration.” [Patrick Sachweh, “The moral economy of inequality: popular views on income differentiation, poverty and wealth.” Socio-Economic Review. Volume 10, 2012. Pages 419-445.]
        “… we discuss the particular moral-economic characteristics of the civic food networks of the city of Manchester. We will argue that contemporary alternative agri- food economic practices constitute a moral economy organized around relations of solidarity and justice with proximate and distant others, concern for land and for the global environment, social inclusion of the disadvantaged, and the reskilling of everyday life, thus going beyond a narrow understanding of economic value …. However, we also aim to identify the ways in which the moral economy of these networks is conditioned by the character of morality in modern societies, and argue for the former’s potential to contribute to a wider societal transformation of the agri-food system.” [Katerina Psarikidou and Bronislaw Szerszynski, “The Moral Economy of Civic Food Networks in Manchester.” International Journal of Sociology of Agriculture and Food. Volume 19, number 3, 2012. Pages 309-327.]
        “Moral Economy is one of several recognized systems of normative behavior that originate from lived experience and people’s intuitive sense of justice. It may be compatible with some formalized top-down theories and it may even be possible to formalize it as a coherent theory, but it did not originate as theory and does not depend on any such theory to function adequately in many communities. Moral Economy occupies the same space as many Western political, economic, and ethical theories, but it also addresses issues ignored by them, especially considerations of exchange and social behavior that are not neatly divided into those three categories.” [Elizabeth D. Mauritz. Moral Economy: Claims for the Common Good. Ph.D. dissertation. Michigan State University. East Lansing, Michigan. 2014. Pages 1-2.]
        “Social revolutions and popular protest have been the major focus of Scott’s work in his various books. By examining the cultural and moral disquiet that informs all forms of protest, Scott has provided anthropologists and social theorists a wide-ranging analytical vocabulary for speaking about peace and its inseparable twin-violence. His particular area of expertise has been the arts of repressive peace, and the artfulness of those who elude or defy such silencing technologies. As [James C.] Scott notes in The Moral Economy of the Peasant …, he deals with ‘the nature of exploitation in peasant society as the victims are likely to see it, and what one might call the creation of social dynamite rather than its detonation’ …. By examining closely the extraordinary actions, words, and struggles of ordinary people, Scott shows us that peace is accomplished at great cost. His work reminds us that several generations may die working for a peace they will never see themselves; nevertheless, they continue to work without any diminution in their passion for it, regardless of the consequences.” [K. Sivaramakrishnan, “Introduction to ‘Moral Economies, State Spaces, and Categorical Violence.’” American Anthropologist. Volume 107, number 3, September 2005. Pages 321-330.]
        “… the success of the concept of moral economy was not refuted for nearly forty years, a success that went well beyond the circles of the social history of Marxist thought, where it inspired as much enthusiasm as criticism. In the United States, it was the object of a relatively faithful re-appropriation in anthropology, thanks especially to James C. Scott, … a political scientist, whose work on the moral economy of the peasants of Southeast Asia in the early 1980s opened the path to a substantial network of researchers working on economic logic and social mobilization in rural areas in developing countries.” [Didier Fassin, “Moral Economies Revisited.” Annales: Histoire, Sciences Sociales. Volume 64, June 2009. Pages 1237-1266.]
        “In Moral Economy [The Moral Economy of the Peasant: Rebellion and Subsistence in Southeast Asia], he [James C. Scott] sought to contrast rebellion and unrest with alternatives to such popular forms of struggle. The tide of national liberation movements in Southeast Asia was clearly subsiding, and he was concerned with predicting future forms of overt and covert rebellion (resistance was not yet a keyword for him) among the Malay peasantry.… As its subtitle, Rebellion and Subsistence in Southeast Asia, indicates, Moral Economy is based on theoretical conclusions with regard to a limited geographic and cultural area in which Scott has expertise and represents a more nuanced approach to resistance in its various expressions and interrelations with other phenomena. Among other things, it helps explain overt rebellion in times of crisis like the Depression of the 1930s.” [Matthew C. Gutmann, “Rituals of Resistance: A Critique of the Theory of Everyday Forms of Resistance.” Latin American Perspectives. Volume 20, number 2, spring 1993. Pages 74-92.]
        “Despite the incompleteness of contracts, a modern economy’s major markets—for labor, credit, and knowledge—can sometimes function tolerably well because social norms and other-regarding motives foster a positive work ethic, an obligation to tell the truth about the qualities of a project or a piece of information, and a commitment to keep promises. ‘The moral economy’ is not an oxymoron.
        “The importance of norms and other social motives extends far beyond what we usually term market failures. It encompasses many of the arenas of social life in which the effects of one’s actions on others is not governed by contract: the long-term climatic effects of one’s lifestyle choices, the creation of drug-resistant superbugs through the opportunistic use of antibiotics, and the traffic congestion resulting from one’s choice of a way to get around. The need for social norms to underwrite good governance is likely to increase as these and other problems pose ever-larger challenges to our well-being. The changing nature of work itself—from producing things to processing information and providing care, for example—further suggests that our economies will increasingly be characterized by contractual incompleteness.”
        [Samuel Bowles. The Moral Economy: Why Good Incentives Are No Substitute for Good Citizens. New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press. 2016. Page 34.]
    55. unified heterodox macroeconomic theory (Jonathan P. Goldstein): He integrates aspects of post Keynesianism and Marxism.
        “This synthesis adapts from post-Keynesian economics true/fundamental uncertainty, endogenous money/credit, endogenous expectations, financial innovation, financial fragility and effective demand. These elements are integrated with Marxian crisis theory, adversarial class relations, a conflict-determined distribution of income and its impact on effective demand, the imperative to accumulate and the Marxian concept of competition as distinct from the classical/neoclassical concept of competition. In addition, the social structure of accumulation (SSA) approach and its associated long wave theory is used to establish the institutional mechanisms and change that underlie long-term growth/accumulation. From both approaches, the role of institutions is integrated, particularly with respect to the constitution of the individual economic agent, the formation of expectations and confidence in expectations and as a support system for profitable long-term accumulation.” [Jonathan P. Goldstein, “An introduction to a unified heterodox macroeconomic theory.” Heterodox Macroeconomics: Keynes, Marx and globalization. Jonathan P. Goldstein and Michael G. Hillard, editors. London and New York: Routledge imprint of Taylor & Francis Group, an Informa PLC business. 2009. Pages 36-53.]
    56. capital theory (Ben Fine and others): He explains a debate between the two “Cambridges”—Cambridge University in Cambridge, England, and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) in Cambridge, Massachusetts.
        “‘Capital theory’ has been used as a shorthand term for the debate known as the Cambridge capital controversies. The reference to Cambridge follows from the dispute having mainly been conducted between prominent figures, or figureheads, attached or aligned to Cambridge, Massachusetts, especially MIT (Massachusetts Institute of Technology), and Cambridge, England. The two Cambridges stood, respectively, as representatives for mainstream neoclassical economics and its critics from radical political economy.…
        “The debate was entirely conducted in terms of choice between linear technologies.…
        “… capital theory attained its greatest prominence in the 1970s when radical political economy was considerably stronger than today. Despite the veracity of its empirical and theoretical results, and their acceptance by the mainstream (who conceded that empirical measurement of performance ought to include both supply and demand and not just supply), the mainstream now proceeds as if the Cambridge critique never existed and shamelessly deploys aggregate production functions as if they are without problems.”
        [Ben Fine, “Capital Theory.” The Elgar Companion to Post Keynesian Economics. J. E. King, editor. Northampton, Massachusetts: Edward Elgar Publishing, Inc. 2003. Pages 51-56.]
    57. relational economics (Andrea Westall, Andrew Samuels, Eisuke Saito [Japanese, えいすけ さいと, Eisuke Saito as pronounced in this MP3 audio file], Matthew Atencio, Karl Polanyi, Eran Binenbaum as pronounced in this MP3 audio file, and others): They discuss various—often historically independent—relational approaches to the economy.
        “Relational economics is useful in debates about how capitalism has become detached from political control, and in dealing with the more negative impacts of our economic system and ways of working on our personal, family and community lives. It can also aid thinking about how to deal with complex challenges that affect whole sectors and systems of economic activity, for example energy production and use.…
        “There is … more to relational economics than just a focus on individual and business relationships. For example, the behaviour of systems with many players can be ‘emergent’ (in other words, different from the sum of individual actions). Complex feedbacks or reinforcements, institutional and policy changes, technological shifts, and the increasing scale and scope of economic activity, have all led to systems that seem beyond capture, understanding and control. But this complexity points to a need to try to understand connections rather than to retreat yet again into abstraction and equations.…
        “… Relational thinking can also assist in finding new ways to re-empower people or rebalance power (for example through networks or unions of the self-employed to enable effective voice and action, or to provide collective and cheaper services); or new ways to restore morality and ethics (for example, through peer groups in the economy with codes of practice); or it can assist in providing identity and points of security (again through forms of mutual economic support). It can also help to increase effectiveness and productivity (for example diverse multi-stakeholder groups and networks can enable decision-making, ‘distributed’ production, information sharing, or innovation).”
        [Andrea Westall, “Relational economics.” Soundings. Volume 49, winter 2011. Pages 94-104.]
        “Psychoanalysts understand how clients struggle to stop thinking like their parents. In our political work and in our professional gatherings, we psychoanalysts have to try to stop thinking like a nation or like a state. In order to claim the freedom to stop thinking like the state, we have to make sacrifices—a sacrifice of identity, security, and having one’s feet on the ground in a place called home. It’s time to leave home, to get outside the box, to press for a relational economics, to help the leader become good enough, to fight for an empathic foreign policy devoted to standing in the shoes of the other. To do this, we have to make some sacrifices: sacrifices in which we act to lose home, suspend identity, and refuse the offer of security. We make these sacrifices in the yearning hope of finding home, identity, and security once again.” [Andrew Samuels, “The Renaissance of Western Politics: The Good-Enough Leader, Relational Economics, and an Empathic Foreign Policy.” Tikkun: to heal, repair, and transform the world. Volume 24, number 4, July–August 2009. Pages 43-49.]
        “The purpose of this paper was to initiate a discussion of group learning from an economic perspective by invoking the relational economic framework advanced by [Karl] Polanyi …. Polanyi’s economic frame was used to describe aspects of an educational economy that necessarily incorporates meaningful interaction amongst educational stakeholders such as teachers and students. Within this integrated scenario, reciprocity, redistribution, and exchange were specified as key attributes that should co-exist when group learning occurs in contemporary classrooms.” [Eisuke Saito and Matthew Atencio, “Group learning as relational economic activity.” Educational Review. Volume 66, number 1, February 2014. Pages 96-107.]
        “Reciprocity, as a form of integration, and symmetrical organization went together. This may be the true explanation of the famous duality in social organization. Indeed, we may ask in regard to preliterate society—ignorant of bookkeeping—how could reciprocity be practiced over long stretches of time by large numbers of peoples in the most varied positions unless social organization met the need halfway by providing ready-made, symmetrical groups, members of which could behave towards one another similarly? The suggestion carried important implications for the study of social organization. It explains, among other things, the role of the intricate kinship relations often found in savage societies where they function as the bearers of social organization.
        “Since there is no separate economic organization and, instead, the economic system is embedded in social relations, there has to be an elaborate social organization to take care of such aspects of economic life as the division of labor, disposal of land, organization of work, inheritance, and so on. Kinship relations tend to be complicated because they have to provide the groundwork of a social organization that substitutes for a separate economic organization.…
        “We have an institutionally separate economic system in our society, and an important integrating concept in our economy is that of an aggregate of interchangeable economic units. Hence the quantitative aspect of economic life. If we possess ten dollars, we do not as a rule think of them as ten individual dollars with separate names but as units that can be substituted one for another. Without such a quantitative concept, the notion at an economy is hardly meaningful.”
        [Karl Polanyi. The Livelihood of Man. Harry W. Pearson, editor. New York: Academic Press imprint of Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich, Publishers. 1977. Pages 52-53.]
        “According to [Karl] Polanyi, the supercession of liberal capitalism by some form of fascism could already be foreseen before 1914. The monopolistic and corporatist developments which eventually led to the emergence of national socialism were inherent in the deficiencies of market capitalism. He predicted that the ‘next period of the capitalist age’ will produce an ordered, regulated capitalism. Its strength will be found in the impersonalization of human relations and the concentration of capital, as the enrichment of individual life and the ‘culture of consciousness’ are replaced by a dehumanizing materialism.” [Kari Polanyi-Levitt and Marguerite Mendell, “Karl Polanyi: His Life and Times.” Studies in Political Economy. Volume 22, spring 1987. Pages 7-39.]
        “The improvements in economic methodology that are suggested in this paper may be summarized under the heading of relational economics. An important aspect of this methodology is an emphasis on inter-organisational relations. Industrial organisation is perhaps the field of mainstream economics that traditionally focuses most clearly on these relations. It will be argued below that this field is currently undergoing a process of ‘natural’ expansion of its scope – an expansion which will enable it to take centre stage in the emerging methodology of relational economics.” [Eran Binenbaum, “Towards a Relational Economics: Methodological Comments on Intellectual Property Strategy, Industrial Organisation, and Economics.” Working paper number 2005-04. University of Adelaide. Adelaide, Australia. June, 2004. Pages 1-30.]
    58. prosperity economics (Jacob S. Hacker and Nate Loewentheil): They examine an alternative to the economics of austerity.
        “To tackle our immediate and long-term economic challenges, we must reject austerity economics and embrace a reality-based economic agenda. The plan we propose here embodies that approach, an approach we call ‘prosperity economics.’ Prosperity economics recognizes that we must make investments in productivity to build our economy, that individually and collectively we need basic securities to move confidently into the future, and that a strong democracy undergirds a strong economy.
        “We turn first to the intellectual underpinnings of prosperity economics and its three pillars: growth, security, and democracy. We then turn to describing the key policies that will be needed to strengthen these pillars and put us on a path toward greater global competitiveness and shared prosperity.…
        “Our history as well as a growing body of economic theory and research point to a very different model for economic success than that pushed by austerity economics. Our alternative, ‘prosperity economics,’ is a set of established findings based on recent currents of scholarship and real-world experience. Prosperity economics has a distinctive goal: shared prosperity. It also has a distinctive prescription: policies and institutions that broadly distribute opportunities for economic success, create the preconditions for productivity among all workers, and provide the broadest possible space for people to shape their own economic lives through voice in the workplace and through democratic politics. Shared prosperity, in other words, is a means as well as an end. As we all share in the production of prosperity, we all share in its rewards.
        “The central idea of prosperity economics is this: Our prosperity is generated by everyone. It does not just drip down from current economic winners, but flows from all of us who work hard to gain skills and climb the economic ladder. It is generated by the common investments and sources of security we agree on as members of a democracy, by the stock of technology and knowledge fostered by these investments—a socially generated stock of productive capacity that is far and away the greatest source of our wealth—and by democratic political institutions that ensure that today’s economic winners do not lock in their position and thereby undermine the openness and dynamism of the economy overall.”
        [Jacob S. Hacker and Nate Loewentheil. Prosperity Economics: Building an Economy for All. Privately published. Creative Commons. 2012. Pages 14-15.]
        “For progressives, reclaiming the high political ground by addressing the bread-and-butter concerns of the middle class is the key to not just broadly shared prosperity but also long-term political success. As the last two years suggest, however, picking the ball back up won’t be easy. Progressives will have to grapple with the decline of the organizations, UUe [United Union Employees] labor unions and broad-based civic associations, that informed Americans about what was at stake in political debates and helped them shape what government did. They will have to break the Democrats’ unholy alliance with Wall Street. Above all, they will need to put forth a clear alternative to the anti-government mantra of tax cuts, deregulation, and programmatic cutbacks—one that is far more compelling than the grab bag of deficit reduction and modest new initiatives that defined the Democratic economic message for so much of the 1990s and 2000s.” [Jacob S. Hacker, “Reclaiming Middle-Class America.” The American Prospect. Volume 22, number 2, March 2011. Pages A3-A5.]
    59. community-based economics (Steve Welzer): He proposes a communitarian approach to economics consistent with the Green Party.
        “I’ll make the case that community-based economics constitutes an alternative to both capitalism and socialism; that it is very much in keeping with the Greens’ [Green Party’s] valuation of diversity and decentralization; and that it has the potential to resonate with the public/electorate—and therefore should be highlighted in our organizing work and electoral campaigns. In terms of developing economic policy, Greens should understand that communitarian social relations are more important than economic property relations.…
        “If Greens advocate regionalization of economic activity and hold out a vision of diverse and decentralized communities, it would be contradictory for us to advocate uniformity in regard to property relations or a single economic system as ‘best‘ for all communities. Economic diversity would mean that in some regions the preponderance of the means of production might be publicly owned and controlled. In other regions only the ‘commanding heights’ of the economy might be socialized. Some communities might opt to hold most things in common, going far beyond socialization of just the means of production. Others may disavow public enterprise, preferring an economic model based on locally-owned private businesses. In other cases there may be a tradition of co-ops (which are private). Most likely, varying mixtures of public and private enterprise would be the rule.…
        “The communitarian perspective of the Greens can encompass market relations here and economic planning there. It can encompass the profit motive and the desire to ‘start one’s own business,’ or municipal socialism with workers’ control. What it cannot encompass is unlimited accumulation of capital. Community-based economics implies that economic activity be local and humanly-scaled. The building of far-flung economic empires (epitomized by modern transnational corporations) and the concentration of wealth and power are anathema to this vision.”
        [Steve Welzer, “Community-Based Economics.” Synthesis/Regeneration. Number 21, winter 2000. Online publication. No pagination.]
        “When I talk about community-based economics as an alternative to capitalism and socialism, I am defining the latter two as modern large-scale economic systems. So, by this definition, primal communities that owned all things in common had not ‘instituted socialism,’ and merchants selling exotic spices during the time of the Roman Empire were not capitalists in the modern sense (they were engaging in private enterprise within the context of an economic system based on slave labor).” [Steve Welzer, “Community-Based Economics: Answers to Respondents.” Synthesis/Regeneration. Number 23, fall 2000. Online publication. No pagination.]
    60. economic theory of greed, love, groups, and networks (Paul Frijters with Gigi Foster): They develop an emancipatory alternative to the thoroughly greed-based model of neoclassical/neoliberal economics.
        “When we join Homo Economicus with the three main additional elements of love, groups, and trade networks, we arrive at a picture of humanity constantly in the grips of the forces of greed and love, with group formation as the main instrument of those forces. Greed leads individuals to abandon their previous informal ties with family and clans for more anonymous ties with supermarkets, clients, and employers. Greed leads individuals with common material interests to set up new collectives in order to prevent other greedy individuals or groups from dominating them. The collectives then start to lead a life of their own, loved by the weaker ones within them and by those with a strong wish to have a cause. Love is also what underpins friendships and teams, which are crucial components in anything humans do. Greed leads individuals to set up hierarchical groups that serve their private interests. Love continuously erodes the power of any individual leader, in that it supports the genesis of the many small reciprocal groups that develop individual agendas within any large hierarchy.” [Paul Frijters with Gigi Foster. An Economic Theory of Greed, Love, Groups, and Networks. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press. 2013. Page 344.]
        “In this book Paul Frijters and Gigi Foster take a risk opening the Pandora’s box of neoclassical economics. They open the lid a little bit, just to stick in a hook and bring out what they call ‘love.’ The book is an attempt to describe the changes to the economics landscape when love is in the air. The views get a bit glaring and dizzy for the untrained eye of the neoclassical economist, and sometimes hard to understand without the help of some friends from biology, psychology, sociology or political science. However, once the economist changes his hat for the one they wear out in the street, the landscape becomes a lot more familiar. All of a sudden academic puzzles like tax compliance or voting behaviour can be trivially explained.” [Pablo Guillen Alvarez, “An Economic Theory of Greed, Love, Groups, and Networks.” Review article. Economic Record. Volume 89, issue 287, December 2013. Pages 584-585.]
    61. biodiversity crisis (Neil Perry and David Primrose): They develop a heterodox economic approach to this subject.
        “Economists must engage with environmental issues such as the biodiversity crisis and heterodox economics provides a more fruitful set of tools than the orthodox approach for doing so. Biodiversity refers to the variability of living organisms at the genetic, species and ecosystem levels and the ecological complexes or interdependencies between species …. Through our economic activity, humans have reduced biodiversity to the point where it can be classified as being at crisis-point. For example, there have been 100 well documented extinctions of birds, mammals and amphibians over the last 100 years; and the extinction rate is 100 to 1,000 times the extinction rate experienced without human influence …. In Australia, a biodiversity hotspot, 27 of approximately 350 native mammals have become extinct since European settlement …. Across all taxonomic groups there has been a decline in population sizes and/or ranges for the majority of species … and 10-50% of mammals, birds, amphibians, conifers and cycads are threatened with extinction …. Genetic, species and ecosystem diversity has declined substantially at a global level and species interdependencies have been compromised.” [Neil Perry and David Primrose, “Heterodox Economics and the Biodiversity Crisis.” Journal of Australian Political Economy. Issue 75, winter 2015. Pages 133-152.]
    62. authentic development project (Rémy Herrera as pronounced in this MP3 audio file): He proposes a heterodox alternative to development economics.
        “Heterodox authors can no longer afford to be disunited by useless polemics, reproducing out-of-date divisions. Nevertheless, it is neither by preaching new ‘syntheses,’ nor by submitting themselves to the neoclassical mainstream, that they will manage to mobilize forces for the rebuilding of a genuine critical alternative. Today more than ever, the question remains: How can we move beyond the failures of the past to construct an authentic development project in a post-capitalist alternative—one that is social, or better yet, socialist? This is the question that has animated the heterodoxies in development economics from the beginning.” [Rémy Herrera, “The Neoliberal ‘Rebirth’ of Development Economics.” Monthly Review: An Independent Socialist Magazine. Volume 58, issue 1, May 2006. Pages 38-50.]
    63. Gandhian economy, economics of ahimsa, or lokavidya–based economy (Joseph Chelladurai Kumarappa [Hindī, यूसुफ चेल्लादुरई कुमारप्पा, Yūsupha Cellāduraī Kumārappā as pronounced in this MP3 audio file], Mahatma Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi [Hindī, महात्मा मोहनदास करमचंद गाँधी, Mahātmā Mohanadāsa Karamacaṃda Gām̐dhī as pronounced in this MP3 audio file], Amit Basole [Hindī, अमित बसोला, Amita Basolā as pronounced in this MP3 audio file], and Ramachandra Guha [Hindī, रामचंद्र गुहा, Rāmacaṃdra Guhā as pronounced in this MP3 audio file]): Kumarappa proposes a heterodox economic perspective based upon the economic dimensions of Gandhi’s approach to non-violence. Basole and Guha add further information.
        “What the Gandhian Economy aims at is to furnish all people with their full requirements of food, clothing, shelters educations medical care, sanitations hygiene, etc. These are our primary needs and it is not beyond our capacity to meet them if we will only concentrate our efforts in this direction. Over and above these, if we asplre for luxuries and indulgences, man’s life combines wasted in the effort to acquire such things. Therefore, if any planning is to he done for our country, it should be with definite reference to and emphasis on our subsistences such as food grains, vegetables, fruits, growing of cotton, and obtaining building materials for simple dwellings.” [J. C. Kumarappa. The Gandhian Economy and Other Essays. Wardha, India: The All-India Village Industries Association. 1949. Page 4.]
        “If we desire to usher in a world set and organized for peace and good will, there is no other way than to control our greed and curb our avarice. To achieve this on a nation-wide scale, it is imperative that the profit motive be sterilized from large-scale production by reserving all centralized industries to the ownership and control of the state. Handicrafts and cottage industries are non-violent in a large measure, and can be left with impunity in the hands of private individuals even with the incentive to profit, as such an economy has its own limitations and does not lend itself to exploitation generally. Maybe life in such a society cannot be based on a multiplicity of wants, but there are other considerations much more vital than material possessions.” [J. C. Kumarappa, “Handicrafts and Cottage Industries.” The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science. Volume 233, May 1944. Pages 106-112.]
        “You cannot build non-violence on a factory civilization, but it can be built on self-contained villages. Rural economy as I have conceived it, eschews exploitation altogether, and exploitation is the essence of violence. You have, therefore, to be rural-minded before you can be non-violent, and to be rural-minded you have to have faith in the spinning wheel.…
        “Now I have no historical proof, but I believe that there was a time in India when village economics were organized on the basis of such non-violent occupations, not on the basis of the rights of man but on the duties of man. Those who engaged themselves in such occupations did earn their living, but their labour contributed to the good of the community. A carpenter, for instance, ministered to the needs of the village farmer. He got no cash payment but was paid in kind by the villagers. There could be injustice even in this system, but it would be reduced to a minimum.”
        [M. K. Gandhi. Panchayat Raj. R. K. Prabhu, compiler. Ahmedabad, India: Jitendra T Desai. 1959. Page 14.]
        “To explicate, postmodern, postcolonial, feminist, and Marxist perspectives can all be counted as part of economic heterodoxy today. But traditional Marxist theory is as ‘modernist’ as the neo-classical school, subscribing with the same vigor to Enlightenment values. Here I would like to make some preliminary comments about a non-modern challenge to economics. The nonmodern challenge must be careful to steer clear of the violent (anti-modern) tendencies shown by religious fundamentalisms resurgent today (the self-styled Islamic fundamentalists with their proclaimed hatred of modernity, for example), on the one hand, and the paralyzing moral and epistemic relativism of postmodernism, on the other hand. It is here that we may draw inspiration from two prominent early-twentieth century Indian thinkers, Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi and his long-time collaborator, Joseph Cornelius Kumarappa.” [Amit Basole, “The Economics of Ahimsa: Gandhi, Kumarappa, and the Non-Modern Challenge to Economics.” Privately published paper. January, 2005. Pages 1-19.]
        “Economic development, for [Mahatma] Gandhi, is not merely an increase in per capita income, but a structural transformation in the economy consistent with the principles of locality (swadeshi [Sanskrit/Saṃskṛtam, स्वदेशी, svadeśī, ‘indigeneity’]), social justice (sarvodaya Sanskrit/Saṃskṛtam, सर्वोदय, sarvodaya, ‘community development’]), and small-scale industry (gramudyog [Sanskrit/Saṃskṛtam, ग्रामोद्योग, grāmodyoga, ‘village industry’]). This can only result from civilizational change; a rejection of the urban industrial civilization and its substitution by a village-centered economy and society based on the principles of satya [Sanskrit/Saṃskṛtam, सत्य, satya] (Truth) and ahimsa [Sanskrit/Saṃskṛtam, अहिंसा, ahiṃsā] (non-violence). In Gandhi’s writings and work we find a unique effort to utilize mass politics in order to effect such a civilizational change through the construction of a lokavidya-based economy [Sanskrit/Saṃskṛtam, लोक विद्या, loka vidyā, ‘common knowledge’].” [Amit Basole, “Whose Knowledge Counts? Reinterpreting: Gandhi for the Information Age.” International Journal of Hindu Studies. Volume 18, number 3, December 2014. Pages 371-414.]
        “The lokavidya perspective envisions that the craft traditions that have been reduced to niche presence have the capacity to fulfill the daily needs of ordinary people. [Mahatma] Gandhi’s handicrafts program is of the latter variety. But such a political program will not gain credibility unless lokavidya itself is not seen as a primitive relic but as a dynamic knowledge tradition that serves people’s needs.” [Amit Basole. Knowledge, Gender, and Production Relations in India’s Informal Economy. Ph.D. dissertation. University of Massachusetts. Amherst, Massachusetts. February, 2012. Page 173.]
        “The Indian candidate for patron saint of the emerging philosophy of social ecology is, in my view, one of Mahatma Gandhi’s closest associates, J. C. Kumarappa. A prophet with as little honor in his in his country as [Lewis] Mumford in his [i.e., the U.S.], it was Kumarappa who, at the Mahatma’s behest, developed an ideological justification for the ‘village-centered economic order.’ The moving spirit behind the All India Village Industries Association and the All India Spinners Association, Kumarappa spent four decades studying the village economy of India, with a view to rehabilitating it on sound social and what we would now call ecological principles.” [Ramachandra Guha, “Toward a Cross-Cultural Environmental Ethic.” Alternatives: Global, Local, Political. Volume 15, number 4, fall 1990. Pages 431-447.]
    64. neo-Gramscian international political economy (Hans-Jürgen Bieling as pronounced in this MP3 audio file): He elucidates five characteristics of the approach.
        “For the most part, assertions about time-diagnostic characterisations of the current state of capitalism, the causes and processes of specific crisis dynamics inherent to this current form of capitalism, and the asymmetrical forms of international networks or formative transnational power relations remain weak or chaotic. In order to overcome these existing deficiencies, this paper will argue from an analytical perspective that situates itself in regulation theory and allows itself to be characterised as an extended neo-Gramscian IPE [international political economy] approach.…
        “… Neo-Gramscian IPE understands hegemony as a consensually supported modus of transnational development that goes beyond the relationship between states …. A second characteristic of neo-Gramscian IPE is a particular understanding of the state. Accordingly, the state represents a specific institutionalised arena of social (class) struggles …, whose mode of operation is dependent on societal power relations and socioeconomic, cultural, and ideological structures of reproduction.…
        “Third, the sustainability of international and transnational hegemony structures is not just the product of the interaction between state and civil society, but should also be understood as a product of the given conditions of socioeconomic (re)production.… Fourth, the emergence of national or transnational ‘historical blocs’ is contingent to the extent that it depends on the ability of social and political actors to universalise their interests in the form of generally accepted ideas, norms, rules, and institutions.…
        “Finally, the fifth characteristic is that neo-Gramscian IPE, in order to disassociate itself from ‘problem-solving theories’, likes to explicitly refer to itself as ‘critical theory’ ….”
        [Hans-Jürgen Bieling, “Comparative analysis of capitalism from a regulationist perspective extended by neo-Gramscian IPE.” Capital & Class. Volume 38, number 1, February 2014. Pages 31-43.]
        “… the neo-Gramscian school, perhaps the most self-conscious attempt to transcend state-centrism, portrays the rise and fall of GMSs [global monetary standards] in terms of successive hegemonic orders that seem disappointingly familiar, given the lengthy expositions on method, ontology and episteme ….” [Matt Hampton, “Hegemony, class struggle and the radical historiography of global monetary standards.” Capital & Class. Volume 30, number 2, summer 2006. Pages 131-164.]
    65. critical political economy (Ian Bruff and Matthias Ebenau): They critically examine the global crisis following the economic crash of 2007.
        “The continued fall-out from the global crisis of the post-2007 period has led to a return of the concept of capitalism to public debate, triggering an ongoing discussion of the causes of the crisis, their connection with the underlying, ‘deeper’ dynamics of this mode of production, and the varied responses to the turmoil. From a critical political economy viewpoint, the need to acknowledge the general and systemic nature of the crisis, whilst also remaining aware of the considerable range of ways in which it has been and is playing out across different parts of the world, is absolutely central if one is to articulate a persuasive analysis and critique of capitalism in all of its forms.” [Ian Bruff and Matthias Ebenau, “Critical political economy and the critique of comparative capitalisms scholarship on capitalist diversity.” Capital & Class. Volume 38, number 1, February 2014. Pages 3-15.]
    66. political economy of the new slavery (Christien van den Anker as pronounced in this MP3 audio file and others): This edited volume critiques various forms of slavery in the modern world.
        “New slavery is also defined as ‘work for no pay and under the threat of violence’ …. This definition excludes bad forms of servitude and people pushed into bad labour conditions by poverty. However, the element of being paid or not is probably less important than the elements of being forced to work against one’s will and under threat of violence, often with restrictions on freedom of movement through either physical ties or by withholding of passport or identity papers. In its contemporary form, slavery violates many other rights over and above the right not to be enslaved, such as the rights to freedom, property and fair remuneration for labour. The violence and the mental degradation that come with most forms of slavery are violations of the internationally protected right to be free from torture and inhumane and degrading treatment. Contemporary forms of slavery include bonded labour, trafficking, the worst forms of child labour, forced marriage and the abuse of domestic migrant workers. These now involve many times the number of people the transatlantic slave trade ever involved.” [Christien van den Anker, “Contemporary Slavery, Global Justice and Globalization.” The Political Economy of New Slavery. Christien van den Anker, editor. New York: Palgrave Macmillan imprint of St. Martin’s Press, LLC. 2004. Pages 15-36.]
        “The Political Economy of New Slavery is … a timely book, and a useful addition to existing literature, bringing together views from both academics and activists on what it calls new forms of contemporary slavery. While recognising that the term ‘contemporary slavery’ may conjure up sensationalist imagery through its association with older, transatlantic forms, the book begins by arguing that there are parallels between the older and newer forms of slavery.” [Dina Abbott, “The Political Economy of New Slavery.” Capital & Class. Volume 28, number 3, winter 2004. Pages 220-222.]
    67. Indigenous economics (Polly Hill, Samuel W. Rose, and others): They explore various aspects of the economics of Indigenous peoples.
        “Indigenous economics is concerned with the basic fabric of existent economic life, with such economic activities as the production of export or other cash crops, subsistence farming, cattle raising, fishing (for cash or subsistence), internal trading in foodstuffs, transportation, economically motivated migration (to cities, industries, and farms), indigenous credit-granting systems, and so forth. Far from being identified with either premonetary or subsistence economics, our subject is more concerned with ‘cash activities,’ not because of their greater importance, for here there is much variation, but for the practical reason that the cash sector is easier to study. Nor are we particularly interested in the old-fashioned evolutionary ideas which would identify ‘progress’ with a shift from subsistence to cash agriculture, for we know that most West African farmers produce both for subsistence (‘own consumption’) and for cash, and that an increase in the one type of activity may actually enhance a growth in the other; it is the structure of the relationship between the two types of activity which is interesting and important.” [Polly Hill, “A Plea for Indigenous Economics: The West African Example.” Economic Development and Cultural Change. Volume 15, number 1, October 1966. Pages 10-20.]
        “In terms of applying the neotraditionalist ideology framework to the United States, there is an extensive literature on the role of indigenous governments in contemporary indigenous economics and development in the United States and Canada …. However, there is little that is critical of the actually-existing processes and practices of indigenous governments and political economies. Instead, most portray indigenous governments as either benevolent or at least neutral when it comes to matters of organizational structure, public and social policy, and policy outcomes. The actions of indigenous governments are often presented as merely the manifestation of the collective will or the genuine self-determination of a given indigenous community. In fact, the ideology behind United States Federal Indian Law and Policy since at least the 1970s is commonly referred to in academic and policy circles as the ‘self-determination period’ ….” [Samuel W. Rose, “Two thematic manifestations of neotribal capitalism in the United States.” Anthropological Theory. Volume 15, number 2, June 2015. Pages 218-238.]
    68. Confucian economics (Kazimierz Z. Poznanski [Polish, Kazimierz Z. Poznański as pronounced in this MP3 audio file], Rosser, J. Barkley, Jr., and Marina V. Rosser): They focus on approaches to economics based upon Confucian ethics or institutions.
        “Studying ‘the art of living,’ Confucian economics assumes that the nature equips people with the will to live and provides them also with adequate, even inexhaustible resources. All they need to survive is to work hard enough. Since work is a moral choice, Confucians consider ‘work ethics’ the primary factor in creating national wealth. Within Confucian type of ethics, people are expected to work not for themselves but rather for the sake of others. This assumption puts Confucian economics in the category called moral economics. The reason why work is done collectively is that the basic ‘work unit’ in any society is family, with work done either for family’s own sake or for the market. Family is said to be the unquestionable axis of economic life, since family is where the strongest impulse to work is located within. This leading impulse is a compassion for others, or more specifically the familial love. With this emphasis on family, Confucian ‘moral economics’ can also be categorized as a type of family economics.” [Kazimierz Z. Poznanski, “Confucian Economics: The World at Work.” World Review of Political Economy. Volume 6, number 2, summer 2015. Pages 208-251.]
        “The paradox of the new traditional Confucian economy in the two Koreas is that while both of them are officially anti-Confucian, they are both deeply influenced by Confucian ideas, practices, and institutions. New traditional economies seek to be technologically advanced high-income societies while having important elements of their economies embedded in a broader sociocultural context, usually that of a religion …. However, in most such economies this search involves a political movement actively seeking to bring about or increase this embedding, with examples such as Iran and Islamic economics being prominent. Within East Asian nations, most that are somewhat new traditional Confucian in their orientation, such as Japan, Taiwan, or Singapore, have leaderships that are sympathetic to their Confucian heritage, if not necessarily actively pushing it …. This contrasts with both of the Koreas, where there is official opposition to Confucianism as a doctrine to influence society in both nations, even though it has long been argued that Korea is the most Confucian of all countries.” [Rosser, J. Barkley, Jr., and Marina V. Rosser, “The Paradox of New Traditional Confucian Economics in the Two Koreas.” Comparative Economic Studies. Volume 58, issue 1, March 2016. Pages 119-138.]
    69. Buddhist economics (Ernst Friedrich „Fritz” Schumacher as pronounced in this MP3 audio file and others): Beginning with Schumacher, various Buddhist teachings, including the “Noble Eightfold Path,” are developed into economic principles.
        “‘Right Livelihood’ is one of the requirements of the Buddha’s Noble Eightfold Path. It is clear, therefore, that there must be such a thing as Buddhist economics.…
        “… No one seems to think that a Buddhist way of life would call for Buddhist economics, just as the modern materialist way of life has brought forth modern economics.
        “Economists themselves, like most specialists, normally suffer from a kind of metaphysical blindness, assuming that theirs is a science of absolute and invariable truths, without any presuppositions. Some go as far as to claim that economic laws are as free from ‘metaphysics’ or ‘values’ as the law of gravitation. We need not, however, get involved in arguments of methodology. Instead, let us take some fundamentals and see what they look like when viewed by a modern economist and a Buddhist economist.”
        [E. F. Schumacher. Small is Beautiful: Economics as if People Mattered. New York: Harper Perennial imprint of Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. 2010. Ebook edition.]
        “The most famous proponent of Buddhist economics is EF Schumacher, whose work dates from the 1970s. The paper’s first contribution is to revise and update the work of Schumacher and others on Buddhist economics. There are two reasons for why a revision is necessary. First, the allegedly changing spirit of capitalism implies a constant need to revise alternative, critical perspectives, such as Buddhist economics. I argue that Schumacher’s critique was directed against heavy capitalism (characterized by big businesses, stable structures) rather than today’s light capitalism (individualism, flexibility). Second, I argue that the critical nature of Schumacher’s Buddhist economics offered in the 1970s has not been sustained. Rather than being translated as a critical philosophy, it will be argued that Buddhism has been, in the translation of Buddhism from one cultural context to another, received in the West as a method for coping and for harmony. Preparing for the main contribution, I advance the view that Buddhism must have a critical potential to become a real future for capitalism.” [Thomas Taro Lennerfors, “A Buddhist future for capitalism? Revising Buddhist economics for the era of light capitalism.” Futures. Volume 68, April 2015. Pages 67-75.]
        “The term Buddhist economics was first introduced in Chapter IV of [E. F.] Schumacher’s book Small is Beautiful in 1973 as mentioned before. Since then, the concept has been elaborated on by many well-known scholars all over the world.…
        “Buddhist economics results from the melding of two words, ‘Buddhist’ and ‘economics.’ ‘Economics’ is a subject developed in the West. It is generally defined as the subject explaining ‘economic activities (production, distribution, and consumption) with the aim for individuals to achieve maximum utility under the condition of resource constraint and for the society to reach maximum welfare under the same condition’ ….”
        [Apichai Puntasen, “Buddhist Economics as a New Paradigm Towards Happinesss.” Society and Economy. Volume 29, number 2, August 2007. Pages 181-200.]
        “… both Mainstream and Buddhist economics share the idea that the insatiable desire is human’s nature. However, Buddhist economics states that this desire can be managed and transformed to satiable desire by training the mind to create wisdom. Therefore, Buddhism promotes self-management as well as develops one’s abilities. This is a very positive orientation toward human nature as a mastery of one’s own destiny.
        “For this reason, Buddhist economics focusses on how to obtain the maximum well being with minimum consumption. Economic activity including consumption must be controlled by an appreciation of moderation and the objective of well-being.”
        [Gullinee Mutakalin, “Buddhist economics: a model for managing consumer society.” Journal of Management Development. Volume 33, number 8/9, 2014. Pages 824-832.]
        “Today’s economies operate at considerable costs to the Earth and social communities. Climate change, ecosystems degradation, biodiversity loss on the one hand, massive unhappiness and other welfare-diseases, social disintegrations other hand are the most important symptoms of our unsustainable economic practices. It is not a surprise that there is a growing interest in Buddhist economics worldwide as Buddhist economics promotes simple lifestyle and non-economic and social life.” [Laszlo Zsolnai, “Preface: Why Buddhist Economics?” Society and Economy. Volume 29, number 2, August 2007. Pages 139-143.]
        “Buddhist economics does not aim to build an economic system of its own. Rather, it represents a strategy, which can be applied in any economic setting at any time. It helps to create livelihood solutions that reduce the suffering of all sentient beings through the practices of want negation, non-violence, caring and generosity.…
        “Today’s dominating business models are based on and cultivates narrow self-centeredness. Buddhist economics points out that emphasising individuality and promoting the greatest fulfilment of the desires of the individual conjointly lead to destruction.”
        [Laszlo Zsolnai, “Western Economics Versus Buddhist Economics.” Society and Economy. Volume 29, number 2, August 2007. Pagse 145-153.]
        “The paper begins with a review of key dimensions of the Buddhist world view that describes the roots of environmental problems and the potential pathways to move towards sustainability. The main section outlines some of the primary characteristics and changes required for an economy derived from Buddhist world views (hereafter noted as BISEs or ‘Buddhist-inspired sustainable economies’). This includes changes involving citizens both as consumers and in their livelihood or producer roles …. Finally, the conclusion overviews the main points and briefly discusses the viability and prospects for utilising and applying Buddhist wisdom in the quest for sustainability.” [Peter Daniels, “Buddhism and the Transformation to Sustainable Economies.” Society and Economy. Volume 29, number 2, August 2007. Pages 155-180.]
        “Buddhist economics rejects the simplistic ‘positivist’ assumption that welfare or happiness has a direct positive and linear relation with individual material accumulation. It emphasizes the need for a far more intensive analysis of the true nature of ultimate ends and desirable means and calls for a fundamental re-examination of the nature, and product, of human livelihood activity.” [Peter L. Daniels, “Buddhist economics and the environment: Material flow analysis and the moderation of society’s metabolism.” International Journal of Social Economics. Volume 30, number 1/2, 2003. Pages 8-33.]
    70. Interbeing Economic Model (Glenn Manga): He develops a model of “systems integrity building economy,” based upon the work of Vietnamese Buddhist Thich Nhat Hanh.
        “This article is part of a much larger work in progress that seeks to formulate a new Interbeing Economic Model. Against the now recognised urgency of unfolding social justice issues related to climate change, I provide a Buddhist deconstructive critique of neo-classical economics which is demonstrated to be the underlying cause of our current problems. A more just and equitable form of distributive justice and economics, based on the concept of interbeing as developed by Thich Nhat Hanh, is posited as an alternative. Interbeing principles also allow us to move beyond the critical theorists’ limited definition of autonomy. A comparative articulation of interbeing autonomy shows that individual consumer driven autonomy is not true autonomy, as it problematically disembodies us from the world. The New Interbeing Economic Model (or, what I differently refer to as systems integrity building economy) is introduced as a possible alternative in order to restore our rights as responsible citizens to be able to interbe in a healthy way. Through this new economic model, I argue, we can move beyond the ill-defined concept of mere sustainability, and toward a healthier regenerative model that promises truly lasting social and ecological justice.…
        “… an empirically grounded ecological economics … may follow along the lines of what I will propose in my interbeing economic model ….”
        [Glenn Manga, “Interbeing Autonomy and Economy: Toward Enduring Social and Ecological Justice.” Human Architecture: Journal of the Sociology of Self-Knowledge. Volume 6, number 3, summer 2008. Pages 113-127.]
    71. economy of life (“Anne” Lapapan Supamanta [Thai, ลพาพรรณ ศุภมนต์, Lphāphrrṇ Ṣ̄up̣hmnt̒ as pronounced in this MP3 audio file]): She develops a Buddhist approach to economics inspired by the teachings of Buddhadasa Bhikkhu (Thai, พุทธทาสภิกข, Phuthṭhthās̄ P̣hikk̄h as pronounced in this MP3 audio file), 1906–1993.
        “Life and the world are inter-dependent. All living beings consume things that originate in nature. In this way, economy of life is the wholesome inter-relationship of beings, living and non-living, in the world. A ‘wholesome’ inter-relationship is one that is normal, harmless to oneself and to others, and dynamic, and that adjusts to remain in the middle way.…
        “The modern economic model following neoliberalism hates regulation. Corporatists and economists advocate for free trade, deregulation, trade liberalization, or other jargons of similar character. At the personal level, the modern economic model also hates self-discipline. It wants people to surrender to greed, which is the engine that keeps the modern economy running. It is unfortunate that the destiny of the running is destruction. Therefore the move toward economy of life needs both spiritual practices and regulation.…
        “Resolution 2 [of Buddhadasa Bhikkhu]: Everyone must engage in inter-religious understanding and cooperation
        “The second Resolution of Buddhadasa [Bhikkhu] can be expanded to reflect the current global situation. Not only are there different religious groups that we could work with to achieve economy of life, there are people with no religious attachment, and differences in ethnicity, sexual orientation, political ideologies, specific interests, and so on. We could find the way to work with them. Often we find that although we are working toward the better world, we cannot work together. We might share the vision, but we do not share the means. At best we do not cooperate, and at worst we fight each other over the means.”
        [Lapapan Supamanta, “Economy of Life: A Buddhist View.” The Ecumenical Review. Volume 67, number 2, July 2015. Pages 192-202.]
        “Nowadays, worldly people can study many different approaches to economic, social, and technological development. The universities teach just about everything. Then, regarding spiritual matters, here in Thailand alone we have so many teachers, so many interpretations of the Buddha’s teachings, and so many meditation centers that nobody knows which teaching to accept or which practice to follow.” [Buddhadasa Bhikkh. Keys to Natural Truth. Santikaro Bhikkhu, translator. Bangkok, Thailand: Mental Health Publishing. Undated. No pagination.]
        “Imagine that everything is going right for you: you have good health, economic security, a good family, good friends, and good surroundings. Then, this life of yours is cool ….” [Buddhadasa Bhikkh. Buddhadasa’s Anapanasati: Mindfulness with Breathing. Santikaro Bhikkhu, translator. Bangkok, Thailand: The Dhamma Study & Practice Group. 1989. No pagination.]
    72. Hindu economics (Mangesh Venkatesh “M. V.” Nadkarni [Hindī, मंगेश वेंकटेश नाडकर्णी, Maṃgeśa Veṃkaṭeśa Nāḍakarṇī as pronounced in this MP3 audio file] and many others)
        “The propriety of discussing Hindu economic philosophy, especially if treated as originating from the Vedic times some four thousand years ago, may be questioned. Can we meaningfully speak of economic in a situation where the extent of commercialization itself was very limited and the role of free markets was not significant, let alone the emergence of capitalism? There may not be much role for economics in such a situation, if we recall that economics (or political economy) as a discipline emerged only during about the last 250 years, coinciding with the rise of capitalism. But we are not discussing economics as such in this chapter, but only economic philosophy, in the sense of view point or attitude to things economic worldly, material, or mundane things valued as wealth, and their production, acquisition, and distribution things that are valued in this life. Philosophy suggests more than a mere viewpoint, or like and dislike, and covers theorization, and taking up a reasoned stand on the issues covered. In this sense, it is certainly possible to discuss Hindu economic philosophy and analyze what it was.” [M. V. Nadkarni, “Hindu Economic Philosophy.” The Handbook of Hindu Economics and Business. Hrishikesh D. Vinod, editor. Tenafly, New Jersey: Hrishikesh D. Vinod. 2013. Kindle edition.]
        “Real-world application of a Hindu economic theory remains in a nascent state. The practical application of its principles on a personal, national or global level, is not clear, but the goal is. As captured by the great spiritual teacher Sri Aurobindo: ‘The aim of economics would be not to create a huge engine of production, whether of the competitive or the cooperative kind, but to give to men and women – not only some men and women but to all, each in his highest possible measure – the joy of work according to their own nature and free leisure to grow inwardly, as well as a simple; rich and beautiful life for all.’” [Meenal Pandya, “Ethical Economics: How we might cure today’s economic woes with a dose of traditional Hindu wisdom.” Hinduism Today. March 31st, 1998. Pages 36+.]
        “The findings clearly show that the amazing sustainability of Bharat’s (i.e. India’s) socio-economic processes, structures and systems, despite the tortures of history visiting her, can be explained by her abiding fidelity to the eternal as the basis of the temporal. This is the very foundation of the sacro-secular character of Hindu culture.…
        “Most authorities in oriental studies tend to agree that Hinduism represents the longest surviving civilization and culture, though it may not be the earliest …. This implies that the economic function must have played an integral part in the total scheme of life. Deeper examination reveals that the Hinduworldviewwith respect to the economic function has been practical yet sublime, logical yet noble.”
        [S. K. Chakraborty and D. Chakraborty, “The economic function in the Hindu worldview: its perennial social relevance.” International Journal of Social Economics. Volume 34, number 10, 2007. Pages 714-734.]
        “… it is obvious that the ancient Hindu principles were not particularly against external trade. On the other hand, they were biased towards competitive spirit and free markets, though regulated by the kings. They were also apprehensive of trade protections, cartels and collusions. India was rarely a cocoon. In fact the unwarranted openness was a cause for the loss of India’s independence for some centuries.… The markets and merchants might have been viewed as a necessary evil, but they were not suppressed, only regulated. Formulation of appropriate regulation procedures is a big problem even today.” [N. S. S. Narayana, “Ancient Hindu Principles of Social and Economic Management: Are they against Globalisation?” Journal of Social and Economic Development. Volume 13, number 2, January–June 2011. Pages 1-44.]
        “… [The] handbook is a unique and groundbreaking attempt at developing an understanding about the economic and business thinking and practices observed among the adherents of the Hindu religion. Although as the title suggests the handbook focuses mainly on the Hindu religion, this religion has influenced other religions that are native to India such as Jainism, Buddhism and Sikhism. Buddhism in turn has had substantial influence over other Asian countries such as Japan, Korea, and Viet Nam, among others. The insights in the handbook therefore have much wider scope than that suggested by its title. The editor of the handbook, Dr. Hrishikesh Vinod, is to be lauded for undertaking and completing this monumental endeavor. He organized a conference at Fordham University to get together recognized scholars with different views and backgrounds on the topic of the handbook. Thanks to his foresight, the collection of essays complied in the handbook have turned out to be rich in diversity, depth, and insights.” [Vijay Gondhalekar, “Handbook of Hindu Economics and Business.” Indian Journal of Economics and Business. Volume 13, number 2, 2014. Pages 311-316.]
    73. Islamic economics (Muhammad Akram Khan [ʾUrdū, مُحَمَّد اکْرَم خَان, Muḥammad ʾAkram H̱ān], Muhammad Ata Al Sid [Arabic/ʿArabiyyaẗ, مُحَمَّد عَطَا السَيِّد, Muḥammad ʿAṭā ʾal-Sayyid], Abdul Azim Islahi [Arabic/ʿArabiyyaẗ, عَبْد العَظِيم إِصْلَاحِيّ, ʿAbd ʾal-Aẓīm ꞌIṣlāḥiyy], Mohammad Umar Chapra [Persian/Fārsī, مُحَمَّد عُمَر چَپْرَا, Muḥammad ʿUmar Čaprā], Abdel-Rahman Yousri Ahmed [Arabic/ʿArabiyyaẗ, عَبْد الرَّحْمَن يُسْرِي أَحْمَد, ʿAbd ʾal-Rraḥman Yusrī ꞌAhmad], Ahmed El-Ashker [Arabic/ʿArabiyyaẗ, أَحْمَد الأَشْقَر, ꞌAhmad ʾal-ꞌAšqar], Rodney Wilson, Sh. Yusuf Talal DeLorenzo, Muhammad Nejatullah Siddiqi [Arabic/ʿArabiyyaẗ, مُحَمَّد نَجَاة الله صِدِّيقِي, Muḥammad Naǧāẗ ʾAlla̍h Ṣiddīqī], Ondřej Šrámek as pronounced in this MP3 audio file, Nagaoka Shinsuke [Japanese, 真輔 長岡 or しんすけ ながおか, Shinsuke Nagaoka as pronounced in this MP3 audio file], and many others): They develop various Islamic approaches to economics.
        “Islam … recognizes the dual nature of human beings. Human beings are selfish as well as altruistic. It does not, however, encourage human selfishness. Instead, it seeks to control human selfishness. It channelizes the selfishness of people to common good and prevents men from hurting others. It energizes their altruistic motives and arouses them to help one another. Consequently, the Islamic economic order visualizes a third sector, besides the private and public sectors, known as the voluntary sector. It recognizes that every individual, besides serving his selfish interests, should play a positive role in promoting common good by helping other human beings. Thus, it propagates that everyone can and should make a contribution to creating a better society.” [Muhammad Akram Khan. An Introduction to Islamic Economics. Islamabad, Pakistan: The International Institute of Islamic Thought. 1994. Page 5.]
        “Owners of property are not absolutely free to do what they like: their rights are limited by the good of the community of which they are members, and if they are incapable of respecting such a right, their control should be removed. However, their interest must be protected, their basic needs met and their emotional welfare soothed by good words. This, of course, can only happen to the few among the owners of property.” [Muhammad Ata Al Sid, “Some Fiqh Concepts Related to Economics.” Lessons on Islamic Economics. Volume 1. Monzer Kahf, editor. Jeddah, Saudi Arabia: Islamic Research and Training Institute. 1998. Pages 61-76.]
        “It is interesting to note that evolution of Islamic economics experienced a course of development similar to the one seen by the main discipline of conventional economics. The history of mainstream economics is generally traced back to Greek philosophical discourses, Roman jurists and administrators, and early Christian fathers. Then there was the so-called ‘great gap’ for about five centuries. During the twelfth century Scholastic Economics emerged which dominated the scene for about four centuries.” [Abdul Azim Islahi, “‘The Genesis of Islamic Economics’ Revisited.” Islamic Economic Studies. Volume 23, number 2, November 2015. Pages 1-28.]
        “Greater emphasis has … been laid so far on explaining what the ideal Islamic economic system is, how it differs from socialism and capitalism, and why it could better succeed in helping realize the humanitarian goals. Most of the discussion is of a normative nature – how all economic agents (individuals and households, firms, altruistic organizations, markets and governments) are expected to behave in the light of Islamic teachings. This has been accompanied by some sporadic historical data to show that the system has actually been in existence at different times in Muslim history and that this has produced positive results. This was natural, and in fact necessary. Economics is so closely related to the worldview and the economic system of a society that without clarity about the worldview and the economic system of Islam, Islamic economics may have perhaps groped in the dark for the direction in which to proceed.” [Mohammad Umar Chapra. What is Islamic Economics? Second edition. Jeddah, Saudi Arabia: Islamic Research and Training Institute. 2001. Page 46.]
        “… when contemporary contributions in Islamic economics are reviewed differences in concepts, assumptions, and methods of analysis among writers will be observed. Though differences in approaches and views are expected among scholars in any field, there should exist among those who belong to the same school, a consensus on the fundamental issues of the philosophy, methodology and the essence of the theoretical structure of their discipline. These basic issues, however, appear to be yet unresolved, while a consensus on them is really needed for a proper and scientific development. Needless to say that disagreement regarding the nature of the new paradigm and its methodology, if remains, would breed controversies and contradictions among Islamic economists, thus hampering the growth and progress of their science. In this paper an attempt is made to discuss and clarify these fundamental issues.” [Abdel-Rahman Yousri Ahmed, “Methodological Approach to Islamic Economics: Its Philosophy, Theoretical Construction and Applicability.” Theoretical Foundations of Islamic Economics: Book of Readings No. 3. Habib Ahmed, editor. Jeddah, Saudi Arabia: Islamic Development Bank. 2002. Pages 20-60.]
        “In the absence of an organized institution that would coordinate the work on Islamic economics literature, several factors served as instigators to the development of the work on the subject. Five main factors could be said to have helped boost the development of Islamic economic literature at that stage: (a) the personal motivation of the writers themselves who were driven by their own religious zeal to promote Islamic economics, or the Islamic approach to economics, as a means of promoting the religious cause, (b) sponsoring academic and non-academic institutions and organisations that had the pro-motion of Islam within their set of missions, (c) religious societies, (d) Muslim students associations, and (e) dedicated publishing houses.” [Ahmed El-Ashker and Rodney Wilson. Islamic Economics: A Short History. Leiden, the Netherlands, and Boston, Massachusetts: Brill. 2006. Page 350.]
        “It was perhaps the wealth generated by oil that provided the real impetus for the revival of Islamic jurisprudence on the subject of finance and commercial law. In the decades of the 1950s and 1960s, at a time when newly independent Muslim states were attempting to come to terms with their cultural and religious identities, a handful of Muslim thinkers began speculating on the theoretical foundations of an Islamic economic system, often as an afterthought to their musings about an ideal Islamic state. The state banks of a few Muslim countries held conferences to discuss the subject, a few scholars published papers in journals and, in general, the interest in the subject was academic.” [Sh. Yusuf Talal DeLorenzo, “Introduction to understanding riba.” Interest in Islamic Economics: Understanding riba. Abdulkader Thomas, editor. London and New York: Routledge imprint of Taylor & Francis Group, an Informa PLC business. 2006. Pages 1-9.]
        “Islam is an art of living, not a science. What do we do if the science of economics is to be studied so that it can be helpful in the Islamic art of living? Obviously it requires taking salient features of that art into account. We do it at two levels. In theory and analysis these features tell us what is relevant. In policy these features tell us what is important to achieve and what means are available. Man as observed behaving and man as he ought to behave in accordance with Islamic teachings, both need be kept in focus. The science of economics helps in the first task, knowledge of Islam helps in the second. But the two are not in separate watertight compartments when it comes to Muslim behavior. In this case what is observed already has some impact of that knowledge. The impact would differ from time to time, place to place, even from person to person. But a mental exercise, that is, our imagination, can help us guess the likely impact, broadly stated so as to accommodate these differences.” [Dr. Muhammad Nejatullah Siddiqi. Teaching Islamic Economics. Jeddah, Saudi Arabia: Scientific Publishing Centre, King Abdulaziz University. 2005. Page 3.]
        “The central principle of Islamic economics is prohibition of usury …. Usury is commonly understood as excessive profit on lending out money, and its prohibition is not unique to Islam. In ancient times it used to be a common practice with the inability to pay one’s own debt resulting in slavery. That, however, gradually became socially unacceptable and regulations on interest rates were introduced in most societies. Another reason probably was the effort to prevent exploitation by life-sustaining goods (animals and crops) upon which the Muslim barter-trading community was heavily dependent ….” [Ondřej Šrámek, “Islamic Economics: New Economic Paradigm, or Political Agenda?” New Perspectives on Political Economy. Volume 5, number 2, 2009. Pages 137-167.]
        “This paper described the history of Islamic economics in terms of the dynamics between the aspiration and reality. It can be summarized that the history of Islamic economics, which originated in the middle of the twentieth century, is strongly tied to the practice of Islamic finance. In particular, the emergence of the commercial practice of Islamic finance in the 1970s gave strength to the arguments about Islamic economics, and resulted in a division of the discipline into two groups: the aspiration-oriented school and the reality-oriented school. All the issues involving Islamic economics have been argued using this fundamental framework.” [Nagaoka Shinsuke, “Critical Overview of the History of Islamic Economics: Formation, Transformation, and New Horizons.” Asian and African Area Studies. Volume 11, number 2, 2012. Pages 114-136.]
        “In discussing the impact of Islamic economics on economic development, I take a rather narrow view of Islamic economics, and focus on the Islamic ban on interest. Such a narrow approach may be justified for three reasons. First, the general Islamic norms of altruism and honesty are common to most ethical systems, religious and non-religious. This is not to say that such norms are unimportant for the market economy. My point is simply that these general norms cannot be expected to influence economic development in a Muslim country in other ways than they affect economic development in a non-Muslim country.” [Kjetil Bjorvatn, “Islamic Economics and Economic Development.” Forum for Development Studies. Number 2, 1998. Pages 229-243.]
        “Islamic economics stand primarily on faith and belief. In fact, a Muslim does his economic activities in light of what his religion recommends as guidelines and instructions. He follows the latter because he strongly believes that they help him to distinguish between Good and Bad; between what is allowed and what is forbidden.
        “Justice, freedom, moderation, compassion and brotherhood are among the values that helps Islam establish itself in the daily life of Muslim society as well as mankind as a whole. To do that, Islamic economics offers a number of alternative instruments that can help attain those values.”
        [Faiçal Boutayeba, Mohammed Benhamida, and Souad Guesmi, “Ethics in Islamic Economics.” Annales. Ethics in Economic Life. Volume 17, number 3, 2014. Pages 111-121.]
        “Seen from this Muslim perspective, the globalization of modem capitalism has not ushered in an end to economic history. In the Muslim world, capitalism’s ascent has intensified debates over that which advertisers and marketers in the West have also long made a target: the tastes and lifestyles of millions of citizen consumers, who use goods and services to explore who they are and how they should behave. In all this, one thing seems certain. It is that, for the world’s 1.2 billion Muslims, the culture-wars chapter in the capitalist revolution has just begun.” [Robert W. Hefner, “Islamic Economics and Global Capitalism.” Society. Volume 44, number 1, November/December 2006. Pages 16-22.]
    74. Islamic finance (Mohammad Dulal Miah [Arabic/ʿArabiyyaẗ, مُحَمَّد دُولَال مِيَاح, Muḥammad Dūlāl Miyāḥ], Yasushi Suzuki [Japanese 靖鈴木, Yasushi Suzuki as pronounced in this MP3 audio file], and Muhammad Ayub [Arabic/ʿArabiyyaẗ, مُحَمَّد أَيُّوب, Muḥammad ꞌAyyūb]): They apply Islamic principles to finance.
        “If … [a] Marxian view is held, it seems infeasible to eliminate the role of functionless financiers in the movement, while maintaining appropriate incentives to the ‘functional’ financiers. Or on other words, we cannot tame the spirit of financialization down without simply killing ‘the golden goose’ – the rentier; and at the same time, continuous financialization is engulfing the real economy. Perhaps, this dilemma can rationalize the partnership strategy upon the profit-loss sharing (PLS) between industrial capitalists and money capitalists (fund providers) widely observed in Islamic finance.…
        “… two elements – interest and uncertainty – are the core principles of Islamic finance.”
        [Mohammad Dulal Miah and Yasushi Suzuki, “Transcending the Trend of Financialization: The Heterodox vs. Islamic Economics View.” Journal of Economic and Social Thought. Volume 2, issue 4, December 2015. Creative Commons. Pages 226-241.]
        “Islamic finance is, what its features and philosophy are and how it works. In particular, the product developers, those responsible for implementation and also the financial experts need to be familiar with the essential requirements of different Islamic modes of business, enabling them to provide financial services relating to retail, corporate and government sectors ensuring Sharī´ah [Arabic/ʿArabiyyaẗ, شَرِيعَة, Šarīʿaẗ, ‘path’] compliance and the best operating procedures. This book is an effort in this regard to make available a textbook-type resource to students, bankers, the business community and the general public. Hopefully it will be useful in providing a sound understanding about the principles of Islamic finance and how they work to form a viable system.”
        [Muhammad Ayub. Understanding Islamic Finance. West Sussex, England: John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. 2007. Page 18.]
    75. takāful (Atiquzzafar Khan [ʾUrdū, عَتِیق اُلْظَّفَر خَان, ʿAtīq ʾUlzzafar H̱ān]): The term takāful (Arabic/ʿArabiyyaẗ, تَكَافُل) can be translated as “joint responsibility” or “mutual agreement.” It is used to refer to Islamic insurance.
        “The negative impacts of the prevailing global economic paradigm and its occasional failures have provided a sound basis for consideration of an alternative economic system.… [T]hough a host of institutions working on the basis of Takāful (the Islamic insurance) are operating in various parts of the world. However, the discipline is yet in the formative phase. There is need to make a comprehensive program while analyzing the diverse experiments having been conducted so far, in this regard. This paper is an endeavor to present and analyze the development of Takāful over time in different regions in the world.…
        “Takāful benefits were available from the second year of participation and withdrawal from the scheme was possible only after the completion of two years of participation. The ratio for profit between the company and the participants was 10 and 90 percent respectively.”
        [Atiquzzafar Khan, “Islamic Insurance: Evolution, Models and Issues.” Policy Perspectives. Volume 13, number 2, December 2016. Pages 29-62.]
    76. transitional economics (Greg Sharzer): He focuses upon cooperatives.
        “For the Bolsheviks, support for cooperatives inside Russia was a pragmatic measure designed to kickstart the Soviet economy. Thus moving cooperation from a single part of a program for social transformation to a foundational element takes the essentially pragmatic Marxist arguments for cooperation out of context. The power of cooperatives as a transitional economic form, through which they demonstrate the collective labor practices of a post-capitalist society, is subordinate to the strategic problems of creating that society.
        “A cooperative is a blanket term referring to an organization in which some aspect of production, distribution, or ownership is conducted collectively, either by business owners or workers inside the firm. The most democratically-run co-ops usually engage in profit-sharing among members, provide health and unemployment insurance, and limit wage differentials inside the firm. This article focuses on cooperation’s potential for creating a radically reformed or even post-capitalist economic order.”
        [Greg Sharzer, “Cooperatives as Transitional Economics.” Review of Radical Political Economics. OnlineFirst edition. July, 2016. Pages 1-21.]
    77. postneoliberalism (Jamie Peck, Nik Theodore, and Simon Springer): They examine and critique attempts to move beyond neoliberal (neoclassical) economics.
        “… postneoliberal alternatives—for all their social, ecological, and indeed economic urgency—may be preemptively constrained, if not neutralized. It will continue to be imperative, therefore, to push for radical transformations in interlocal and international regulatory relations, the liminal zones inwhich residual neoliberalisms lurk, through every channel available, including the nation state. New spaces must be carved out not only for a global ethics of responsibility, but also for sustainable forms of sociospatial redistribution—anathema to neoliberalism—which can ultimately only be secured between places, through a reconstitution of sociospatial relations ….” [Jamie Peck and Nik Theodore, “Postneoliberalism and its Malcontents.” Antipode. Volume 41, number S1, 2009. Pages 94-116.]
        “I attempt to unpack the “post” in the various postneoliberalism arguments and indicate that despite the desire to transcend neoliberal strictures, there is an irrefutable degree of continuity to neoliberalism that must be understood if we ever hope to abandon this acrimonious version of capitalism to the annals of the past. In the conclusion I offer some thoughts on the frightening nature of the current moment, where neoliberalism’s continuing salience no longer rests on its intellectual project, but on its crisis-driven approach to governance.” [Simon Springer, “Postneoliberalism?” Review of Radical Political Economics. Volume 47, number 1, March 2015, Pages 5-17.]
    78. institutional matrix theory (Svetlana Kirdina [Russian Cyrillic, Светлана Кирдина, Svetlana Kirdina as pronounced in this MP3 audio file]): She proposes a “new systemic institutional approach” which is also known as X- and Y-theory.
        “The article presents institutional matrix theory (IMT), or X- and Y-theory, as a new framework for comparative analysis of ‘capitalistic’ and ‘non-capitalistic’ countries. In opposition to the popular view that cultural differences principally do matter, IMT finds that the type of institutional matrix historically dominant in a given country is the crucial point.…
        “Proceeding with the Marxian approach, IMT … elaborates on a model of human society as a social system structured into three main spheres: economy, politics and ideology. In contrast to Marxian ‘economic determinism’ (which gives primacy to the economic structure over politics and others cultural spheres in the development of human history), in IMT economy, politics, and ideology are of equal importance.”
        [Svetlana Kirdina, “New Systemic Institutional Approach for Comparative Political and Economic Analysis.” Review of Radical Political Economics. Volume 45, number 3, September 2013. Pages 341-348.]
        “The article is aimed at presentation of two alternative types of institutional matrices underlying the unique, peculiar path of evolution in Russia and East European countries, both in historical retrospective and nowadays. The theory of institutional matrices, which is being developed by the author, is a new macrosociological hypothesis so far. It is being actively discussed in the social sciences in Russia now. Verification of this concept is to be performed in various ways. One of them is to explain explicit and latent peculiarities of the transformation process in post-communist Europe.” [Svetlana Kirdina, “Fundamental Difference in the Transformation Process between Russia and East European Countries.” Berliner Osteuropa Info. Volume 16, 2001. Pages 14-16.]
        “Institutions have a dual natural-artificial character. On the one hand, institutions manifest self-organizational principles in a society as a co-extensive natural-social system. On the other hand, institutions are the result of purposeful human reflection with regard to relevant laws and rules; they emerge and are shaped as ‘human-made’ entities. Aggregations of interrelated basic economic, political and ideological institutions are defined as institutional matrices. Historical observations and empirical research as well as mathematical modelling and a broad philosophical approach provide a ground for our hypothesis about two particular types of institutional matrices existing around the world. Namely, we call the two types X-matrices and Y-matrices and compare the unique identities of each one.” [Svetlana Kirdina, “Prospects of liberalization for S&T policies in Russia: institutional analysis.” Sociology of Science and Technology. Volume 1, number 2, June 2010. Pages 10-28.]
    79. system of labor–managed firms (Bruno Jossa as pronounced in this MP3 audio file): He also refers to these entities as self–managed, cooperative, or democratic firms. Given the collapse of the “centrally planned” Soviet Union, Jossa proposes an economic alternative to the capitalist system.
        “… economic analysts have been theorising a system of labour-managed firms as a possible alternative to capitalism, and the viability of this system justifies the claim that [Karl] Marx has happily survived a spell of near-hibernation: unlike what happened in the past century, his name will no longer be associated with an oppressive bureaucratic system ….
        “… I hold that given the collapse of the centrally planned Soviet regime, a system of self-managed firms is the most readily acceptable and credible alternative to capitalism.…
        “… in Marx’s approach it is the employment contract (the assumption for the existence of hired labour) that triggers the transformation of the value advanced in the form of money into capital (an additional amount of value), and this explains why the labour theory of value fails to explain how prices are formed in a system with labour-managed firms.”
        [Bruno Jossa, “A system of self-managed firms as a new perspective on Marxism.” Cambridge Journal of Economics. Volume 36, 2012. Pages 821–841.]
        “From [Karl] Marx’s contention that hired labor is the main determinant of capitalistic alienation it follows that the suppression of hired labor in a system of self-managed firms would sweep away the primary form of alienation. As mentioned above, a democratic firm system reverses the capitalistic capital-labor relation since workers become buyers of production means instead of being bought by the owners of them. As a result, democratic firms are an effective means of counteracting that form of alienation that stems from the subordination of labor to capital ….
        “… the one form of alienation that democratic firm management is unable to cancel is commodity fetishism, which Marx held to affect every market economy. As a result, irrespective of the degree of freedom assumed to reign in the markets of a self-managed system, there will be no means of eliminating market-related alienation altogether.”
        [Bruno Jossa, “Alienation and the Self-Managed Firm System.” Review of Radical Political Economics. Volume 46, number 1, March 2014. Pages 5-14.]
        “Bearing in mind the criticisms levied against the Soviet model of socialism, today it is possible to argue that a feasible socialist model is market socialism with labor-managed firms, which is not what [Antonio] Gramsci had in mind. In the debate of the 1930s, socialist economists got the better of their liberal colleagues by providing evidence that centralized planning could be reconciled with pricing systems based on individual preferences. What they failed to address was the incentive issue …, while today theorists of market socialism hold that no economic system will ever function properly without suitable incentives to underpin choices deemed to work in the interests of the economy.” [Bruno Jossa, “Gramsci and the Labor-Managed Firm.” Review of Radical Political Economics. Volume 41, number 1, winter 2009. Pages 5-22.]
        “In the paper the terms ‘cooperative firms,’ ‘labour-managed firms’ and ‘democratic firms’ are used as synonyms. In a cooperative firm, therefore, (a) all decisions about production are made by managers elected by the workers, (b) the firm uses private loan capital only, and (c) the workers appropriate the balance between the firm’s total revenues and total production costs.” [Bruno Jossa, “Cooperative Firms as a New Mode of Production.” Review of Political Economy. Volume 24, number 3, July 2012. Pages 399-416.]
        “[Vladimir] Lenin’s neglected ‘testament to posterity’ suggests that socialism can be implemented by creating a system of self-managed firms that operate in markets under the lead of the Communist Party.” [Bruno Jossa, “Marx, Lenin and the Cooperative Movement.” Review of Political Economy. Volume 26, number 2, April 2014. Pages 282-302.]
    80. new political economy for the U.S. (Ron Baiman): He focuses upon the processes of restructuring and revitalization.
        “The U.S. economy needs both radical restructuring to increase publicly funded productive service employment, and revitalization to increase production of high value added, internationally competitive tradable goods that can be exported to pay for necessary imports. As many of these exports will, for the foreseeable future, be manufactured goods, a core high skilled, high value added manufacturing capability must be maintained and/or recreated. These policies must both reverse the alarming growth of inequality in income and wealth that underlies the increasing corruption of democratic politics in the United States, and the inability of the economy to sustainably increase overall prosperity.” [Ron Baiman, “Toward a New Political Economy for the U.S.” Review of Radical Political Economics. Volume 42, number 3, September 2010. Pages 353-362.]
    81. immanent critique of neoliberalism (Mary V. Wrenn): She considers “the contradictions embedded within the neoliberal social structure of accumulation.”
        “An immanent critique begins with a description of what the social structure purports to be and proceeds by unveiling the true machinations of the system, revealing the conspicuously hidden contradictions therein …. One type of immanent critique of neoliberalism aims to uncover the contradictions embedded within the neoliberal social structure of accumulation, specifically with respect to the rhetoric and ideology which supports it juxtaposed against the actual mechanics of it. In so doing, immanent critique exposes veiled sources of repression even when the oppressed are not conscious of it …. A central line of inquiry is to examine why a given norm or cultural practice, perceived as counter to human flourishing, is widely accepted within a society …. In the case of neoliberalism, immanent critique must take into account the influence of the powerful on the general population’s interpretation of neoliberalism.” [Mary V. Wrenn, “Immanent Critique, Enabling Myths, and the Neoliberal Narrative.” Review of Radical Political Economics. Volume 48, number 3, September 2016. Pages 452-466.]
    82. male–female comparable worth debate (Stephen L. Mangum): He develops a heterodox—an alternative—economic approach to this issue.
        “Surveying the literature on the comparable worth or pay equity debate, one often encounters reference to the economic view. In reality however, three major paradigms exist in labor economics today; the prevailing neoclassical paradigm, the radical or Marxian view, and the institutional approach. While the three can be viewed as sharing common objectives (to describe, to predict, and to prescribe) they approach issues from different philosophical frameworks, employ different analytical tools, and lead to very different policy implications. Examining the pay equity issue from the perspectives of the three paradigms suggests different insights into the issue than that usually labelled the economic view.” [Stephen L. Mangum, “The Male-Female Comparable Worth Debate: Alternative Economic Perspectives on an Issue That Cuts Across the Social Sciences.” American Journal of Economics and Sociology. Volume 47, number 2, April, 1988. Pages 149-195.]
    83. post–autistic economics or real–world economics (Keith Rankin, Edward Fullbrook, and many others): This approach to economics critiques both mainstream (neoclassical) and heterodox (alternative) economics. Because the term “post–autistic” may be offensive to Autistics and their families (although “autistic,” as an economic concept, predated the psychiatric reference), “real–world economics” has, more recently, become an alternate designation.
        “Before examining what is autistic – or allegedly autistic – about neoclassical economics, I should note that the use of ‘autism’ as a metaphor might be regarded as inappropriate by many of those whose lives are touched by autism, or who are researchers of autism.…
        “Post-autistic economics suggests … that economics should emphasise the way the world does work, and not how it might work in a private property/perfect competition/free market utopia. In this context, policymaking depends critically on knowledge gleaned from observation rather than from abstraction. Economic history should be a critical part of post-autistic economics teaching.
        “Having expressed my sympathy for the goals of the Post-autistic economics network, I do have reservations about it. First, autism is still too much of a taboo subject to enable it to become an effective metaphor for a protest movement. Second, there is a danger to overreacting to the failings of mathematical economics. Abstract mathematical economics, in its place, has a lot to offer humankind, as indeed does pure mathematics.”
        [Keith Rankin, “Autistic Economics.” Journal of Australian Political Economy. Number 50, December 2002. Pages 10-13.]
        “The first issue of the Post-Autistic Economics Newsletter appeared in September 2000. It arose out of a conversation the previous month at the World Congress of Social Economics at Cambridge in the UK. Benjamin Balak, then a graduale srudent at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, told me that some distinguished American universities were eliminating, even as an elective, the history of economic thought from the curriculum, the, idea being that the total absence of competing ideas would facilitate students’ indoctrination into neoclassicalism. I was incredulous. It seemed too much to believe that the closing down of the horizons of economic enquiry could have gone so far. But a quick check with other conferees not only confirmed Balak’s account but also turned up economists faced with redundancy in consequence of this new narrowing of vision.” [Edward Fullbrook, “The Post-Autistic Economics Movement: A Brief History.” Journal of Australian Political Economy. Number 50, December 2002. Pages 14-23.]
        “One aspect of simplification that is apparent at the level of public debate is the way that policy conclusions are frequently drawn from limited statistical evidence. While economists and econometricians are generally cautious about specifying policy implications arising from econometric analyses, at the level of broader debate and media coverage there are fewer reservations. This paper explores some of the limitations and potential opportunities for policy-relevant findings from econometrics. In particular, it considers what can and cannot be deduced as a result of an explanatory variable being found to be statistically significant. In addition, it indicates what aspects to address or questions to raise if econometricians and economists are to extend this work to the point where it may be directly applicable in policy debate.…
        “This paper has shown that there is a large rhetorical component in the application of results from econometric models to real world issues.”
        [Stuart Birks, “Rethinking economics: Logical gaps – empirical to the real world.” Real-World Economics Review (previously called, Post-Autistic Economics Review). Issue 62, December 2012. Pages 51-67.]
        “In [Adam] Smith’s famous pin factory example there was an unresolved contradiction: The specialization which comes with the division of labor allows for remarkable increases in productivity. But up to a point at least, the bigger the pin factory the greater the possibilities of specialization and thus of increased efficiency—technically, increasing returns to scale. But since larger firms can achieve a larger scale than smaller firms, there will be a tendency toward monopoly—as [Karl] Marx had insisted. Smith’s more famous metaphor, the invisible hand, however, requires many competitors in which no firm can achieve market control: In this condition, returns to scale will be diminishing rather than increasing. Since growth occurs all the time, how then to resolve this paradox?” [Peter T. Manicas, “Endogenous growth theory: The most recent ‘revolution’ in economics?” Post-Autistic Economics Review (subsequently renamed, Real-World Economics Review). Issue 41, March 2007. Pages 39-53.]
        “Obviously, it has become more difficult under these circumstances to collect profit in the conventional commercial way. The technically warranted potential abundance of information with its collective good and cumulative character reduces the commercial producers’ abilities to collect revenue in the ‘markets.’ The corporate efforts to change conditions in order to secure and increase profits, in turn, endanger a continued process of generation of new information, knowledge and cultural material …. Here we may have to face ‘the simple choice between profits and production’ ….
        “Increased complexity reflects the overall socialization of production and innovation, in the face of a fragmented and de-regulated economy. The ‘need, then, is for new institutions …’ …. The ‘limitations of information as a commodity now have come to the fore, both in economic analysis and in policy matters’ and call for a’thoroughgoing innovation in organizational design’ to include ‘a very high level of collaboration’ ….
        “This renders real-world economics a science of (the joint learning of) appropriate co-ordination rather than a science of isolated individual maximization, general equilibrium and ‘optimality’ ….”
        [Wolfram Elsner, “Real-World Economics Today: The New Complexity, Co-ordination and Policy.” Review of Social Economy. Volume 63, number 1, 2005. Pages 19-53.]
    84. Thoreau’s alternative economics (Brian Walker and Samuel Alexander): They examine Henry David Thoreau’s approach to economics, including “voluntary poverty.” Alexander’s website is The Simplicity Collective: Let us be pioneers once more.
        “[Henry David] Thoreau’s central theme is that working conditions in a market democracy can easily undermine liberty and erode autonomy. His goal in Walden is to set out strategies by which people might enact their freedom when they face working conditions that are likely to threaten their autonomy and well-being. After a careful reading of Walden we may still be uncomfortable with many of Thoreau’s strategies – his idea of voluntary poverty will not appeal to everyone – but at least we will no longer underestimate Walden’s complexity and subtlety as a reflection about the preconditions for democratic enactment in market societies.” [Brian Walker, “Thoreau’s Alternative Economics: Work, Liberty, Democratic Cultivation.” American Political Science Review. Volume 92, number 4, December 1998. Pages 845-856.]
        “[Henry David] Thoreau reminds us that ‘the object of clothing is, first, to retain the vital heat, and secondly, in this state of society, to cover nakedness.’ On that basis he suggested – and this is his central point here – that any necessary or important work may be accomplished without adding to our wardrobes. ‘A man who has at length found something to do will not need to get a new suit to do it in.‘ Beware, then, he wrote, ‘of all enterprises that require new clothes, and not rather the new wearer of clothes.’
        “Thoreau was of the view that, in terms of what is necessary to life, functional clothing can be obtained very cheaply – ‘at prices to suit customers really’ – or even made at home for a nominal cost. Furthermore, he thought that before we seek ‘finer clothing’ we should first make sure that our pursuits are ‘finer,’ or else we are just relying on the ‘false skin’ of clothing to obtain a false respect. Thoreau wondered how far people would retain their relative rank if they were divested of their clothes. Should this happen, he implied, we would simply have to confer social status on the basis of worthiness, or the like, rather than on the basis of fine dress, which all too often merely represents an accidental and arbitrary possession of wealth.”
        [Samuel Alexander. Just Enough is Plenty: Thoreau’s Alternative Economics. Melboure, Victoria, Australia: The Simplicity Collective. 2011. Creative Commons. Page 20.]
        “I learned from my two years’ experience that it would cost incredibly little trouble to obtain one’s necessary food, even in this latitude; that a man may use as simple a diet as the animals, and yet retain health and strength. I have made a satisfactory dinner, satisfactory on several accounts, simply off a dish of purslane … which I gathered in my cornfield, boiled and salted. I give the Latin on account of the savoriness of the trivial name. And pray what more can a reasonable man desire, in peaceful times, in ordinary noons, than a sufficient number of ears of green sweet corn boiled, with the addition of salt? Even the little variety which I used was a yielding to the demands of appetite, and not of health. Yet men have come to such a pass that they frequently starve, not for want of necessaries, but for want of luxuries; and I know a good woman who thinks that her son lost his life because he took to drinking water only.
        “The reader will perceive that I am treating the subject rather from an economic than a dietetic point of view, and he will not venture to put my abstemiousness to the test unless he has a well-stocked larder.”
        [Henry D. Thoreau. Walden: or Life in the Woods. Boston, Massachusetts, and New York: Houghton Mifflin Company. 2010. Page 68.]
    85. human economy (Hilkka Pietilä as pronounced in this MP3 audio file): She examines the triangle of household, cultivation, and industrial production.
        “The concept of the human economy is used in this paper to signify all work, production, actions and transactions needed to provide for the livelihood, welfare and survival of people and families, irrespective of whether they appear in statistics or are counted in monetary terms. It implies also a basic understanding of the necessity to manage the human household in a sustainable way, i.e., how it is in the vital interest of humanity to preserve living nature, the biosphere, in optimal shape for life, cultivation and healthy human habitation.…
        “The triangle picture of the human economy … sees these three components [household, cultivation, and industrial production] each having its own right of existence and thus helps us to see the links and dynamism within and between the three. There are links between the macro and micro, monetary and nonmonetary, visible and invisible, living and nonliving, private and public in the reality of human subsistence. Some of these links are within the components, some are between them. And thus we see the need for a new theory of the totality of human actions for sustainable livelihood.”
        [Hilkka Pietilä, “The triangle of the human economy: household – cultivation – industrial production—An attempt at making visible the human economy in toto.” Ecological Economics. Volume 20, issue 2, February 1997. Pages 113-127.]
    86. poly economics (Christian Klesse as pronounced in this MP3 audio file): He develops a heterodox economic approach—including Marxism and post–Marxism—to polyamory (the practice of having more than one sexual partner).
        “Academic research and popular writing on nonmonogamy and polyamory has so far paid insufficient attention to class divisions and questions of political economy. This is striking since research indicates the significance of class and race privilege within many polyamorous communities. This structure of privilege is mirrored in the exclusivist construction of these communities. The article aims to fill the gap created by the silence on class by suggesting a research agenda which is attentive to class and socioeconomic inequality. The paper addresses relevant research questions in the areas of intimacy and care, household formation, and spaces and institutions and advances an intersectional perspective which incorporates class as nondispensable core category. The author suggests that critical research in the field can stimulate critical self-reflexive practice on the level of community relations and activism. He further points to the critical relevance of Marxist and Postmarxist theories as important resources for the study of polyamory and calls for the study of the contradictions within poly culture from a materialist point of view.…
        “Polyamory is often described by its practitioners as an ethical practice of nonmonogamy. In this paper, I have shown that existing research persistently highlights the exclusive nature of most poly communities in terms of race and class. I have sketched an agenda for future research around the three key areas of intimacy and care, household formation, and spaces and institutions because I believe that without a sustained commitment to socioeconomic equality it is impossible to do justice to the common self-representation of polyamory as an egalitarian practice. I consider it as problematic that research into polyamory has so far shared the disregard for class analysis with most critical work within sexualities studies ….”
        [Christian Klesse, “Poly Economics—Capitalism, Class, and Polyamory.” International Journal of Politics, Culture, and Society. Volume 27, number 2, June 2014. Pages 203-220.]
    87. heterodox social surplus approach (Frederic S. Lee and Tae-Hee Jo [Korean, 태 헤 조, T’ae He Cho as pronounced in this MP3 audio file]): They consider surplus as socially emergent from human agency.
        “In this article we also adopt the technical definition of the social surplus, but instead of having it emerge as a residual from given total social product, the surplus emerges directly from the act of agency with the total social product emerging as a result. This alternative delineation of the social surplus draws upon aforementioned various heterodox traditions; hence we denote it as the heterodox social surplus approach.
        “Economics and especially heterodox economics is about developing theoretical explanations of the social provisioning process. People have social lives; they have families, parents, children, and a history; and they need to be fed, housed, clothed, married and schooled. And, the needed and desired ‘surplus’ goods and services are produced to sustain their socially constructed, meaningful lifestyle. Thus the social provisioning process is a continuous, non-accidental series of production-based, production-derived economic activities through historical time that provide needy individuals and families the goods and services necessary to carry out their sequential reoccurring and changing social activities through time.”
        [Frederic S. Lee and Tae-Hee Jo, “Social surplus approach and heterodox economics.” Journal of Economic Issues. Volume 45, issue 4, 2011. Pages 857-876.]
    88. alternative economic strategy (Bob Rowthorn): He considers various proposals to improve the economy of the UK in the early 1980s.
        “There are many different versions of the [British] Alternative Economic Strategy (AES), some of which are so modest that they hardly deserve such a grandiose name. For example, the Cambridge Economic Policy Group calls for a traditional Keynesian package consisting of little else but reflation of the economy, import controls and an incomes policy. In what follows I shall use the name AES in a more restrictive sense to cover the fairly radical programmes put forward by the Labour Left and the Communist Party. These programmes differ in some respects, but their basic proposals are as follows:
        • “reflation of the economy …;
        • “import controls …;
        • “price controls …;
        • “compulsory planning agreements …;
        • “nationalisation …;
        • “public ownership …;
        • “new powers for workers …;
        • “withdrawal from the Common Market …;
        • “expansion of the social services …;
        • “a reduction in military expenditure …;
        • “redistribution of income and wealth …;
        [Bob Rowthorn, “The Politics of the Alternative Economic Strategy: The Alternative Economic Strategy is the Left’s great strength But it lacks vision and, above all, it must be seen as part of a political strategy.” Marxism Today. January, 1981. Pages 4-10.]
    89. models of alternative economy (Mi Park [Korean, 박 미, Pak Mi as pronounced in this MP3 audio file]): Seven models are examined and critiqued in the article.
        “The following models of alternative economy are discernable in the publications of ANGM [Anti-Neoliberal Globalization Movement] groups and their affiliate members:
        • “Eco-capitalist Globalization model: This model is drawn from policy suggestions made by major trade unions like ETUC (European Trade Union Confederation), ILO (International Labour Organization), ICFTU (International Confederation of Free Trade Unions), International Trade Union Confederation (ICTU) and environmental and aid NGOs [non-governmental organizations] such as Green Peace, the Friends of the Earth, Oxfam and the International Fair Trade Organization.
        • “Alternative Regionalism of Solidarity Economy model: The idea of building an alternative regional bloc of solidarity economy is being discussed among activist scholars associated with the Focus on the Global South, the Transnational Institute and the La Via Campesina.
        • “Nation-state Centric Localization model: Key ideas of this model come from the International Forum on Globalization (IFG) and its member organizations such as the Polaris Institute (Canada), and the Council of Canadians (Canada) as well as many of the same environmental organizations associated with the eco-globalization camp.
        • “De-growth Subsistence Economy model: This camp houses various shades of radical greens including bioregionalists, spiritual eco-feminists, eco-socialists, eco-anarchists and autonomists who are steeped in the tradition of deep ecology.
        • “Socialist Planning model: This model is based on the ideas of socialist organizations with Trotskyist pedigree.
        • “Eco-socialist model: This model draws on the work of scholar activists associated with the International Eco-socialist Network.
        • “Anarcho-communist model: This model is constructed based on ideas of anarchists associated with [Murray] Bookchin’s social ecology …, [Michael] Albert’s Participatory Economics and [Takis] Fotopoulos’ Inclusive Democracy.
        [Mi Park, “Imagining a Just and Sustainable Society: A Critique of Alternative Economic Models in the Global Justice Movement.” Critical Sociology. Volume 39, number 1, 2011. Pages 65-85.]
    90. imperfect knowledge economics (Michael Frydman, Michael D. Goldberg, Giuseppe Garofalo as pronounced in this MP3 audio file, and others): They develop an approach to economics which posits that human knowledge is imperfect.
        “Here, we sketch how IKE [imperfect knowledge economics] formalizes imperfect understanding and reflexivity by opening mathematical models to the growth of knowledge, that is, to unanticipated changes in participants’ understanding of the process driving outcomes. IKE enables an economist to acknowledge his own imperfect understanding, as well as that of market participants.
        “IKE explores the possibility that individual behavior and market outcomes exhibit context-dependent regularities that begin and cease to be relevant at moments that no one can fully foresee. IKE partly opens its models to Knightian uncertainty by formalizing such regularities with qualitative and contingent conditions.”
        [Roman Frydman and Michael D. Goldberg, “Fallibility in formal macroeconomics and finance theory.” Journal of Economic Methodology. Volume 20, number 4, December 2013. Pages 386-396.]
        “… imperfect knowledge economics (IKE) jettisons conventional models’ core premise and how doing so helps to overcome these models’ epistemological flaws. By opening economic models to change, that is, at least in part, indeterminate, and by recognizing imperfect knowledge on the part of economists, IKE explores the frontier of what empirically relevant mathematical macroeconomic and finance models can deliver.…
        “Our critique of contemporary economic science suggests that addressing its models’ epistemological and empirical difficulties requires opening them to non-routine change and imperfect knowledge. A key aspect of such a research program involves according market participants’ forecasting behavior an autonomous role.”
        [Roman Frydman and Michael D. Goldberg, “Change and expectations in macroeconomic models: recognizing the limits to knowability.” Journal of Economic Methodology. Volume 20, number 2, June 2013. Pages 118-138.]
        “The paper discusses synthetically an epistemological question in the field of economics: how to translate a real problem into formal terms without a substantial loss of significance for its solution in policy making. The discussion will challenge the plausibility of the basic assumption of ultra-rational subjects who act independently of each other and will propose a research programme in Imperfect Knowledge Economics ….
        “Two principles lie at the heart of Ike [Imperfect Knowledge Economics] thought, one that economics is a social science, mostly interpretative, which means economists can make only qualitative forecasts in certain fields, and the other that there are systemic risks to control as prices can fluctuate a lot and for a long time.”
        [Giuseppe Garofalo, “Irreducible complexities: from Gödel and Turing to the paradigm of Imperfect Knowledge Economics.” Quality and Quantity. Volume 48, number 6, November 2014. Pages 3463-3474.]
    91. economy for the common good (Christian Felber as pronounced in this MP3 audio file): He proposes an perspective on economy which promotes the common welfare of democratic states. This approach is supported by the website, Economy for the Common Good: An economic model for the future.
        “… the US constitution features in its preamble the words ‘promote the general welfare.’ The constitutions of democratic states are pervaded by a wide consensus as to what the goal of economic activity is: the advancement of the common good. In any case no constitution that I have read states that the goal of economic activity is to achieve monetary gain.… In the Western world there has been consensus for over two thousand years concerning the goal of economic activity. As you can see, the Economy for the Common Good is not suggesting anything new; it merely proposes that the constitutional goal of the economy should be implemented in the existing economic order as well.…
        “To do this our current market economy would have to be put on a new course: directing our path away from pursuit of profit and competition, and instead striving towards pursuit of the common good and cooperation. The framework of legal incentives would have to abandon ‘maximization of self-interest’ and embrace ‘the common good’ as its guiding light instead, with the goal of all enterprise being to make the largest possible contribution to the common good. This is nothing new. The goals of individual economic protagonists would merely be harmonized with constitutional goals. This would be the first step towards an ethical reorientation of free markets.”
        [Christian Felber. Change Everything: Creating an Economy for the Common Good. Susan Nurmi, translator. London: Zed Books. 2015. Pages 16-17.]
    92. economics of race (Elizabeth Warren, Nathan Wright, Jr., Walter W. Heller, Gregory N. Price, William A. Darity, Jr., John Majewski, and others): They examine the economic implications of racial discrimination.
        “When my coauthors and I began our first study of the families in bankruptcy back in the early 1980s, we accepted the conventional wisdom that we would encounter lower class Americamarginally employed or chronically unemployed people with little education and poor economic prospects. After all, who else would go bankrupt? To be sure, the incomes of the families filing for bankruptcy were low. In 1981, about a quarter of the families were below the poverty line, and half were sandwiched between poverty and median incomes. By 2001, those numbers had dropped even further, with about half below the poverty line and another 40% sandwiched between poverty and median income in the United States. When the households in bankruptcy are segregated by race, the most salient feature is their similarity. Income differences among different groups filing for bankruptcy are modest; at the time of filing, most of the families have quite low incomes.” [Elizabeth Warren, “The Economics of Race: When Making It to the Middle Is Not Enough.” Washington and Lee Law Review. Volume 61, number 4, fall 2004. Pages 1777-1799.]
        “From the ratios of median money income it is clear that the highest post-World War II relative income period for Negroes was in the early 1950’s. While there was a low point in the ratio of Negro to white income in the late 1950’s, Negro proportionate income in the early 1960’s was lower than in the early 1950’s. This may suggest to some degree an over-all relative worsening of the Negro’s position over a twelve-year period. To be in a position to make any such inference when the Ameri-can commitment and philosophical thrust is toward an elimination of the statistical differences between Negro and white involvement and benefit levels in American life is more than sufficient evidence that in some seriously significant way our plan for progress has been thwarted. It is this crucial message which has been heard acutely not only in Watts [in Los Angeles, California] but also in twenty other major big-city trouble spots recently identified by federal officials. It is this same message which is heard in Bogalusa [in Louisiana] and Boston [in Massachusetts] and in nearly every community in America in which Negroes live.” [Nathan Wright, Jr., “The Economics of Race.” The American Journal of Economics and Sociology. Volume 26, number 1, January 1967. Pages 1-12.]
        “The high cost of discrimination—and I shall focus on the Negro as representative of all racial minorities in the American economy—is so plain and compelling that it may seem almost superfluous to examine it. Yet, the numbers that have been developed to document this cost deserve our attention, if only for their cumulative shock effect as a backdrop for an analysis of economic causes and cures.…
        “The thirty-year lag in black income distribution is another index of how far the Negro has been left behind.”
        [Walter W. Heller, “Economics of the Race Problem.” Social Research. Volume 37, number 4, winter 1970. Pages 495-510.]
        “… our findings have implications about the need for and efficacy of policy interventions designed to achieve equal treatment for groups subjected to discriminatory treatment and stigmatization. Racial stigma and its attendant presumption of inferiority—biogenetic or otherwise—has consequences for the historical trajectory of black–white disparities in social and economic outcomes. In this context, traditional public policy interventions based on ensuring equal treatment of blacks can have limited efficacy, as historically based racial stigma constrains whites to view blacks as being less than equal. The eugenics movement clearly viewed blacks and whites as biologically and genetically unequal, and not worthy of equal treatment.” [Gregory N. Price and William A. Darity, Jr., “The economics of race and eugenic sterilization in North Carolina: 1958–1968.” Economics and Human Biology. Volume 8, issue 2, July 2010. Pages 261-272.]
        “… government programmes often benefit the most prosperous members of the targetted group at the expense of the poorer. Affirmative action programmes, which force employers to hire a certain percentage of an ethnic group, are intended to help the most disadvantaged segments of a minority. But the constant for lower wages …. The result is that affirmative action programmes help only the most prosperous minority members while hurting those who most require assistance. The propensity of government intervention to hurt minorities will be more clearly understood through an analysis of the economics of discrimination.” [John Majewski, “The Economics of Race and Discrimination.” Economic Affairs. Volume 8, number 3, February/March 1988. Pages 23-29.]
    93. urban and regional economics (Mariusz E. Sokołowicz as pronounced in this MP3 audio file, Christopher K. Johnson, Matthew Edel, and others): They develop various approaches, including Marxian, to the economics of urban and regional development.
        “The inclusion of institutional context in economics resulted in the dissemination of many theoretical trends alternative to mainstream economics. They are collectively identified under the common term of ‘institutional economics’ composed of various, often opposite strands. While theoretical considerations, which can be regarded as their offspring, are burdened with over 100 years of legacy, their empirical testing seems to be still at the initial stage. However, the research reflecting the spirit of various approaches to institutionalism seems to be relevant also to some aspects of urban and regional studies.…
        “Studies on urban and regional development can draw from the intellectual heritage of institutionalism which assumes, among other things, that historical trajectories of development, as well as formal and informal relations, determine the ways in which economic entities accomplish their goals. In a broader context, institutional environment (especially the one shaped under the conditions of spatial proximity), is not only a framework, but also a potential source of new ideas and it contributes to sustainable growth and competitiveness.”
        [Mariusz E. Sokołowicz, “Institutional perspective of urban and regional economics – selected areas of empirical application.” Journal of Economics and Management. Volume 19, number 1, 2005. Pages 45-62.]
        “This dissertation explores issues in urban and regional economics in three essays, Essays one and two are related in that both investigate aspects of poverty in the United States. Even in a rich nation like the United States poverty is one of the most pronounced and persistent economic problems. Essays one and two add to our understanding of poverty from an urban and regional perspective by using innovative distribution sensitive measures of poverty proposed by Nobel Laureate Amartya Sen. Essay one applies recently developed statistical inference procedures for the Sen index of poverty to test for differences in poverty across time and among urban and regional areas. Poverty is estimated using two measures of family well-being, cash income and comprehensive income. Cash income underpins the official U.S. government poverty statistics, but comprehensive income provides a more reliable indicator of family resources and wellbeing. Essay one helps us to better understand the question of who are the urban poor and where are they located.
        “Essay two also uses cash and comprehensive income Sen indexes of poverty, but investigates a different question What impact does sustained economic growth. especially the long expansion in the 1990s have on poverty when poverty is appropriately measured? Essay two uses pooled time series and regional cross section regression analysis to provide a more robust test of the relationship between poverty and economic growth over the past two decades.
        “The third essay is unrelated to poverty, but continues a study in regional economics by using a dynamic general equilibrium regional model to determine the economic impacts of the National Missile Defense program on the Alabama economy and multi-county sub-regions in north Alabama and south central Tennessee.”
        [Christopher K. Johnson. Essays in Urban and Regional Economics. Ph.D. dissertation. The University of Alabama. Tuscaloosa, Alabama. 2003. Pages 1-2.]
        “A Marxist approach to urban and regional economics cannot simply rely on what [Karl] Marx and [Friedrich] Engels said about cities or regions. They did not devote systematic study to spatial issues, although they discussed them in a number of contexts. Relations between country and city entered into their historical works. In political debates, as over the strategy of the Paris Commune, they took geographical questions seriously. Nonetheless, to derive a Marxist methodology of urban-regional studies, one must synthesize an approach out of scattered specific remarks on urban growth and regional differentiation, and from more general aspects of Marxist theory.
        “… Marxist method involves both a study of forces in long-term change, and a study of the specific political economy of class-divided modes of production. This section first discusses the treatment of cities within Marx’s and Engels’ historical theory, and then turns to their treatment of capitalism, discussing the role of uneven development and urbanization within their general treatment of accumulation, and the spatial flow of values within their more formal short-period economic model.”
        [Matthew Edel. Urban and Regional Economics: Marxist Perspectives. London and New York: Routledge imprint of Taylor & Francis Group, an Informa PLC business. 2007. Page 33.]
    94. humanistic economics (Lewis D. Solomon, Kathleen J. Collins, John Quell, and others): They propose versions of economics focusing on human needs. See the Humanistic Economics website.
        “For many years the large corporation’s role in society and the model of corporate governance has been the subject of controversy. Concern over the corporate role and whether corporate decision makers should consider the interests of ‘stakeholders’ other than the shareholders stems from the aggregation of resources and the resulting economic, social, and political power inherent in the corporate form. This article begins by analyzing two popular legal theories, Law and Economics and Critical Legal Studies, and their efforts at defining the corporate role in society and the interests of various constituencies in corporate decision making. The article then develops the concept of humanistic economics, a human needs orientation to policy making. Finally, the article attempts to apply the human needs approach to broadening the scope of corporate decision makers to include a concern for human beings, primarily employees, who form a constituency of the corporation. Emphasis is placed on the creation and development of economic organizational structures which will further human growth as part of a larger interest in the quality of life.” [Lewis D. Solomon and Kathleen J. Collins, “Humanistic Economics: A New Model for the Corporate Constituency Debate.” The Journal of Corporation Law. Volume 12, issue 2, winter 1987. Pages 331-353.]
        “No unregulated market economy has ever produced full employment for any extended period of time. Since the thirties, every major capitalist democracy has had to intervene in markets through government deficits, which directly and indirectly create jobs and keep wages high, and through taxes, labor protection, and income support policies, which prevent extreme economic inequalities. Far from drowning the private sector, these policies have created demand for unused human and capital resources and led to increased private saving and investment. National debts and stronger economies have grown together. Good wages also assure a modicum of labor peace.” [John Quell, “Humanistic Economics: Back to the Future.” The Humanist. Volume 55, number 3, May 1995. Pages 46-47.]
        “Differences in income distribution might be better understood as a reflecttion of the way firms and societies treat actual or perceived differences among workers and citizens. Some businesses manage to treat human beings as equal. By this1 do not mean that they harbor the absurd belief that all of us possess the same skills and interests. Equality means that we believe all human beings have mental and physical skills which are capable of continuous development and a willingness to deploy these in the interest of larger causes. Because each person is capable of making significant contributions, each should be nurtured both in education and in opportunities on the job. Enterprises andorganizations which make such assumptions have been not only more egalitarian in income distribution but more productive as well.” [John Quell, “Humanistic Economics: The Politics of Race Bashing.” The Humanist. Volume 55, number 2, March 1995. Pages 35-36.]
    95. humanomics (Bobby Varanasi, Deirdre Nansen McCloskey, and others): They propose various human–centered approaches to economics.
        “This book is an attempt to put into writing what I have learned in my journey so far. It is an attempt to pose all the questions—that continue to perplex me—to the larger audience out there. It is a humble acknowledgement of the fact that while capitalistic goals beset our day-to-day lives, there is more, much more one can do to create positive, sustainable impacts by calling upon human endeavor, not for the purposes of economic gain alone, but bundling such gains intrinsically, and irrevocably with social gains. The book is divided into three parts—starting with the industry, moving on to the players and attendant issues/ opportunities, culminating with a part on perspectives and way forward. Each of the three parts contains chapters that look at particular facets of the ‘impacts’ the global sourcing industry is meant to create, or has been able to. Within each chapter there are various questions that form the crux of this book. I have tried to provide perspectives and in some cases potential solutions to the issues addressed by each question. I have tried to tie in the solutions to socio-economic impacts—so as to maintain the reader’s attention with the subject at hand—and not get carried away into the larger aspects surrounding macroeconomics or geo-politics. I am neither qualified nor an expert in either of these two subjects, but surely an avid observer and learner.” [Bobby Varanasi. Humanomics: Making Sense Of The Socio-Economic Impacts Of Global Sourcing. Bloomington, Indiana: AuthorHouse LLC. 2014. Kindle edition.]
        “… [One] question is the ethical: can a businessperson can be ethical without abandoning her business? What then was the role of ethical change in the Bourgeois Revaluation of 1600-1800 in the Industrial Revolution. One might reply that the seven primary virtues of any human life—prudence, temperance, justice, courage, faith, hope, and love—also run a business life. Businesspeople are people, too. ‘Bourgeois virtues’ would therefore not be a contradiction in terms. On the contrary, capitalism works badly without the virtues—a fact long demonstrated by economic sociologists, and now admitted even by neo-institutional and behavioral economists. The virtues can be nourished in a conversation about the market, and often have been. You can see why the neologism ‘humanomics’ is appropriate here: a serious inquiry into the ethical context of the Industrial Revolution (and of development in presently poor countries, too) would require collaboration between the social sciences as behavior and the 5 humanities of philosophy, anthropology, history, and even theology as meaning (as in Robert Nelson’s books on economic theology).” [Deirdre Nansen McCloskey, “Language and Interest in the Economy: A White Paper on ‘Humanomics.’” Privately published paper. 2010. Creative Commons. Pages 1-6. Retrieved on November 9th, 2016.]
        “Humanomics is a nascent interdisciplinary program to teach and research a humanistic science of economics. Economics and the humanities are often perceived as fundamentally disconnected. Economics asks why Homo sapiens is the most prosperous species in the history of the planet, but the tools of the discipline are inadequate to account for the wide range of human motives. In economics the human predicates of feeling, wanting, thinking, and knowing have been boiled down to the single motivation of naked ‘self-interest.’ What does prosperity have to do with justice, courage, faith, hope, and love? The answer in economics is, ‘That’s for the humanities to ponder.’” [Editor, “Humanomics.” Website. Chapman University. 2016. Retrieved on November 9th, 2016.]
    96. breakdown theory (Henryk Grossmann as pronounced in this MP3 audio file): He develops a “natural” approach to Marxist economics. It incorporates laws of capitalist value, accumulation, and breakdown.
        “Obviously, as a dialectical Marxist, I understand that both sides of the process, the objective and subjective elements influence each other reciprocally. In the class struggle these factors fuse. One cannot ‘wait’ until the ‘objective’ conditions are there and only then allow the ‘subjective’ factors to come into play. That would be an inadequate, mechanical view, which is alien to me. But, for the purposes of the analysis, I had to use the process of abstract isolation of individual elements in order to show the essential function of each element. [Vladimir] Lenin often talks of the revolutionary situation which has to be objectively given, as the precondition for the active, victorious intervention of the proletariat. The purpose of my breakdown theory was not to exclude this active intervention, but rather to show when and under what circumstances such an objectively given revolutionary situation can and does arise.” [Henryk Grossmann (1931 letter to Paul Mattick) in Rick Kuhn, “Henryk Grossman and the Recovery of Marxism.” Historical Materialism. Volume 13, number 3, 2005. Pages 57-100.]
        “The empirical fact of the displacement of workers through machinery has nothing to do with the Marxist theory of immiseration or with the process by which workers are ‘set free’ due to the general law of capitalist accumulation and its historical tendency. The setting free of workers through machinery which [Karl] Marx describes in the descriptive portion of his book is an empirical fact. The theory of immiseration and breakdown … is a theory derived in a deductive manner, on the foundation of the law of value, from the fact of capitalist accumulation. It is a theory that makes no sense apart from the law of value.…
        “Even if Marx did not actually leave us a concise description of the law of breakdown in any specific passage he did specify all the elements required for such a description. It is possible to develop the law as a natural consequence of the capitalist accumulation process on the basis of the law of value, so much so that its lucidity will dispose of the need for any further proofs.”
        [Henryk Grossmann. Law of the Accumulation and Breakdown of the Capitalist System. Abridged. Jairus Banaji, translator. Pacifica, California: Marxists Internet Archive (Marxists.org) ebook edition. 2005. Creative Commons. No pagination.]
    97. political economy of American empire (Leo Panitch and Sam Gindin): They explore the relationships between “the process of capitalist globalization” and American imperialism.
        “This book is about globalization and the state. It shows that the spread of capitalist markets, values and social relationships around the world, far from being an inevitable outcome of inherently expansionist economic tendencies, has depended on the agency of states—and of one state in particular: America. Indeed, insofar as the relationship between the American state and the changing dynamics of production and fi nance was inscribed in the very process that came to be known as globalization, this book is devoted to understanding how it came to be that the American state developed the interest and capacity to superintend the making of global capitalism. In this respect, this is emphatically not another book on US military interventions; it is about the political economy of American empire. In this quite distinctive imperial state, the Pentagon and CIA have been much less important to the process of capitalist globalization than the US Treasury and Federal Reserve. This is so not just in terms of sponsoring the penetration and emulation of US economic practices abroad, but much more generally in terms of promoting free capital movements and free trade on the one hand, while on the other trying to contain the international economic crises a global capitalism spawns.” [Leo Panitch and Sam Gindin. The Making of Global Capitalism: The Political Economy of American Empire. London and Brooklyn, New York: Verso imprint of New Left Books. 2012. Page VII.]
        “The book’s central theoretical argument is that “the state needs to be placed at the centre of the search for an explanation of the making of global capitalism.” In contrast with competing theories of globalization that emphasize the extent to which global capitalism now constrains nation-state sovereignty, [Leo] Panitch and [Sam] Gindin argue that the spread of capitalism around the world wasn’t the “inevitable outcome of inherently expansionist economic tendencies” but, rather, that it has depended on the agency of states – especially, the US state.” [J. Z. Garrod, “The Making of Global Capitalism: The Political Economy of American Empire.” Review article. Antipode: A Radical Journal of Geography. July, 2013. Open access. Pages 1-5.]
        “… in suggesting that the nation-state is an actor, [Leo] Panitch and [Sam] Gindin [in The Making of Global Capitalism: The Political Economy of American Empire] downplay the significance of a) the need for capital to reproduce itself; and b) that in doing so, capital also transforms the structure of the social world and the means by which we come to comprehend it. In other words, Panitch and Gindin fail to provide an accurate historical materialist conceptualization of social and political space. Of course, certain ‘things’ need to happen to make the expansion of capitalist social relations possible, and these ‘things’ are often done by the institutions of the nation-state as they mediate conflicts from multiple sources; it is not clear, however, on what, exactly, this rests in the case of Panitch and Gindin’s account, as well as the extent to which such changes might also necessarily restructure the very relations that constitute our conceptual understanding of these various social ‘containers.’” [J. Z. Garrod, “A Critique of Panitch and Gindin’s Theory of American Empire.” Science & Society. Volume 79, number 1, January 2015. Pages 38-62.]
    98. political economy of distributed media (Andreas Wittel as pronounced in this MP3 audio file): He develops “a political economy from below” focused upon distributed media.
        “To avoid any misunderstandings: This is not meant as a critique of political economists of mass media. I do not see this limited appropriation of Marxist concepts as a failure of this academic field. My point is very different. I want to argue that this limited appropriation made complete sense in the age of mass media. It has a logic to it that lies very much in mass media technologies. This will be discussed in more detail in the following section. It should also be noted, very much in line with my argument, that over the last decade, which marks the transition from mass media to distributed media, [Karl] Marx has been rediscovered by political economists. Even more so, he has been rediscovered in ways that are not just rehearsals of the base and superstructure debate.…
        “… it might be hard to come up with a rationale as to why political economy of media needs to engage with value theory in the first place. In fact this is not the point I want to make. I do think however, that Marx’s labour theory of value (understanding labour in this broad meaning of the term) would open up new paths for empirical research. If it makes sense to see value as the power to act and to see it as the power to create social relations, if value is about how people give meaning to their own actions, then a political economy of communication, a political economy of distributed media would be in a perfect position to redefine what political economy means and to establish … a political economy from below. This would be research on value that is focused not on structures but on subjectivities and their desires to create, to connect, to communicate, to share, to work together and to give meaning to all these things.”
        [Andreas Wittel, “Digital Marx: Toward a Political Economy of Distributed Media.” tripleC: Cognition, Communication, Co-operation. Volume 10, number 2, 2012. Creative Commons. Pages 313-333.]
    99. behavioral economics (George Katona, Donald J. Harris, Robert J. Shiller, and others): This heterodox approach, also known—“psychology and economic” or “psychological economics”—applies psychology to economics.
        “Traditional economists analyze the relations among incomes, prices, amounts spent, saved and invested, and the like, by studying the behavior of markets. Behavioral economists study the behavior of people by analyzing the processes of spending, saving, investing, price-setting, including such psychological factors influencing behavior as people’s motives, attitudes, and expectations.” [George Katona and Donald J. Harris, “Behavioral Economics.” Challenge. Volume 21, number 4, September/October 1978. Pages 14-18.]
        “… the major theme I wish to address is the importance of behavioral economics in bringing economic ideas to successful results. Behavioral economics is really the application of methods from other social sciences—particularly psychology—to economics. Behavioral economics is central to institutional innovation because it rounds out the details, the frictions or imperfections that might make some grand idea for a new economic institution unworkable if not appropriately dealt with.” [Robert J. Shiller, “Behavioral Economics and Institutional Innovation.” Southern Economic Journal. Volume 72, number 2, October 2005. Pages 268-283.]
        “Over the past 20 years, researchers have incorporated an increasing number of results from behavioral economics into macroeconomic models. There are two main reasons for this change. First, it has become clear to macroeconomists that models based on assumptions of optimizing behavior in many cases have difficulty accounting for key real-world observations. Hence researchers have used behavioral economics assumptions with the aim of making their model predictions better fit the data. Early attempts to do this were criticized as being ad hoc. The force of this criticism has been reduced by the second reason for incorporating behavioral economics results into macroeconomics: cognitive psychologists and experimental economists have documented a number of systematic deviations between the decisions of human beings and those of the ‘economic man.’” [John C. Driscoll and Steinar Holden, “Behavioral economics and macroeconomic models.” Journal of Macroeconomics. Volume 41, September 2014. Pages 133-147.]
        “Behavioral economics incorporates insights from psychology and sociology into standard economic theory to betterunderstand human behavior. It is often complemented by experimental evidence on actual behavior. Together these two fields suggest that people have non-standard preferences (such as preferences for fairness, time-inconsistent preferences and reference dependent preferences), they have non-standard beliefs (e.g., they are overly self-confident about their abilitiesor they hold self-serving beliefs) and they engage in non-standard decision making by responding to framing of choices or emotions ….” [Alexander Kocha, Julia Nafziger, and Helena Skyt Nielsen, “Behavioral economics of education.” Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization. Volume 115, July 2015. Pages 3-17.]
        “Behavioral economics agrees with the standard economic model that markets and incentives play a key role in shaping people’s behavior. However, behavioral economics departs from the standard model in acknowledging three human behavioral traits: bounded rationality, bounded willpower, and bounded selfishness. The current paper elaborates on these three traits and introduces several constructs used by behavioral economists that are relevant to public health and health behavior change.” [Tryggvi Thorgeirsson and Ichiro Kawachi, “Behavioral Economics: Merging Psychology and Economics for Lifestyle Interventions.” American Journal of Preventive Medicine. Volume 44, number 2, February 2013. Pages 185-189.]
        “Behavioral economics is a reaction against the restrictive assumptions of the marginalist revolution. Behavioral economists seek to introduce more ‘realistic’ assumptions regarding the behavior of economic agents. Behavioral economics attempts to use concepts and insights from the other social sciences to replace, modify or enrich the current array of profit and utility maximizing models used by mainstream economics.” [Richard E. Hattwick, “Behavioral Economics: An Overview.” Journal of Business and Psychology Volume 4, number 2, December 1989. Pages 141-154.]
        “The key thesis of B.E. [behavioral economics]—that systematic biases are built into people’s choices that prevent utility maximization (from here on, optimizing choices)—is subject to different interpretations, and B.E. would benefit if this matter were clarified. One can hold that these systematic limitations are found in all people, are ‘congenital’ or even wired in (a ‘universalistic’ interpretation); or that they are found only among some people (a ‘particularistic’ interpretation); or that one and the same person can sometimes optimize and at other times cannot (an ‘oscillating’ interpretation).” [Amitai Etzioni, “Behavioral Economics: Toward a New Paradigm.” American Behavioral Scientist. Volume 55, number 8, August 2011. Pages 1099-1119.]
        “There is a wide range of behavioral economics papers generally. Some papers pursue better understanding of how individuals decide, particularly about economic transactions. Others pursue the properties of economic equilibriumgiven a model of how people decide (possibly with heterogeneity in individual behavior) and amodel of the underlying economic environment. Others pursue policy implications. Some of these are in areas where there must be policy (for example, taxation) and ask how the insights from behavioral economics might change existing policy analyses. Others open up newareas where government intervention might be successful (for example legislating defaults in 401k plans).” [Peter Diamond, “Behavioral economics.” Journal of Public Economics. Volume 92, numbers 8–9, August 2008. Pages 1858-1862.]
        “The behavioral patterns of the poor, we argue, may be neither perfectly calculating nor especially deviant. Rather, the poor may exhibit the same basic weaknesses and biases as do people from other walks of life, except that in poverty, with its narrow margins for error, the same behaviors often manifest themselves in more pronounced ways and can lead to worse outcomes. In what follows, we illustrate the kinds of insights that might be gained from a behaviorally more realistic analysis of the economic conditions of the poor, and we propose that alternative policies for alleviating poverty be considered.” [Marianne Bertrand, Sendhil Mullainathan, and Eldar Shafir, “A Behavioral-Economics View of Poverty.” The American Economic Review. Volume 94, number 2, May 2004. Pages 419-423.]
        “The main aim of research in behavioral economics is to explain hitherto unexplored issues that have been regarded as anomalies. This term is frequently used in the behavioral economics literature to expose irregularities in mainstream economics. The areas marginalized by conventional economic theory are the focal point of behavioral economics.” [Justyna Brzezicka1 and Radosław Wisniewski, “Homo Oeconomicus and Behavioral Economics.” Contemporary Economics. Volume 8, issue 4, October 2014. Pages 353-364.]
        “More than in other scientific (sub-)disciplines, any appreciation of behavioral economics depends on accepting its account of the history of economics. Behavioral economists, like everyone else, have their own view of the history of their (sub-)discipline which favors their own contributions and emphasizes the field’s importance. But on top of that, the argument for behavioral economics is explicitly premised on the historical view that mainstream neoclassical economists indeed believe all human beings are always perfectly rational.” [Floris Heukelom, “Mainstreaming behavioral economics.” Journal of Economic Methodology. Volume 21, number 1, March 2014. Pages 92-103.]
        “When economists analyze decisions, people are assumed to be capable of performing complex mental calculations involving time preferences, probabilities, and the expected utility of the outcomes. Behavioral economists, however, suggest that our preferences are not always consistent or well defined …; choices often depend on their contexts or on how they are framed.” [Huriya Jabbar, “The Behavioral Economics of Education: New Directions for Research.” Educational Researcher. Volume 40, number 9, December 2011. Pages 446-453.]
        “The objective of this paper is to summarize a growing list of recent papers that document aspects of behavior in market settings that also deviate from the forecasts of the standard theory. This research area is known as Psychology and Economics (or Behavioral Economics). The evidence suggests deviations from the standard theory in each step of the decision-making process: (1) nonstandard preferences, (2) incorrect beliefs, and (3) systematic biases in decision making. For each of these three steps, I present an example of the laboratory evidence, introduce a simple model if available, and summarize the strength and weaknesses of the field evidence. Since the focus of the paper is on the field evidence, I do not survey the laboratory evidence or the theoretical literature.” [Stefano DellaVigna, “Psychology and Economics: Evidence from the Field.” Journal of Economic Literature. Volume 47, number 2, June 2009. Pages 315-372.]
        “The literature in economics has also largely disregarded awards despite the recognition of the importance of incentives. However, there is some literature in economics that provides insights into isolated aspects of awards. A typical way for (standard) economists to look at awards would be in terms of the signal sent …, in terms of the competition induced (Lazear & Rosen, 1981), and in terms of incentives in a principle-agent relationship in a firm …. While these approaches are useful, they are hardly able to capture and reveal the many different aspects involved in the workings of awards. In psychological economics, which combines economic methods with insights from psychology, certain other aspects relevant to understanding awards have been discussed. Of particular relevance are analyses of status incentives …, of rewards as feedback …, of social recognition …, of reciprocity …, and of identity ….” [Bruno S. Frey and Susanne Neckermann, “Awards: A View from Psychological Economics.” Zeitschrift für Psychologie / Journal of Psychology. Volume 216, number 4, 2008. Pages 198-208.]
        “… the idea of enhancing performance by pay-for-performance is under certain conditions wrong in itself. This criticism can be substantiated by psychological economics or behavioral economics ….
        “We prefer the expression ‘psychological economics,’ rather than ‘behavioral economics,’ for two reasons. First, economists had already examined human behavior before this new field emerged. Second, … the term ‘behavioral’ … [could be] misleading since it may be confounded with the ‘behaviorist’ approach in psychology.”
        [Margit Osterloh, “Viewpoint: why variable pay-for-performance in healthcare can backfire—Evidence from psychological economics.” Forum for Empirical Scholarship. Volume 2, number 1, 2014. Pages 120-123.]
        “… we have been considering psychological economics (and indeed economics as a whole) only as a positive, explanatory science, which aims at giving the fullest possible account of the functional relations (cause and effect, if you like) among stimuli and responses connected with economic goods. In such a study we have no interest in states of consciousness as such; they are data useful to us only so far as they are links in our explanatory chains, and the psychological theory most in harmony with the general standpoint of natural science is coming to consider that the most useful and fundamental account of behavior can be given ultimately in physico-chemical terms, mental states being used only as frequently necessary or convenient mirrors reflecting the underlying mechanics.” [Z. Clark Dickinson, “Quantitative Methods in Psychological Economics.” The American Economic Review. Volume 14, number 1, March 1924. Pages 117-126.]
    100. behavioral political economy (Dimitri Landa as pronounced in this MP3 audio file, Jan Schnellenbach as pronounced in this MP3 audio file, Christian Schubert as pronounced in this MP3 audio file, Petrik Runst as pronounced in this MP3 audio file, Niclas Berggren as pronounced in this MP3 audio file, Joseph Daniel Ura, Erica M. Socker, Yongjing Zhang [Chinese, 张永靖, Zhāng-Yǒng-jìng as pronounced in this MP3 audio file], and others): They develop a behavioral approach to political economy inspired by behavioral economics.
         “One of the inspirations for BPE [behavioral political economy] is behavioral economics, which has taken off as one of the most significant field-defining developments in economics in the last one-and-a-half decades. Behavioral economics is predicated on the recognition of the importance of departures from the classic assumptions of rational agency for explaining a variety of behavioral phenomena identified by empirical scholars. At its best, it proceeds by bridging the micro-level laboratory findings of experimental economists with the aggregate behavioral patterns found in observational studies. The model of theoretical inquiry as micro-macro bridging, is, of course, the gold standard of economic reasoning and has been the gold standard in political economy since its inception as a field. In this sense, theoretical BPE is of a piece with that tradition, both in the form of inquiry and in the expected rigor, but whereas micro is assumed to be the classic form of rational agency in classic political economy, BPE substitutes for that assumption a model (or models) of agency with elements explicitly derived from experimental evidence.” [Dimitri Landa, “Behavioral Political Economy, Argumentation, and Democratic Theory.” The Good Society. Volume 24, number 1, 2015. Pages 86-97.]
         “Explanations of individual behavior in politics should rely on the same motivational assumptions that guide the economic analysis of market behavior. And the systemic processes that generate political outcomes should be understood as reflecting the interplay of supply and demand. That is what Political Economy—to be understood as the application of economic analysis to the study of political processes—is all about. In its standard (neoclassical) variant, aligning the motivational assumptions means, of course, to model agents as maximizing their expected utility not only in the marketplace, but also in the political arena — as voters, politicians, lobbyists or bureaucrats.… [M]otivational symmetry does not necessarily translate into behavioral symmetry, given the weak incentives to invest in rational decision-making that prevail in the realm of collective decision-making. This holds in particular for voters, whose perfectly rational individual behavior may lead to catastrophic collective outcomes, because in the political arena, individual feedback and learning mechanisms are much weaker and more indirect than in the marketplace.” [Jan Schnellenbach and Christian Schubert, “Behavioral political economy: A survey.” European Journal of Political Economy. Volume 40, part B, December 2015. Pages 395-417.]
         “… if a marginally increased support for constitutional changes surpasses the required threshold level, it might not be reversible after the constitutional moment has passed. Secondly, newly created agencies and programs generate a transitional gains trap, in which stakeholders will oppose future policy reversals ….
         “The findings of this paper also have important implications for economic development. Democratic countries with a population less inclined toward market economic principles, such as many post-socialist countries during the 1990s …, could be susceptible to the behavioral effects described above. In this situation, the confirmation bias could work against the development of market economic institutions by creating institutional stickiness.”
         [Petrik Runst, “Crisis and belief: confirmation bias and the behavioral political economy of recession.” Constitutional Political Economy. Volume 25, number 4, December 2014. Pages 376-392.]
         “What might research in behavioral political economy entail? Although the precise details will arguably be made clear in the actual work carried out in the future, some possible (and, in our view, desirable) broad features of such research can be identified. First, the most natural extension would be to offer an explicit and well-motivated modeling of political actors in theoretical models and to conduct experiments that investigate the rationality of voters, politicians and bureaucrats. These findings would then be incorporated into the overall analysis, together with the explicit modeling of economic agents and experimental results of economic decision-making. As in behavioral economics, not only lab but also field experiments could be conducted. Second, in addition to the study of individual decision-makers, the research field could benefit from system-level analyses as well that take into account how political institutions affect behavior. As mentioned above, economic decision-makers, although cognitively limited on an individual basis, may act as if they were rational in market exchange governed by certain institutions.” [Niclas Berggren, “Time for behavioral political economy? An analysis of articles in behavioral economics.” Review of Austrian Economics. Volume 25, number 3, September 2012. Pages 199-221.]
         “Evidence that the public’s aggregate demand for government is price-sensitive supports a coherent behavioral account of the failure of starve the beast policies to reduce government spending. While prior systematic analyses have demonstrated elected policymakers’ failure to reduce future public expenditures when revenue collections decrease, our analysis provides evidence for a behavioral mechanism that motivates policymakers’ actions. The electorate’s response to deficit spending increases the political costs to politicians of reducing government spending. This insight into public responsiveness to the perceived price of government offers some guidance about how to construct policies to restore fiscal balance that might win public support.” [Joseph Daniel Ura and Erica M. Socker, “The Behavioral Political Economy of Budget Deficits: How Starve the Beast Policies Feed the Machine.” The Forum. Volume 9, issue 1, article 7, 2011. Pages 1-20.]
         “A behavioral political economy framework is built on the basis of prospect theory to explain the induced and imposed institutional changes during China's market reform, giving special attention to the integrated effects of economic and political institutions. According to prospect theory, how rulers frame their decisions – in the prospects of gains or losses, influences how much risk they will take. China's market reform has been largely framed in the prospects of economic gains, for which the continuously growing private sector is the driving force. China’s central government adopts a growth-oriented incremental reform that coincides with the prediction of prospect theory.…
         “There have been numerous studies of China’s institutional changes since 1978, but few, if any, provide a view from a behavioral political economy framework. This study attempts to address this deficiency in the literature. This analysis is based on a behavioral political economy framework that integrates behavioral economics with political economy.”
         [Yongjing Zhang, “A view from behavioral political economy on China’s institutional change.” China Economic Review. Volume 23, issue 4, December 2012. Pages 991-1002.]
    101. cognitive economics (Miles Kimball, Nick Chater, and others): They develop approaches of cognitive science to economics.
         “Names matter. In particular, naming subfields of economics can help economists to see connections they otherwise might not have seen between their own research agenda and the research agenda of other economists. A well-chosen name can foster esprit de corps within a subfield and help in explaining the unifying ideas in that subfield to students. This paper is an argument for the appropriateness of the name ‘cognitive economics’ for a growing subfield of economics, and for the importance of the research that has been done and can be done in cognitive economics. It also discusses key themes in cognitive economics and the issues they raise.
         “It is important to stress that (if the name I propose is deemed acceptable) research in cognitive economics has already been underway for a long time. However, as a participant in this subfield, it seems to me that research in this area has been growing in recent years. I argue here that there are great opportunities for further research in cognitive economics.”
         [Miles Kimball, “Cognitive Economics.” The Japanese Economic Review: The Journal of the Japanese Economic Association. Volume 66, number 2, June 2015. Pages 167-181.]
         “What might a ‘‘cognitive economics’’ look like? Here, I wish to explore three promising, and very different, links. First, and perhaps most obviously, the ‘‘rational economic agent’’ may be enriched by understanding the operation and limitations of the cognitive mechanisms from which economic and other decisions are constructed. Thus, cognitive science can export knowledge into economic realm. Second, economics provides powerful technical machinery for analysing distributed information processing systems: markets, not just minds, can be thought of as computational machines. Cognitive science may benefit from importing some of this machinery, to understand distributed cognition across people, and perhaps also information processing within the person. Third, and perhaps most promising, cognitive science and economics can jointly contribute to new rational theories of human thought and behaviour, upon which accounts of individual and collective behaviour can be constructed. Here, I briefly illustrate, in turn, the opportunities that may be available if we further explore each of these links, before concluding.” [Nick Chater, “Can cognitive science create a cognitive economics?” Cognition. Volume 135, February 2015. Pages 52-55.]
         “In cognitive economics, bounded rationality, with its paradoxical formulation, is the cornerstone of individual rationality. One way to resolve the paradox of bounded rationality consists in attributing all sorts of procedural knowledge to individuals, enabling them to proceed fairly directly towards their goals. Different authors have used different terms to refer to this knowledge: heuristics, production rules, situation/action patterns, habits. It can manifest itself in the form of explicit knowledge or, more likely, as implicit know-how. When it is explicit, it makes reasoning possible.…
         “If agents do not use explicit procedures for the optimisation of their objective function, fresh attention must be given to their effective selection procedures. Substantive rationality focuses on a property of the result of the procedure: it must be one of the optima. What follows is a complete reversal of the meaning of rationality: instead of being focused on the result of the procedure, rationality is now focused on the procedure itself and the procedural knowledge it makes use of. This procedural knowledge also contains the satisficing rules that enable the search to be stopped.… The principle of procedural rationality is thus derived from that of bounded rationality.”
         [Paul Bourgine and Jean-Pierre Nadal. Cognitive Economics: An Interdisciplinary Approach. Berlin, Germany, and New York: Springer-Verlag. 2003. Pages 4-5.]
         “‘Cognitive Economics’ is a newcomer to economic research. As of now, only a few publications bear its name, and it saw its first European and its first international conference in 2004 and 2005 respectively. This book, carrying the new subdiscipline’s name as its title, collects 27 articles from fields as diverse as economics, artificial intelligence, logic, psychology and physics. With many of the articles being surveys, the book serves both as an introduction to the field – nine essays explicitly cover the ‘disciplinary bases for cognitive economics’ – as well as a ‘tool for future research.’ The anthology fulfils these two purposes well. Researchers interested in bounded procedural rationality, social influence on individual decisionmaking and the dynamics of adaptive social systems can learn modelling techniques from outside their fields, and they are offered a wealth of suggestions on how to apply them fruitfully to economic problems.” [Till Grüne-Yanoff, “Cognitive Economics: An Interdisciplinary Approach.” Review article. Economics and Philosophy. Volume 22, 2006. Pages 448-455.]
    102. historiography of heterodox economics (Tiago Mata as pronounced in this MP3 audio file and Frederic S. Lee): They apply the methodology of oral history to the Union for Radical Political Economics.
         “Through a life narrative, be it conveyed in an interview, autobiography, or oral history, we can study an individual’s sense of self and location in society. The narrative selects and organizes the events and meanings that bound an individual to a community. We also unearth traces of change in the community, of solidarities broken and new ones established. How this social and cultural history fits with more standard historiographical practices in the history of economics is unclear. Our study was tentative and did not seek to establish a definite history of URPE [Union for Radical Political Economics]. Further research is warranted in studying the gamut of radical subjectivities. Nor did we attempt to match in detail our narrative of shifting identities to existing intellectual histories. Indeed, how have changes to the radical community, for instance, with the emergence of the women’s caucus, reshaped theoretical research? This is an empty canvas, but one that we can fill with the colors of enthusiasm, commitment, imagination, and a deep respect for the many different lives that inhabit the economics profession.” [Tiago Mata and Frederic S. Lee, “The Role of Oral History in the Historiography of Heterodox Economics.” History of Political Economy. Volume 39, supplement 1, 2007. Pages 154-171.]
    103. evolutionary cognitive economics (Gilles Paquet as pronounced in this MP3 audio file): He proposes a synthesis of cognitive economics and evolutionary economics.
         “Cognitive economics examines the process of extraction of information from the environment through perception, and the development of knowledge through communication. In this framework, information exists to the extent that it becomes embodied in the brain as a pattern or in an artifact (capital) designed to act as a surrogate for the brain. Instead of focusing on the allocation of existing informational resources, cognitive economics focuses on the production of new knowledge. To the extent that cognition is conditioned and restricted by the mechanism of brain and mind, it is all but impossible to understand how information and communication matter without a fair idea of the way in which people gain knowledge. This is the main reason for cognitive economics to focus on the protocols leading to cognition.…
         “Evolutionary economics is built on the assumption of limited cognitive capabilities for both humans and organizations. This entails a continuous process of trial and error. And since the cost of thinking is not zero, once some appreciation of context has been arrived at, routines, conventions, and standard procedures are adopted that would appear to ensure survival or satisfying performance.”
         [Gilles Paquet, “Evolutionary cognitive economics.” Information Economics and Policy. Volume 10, issue 3, September 1998. Pages 343-357.]
    104. practices of happiness (John Atherton, Malcolm Brown, and others): They examine the interface between the economy and happiness.
         “Identifying religious concerns for wellbeing as a renewed project is but to illustrate its historic interests in, and major contributions to, our understanding of wellbeing. The pursuit of happiness is deeply embedded in human history, certainly from the ancient Greeks’ focus on eudaimonia or happiness as the good life, and the necessary virtues associated with its pursuit …). The early and medieval Christian tradition of Augustine and Aquinas located that Greek tradition in a deeply Christian framework, interpreting the pursuit of wellbeing as conforming to God’s purposes, a telos [Greek/Hellēniká, τέλος, télos, ‘end’ or ‘purpose’] which could only be fulfilled in the afterlife, as essentially ‘an ultimate goal of self-fulfilment’ ….” [John Atherton, “Introductory essay: Developing an overview as context and future.” The Practices of Happiness: Political economy, religion and wellbeing. John Atherton, Elaine Graham, and Ian Steedman, editors. London and New York: Routledge imprint of Taylor & Francis Group, an Informa PLC business. 2011. Pages 1-19.]
         “The idea that happiness is to be found in the struggle for change, within a world of complexity, echoes an Aristotelian teleology in which a life properly lived is concerned with discovering and pursuing distinct ends, and the ‘good life’ is not just a desired end but is discovered in the pursuit of the telos.” [Malcolm Brown, “Happiness isn’t working, but it should be.” The Practices of Happiness: Political economy, religion and wellbeing. John Atherton, Elaine Graham, and Ian Steedman, editors. London and New York: Routledge imprint of Taylor & Francis Group, an Informa PLC business. 2011. Pages 75-85.]
    105. neuroeconomics (Paul W. Glimcher, Colin F. Camerer, Ernst Fehr as pronounced in this MP3 audio file, Russell A. Poldrack, and others): This interdisciplinary and heterodox approach applies neuroscience and neurobiology to economics.
         “Like economics, the history of the neuroscientific study of behavior also reflects an interaction between two approaches – in this case, a neurological approach and a physiological approach. In the standard neurological approach of the last century, human patients or experimental animals with brain lesions were studied in a range of behavioral tasks. The behavioral deficits of the subjects were then correlated with their neurological injuries and the correlation used to infer function. The classic example of this is probably the work of the British neurologist David Ferrier …, who demonstrated that destruction of the precentral gyrus of the cortex led to quite precise deficits in movement generation. What marks many of these studies during the classical period in neurology is that they often focused on damage to either sensory systems or movement control systems. The reason for this should be obvious; the sensory stimuli presented to a subject are easy to control and quantify – they are observables in the economic sense of the word.” [Paul W. Glimcher, Colin F. Camerer, Ernst Fehr, and Russell A. Poldrack, “Introduction: A Brief History of Neuroeconomics.” Neuroeconomics: Decision Making and the Brain. London and San Diego, California: Academic Press imprint of Elsevier. 2009. Pages 1-12.]
         “… for neuroeconomists, neurobiology can provide physical ‘anchor points’ for psychological and economic constructs. By assuming a physical reference, these constructs can be open to some form of observation or, at least, of detection. It is important to note that, in general, neuroeconomists do not appear to support an elimination of the theoretical vocabulary of cognitive psychology and behavioural economics in favour of an observational neurobiological one. Rather, when they argue about the replacement of the ‘as if assumptions’ that have never been empirically well supported, they actually deal with the definition of the nature of the entities to which the constructs of cognitive psychology and behavioural economics refer.” [Giuseppe Lo Dico, “Neuroeconomics, identity theory, and the issue of correlation.” Theory & Psychology. Volume 23, number 5, October 2013. Pages 576-590.]
         “For neuroeconomists, knowing more about functional specialization, and how regions collaborate in different tasks, could substitute familiar distinctions between categories of economic behavior (sometimes established arbitrarily by suggestions which become modeling conventions) with new ones grounded in neural detail.” [Colin Camerer, George Loewenstein, and Drazen Prelec, “Neuroeconomics: How Neuroscience Can Inform Economics.” Journal of Economic Literature. Volume 43, number 1, March 2005. Pages 9-64.]
         “The last few years have witnessed impressive progress toward understanding the neurobiology of decision making …. This progress reflects the individual and collaborative efforts of scholars from a variety of intersecting disciplines. The pace of discovery plainly establishes the viability of neuroeconomics as an independent, self-sustaining field, one that addresses a new set of fascinating and scientifically meritorious questions. Many participants in this area of inquiry, as well as interested observers, hope neuroeconomics will also eventually make foundational contributions to the various traditional fields from which it emerged, including economics, psychology, and artificial intelligence. My purpose here is to evaluate its potential contributions to economics.” [B. Douglas Bernheim, “On the Potential of Neuroeconomics: A Critical (but Hopeful) Appraisal.” Working paper number 13954. National Bureau of Economic Research. Cambridge, Massachusetts. April, 2008. Pages 1-63.]
         “… much research in cognitive neuroscience, including much of neuroeconomics, has taken a turn and now seeks to uncover the computations being carried out in the brain. The focus has turned to particular brain regions and networks in an effort to understand what they are doing and how they interact to produce behavior. While this detour has certainly hampered the short-run impact of neuroeconomics on mainstream economics, in the long run it will hopefully yield a stronger foundation on which to base neuroeconomic research.” [Arkady Konovalov and Ian Krajbich, “Over a Decade of Neuroeconomics: What Have We Learned?” Organizational Research Methods. OnlineFirst edition. May 2016. Pages 1-16.]
         “A proponent of NE [neuroeconomics] may concede that NEs rarely succeed in predicting individuals’ choices beyond limited time spans. At the same time, she might claim that NEs [neuroeconomists] can make significant predictive advances in this respect by categorizing agents into different types. This claim relates to the following two-step procedure …. First, neural findings are used to identify characteristics (e.g., attitudes to risk) that supposedly predict agents’ behavior across choice domains. Second, the distribution of agents’ types is used as a primitive in models that predict choices probabilistically over non-negligible temporal intervals.” [Roberto Fumagalli, “Neural Findings and Economic Models: Why Brains Have Limited Relevance for Economics.” Philosophy of the Social Sciences. Volume 44, number 5, September 2014. Pages 606-629.]
         “Located at the intersection of neuroscience, economics, and psychology, the field of neuroeconomics converges around behavioral deviations from the model of the human being as Homo economicus, a rational actor who calculates his choices to maximize his individual satisfaction. Neuroeconomists look to the biological substrate of the brain for clues to the puzzles of consumer action – why people often make decisions to buy, sell, invest, and trade in ways that seem to go against their best interest. Going a step farther than behavioral economists, who argue that policy designers need to take seemingly ‘irrational’ choices into account, neuroeconomists insist that they need to understand how such choices get made in the brain.” [Natasha Dow Schüll and Caitlin Zaloom, “The shortsighted brain: Neuroeconomics and the governance of choice in time.” Social Studies of Science. Volume 41, number 4, August 2011. Pages 515-538.]
         “In the past few years there has been an increasing interest in applying neuroscience techniques to address questions in business and economics research. The majority of applications of neuroscience techniques to problems in this field can be found in neuroeconomics, where these techniques are used to explore specific research questions with regard to cooperation, trust, risk assessment, reputation, social norms, and many more …. Neuroeconomics, an interdisciplinary research field at the intersection of economics and neuroscience, investigates the neural foundations of economic behavior. In this research paradigm, behavioral tasks adopted from experimental economics are merged with neuroscience methods to investigate the neural and neurochemical systems involved in the processing of these tasks.” [Stefan Volk and Tine Köhler, “Brains and Games: Applying Neuroeconomics to Organizational Research.” Organizational Research Methods. Volume 15, number 4, October 2014. Pages 522-552.]
         “… what are we to make of some of the major claims in the neuroeconomics literature? Is it good, interesting economics? We first consider some general issues to do with samples, statistics and procedures. These are troubling, and need to be made explicit because they are blurred in the existing literature, but in the end not the stuff that we should use to pass judgment on the potential role of neuroeconomics. We then examine three illustrative areas of substantive research that should be of immediate interest to economists: discounting over time, social preferences and trust, and the strategic sense that we expect to see in subjects playing games. The theme to emerge is that many confounds that are known in the experimental economics literature are glossed, and the contribution is to simply tack on some neurological data to help tell the preferred story.” [Glenn W. Harrison, “Neuroeconomics: A Critical Reconsideration.” Economics and Philosophy. Volume 24, number 3, November 2008. Pages 303-344.]
    106. Austrian school of economics (Carl Menger as pronounced in this MP3 audio file and many others): This version of heterodox economics includes a focus on methodological individualism.
         “Whether and under what conditions a thing is useful to me, whether and under what conditions it is a good, whether and under what conditions it is an economic good, whether and under what conditions it possesses value for me and how large the measure of this value is for me, whether and under what conditions an economic exchange of goods will take place between two economizing individuals, and the limits within which a price can be established if an exchange does occur—these and many other matters are fully as independent of my will as any law of chemistry is of the will of the practicing chemist. The view adopted by these persons rests, therefore, on an easily discernible error about the proper field of our science. For economic theory is concerned, not with practical rules for economic activity, but with the conditions under which men engage in provident activity directed to the satisfaction of their needs.” [Carl Menger. Principles of Economics. James Dingwall and Bert F. Hoselitz, translators. Auburn, Alabama: Ludwig von Mises Institute. 2007. Page 49.]
         “The Austrian Cabinet in whose journalistic department [Carl] Menger served in the early 1870s—before his appointment in 1873 as assistant professor at the University of Vienna—was composed of members of the Liberal Party that stood for civil liberties, representative government, equality of all citizens under the law, sound money, and free trade. At the end of the 1870s the Liberal Party was evicted by an alliance of the Church, the princes and counts of the Czech and Polish aristocracy, and the nationalist parties of the various Slavonic nationalities. This coalition was opposed to all the ideals which the Liberals had supported. However, until the disintegration of the Habsburg Empire in 1918, the Constitution which the Liberals had induced the Emperor to accept in 1867 and the fundamental laws that complemented it remained by and large valid.
         “In the climate of freedom that these statutes warranted, Vienna [Austria] became a center of the harbingers of new ways of thinking. From the middle of the sixteenth to the end of the eighteenth century Austria was foreign to the intellectual effort of Europe. Nobody in Vienna—and still less in other parts of the Austrian dominions—cared for the philosophy, literature, and science of Western Europe. When [Gottfried Wilhelm] Leibniz and later David Hume visited Vienna, no indigenes were to be found there who would have been interested in their work. With the exception of [Bernard] Bolzano, no Austrian before the second part of the nineteenth century contributed anything of importance to the philosophical or the historical sciences.”
         [Ludwig von Mises, “The Historical Setting of the Austrian School of Economics.” Austrian Economics: An Anthology. Bettina Bien Greaves, editor. Irvington–on–Hudson, New York: Foundation for Economic Education. 1996. Pages 53-76.]
         “The Austrian analysis uses as its data human nature and the realities of the human predicament. Individual human values and human actions, amidst limited means including perceived knowledge, are placed at the center of economic science. The factors of human error, the uncertainty of the future, and the inescapable passage of time must receive their due attention this analytical approach cuts through the seeming complexities of an advanced market economy and provides a basic understanding of the economic process by examining essential market elements. Dispelled is any mystique surrounding the economy, market prices, business profits and losses, interest rates, inflation, and economic recessions and depressions. These phenomena are not inexplicable nor without cause, as will be shown in subsequent sections.
         “This book, as its title indicates, presents an overview of basic Austrian theory. Its focus is on the free market or capitalist economy. The seminal works of the Austrian economists surely cannot be neglected for a deeper understanding of the topics herein discussed. These original works must be consulted, especially in order to obtain a thorough appreciation of the serious implications of governmental intervention into the market process, which is now rampant Suggested readings for expanded understanding are provided at the end of each major section.”
         [Thomas C. Taylor. An Introduction to Austrian Economics. Auburn, Alabama: Ludwig von Mises Institute. 1980. Page 11.]
         “A deep theme of Austrian economics has been that of spontaneous order or self-organization of the economy. The origin of this theme dates to the putative founder of the Austrian School, Carl Menger, with his theory of the spontaneous emergence of money for transactions purposes in primitive economies being an archetypal example ….
         “This essay will consider more thoroughly the relationship between the concepts of emergence and complexity and the roles that they have played in Austrian economics as well as more broadly in philosophy and science. An important point is that both of these concepts do not possess precise meanings; they are ‘terms of art’ within philosophy. However, while closely linked through the general idea of a whole being ‘greater than the sum of its parts’ (or at least not equal to that sum), they are not identical, with complexity being the broader concept. It must also be recognized that focusing on such concepts has not been central to, or even particularly a part of, certain branches of Austrian economics or of much concern to some of its adherents.…
         “… emergence can be seen as a part of the broader complexity concept. Indeed, it is hard to conceive of an example of emergence that could not also be viewed as representing a complex dynamic.”
         [J. Barkley Rosser Jr., “Emergence and complexity in Austrian economics.” Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization. Volume 81, issue 1, January 2012. Pages 122-128.]
         “At first glance, there is good and sufficient reason to criticize any attempt to link Ayn Rand and Austrian economics, such as is attempted in the present collection of essays. After all, the school of thought founded by this novelist and philosopher is non-controversially called ‘Objectivism,’ while the Austrian or Praxeological School of economics—epitomized in the works of Ludwig von Mises and Murray N. Rothbard—is well known as the ‘Subjectivist School.’ But the polar opposites implied by these appellations are more apparent than real. For while ‘objectivism’ for Rand meant an insistence on objective reality, ‘subjectivism’ for the Austrians has nothing to do with its rejection. Rather, Austrian subjectivism focuses on the claim that consumer tastes are subjective, and that prices reflect this phenomenon.” [Walter Block, “Ayn Rand and Austrian Economics: Two Peas in a Pod.” The Journal of Ayn Rand Studies. Volume 6, number 2, spring, 2005. Pages 259-269.]
         “Recent economic turbulences such as the ‘Great Recession’ and its consequences have led many economists to look for alternatives to mainstream economics, which they consider to be inadequate in explaining these events and providing remedies for them.…
         “This justifies a re-examination of the foundations of Austrian Economics and an attempt to evaluate its potential for replacing or at least modifying the edifice of neoclassical economic theory and its policy prescriptions. As Carl Menger is generally acknowledged to be the founding father of the Austrian School of Economics, it seems like a good idea to examine his work and contrast it with contemporary Austrian Economics, which is indeed the aim of the present paper.”
         [Reinhard Neck, “On Austrian Economics and the Economics of Carl Menger.” Atlantic Economic Journal. Volume 42, issue 3, September 2014. Pages 217–227.]
         “The thesis of the paper is that Austrian economics (AE) and new institutional economics (NIE) are methodologically incompatible. This casts doubts on the coherence of the programs that are trying to unite these two branches.…
         “By arguing on different (and incompatible) theoretical contexts, AE and NIE manage to affirm the principle of the maximum autonomy for private capital and for implementation of policies of privatization and deregulation, even in those cases in which the standard neoclassical competitive model (the only other theoretical approach they take into consideration) would prescribe the opposite.”
         [Giulio Palermo, “The Convergence of Austrian Economics and New Institutional Economics: Methodological Inconsistency and Political Motivations.” Journal of Economic Issues. Volume 33, number 2, June 1999. Pages 277-286.]
         “In the Austrian literature, much attention has been given to questions of equilibration—or, perhaps more accurately, whether and to what extent such a process takes place—and the usefulness of equilibrium constructs like the ERE [evenly rotating economy] once equilibration has been taken into account …. The consensus, if one exists, is that equilibration occurs for small departures from equilibrium. How small is small and what results from departures beyond this critical threshold remain contested issues. These concerns surely deserve the attention they have received.” [William J. Luther, “Evenly rotating economy: A new modeling technique for an old equilibrium construct.” The Review of Austrian Economics. Volume 27, number 4, December 2014. Pages 403-417.]
         “Having established the fundamental differences in the behavioral foundations of Austrian and neoclassical economics, it is worth considering whether if one of these approaches is accepted, the other can ever be justified. The answer … is yes. Models are simplified depictions of reality, and their simplifying assumptions are a virtue. The real world is a complex place—too complex to understand just by observation alone—and the purpose of a model is to create a simplified framework that is analogous to some features of the real world, but easier to understand. Indeed, if real-world economic phenomena could be understood just by observing them, there would be no reason to model those phenomena. The virtue of a model that is simpler than reality is that if someone can understand the model, and if the model works in a manner analogous to the real world, then that person can gain some understanding about the real world. But because all models are simplified depictions of reality, no model can be ideal for understanding every aspect of the real world. Those aspects of the real world that are assumed away in the model cannot be explained by it, and often, unrealistic assumptions lead to inaccurate conclusions about the real world.” [Randall G. Holcombe, “The behavioral foundations of Austrian economics.” The Review of Austrian Economics. Volume 22, number 4, December 2009. Pages 301-313.]
         “The article analyzes basic reasons for renewed interest in [phenomenologist] Alfred Schutz’s works by the Austrian economists in the context of postmodern criticism of aprioristic methods of praxeology and foundational paradigm as such. It also deals with the possible applications of Schutzian method of telescopic ideal type on the problem of spontaneous order and shows this method as a possible alternative to [Friedrich] Hayek’s evolutionary approach. Phenomenological method that creates a baseline for Schutz is only useful to an extent to which the structures of spontaneous order can be grounded in individual consciousness. In cannot, therefore, be used to answer the question of the origin of spontaneous order but it can provide some answers regarding its reproduction.…
         “Schutz cannot answer the question of the origin of spontaneous order that has no correlate in individual consciousness …. Nevertheless, we can still use Schutz’s understanding sociology and his methodology when solving the problems connected with the reproduction of this order which happens through the means of socialization and gradual constitution of our image of the world including the primitive models of social coordination that can be traced to the individual consciousness.”
         [Petr Špecián, “To the Interpretation of Spontaneous Order.” E-Logos: Electronic Journal for Philosophy. Volume 17, 2013. Pages 1-11.]
         “It seems to me that Austrian economics has two distinctive doctrines. The first (I accept that Particular Austrians regard it as much the more important) may be described as the Supremacy of Demand, or, better perhaps, the Supremacy of Marginal Utility. This is opposed not only to the Classical (or Marxist, or even sometimes Keynesian) determination of value by cost, but also to the Marshallian halfway house, in which both Utility and Cost play a part, like the blades of a pair of scissors, as [Alfred] Marshall said. The second Austrian doctrine, not at all the same as the first, is insistence on the nature of production as a process in time, with the temporal relations between inputs and outputs occupying a similarly commanding position. There are relations between these two doctrines, but they are separate. It is possible to hold to one without attaching much importance to the other.” [Sir John R. Hicks, “Is Interest the Price of a Factor of Production?” Time, Uncertainty, and Disequilibrium: Exploration of Austrian Themes. Mario J. Rizzo, editor. Lexington, Massachusetts: LexingtonBooks imprint of D. C. Heath and Company. 1979. Pages 51-63]
    107. Georgism (Henry George and many others): This radical approach to heterodox economics—which is associated with the Georgist Economic Association—was inspired by George (1839–1897). He argued, among other things, for a single tax. George’s work also contributed to the development of a non-Marxian British socialism.
         “Political Economy has been called the dismal science, and as currently taught, is hopeless and despairing. But this, as we have seen, is solely because she has been degraded and shackled; her truths dislocated; her harmonies ignored; the word she would utter gagged in her mouth, and her protest against wrong turned into an indorsement of injustice. Freed, as I have tried to free her—in her own proper symmetry, Political Economy is radiant with hope.
         “For properly understood, the laws which govern the production and distribution of wealth show that the want and injustice of the present social state are not necessary; but that, on the contrary, a social state is possible in which poverty would be unknown, and all the better qualities and higher powers of human nature would have opportunity for full development.”
         “And, further than this, when we see that social development is governed neither by a Special Providence nor by a merciless fate, but by law, at once unchangeable and beneficent; when we see that human will is the great factor, and that taking men in the aggregate, their condition is as they make it; when we see that economic law and moral law are essentially one, and that the truth which the intellect grasps after toilsome effort, is but that which the moral sense reaches by a quick intuition, a flood of light breaks in upon the problem of individual life. These countless millions like ourselves, who on this earth of ours have passed and still are passing, with their joys and sorrows, their toil and their striving, their aspirations and their fears, their strong perceptions of things deeper than sense, their common feelings which form the basis even of the most divergent creeds—their little lives do not seem so much like meaningless waste.”
         [Henry George. Progress and Poverty: An Inquiry in the Cause of Industrial Depressions and of Increase of Want with Increase of Wealth. New York: D. Appleton and Company. 1886. Page 503.]
         “It is not merely the ease with which indirect taxes can be collected that urges to their adoption. Indirect taxes always enlist active private interests in their favor. The first rude device for making the collection of taxes easier to the governing power is to let them out to farm. Under this system, which existed in France up to the Revolution, and still exists in such countries as Turkey, persons called farmers of the revenue buy the privilege of collecting certain taxes and make their profits, frequently very large, out of the greater amount which their vigilance and extortion enable them to collect. The system of indirect taxation is essentially of the same nature.
         “The tendency of the restrictions and regulations necessary for the collection of indirect taxes is to concentrate business and give large capital an advantage. For instance, with a board, a knife, a kettle of paste and a few dollars’ worth of tobacco, a competent cigar-maker could set up in business for himself, were it not for the revenue regulations. As it is, in the United States, the stock of tobacco which he must procure is not only increased in value some two or three times by a tax upon it; but before the cigar-maker can go to work he must buy a manufacturer’s license and find bonds in the sum of five hundred dollars.”
         [Henry George. Protection or Free Trade: An Examination of the Tariff Question With Especial Regard to the Interests of Labor. Garden City, New York: Doubleday, Page & Company. 1911. Page 75.]
         “The whole weight of taxation would be lifted from productive industry. The million dollar manufactory, and the needle of the seamstress, the mechanic’s cottage, and the grand hotel, the farmer’s plough, and the ocean steamship, would be alike untaxed. All would be free to buy or sell, to make or save, unannoyed.
         “Imagine this country with all taxes removed from production and exchange! How demand would spring up; how trade would increase; what a powerful stimulus would be applied to every branch of industry; what an enormous development of wealth would take place. Imagine this country free of taxation, with its unused land free to those who would use it! Would there be many industrious men walking our streets, or tramping over our roads in the vain search for employment?”
         [Henry George. Our Land and Land Policy: Speeches, Lectures and Miscellaneous Writings. New York: Doubleday and McLure Company. 1901. Page 113.]
         “The body politic is more obvious to our eyes, and, so to speak, makes more noise in our ears, than the unseen and silent body economic, from which it proceeds and on which it depends. Thus, in the intellectual development of mankind, it and its relations are noticed sooner and receive names earlier than the body economic. And the words so made part of our mental furniture, afterwards by their analogies furnish us with words needed to express the body economic and its relations when later in intellectual growth we come to recognize it. Thus it is that while the thing civilization must in the natural order precede the body politic or state, yet when in the development of human knowledge we come to recognize this thing, we take to express it and its relations words already in use as expressive of the body politic and its relations.
         “But without at present pursuing further that record of the history of thought that lies in the meaning of words, let us endeavor to see whence comes the integration of men into a body economic and how it grows.”
         [Henry George. The Science of Political Economy. London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trübner & Co., Ltd. 1898. Page 28.]
         “… [There] followed the mortal remains [of Henry George], mounted high upon a draped and garlanded funeral car, drawn by a double line of led horses. Behind came the vast, winding column of those, riding and walking, rich and poor, high and low, distinguished and unknown, who wished to pay homage to the dead man’s worth and high-born principles—moving along without pomp or demonstration, save only the fluttering of occasional trade union banners. Chief in the multitude were such as had personally known and talked with Henry George, who had accepted his teachings and were counted among the faithful. Now in the closing drama they followed their friend and leader, so eloquent in death that all the world seemed to reverence—gathering each present shifting scene, each past look and word, to leave as a priceless heritage to their furthermost posterity.” [Henry George, Jr. The Life of Henry George: By His Son Henry George, Jr. New York: Doubleday and McLure Company. 1900. Page 610.]
         “Commitment to a Georgist program of public finance could have long-run welfare implications exceeding those described by the previous section. We consider a shift in expectations that discourages investment in land even after the George tax is repealed. Now, when calculating the net present value of land, the buyer considers not only the tax rate for the current period but his expectation for the tax rate in future periods as well. Under these assumptions, the effects of a Georgist tax remain even after repeal, but this distortion declines in time. The slower expectations are to adjust to sudden changes in the tax code, the longer the effect of the distortion. This would not be the worst case, though, as a drastic change in the tax code of this magnitude may fundamentally effect expectations about the social contract. Therefore we should direct our attention to the political economy effects of a Georgist tax.” [Zachary Gochenour and Bryan Caplan, “An entrepreneurial critique of Georgism.” Review of Austrian Economics. Volume 26, number 4, December 2013. Pages 483-491.]
         “… ironic though it may appear, it is my contention that (if one excludes anarchism, which, advocating no government at all, need offer no theory on how to fund one) Georgism is the most consistently libertarian of all systems of political economy. Even a minimal state must be supported. So the question arises: Shall government, however limited, be supported by true taxes, even if light ones, which are imposed upon all forms of wealth, no matter how produced? Or shall it be supported by something that is not actually a true tax at all, but rather a charge for the use of a natural good in limited supply, the value of which is socially, not individually, produced? If society supports itself through a fund of its own creation (now largely siphoned off into the hands of privilege), the wealth created by individuals may be left to that extent in their own hands. What could be more libertarian than this?” [Robert V. Andelson, “Neo-Georgism.” American Journal of Economics and Sociology. Volume 63, number 2, April 2004. Pages 545-569.]
         “George was dismissed by many economists and others as a quack, crank, radical, or whatever, garnering a favorable reception and attention by a relatively few true believers, but no mass of economists interested in the actual implementation of his ideas and policy. Yet a century ago George had a huge popular following both in the United States and abroad.
         “In addition, the Georgian single tax was seen not only as an attack on property writ large, whereas it might have been seen as a defense of productive property, but as an ally of socialism, which attacked all private ownership of the means of production. The opposition to George, his policies, and his ideas was not entirely a casual affair.
         “The opposition was also highly organized, not least by the Catholic Church, a major owner of land. Moreover, once the choice lands in the United States were taken into private ownership, the passivity of the majority was reinforced by what Thorsten Veblen called the vested interests in control of the media, the colleges and universities, the churches, the farm associations, and the political parties—together the principal organs of generating and spreading ideas.”
         [Warren J. Samuels, “Why the Georgist Movement Has Not Succeeded: A Speculative Memorandum.” The American Journal of Economics and Sociology. Volume 62, number 3, July 2003. Pages 583-592.]
         “Does the land tax satisfy the Georgist principle of equality of opportunity to produce using natural resources? To the extent that the loss of occupation of a piece of property is a loss of opportunity for a person that cannot be compensated for in monetary terms, the payment of rent fails to satisfy the principle of equality of opportunity to produce using natural resources. It might be thought that insofar as rent payment equalizes monetary values it satisfies the principle by providing enough. In fact, however, the ability of the payment of rent to satisfy the principle of equality of opportunity to produce using natural resources is contingent. The contingency rests on the pattern of land holdings at the time of institution of the land tax. For that pattern might leave many with no land upon which to produce.” [Darrel Moellendorf, “World-ownership, self-ownership, and equality in Georgist philosophy.” International Journal of Social Economics. Volume 36, number 4, 2009. Pages 473-488.]
         “[Henry] George thought it necessary to knock down both the wages fund doctrine and the Malthusian theory of population in order to show that neither provided a convincing account of the persistence of poverty amidst the growing affluence of an industrial civilization, the real reason being the growing rental share that leaves only a dwindling share going to wages and profits.” [Mark Blaug, “Henry George: rebel with a cause.” The European Journal of the History of Economic Thought. Volume 7, number 2, summer 2000. Pages 270-288.]
         “Why should socializing all or most of either land or rent while concurrently reducing to the same degree the government’s levy on other property or income be characterized as ‘a socialist scheme’ any more than the usual, converse, practice? Any political system funded by compulsory payment is to that extent, by definition, socialistic.” [Robert V. Andelson, “On Separating the Landowner’s Earned and Unearned Increment: A Georgist Rejoinder to F.A. Hayek.” American Journal of Economics & Sociology. Volume 59, issue 1, January 2000. Pages 109-117.]
         “Historically, Henry George played a significant role in the development of the characteristically British, non-Marxian variety of individualist and collectivist socialism. But no less significant was the role he played in the development and growth of the British Liberal party and of British Liberalism. In the Liberals’ program, the demand for land taxation, based on George’s analysis of the causes of poverty, was to play a tremendous role. And that politician who, more than anyone else, fought to place the land question foremost among the later policies of the Liberals was Joseph Chamberlain (1836-1914).” [Michael Silagi and Susan N. Faulkner, “Henry George and Europe: George and His Followers Awakened the British Conscience and Started a New, Freer Society.” The American Journal of Economics and Sociology. Volume 50, number 2, April 1991. Pages 243-255.]
    108. heterodox economic analyses of property law (Lua Kamál Yuille): She applies various heterodox economic approaches to property law.
         “… heterodox economic analyses of property law may offer property law a discourse that satisfies the competing considerations animating the field.…
         “… liberated from the reductive requirements of abstract modeling—the hallmark of neoclassical economics’ scientific approach—heterodox economics self-consciously and transparently embeds its values and social philosophies into its descriptions and its prescriptions. Especially in an era in which voices in mainstream economics are paying increasingly sustained attention to heterodox economic substantive critiques, it is this latter quality that maintains the largely marginalized status of heterodox economics within contemporary economic thought. However, it is this latter quality that makes heterodox economics a viable candidate to relieve property law’s discontents.…
         “… in liberating property from the methods, questions, and values presupposed by mainstream economics, it offers new horizons for the reconceptualization and reconciliation of property’s circular dilemmas.”
         [Lua Kamál Yuille, “Toward a Heterodox Property Law and Economics.” Texas A&M Law Review. Volume 2, issue 3, article 9, 2015. Pages 489-500.]
    109. agro–economics (Rob Wallace and Rodrick Wallace): They examine the Ebola crisis in West Africa.
         “The regional agro-economic impacts of global neoliberalism can be felt across the levels of biocultural organization, down as far as the virion and molecule. The exploration of such connections may well be a cutting-edge question for the twenty-first century. A growing public- and animal-health literature suggests that current patterns of agro-economic exploitation raise the risk of a new pandemic, whether triggered by an RNA virus like Ebola or sars [severe acute respiratory syndrome], or by some other pathogen. Ecosystems in which ‘wild’ viruses are controlled by the rough-and-tumble of environmental stochasticity are being drastically streamlined by deforestation and plantation monoculture. Pathogen spillovers that once died out relatively quickly are now discovering chains of vulnerability, creating outbreaks of greater extent, duration and momentum. There is a possibility that some of these outbreaks may come to match the scale of 1918’s influenza pandemic, with a global reach and high rates of incapacitation and mortality.” [Rob Wallace and Rodrick Wallace, “Ebola’ Ecologies: Agro-Economics and Epidemiology in West Africa.” New Left Review. Series II, number 102, November–December 2016. Pages 1-13.]
    110. capitalist realism (Mark Fisher): He critiques the inevitability of capitalism—the assumption that capitalism is the only possible economic alternative.
         “… we are inevitably reminded of the phrase attributed to Fredric Jameson and Slavoj Žižek, that it is easier to imagine the end of the world than it is to imagine the end of capitalism. That slogan captures precisely what I mean by ‘capitalist realism’: the widespread sense that not only is capitalism the only viable political and economic system, but also that it is now impossible even to imagine a coherent alternative to it. Once, dystopian films and novels were exercises in such acts of imagination – the disasters they depicted acting as narrative pretext for the emergence of different ways of living.” [Mark Fisher. Capitalist Realism: Is There No Alternative? Hants, England: 0 Press. 2009. Page 2.]
         “The power of capitalist realism derives in part from the way that capitalism subsumes and consumes all of previous history: one effect of its ‘system of equivalence’ which can assign all cultural objects, whether they are religious iconography, pornography, or Das Kapital, a monetary value. Walk around the British Museum, where you see objects torn from their lifeworlds and assembled as if on the deck of some Predator spacecraft, and you have a powerful image of this process at work. In the conversion of practices and rituals into merely aesthetic objects, the beliefs of previous cultures are objectively ironized, transformed into artifacts. Capitalist realism is therefore not a particular type of realism; it is more like realism in itself.” [Mark Fisher. Capitalist Realism: Is There No Alternative? Hants, England: 0 Press. 2009. Page 4.]
         “Mark Fisher’s Capitalist Realism: Is There No Alternative? is a provocative account of the prevailing ideological conditions of contemporary capitalist society. It is a short polemical analysis of the powerful ideological grip that capitalism exerts on the collective psyche, destroying our capacity to imagine political alternatives. This is Fisher’s first book, but many readers may be familiar with his website, ‘k-punk,’ which brings radical criticism to bear on a broad range of cultural subjects and issues. The same wide-ranging eclecticism is evident in this book in which the author draws on a welter of examples and ideas from both ‘popular culture’ and ‘high theory’. Fisher’s style of exposition has a fast-paced, free-wheeling quality to it reminiscent of Slavoj Žižek’s writing – and, indeed, there is a Žižekian audaciousness to many of the ideas that Fisher puts forward.” [Ed Rooksby, “Capitalist Realism: Is There No Alternative?” Review article. Historical Materialism. Volume 20, number 1, 2012. Pages 222-231.]
    111. Sraffian Economics (Piero Sraffa as pronounced in this MP3 audio file and others): They critique neoclassical economics and attempt to rehabilitate classical political economy.
         “We have … regarded wages as consisting of the necessary subsistence of the workers and thus entering the system on the same footing as the fuel for the engines or the feed for the cattle. We must now take into account the other aspect of wages since, besides the ever-present element of subsistence, they may include a share of the surplus product. In view of this double character of the wage it would be appropriate. when we come to consider the division of the surplus between capitalists and workers, to separate the two component parts of the wage and regard only the ‘surplus’ part as variable; whereas the goods necessary for the subsistence of the workers would continue to appear, with the fuel, etc., among the means of production.” [Piero Sraffa. Production of Commodities by Means of Commodities: Prelude to a Critique of Economic Theory. Bombay, India: Vora & Co, Publishers PVT. LTD. 1963. Page 10.]
         “Everyday experience shows that a very large number of undertalings—and the majority of those which produce manufactured consumers’ goods—work under conditions of individual diminishing costs. Almost any producer of such goods, if he could rely upon the market in which he sells his products being prepared to take any quantity of them from him at the current price, without any trouble on his part except that of producing them, would extend his business enormously. It is not easy, in times of normal activity, to find an undertaking which systematically restricts its own production to an amount less than that which it could sell at the current price, and which is at the same time prevented by competition from exceeding that price. Business men, who regard themselves as being subject to competitive conditions, would consider absurd the assertion that the limit to their production is to be found in the internal conditions of production in their firm, which do not permit of the production of a greater quantity without an increase in cost. The chief obstacle against which they have to contend when they want gradually to increase their production does not lie in the cost of production—which, indeed, generally favours them in that direction—but in the difficulty of selling the larger quantity of goods without reducing the price, or without having to face increased marketing expenses.” [Piero Sraffa, “The Laws of Returns under Competitive Conditions.” The Economic Journal. Volume 36, number 144, December 1926. Pages 535-550.]
         “One can only wonder what is the good of a quantity of capital or a period of production which, since it depends on the rate of interest, cannot be used for its traditional purpose, which is to determine the rate of interest.” [Piero Sraffa, “Production of Commodities: A Comment.” The Economic Journal. Volume 72, number 286, June 1962. Pages 477-479.]
         “… only under conditions of equilibrium would there be a single rate; and that when saving was in progress there would at any one moment be many ‘natural’ rates, possibly as many as there are commodities; so that it would be not merely difficult in practice, but altogether inconceivable, that the money rate should be equal to ‘the’ natural rate.” [Piero Sraffa, “Money and Capital: A Rejoinder.” The Economic Journal. Volume 42, number 166, June 1932. Pages 249-251.]
         “I claim that Sraffian economics, however rigorous in its use of the simultaneous equations method, the second of our three versions of mathematical rigor, is irrelevant to our understanding of the real world and, judging by its failure to draw any policy implications, is largely irrelevant to the major concerns of modern economists. I have in mind such issues as environmental pollution, poverty both at home and abroad, race and gender inequalities, the governance of corporate industry, and macroeconomic policies aimed at combating inflation or deflation. This is not a judgment based simply on my opinion, which is ultimately no better than yours. Relevance is not a matter for individual opinion but a social judgment of the community of professional economists. We assess that judgment by inspecting the professional literature, by citation counts, or by any of the other methods of bibliometrics.” [Mark Blaug, “The Trade-Off between Rigor and Relevance: Sraffian Economics as a Case in Point.” History of Political Economy. Volume 41, number 2, summer 2009. Pages 219-247.]
         “Sraffian economics has had two main themes: a critique of neoclassical economics and the rehabilitation of the classical approach to political economy. The former reached its apex in the Cambridge Capital Controversies, in which the Sraffians won the war but lost the peace, but it is in the latter that we find the constructive aspects of Sraffian economics. Sraffian economics is perceived by Sraffians as a rehabilitation of the classical political economy of [Adam] Smith, [David] Ricardo, and [Karl] Marx. What the Sraffians get from classical political economy is a concentration on issues revolving around the production and dispersement of the social surplus and an interest in the determination of natural values (prices of production in Marxian terminology, long-term equilibrium prices in Marshallian). Methodologically, Sraffians follow one aspect of classical political economy—the use of abstract models and logical deductions as the main theoretical tools with which to devise theories. The historical analysis of classical political economy, which played such an important role in the thought of Smith and Marx, is relegated to a very minor role.” [Charles M. A. Clark, “An Institutionalist Critique of Sraffian Economics.” Journal of Economic Issues. Volume 26, number 2, June 1992. Pages 457-468.]
         “[Piero] Sraffa makes it clear that he is referring to a capitalist economy when he says he concentrates his attention on the problem of ‘division of the surplus between capitalists and workers’ …. [Karl] Marx explicitly disregards capital and wages, as we have seen; and when he talks about the conditions of production he refers to a hypothetical ‘production in general.’ Sraffa shows that this abstraction is illicit; that, if we want to explain the value of goods as a phenomenon determined by the social conditions of production, we cannot leave out of consideration the class relationships instituted in the ‘value-creating process.’ And since these relationships can be defined only by reference to the specific mode of production within which they are given, it is not permissible to abstract from the mode of production in explaining the value of goods, nor is it permissible to disregard capital and wages.” [Ernesto Screpanti, “Sraffa after Marx: a new interpretation.” Review of Political Economy. Volume 5, number 1, January 1993. Pages 1-21.]
    112. Shaklean economics (George Lennox Sharman “G. L. S.” Shackle and others): They develop a Post Keynesian challenge to rational–choice economics.
         “If choice is originative, it can be effective, it can give a thrust to the course of things intended to secure its ends. In order to secure its ends, choice must apply a knowledge of what will be the consequence of what. But the sequel of an action chosen by one man will be shaped by circumstance, and its circumstances will include the actions chosen now and actions to be chosen in time to come by other men. If, therefore, choice is effective, it is unpredictable and thus defeats, in some degree, the power of choice itself to secure exact ends. This is the human predicament.…
         “There are two questions which the chooser of action must ask himself: (1) how do these rival answers compare with each other when I consider them as things desirable or undesirable, regardless of their seeming power, or lack of it, to come true; (2) how do they compare in respect of their seeming power to come true? We shall refer to these two comparisons as those of desiredness and standing. When the source of desiredness or its opposite is of some special kinds, it will be possible for the action-chooser to say not only that he prefers one answer to another, but by how much, in terms of some unit meaningful to him.”
         [G. L. S. Shackle, “Decision: The Human Predicament.” The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science. Volume 412, March 1974. Pages 1-10.]
         “When all life’s questions are answered for any one of us, life itself will surely have ceased to hold for him any interest or purpose. Are we then to say that so long as a man finds a theory interesting he does not yet believe in it ? And if we constrict the notion of belief to this extreme degree, are we therefore to forbid him to act upon, teach, or think with any theory that he still finds interesting? An absurd and artificial dilemma, perhaps you will say. But if it be once admitted that a theory which we take invariably, absolutely, and unquestioningly for granted, and which we regard ourselves as having explored to the uttermost so that all its implications, and the consequences of acting on it, are known, could have no power of stimulating thought and indeed would be incapable of being any longer the object of thought, it follows of necessity that all the theories which have any active role in an economist’s mental life and in his work must be ones that he can still cast doubt upon, can question and suspect, can feel to be incompletely worked out, and to hold unknown possibilities for good or evil when used as the basis of policy.” [G. L. S. Shackle, “Economics and Sincerity.” Oxford Economic Papers. Volume 5, number 1, March 1953. Pages 1-12.]
         “I believe it is sometimes said that if we are to be able to claim that a given variable is cardinal, we must provide it with a unit interval and a zero point. If, by the nature of what we seek to measure, only one possible unit and only one possible zero point offer themselves, cardinality is complete. For some purposes, however, we shall be content, on a certain condition, with a lesser cardinality in which those two elements can be arbitrarily chosen; this condition is that the expression of a given magnitude in terms of one pair of these elements can always be re-expressed in terms of any other pair merely by a linear transformation.” [G. L. S. Shackle, “Expectation and Cardinality.” The Economic Journal. Volume 66, number 262, June 1956. Pages 211-219.]
         “By expectational vista I mean the entire assemblage of conjectures or assumptions about future situations which exists in the mind of an individual at any moment. Let us assume that these expectations specify the values which a number of variables will assume at certain fixed dates, and are not concerned with the non-quantitative aspects of events or situations. A ‘situation’ thus means a set of specific values of certain variables.” [G. L. S. Shackle, “Expectations and Employment.” The Economic Journal. Volume 49, number 195, September 1939. Pages 442-452.]
         “Decision … is choice, but it is choice amongst thoughts. Before a man can choose a course of action he must imagine the possible, the available courses. Before he can know which to choose he must imagine, for each such course, as many as he can of its possible outcomes. Decision involves imagination, it is an act of imagination, it is choice amongst the products of imagination. The apparent power, precision and penetration of the modern mathematical and statistical techniques of choice are in themselves a testimony to this elusiveness of the objects of choice. To call them objects is, indeed, itself misleading. They are figments. My first proposition is that decision is choice amongst the products of imagination.” [G. L. S. Shackle, “Policy, Poetry and Success.” The Economic Journal. Volume 76, number 304, December 1966. Pages 755-767.]
         “What is left of the distinction between rational conduct? Conduct is judged, by an outside observer, to have been rational when it has brought consequences which, at the moment of experiencing them, the individual finds superior to any others he now judges he could have secured. Does this mean that, in any other case, his conduct at some earlier date was ‘mistaken’? By what right does the later moment claim jurisdiction over the earlier? The earlier had its own enjoyments by anticipation towards which, in their actuality at the moment of decision, the later moment can contribute nothing and from which its conflicting evaluation has the right to detract nothing. The two moments are eternally exclusive ofe ach other and wholly incomparable. Rationality means something only for for the outside observer.” [G. L. S. Shackle, “Time and Thought.” The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science. Volume 9, number 36, February 1959. Pages 285-298.]
         “In making decisions over the assignment of legal rights, the polity often profoundly influences the capacity of individuals and firms to participate in the market. Market forces are channeled by a legal power structure—a structure that was typically the source of conflict and reworked out in policy process. The assignment of legal rights is one determinant of who has power and who is exposed to this power (i.e., vulnerable to being injured). For example, if the upstream polluter has the right to dump toxic waste in the river, and acts in accordance with this right, then injury is inflicted on the downstream pollutee; if the downstream pollutee has the right to clean water, then the burden of having to dispose of the toxic waste is visited on the upstream polluter.” [Richard M. Dawson, “The Shacklean Nature of Commons’s Reasonable Value.” Journal of Post Keynesian Economics. Volume 17, number 1, autumn 1994. Pages 33-44.]
         “[G. L. S.] Shackle has consistently criticized economists for not presenting the assumptions underlying the concept of ‘time’ which they are using. ‘Time’ is a concept that is usually neglected even in methodological discussions. Neoclassical economics, particularly, has treated this problem in a rather light way, approaching time as just another ‘space dimension.’
         “The importance of an unambiguous statement on the concept of time cannot be exaggerated. Until one deals explicitly with the concept of time one cannot analyze the concept of changes in the economic system.”
         [Fernando Carvalho, “On the Concept of Time in Shacklean and Sraffian Economics.” Journal of Post Keynesian Economics. Volume 6, number 2, winter 1983–1984. Pages 265-280.]
    113. ontology of socialism (Richard Westra): He develops this ontology from Marxist political economy.
         “… I will introduce what I have dubbed an ontology of socialism, which is derived from Marxist political economy, and outline its three core principles.…
         “… socialism constitutes a non-reified economy in which the responsibility for organising human material life is vested in human beings themselves, and that material reproduction is managed for concrete human purposes.…
         “… socialism demands the de-commodification of human labour power without the reinstatement of extra-economic compulsion.…
         “… the re-entrenchment of the use value dimension of socio-material life.”
         “… If there is one signal conception animating the ontology of socialism it is the view that contrary to a hitherto received Marxist convention, a genuine socialism is not institutionally prefigured by capitalism, but in its most fundamental incarnation is to be approached as the antithesis or institutional opposite of capitalism.”
         [Richard Westra, “Marxian economic theory and an ontology of socialism: a Japanese intervention.” Capital & Class. Volume 26, number 3, autumn 2002. Pages 61-85.]
    114. econophysics or the physics of finance (Russ Ray, Christopher A. Zapart, J. Barkley Rosser, Dean Rickles, and others): See this page on econophysics—the application of physics to economics—from the University of Houston.
         “Econophysics has successfully utilized four powerful tools from physics to explain economic and financial behaviour: (1) non-linearity, (2) scaling properties, (3) statistical mechanics and (4) the Cauchy and Levy distributions. These tools have more robustly described many types of economic and financial behaviours (such as income and wealth) than the Gaussian distribution; and further, econophysical models have been able to describe many ‘nooks and crannies’ of economic and financial behaviour which heretofore have not been able to be modelled by traditional economic and financial tools.” [Russ Ray, “Econophysics: finance, economics and physics.” Applied Economics Letters. Volume 18, number 3, February 2011. Pages 273-277.]
         “… the author does not claim to be able to predict the arrival of shocks and dislocations in financial assets. Instead behavioural econophysics attempts to model traders’ reactions to profits and losses incurred due to shocks. After a release of economic indicators, those traders caught on the wrong side are often forced to change the direction of their positions due to the use of leverage that grossly amplifies losses, breaching their risk limits.” [Christopher A. Zapart, “Econophysics: A challenge to econometricians.” Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications. Volume 419, February 2015. Pages 318-327.]
         “… while econophysicists have made strong claims about the superiority of their approaches, even going so far as to argue that econophysics should replace standard economics as such, the critics have argued that there have been some serious flaws in much econophysics work, including ignorance of relevant work in economics, inappropriate use of statistics, excessive and unwarranted assertions of finding universal laws, and a failure to provide adequate theory for the models used. Again, as with the complexity debate, points made by both sides are found to have some reasonableness.” [J. Barkley Rosser, “Econophysics and Economic Complexity.” Advances in Complex Systems. Volume 11, number 5, October 2008. Pages 745-760.]
         “This so-called ‘interacting agents hypothesis’ leads naturally to comparison with complex systems science, and models from statistical physics and condensed matter physics. A central idea there is that in complex systems (very roughly, systems with vast numbers of strongly, nonlinearly interacting parts) there are properties (of the unit complex system) that are determined by the parts’ interactions, and do not depend on the specific properties of the parts. This leads to the possibility of having apparently unrelated systems behaving in similar ways: the properties are then said to be ‘universal.’ The idea here, then, is that financial systems are complex systems and can be described using the same models and concepts from other complex systems theories. For this reason many econophysicists view their subject as ‘the statistical physics of financial markets’ or the study of ‘financial market complexity.’” [Dean Rickles, “Econophysics for philosophers.” Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics. Volume 38, issue 4, December 2007. Pages 948-978.]
         “Econophysics, created outside economics by physicists from statistical physics, studies economic phenomena, and more specifically financial markets, usingvarious models and concepts imported from condensed matter and statistical physics. This recent approach is often presented as a field between physics and economics, and more particularly financial economics …. Multidisciplinarity, interdisciplinarity and transdisciplinarity refer to different levels of integration of several disciplines. Analyzing these types of integration, this article shows that despite the fact that econophysics is regularly described as an interdisciplinary approach, it is in fact a multidisciplinary field. Beyond this observation, we note that recent developments suggest that econophysics could evolve towards a more integrated field.” [Christophe Schinckusa and Franck Jovanovic, “Towards a transdisciplinary econophysics.” Journal of Economic Methodology. Volume 20, number 2, June 2013. Pages 164-183.]
         “Econophysics, which emerged over a decade ago, applies various models and concepts associated with statistical physics to economic (and financial) phenomena. This new field of research generates a lot of methodological debates and it is often presented in the economic literature as a very fragmented discipline. Few methodological links between economics and econophysics have been emphasized in the literature (except the origins of scaling laws that were discovered by [Vilfredo] Pareto in his studies of the distribution of income in the upper reaches of society). This paper proposes a link by analyzing the methodological connections between econophysics and mainline theories of economic uncertainty.” [Christophe Schinckus, “Economic uncertainty and econophysics.” Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications. Volume 388, issue 20, October 2009. Pages 318-327.]
         “… [An] active area of empirical investigation for econophysics has been industrial structure and its evolution. As with financial markets, large amounts of generally reliable data are available in this area, too. It should be said that some of the econophysics literature is perhaps less original and/or well established than physicists might appreciate. Decisive evidence on the right-skew distribution of firm sizes, for example, has been both available and well known in industrial economics for many years …. Plausible candidates in the economics literature to represent the empirical size distribution are the lognormal, the [Vilfredo] Pareto and the Yule. The main problem is in capturing the coverage of small firms. Recent attempts to do this, such as on the population of US firms, lend support to a power-law distribution linking firm sizes probability densities with the size ranking of firms. However, this may well be an as yet unexplained outcome of aggregation, because the findings seem not be robust with respect to sectoral disaggregation. A more decisive finding by econophysicists is that the variance of firm growth rates falls as firm size increases, although this too was anticipated in the early 1960s.” [Mauro Gallegati, Steve Keen, Thomas Lux, and Paul Ormerod, “Worrying trends in econophysics.” Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications. Volume 370, issue 1, October 2006. Pages 1-6.]
         “Econophysics tools have developed in the context of physical theories that predict certain aggregate properties, and so focus on the measurement of these properties. The utility of these tools for the social sciences is, however, limited by the fact that they were developed in very different empirical contexts than those that face a social scientist. Social scientists often employ data sets of limited size, which raise issues of the accuracy of estimates that do not arise in natural science contexts.” [Steven N. Durlauf, “Complexity, economics, and public policy.” Politics, Philosophy & Economics. Volume 11, number 1, February 2012. Pages 45-75.]
    115. bioeconomics (Stephen P. Magee, Jon M. Conrad, Martin D. Smith, Kean Birch, David Tyfield, Younes Nademi [Persian/Fārsī, یُونِس نَادِمِی, Yūnis Nādimī], Colin W. Clark, and others): This field synthesizes aspects of biology and economics.
         “Bioeconomic work to date falls into two broad groups. Work by most economists looks to rational choice as paradigm. In contrast, many biologists and sociobiologists utilize a broader notion of survival value, which incorporates rational choice as a subset.…
         “Bioeconomics is a one-factor theory based on hierarchy, which can exlain both economics and politics. In bioeconomics, the strong dominate the weak, economically, politically and socially. Experiments have shown that when, say, 20 chickens are placed together for the first time, they engage in vigorous combat for about an hour until the pecking order is determined, from 1 to 20. Thereafter, when conflicts arise, each chicken typically defers to superior chickens and dominates inferior chickens. The pecking order is much more than a social process.”
         [Stephen P. Magee, “Bioeconomics and the Survival Model: The Economic Lessons of Evolutionary Biology.” Public Choice. Volume 77, number 1, September 1993. Pages 117-132.]
         “The early literature in bioeconomics was concerned with the open access harvest of common-pool fishery resources as well as their optimal management. While it may be difficult to imagine, as late as 1945 many believed marine fishery resources to be effectively unlimited in absolute terms and only limited in availability due to cost constraints …. With the growth of industrial fishing in the post World War II era, this belief quickly gave way to an understanding that fish stocks could indeed be overfished, triggering the need for scientists and managers to understand this phenomenon. Early bioeconomic models began to emerge in this context as a means to understand the role of rent or profit seeking in the overexploitation of a common-pool renewable resource. The economic history of whaling, sealing, and fishing provided motivation for early bioeconomic work with many examples of resource depletion and occasionally extinction.” [Jon M. Conrad and Martin D. Smith, “Nonspatial and Spatial Models in Bioeconomics.” Natural Resource Modeling. Volume 25, number 1, February 2012. Pages 52-92.]
         “In this article, our aim is not to attempt another definition of the anticipated or promised transformative restructuring represented by the so-called bioeconomy. It is instead to look at how science and technology studies (STS) scholars have gone about theorizing the bioeconomy and to critique some of the ‘bio-concepts’ that they have come up with. We are interested in how they have gone about thinking/rethinking the relationship between the life sciences and their capitalization.” [Kean Birch and David Tyfield, “Theorizing the Bioeconomy: Biovalue, Biocapital, Bioeconomics or … What?” Science, Technology, & Human Values. Volume 38, number 3, May 2013. Pages 299-327.]
         “Bioeconomics is the discipline originating from the synthesis of biology and economics. It is an attempt to bridge, through the concept of holism and interdisciplinary methodology, the empirical culture of biology and the literary culture of economics and thus finish with … ‘the two cultures.’ Bioeconomics is a paradigmatic shift in the development of the economy-environment disciplines such as natural resource economics, environmental economics and ecological economics. The paradigm shift is really an endeavour to make the invisible visible: in the case of bioeconomics the aim is to make visible all the weaknesses of the socioeconomic activity based on the neoclassical theory and the competitive capitalist ideology.” [Younes Nademi, “BioEconomics and NanoEconomics.” Advances in Environmental Biology. Volume 5, number 9, 2011. Pages 2611-2613.]
         “Human social organization has evolved with the purpose of resolving or minimizing conflicts between members of the community. Successful economic development obviously relies upon such social organization. The problem of devising social institutions that reduce conflict without destroying individual freedom and initiative, or establishing privileged classes, is one of the main themes of history.
         “In the case of marine resources, the evolution of conflict-reducing institutions is still at an early, trial-and-error stage. In view of the increasing economic importance of these resources, delays in establishing effective institutions are especially unfortunate.”
         [Colin W. Clark, “Bioeconomics of the Ocean.” BioScience. Volume 31, number 3, March 1981. Pages 231-237.]
    116. international development economics (M. D. Litonjua): This approach to alternative economics focuses on the Third World.
         “International development economics arose to address the problems of misery and suffering of the ‘underdeveloped areas’ of the world as part of the ‘Fair Deal’ that President Harry Truman in his inaugural address in 1949 announced for the entire world. But it really came to its own in the 1960s with the decolonization of the countries of Africa that then became members of the United Nations. The newly-independent countries of Africa with the countries of Asia, independent since World War II, and the nations of Latin America, independent since the 19ᵗʰ century, would be grouped together and known as the Third World. The United Nations designated the 1960s as the Development Decade, and the United States under President John F. Kennedy for its part launched the Alliance for Progress. In the sixty-year history of international development economics, various goals and objectives have been proposed and posited as ends to be pursued by development policies, programs, and efforts.
         “International development ethics addresses and assesses value assumptions and ethical questions that underlie development goals, ends, and means, especially in the Third World/Global South. It explains, justifies, applies, and extends ethical reflection on development policies, projects, and institutions from the local and national to the regional and global levels.”
         [M. D. Litonjua, “International Development Economics and the Ethics of the Preferential Option for the Poor.” Journal of Third World Studies. Volume 30, number 1, spring 2013. Pages 87-119.]
    117. economic imperialism (Kurt W. Rothschild as pronounced in this MP3 audio file): He critiques the deriding of heterodox economists by many neoclassical economists.
         “Economic Imperialism is the claim of some economists that the methodology of neoclassical economics has superior scientific qualities and should be adopted by most or all social sciences. The paper first shows why such a dominant claim could develop among economists but in no other science and then goes on to point out the shortcomings of this claim of methodological superiority. These critical remarks are also relevant for methodological controversies within economics between a mainstream and heterodox economists.…
         “In fact one can distinguish between two forms of Economic Imperialism (EI). A milder form, sometimes called the ‘economic approach’, which recommends the application of the neoclassical method in all social sciences but admits that other basic methods may be useful too, and ‘economic imperialism’ in a narrower sense which looks at the economic method as the only or at least most dominant path for scientific discovery.”
         [Kurt W. Rothschild, “Economic Imperialism.” Analyse & Kritik. Volume 30, 2008. Pages 723-733.]
         “The methodology – or better: the methodologies – employed by economists have proved to be powerful instruments for building valuable theoretical models and deriving useful explanations and predictions. There is no doubt that other social sciences can benefit from applying these methods in some of their problems. But they are not very helpful in ail social sciences and in all situations (including several fields in economics.) At the same time there is no doubt that economists can (and do) learn a lot from the research and research methodologies in other social of sciences. There is no sensible basis for advocating ‘Economic Imperialism.’ With a research free of methodological bias the different approaches in all sciences can act as a ‘box of tools’ from which those specimens can be chosen which seem to be best suited for the problems and situations under consideration.” [Kurt W. Rothschild, “A Note on ‘Economic Imperialism.’” Jahrbücher für Nationalökonomie und Statistik / Journal of Economics and Statistics. Volume 221, number 4, July 2001. Pages 440-447.]
         “… [The] special methodological achievement and the considerable insights it can provide for many aspects of the market process which is responsible for the inhibitions of neoclassical economics to open itself without prejudice to important additional factors. This concerns not only the power problem but also numerous other sociological and psychological phenomena like institutions, bounded rationality, fairness, and solidarity. Not only is there a reluctance to accept important insights from other social sciences, there exists also an economic arrogance expressed in ‘economic imperialism’ which urges the other social sciences to copy the methods of neoclassical economics because it alone is declared to be ‘scientific.’” [Kurt W. Rothschild, “The absence of power in contemporary economic theory.” Journal of Socio-Economics. Volume 31, number 5, 2002. Pages 433–442.]
         “Economics must, by the very nature of its subject, be a multi-paradigmatic science. If some questions and areas permit the use of highly sophisticated closed models, so much the better. But there is no need to put these above less axiomatic and more open theories and models which offer better approaches to certain fields. The belief in a hierarchy of theories based on formal ‘scientific’ qualities lies behind the excesses of ‘economic imperialism within economics itself and stretching beyond it.’ Such attitudes carry the danger that more promising avenues are overlooked or deliberately bypassed.” [Kurt W. Rothschild, “To RAP or not to RAP, is that the question?: Reflections on a book by Melvin Reder.” Journal of Economic Studies. Volume 29, number 6, 2002. Pages 439-445.]
    118. egalitarian market economy (Andrew Gamble and Gavin Kelly): They argue for a broad spectrum of owners of production.
         “In this article, we argue that the project of an egalitarian market economy should be the foundation of left political economy. In recent years some intellectuals on the Left have supported the role of markets as a (comparatively) efficient mechanism for allocating scarce resources but argue that this should still be combined with full public ownership of productive assets. Such proposals would not however realize the full potential of an egalitarian market economy. We argue that, in seeking to pursue efficiency and greater equality, a left programme should promote the broadest possible individual ownership of productive assets as well as new collective ways of monitoring and controlling the ways in which they are managed.” [Andrew Gamble and Gavin Kelly, “The New Politics of Ownership.” New Left Review. Series I, number 220, November–December 1996. Pages 62-97.]
    119. radical economic subjectivity (Julie Steinkopf Rice, Emily R. Cummins, and Aprildawn Willeford): They explore an approach to “creating alternative economies.” Rice’s own activism along this line is documented on the website, Borderlands Solidarity Economy.
         “Research examining radical economic subjectivity processes involved in creating alternative economies remains extremely scarce.…
         “One’s perspective on radical economic subjectivity processes will be influenced by how one views economic globalization. If local context is seen as subordinate to larger structures then it follows that the resistant subject will likely not see context as being important to building economic alternatives. This occurs within the conventional political economy literature, which also has the tendency to homogenize the impacts of global political economy upon people’s lives. The global is seen to contain and define the local ….
         “In terms of radical economic subjectivity processes, this disparate literature raises numerous questions as to the relationship between the radical economic subject and the state.”
         [Julie Steinkopf Rice, Emily R. Cummins, and Aprildawn Willeford, “Crossing Borders: Building Radical Economic Subjectivities along the USA/Mexico Border from Sites of Privilege.” Critical Sociology. Volume 37, issue 6, November 2011. Pages 721-737.]

Return to the table of contents.

13. Approaches to Political Theology (Carl Schmitt as pronounced in this MP3 audio file, William Desmond, Dominic Johnson, Oliver Krüger as pronounced in this MP3 audio file, Anver M. Emon [Persian/Fārsī, انْوِر م. اِمُون, ʾAnvir M. ʾImūn], Sajjad Rizvi [ʾUrdū, سَجَّاد رِضْوِی, Saǧǧād Riḍvī], Dirk J. Smit, Amos Yong, Jean Louise Cohen, Jo Renée Formicola, Tim Gorringe, Kathryn Tanner, William Desmond, Mark Lilla, and others): For instance, Schmitt’s political theology—which arguably originated the field in its modern form—focuses upon the sovereign as “he who decides on the exception.” Given that this man’s personal biography is immensely problematic—as an unrepentant Nazi apologist—his disconcerting, even chilling, characterization of loyalty to a sovereign must be strongly condemned. Nevertheless, he has influenced numerous subsequent versions of political theology—left, right, and center. Coming from a much different perspective, Rizvi develops a brilliant approach to political theology based upon the largest branch of Shiʻi (Arabic/ʿArabiyyaẗ, شِيعِيّ, Šīʿiyy) Islam (Arabic/ʿArabiyyaẗ, إِسْلَام, ꞌIslām), the Twelvers (Arabic/ʿArabiyyaẗ, الاثْنَا العُشْرِيَّة, ʾal-ʾIṯnā ʾal-ʿUšriyyaẗ). Others are also included below.
    1. general information
       “Sovereign is he who decides on the exception.
       “Only this definition can do justice to a borderline concept. Contrary to the imprecise terminology that is found in popular literature, a borderline concept is not a vague concept, but one pertaining to the outermost sphere. This definition of sovereignty must therefore be associated with a borderline case and not with routine. It will soon become clear that the exception is to be understood to refer to a general concept in the theory of the state, and not merely to a construct applied to any emergency decree or state of siege.
       “The assertion that the exception is truly appropriate for the juristic definition of sovereignty has a systematic, legal-logical foundation. The decision on the exception is a decision in the true sense of the word. Because a general norm, as represented by an ordinary legal prescription, can never encompass a total exception, the decision that a real exception exists cannot therefore be entirely derived from this norm.…
       “From a practical or a theoretical perspective, it really does not matter whether an abstract scheme advanced to define sovereignty (namely, that sovereignty is the highest power, not a derived power) is acceptable. About an abstract concept there will in general be no argument, least of all in the history of sovereignty.”
       [Carl Schmitt. Political Theology: Four Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty. George Schwab, translator. Chicago, Illinois: University of Chicago Press. 2005. Pages 5-6.]
       “It is not surprising that many … theorists associate political theology with dogmatism and violence, because a political theological critique of liberalism has actually accompanied dogmatic and violent political thought in the past. Carl Schmitt’s book Political Theology is a good example of this relation. Schmitt’s book has influenced the project of political theology because it succinctly states the politico-theological critique of liberalism, but in doing so, it puts forward the doctrine of decisionism. Decisionism is the view that the unrestrained personal decision of a ruler is necessary to give coherence and stability to a state. Schmitt’s decisionism emphasizes the sovereign’s political importance, and implies that only a sacred justification of authority can legitimize the state. Without such legitimacy, political order in a state depends on decisions grounded only on a sovereign will unrestrained by any norm.” [Paulina Ochoa Espejo, “Does political theology entail decisionism?” Philosophy and Social Criticism. Volume 38, number 7, 2012. Pages 725-743.]
       “With the arrival of the 19ᵗʰ century, the need to ground sovereignty in notions of the divine had vanished and popular sovereignty was now, seemingly, able to stand on its own mercurial and multiple feet. Carl Schmitt noted in his Political Theology that, in democratic thought: ‘the people hover above the entire political life of the state, just as God does above the world, as the cause and the end of all things, as the point from which everything emanates and to which everything returns’. The basis of the democratic creed, the fact that ‘the people became the sovereign,’ became ‘as self-evident in the consciousness of that period’ as monarchy was in an earlier time …. Schmitt concluded that even ‘the economic postulates of free trade and commerce are, for an examination within ….” [Stefan Schwarzkopf, “The Political Theology of Consumer Sovereignty Towards an Ontology of Consumer Society.” Theory, Culture & Society. Volume 28, number 3, 2011. Pages 106-129.]
       “In this analysis of the current state of emergency [civilizational struggles], I outline [Carl] Schmitt’s political theology of the friend/enemy distinction and examine recent commentaries on Islam as the Other. While Schmitt’s political theory provides a productive paradigm for understanding American politics, Schmitt has of course not been without his critics …. I concentrate in particular on his relationship to [Leo] Strauss …, who argued that Schmitt had not successfully broken out of the liberal paradigm ….” [Bryan S. Turner, “Sovereignty and Emergency: Political Theology, Islam and American Conservatism.” Theory, Culture & Society. Volume 19, number 4, 2002. Pages 103-119.]
       “[Carl] Schmitt argues against the liberal claim that the laws of parliamentary democracy suffice to deal with emergency situations. How can you legislate for that which is exceptional, novel and threatening? There will always be the need for a sovereign authority competent to recognize the need for an exception to the law. Schmitt’s contention is that it is people who rule and not laws. Procedural and formal systems of law are too general, mechanistic and impersonal. They do not have the power of ‘real life’ which breaks through when the sovereign decides.” [Matthew Bullimore, “The politics of resurrection: Responding to Carl Schmitt on law and sovereignty.” Theology. Volume CXII, number 870, November/December 2009. Pages 425-434.]
       “It is less in ignorance of the ambiguities of the concept of exception than in acute sensitivity to them that [Carl] Schmitt elaborates his theory of sovereignty in the way that he does. This sensitivity manifests itself in his hesitance to locate sovereignty, or the decision on the exception, wholly outside of political order. Given that a state of exception is a complete suspension of the law, it would be easy for Schmitt to insist that the sovereign acts utterly beyond the bounds of political order. Yet, while the exceptional decision contains an extra-legal element, it never becomes entirely extra-legal; exception remains a dual phenomenon, one that operates both within and outside of normal political order.” [Regan Burles, “Exception and governmentality in the critique of sovereignty.” Security Dialogue. Volume 47, number 3, 2016. Pages 239-254.]
       “… [The] conception of sovereignty as a kind of inclusive exclusion, or a constituent illegitimacy that instantiates, conditions, and relentlessly haunts every legitimate order, is closely associated today with the work of Carl Schmitt. In fact, in theoretical debates at least, the revival of the question concerning sovereignty has been more or less coeval with a revival of interest in Schmitt. It goes without saying that, only a short while ago, nothing could have seemed less likely.” [Charles Barbour, “Sovereign Times: Acts of Creation.” Law, Culture and the Humanities. Volume 6, number 2, 2010. Pages 143-152.]
       “The attempt to utilize [Carl] Schmitt for the rethinking of socialist theory turns Schmitt – conservative revolutionary, fascist and an enemy of the Left – into a debating adversary. This, as any good Schmittian should know, is a dangerous political manoeuvre. For if Schmitt teaches us anything, it is that we need to know who our friends and enemies are; and if the history of the twentieth century has taught us anything, it is that fascism and its supporters are our enemy. We forget this at our peril.” [Mark Neocleous, “Friend or enemy?: Reading Schmitt politically.” Radical Philosophy: Philosophical Journal of the Independent Left. Number 54, September/October 1996. Pages 13-23.]
       “… in April 1939 [Adolf] Hitler began to articulate ideas of a German-dominated Monroe doctrine for Europe, as a response to President [Franklin Delano] Roosevelt’s demands on him to cease his territorial ambitions. Hitler declared that this was a European matter, off-limits for America. Schmitt was apparently warned from trying to assert his own prior articulation of such claims. [Carl] Schmitt complied and clearly followed the tide of opinion in his attitude to Nazi foreign policy ….” [Stuart Elden, “Reading Schmitt geopolitically: Nomos, territory and Großraum.” Radical Philosophy: Philosophical Journal of the Independent Left. Number 161, May/June 2010. Pages 18-26.]
       “Post-Schmittian thinkers of power – that is, those (regardless of their affiliation with [Carl] Schmitt) who labour under the impression that all political concepts have a theological origin and history, or a theological future – can be called political theologians.” [Kyle McGee, “Demononics: Leibniz and the antinomy of modern power” Radical Philosophy: Philosophical Journal of the Independent Left. Number 168, July/August 2011. Pages 33-45.]
       “I will argue that any theoretical, rather than biographical, reading will disclose that a Schmittian sociology of sovereignty or emergency is a contradiction in terms. I will further clarify why [Carl] Schmitt’s history of international law and order … has to be understood in context-specific ideological terms, which render it deeply problematic on theoretical, logical and empirical grounds.” [Benno Teschke, “The Fetish of Geopolitics: Reply to Gopal Balakrishnan.” New Left Review. Series II, number 69, May–June 2011. Pages 81-100.]
       “Some followers of [Carl] Schmitt detect in the hubris of post-Cold War us foreign policy—with its morally recharged discourse of good versus evil, humanity against terrorists, the impossibility of neutrality—a replay, if in intensified form, of the spectre of Versailles. This is embedded in a much broader and essentially continuous proclivity in us foreign policy since World War One and its redefinition of international law.” [Benno Teschke, “Decisions and Indecisions: Political and Intellectual Receptions of Carl Schmitt.” New Left Review. Series II, number 67, January–February 2011. Pages 61-95.]
       “The impulse to place faith in a seemingly messianic executive who promises to deliver the people from evil lends credence to Carl Schmitt’s intriguing suggestion that theology continues to structure modern jurisprudence—but not necessarily in the way that Schmitt believed. In his view, liberal constitutionalism corresponds to a deistic world view so committed to the idea of a harmonious system operating according to regular and inviolable laws that it denies the need for an authoritative personal decision to set things right.” [Clement Fatovic, “The Political Theology of Prerogative: The Jurisprudential Miracle in Liberal Constitutional Thought.” Perspectives on Politics. Volume 6, number 3, September 2008. Pages 487-501.]
       “[Carl] Schmitt’s discussion is particularly relevant to the study of modern politics and statecraft. Expanding on the claims of Thomas Hobbes and other early modern thinkers, Schmitt sees the modern state as resting on secularized forms of religious sovereignty and legitimacy. Whereas in premodern times leaders relied on religious law and authority to exercise worldly political power, the modern state is based on a secularized law that is largely self-grounded—that is, not dependent on external sources of validity like religious natural law or God, but rather on its own claims to comprehensive rational justification rooted in Enlightenment principles. Within this framework of positivist law modern elites seek to ‘depoliticize’ issues of public concern by transforming religious (and later ‘political ideological’) conflicts into questions of technical administration through the application of transparent and rational norms, rules and procedures.” [Ernesto Verdeja, “International Political Theology.” Religion and International Relations: A Primer for Research—The Report of the Working Group on International Relations and Religion of the Mellon Initiative on Religion Across the Disciplines. Michael C. Desch and Daniel Philpott, co-conveners. Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame. May, 2013. Pages 103-110.]
       “… I broadly consider ‘theological voluntarism’ as a view that the moral status of certain entities and acts are by virtue of a divine command.…
       “For the purpose of this article, I will focus on Islamic voluntarist theology in broad terms. There are others more capable to address debates within Protestant theology on voluntarism and its competitors, as well as others devoted to particular accounts of Islamic voluntarist theology.…
       “Among the various features of an Islamic voluntarism is an understanding of the God of Islam. As much as Islamic tradition recognises Allah as the God of Christianity and Judaism, it also posits a God who is generally understood as omniscient, omnipresent and all-powerful.”
       [Anver M. Emon, “Beyond the Protestantism of Political Theology: Thinking the Politics of Theological Voluntarism.” Studies in Christian Ethics. Volume 29, number 2, 2016. Pages 190-203.]
       “I attempt in this piece to present a normative study of Twelver Shiʻi political theology predicated on my reading of some of the foundational, perhaps canonical, texts of the early tradition. That canon is somewhat contested not least between those who see the Imams as the foremost of their peers without having a ‘supernatural’ quality as infallible, divine beings, a position often rejected as ‘shortcoming’ (taqṣīr [Arabic/ʿArabiyyaẗ, تَقْصِير]) in everlasting and indeed ever-revealing countenance of the divine mentioned in the Qur’an … is glossed in the tradition as the person of the Imam. The Imam is not the defender of the Law; he is the Law—he is not the exegete of scripture; he is revelation itself. One recognises the Imam through their manifestation of divine attributes in their totality, not least in the particular privileging of knowledge, of the unseen, of the true nature of scripture and revelation, of the metaphysical, of how what come to pass and what will be. This ‘gnostic’ and sophiological aspect of the mode in which God presents herself to humans is critical.” [Sajjad Rizvi, “Authority in Absence? Shi‘i Politics of Salvation from the Classical Period to Modern Republicanism.” Studies in Christian Ethics. Volume 29, number 2, 2016. Pages 204-212.]
       “Reflecting in a comparative context—and using the terms that are borrowed in the study of religion from the normativity of the Christian case—it is difficult to see how one can adequately respond to questions about representation, authority and governance without a clear sense of the historical development of these terms and concepts within Muslim milieux. This does not mean that one has to catch up necessarily—one thinks of the rather tedious debates about temporalities, reformations and orthodoxies among contemporary Muslim thinkers. But does it mean that we are stuck between the ahistorical sense of politics and the theoretical attempts to reconcile Islam with various types of ‘isms’? So some caveats are in order in terms of the contexts in which we pose the questions—all the while recognising that caveats and theoretical preliminaries may act as obstacles to actual thought and action. I will focus on four: biopolitics, the construction of traditions, the notion of philosophy and reasonable religiosity, and finally the possibilities of comparative political theology.” [Sajjad Rizvi, “Authority, Governance, Legitimacy, Representation: Some Thoughts from the Muslim Margins.” Studies in Christian Ethics. Volume 29, number 2, 2016. Pages 146-157.]
       “Sajjad Rizvi’s lucid essay on Shi‘i political theology will have many resonances for Christian students in this area. The Gospels present Jesus of Nazareth as announcing the arrival of the divine basileia—the ‘rule’ rather than the ‘Kingdom’ of God, that is, a state of affairs in which God is sovereign. That sovereignty is revealed in the fact that Jesus is free to re-draw the boundaries of God’s people so as fully to include those previously regarded as ‘impure’ or hopelessly compromised in their Jewish identity: the chronically sick and literally outcast, the tax farmers and prostitutes (that is, those who most conspicuously colluded with the occupying Roman armies), but also those whose intensive labour in various complex but menial tasks regularly rendered them ritually unclean or incapable of performing the full demands of the Torah—fishermen, carpenters like himself, casual labourers and indentured workers of the kind so regularly referred to in his parables.” [Rowan Williams, “Authority Deferred: A Christian Comment.” Studies in Christian Ethics. Volume 29, number 2, 2016. Pages 213-217.]
       “Political secularism requires this-worldly justifications for coercive public laws and policy, which, unlike religious reasons, everyone can, in principle, accept and which can become the stuff of compromise. Separation on this level is important because the kind of disagreement religious reasons entail cannot be resolved discursively across faiths. Epistemic standards of publicness in the sense of accessibility of reasons are requisite to a democratic civil polity predicated on equal citizens with an equal right to justification regarding coercive public law and policy. Whether this means that only public officials should refrain from giving religious reasons to justify law and policy or whether there is also a ‘duty of civility’ for citizens to translate their religious views into public reasons is hotly debated. Since political secularism pertains to the separation of church and state, not to the articulation of religious beliefs by the citizenry, it entails only the former position.” [Jean L. Cohen, “Political religion vs non-establishment: Reflections on 21ˢᵗ-century political theology: Part 1.” Philosophy and Social Criticism. Volume 39, numbers 4–5, 2013. Pages 443-469.]
       “We are indeed in the epoch of the regulatory state. Political secularism and the concomitant separation on the level of ends, institutions, legitimacy, and symbolically, is as important for preserving liberal constitutional democracy in the interventionist as it was for the laissez-faire epochs. It is a category mistake to assume that separation means no relation between that which has been differentiated. Yet criteria are needed for determining when an accommodation, a regulation or no regulation is appropriate. Separation [of church and state] cannot do that work.” [Jean L. Cohen, “Political religion vs non-establishment: Reflections on 21ˢᵗ-century political theology: Part 2.” Philosophy and Social Criticism. Volume 39, number 6, 2013. Pages 507-521.]
       “My hypothesis is that pentecostal reflections on political theology can be summarized with the motto, ‘many tongues, many political practices.’ There are three interlocking motifs that frame the thesis: the biblical, the pentecostal, and the political-theological.
       “Biblically, I posit that the dominant theme of the restoration of Israel and the renewal of the world in Luke-Acts opens up the people of God to a multiplicity of political stances, practices, and theologies. The notion of the gospel going forth to the ends of the earth fulfills the Old Testament promise that through Abraham, all the nations of the earth would be blessed.…
       “From a pentecostal perspective, we have already seen that there is no one form of political, economic, or social engagement in global pentecostalism …. Rather, there is a multiplicity of pentecostalisms in the global south, with distinct orientations toward the political, broadly construed.…
       “Finally, then, from the standpoint of political theology itself, we have observed … that there is no one normative standard for how Christians should think about the political. Instead, there have always been a multiplicity of political structures in and through which the people of God have borne witness to the coming kingdom. Not without reason, we are beginning to see accounts that discuss political pluralism as if that itself were normative for Christian theology.…
       “In short, I am proposing that the many tongues of Pentecost and the many concomitant political practices may constitute a distinctive pentecostal contribution to the wider Christian discussion of political theology. One might read the following as a ‘pentecostal political theology,’ and that would be appropriate at one level. I’m more interested, however, in how pentecostal perspectives can shape a Christian political theology that is viable for the church catholic.…
       “I will unfold the ‘many tongues, many political practices’ thesis …. This scheme means that the fundamental theological categories will be christologically focused, but pentecostally delineated.”
       [Amos Yong. In the Days of Caesar: Pentecostalism and Political Theology. Grand Rapids, Michigan: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company. 2010. Pages 109-111.]
       “With erudition and finesse, [Amos] Yong undertakes the monumental task of surveying the complex terrain of global Pentecostal political practices and often informal theological reflections, weaving a net of meaning and cohesion that celebrates the beauty of Pentecostal diversity while anchoring its constructive and creative argument into unifying distinctives of Pentecostal spirituality. Starting with the Pentecostal kaleidoscope of perspectives, the text evolves into a skillfully structured ecumenical dialogue, which (in continuity with the Pentecostal openness to the language of the other) shapes the many tongues of political theology into an imaginative and inspiring proposal for Christian socio-political praxis in the global village.” [Daniela C. Augustine, “In the Days of Caesar: Pentecostalism and Political Theology.” Review article. Theology Today. Volume 68, number 4, 2012. Pages 490-505.]
       “The conscious development of an American Catholic political theology did not begin until the mid-1950s. Prior to that time, traditional papal encyclicals and teachings, particularly those of Leo XIII (1878-1903), were regarded as the final word on church-state theory. The Catholic clergy and faithful understood those documents to be religious, definitive, and non-political. On the one hand, while the encyclicals and writings, which often covered political issues, were binding on the consciences of Catholics, they attached no sin to non-compliance and were not to be interpreted in a partisan manner. On the other hand, these writings were perceived by many non-Catholics, particularly those in the United States, as political, not religious tenets. Thus, such promulgations helped to reenforce the notion that a true Catholic could not be a loyal American, an idea that fueled the Catholic-Protestant rivalry in the United States until the middle of the twentieth century.” [Jo Renée Formicola, “American Catholic Political Theology.” Journal of Church and State. Volume 29, number 3, autumn 1987. Pages 457-474.]
       “… any political theology adequate to the Christian Scriptures will have to be evangelical, which is to say, a message of joy and gladness for human beings. Much political theology, right up to the present, has been anything but that. From these Scriptures I take just three key themes for a Christian political theology.…
       “… God is only disclosed, God reveals Godself, in the passage from bondage to freedom.…
       “Freedom means nothing if it is not accompanied by ‘shalom’ [Hebrew/ʿIḇəriyṯ, שָׁלוֹם, šālōm], not simply absence of conflict but wholeness and well being, so that shalom can properly be translated welfare ….
       “… justice is not identical with fairness or the determined attempt to see that each is given their due, which it was for Aristotle, but is grounded in the righteousness and love of God. This is the fount of human justice and what is required for its exercise, above all, is relationship with God.”
       [Tim Gorringe, “Political Theology.” The Expository Times. Volume 122, number 9, 2011. Pages 417-424.]
       “Since the kingdom to come, as it is inaugurated in Jesus’ own life, establishes the shape of human relations that the economic workings of the Trinity itself specifies, gone are the merely formal and abstract preoccupations typical of trinitarian political theology. One cannot stop with attacks on individualism or on monolithic social identities and not consider the character of society more concretely. Even nonindividualistic, internally diverse communities must be subject to further critical scrutiny with reference to the goals to which they are dedicated. Are those communities dedicated to anything like what Jesus was dedicated to in his relations with other people? Are they dedicated to policies ensuring the comprehensive well-being of all their members, especially the disempowered, following Jesus’ own concern for the physical and spiritual well-being of the poor and suffering? Are they dedicated to breaking all analogues of the purity codes distinguishing the righteous from sinners, which Jesus opposed in their disadvantaging of the most vulnerable? And so on.” [Kathryn Tanner, “Trinity.” The Blackwell Companion to Political Theology. Peter Scott and William T. Cavanaugh, editors. Malden, Massachusetts: Blackwell Publishing Ltd. 2004. Page 319-332.]
       “Political theology means different things to different thinkers, but if we take seriously the inclusion of theology in the enterprise of political theology, then we inevitably face the problem of evil. We face it diversely also, depending on what God, secret or proclaimed, finds itself devotees in the particular political theology that is espoused. One does sometimes get the impression that discussions of political theology are much less interested in the finesses of theology than in the real politics of worldly powers. And yet even when one’s God is the ‘mortal god,’ the perplexity about evil is never far away, never can be kept at a far distance. It insinuates itself in serpentine ways in all endeavors.…
       “It is true that not a few have turned away from traditional theodicy, giving one the impression that theodicy is a kind of ideological construct offering God a dubious alibi. In addition, it seems to be suggested that human beings interested in theodicy are also interested in securing an alibi for themselves, by exculpating God.”
       [William Desmond, “On Evil and Political Theology.” Political Theology. Volume 16, issue 2, 2015. Pages 93-100.]
       “Our hypothesis predicts that supernatural punishment, if it is such a crucial method of promoting cooperation, should be present in most human societies. Religious beliefs in general are a universal feature of all human societies known from both past and present times.… Punishment for flouting norms of behaviour, specifically, is indeed also a common aspect of religion across the world’s cultures. Sentiments of hostility towards defectors who behave ‘unfairly’ is another systematic feature of all western and non-western societies studied, from those deep in the Amazon Basin to those in New York city.…
       “Many of our social norms developed because they promoted cooperation towards public goods in the past. These norms are often driven and justified by religion. We suggest that the origins of these social norms may have spontaneously emerged in evolution as a result of the specific selective advantages of supernatural punishment. The idea that complex norm-enforcing institutions can arise spontaneously in human societies is well supported.”
       [Dominic Johnson and Oliver Krüger, “The Good of Wrath: Supernatural Punishment and the Evolution of Cooperation.” Political Theology. Volume 5, issue 2, 2004. Pages 159-176.]
       “Political theology has at least two, sometimes overlapping meanings. One is the sense of [Carl] Schmitt that politics begins to appropriate notions from theology as societies secularize, thus making politics a matter of theology; the other is the ideological use of theology to mask political motivations. Both forms of political theology spring from secularization. The theology of politics, on the other hand, starts from an explicitly theological framework. This theological framework can be either natural or revelatory theology, and in the medieval period it was both.” [Phillip W. Gray, “Political Theology and the Theology of Politics: Carl Schmitt and Medieval Christian Political Thought.” Humanitas. Volume XX, numbers 1 and 2, 2007. Pages 175-200.]
    2. A variety of left, or left-leaning, versions of political theology will be considered below. However, why not simply avoid the issue of Schmitt’s disguisting Nazi loyalties and refer to left political theologies as liberation theologies? Schmitt’s work can still be referenced when prudent or appropriate.
    1. new political theology (Jürgen Moltmann as pronounced in this MP3 audio file, Johann Baptist Metz as pronounced in this MP3 audio file, and others): Influenced by Marxian critiques, they develop a left “socio-critical” approach to political theology.
       “Here I see the opportunity and task for an ecumenism of religions that takes the form of an indirect ecumenism of religions — in accord with the thinking of the new political theology. This ecumenism is not a coming together and comparing of religions, but the praxis of a common response, a common resistance to the sources of unjust suffering in the world: racism, xenophobia, and nationalistic or purely ethnic religiosity with its civil war ambitions. But it is also a resistance to the cold alternative of a global community in which increasingly the ‘human being’ vanishes amid self-serving systems of economics, technology, and their culture and communications industries; of a global community in which world politics increasingly loses its primacy to a world economics whose laws of the market were long ago abstracted from ‘human beings’ themselves.” [Johann Baptist Metz, “In the Pluralism of Religious and Cultural Worlds: Notes Toward a Theological and Political Program.” John Downey and Heiko Wiggers, translators. CrossCurrents. Volume 49, number 2, summer 1999. Pages 227-236.]
       “When Jürgen Moltmann and Johann Baptist Metz developed the notion ‘Political Theology’ during the 1960s as a socio-critical theology …, the concern was that this ‘strange mixture’ would entail the politicisation of the church. In reaction, both theologians pointed out that there is no such thing as un-political theology. Where concern about Political Theology as the politicisation of the church exists, it points towards a lack of awareness of the political dimension of theology, or as I refer to it, a lack of a hermeneutics of suspicion.” [Tanya van Wyk, “Political Theology as critical theology.” HTS Teologiese Studies/Theological Studies. Volume 71, number 3, 2015. Pages 1-8.]
       “Supported by the Second Vatican Council, Catholic and Protestant theologians entered into Christian-Marxist dialogue in the 1960s through the Catholic Paulus-Gesellschaft [Paul Society or Society of Paul]. The participants tried to bring the humanistic Marxists, who were acquainted with evil and knew the power of death, near to grace and the hope of the resurrection. Milan Machovec and Roger Garaudy understood very well the deficiency of the immanent hopes of the modern age, and we theologians, for our part, took up their passion for the liberation of the oppressed and for the rights of the humiliated. The ‘theology of hope’ and the ‘theology of liberation’ arose from a cooperative-critical engagement with the situation of modernity. ‘Political theology’ shaped greater frameworks for the deepest solidarity of the church ‘with the entire human family.’” [Jürgen Moltmann, “Horizons of hope: A critique of ‘Spi salvi.’” The Christian Century. Volume 125, number 10, May 2008. Pages 31-33.]
       “Fundamentally … planet earth and the life that it brings forth are (as far as we know) a one-off, a unique creation sui generis, therefore, comparisons are impossible. From a theological point of view, the earth is a creative creation, and in that, it is like nothing else but humanity itself.” [Jürgen Moltmann, “A Common Earth Religion: World Religions from an Ecological Perspective.” The Ecumenical Review. Volume 63, number 1, March 2011. Pages 16-24.]
       “I understood the debate with Marxism primarily as a discussion about the socially critical dramatization of the theodicy issue. I did not want to save politics and political culture—as any sort of pragmatism recommends—from the gaze of theodicy. Of course I also wanted to bring into the discussion a position other than that of Marxism: I wanted always and unconditionally to ask about the suffering of others, the suffering even of the enemy, and to ask about the sufferings of the dead, to which no impassioned struggle of the living can reconcile us. This mix of politics and theodicy had and has a high price: it subjects this political theology again and again to mockery by every political pragmatist and political utopian, outside and inside Christianity. But how does one ultimately rescue political life from pure political Darwinism without the viewpoint of theodicy? These discussions in any case have sharpened the focus of the world church on the world it encounters.” [Johann Baptist Metz, “Facing the World: A Theological and Biographical Inquiry.” John K. Downey, translator. Theological Studies. Volume 75, number 1, March 2014. Pages 23-33.]
       “Even when cultural and political pressures from without resulted in the import of myths or idealizing concepts, Israel still found itself unable to be consoled by them. Israel’s talent for God, its capacity for God (if this word be here allowed) showed itself in a particular kind of incapacity, namely, its incapacity to be consoled by myths or ideas that are far removed from history.” [Johann Baptist Metz, “Suffering Unto God.“ J. Matthew Ashley, translator. Critical Inquiry. Volume 20, number 4, summer 1994. Pages 611-622.]
       “Johann Baptist Metz explicitly advocated a Political Theology in contrast to Karl Rahner’s transcendental theology. Dorothee Sölle appealed to political theology as a political hermeneutic. These theologians began to advocate a new political theology two decades after World War II and during a time of strong economic development and national renewal. Within the postwar context, they critically reflected upon the recent German experience of National Socialism, the horrors of the war, and the Holocaust. At the same time, they brought to consciousness that the economic growth within a market economy not only made the market itself central to society, but also led increasingly to religion becoming a consumer object, often reduced to private individual choice. These emergent political theologies criticized transcendental and existential theologies as inadequate to this situation. Not only did they fail to criticize the privatization of religion, but they even accentuated it through their emphasis upon the existential and upon individual decision. In contrast, the emergent political theologies offered a political hermeneutic of the Christian message, underscoring the centrality and reality of the promise of God’s Kingdom.” [Francis Schüssler Fiorenza, “Prospects for Political Theology in the Face of Contemporary Challenges.” Political Theology: Contemporary Challenges and Future Directions. Michael Welker, Francis Schüssler Fiorenza, and Klaus Tanner, editors. Louisville, Kentucky: Westminster John Knox Press. 2013. Pages 46-70.]
       “One of the most important tasks for political theologians today is the cultivation of capacities for democratic reasoning about exceptions to the rule of law. The task is important because liberal societies face – or at least believe they face – a number of threats that seem to require exceptional measures in response. The pressure to make exceptions grows stronger, even as we find ourselves with fewer and weaker resources for thinking about them.” [Ted A. Smith, “‘Reasoning about Exceptions’” Political Theology. Volume 15, issue 5, September 2014. Pages 381-384.]
    2. political theology of reconciliation (Mark Lilla): He develops a Hegelian approach to Christian political theology.
       “… the Christian account of alienation and reconciliation is unique in several respects. Like orthodox Judaism it refuses to trace human alienation to a cosmic source and places re sponsibility instead squarely on the shoulders of sinful man. By will fully separating himself from God, man has made himself homeless in a world where he must now toil, govern himself, and suffer the conse quences of his fallen nature, until his death. Unlike Judaism, however, Christianity refuses to concede to fallen man the ability to expiate his sins through punctilious observation of the law and thereby reconcile himself to his God and his fellow man through his own efforts. Christ alone can reconcile us. Only through his grace can man be justified before the Father and thus be redeemed. Repentance is a necessary condition of receiving grace, but it alone is insufficient to work a reconciliation.
       “Christianity teaches that unrepentant and untouched by grace, man has no power to overcome alienation. Yet once he does repent and joins the company of the faithful, man’s collective power to work reconciliation in the world is great indeed—certainly greater than Judaism imagined was possible through observance of the law.”
       [Mark Lilla, “Hegel and the Political Theology of Reconciliation.” The Review of Metaphysics. Volume 54, number 4, June 2001. Pages 859-900.]
    3. Lutheran political theology (Carl-Henric Grenholm as pronounced in this MP3 audio file): He argues for a political theology focusing on liberation from oppression.
       “In this article the purpose is to examine the contributions that might be given by Lutheran political theology to this discourse on global justice. Is there any particular perspective on global justice that can be derived from Lutheran political ethics?…
       “… I argue that Lutheran political theology should develop a Christological perspective on global justice.… [T]he theology of the cross gives arguments in favor of an understanding of justice as liberation from oppression. Global justice is not only an equal distribution of welfare and liberty, it is also a radical change of existing power structures.…
       “… My thesis is that Lutheran ethics should not be based on Creation and reason alone – it should also be based on Christology and Eschatology. This means that we should abandon the sharp difference between law and gospel within ethics. From a Christological perspective it is possible to argue that all humans have an equal dignity before God, and this equality should also be applied within political ethics. God’s sacrificial love in Christ would also inspire a political practice that supports those who are marginalized and suffers from poverty. From this perspective global justice would mean both an equal distribution of welfare and liberation from oppression.”
       [Carl-Henric Grenholm, “Global Justice in Lutheran Political Theology.” De Ethica. A Journal of Philosophical, Theological and Applied Ethics. Volume 3, number 1, 2016. Pages 45-58.]
    4. liberative social ethics and theology (Joseph Wiinikka-Lydon): In the tradition of political theology, he develops an approach to “the prophetic potential of moral injury.”
       “The prophetic potential of moral injury
       “… Moral injury occurs within an environment created through social, political, and foreign policies, sustained through political relationships and power struggles both at home and in the war theater, as well as cultural narratives of one’s self, one’s group, and others enacted in a foreign cultural environment. It is the result not only of personal action and belief but is to a significant extent born of and shaped through social and foreign policy and a society’s actions and effects in the world. Moral injury, then, is a visceral experience of policy, as well as cultural assumptions, that are put into effect corporately on the ground through the bodies of soldiers and others.…
       “What I mean by prophetic … is understood generically in the mode of liberative social ethics and theology as a radical insight into the conditions and needs of the present moment. It draws from these traditions and particularly from feminist and consciousness-raising movements emphasizing the importance of experience to theology, philosophy, and politics.”
       [Joseph Wiinikka-Lydon, “Moral Injury as Inherent Political Critique: The Prophetic Possibilities of a New Term.” Political Theology. April 29th, 2016. Pages 1-14.]
    5. radical political theology (Clayton Crockett): He proposes a radical theological alternative to conservatism, neoconservatism, and liberalism.
       “For many Americans, the only alternative to liberalism seems to be a conservative or neoconservative political worldview. During the latter half of the twentieth century, a number disillusioned radicals and liberals drifted toward conservative positions with varying degrees of zealousness. The critique of modern liberalism advanced by intellectuals such as Carl Schmitt and Leo Strauss seemed to leave no alternative to conservatism or pessimism, especially as the horrors committed in the name of Marxism became more and more apparent. Marxism was proclaimed dead in the wake of communism’s collapse, but many of the most interesting, important, and powerful contemporary political philosophy has been done in a broadly post-Marxist, Continentalist context ….
       “There is the possibility for a radical political theology, which means the refusal of conservative or neoconservative options in politics and in theology after the demise of liberalism. Most varieties of political theology take some form of liberal or at best liberation theology, or alternatively some form of neoorthodox theology.… Today, there are some thinkers (including myself and Jeffrey W. Robbins, and in a slightly different way, Creston Davis) who identify with the tradition of radical theology and also follow this political ‘turn,’ and who attempt to theorize the intrinsic relationship between the religious and the political within the world today. This trajectory is neither an embrace nor an exclusion of transcendence, but thinks beyond liberalism and eschews conservatism as well as nostalgia for liberal and traditionalist theologies and political theories.”
       [Clayton Crockett. Radical Political Theology: Religion and Politics after Liberalism. New York: Columbia University Press. 2011. Pages 162-164.]
       “In [Clayton] Crockett’s interventions, readers will find some of the most clear and condensed commentary on a variety of political and religious thinkers available. There is much to admire in his application of diverse traditions to contemporary political problems. Some might find the expansive view contained in the work troubling, as Crockett tends to refer to crises in the most general sense. His work indicates a growing interest in the connection between political movements and religious sentiments that have been under erasure in contemporary analyses due to the normative constraints of political liberalism.” [Eric Guzzi, “Radical Political Theology: Religion and Politics after Liberalism.” Review article. Critical Research on Religion. Volume 4, number 2, August 2016. Pages Pages 220-223.]
       “As the supposed victory of liberal global capitalism becomes more widely accepted, the religious (re)turn to modernity’s secular world deconstructs the haphazardly constructed walls that divide the religious from the secular. While postmodern theology exemplifies those attempts at operating within the postsecular logic, it is decidedly apolitical, bordering on conservatism. Clayton Crockett’s Radical Political Theology represents a sophisticated radical theology with the ambitious goal of decentering establishment theology while maintaining an explicitly political focus. Indeed, at its most fundamental level, Crockett’s theopolitical project exists as a union of opposites that exhibits rewarding uses of post-Marxism, postmodernism, postliberalism, and postsecularism.” [Bo Eberle and George Schmidt, “Radical Political Theology: Religion and Politics after Liberalism.” Review article. Union Seminary Quarterly Review. Volume 64, number 1, 2013. Pages 62-66.]
    6. International Political Theology (Vendulka Kubálková as pronounced in this MP3 audio file): Informed by international relations, she develop an ontological approach to political theology.
       “Can International Relations (IR) as a discipline contribute to the study of the worldwide resurgence of religion? …
       “… In this paper I outline the foundation of what I call International Political Theology (IPT).…
       “… ‘Theology’ was once synonymous with philosophy and science.…
       “It is infeasible to discuss religion in IR without appreciating that the difference in religious and secular thought is ontological, i.e., in what in each of them ‘counts for real.’ All spiritual communities, all religions, Western and Eastern, share a distinction between ordinary and transcendental reality.”
       [Vendulka Kubálková, “Towards an International Political Theology.” Millennium: Journal of International Studies. Volume 29, number 3, 2000. Pages 675-704.]
    7. Reformed political theology in South Africa (Dirk J. Smit): He discusses an emancipatory Reformed approach to struggling against apartheid.
       “… the struggles, insights and failures of the South African Reformed experiences have been part of the broader Reformed tradition in a remarkable way. This is particularly true of Reformed political theology in South Africa. The role of the Reformed faith in the story of apartheid, the struggle against apartheid and the dramatic transformation to a democratic society has all been part of the world-wide Reformed story, and vice versa. The Reformed tradition itself was involved, was at stake, was put to the test—and the ecumenical Reformed church and theology was no spectator but an active participant.…
       “The Reformed tradition has been known from its beginnings for its passion for public and political life. Calvin has been described as a social reformer and even revolutionary and Calvinism was characterised by an interest in ethics, particularly issues of political, social, economic, legal and public life.”
       [Dirk J. Smit, “‘No Polycarps among Us’? Questions for Reformed Political Theology Today.” Studies in Christian Ethics. Volume 28, number 2, 2015. Pages 187-200.]
    8. sociopolitical justice in Islam (Bustami Mohamed Khir [Arabic/ʿArabiyyaẗ, بُسْطَامِيّ مُحَمَّد الخَيْر, Busṭāmiyy Muḥammad H̱ayr]): He develops an Islamic response the predominantly Christocentric political theology.
       “… it is important to view the development of modern ideas on sociopolitical justice in Islam in its duality: as both a response to external influences and an internal evolution from within. Basically, the thinkers have attempted to use traditional ideas and present them in modern language.
       “The quest for sociopolitical justice comprised both theorization and activism, and contributors to it represented a wide spectrum of campaigners.…
       “On the basis of the principle of equality, it is argued, Islam has formulated basic individual rights, which may be equated with modern human rights. The debate over the issue is intense, and there are many areas of disagreement.”
       [Bustami Mohamed Khir, “The Islamic Quest for Sociopolitical Justice” The Blackwell Companion to Political Theology. Peter Scott and William T. Cavanaugh, editors. Malden, Massachusetts: Blackwell Publishing Ltd. 2004. Page 503-518.]
    9. leftist critique of liberalism (Paul Kahn): Kahn frames his critique, an approach to political theology, around differing notions of social justice.
       “The leftist critique of liberalism may rest on a deep philosophical difference concerning the nature of justice and the forms of oppression, but that debate avoids any claims for or about the sacred. That political concepts have their origin in theological concepts is, to most contemporary theorists, about as interesting and important as learning that English words have their origin in old Norse. Consequently, a contemporary political theology must be more than a genealogical inquiry if it is to be more than a passing curiosity. It becomes interesting just to the degree that these concepts continue to support an actual theological dimension in our political practices. Political theology as a form of inquiry is compelling only to the degree that it helps us recognize that our political practices remain embedded in forms of belief and practice that touch upon the sacred.” [Paul Kahn. Political Theology: Four New Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty. New York: Columbia University Press. 2011. Page 3.]
       “Particularly troubling about [Paul] Kahn’s focus on the social imaginary is just how natural he makes it sound. He writes, for example, ‘The leftist critique of liberalism … avoids any claims for or about the sacred,‘ as if ‘the sacred’ is a perfectly natural, perfectly obvious object of inquiry.… Kahn’s use of ‘the sacred’ allows the reader to easily forget that, ostensibly, Kahn is interested in the term as part of the social imaginary rather than for the objects in the world that it references. Similarly, assertions such as ‘political violence has been and remains a form of sacrifice’ resonate so much with ordinary language that the ostensibly special use of ‘violence’ and ‘sacrifice’ as aspects of the social imaginary is difficult to remember. Indeed, the reader is tempted to challenge such assertions by asking for evidence, forgetting that Kahn purports to be describing how we imagine our world, not how it actually is.” [Vincent Lloyd, “The Rhetoric of Political Theology.” Political Theology. Volume 13, issue 6, December 2012. Pages 741-750.]
    10. political theology of Martin Luther King, Jr. (Karen V. Guth): She moves the discussion of King’s political theology beyond his focus on nonviolent resistance.
        “Standard accounts construe King’s [Martin Luther King, Jr.’s] contributions to political theology primarily in terms of his philosophy of nonviolence. Certainly, nonviolence is central to King's thought and practice, but we fail to reap the wealth of his theological and political legacy if we confine his concept of agape to nonviolent protest. I argue that feminism and womanism enable a more expansive account of King’s theopolitical vision, in which nonviolent resistance is one of many potential forms of ‘agapic activity’ [from the Ancient Greek/Archaía Hellēniká, ἀγάπη, a̓gápē, ‘love’ or ‘charity’] demanded of Christians. Building on feminist insights that the political extends beyond the public, this account construes more broadly the political implications of agape to include any practice with the power to create relationships and social spaces marked by reconciliation and justice.” [Karen V. Guth, “Reconstructing Nonviolence: The Political Theology of Martin Luther King Jr. after Feminism and Womanism.” Journal of the Society of Christian Ethics. Volume 32, number 1, spring/summer 2012. Pages 75-92.]
    11. Abrahamic theo-politics (Peter Ochs): Ochs argues that his political theology “subverts the dichotomous logics of modernity.”
        “My more unconventional thesis is that there is a nonliberal, Abrahamic theo-politics, yet to be articulated but already practiced, that subverts the dichotomous logics of modernity. Certain Muslim, Christian, and Jewish scholars/religious leaders will proclaim this theo-politics as the tripartite work of God in response to the dominant political crisis of the contemporary West.
        “The main features of this crisis are: (1) the inadequacy of the nation-state as a privileged context for theo-political inquiry and work; (2) the inadequacy of late modern alternatives to the nation-state, which alternatives are still dominated by the universalist economic contraries of anticapitalist socialism or global capitalism; (3) the inadequacy of value-neutral models of nation-state democracy; (4) the inadequacy of late modern alternatives to these models, which alternatives are still dominated by the primarily secular contraries of societal communitarianism and individual-rights liberalism; (5) the inadequacy of both antimodern religious orthodoxies and antireligious secular universalisms as sources of norms for responding to this crisis.”
        [Peter Ochs, “Abrahamic Theo-politics: A Jewish View.” The Blackwell Companion to Political Theology. Peter Scott and William T. Cavanaugh, editors. Malden, Massachusetts: Blackwell Publishing Ltd. 2004. Page 519-534.]
    12. politics of forgiveness (Ilsup Ahn [Korean, 안일섭, An-Ilsŏp as pronounced in this MP3 audio file]): As a political theology, he develops a “new theopolitical paradigm” related to immigration.
        “The purpose of this paper is to respond to the current political (d)evolvement with a newtheological appropriation of the biblical concept of ‘jubilee.’ I argue in this paper that Christian churches and communities should adopt a new theopolitical paradigm modeled after jubilee in engaging political process to promote justice and peace for many undocumented migrants. I call this new theopolitical paradigm the politics of forgiveness. Inspired by the biblical concept of jubilee, the politics of forgiveness is developed as a political–legal solution to overcome the ongoing ideological impasse between two political approaches: the ‘politics of punishment’ versus the ‘politics of compassion.’” [Ilsup Ahn, “Proclaiming the jubilee year for undocumented migrants: anti-immigration biopolitics and a Christian theopolitical response.” Political Theology. April 20th, 2016. Pages 1-20.]
    13. Žižek’s political theology (Marcus Pound): Pound focuses on the concept of kenosis (Greek/Hellēniká, κένωσις, kénōsis), the emptying or depletion of the self.
        “[Slavoj] Žižek’s political theology takes its orientation from Hegel’s kenotic logic (God’s self-emptying). ‘What dies on the cross is indeed God himself; not just his “finite container” but the God of the beyond – the God of metaphysics. Thereafter ‘Spirit’ names the community of believers, the purely corporal body of the church; that is to say, the realization of the cross is the release it brings from transcendence, making it homologous to Hegel’s ‘night of the world.’ Translated into the concerns of Marx, kenosis provided the basis for the political gesture, ending ‘obfuscation and fetishization, and liberation into the inexplicable joy and suffering of the world.’” [Marcus Pound, “Political Theology and Comedy: Žižek through Rose Tinted Glasses.” Crisis & Critique. Volume 2, issue 1, 2015. Pages 171-191.]
    14. Slavoj Žižek’s postmodern political theology (Claudia Breger): Breger presents a critique of Žižek.
        “[Slavoj] Žižek was not alone in warning that the new government in Yugoslavia might not bring an end to Serbian nationalist politics. The pessimistic scenario Žižek evoked on this occasion, however, was not simply the result of his evaluation of the current political constellation in Serbia. Rather, the fantasy of the necessary return of the leader is connected to his political theory—a theory that does not allow for more optimistic scenarios of democratization and the diminution of nationalism in society. My reading of Žižek’s work thus argues for a reevaluation of his theory in terms of its implicit authoritarian politics. The need for such a reevaluation is also suggested by [Ernesto] Laclau toward the end of his recent exchange with Judith Butler and Žižek when he admits that ‘the more our discussions progressed, the more I realized that my sympathy for Žižek’s politics was largely the result of a mirage’ ….” [Claudia Breger, “The Leader’s Two Bodies: Slavoj Žižek’s Postmodern Political Theology.” Diacritics. Volume 31, number 1, spring 2001. Pages 73-90.]
    15. new religious discourse (Jenny Taylor): She examines a post-secular political theology based upon religious openness.
        “… a new religious discourse … [is] replacing the dominant discourse of secularity.…
        “… features of a new religious discourse were found. These are: (1) It encompasses actual or perceived deprivatization of faith and dedifferentiation of the State and religious spheres. (2) It is used by public officials—or religious officials in public—who discuss theology, or religious values or who evidence awareness that they are so doing, thereby rebutting the colloquial notion that ‘faith is a private matter.’ …
        “The old dominant discourse of modernity had disallowed the use or relevance of religious signifiers in public …—religion was regarded as purely private and personal. It had disallowed the expression or validity of religious or theological meanings in reality and in public. Any referring of ethical conundrums back to a religious root … was disqualified, as was the identification of people principally by their religion. New religious discourse, on the other hand, now appears to indicate change in all these respects. Religious language at least is no longer embarrassing nor is faith professionally stigmatizing.…
        “The new religious discourse attempts to embrace—or absorb—difference in the interests of social integration and moral renewal, while professing to accommodate and even celebrate difference.”
        [Jenny Taylor, “There’s Life in Establishment—But Not as We Know It.” Political Theology. Volume 5, issue 3, 2004. Pages 329-349.]
    16. theologization of power (Marilena Chauí as pronounced in this MP3 audio file): She develops a critical approach to the political implications of absolute truth and transcendence.
        “The unity and cohesion of society depend on the internalization of this orthodoxy by all of its members, which can be achieved only if mediated by an official religion. Why religion? Because religion links the political order to truth or an ultimate reality, providing this order with a sacredness or sanctity that citizens will then fight, kill or die for. Religion thus imbues politics with something that is absolutely necessary: transcendence of the origin of power. The theologization of power is the only possible alternative to modernity.…
        “… in order to be free from the vicissitudes of fortune, men subject themselves to the mercy of powers whose form, content and action provide them with security if they and their representatives are directly obeyed.”
        [Marilena Chauí, “Political theology, religious fundamentalism and modern politics.” Radical Philosophy: Philosophical Journal of the Independent Left. Number 171, January/February 2012. Pages 27-32.]
    17. theory of radical democracy (Kyle McGee): The article joins political theology with biopower as “heirs” to political philosophy’s critical tradition.
        “Two apparently opposed approaches to power in political philosophy – political theology and biopower – are the contemporary heirs to this critical tradition. Each can be described loosely as a post-Marxist discourse on power advancing something like a theory of radical democracy on its normative edge. Despite the shortcomings I set forth throughout my discussion, and those I omit, these remain the farthest reaching, the most provocative and the most sophisticated theories of power and democracy in circulation today. Together, however, they compose an antinomy. Its resolution would carry us swiftly out of democratic theory and, therefore, beyond the principle of modern power.…
        “… biopower … offers access to the manufacture of subjectivity, which in turn opens onto the political-economic question of biopolitical or immaterial labour, the new hegemonic form of labour under imperial capital.”
        [Kyle McGee, “Demononics: Leibniz and the antinomy of modern power.” Radical Philosophy: Philosophical Journal of the Independent Left. Number 168, July/August 2011. Pages 33-45.]
    18. biblical Jewish political theology (Zachary Braiterman): He develops a political theology informed by the work of Martin Buber.
        “Presented by Martin Buber in the 1930s, the primary governing trope of biblical Jewish political theology—malkhut shamayim [Hebrew/ʿIḇəriyṯ, מַלְכוּת שָׁמַיִם, Mạləḵūṯ Šāmạyim] (the kingdom of heaven)—represents an absolute refusal of the political theology theorized by [Carl] Schmitt, a political theology in which theological concepts and energies slip into the secular and state authority. Buber resisted this slippage, privileging instead the anti-monarchical strata composing Hebrew Scripture.… What Buber reads as a genuine, unconditional ‘no’ to political sovereignty rests on an unconditional ‘yes’ affirming the absolute kingship of God (Judges 8). Against the theory staked out by Schmitt, the assertion that God alone is sovereign means that God’s authority is non-transferable to any human head or political institution. The implication is to preserve the notion of divine sovereignty over against the forms of state apparatus and authority rejected by Buber, no less than by [Giorgio] Agamben and [Jacques] Derrida.” [Zachary Braiterman, “The Patient Political Gesture: Law, Liberalism, and Talmud.” Judaism, Liberalism, and Political Theology. Randi Rashkover and Martin Kavka, editors. Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press. 2014. Pages 241-265.]
    19. Paul’s political theology (Simon Critchley): He develops a dualistic Pauline political theology.
        “Paul’s political theology has been employed negatively as a critique of empire, and positively as a means of finding new figures of activism and militancy based around a universalistic claim to equality. I begin by arguing that the return to Paul is nothing new and that the history of Christianity, from Marcion to [Martin] Luther to [Søren] Kierkegaard, can be understood as a gesture of reformation whereby the essentially secular order of the existing or established church is undermined in order to approach the religious core of faith. Paul has, I argue, always been the figure for a reformation motivated by intense political disappointment. The double nature of the address in Paul is fascinating: both in his address by the call that transformed him from a persecutor of Jewish Christians into a preacher of Christ’s gospel; and in the addressee of Paul’s call, namely the various churches or communities that he established and which are identified as the refuse of the world, the scum of the earth.” [Simon Critchley. The Faith of the Faithless: Experiments in Political Theology. London and New York: Verso imprint of New Left Books. 2012. Page 13.]
    20. emancipatory political theology (Nami Kim [Korean, 나미 김, Nami Kim as pronounced in this MP3 audio file] and Wonhee Anne Joh): They discuss Asian and Asian–American feminist political theologies.
        “Asian/Asian North American feminist theologies are by definition political theologies invested in critique and revisioning of both theology and the political contexts in which theological discourses circulate.…
        “Secular and academic practices … are pedagogies attempting to secure the identity of nation, which presents a crisis for gender politics. Interrogating what various secularisms offer for emancipatory gender politics remains extremely important.…
        “… In view of an emancipatory political theology, I ask that Asian/Asian North American feminist theology remain self-reflexively aware of the pitfalls of asserting identity and participating in the covert violence of Western academic and secular institutions. Self-reflexivity of course implies that we cannot escape these contexts. Asian/Asian North American feminist theology therefore … has to bring religion, secularism, and its academic enterprise into crisis.”
        [Nami Kim and W. Anne Joh, “Roundtable: Asian/Asian North American Feminist Theologies.” Journal of Feminist Studies in Religion. Volume 31, number 1, spring 2015. Pages 107-115.]
        “… the importance of [W. Anne] Joh and [Nami] Kim’s concern [in their article, ‘Roundtable: Asian/Asian North American Feminist Theologies’] over the politics of solidarity cannot be overestimated because, as they point out, both postcolonialism and transnationalism implicate those of us who are citizens of the United States as, wittingly and unwittingly, agents of imperialism. I have already mentioned the politics of knowledge, so we must be aware of the potential for ‘intellectual imperialism’ as we seek to ‘know’ and be in ‘solidarity’ with people in Asia, especially since many Asian North Americans are part of the global system that benefited from the colonization of Asia. As postcolonialism and transnationalism challenge Asian Americans to attend beyond the boundary of our nation-state and perhaps even reformulate our epistemological framework, we must not miss or dismiss what Joh and Kim repeatedly remind us: namely, the power differentials that situate us and our studies.” [Tat-siong Benny Liew, “On Asian/Asian North American Scholarship and Feminism in Religion: Twenty-Eight Years Later.” Journal of Feminist Studies in Religion. Volume 31, number 1, spring 2015. Pages 126-131.]
    21. metaphysics of the profane (Eric Jacobson): He rescues the term political theology from Carl Schmitt. Jacobson then critically examines political theology as developed both by Walter Benjamin (1892-1940) and Gershom Scholem (Hebrew/ʿIḇəriyṯ, גֵּרְשֹׁם שׁוֹלֶם, Gērəšōm Šōlẹm). Gērəšōm (Hebrew/ʿIḇəriyṯ, גֵּרְשֹׁם) is a “foreigner there.” Šōlẹm (Hebrew/ʿIḇəriyṯ, שׁוֹלֶם) is “peace.” Gershom Scholem was born Gerhard Scholem (MP3 audio file) in Germany (1897). He died in Jerusalem (1982).
        “The title of this study should … be qualified by a few remarks. I have taken to the term metaphysics to highlight the basic nature of the thinking addressed in this study: it is a highly speculative philosophy of fundamental questions regarding politics and theology, drawing on a near scholastic aptitude for categorical analysis and Talmudic rigor within a conception of divine continuity of meaning. In this way it is in fact a philosophy of divine as well as profane questions. ‘Metaphysics,’ Scholem once remarks in his Swiss notebook, ‘is a legitimate theory in the subjunctive form. This is the best definition I have found so far; it says everything.’…
        “The use of the term political theology … requires some explanation. It stems from a desire for a concise phrase to serve as an umbrella for subject matter related to messianism, speculations on divine language and on justice. It goes without saying that the use of the term here has nothing to do with Nazi theorist Carl Schmitt’s use of it in the title of a publication in 1923, after the period in question. In contrast to Schmitt, who spuriously claimed to have invented the term, the view presented here is that political theology begins with the Torah and the political and religious structure of the Israelites, their classes of priests and judges, the divine ordination of kings—in short, everything that led Josephus to coin the term theocracy to capture the meaning of their social and religious organization. It is in a biblical sense that political theology is used here.”
        [Eric Jacobson. Metaphysics of the Profane: The Political Theology of Walter Benjamin and Gershom Scholem. New York: Columbia University Press. 2003. Page 20.]

Return to the table of contents.

14. Review of Third–Way Perspectives: Many of the third ways referenced in this section reflect the disintegrative spirit of our times: angst and anomie. Ours is an age in search of alternatives. This writer has decided to include these perspectives on the Third Way even though, from a Leftist perspective—or what particular faux leftists refer to as “the regressive left”—a limited amount (certainly not all or even most) of the literature on the subject is quite regressive and even reactionary.
    Indeed, some of the Third Way turns out, arguably, to be an apologia for neoliberalism (also known as neoclassical economics or the modern Chicago school of economics). As a clarification, and following the reasoning of Anthony Giddens, traditional social democracy (or Keynesianism) and economic neoliberalism, variously defined, are generally understood to be, respectively, the first way and the second way. An academic journal which focuses on Third-Way issues is The Good Society.
    1. general information
       “… it [is not] sufficient to simply conceptualize the whole of society ‘as a kind of large organism’ whose members’ fulfillment and development (‘the good society’) requires group activity and mutual support based on individuals recognizing their obligations to the whole society, as in the organic statist communitarianism of [Amitai] Etzioni and [Hilary] Putnam. Explicit attention must be paid to the class and other power relations that shape production and consumption conceived as a material-social metabolism with nature, and the ways in which these power relations instrumentalize and constrain state power and policies.” [Paul Burkett, “Toward A Green and Red Theory of Human Development.” Journal of Critical Realism. Volume 4, issue 1, 2005. Pages 167-185.]
       “The whole idea of ‘The Third Way,’ which combines markets with a revised welfare state, depends on the hope that there is a way forward that escapes this fate, that avoids the risks of globalization, and that does so in a way that is a model for the world. The Third Way wishes to inherit the moral appeal of the Left, just as the concern for the working conditions of the impoverished of the earth is an attempt to formulate a moral standard for policy that responds to globalization.…
       “The Third Way is a movement based on a recognition—a recognition that there is no viable alternative to the market, at least for the making of basic decisions about what to produce and consume. Globalization is about something even more basic: it is a means of gaining new advantages in the division of labor, by breaking down the barriers to the division of labor created by the nation-state.”
       [Stephen Turner, “The Third Way.” Society. Volume 42, number 2, January 2005. Pages 10-14.]
       “The contemporary European Third Way is in most ways a completely different political animal than its predecessors. Its social and economic policies are clearly regressive and, in many ways, closer to the policies of the right-wing adversaries of the earlier Third Way reform socialists and welfare capitalists. Rather than breaking new ground, the contemporary Third Way reproduces and reinforces the neoliberal policies of the Old Right which they displaced, albeit while providing a new ideological gloss. Third Way leaders now compete with the Old Right for the allegiance of bankers, generals, and corporate chieftains to secure social recognition, financial backing, and personal gratification. The Third Way ideology is a way for the New Right to differentiate itself politically from the Old Right while assimilating the basic tenets of their program and putting distance between itself from the welfarism of the older, social democratic traditions and programs. The Third Way ideology masks the continuities with the discredited free-market policies of the Old Right while providing opportunities for the upwardly mobile professionals and entrepreneurs who form the core group of Third Way loyalists to connect with existing configurations of power.” [James Petras, “The Third Way: Myth and Reality.” Monthly Review: An Independent Socialist Magazine. Volume 51, issue 10, March 2000. No pagination.]
       “The Third Way, many argued, by its very name presupposes two previous or alternative ways. A frequent starting assumption of participants was to see the two previous alternatives as social democracy and neo-liberal economics.…
       “A third way does imply the existence of a first and second way – old Left and New Right …. But that still leaves unresolved whether these three ways are alternative political projects which it is possible to choose between or whether the third way has evolved from the others and now replaces them.…
       “One view of the Third Way, therefore, is that it has at its heart ‘pragmatism’ – a technical and hands-on orientation to what actually works. In this respect, the Third Way could be seen as an emerging paradigm: its principles are emerging out of the keynote policies of the new administration, and of similar governments across the world.…
       “While pragmatism might be an important part of the thinking behind the keynote policies of the Third Way, pragmatism alone cannot define a policy programme. Objectives must still be set and choices made.…
       “One of the principles that appears to underlie Third Way thinking is a notion of personal responsibility. This emphasis on personal responsibility is seen by many to be one of the distinguishing aspects of Third Way thinking compared with that of the traditional Left and was an obvious theme of the keynote policies described in the previous section. However, this conception of personal responsibility differs radically from that of the New Right’s ethic of ‘self-reliance.’ …
       “The NEXUS discussion made clear that the term the ‘Third Way’ does not yet have a universally accepted definition. For some, this lack of clarity was a source of concern. Unease was expressed by some that the term might become used, whether intentionally or otherwise, to ‘dump’ much that was of value in older social democratic tradition into an implied second way that was then abandoned. For others, however, the use of the term offered an important opportunity to re-evaluate, and where necessary update, such tradition in the context of the challenges facing us today.”
       [David Halpern, David Mikosz, Gerald Holtham, Michael Jacobs, David Marquand, Melissa Lane, Julian Le Grand, Paul Thompson, and Iain McLean, “The Third Way: summary of the NEXUS on-line discussion.” David Halpern and David Mikosz, editors. Nexus. May, 1998. No pagination.]
       “There is much confusion and scepticism about third way ideas. For some, they are very malleable and vague, blurring settled political and social divisions and distinctions without articulating convincing alternatives. Nevertheless, it is pretty clear that the new thinking represents a revival and re-energising of thought on the left which might gain steam and become more important politically as we enter the new millennium. So it is important to understand what third way thinkers are saying and why.” [Lionel Orchard, “Which Way Third Way.” AQ: Australian Quarterly. Volume 71, number 3, May–June 1999. Pages 18-24.]
       “As state socialism during the 1980s was entering the terminal stage of its economic ills a new specter haunted the world, the specter of the ‘third way.’
       “The idea of the ‘third way’ was not all that new. Its origins can be traced back to the nineteenth-century German notion of Sonderweg [exceptionalism]: a uniquely German way to modernity that escapes the individualism/anarchy of the English and French ways of development on the one hand and the despotism of Russia on the other. The intellectual and political history of the idea of Sonderweg is complex. During the nineteenth century and the first half of the twentieth century it was mainly nationalistic. It was even an inspiration for Nazi theory (which combined anti-bourgeois ideology with anti-bolshevism).”
       [Ivan Szelenyi, “Third Ways.” Modern China. Volume 37, number 6, November 2011. Pages 672-683.]
       “In the early 1990s, the challenge facing the architects of New Labour was to convince the electorate and the ‘business community’ that a [British] Labour government could be trusted with the economy and could address the social disintegration created by the individualism promoted by almost 20 years of Conservative government. As Jane Franklin points out, the ‘third way,’ as a synthesis of communitarian ideas and neo-liberal economics was designed to meet that challenge. The New Labour modernizers discarded Labour’s historical commitment to public ownership in favour of a more pragmatic approach to the free market.” [Lizzie Ward, “‘Globalization’ and the ‘Third Way’: A Feminist Response.” Feminist Review. Number 70, 2002. Pages 138-143.]
       “The aim of this article … is to investigate the politics side of the ‘third way.’ We pose two main questions: first, what has caused Social Democratic parties to enter the ‘third way’? Second, how can the different sequences of change be explained (variation between countries)? Our empirical basis for answering these questions is the development of the Danish and Dutch Social Democratic parties. The choice of these cases is based on the theoretical considerations of the article ….” [Christoffer Green-Pedersen and Kees van Kersbergen, “The Politics of the ‘Third Way’: The Transformation of Social Democracy in Denmark and The Netherlands.” Party Politics. Volume 8, number 5, 2002. Pages 507–524.]
       “While Empire promises to keep the wheels spinning (well oiled, as it were), it also explodes a cardinal tenet of globalist foreign policy: the myth that the new economism can all but supplant the old geopolitics. Empire keeps all the major features of globalization, plus one: it stands ready to enforce market privileges the old fashioned way. Neoliberalism hereby drops its Third Way vestments to join neoconservatism within the American fortress state. Call it the Fourth Way.” [William H Thornton, “Neoglobalism: The Fourth Way.” Antipode. Volume 36, issue 4, September 2004. Pages 564-574.]
       “… [The] ‘third way’ … may be interpreted as a … ‘middle of the road’ position.…
       “… there is no readily available formula for blending the pursuit of economic efficiency, social equity, ecological sustainability and participatory democracy. Working out how this is to be done, both conceptually and ‘on the ground’ is one of the major challenges in the development of a ‘fourth way.’”
       [Frank Stilwell, “Political-Economic Systems: A Fourth Way?” Social Alternatives. Volume 13, numbers 3 and 4, October 1994. Pages 5-11.]
       “… if … [we consider] the Third Way in action in the context of life politics—an example of community renewal through harnessing local initiatives such that government and civil society work in partnership—liberty has clearly and completely displaced equity as a political concern. As well, a truly ecocentric ethic is missing from much of these politics, an ethic keeping in mind the whole ecosystem of the earth, if not the entire cosmos. Perhaps then those committed to social justice and deep ecology must envision and pursue a new approach—a fourth way.” [Robert Pitter, “Finding the Kieran Way: Recreational Sport, Health, and Environmental Policy in Nova Scotia.” Journal of Sport & Social Issues. Volume 33, number 3, August 2009. Pages 331-351.]
       “The term Third Way in its most recent use was coined in 1992 by a group of policy consultants to Bill Clinton and taken over by Tony Blair and his intellectual aids with new emphasis half a decade later in order to brand a new centre-left approach to what they consider the inevitable new challenges of economic globalisation. It is by its authors understood as the opening move for a new wave of revisionism which aims at a new synthesis between traditional social democracy and liberalism in some of the key fields of social reform such as governance, welfare state, education, political culture and job creation in a new economy. The very brand-name and the new direction of political thinking for which it stands have proved highly controversial in the short time since they have entered the political arena.” [Thomas Meyer, “The Third Way at the Crossroads.” Internationale Politik und Gesellschaft/International Politics and Society. March, 1999. Pages 294-304.]
       “The idea of a ‘third way’ is one of a number of attempts by [British] Labour modernisers to find a synthetic term or language to capture New Labour politics. New Labour has been projected as the party of ‘one nation’ concerned with ‘the many not the few,’ and as a government capable of undertaking a programme of modernisation to build a ‘new Britain.’ Ideas of ‘stakeholding’ and ‘social exclusion’ and the emphasis placed on ‘community’ have also figured prominently. The idea of a third way is attractive to Labour modernisers because it appears to challenge conventional notions of a political Left and Right – and thus reinforces the ‘newness’ of New Labour.” [Stephen Driver and Luke Martell, “Left, Right and the third way.” Policy & Politics. Volume 28, number 2, 2000. Pages 147-61.]
       “Globalisation is a topical and contentious issue not just for academics but also for politicians. Indeed, some academics have specifically targeted politicians in their analyses of the ways in which globalising forces have led to new political approaches such as the Third Way, which is supposed to replace social democracy (where the main form of distribution of goods and services is through the state, and social welfare has a high priority as means of addressing inequities) and neo-liberalism (where the market replaces the state as the main mechanism of distributing goods and services, and social welfare is reduced to a safety net) as the predominant political discourse …. The Third Way is intended to offer a combination of democracy and public welfare services with private sector partnerships and the modernisation of public institutions to make them less bureaucratic and more responsive to consumers.” [Rosemary Deem, “Globalisation, New Managerialism, Academic Capitalism and Entrepreneurialism in Universities: Is the Local Dimension Still Important?” Comparative Education. Volume 37, number 1, February 2001. Pages 7-20.]
       “… for most of its [constitutional theory’s] history, the inquiry into the theory and methods of constitutional interpretation has been based on a belief that I call the ‘third way.’ Somewhat similar to the politi cal approach advocated by former President Bill Clinton and Prime Minister Tony Blair, the idea of the third way is that the Constitution should be interpreted from a non-ideological per spective that is neither liberal nor conservative, Democratic nor Republican. Instead, the Constitution can perform its function in a democratic, often divided society, only if it is interpreted along a third path that does not track the major fault lines of ordinary democratic politics.” [Stephen M. Griffin, “Constitutional Theory As I Found It.” The Good Society. Volume 13, number 2, 2004. Pages 25-28.]
       “The task today in theory no less than in practice is then to reilluminate public space for a civil society in eclipse. Unless a third way can be found between private markets and coercive govern ment, between anarchistic individualism and dogmatic communitarianism, we seem fated to enter an era where in the space where America’s public voice should be heard will be a raucous babble that leaves the nation’s civic soul forever mute.” [Benjamin R. Barber, “An American Civic Forum.” The Good Society. Volume 5, number 2, spring 1995. Pages 10-14.]
       “… third way politics keeps shifting the political discussion to the right. On the worldwide spectrum of health care policies, the options range from socialized medicine, in which the government directly manages the health care system, to laissez-faire medicine, where the costs are directly borne by the individual. Canadian-style national health insurance, in which the government finances the system but does not operate it, is a third way. In the [Bill] Clinton debate, however, national health insurance was defined as the extreme left position and his plan as the third way. New Democrats then shifted further to the right, supporting a proposal closer to that of the private insurance companies, which became the third way, with Clinton’s compromise plan on the extreme left.” [Jeff Faux, “Lost on the Third Way.” Dissent. Volume 46, number 2, spring 1999. Pages 67-76.]
       “The transformation from Old to New Labour, leading to the election of the ‘New’ Labour government on 1 May 1997, involved a significant ideological shift, embedded in a new political ‘philosophy,’ the Third Way, intended to represent a radical departure from the atrophied politics of Right and Left …. A form of corporatist and statist socialism associated with large-scale industrial production and universal welfare provision by the state was abandoned as New Labour joyously embraced the new ‘realities’ of globalisation, post-Fordism, flexible labour relations and a more fragmentary, service-based and volatile labour market. At the same time, the Third Way sought to distance itself from the burgeoning distributional inequalities of Thatcherite neo-liberalism. As such, the concept of social exclusion for the first time became central to national policy ….” [Ash Amin, Angus Cameron, and Ray Hudson. Placing the Social Economy. London and New York: Routledge imprint of Taylor & Francis Group, an Informa PLC business. 2004. Pages 22-23.]
       “The Third Way is not a project for humanising or tempering capitalism. It is a project for adapting to the capitalism of the economic boom of the 1990s—a boom which is bound to give way to another aspect of an economic cycle which has been far from overcome. Indeed, the erstwhile reformist parties of the Third Way have been at enormous pains to win legitimation from those who have profited from the boom by a systematic and ruthless rationalisation of capitalism. However, the boom may come to an unexpectedly rapid end.” [Norman Birnbaum, “Is the Third Way authentic?” New Political Economy. Volume 4, number 3, November 1999. Pages 437-446.]
       “As soon as one begins to reflect on the philosophy of the Third Way it becomes apparent that it is not based on any critical analysis of modern capitalism, so that a critique of the Third Way as a political philosophy must begin from what it fails to say rather than what it claims to stand for. In contrast to traditional social democratic and socialist programs, one looks in vain for any discussion of classes, exploitation, the influence of the profit motive, the power of transnational corporations, the division of labour, the myth of free markets, the alienation of consumer society, or even the roots of unsustainable development and patriarchy.” [Clive Hamilton, “The Third Way and the End of Politics.” The Drawing Board: An Australian Review of Public Affairs. Volume 2, number 2, November 2001. Pages 89-102.]
       “What emerges from the radical democratic critique of the Third Way is an awareness that conflict and disagreement are an inherent part of democratic political societies. In this sense democracy is envisaged not as the mechanism for solving disagreements but rather as a means of enabling their expression. Thus radical democracy provides a counterpoint to the perfectionism of theories that see consensus as a healthy state of affairs by recognizing the untidy contingency which emanates from incommensurable value pluralism.” [Adrian Little, “Community and radical democracy.” Journal of Political Ideologies. Volume 7, number 3, 2002. Pages 369-382.]
       “[Anthony] Giddens’ Third Way takes key changes in contemporary society, subjects them to sociological analysis and proposes a number of modern and managerialist social democratic solutions under the heading of the Third Way. It does this with extraordinary clarity, bringing complex ideas within the grasp of a popular readership. In this guise the Third Way is a sociology of social change in the service of the centre left.” [Angela McRobbie, “Feminism and the Third Way.” Feminist Review. Number 64, spring 2000. Pages 97-112.]
       “My conclusion is that national peculiarities and variations may be enhanced in the absence of a realistic European dimension of political community. The Third Way discourse provides an opportunity for a convergent renewal of centre-left strategies able to cope with the common challenges of globalisation only if it strengthens the three layers of subsidiarity—local and ‘patriotic,’ but also European.” [Mario Telo, “European Social Democracy and the Third Way: Another View” New Political Economy. Volume 5, number 1, March 2000. Pages 139-144.]
       “… in the post-1997 period, Western liberal democracies have seen the growth of a ‘Third Way’ that has attempted to balance the extremes of welfare commitments on the one hand and an unbridled free market on the other ….” [Leon Benade, “The New Zealand Draft Curriculum 2006: a policy case study with specific reference to its understanding of teaching as an ethical profession.” Policy Futures in Education. Volume 7, number 1, 2009. Pages 5-19.]
       “The neoliberal market mechanism remains largely the same, then, in both Third Way social welfarism and the insanely aggressive corporatism recently favored by the [George W.] Bush/[Dick] Cheney administration. The only major difference between them may be the nature of the trade rules and goals issued by the governing consensus. In this, the Clinton Global Initiative is a poster child for the ideology of the majority of center-left liberals, who believe that governmental administrations can learn to legislate temperance by creating evermore opportunities for intemperate economic investment in alternative, socially responsible markets.” [Editor, “Ecopedagogy: An Introduction.” Counterpoints. Volume 359, 2010. Pages 1-33.]
       “The manner in which I presented the project of ‘good society’ from the point of view of [Amitai] Etzioni and [Anthony] Giddens, may give the impression that it is an attempt to caricature it. But the projects themselves, although discuss sensible aspects of our lives, are both naive and inconsistent. The ‘state without enemies,’ positive welfare as opposed to negative welfare (!) or a society cured of desires, diseases, ignorance, misery and idleness, seems to be assertions that are part of a rather propagandistic arsenal unfortunately located not ‘beyond’ ideologies as the authors have claimed but right in the heart of one. In fact I tried to render the ‘picture’ painted by some of the best known theorists of ‘the third way’ as faithfully as I could.” [Eugenia Udangiu, “Policy and the Narrative of the ‘Third Way.’” Revista de Ştiinţe Politice/Revue des Sciences Politiques. Issue 44, October 2014. Pages 94-102.]
       “In political practice, Thirdwayism may be characterized by three basic elements: (i) acceptance of monetary stabilization, deregulation and privatization as top priorities in economic and social policy; (ii) a changed role for the state, from caretaker to empowering agency; and (iii) acceptance of US dominance in technology and military fields.”[Egon Matzner, “Third Way.” The Elgar Companion to Post Keynesian Economics. J. E. King, editor. Northampton, Massachusetts: Edward Elgar Publishing, Inc. 2003. Pages 337-341.]
       “Neoliberalism is that philosophy, mentality, discourse, ideology, project or strategy based on liberalism which became dominant in west capitalist countries in the context – or as part – of the crisis of the national Keynesian state ….
       “Both the discourse of neoliberalism and of third way-ism attempt to fix the meanings and antagonisms which should guide the advocacy for particular mechanisms of coordination of all kind of social relations, involving the sphere of economy, state and citizenship …. In the case of neoliberalism, there is no doubt that its ideal is the primacy of the market over all forms of relations. Meanwhile, the guiding principle of third way-ism is not clear enough. By questioning whether the third way is a form of neoliberalism, we are actually questioning whether market is too its main mechanism of coordination.”
       [Francisca Corbalán Pössel, “Third Way: a particular variant of neoliberalism?” Justice: Contemporary Social Issues and Perspectives. Autumn 2011–2012. Pages 1-11.]
       “Like their New Right counterparts, adherents of the Third Way espouse the view that ‘there is no alternative to the market’. Globalisation is seen as having made anything other than total submission to the world market both utopian and foolish.” [Iain Ferguson, “Neoliberalism, the Third Way and Social Work: the UK Experience.” Social Work and Society: International Online Journal. Volume 2, number 1, 2004. Online publication. No pagination.]
    2. presentation of diverse third–way approaches
       1. responsive communitarianism or neo–communitarianism (Amitai Etzioni [Hebrew/ʿIḇəriyṯ, אֲמִתַּי עֶצְיוֹנִי, ʾĂmitạy ʿẸṣəyōniy], Mohd Azizuddin Mohd Sani [Malay language of Malaysia], Abubakar Eby Hara [Arabic/ʿArabiyyaẗ, أَبُو بَكْر إِيبِيّ حَارَة, ꞌAbū Bakr ꞌIybiyy Ḥāraẗ], and others): Two activities associated with responsive communitarianism are The Communitarian Network and the academically oriented Institute for Communitarian Policy Studies. They present a third-way, neo-communitarian vision of “the good society.” Notably to this writer, U.S. President Barack H. Obama, himself a responsive communitarian (reportedly of some pride to Etzioni), introduced his own “axis of evil” to a global audience (complete address in this MP3 audio file), placing communists into the same self-defined inimical category as fascists, radical jihadists (Arabic/ʿArabiyyaẗ, جِهَادِيِّينَ المُتَطَرِّفِينَ, ǧihādiyyīna ʾal-mutaṭarrifīna), and homegrown demagogues (Greek/Hellēniká, δημαγωγοί, dēmagōgoí).
          “America has changed over the years. But these values that my grandparents taught me, they haven’t gone anywhere. They’re as strong as ever; still cherished by people of every party, every race, every faith. They live on in each of us. What makes us American, what makes us patriots is what’s in here [the heart]. That’s what matters.
          “And that’s why we can take the food and music and holidays and styles of other countries and blend it into something uniquely our own. That’s why we can attract strivers and entrepreneurs from around the globe to build new factories and create new industries here. That’s why our military can look the way it does, every shade of humanity, forged into common service. That’s why anyone who threatens our values, whether fascists or communists or jihadists or homegrown demagogues, will always fail in the end.”
          [U.S. President Barack H. Obama, “Address to the Democratic National Convention.” Wells Fargo Center. Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. July 27th, 2016.]
          “If we Americans are individualistic at heart, if we instinctively chafe against a past of tribal allegiances, traditions, customs, and castes, it would be a mistake to assume that this is all we are. Our individualism has always been bound by a set of communal values, the glue upon which every healthy society depends. We value the imperatives of family and the cross-generational obligations that family implies. We value community, the neighborliness that expresses itself through raising the barn or coaching the soccer team. We value patriotism and the obligations of citizenship, a sense of duty and sacrifice on behalf of our nation. We value a faith in something bigger than ourselves, whether that something expresses itself in formal religion or ethical precepts. And we value the constellation of behaviors that express our mutual regard for one another: honesty, fairness, humility, kindness, courtesy, and compassion.” [Barack Obama. The Audacity of Hope: Hopes on Reclaiming the American Dream. New York: Crown Publishers. 2006. Ebook.]
          “While this fiercely anti-individualist, anti-authoritarian philosophy goes by many names, political scientists generally refer to it as ‘communitarianism,’ named after the decentralized yet collectivist orientation of communities. ‘In my wildest dreams, during 18 years of championing communitarianism, I did not expect a presidential candidate to be as strongly identified with this political philosophy as [Barack] Obama is,’ gushed George Washington University professor of philosophy Amatai [sic; Amitai] Etzioni.” [Gregory Ferenstein, “Obama’s Shift Toward Communitarianism.” The Daily Beast. June 30th, 2013. Retrieved on April 2nd, 2016.]
          “To understand [President Barack] Obama’s attitude toward American politics and his long-term commitment to breaking the logjam of American party politics, it is not enough to trace his sensibility to his formative years in Indonesia and Hawaii; to Los Angeles, New York, and Cambridge; to Illinois and Kenya. It is equally crucial to locate him within the frameworks of civic republican and communitarian discourse, within the tradition of philosophical pragmatism, and in relation to a cluster of complex ideas that emerged in the 1960s and 1970s.” [James T. Kloppenberg. Reading Obama: Dreams, Hope, and the American Political Tradition. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press. 2011. Page 78.]
          “The present crisis presents an opportunity for Obama to recast the traditional divide in American politics. Rather than the usual left-right split over the size and role of government, he has to address himself to the greatest problem most Americans have with Washington: they see their government as predatory and corrupt. They look at the tax code and worry less that it ‘spreads the wealth’ than that it institutionalizes corruption through loopholes and special deals. True reform will mean attacking predatory policies and corruption, from the left and the right.” [Fareed Zakaria, “Obama’s Third Way.” Newsweek. November 4th, 2008.]
          “Barack Obama is a liberal-leaning, moderate, pragmatic communitarian. His thought was shaped in the 1980s and early 1990s, when debates over liberalism versus communitarianism re-energized the field of political theory.” [Gary Dorrien, “Obama’s Communitarianism.” The Huffington Post. May 4th, 2012. Retrieved on April 2nd, 2016.]
          “… in the West the politics of the center takes new forms. We find it in the international Communitarian Network, or the efforts to build a new program for the center left, a new Third Way.” [Karol Edward Soltan, “Liberal Conservative Socialism and the Politics of a Complex Center.” The Good Society. Volume 11, number 1, 2002. Pages 19-22.]
          “Communitarianism is a … political doctrine which emphasizes the interest of communities and societies over those of the individual. While not necessarily hostile to Liberalism or Social Democracy per se, it does oppose individualist doctrines like Libertarianism (which stresses human independence and the importance of individual self-reliance and liberty) and most aspects of modern Conservatism, advocating instead ideas such as civil society (the concept of voluntary civic and social organizations and institutions, as opposed to the force-backed structures of a state and commercial institutions).” [Luke Mastin, “Communitarianism.” The Basics of Philosophy. 2008.]
          “In politics, … Bill Clinton and the ‘New Democrats’ consciously sought to reclaim the civic-republican tradition.” [Will Marshall, “The Forgotten Communitarian.” Democracy: A Journal of Ideas. Number 25, summer 2012. Online publication. No pagination.]
          “We are becoming more communitarian to those who resemble us, substituting voluntary associations for politics in addressing social problems and drawing on like-minded communities rather than national sources in making political decisions.” [Jedediah Purdy, “Community.” Democracy: A Journal of Ideas. Number 11, winter 2009. Online publication. No pagination.]
          “Communitarianism, in broad terms, is a partial rejection of the liberal ideology that has been a cornerstone of Western political and social thought for approximately 200 years. Liberalism maintains that the rights of individuals supersede the rights of the group and that governments are formed to secure individual liberties. Communitarians claim that the responsibilities individuals have to each other and to the larger society have taken a backseat to individual rights, and this has led to a downward spiral of selfishness, greed, and conflict. In U.S. society, and throughout much of the modern world, rights have trumped responsibilities. Individuals have gained a strong sense of entitlement but with a rather weak sense of obligation to the broader group—whether it be family, community, or society.” [Gerald Kloby, “Communitarianism.” Encyclopedia of Social Problems. Vincent N. Parrillo, editor. Thousand Oaks, California: SAGE Publications, Inc. 2008. Page 146.]
          “Unfortunately, there is a practical problem with [Amitai] Etzioni’s … vision of an emerging global community that coalesces gradually, almost naturally, on the back of a growing moral consensus that is, at least, a synthesis of Western and Eastern notions of the good society. Although Etzioni is right to emphasize the moral dimension, he appears to ignore the argument, favored by this theorist, that norms are driven by culture, rather than vice versa, and that in its turn, culture is driven by context.” [Colin S. Gray, “Sandcastle of Theory: A Critique of Amitai Etzioni’s Communitarianism.” American Behavioral Scientist. Volume 48, number 12, August 2012. Pages 1607-1625.]
          “The quest for balance [between ‘individual rights and public safety’] reflects a new or responsive communitarian position developed in the 1990s. Its starting point is that there are two valid claims each society faces. First, society must advance the public interest, including not only public safety and health but also other elements of the common good, such as protection of the environment. Second, society must protect liberty, including individual rights. The ‘turf’ does not belong apriori to either claim. In addition, public safety and individual rights are not necessarily in conflict. In some situations, both can be advanced, such as when the police restore law and order to a crime-ridden neighborhood. However, when the public interest and rights do pose conflicting demands, criteria must be developed as to which should take priority, without assuming that one automatically trumps the other.” [Amitai Etzioni, “Implications of Select New Technologies For Individual Rights and Public Safety.” Harvard Journal of Law & Technology. Volume 15, number 2, spring 2002. Pages 258-290.]
          “… communitarians see community as a set of Chinese nesting boxes, in which smaller communities nestle in more encompassing ones. Moreover, we see community in the moral voice that people use to appeal to one another, a voice that is carried by a variety of communities.…
          “… we need individuals who act as community members and not simply as self-centered monads. We require their membership not merely to make them better citizens, not only to make politics work better, but also because much joy and ‘problem solving’ lies in the nongovernmental, non-political, social realm of action within the community, by the community, through its myriad of non-political institutions.”
          [Amitai Etzioni, “A Communitarian Response.” The Responsive Community. Volume 2, issue 4, fall 1992. Pages 77-78.]
          “… communitarians argue that the state cannot be neutral and that the definitions of the common good are both needed and not antiliberal. The procedural virtues of tolerance, fairness, and reasonableness associated with neutrality (and which libertarians do endorse) are not sufficient to order the life of the republic. They provide a thin theory of the good that cannot sustain the seedbeds of virtue on which the republic depends. The state, however carefully, must ensure that it is pursuing policies that nourish these seedbeds because societies in which individual liberties are well defended depend on strong families, a rich web of voluntary associations and other mediating structures, a well-educated citizenry, and citizens who recognize their personal and social responsibilities and not merely their rights.” [Amitai Etzioni, “A Moderate Communitarian Proposal.” Political Theory. Volume 24, number 2, May 1996. Pages 155-171.]
          “In contrast to the advocacy model, … [there is] a liberal communitarian philosophy, which assumes that as a nation we face two fully legitimate normative and legal claims: protecting national security and the freedom of the press. Neither can be maximized nor fully reconciled, as there is an inevitable tension between these two claims. It thus follows that some balance must be worked out between the conflicting claims. That is, the liberal communitarian model assumes from the outset that the nation is committed to both individual rights and the advancement of the common good, and that neither should be assumed a priori to trump the other. The liberal communitarian philosophy is dedicated to achieving a balance between individual rights and social responsibilities, which emanates from the need to serve the common good.” [Amitai Etzioni. The New Normal: Finding a Balance between Individual Rights and the Common Good. New Brunswick, New Jersey: Transaction Publishers. 2015. Kindle edition.]
          “Clearly terrorists are human beings, and as such they are entitled to some basic rights, for instance not to be tortured and not to be held indefinitely without being charged. However it does not follow that they are entitled to the same rights as an American citizen who never lifted his hand against his country. They are best treated as a category in and of themselves.…
          “Terrorists are surely entitled to basic human rights, as are all human beings. However, we cannot allow them full access to all the evidence against them, which criminals are entitled to, without creating unacceptable security risks.”
          [Amitai Etzioni, “Terrorists Are a Unique Breed.” The Huffington Post. August 19th, 2012.]
          “Communitarians stress that individuals do not merely have rights but also responsibilities, to each other and the common good. And the balance between rights and responsibilities must be adjusted over time, as either the normative systems tilt in one direction or the other (part of the general tendency of societies to require course correction) or the surrounding reality changes significantly. The period of decolonization was a period in which much stress was put on the value of independence, self-determination and hence sovereignty for the former colonies. But now, for reasons discussed above, there are strong reasons to treat nations as citizens of the world and expect them to assume more responsibilities for preserving the international order and promoting the common good. Curbing transnational terrorism ranks high on both these lists.” [Amitai Etzioni, “A Liberal Communitarian Paradigm for Counterterrorism.” Stanford Journal of International Law. Volume 49, issue 2, June 2013. Pages 330-370.]
          “If we are to have a more decent world, you and I must actively advance Communitarian ideas and ideals across neighbors’ fences, in town hall meetings, in political debates, during call-in radio shows, and, above all, in our own lives. At issue is how to take care of our children, what we should ask of teachers in school (even if our children graduated long ago or if we do not have any), and what we can reasonably and fairly ask of other members of our neighborhood and what they can ask of us.” [Amitai Etzioni. The Spirit of Community: Rights, Responsibilities, and the Communitarian Agenda. New York: Crown Publishers, Inc. 1993. Kindle edition.]
          “… [One observes] that both frayed bonds and tightly knit ones are incompatible with basic human needs; that social bonds are essential for human well-being, but only if they remain rather slack; and that one attribute of a good society is that it is one in which strong communal bonds are balanced by powerful protections of self. Such a society is not simply communal, but also firmly upholds both social ties and autonomy, social order and liberty. Thus, different societies may need to move in opposite directions—to approach the same point of balance. For example, some societies must shore up their weakened social bonds, while others must loosen them.” [Amitai Etzioni, “The Good Society.” Seattle Journal of Social Justice. Volume 1, issue 1, spring/summer 2002. Pages 83-96.]
          “… if the critics mean that the Third Way is indefinable or that it lacks a core, they are wrong. The Third Way takes for granted that the state is neither the problem nor the solution, that unfettered markets can cause much havoc and suffering, and that carefully contained markets can be powerful engines of economic growth and employment. Above all, it maintains that a society best relies on three pillars: a strong but lean government; a well-developed but encapsulated market; and a vibrant community. So far, all the societies that have adopted the Third Way – though they differ in how they combine the roles of state and market have neglected the third pillar. In my view, they will have to strengthen it if they are to make much further progress. I believe that, in the years to come, communities must shoulder an increasing share of social services, because they do it at lower cost to the public, and with greater humanity, than either the state or the market.” [Amitai Etzioni, “The road to the good society.” New Statesman. Volume 13, number 605, May 2000. Pages 25-27.]
          “Ever since I was a student in the early 1950s, I have been told that a world government is a dream of dewy-eyed idealists, a vision no serious person would pursue. To a certain extent, one exists now in the form of a coalition of nations organized by the United States in response to the events of September 11, 2001. I believe this will evolve further into what I call a Global Safety Authority (GSA), an authority run [imperialistically? – Foster’s comment] by the United States and its allies but encompassing most of the nations of the world. Such an authority—born out of antiterrorism initiatives in the United States and fueled by international agreements to facilitate world peace—would have as its core missions antiterrorism, deproliferation of weapons, and humanitarian intervention.” [Amitai Etzioni, “Forming a Global Authority: A World Government Response to Terrorism.” The Futurist. November-December, 2004. Pages 12-13.]
          “Communitarianism is one of the smallest philosophical schools, as indicated by the very small number of scholars who consider themselves as communitarians, by the relatively small number of academic articles and books published that employ this term each year, and by the number of citations. Communitarian ideas, however, have a long history, are found in different civilizations and bodies of religions, and are very widely followed. One finds strong communitarian elements in many modern and historical political and religious belief systems. They make appearances in both the Hebrew Bible (Old Testament) and the Christian New Testament such as in Acts where it is written that ‘the whole group of those who believed were of one heart and soul, and no one claimed private ownership of any possessions, but everything they owned was held in common.’” [Amitai Etzioni, “Communitarianism revisited.” Journal of Political Ideologies. Volume 19, number 3, 2014. Pages 241-260.]
          “This book argues that the neoclassical paradigm— that of a utilitarian-based version of radical individualism—needs to be integrated into one that is more encompassing. After outlining the differences in the core assumption between the prevailing neoclassical paradigm (most noted, in the groundwork for neoclassical economics) and an emerging deontological paradigm (that of the I&We charted here), the differences between the two paradigms are explored from social philosophic, ethical, epistological, historical, and methodological viewpoints. Finally, ways to synthesize the two paradigms are indicated.” [Amitai Etzioni. Moral Dimension: Toward a New Economics. New York: Free Press imprint of Simon & Schuster Inc. 1990. Page 1.]
          “Third Way societies recognize that the market is the best engine for production of goods and services, of work and thus jobs, of economic progress. Moreover, the private sector may foster innovation that adapts the economy to changing conditions and opportunities.
          “While much attention is properly paid to social problems created by market forces—factory closures, loss of job security, overwork in some industries and idleness in others—such problems should not blind us to the basic merit of strong economic growth. So, for example, rising international trade raises a host of problems concerning labor and environmental standards, but we should also recognize that trade, in the long run, benefits most societies and most members of society.”
          [Amitai Etzioni. The Third Way to a Good Society. London: Demos. 2000. Page 28.]
          “Criticisms of communitarianism, as well as the major changes commnunitarians have made as a result, are of import to many who may have little interest in social, philosophical, and academic disputes. The greatly altered communitarian position—call it neo-communitarianism—lays the foundation for an international legal framework that is significantly more comprehensive than the United Nations’ Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and for a normative framework that is more attentive to widely-held beliefs in the East and not just to those held mainly in the West. Such a framework, in turn, enhances the ability of nations that adhere to different values to find common grounds for agreement on a variety of policies, ranging from humanitarian interventions to fighting those terrorist groups with a ‘global reach,’ from combating epidemics to dealing with barriers to trade.…
          “A major sea change has taken place within communitarianism, which the above scholars have not taken into account. This change came about partly in response to their rights-centric critique, but also from an infusion of new voices into the debate by social philosophers, political theorists, and students of public policy—call them the neo-communitarians. The main way the resulting neo-communitarian position, at least the way I see it, differs from the old version, is that neo-communitarians take as their starting point that both the universal claims of human rights and the particularistic claims of communities have a strong moral standing.”
          [Amitai Etzioni, “A Neo-Communitarian Approach to International Relations: Rights and the Good.” Human Rights Review. Volume 7, issue 4, July–September 2006. Pages 69-80.]
          “Although responsive communitarianism’s starting point is the recognition that the tense relationship between autonomy and the common good must be worked out rather than assuming a priori that one of these core values trumps the other, the treatment should be expected to differ from one society to another and among different historical periods.” [Amitai Etzioni, “Authoritarian versus responsive communitarian bioethics.” Journal of Medical Ethics. Volume 37, number 1, January 2011. Pages 17-23.]
          “… communitarianism is as distinct from collectivism as it is from atomistic democracy. It is a third social theory.” [Clifford G. Christians, “Communitarianism: A Third Way.” Media Ethics. Volume 17, number 2, spring 2006. Pages 5-16.]
          “Old Communitarians are intolerant toward liberal values where they argue the opposite.…
          “In contrast, Neo-Communitarians are more flexible in their arguments and willing to blend liberal arguments together.”
          [Mohd Azizuddin Mohd Sani and Abubakar Eby Hara, “ASEAN Paradigm Shift from a State to People-Oriented Organization: A Neo-Communitarian Perspective.” Japanese Journal of Political Science. Volume 14, 3, 2013. Pages 379–394.]
          “First, doesn’t communitarianism license the majority to impose its views on minorities? On the contrary, responsive communities are consensual, not majoritarian, and dialogue is the means by which consensus develops. Second, isn’t communitarianism nostalgic? On the contrary, communitarian dialogue explains how communities respond creatively to historical change without coming apart and without succumbing to the rule of bureaucrats and experts.” [Jonathan Marks, “Moral Dialogue in the Thought of Amitai Etzioni.” The Good Society. Volume 14, number 1/2, 2005. Pages 15-18.]
          “… the adoption of a corporate governance framework, or particular language, appears to matter less than the way company members understand and agree their rights and responsibilities regarding participation. Based on this study, not all institutional arrangements in employee-owned companies are designed to accommodate diverse points of view, allow members to act congruently with their beliefs and participate equally in the institutions of governance. Nevertheless, the templates that will enable this are maturing quickly. In these two cases, both social and economic outcomes are being achieved while concurrently developing dominant positions in trading markets. For this reason, their respective approaches will be of interest to practitioners and policy makers in the social enterprise movement.” [Rory Ridley-Duff, “Communitarian governance in social enterprises: Case evidence from the Mondragon Cooperative Corporation and School Trends Ltd.” Social Enterprise Journal. Volume 6, issue 2, August 2010. Pages 125-145.]
          “American men, women, and children are members of many communities—families; neighborhoods; innumerable social, religious, ethnic, work place, and professional associations; and the body politic itself. Neither human existence nor individual liberty can be sustained for long outside the interdependent and overlapping communities to which all of us belong. Nor can any community long survive unless its members dedicate some of their attention, energy, and resources to shared projects. The exclusive pursuit of private interest erodes the network of social environments on which we all depend, and is destructive to our shared experiment in democratic self-government. For these reasons, we hold that the rights of individuals cannot long be preserved without a communitarian perspective.…
          “There is little sense in gun registration. What we need to significantly enhance public safety is domestic disarmament of the kind that exists in practically all democracies. The National Rifle Association suggestion that criminals not guns kill people, ignores the fact that thousands are killed each year, many of them children, from accidental discharge of guns, and that people—whether criminal, insane, or temporarily carried away by impulse—kill and are much more likely to do so when armed than when disarmed. The Second Amendment, behind which NRA [National Rifle Association] hides, is subject to a variety of interpretations, but the Supreme Court has repeatedly ruled, for over a hundred years, that it does not prevent laws that bar guns. We join with those who read the Second Amendment the way it was written, as a communitarian clause, calling for community militias, not individual gun slingers.”
          [“Responsive Communitarian Platform.” The Institute for Communitarian Policy Studies. January, 1991. Retrieved on April 2nd, 2016.]
          “Community … depends … on a shared sensibility, or sense of right—so that I can be confident that what I think is right is also what you think is right, which in turn means that I can be confident that you will act as I think is right when needed in the future. Thus the first task of community is to instill and enforce that shared sense of rightness in its members.
          “For this reason the community must penetrate into the personality of individuals and become part of their deepest motivations and values.”
          [Charles Heckscher. Trust in a Complex World: Enriching Community. Oxford, England, and New York: Oxford University Press. 2015. Page 6.]
          “Although the ‘Third Way’ has had many previous incarnations, the current version is generally said to have originated with the New Democrats and the [Bill] Clinton administration, from 1992 in the USA, and been taken up by [Tony] Blair’s New Labour Government in the UK. However, there remains widespread debate over whether the term is applicable only to the Anglo-Saxon ‘liberal’ welfare states of the UK and the USA, or whether it is meaningful for the ‘social democratic’ and ‘Christian democratic’ countries of continental Europe.…
          “… [Anthony] Giddens suggests a ‘Third Way programme’ including the new democratic state, active civil society, the democratic family, the new mixed economy, equality as inclusion, positive welfare and the social investment state.”
          [Armando Barrientos and Martin Powell, “The route map of the Third Way.” The Third Way and beyond: Criticisms, futures, alternatives. Sarah Hale, Will Leggett, and and Luke Martell, editors. Manchester, England, and New York: Manchester University Press. 2004. Pages 9-26.]
          “As presented by one of its [communitarianism’s] main champions, Amitai Etzioni, it is an attempt to restore moral order and to consolidate common goals with individual self-interest by emphasizing traditional concepts of education, family, and values …. Whatever the moral and political strengths or weaknesses of this doctrine, which has some links with the Third Way Socialism of Anthony Giddens and Tony Blair in the United Kingdom, the philosophical assessment of altruism within it is very difficult …. Etzioni seems to dislike the term ‘altruism’ in the first place. and he asserts that ‘the pursuit of self-interest can be balanced by a commitment to the community, without requiring us to lead a life of austerity, altruism, or self-sacrifice.’ …. In Giddens and Blair, it is not too easy to see if altruism in the sense of caring for others is a means to a thriving communal life, or communal life a means to increasing altruism.” [Tuija Takala and Matti Häyry, “Is Communitarian Thinking Altruistic?” Trames. Volume 8, issue 3, September 2004. Pages 276-283.]
          “The contested nature of community is … bound up with the distinction between liberal modern society as ‘a mass of separate individuals each pursuing his or her arbitrary and subjective ends’ and the communitarian notion of identity as socially constituted in the ‘shared understandings’ of communal existence …. From a liberal standpoint, community can be likened to an aggregation of self-interested, rights-oriented individuals …, as contrasted with the communitarian emphasis on communal experiences and the pursuit of a common good. [Amitai] Etzioni … has suggested that the authentic community concept represents a key aspect of ‘a good society’ and ‘a major antidote to alienation and tyranny.’” [Kenneth C. Bessant, “Authenticity, Community, and Modernity.” Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour. Volume 41, issue 1, 2010. Pages 2-32.]
          “[Amitai] Etzioni …, founder of the interdisciplinary Communitarian Network, has described the complex social and political tension between individual autonomy and social order. Psychologists and psychotherapists have traditionally supported an individualistic ethic of personal autonomy for many good reasons …, although the development of emancipatory communitarian approaches to social science … offers corrective potential for fostering the “I-We” balance ….” [Steven J. Sandage and Peter C. Hill, “The Virtues of Positive Psychology: the Rapprochement and Challenges of an Affirmative Postmodern Perspective.” Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour. Volume 31, issue 3, 2001. Pages 241-260.]
          “It [a confusion] exists as much among Muslims as among their fellow citizens and concerns the understanding of what Muslims mean by ‘the community of faith.’ … [L]et us remember that the community of faith imprints the heart of believers with the collective dimension of their belonging with regard to spirituality, practice, and solidarity; it does not justify taking up a passionate, chauvinistic, or blind stance. Higher ethical principles should inspire the behavior of individuals, sometimes even against their own coreligionists if they are untruthful, treacherous, unjust, or oppressive. Spiritual community is an allegiance to a body of principles and a morality, not to a community united by blood or self-interest. One gets involved in politics not in the name of ‘my people’ but before God and in conscience, in the name of inalienable principles. As a result, the community of faith is essentially opposed to any form of communitarianism.” [Tariq Ramadan. Western Muslims and the Future of Islam. Oxford, England, and New York: Oxford University Press. 2004. Pages 146-147.]
          “… emerging Muslim actors have often started to scrutinize unfair implementations of ideals of secular republicanism. In doing so, they have reconstructed an Islamic socio-political identity, conceived as a culturally autonomous basis for practising universal notions of citizenship and therefore for overcoming – when not explicitly opposing – ‘communitarianism’. Nevertheless, this Islamic bid for participatory democracy is the target of a vehement counter-critique that questions the real intentions of the critique and surmises a communitarian logic in disguise as its ideological engine.” [Armando Salvatore, “Authority in Question: Secularity, Republicanism and ‘Communitarianism’ in the Emerging Euro-Islamic Public Sphere.” Theory, Culture & Society. Volume 24, number 2, March 2007. Pages 135-160.]
          “Following [Marshall] Hodgson, one should … concretely ask whether the (at the time hegemonic) Islamic proto-modernity enshrined in the power and culture of the three modern ‘gunpowder empires’ (the Ottoman, the Safavid and the Mughal) was inadequate response to the ideal of societal autonomy, communitarian connectedness and civilizational interconnectedness that had been deployed within the Islamic ecumene during the middle periods, and why it could not match the development of a Westphalian type of modern sovereignty in Western Europe.” [Armando Salvatore, “Repositioning ‘Islamdom’: The Culture—Power Syndrome within a Transcivilizational Ecumene.” European Journal of Social Theory. Volume 13, number 1, February 2010. Pages 99-115.]
          “… Armando Salvatore … also recommends us to pay attention to the role of Muslim scholars and activists—such as iconic European Muslim leader Tariq Ramadan—in the development of a “Euro-Islamic public sphere”, notably since 1989 (connected with the headscarf affair in France and the Rushdie affair in Great Britain).” [Anne-Sophie Lamine, “Singular Pluralities: A Critical Review of Religious Pluralism.” Religion and Society: Advances in Research. Volume 4, issue 1, December 2013. Pages 150-166.]
          “As we have seen, people may reasonably disagree about the right as well as the good. They can differ in their views of private and public autonomy, and so propose different accounts of democracy and the procedural rights it entails. Indeed, communitarian and liberal views offer two such different accounts. Both involve democratic communication – they simply entail different conceptions of political communication to his.” [Richard Bellamy. Political Constitutionalism: A Republican Defence of the Constitutionality of Democracy. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press. 2007. Page 128.]
          “The Third Way, says Amitai Etzioni …, is a vague way to the ‘good society’ ideal, a way without fixed milestones, which societies build according to their specific characteristics and contexts. It is also a public philosophy that is based on two principles: first principle argues that there is a social definition of ‘good’ and the second one says that membership in different social groups is what gives meaning to existence and content to social identity. This road does not need an ideology or a doctrine because it will exceed the old left – right dichotomy that will become irrelevant and will be abandoned.” [Eugenia Udangiu, “Policy and the Narrative of the ‘Third Way.’” Revista de Ştiinţe Politice/Revue des Sciences Politiques. Issue 44, October 2014. Pages 94-102.]
          “In recent years … communitarianism has achieved unexpected political relevance. This has occurred, in part, because the movement undergirds a ‘third’ way of conceiving government and policy, beyond New Deal liberalism and [Ronald] Reagan-[George H. W.] Bush conservatism. of equal importance has been a decade-old confluence of multi-disciplinary, scholarly discussion and practical political experience in which citizens have demonstrated the power of collective, collaborative action. In academic circles, developments in sociology, law and political science have been of particular importance in the evolution of communitarian thinking.” [William A. Galston, “The promise of communitarianism.” National Civic Review. Volume 82, issue 3, summer 1993. Pages 217–220.]
          “Communitarians … argue that parents should forsake consumerism, personal advancement, and greed. Workplace reforms such as paid parental leave and flex schedules should be mandated. Additionally, communitarians propose making it more difficult for couples with children to divorce. Advocacy of an increased emphasis on moral education in the nation’s schools is another element of the communitarian message. Schools should ‘teach those values Americans share,’ such as ‘the values of civility, sharing, and responsibility to the common good.’” [David B. Kopel and Christopher C. Little, “Communitarians, Neorepublicans, and Guns: Assessing the Case for Firearms Prohibition.” Maryland Law Review. Volume 56, January 1997. Pages 438-554.]
          “Ever since President-elect Bill Clinton declared his candidacy for the Presidency 15 months ago, political journalists have noted important ‘communitarian’ strands in his public utterances.…
          “Further, Mr. Clinton’s running mate, Vice-President elect Al Gore, attended the first ‘communitarian teach-in’ held on Capitol Hill in November 1991, and his post-election victory speech was studded with communitarian themes, such as the links between citizens’ rights and responsibilities.”
          [William A. Galston, “Point of View: Clinton and the Promise of Communitarianism.” The Chronicle of Higher Education. Volume 39, number 15, December 1992. Page A52.]
          “The complaint here is that, ultimately, there is no consistency in the literature as to what communitarianism means. If it is simply a variant of liberalism, an attempt to reform it, it is one thing; if it is its antithesis, it is quite another. It certainly cannot be both, since we cannot have a little of two contradictory positions in the same scheme, unless we assume that all cultures contain a core set of liberal values, which is not so.” [Katerina Dalacoura, “A critique of communitarianism with reference to post-revolutionary Iran.” Review of International Studies. Volume 28, issue 01, January 2002. Pages 75-92.]
          “Notwithstanding the obvious appeal of the voluntary consensus model [responsive communitarianism], it is not a workable solution to the problems of pluralism. First, this model of voluntariness necessarily assumes that basic needs of members are met. People lacking necessities or struggling to maintain a minimally acceptable standard of living generally cannot afford the luxury of looking beyond their immediate survival. It also assumes that basic agreement on a set of core social values can be attained.… According to [Amitai] Etzioni, Americans do share a number of basic values, such as a substantive belief in democracy and a commitment to the Constitution, including its protection of rights and its structuring of decisionmaking power. The question remains, however, whether these values are in themselves sufficiently thick to promote mediation of moral conflict.” [Linda E. Fisher, “Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms: Autonomy, the Common Good, and the Courts.” Yale Law & Policy Review. Volume 18, issue 2, article 5, 1999. Pages 351-386.]
          “Does the inadequacy of [Amitai] Etzioni’s overall argumentation prove the hopelessness of his concerns? On the contrary, the concerns are well-grounded. What is more, his discussion begs for some solutions, the search for which must never be abandoned if one wants to stay true to one’s belief in human creativity. What I find in Etzioni’s theory is a picture of the divided self, though I cannot find there any obstacle to perceiving this self as striving for integration. The state of division does not need to be unchanging; the amounts of conflicting urges and calls might fluctuate, allowing the possibility of diminishing the conflict.” [Aneta Gawkowska, “Neutrality, Autonomy and Order: Amitai Etzioni’s Communitarian Critique of Liberalism Under Scrutiny.” A Decade of Transformation. Volume 8, 1999. Pages 1-34.]
          “Contemporary communitarianism does not constitute a united school. Nevertheless, its main proponents are agreed in rejecting the liberal account of the individual and society and the attempt to found a universal conception of justice or the good upon it. The communitarian critique focuses particularly on the ‘autonomous’ individual of liberal social theory, who is supposed to exist prior to, and independent of, social relations. We are essentially social beings. Our needs and desires, our ability to reason and choose, our very being and identity as moral selves, are formed only in and through our social relations and roles.” [Sean Sayers, “The value of community.” Radical Philosophy: Philosophical Journal of the Independent Left. Number 69, January/February 1995. Pages 2-4.]
          “‘No society can function well,’ writes Amitai Etzioni, ‘unless most of its members “behave” most of the time because they voluntarily heed their moral commitments and social responsibilities.’ The importance of strong families, caring neighbours, a flourishing sector of self-help groups, voluntary associations, churches, trade unions and social clubs, as well as a widespread sense of social membership to the healthy functioning of modern societies is now rarely disputed. The civic institutions of the family and neighbourhood are perceived by thinkers on the Right as a precondition for a sustainable welfare state, and by conservative traditionalists as the foundation for the formation of self-disciplined and dependable personalities. They are defended by civic conservatives, who recognize that effective free markets rely on and must contribute to strong moral and cultural institutions, and by ‘ethical philosophers’ who see the principle of duty as the bond of social cohesion that limits the need for a repressive state.” [Finn Bowring, “Communitarianism and Morality: In Search of the Subject.” New Left Review. Series I, number 222, March–April 1997. Pages 93-113.]
          “Keen to distance itself from both ‘Old’ Labour Left (pro-state, anti-market) and the Thatcherite Right (pro-market and anti-state), ‘new’ Labour has embraced a new, Third Way political philosophy …. While this contains a neo-liberal emphasis on the need to engage with the new ‘realities;’ of globalisation and embrace the market, choice and competition, it also adopts a neocommunitarian stance by stressing the strategic importance of civil society for social cohesion and economic vitality. Informed partly by the work of Amitai Etzioni …, this neo-communitarian emphasis on civil society has been crucial not only in providing Labour with the type of ‘post-Thatcherite edge it wants’ … but also in promoting the role of the third sector within Labour policy discourse.” [Nicholas R. Fyfe, “Making Space for ‘Neocommunitarianism’? The Third Sector, State and Civil Society in the UK.” Antipode: A Radical Journal of Geography. Volume 37, issue 3, June 2005. Pages 536-557.]
          “Policies are needed that ease the tension between workplace and parental responsibilities and relieve the time crunch now experienced by so many American families. Forty hours remains the official work-week norm, but too many middle-class families must put in many extra hours just to satisfy employer expectations and maintain life-style standards, while wage earners in lower-middle-class and working-poor families must frequently hold several jobs. The resulting time squeeze makes it more difficult for parents to properly discharge their responsibilities. It also pressures organizations that depend on volunteers—informal associations that have served families and communities. Families flourish in a solid communitarian environment; when community deteriorates, families suffer.” [Jean Bethke Elshtain, Enola Aird, Amitai Etzioni, William Galston, Mary Ann Glendon, and Martha Minow, “A communitarian position on the family.” Volume 82, issue 1, winter 1993. Pages 25-35.]
          “In order to correct the … imbalance between rights and responsibilities, communitarians worked out a four-point agenda: a moratorium on the minting of most, if not all, new rights; re-establishing the link between rights and responsibilities; recognizing that some responsibilities do not entail rights; and, most carefully, adjusting some rights to the changed circumstances.” [Jarmila Jurová, “Communitarian Moral Claims for Democracy.” Revista de Filosofía y Letras. Volume XVII, number 64, July–December 2013. Pages 1-8.]
          “Communitarianism is usefully contrasted with social democracy, which has succeeded in establishing a permanent presence alongside of and sometimes conjoined with liberal politics. Social democracy has its own intermittently fashionable critics, largely anarchist and libertarian in character. Since it sponsors certain sorts of communal identification, it is less subject to communitarian criticism than liberalism is. But it can never escape such criticism entirely, for liberals and social democrats alike share a commitment to economic growth and cope (although in different ways) with the deracinated social forms that growth produces. Community itself is largely an ideological presence in modern society; it has no recurrent critics of its own. It is intermittently fashionable only because it no longer exists in anything like full strength, and it is criticized only when it is fashionable.” [Michael Walzner, “The Communitarian Critique of Liberalism.” Political Theory. Volume 18, number 1, February 1990. Pages 6-23.]
       2. communitarian economics (Ian Gough, Norman Garfinkle, William Galston, and Amitai Etzioni): They develop an approach to economics using Etzioni’s responsive communitarianism.
          “… there is the idea of communism held by radical socialist thinkers such as [Karl] Marx, [William] Morris, and [Pyotr Alexeyevich ‘Peter’] Kropotkin …. This idea has been revived in the last three decades in response partly to the belief that developments within capitalism are laying the foundations for communitarian economic relationships ….
          “… a moral solidaristic community could prioritize the production of need satisfiers, distribute them according to urgency of need, and reorder interpersonal relations to develop gender equality and more effective need transformation. In this way, collective needs can be asserted over individual wants as the dominant goal of a communitarian economy.…
          “This … form of economy has been conceptualized as … a ‘democratic communitarian’ third way ….”
          [Ian Gough, “Economic Institutions and the Satisfaction of Human Needs.” Journal of Economic Issues. Volume 28, number 1, March 1994. Pages 25-66.]
          “Communitarian philosophy provides a value-centered guide to defining society’s common goals. Communitarian philosophy holds a centrist position on the social order that mediates between totalitarianism and libertarianism. Totalitarianism argues that the collectivity in the form of the nation state has superior needs and objectives and that individuals exist only to serve these collective needs. Libertarianism argues that the autonomous individual stands at the center of the philosophic universe, and the larger community can make no legitimate demands on the individual except those necessary to maintain civil order. Communitarians seek to mediate the tension between these two forces of extreme autonomy and extreme centralized authority based upon their understanding that societies remain healthy only so long as they effectively provide a balance between the centrifugal forces of autonomy and the centripetal force of centralized authority.
          “Communitarian economics insists that economic policies depend critically on the common purposes to be achieved. These common purposes must be founded on the core values of the citizens of the community. Today, political and economic decision structures are national rather than global in scope: For this reason, questions of economic policy must initially be examined on a country-by-country basis. Accordingly, this discussion focuses largely on one country, the United States. It is hoped that the issues stated and conclusions suggested will have relevance not only to the United States, but also to other countries.”
          [Norman Garfinkle, “Communitarian Economics.” Journal of Socio-Economics. Volume 26, number 1, January 1997. Pages 1-24.]
          “The combination of communitarian budget deficit reduction and a back-to-work program rests squarely on our moral vision—a due regard for the capacities of our fellow-citizens and a responsibility to future generations. We reject the facile and evasive optimism of supply-side views, liberal and conservative. At the same time, we reject the spirit of uncompensated sacrifice characteristic of fiscal traditionalism. Budgetary balance makes sense only in the context of, and as a means to, an expanding economy with opportunity for all.
          “The stakes could not be higher. The social divisions of recent years can only intensify under the stress of continued economic stagnation. It is far from clear that American democracy itself can indefinitely survive the relentless constriction of opportunity.”
          [William Galston and Amitai Etzioni, “Communitarian Economics: How to Cut the Deficit and Put America Back to Work.” Challenge. Volume35, number 6, November/December 1992. Pages 53-55.]
       3. communitarian realism (Nikolas K. Gvosdev as pronounced in this MP3 audio file): This interpretation of Amitai Etzioni’s responsive communitarianism is discussed, here, by Gvosdev, as a third way, and then examined and critiqued by Etzioni, Derek Mitchell, Fernando R. Tesón (MP3 audio file), and Toni Erskine.
          “… I believe that the communitarian emphasis on shared interests and norms as the basis for community, rather than force and coercion, provides the starting point for what might be termed ‘communitarian realism’—a foreign policy strategy that maintains that the emergence of a global community will come about through the voluntary coordination of the activities of nation-states to combat transnational threats. And a foreign policy approach that encourages the evolution of the current international order away from ‘coalitions of the willing’ dominated by a single major power to a ‘concert of powers’—where each state knows why it is involved, what it hopes to gain from membership, and what role it is expected to play—not only would produce a more stable world but also would lay the foundation for a lasting global community.” [Nikolas K. Gvosdev, “Communitarian Realism.” The American Behavioral Scientist. Volume 48, number 12, August 2005. Pages 1591-1606.]
          “The communitarian perspective on foreign affairs is … quite interesting as, just as in domestic policy, it posits a ‘third way’ between the traditional understanding of the international order as a ‘society of states’ and newer visions of a global cosmopolis with a hegemonic power in place as the arbiter or where nations somehow voluntarily accept the primacy of inter national law and institutions over domestic legislation and national governments.…
          “… I have termed [Amitai] Etzioni’s perspective in foreign policy as ‘communitarian realism’ – a foreign policy strategy that maintains that the emergence of a global community will come about through the voluntary coordination of the activities of nation-states to combat transnational threats.”
          [Nikolas K. Gvosdev, “Achieving a Global Community, Realistically.” The Good Society. Volume 14, number 3, 2005. Pages 10-14.]
          “[Nikolas K.] Gvosdev emphasizes that … [certain] forms of collaboration based on shared interests can serve as the means of building shared values and thus community. He terms this approach ‘communitarian realism’ and defines it as ‘a foreign policy strategy that main tains that the emergence of a global community will come about through the voluntary coordination of the activities of nation states to combat transnational threats.’ In contrast to neoconservatives who favor imposing US values by fiat and realists who hold to the supremacy of state sovereignty and national interest, communitarian realism argues that global community and supranational authorities will emerge from a convergence of national interests. However, Gvosdev concludes that although it is clear that nations do increasingly collaborate to face common threats, there is no guarantee that this will lead to the formation of community.…
          “Gvosdev is correct in pointing out the shortcomings of relying on shared interests to build global community and supranational authorities. Transnational moral dialogues must also be under taken to form the shared values and norms that undergird any form of a global community.”
          [Amitai Etzioni and Derek Mitchell, “Commentary on a Communitarian Approach to International Relations.” The Good Society. Volume 14, number 3, 2005. Pages 22-23.]
          “Communitarian realism has the virtue of rejecting the pure utilitarian approach to national interest described above. It recognizes that there may be higher principles that are not honored or appreciated by the majority of members of the community at a given historical moment. By refusing to base foreign policy on whatever the citizens of the state happen to prefer at a given time, or on their self-interest, communitarian realism can be seen as an attempt to instill morality into international relations. In many instances the analysis will be intuitively appealing. For example, an argument against the C.I.A.’s involvement in the overthrow of Chilean president Salvador Allende is that such action was incompatible with the principles embedded in the American tradition. For the United States to engage in that operation was inconsistent with the American tradition of respect for human rights and the will of the people.” [Fernando R. Tesón, “International Abductions, Low Intensity Conflicts, and State Sovereignty: A Moral Inquiry.” Columbia Journal of Transnational Law. Volume 31, 1994. Pages 551-596.]
          “Communitarian realism … shares with the human rights approach its foundational quality. For communitarian realism, … there are principles that trump the pursuit of actual interest. However, despite its antiutilitarian, foundational approach, communitarian realism is untenable for two reasons. The first is common to realism generally and has already been mentioned: indifference to human rights. In fact, by postulating some national interest over and above the actual preferences of citizens, this version of realism is far more dangerous, and (in spite of its current vogue) even less appealing than utilitarian realism, because it is too close to the spurious and destructive themes of nationalism.” [Fernando R. Tesón, “Realism and Kantianism in International Law.” Proceedings of the Annual Meeting (American Society of International Law). Volume 86, April 1992. Pages 113-118.]
          “… although this position that I label ‘communitarian realism’ reflects the problematic move within normative IR [international relations] theory of equating the idea of the morally constitutive community with the state, it is not intended to be representative of a single ‘communitarian’ position in IR theory. Rather, it is meant to provide a useful foil for both impartialist and ‘embedded’ ethical cosmopolitan positions.” [Toni Erskine, “‘Citizen of nowhere’ or ‘the point where circles intersect’? Impartialist and embedded cosmopolitanisms.” Review of International Studies. Volume 28, issue 03, July 2002. Pages 457-478.]
          “The communitarian dimension of anti-cosmopolitanism has found expression in … what Toni Erskine has identified as ‘communitarian realism’ ….” [Richard Shapcott, “Anti-Cosmopolitanism, Pluralism and the Cosmopolitan Harm Principle.” Review of International Studies. Volume 34, number 2, April 2008. Pages 185-205.]
          “In IPT [International Political Theory], communitarianism treats ‘community’ and ‘the state’ synonymously, while Political theory would not make such an assumption. The state-centric character of communitarianism in IPT has led to the introduction of the term ‘communitarian realism’ in order to distinguish the concept from its political theory counterpart ([Toni] Erskine …).” ]Simon Koschut, “Regional order and peaceful change: Security communities as a via media in international relations theory.” Cooperation and Conflict. Volume 49, number 4, 2014. Pages 519-535.]
          “[Toni] Erskine claims to bring situatedness, embeddedness and embodiedness into her account of cosmopolitanism, but she eschews a material understanding of the last two of these three terms. This, I think, prevents her from linking the source and the nature of cosmopolitan obligation in the compelling way I believe thick cosmopolitanism is able to do.” [Andrew Dobson, “Thick Cosmopolitanism.” Political Studies. Volume 54, issue 1, March 2006. Pages 165-184.]
       4. democratic communitarianism (Robert N. Bellah): Bellah proposes “that the function of the market and the state is to serve us, not to dominate us.”
          “One approach [to truth] is to continue the search for a third way that will overcome the defects of modernity, reassert some of the virtues of traditional society but neither reject the achievements of modern reason nor reassert the oppressive features of traditional society.… Does this mean that Christians should exclude themselves from the search for a viable alternative to the self-destructiveness that seems endemic in modern society? Not at all, but it probably does mean that Christians should devote themselves to that search with caution and detachment, not forgetting that in even the best of societies we will be as strangers and wayfarers. Such an attitude may provide just the reservation against total commitment that could help future efforts to find a third way from becoming as idolatrous and destructive as past ones.” [Robert N. Bellah, “Biblical Religion and Social Science in the Modern World.” National Institute for Campus Ministries Journal. Volume 6, number 3, 1981. Pages 8-22.]
          “I want to sketch a framework that escapes the ideological blinders of current American politics and highlights what is missing in much of our debate. As opposed to free market conservatism and welfare state liberalism, I want to describe another approach to our common problems which I will call … democratic communitarianism. Democratic communitarianism does not pit itself against the two reigning ideologies as a third way. It accepts the value and inevitability of both the market and the state, but it insists that the function of the market and the state is to serve us, not to dominate us. Democratic communitarianism seeks to provide a humane context within which to think about the market and the state. Its first principle is the one already enunciated in what I have said about community: it seeks to define and further the good which is the community’s purpose.” [Robert N. Bellah, “Community Properly Understood: A Defense of ‘Democratic Communitarianism.’” The Responsive Community. Volume 6, issue 1, winter 1995/1996. Pages 49-54.]
          “As we pointed out in the preface to The Good Society, if communitarianism means opposition to the neocapitalist agenda and to a theoretical liberalism for which autonomy is almost the only virtue, then we are communitarians. But if it means a primary emphasis on small-scale and face-to-face face relations, with the nineteenth-century small town as its exemplar, we are not communitarians. As we argued in The Good Society and reiterate here, only effective institutions—economic, political, and social—make complex modern societies livable.” [Robert N. Bellah, Richard Madsen, William M. Sullivan, Ann Swidler, and Steven M. Tipton. Habits of the Heart: Individualism and Commitment in American Life. Updated edition. Berkeley, California: University of California Press. 1996. Kindle edition.]
          “If philosophical liberals are those who believe that all our problems can be solved by autonomous individuals, a market economy, and a procedural state, whereas communitarians believe that more substantive ethical identities and a more active participation in a democratic polity are necessary for the functioning of any decent society, then we are indeed communitarians. But we feel that the word ‘communitarian’ runs the risk of being misunderstood if one imagines that only face-to-face groups—families, congregations, neighborhoods—are communities and that communitarians are opposed to the state, the economy, and all the larger structures that so largely dominate our life today. Indeed, it is our sense that only greater citizen participation in the large structures of the economy and the state will enable us to surmount the deepening problems of contemporary social life. In order not to be misunderstood, we are reaching back into the earlier twentieth century for terminology that will put the issues in terms that are helpful.” [Robert N. Bellah, Richard Madsen, Steven M. Tipton, William Sullivan, and Ann Swidler. The Good Society. New York: Vintage Books imprint of Randon House, Inc. 1992. Page 4.]
          “In Habits of the Heart … we offered a portrait of middle-class Americans and of the cultural resources they have for making sense of their society and their lives. We described a language of individualistic achievement and self-fulfillment that often seems to make it difficult for people to sustain their commitments to others, either in intimate relationships or in the public sphere. We held up older traditions, biblical and civic republican, that had a better grasp on the truth that the individual is realized only in and through community; but we showed that contemporary Americans have difficulty understanding those traditions today or seeing how they apply to their lives. We called for a deeper understanding of the moral ecology that sustains the lives of all of us, even when we think we are making it on our own.” [Robert Bellah, Richard Madsen, William Sullivan, Ann Swidler, and Steven Tipton, “‘The Good Society’: Shaping the Institutions that Shape Us.” Commonweal. July 12th, 1991. Pages 425-429.]
          “The establishment view of religion in American universities today is what I have called ‘enlightenment fundamentalism.’ This is the view that science and historical scholarship have effectively disposed of fallacious religious beliefs. If the study of religion has any place in the university at all, which is doubtful to enlightenment fundamentalists, it is to disclose the true reasons why religious believers have been so misguided.…
          “Finally, let me say that teaching religion in a way that tries to respond to the current cultural crisis is itself a kind of religious discipline. For how can one try to integrate culture if one does not also try to integrate oneself?”
          [Robert N. Bellah, “Confessions of a Former Establishment Fundamentalist.” Bulletin of the Council on the Study of Religion. Volume I, number 3, December 1970. Pages 3-6.]
       5. critical theory of world risk society, new critical theory with a cosmopolitan intent, new critical theory of social inequalities, and new global political economy (Ulrich Beck as pronounced in this MP3 audio file): Beck (1944–2015), a German sociologist, focused upon the establishment of a cosmopolitan civil society and social justice through the reduction of risks to human well-being.
          “A critical theory of world risk society must address at least three questions: (1) What is the basis of the critique? What is ‘critical’ about this critical theory? (The question of the normative horizon of the world risk society) (2)What are the key theses and core arguments of this theory? Is it an empirical theory of society with critical intent? (3) To what extent does this theory break with the automatisms of modernization and globalization which have taken on a life of their own and rediscover the openness of human action to the future at the beginning of the 21ˢᵗ century political perspectives, cosmopolitan alternatives? …
          “I hardly need to underline that I am always concerned with just one, not ‘the,’ critical theory, namely, that based on the theory of the world risk society. This already alludes to the limits of this critical theory. Here the perspective shifts from a descriptive to a normative outlook.…
          “… the critical theory of world risk society becomes at once realistic and critical; indeed, it becomes realistic because it is critical, and thus capable of distancing itself in a critical way from the cognitive structures of the national outlook which dominate social and political action. This kind of realistic critical theory does not hamper a realistic scientific sociology but first makes it possible.”
          [Ulrich Beck, “Critical Theory of World Risk Society: A Cosmopolitan Vision.” Constellations. Volume 16, number 1, 2009. Pages 3-22.]
          “Perhaps … nostalgia can be overcome by the theory of world risk society. My aim is a non-nostalgic New Critical Theory to look at both the past and the future of modernity. The word for this is neither ‘utopianism’ nor ‘pessimism’ but ‘ambivalence.’ Yes, there is a historic alternative of political action.” [Ulrich Beck, “The Cosmopolitan Condition: Why Methodological Nationalism Fails.” Theory, Culture & Society. Volume 24, issue 7–8, December 2007. Pages 286-290.]
          “… the political sociology and theory of the risk society is in essence cognitive sociology, not only the sociology of science, but in fact the sociology of all the admixtures, amalgams and agents of knowledge in their combination and opposition, their foundations, their claims, their mistakes, their irrationalities, their truth and in the impossibility of their knowing the knowledge they lay claim to. To summarize, the current crisis of the future is not visible, it is a possibility on the way to reality. But as just happens to be the case with possibilities: it is an imputation one hopes will not occur. The falsity of the claim thus lies in the intention of the prognosis. It is an invisible immiseration in the face of flourishing wealth, ultimately with global extent, but without a political subject. And yet: it is clearly and unambiguously an immiseration, if one looks correctly at both the similarities to and the differences from the nineteenth century. Alongside lists of casualties, pollutant balances and accident statistics, other indicators also speak in favor of the immiseration thesis.” [Ulrich Beck. Risk Society: Towards a New Modernity. Mark Ritter, translator. Thousand Oaks, California: SAGE Publications, Inc. 1992. Page 55.]
          “People remain indifferent to decisions as such. It is not until they begin to communicate with one another about the problematic consequences of decisions that they wake up. It is communication that shakes them out of their complacency and makes them worry. It shakes them out of their indifference, creating a public sphere and a potential community of action. I would put it this way: It is global risk—or, more precisely, the staging and the perception of global risk—that creates imagined communities across all kinds of boundaries. It is the reflexivity of world risk society that produces the reciprocal relation between the public sphere and globality.” [Ulrich Beck, “Cosmopolitanism as Imagined Communities of Global Risk.” American Behavioral Scientist. Volume 55, number 10, 2011. Pages 1346-1361.]
          “There is a nostalgia built into the foundations of European sociological thought, which has never disappeared. Perhaps, paradoxically, this nostalgia can be overcome with the theory of world risk society? My aim is a non-nostalgic, new critical theory to look at the past and the future of modernity. The words for this are neither ‘utopianism’ nor ‘pessimism’ but ‘irony’ and ‘ambivalence.’ Instead of an either/or, I am looking for a new both one thing and the other: a means of keeping the two contradictory views within us – self-destructiveness and the ability to begin anew – in balance with one another.” [Ulrich Beck, “Living in the world risk society: A Hobhouse Memorial Public Lecture given on Wednesday 15 February 2006 at the London School of Economics.” Economy and Society. Volume 35, number 3, August 2006. Pages 329-345.]
          “‘Risk society’ means that we live in a world out of control. There is nothing certain but uncertainty. But let’s go into details. The term ‘risk’ has two radically different meanings. It applies in the first place to a world governed entirely by the laws of probability, in which everything is measurable and calculable. But the word is also commonly used to refer to non-quantitative uncertainties, to ‘risks that cannot be known.’ When I speak about ‘risk society,’ it is in this latter sense of manufactured uncertainties. These ‘true’ uncertainties, enforced by rapid technological innovations and accelerated societal responses, are creating a fundamentally new global risk landscape. In all these new uncertain risk technologies, we are separated from the possible end results by an ocean of not knowing.” [Ulrich Beck in Joshua Yates, “An Interview with Ulrich Beck on Fear and Risk Society.” The Hedgehog Review. Fall 2001. Pages 96-107.]
          “The risk society thesis always encounters the objection: Have not endangerment and insecurity belonged to the human existence from its beginnings, in earlier ages seemingly more so then today (sickness, short life expectancies, wars, epidemics)? This is true, but according to a conventionally agreed distinction, this is not ‘risk,’ but a ‘threat.’ We can make the following distinction: risk is a modern concept, risk presupposes human decisions, humanly made futures (probability, technology, modernization). Risk-as-anticipation is the turning point for modern technology, as it has to embrace the future as an extended present. While the confidence in large-scale planning and regulation has proved deceptive, the concept of risk calls for an engagement with the future which is both less speculative and less careless, but opts for a political commitment to responsibility and accountability.” [Ulrich Beck, “World Risk Society and Manufactured Uncertainties.” IRIS: European Journal of Philosophy and Public Debate. Volume 1, number 2, October 2009. Pages 291-299.]
          “Modern society has become a risk society in the sense that it is increasingly occupied with debating, preventing and managing risks that it itself has produced. That may well be, many will object, but it is indicative rather of a hysteria and politics of fear instigated and aggravated by the mass media. On the contrary, would not someone looking at European societies from outside have to acknowledge that the risks which get us worked up are luxury risks, more than anything else? After all, our world appears a lot safer than that, say, of the war torn regions of Africa, Afghanistan or the Middle East. Are modern societies not distinguished precisely by the fact that to a large extent they have succeeded in bringing under control contingencies and uncertainties, for example with respect to accidents, violence and sickness?” [Ulrich Beck, “Risk Society’s ‘Cosmopolitan Moment.’” Lecture delivered at Harvard University. November 12th, 2008. Retrieved on May 30th, 2016.]
          “People remain indifferent to political decisions as such. It is not until they begin to communicate with one another about the problematic consequences of decisions that they wake up. It is this communication that shakes them out of their complacency and makes them worry. It shakes them out of their indifference, creating a public sphere and a potential collectivity of action. In our language, it is global risk – or, more precisely, the staging and the perception of global risk – that creates imagined collectivities across all kinds of boundaries. It is the reflexivity of world risk society that produces the reciprocal relationship between the public sphere and globality.” [Ulrich Beck, “Cosmopolitanized Nations: Reimagining Collectivity in World Risk Society.” Collège d’études mondiales, Fondation maison des sciences de l’homme. Working paper number 26, February 2013. Pages 1-24.]
          “The malaise is rooted in the fact that we have a Europe without Europeans. What is missing, the Europe of citizens, can only develop from below, out of civil society itself. This is why we need a voluntary European year for all. This voluntary European year offers its own answer to the question: what does Europe mean for individuals? It makes the active participation of individuals possible and in this way it establishes an often decidedly critical connection between one’s own life and action and the (as it seems to many) technocratic nirvana called Brussels.” [Ulrich Beck, “The European Crisis in the Context of Cosmopolitization.” New Literary History. Volume 43, number 4, autumn 2012. Pages 641-663 and 751.]
          “… social reality today is increasingly the reality of globalized modernity, characterized by the globalized freedom of movement of capital, the spread of communications and transport technologies, the establishment of global civil society movements, the emergence of global terrorist networks, etc.” [Ulrich Beck and Elisabeth Beck-Gernsheim, “Global Generations and the Trap of Methodological Nationalism for a Cosmopolitan Turn in the Sociology of Youth and Generation.” European Sociological Review. Volume 25, number 1, February 2009. Pages 25-36.]
          “… [A] model [of climate policy] is based on the realisation that, when taken seriously and thought through to its logical conclusions, climate change entails a political paradigm shift. Only a broad-based coalition that includes ‘old Europeans,’ eco-conscious Americans, underdeveloped countries, developing countries and civil society movements can win back national sovereignty in a world risk society that is ecologically fragile and vulnerable to terrorist threats. It is not a matter of undermining, let alone abolishing nation states. Rather, it is a matter of restoring to them the capacity to act effectively at all—together.” [Ulrich Beck, “Climate Change and Globalisation are Reinforcing Global Inequalities: High Time for a New Social Democratic Era.” Globalizations. Volume 5, number 1, March 2008. Pages 78-80.}
          “The terrorist attack was not a war, not a crime, and not even terrorism in the familiar sense. It was not a little bit of each of them and it was not all of them at the same time. No one has yet offered a satisfying answer to the simple question of what really happened. The implosion of the Twin Towers has been followed by an explosion of silence. If we don’t have the right concepts it might seem that silence is appropriate. But it isn’t. Because silence won’t stop the self-fulfilling prophecies of false ideas and concepts, for example, war. This is my thesis: the collapse of language that occurred on September 11ᵗʰ expresses our fundamental situation in the 21ˢᵗ century, of living in what I call ‘world risk society.’” [Ulrich Beck, “The Terrorist Threat: World Risk Society Revisited.” Theory, Culture & Society. Volume 19, number 4, August 2002. Pages 39-55.]
          “Twenty-five years ago in my book Risk Society (1986), I argued that there is an epochal shift from industrial to risk societies. The former were based upon industry and social class, upon welfare states and upon the distribution of various goods (as opposed to bads) organised and distributed through the state, especially of good health, extensive education, and equitable forms of social welfare.…
          “By contrast, the concept of risk society is based on the importance of bads. Risk societies involve the distribution of bads that now within and across various territories and are not confined within the borders of a single society. Nuclear radiation is a key example of this, but also financial risks, global warming, SARS [severe acute respiratory syndrome] and so forth. These risks cannot be confined to any geographic space nor to any current sector of time. Such risks thus cannot be insured against. They are uncontrolled and the consequences are incalculable.”
          [Ulrich Beck, “We do not live in an age of cosmopolitanism but in an age of cosmopolitisation: the ‘global other’ is in our midst.” Irish Journal of Sociology. Volume 19, number 1, 2011. Pages 16-34.]
          “In this article I want to focus on one central mode or figure of metamorphosis: the hidden emancipatory side effects of global risk.…
          “The hidden emancipatory side effects of Hurricane Katrina unfolded when it hit the coast of Louisiana on 29 August 2005. This is manifest in how the literature reflected on the event. Analysing the discourses around Katrina makes apparent a paradigm shift, in fact, a social catharsis, in that two formerly separate discourses came together: ecological challenges and the history of racism in the US.”
          [Ulrich Beck, “Emancipatory catastrophism: What does it mean to climate change and risk society?” Current Sociology. Volume 63, number 1, January 2015. Pages 75-88.]
          “I have sketched out three generational constellations: the transnational generation of equality and migration, the 9/11 generation of global terrorism and the Western insecure generation, united in decline. Each of those reflects specific sections of world risk society and correspondingly contradictory experiences and positions. They have a methodological point in common: They all no longer understand generation solely within the frame of the nation state and its conditions. They initiate – to put it at its most ambitious – a cosmopolitan turn and perspective in generational sociology.” [Ulrich Beck, “Global Generations in World Risk Society.” Revista CIDOB d’Afers Internacionals, No. 82–83, September 2008. Pages 203-216.]
          “The power of not investing capital exists everywhere. Globalization is not a choice. It is nobody’s rule. No one is in charge, no one started it, no one can stop it. It is a kind of organized irresponsibility. You keep looking for someone who is responsible, to whom you can complain. But there is nobody at the other end of the line, no e-mail address. The more the globalization discourse dominates all areas of life, the more powerful capital strategies become. But this still does not mean that managers are ruling the world. It is important to stress that the meta-power of withdrawing investments does not depend on managerial princes who actively pursue a political agenda. Rather, they happen to do ‘politics’ as a side effect. Their involvement is neither political nor nonpolitical. It is a kind of global sub-politics.
          “Two unseen consequences of this sub-political meta-power are remarkable. Until now, the rules of the game in world politics have been bloody and imperialistic. The new global meta-power is in its essence pacifist (though maybe not in its consequences). The power of global capitalism derives from potential nonconquest. Of course, global capital has to be localized somewhere and so it is imperialistic at the same time. But this is a kind of imperialism whose subjects, even if they don’t like it at all, vitally depend upon it.”
          [Ulrich Beck, “Redefining Power in the Global Age: Eight Theses.” Dissent. Volume 48, number 4, fall 2001. Pages 83-89.]
          “[My] line of argument coincides with a (somewhat crude) distinction between the epochs of ‘pre-industrial cultures,’ ‘industrial society,’ and ‘risk society.’ The typology (or more conventionally, set of hypotheses) [is] briefly sketched out [below:] ….”
          
          Diagram C
          [Ulrich Beck. Ecological Politics in an Age of Risk. Malden, Massachusetts: Blackwell Publishers Inc. 1995. Pages 72-73.]
          “… it is only by systematically alternating between the national and the cosmopolitan perspective that the big blind spots – and sources of error – present in the methodological nationalism of inequality research can be brought to light …. Only in the context of … a New Critical Theory of social inequalities can the fundamental asymmetry of perceptions of inequality that are bound up with the national outlook be revealed from both a social and a social scientific perspective. This illuminates the fact that the ‘legitimatory achievement’ of the nation-state lies in turning people’s attention exclusively towards domestic issues, thereby banishing global inequalities from the field of vision of the (relatively) privileged.” [Ulrich Beck. Power in the Global Age: A New Global Political Economy. Kathleen Cross, translator. Malden, Massachusetts: Polity Press. 2005. Wiley ebook edition.]
          “… the … blind spots – and sources of error – of methodological nationalism linked to research on inequality will only be recognizable by means of a systematic switch from the national to the cosmopolitan perspective. It is only within the framework of such a new critical theory of social inequality that the fundamental asymmetry of inequality perception – as embedded in the national viewpoint as well as in the social-science perspective – can be unraveled.…
          “In this new era, a new critical theory with a cosmopolitan intent plays a key role. It must break through the fixed walls of categories and research routines of the methodological nationalism used by social sciences, in order, for example, to shift the legitimatory role of the nation-state in the system of large equalities back into the field of vision. The established infranational maps of social inequalities are elegant, detailed, and generally thought to be sufficient to politically manage the potential agitation of the more privileged part of the world population.…
          “Finally, the new critical theory is also a self-critical theory. The cosmopolitan viewpoint first of all detects, linked to various realities, the chasms that threaten the beginning of the twenty-first century. The new critical theory investigates the contradictions, dilemmas, and unseen and unintended side-effects of a modernity which is becoming increasingly cosmopolitan and draws its critical power from the tension between political self-description and the observation of the social sciences.”
          [Ulrich Beck, “Toward a New Critical Theory with a Cosmopolitan Intent.” Constellations. Volume 10, number 4, 2003. Pages 453-468.]
          “One of the errors committed by methodological nationalism is that it has blinded large parts of political theory and political science to the transformation of politics in the second, cosmopolitan modernity. As a result, a number of things have been missed along the way, such as the political reflexivity of a society and a history open to the future; the fundamental experience of historicity, of double contingency, of change towards an open future characterized by a different kind of society, statehood and politics. Globalization makes global politics a necessity. But how can the role of politics be defined in the new global political economy? How can politics seize its opportunities? Who will decide on strategy? Who will win?” [Ulrich Beck. Power in the Global Age: A New Global Political Economy. Kathleen Cross, translator. Malden, Massachusetts: Polity Press. 2005. Wiley ebook edition.]
          “Cosmopolitanism must … entail a self-critique of one’s prejudices, as well as a confession and disclosure of one’s own epistemic standpoint. In this way, then cosmopolitanism is reflexive, to use [Ulrich] Beck’s terminology.” [Eduardo Mendieta, “From imperial to dialogical cosmopolitanism.” Ethics & Global Politics. Volume 2, number 3, 2009. Pages 241-258.]
          “The ‘risks’ of [Ulrich] Beck’s title [Risk Society: Towards a New Modernity] are in the first instance ecological: the unforeseeable and barely controllable consequences for human life of the scientific and technological revolutions. But more original than Beck’s somewhat rhetorical discussions of actual risks, ecological and other, is his re-reading of the process of modernisation and of the nature of ‘modernity’ itself. Here he offers a remarkable synthesis of changes taking place in many spheres – work, science, politics, class, and family – each of which manifests similar attributes of partially-realised rationality.” [Michael Rustin, “Incomplete Modernity: Ulrich Beck’s Risk Society. Radical Philosophy: Philosophical Journal of the Independent Left. Number 67, summer 1994. Pages 3-12.]
          “[Ulrich] Beck’s Risk Society, first published in Germany in 1986 and a major theoretical work of the last decades, did provide a possible basis for a new conception of modernity: ‘Risk may be defined as a systematic way of dealing with hazards and insecurities induced and introduced by modernization itself. Risks … are politically reflexive.’ This is an important societal conceptualization—risk being a key concept of economics—that also found a political resonance in environmental circles. However, the critical edge of Risk Society is blunted by two features: first, its basic blindness to what was happening on the right-of-centre of the political scale, the rise of right-wing liberal modernism “. Second, the specific institutional content of Beck’s ‘new,’ later ‘second,’ modernity—the demise of class, full employment, the nation-state; the ‘release’ of individuals from industrial institutions—lays his perceptive grasp of a changed time-frame open to charges of arbitrary selectivity, empirical unreliability, or both.” [Göran Therborn, “After Dialectics.” New Left Review. Series II, number 43, January–February 2007. Pages 63-114.]
          “In [now former British Prime Minister Tony] Blair’s ideal world, politics would eventually become redundant. As one of his close cabinet colleagues was later to remark, ‘depoliticizing of key decision-making is a vital element in bringing power closer to the people.’ At one level, this was a simple populist strategy—employing the rhetoric of ‘the people’ in order to suggest that there had been a radical break with past styles of government. At another, however, it gelled perfectly with the tenets of what were then seen as newly emerging schools of ‘governance’—and with the idea that ‘society is now sufficiently well organized through self-organizing networks that any attempts on the part of government to intervene will be ineffective and perhaps counterproductive.’ In this perspective, government no longer seeks to wield power or even exercise authority. Its relevance declines, while that of non-governmental institutions and practices increases. In Ulrich Beck’s terms, the dynamic moves from Politics, with a capital ‘P,’ to politics with a lower-case one, or to what he has called ‘subpolitics.’” [Peter Mair, “Ruling the Void?: The Hollowing of Western Democracy.” New Left Review. Series II, number 42, November–December 2006. Pages 25-51.]
          “… for some theorists, deindustrialization marked the end of unemployment as a political and conceptual tool. Among those arguing that we had reached the end of work was Ulrich Beck, the German theorist of neoliberalism’s risk society, who pointed to the shift from a ‘uniform system of lifelong full-time work organized in a single industrial location, with the radical alternative of unemployment, to a risk-fraught system of flexible, pluralized, decentralized underemployment, which, however, will possibly no longer raise the problem of … being completely without a paid job.’” [Michael Denning, “Wageless Life.” New Left Review. Series II, number 66, November–December 2010. Pages 79-97.]
          “In World at Risk … [Ulrich] Beck avers that ‘non-knowledge’ presents major challenges for institutions concerned with establishing and maintaining security. In circumstances of ‘not-knowing’, the state and security agencies have either to act swiftly or to monitor threat evolution on the basis of incomplete and possibly contradictory flows of information. According to Beck …, ‘institutional power holders are rendered accountable for making decisions in a miasma of imperfect information and incomplete knowledge.’ He posits that the mismatch between unpredictable manufactured uncertainties and the capacity of institutions to respond to them results in simulation of control as a mode of attempting to pacify fearful citizens.” [Gabe Mythen and Sandra Walklate, “Not knowing, emancipatory catastrophism and metamorphosis: Embracing the spirit of Ulrich Beck.” Security Dialogue. OnlineFirst edition. August, 2016. Pages 1-17.]
          “In much of [Ulrich] Beck’s writings he demonstrates a realist approach to risk. A risk, for him, is another word for a hazard or danger, and he claims that the ‘risks of modernization’ are ‘irreversible threats to the life of plants, animals, and human beings’ …. At many points he demonstrates anger at the ever-hazardous nature of life in late modernity, presenting an apocalyptic vision of how hazards and dangers may destroy humankind and other living creatures. This realist approach, however, is not consistently maintained throughout his work. In some parts of Beck’s writings, the social and cultural processes by which understandings and perceptions of risk are mediated are highlighted, and he thus demonstrates a ‘weak’ version of social constructionism.” [Deborah Lupton. Risk. London and New York: Routledge imprint of Taylor & Francis Group, an Informa PLC business. 2005. Pages 61-62.]
       6. critical theory without guarantees, utopian realism, and civil society as a self-generating mechanism of social solidarity (Anthony Giddens): These perspectives appear, in certain respects, to be replacements for his earlier structuration theory (which has, nonetheless, been continued by others). Informed by Ulrich Beck’s critical theory of world risk society, Giddens—a member of the British House of Lords and, like Beck, a sociologist—initiated the Third Way movement in the UK. There, Giddens inspired former UK Prime Minister Tony Blair and his “New Labour” movement in the British Labour Party. Somewhat less directly, the “Clintonian” Democratic Leadership Council (1985–2011), the Progressive Policy Institute, the New Democrat Network, and Third Way (a think tank) were influenced by Giddens’ and other third-way approaches in the U.S. Notably, he has a rather negative view of Amitai Etzioni’s responsive communitarianism. Giddens advocates, instead, for a civil society. The term, “critical theory without guarantees,” may be an allusion to the cultural studies scholar Stuart Hall’s article, “The Problem of Ideology—Marxism without Guarantees” (published in 1986).
          “What should a critical theory without guarantees look like in the late twentieth century? It must be sociologically sensitive—alert to the immanent institutional transformations which modernity constantly opens out to the future; it must be politically, indeed, geopolitically, tactical, in the sense of recognising that moral commitments and ‘good faith’ can themselves be potentially dangerous in a world of high-consequence risks; it must create models of the good society which are limited neither to the sphere of the nation-state nor to only one of the institutional dimensions of modernity; and it must recognise that emancipatory politics needs to be linked with life politics, or a politics of self-actualisation. By emancipatory politics, I mean radical engagements concerned with the liberation from inequality or servitude. If we see once and for all that history does not obey a master-slave dialectic, or that it only does so in some contexts and circumstances, we can recognise that emancipatory politics cannot be the only side of the story. Life politics refers to radical engagements which seek to further the possibilities of a fulfilling and satisfying life for all, and in respect of which there are no “others.” This is a version of the old distinction between ‘freedom from’ and ‘freedom to,’ but ‘freedom to’ has to be developed in the light of a framework of Utopian realism.” [Anthony Giddens. The Consequences of Modernity. Malden, Massachusetts: Polity Press. 1991. Pages 155-156.]
          “Responsibility is also the clue to agency. Today we must disavow providentialism – the idea that ‘human beings only set themselves such problems as they can resolve.’ With it, we have to discard the idea that there are agents sent to fulfil history’s purposes, including the metaphysical notion that history is ‘made’ by the dispossessed. Recognizing the irreducible character of risk means having a critical theory without guarantees. Yet this recognition is also a source of liberation. There is no single agent, group or movement that, as [Karl] Marx’s proletariat was supposed to do, can carry the hopes of humanity; but there are many points of political engagement which offer good cause for optimism.” [Anthony Giddens. Beyond Left and Right: The Future of Radical Politics. Malden, Massachusetts: Polity Press. 1994. Page 27.]
          “Utopian realism, such as I advocate it, is the characteristic outlook of a critical theory without guarantees. ‘Realism’ because such a critical theory, such a radical politics, has to grasp actual social processes to suggest ideas and strategies which have some purchase; ‘utopianism’ because in a social universe more and more pervaded by social reflexivity, in which possible futures are constantly not just balanced against the present but actively help constitute it, models of what could be the case can directly affect what comes to be the case. An outlook of utopian realism recognizes that ‘history’ cannot simply be ‘reflexively grasped’; yet this very recognition adds weight to the logic of utopian thought, since we no longer hold fast to the theorem that greater understanding of history means greater transparency of action and thus greater control over its course.” [Anthony Giddens. Beyond Left and Right: The Future of Radical Politics. Malden, Massachusetts: Polity Press. 1994. Pages 250-251.]
          “In what ways does this array of risks impinge upon lay trust in expert systems and feelings of ontological security? The baseline for analysis has to be the inevitability of living with dangers which are remote from the control not only of individuals, but also of large organisations, including states; and which are of high intensity and life-threatening for millions of human beings and potentially for the whole of humanity. The facts that these are not risks anyone chooses to run and that there are, in [Ulrich] Beck’s terms, no ‘others’ who could be held responsible, attacked, or blamed reinforce the sense of foreboding which so many have noted as a characteristic of the current age.…
          “The large majority of people do not spend much of their time, on a conscious level at least, worrying about nuclear war or about the other major hazards for which it may or may not be a metaphor. The need to get on with the more local practicalities of day-to-day life is no doubt one reason, but much more is involved psychologically.…
          “Low-probability high-consequence risks will not disappear in the modern world, although in an optimal scenario they could be minimised. Thus, were it to be the case that all existing nuclear weapons were done away with, no other weapons of comparable destructive force were invented, and no comparably catastrophic disturbances of socialised nature were to loom, a profile of global danger would still exist. For if it is accepted that the eradication of established technical knowledge could not be achieved, nuclear weaponry could be reconstructed at any point. Moreover, any major technological initiative could thoroughly disturb the overall orientation of global affairs. The juggernaut effect is inherent in modernity ….”
          [Anthony Giddens. The Consequences of Modernity. Malden, Massachusetts: Polity Press. 1991. Pages 131-133.]
          “Given that ‘scientific socialism’ is dead, we require precisely a new injection of utopianism if we are, as collective humanity, somehow to emerge unscathed from the turbulent and risky world into which modernity has launched us. Utopianism in this sense has to go beyond the dynamism already intrinsic to modernity: it has to envisage futures whose achievement is both contingent and highly risky. I call the conjunction of these characteristics utopian realism.
          “The principle of utopian realism can be applied to each of the several dimensions of modernity. Consider, first—to reverse the previous order—the case of military power and war. We live today in a world in which there is the constant application of industrial technology to the means of waging war, and in which the arms trade is diffusing first-world weaponry across the globe. Quite apart from nuclear weaponry, the destructive power of conventional armaments is now immense. Moreover, it is entirely possible that, at some point, weapons equivalent in their destructive power to nuclear arms, but cheap and easy to construct, will come available.…
          “… Yet the perspective of utopian realism would suggest that radical democratization, affecting many spheres of social life, and perhaps extending right up to the global level, can be achieved.…
          “World government, in some form or another, forms part of the scenario of utopian realism in this sphere. Whether or not some form of global super-state emerges, from a utopian point of view it is essential that states and other organizations collaborate to resolve issues that in previous ems might have been approached in a more fragmented or divisive way.”
          [Anthony Giddens, “Modernity and utopia.” New Statesman & Society. Volume 3, number 125, November 1990. Pages 20-22.]
          “Its [Law’s] connection with democracy is close. Democracy, however, is not enough. This is why I develop the notion of utopian realism and make a distinction between emancipatory and life politics. These emancipatory anticipations of a social order beyond modernity need to be complemented by life – that is, political questions. Democracy provides a framework for decision-making, but it does not supply the criteria in terms of which these decisions are formulated. Life politics is a largely new domain of ethical debate, in which the old issue of classicial philosophy, ‘How shall I live?’ becomes itself open to discourse, against the backdrop of transformations affecting nature, the self and the global community.” [Anthony Giddens, “Modernity, History, Democracy.” Theory and Society. Volume 22, number 2, April 1993. Pages 289-292.]
          “It is not just people like Nick Leeson, not just the new financial entrepreneurs, who live at the barbaric outer edge of modern technology. All of us now do – and I would take this to be the defining characteristic of what Ulrich Beck calls risk society. A risk society is a society where we increasingly live on a high technological frontier which absolutely no one completely understands and which generates a diversity of possible futures. The origins of risk society can be traced to two fundamental transformations which are affecting our lives today. Each is connected to the increasing influence of science and technology, although not wholly determined by them. The first transformation can be called the end of nature; and the second the end of tradition.” [Anthony Giddens, “Risk and Responsibility.” The Modern Law Review. Volume 62, number 1, January 1999. Pages 1-10.]
          “The overall aim of third way politics should be to help citizens pilot their way through the major revolutions of our time: globalization, transformations in personal life and our relationship to nature. Third way politics should take a positive attitude towards globalization – but, crucially, only as a phenomenon ranging much more widely than the global marketplace.…
          “Third way politics should preserve a core concern with social justice, while accepting that the range of questions which escape the left/ right divide is greater than before. Equality and individual freedom may conflict, but egalitarian measures also often increase the range of freedoms open to individuals. Freedom to social democrats should mean autonomy of action, which in turn demands the involvement of the wider social community. Having abandoned collectivism, third way politics looks for a new relationship between the individual and the community, a redefinition of rights and obligations.
          “Opportunity and innovation are the positive side of risk. No one can escape risk, of course, but there is a basic difference between the passive experience of risk and the active exploration of risk environments. A positive engagement with risk is a necessary component of social and economic mobilization. Some risks we wish to minimize as far as possible; others, such as those involved in investment decisions, are a positive and inevitable part of a successful market economy.
          “Risk isn’t exactly the same as danger. Risk refers to dangers we seek actively to confront and assess. In a society such as ours, oriented towards the future and saturated with information, the theme of risk unites many otherwise disparate areas of politics: welfare state reform, engagement with world financial markets, responses to technological change, ecological problems and geopolitical transformations. We all need protection against risk, but also the capability to confront and take risks in a productive fashion.…
          “One might suggest as a prime motto for the new politics, no rights without responsibilities. Government has a whole cluster of responsibilities for its citizens and others, including the protection of the vulnerable. Old-style social democracy, however, was inclined to treat rights as unconditional claims. With expanding individualism should come an extension of individual obligations.”
          [Anthony Giddens. The Third Way: The Renewal of Social Democracy. Malden, Massachusetts: Polity Press. 1998. Pages 63-65.]
          “Disenchantment with neoliberal policies, plus the problems of governability just referred to, were factors leading to the rise of communitarian thinking over recent years. According to communitarians, the consolidating of communities, and of civil society as a whole, are to overcome the social disintegration brought about by the dominance of the marketplace.…
          “Communitarianism … has its problems, well established in the now extensive literature to which it has given rise. The term ‘community’ does too much work in communitarian theory: a society or a nation, for example, is only a community in an elliptical sense. Moreover, if they become too strong, communities breed identity politics, and with it the potential for social division, or even disintegration. Even in its milder forms, identity politics tends to be exclusivist, and difficult to reconcile with the principles of tolerance and diversity upon which an effective civil society depends. Hence it is to civil society more generally, rather than to ‘the community,’ that we should turn as an essential element of third way politics.”
          [Anthony Giddens. The Third Way and its Critics. Malden, Massachusetts: Polity Press. 2000. Pages 50-51.]
          “The thesis of the minimal state is closely bound up with a distinctive view of civil society as a self-generating mechanism of social solidarity. The little platoons of civil society must be allowed to flourish, and will do so if unhampered by state intervention. The virtues of civil society, if left to its own devices, are said to include ‘Good character, honesty, duty, self-sacrifice, honour, service, self-discipline, toleration, respect, justice, self-improvement, trust, civility, fortitude, courage, integrity, diligence, patriotism, consideration for others, thrift and reverence.’” [Anthony Giddens. The Third Way: The Renewal of Social Democracy. Malden, Massachusetts: Polity Press. 1998. Pages 11-12.]
          “The communitarians of today look forward rather than back, and in the US counterpose their views to those of liberal individualism, but the idea of defending community is as old as modernity itself. Communitarianism isn’t the way to go for New Labour, a supposedly modernising party—just as it hasn’t proved to be of much help to beleaguered Bill Clinton.” [Anthony Giddens, “What’s he up to?” New Statesman & Society. Volume 8, number 341, February (24th) 1995. Pages 21-23.]
          “In propagating the idea of the ‘big society,’ the Conservatives are drawing upon the same communitarian traditions that Tony Blair also endorsed. Naturally, they may retreat from these emphases, but at the moment they look genuine.” [Anthony Giddens, “The rise and fall of New Labour.” New Statesman. May 17th, 2010. Pages 25-27.]
          “Not all forms of communitarianism are authoritarian – no one could conceivably say such a thing, for example of the ‘philosophical communitarianism’ of Charles Taylor. Yet the authoritarian tinge of the more primitive versions advanced by Amitai Etzioni and others is plain to see. Strong communities, duties, obligations – this is the traditional stuff of conservatism, not socialism. Ms [Anna] Coote is right to say that there is a tension between individual freedom or empowerment and strong communities.” [Anthony Giddens, “Communitarians, authoritarians and nonconformists.” The Independent. Newspaper. Page 16. Retrieved on April 29th, 2016.]
          “… [Anthony] Giddens’ utopia is neither a fine-grained portrayal of an ideal society nor a detailed blueprint to realize one. On the other hand, it does invite consideration of the need for and content of a new form of social democracy, thus satisfying the visionary qualities ordinarily associated with applications of the utopian imagination.…
          “… Giddens is anxious to avoid the charge that what he is proposing is realizable by definition. Instead, what he offers is ‘a critical theory [of society] without guarantees’ …—that is to say, a radical thesis about the nature and future of political economy which is critically insightful, but without entailing historical inevitability. Thus, in contrast to classical Marxist utopianism, Giddens’ less deterministic conception of the future eschews intrinsic solutions. Nor does it propose any social force, least of all the organized working class, as the inherent bearer of a better society. On the contrary, in the latter connection, Giddens cautions us from thinking that any group today ‘has a monopoly over radical thought or action in a post-traditional social universe’ … where life for the majority is no longer constructed against the backdrop of a single grand narrative, but rather invented as a means to its own ends.”
          [David Halpin. Hope and Education: The Role of the Utopian Imagination. London and New York: RoutledgeFalmer imprint of Taylor & Francis Group, an Informa PLC business. 2003. Pages 63-64.]
          “… [A] theoretically ambitious … [work] is that of Anthony Giddens [Beyond Left and Right: The Future of Radical Politics]. It is a prolegomenon to a political programme, somewhere between a theoretical framework and the specific policies it might generate. ‘A Future for Post-Socialism,’ one might say. This book was originally announced in 1981 under the title ‘Between Capitalism and Socialism.’ It was going then to combine the project of realizing still-valid socialist ideals with confronting the ‘absences’ in Marxism and in actually-existing socialism: the role of violence, military power, ethnic and sexual exploitation. But Giddens’s thinking has moved on. Now he says socialism is virtually moribund and looks to a post-socialist and post-capitalist perspective, as if the enemies confronted by these old ideologies have vanished into thin air, or, more precisely, into cyberspace.” [Michael Rustin, “The future of post-socialism.” Radical Philosophy: Philosophical Journal of the Independent Left. Number 74, November/December 1995. Pages 17-27.]
          “[Bill] Clinton’s and [Al] Gore’s new Third Way … took shape shortly before Clinton’s candidacy for the US presidency was conceived. Their Third Way was the brainchild of the New Democrats making up the Democratic Leadership Council (DLC) ….” [Teresa Brennan, “Which Third Way?” Thesis Eleven. Number 64, February 2001. Pages 39-64.]
          “In the pages that follow, we will consider some of the implications of what is known about the emotional and cognitive development of children. We will explore both big and bite-sized ideas we can put to work in our homes, schools, hospitals, businesses, media, churches, and governments to do a better job raising our own children, even when the odds seem weighted against us. Above all, we will learn ways to come together as a village to support and strengthen one another’s families and our own. Most of these lessons are simple, and some may seem self-evident. But it’s apparent that many of us have yet to learn them or to apply them in our families and communities.” [Hillary Rodham Clinton. It Takes a Village. New York: Simon & Schuster. 2006. Pages 10-12.]
          “For Bill [Clinton] and me, there has been no experience more challenging, more rewarding and more humbling than raising our daughter. And we have learned that to raise a happy, healthy, and hopeful child, it takes a family. It takes teachers. It takes clergy.
          “It takes business people. It takes community leaders. It takes those who protect our health and safety. It takes all of us. Yes, it takes a village. And it takes a President.
          “It takes a President who believes not only in the potential of his own child, but of all children, who believes not only in the strength of his own family, but of the American family who believes not only in the promise of each of us as individuals, but in our promise together as a nation.
          “It takes a President who not only holds these beliefs, but acts on them. It takes Bill Clinton.”
          [Hillary Rodham Clinton, “It Takes a Village.” Address to the Democratic National Convention. United Center. Chicago, Illinois. August 27th, 1996.]
          “We can make market forces work better for the poor if we can develop a more creative capitalism—if we can stretch the reach of market forces so that more people can make a profit, or at least make a living, serving people who are suffering from the worst inequities. We also can press governments around the world to spend taxpayer money in ways that better reflect the values of the people who pay the taxes.
          “If we can find approaches that meet the needs of the poor in ways that generate profits for business and votes for politicians, we will have found a sustainable way to reduce inequity in the world.
          “This task is open-ended. It can never be finished. But a conscious effort to answer this challenge will change the world.”
          [Bill Clinton. Giving: How Each of Us Can Change the World. New York: Alfred A. Knopf imprint of Random House, Inc. 2007. Pages 28-29.]
          “The election night of 1 May [1997] had passed in a riot of celebration, exhilaration and expectation. History was not so much being made as jumping up and down and dancing. Eighteen years of Conservative government had ended. Labour – New Labour – had won by a landslide. It felt as if a fresh era was beginning. As I walked through the iron gates into Downing Street, and as the crowd – carefully assembled, carefully managed – pressed forward in enthusiasm, despite the setting, the managing and the fatigue of being up all night, I could feel the emotion like a charge. It ran not just through the crowd but through the country. It affected everyone, lifting them up, giving them hope, making them believe all things were possible, that by the very act of election and the spirit surrounding it, the world could be changed.” [Tony Blair. A Journey: My Political Life. London: The Random House Group Limited. 2010. Ebook edition.]
          “My principal reflection is not about ‘blaming’ anyone. It is that the relationship between politics, public life and the media is changing as a result of the changing context of communication in which we all operate; no one is at fault—it is a fact; but it is my view that the effect of this change is seriously adverse to the way public life is conducted; and that we need, at the least, a proper and considered debate about how we manage the future, in which it is in all our interests that the public is properly and accurately informed.” [Tony Blair, “Tony Blair’s ‘Media’ Speech: The Prime Minister’s Reuters Speech on Public Life.” The Political Quarterly. Volume 78, number 4, October–December 2007. Pages 476-487.]
          “New Labour’s ‘Third Way’ in welfare derives its intellectual underpinning from ‘risk society’ theory as developed in the UK by Anthony Giddens.… The risk society thesis is class ideology masquerading as social theory: it serves the interests of those already privileged in a more flexible society by obscuring the needs and aspirations of the more vulnerable, who already bear most of the burdens of social change.…
          “The “Third Way” is based on a particular theory about what governments in the modern world can and should do for the welfare of citizens. Recent path-breaking work by Anthony Giddens develops a theory of the role of government based on an analysis of ‘risk society.’ The theory is an idealism that understands social change essentially in terms of the ideas and values of members of society. It envisages the transition to risk society as bound up with a shared experience that affects all members of society in the same way and has a common effect on attitudes and assumptions, including expectations of government. It is a value-consensus theory.”
          [Peter Taylor-Gooby, “Risk, Contingency and the Third Way: Evidence from the BHPS and Qualitative Studies.” Social Policy & Administration. Volume 35, issue 2, May 2001. Pages 195-211.]
          “It is well known that it were first of all sociologists Anthony Giddens and Ulrich Beck who articulated the paradigm of the ‘Third Way’ and ‘Risk Society’ in the 1990’s, striving to provide a theoretical basis for the revision of practical activeity of social democratic parties confronted with neo-liberal attacks of conservative parties on the heritage of the so called welfare states. In a nutshell, the pioneers of the ‘Third Way’ and ‘Risk Society’ recommended the combination of the dynamism of the market competition pleaded for by the political ‘Right’, and social justice and solidarity pleaded for by the political ‘Left’, trying to avoid the excesses of both the free market and the state socialism.” [Vera Vratuša, “Where does the ‘Third Way’ Lead.” Социолошки преглед/Sociološki pregled/Sociological Review. Volume XLIV, number 1, 2010. Pages 119-137.]
          “Put at its most basic the Third Way is something different and distinct from liberal capitalism with its unswerving belief in the merits of the free market and democratic socialism with its demand management and obsession with the state. The Third Way is in favour of growth, entrepeneurship, enterprise and wealth creation but it is also in favour of greater social justice and it sees the state playing a major role in bringing this about. So in the words of one of its gurus Anthony Giddens of the LSE [London School of Economics] the Third Way rejects top down socialism as it rejects traditional neo liberalism.” [UK Politics, “What is the Third Way?” BBC News. September 27th, 1999. Retrieved on April 17th, 2016.]
          “[Anthony] Giddens’ self-styled ‘third way’ approach has been widely taken up, commented upon and criticised as a theoretical underpinning for a renewed social democracy on a global scale …. Additionally Giddens’ recent political theory has been linked to ideas around communitarianism and social capital as part of a resurgence of social democratic thinking …. Giddens’ individualisation arguments enable him to suggest that political distinctions between left and right are no longer pertinent, and that emancipatory politics is increasingly supplanted by life-politics. He marries neo-liberal ideas about choice to postmodernist ideas of the identity politics of recognition to create ‘life-politics.’ Structuration theory at least retained a possibility of social critique. However, Giddens’ current thoughts jettison critique in favour of legitimising certain dominant political tendencies within social democracy.” [Paul Bagguley, “Reflexivity Contra Structuration.” The Canadian Journal of Sociology / Cahiers canadiens de sociologie. Volume 28, number 2, spring 2003. Pages 133-152.]
          “Notwithstanding Anthony Giddens’s best efforts to put an appealing spin on the Third Way, it remains what it has always been, a ill-disguised Second Way, a species of sugar-coated despotism that recommends itself to those who fancy that slaves can be jived into loving their masters. There can be no third way. Either our rulers remove their spurs from our ribs, or they don’t.” [Robert Higgs, “The So-called Third Way.” The Independent Review. Volume 4, number 4, spring 2000. Pages 625-630.]
          “The Third Way is not about either open societies or liberty. There is, indeed, a curious authoritarian streak in it, and not just in practice. When [Anthony] Giddens speaks of a ‘second wave of democratization,’ he in fact means deconstructing traditional democratic institutions. Parliaments are outmoded; referenda and focus groups should take their place. Third Way reforms of the welfare state not only involve compulsory savings but, above all, the strict insistence on everyone working, including single mothers and the disabled. Where normal employment—let alone desirable employment—is unavailable, people have to be forced to work by the withdrawal of benefits.” [Ralf Dahrendorf, “The Third Way and Liberty: An Authoritarian Streak in Europe’s New Center.” Foreign Affairs. Volume 78, number 5, September–October 1999. Pages 13-17.]
          “… we set out an argument that the possibilities for a more sociologically informed third way have been subsumed by its political interpretation where [Anthony] Giddens’ input has been a part of this development. We suggest that this relationship has become increasing significance in recent times, not least due to the fact that the variant of the third way advocated by Giddens, and its political appropriation by New Labour, has now come to occupy an influential moral argument: positing agency as the primary bearer of contemporary risk, while serving to legitimate many of the structural barriers that stand between the self-autonomizing individual Giddens would have us believe is now characteristic of late modern society.” [Shane Fudge, “Beyond Left and Right: Can the Third Way Deliver a Reinvigorated Social Democracy?” Critical Sociology. Volume 32, issue 4, 2006. Pages 583-602.]
          “[Anthony] Giddens’ recent focus on issues of political and social reform has generated much heated debate among not only social scientists but also among lay persons interested in the present state and future prospects of the societies we live in. In fact, his last three books … attempt, by linking social theory with the more concrete problems of political analysis and social pohcy, to transcend the impasses that both neo-liberalism and conventional social democracy are currently facing.” [Nicos Mouzelis, “Reflexive modernization and the third way: the impasses of Giddens’ social-democratic politics.” The Sociological Review. Volume 29, issue 3, August 2001. Pages 436-456.]
          “Anthony Giddens has added a recent reputation for eminence among [Tony] Blair’s intellectual mentors to his high credit as an academic sociologist and new Director of the London School of Economics. So it is not surprising to find a good deal in common between his [Giddens’] and the other Tony’s [Blair’s] version of the Third Way.… Giddens also takes a track for his Third Way—a term whose chequered associations and ambiguities he freely acknowledges—which seems to run a good few paces leftward of Blair’s, intent though he [Giddens’] still is on some destination ‘beyond left and right.’” [John Westergaard, “Where does the Third Way lead?” New Political Economy. Volume 4, number 3, November 1999. Pages 429-436.]
          “This article does not provide an overall verdict on the Third Way project because it is concerned only with the economy and economic policy. Yet, the Third Way project, in both the [Tony] Blair and [Anthony] Giddens representations, is fatally weakened by its refusal to confront old and new economic problems. It is argued here that the Third Way is not a progressive shift in political and economic problematic because it inhibits economic management of … ‘the jammed economy.’ Naturally, the political practice of New Labour is neither necessarily deduced from nor governed by a common Third Way discourse.” [Julie Froud, Colin Haslam, Sukhdev Johal, Adam Leaver, John Williams, and Karel Williams, “The Third Way and the Jammed Economy.” Capital & Class. Volume 23, number 1, spring 1999. Pages 155-166.]
          “I want to say at the outset that I am in many respects sympathetic to [Anthony] Giddens’ overall project of trying to formulate a political middle road between neo-liberalism and old-style social democracy. I share the view that there is a need for a renewed social democratic policy vision that can grapple with the complexities of globalization and the changing role of the nation state. I agree with the idea that this would imply a new balancing of responsibilities between different actors and social spheres: government, industry, individual citizens, political organizations and the institutions of civil society. In fact, this amounts to a transformation of the concepts of citizenship and political agency. And, last but not least, as a feminist I am pleased with the fact that Giddens presents his readers with a policy vision that contains many valuable observations about gender relations and (at first sight) promising normative arguments for greater equality between men and women.” [Selma Sevenhuijsen, “Caring in the third way: the relation between obligation, responsibility and care in Third Way discourse.” Critical Social Policy. Volume 62, 2000. Pages 5-37.]
          “Harry Boyte certainly gets one thing right: Civil society is a slippery term that has been put to a variety of political uses by a variety of players with radically disparate political agendas. However, that apostles of cultural conservatism may use third sector or third way language to wage a war on secularism or on politics, civic work, and government, or that voluntarists may use it to trivialize power and abandon politics altogether is not a sufficient reason for democrats, civic republicans, and progres sives to yield the concept to them.” [Benjamin R. Barber, “Civil Society: Playground, Workground, or Just Plain Ground of Democracy.” The Good Society. Volume 9, number 3, 2000. Pages 24-25.]
          “… the faith-based idea is not reducible to a Republican tac tic. For it is part and parcel of a broader strategy of ‘third way’ public policy pioneered by Clinton in the U.S. and Tony Blair in the U.K. On this view—which is the self-described approach of the center-left in today’s political environment—the state needs to be unburdened of bureaucratic and often-counterproductive methods of providing welfare, and civil society institutions need to be empowered to do much of this work themselves.” [Jeffrey C. Issac, “Faith-Based Initiatives: A Civil Society Approach.” The Good Society. Volume 12, number 1, 2003. Pages 1 and 4-10.]
          “One could argue that [Anthony] Giddens’ major intellectual preoccupation is not society so much as sociology itself. For Giddens, a kind of sociological mind-set is the one best placed to act well in modern society.…
          “By implication, sociology is vastly superior for thinking about politics to political thought. By its very nature sociological thinking enters into social life, altering its character while necessitating a further revision of sociological thinking. Giddens’ role as an adviser to [Tony] Blair is a reflection not merely of considerable personal talent, but of a logic that inheres within the very project of sociology as Giddens has delineated it. Philosophers have interpreted the world in various ways, and political theorists sometimes try to change it; but in re-interpreting the world sociologists actually contribute to changing it.”
          [Alan Finlayson, “Third Way Theory.” Political Quarterly. Volume 70, issue 3, July-September 1999. Pages 271-279.]
          “By indicating a network of mutually reinforcing social reforms—moving from ‘parenting contracts’ to truancy supervision, the improvement of academic education incorporating a ‘civic liberalism’ component too; and a responsible business ethos with social investment directed at the entire community—[Anthony] Giddens sets out a programme that, without being intrusive, has the capacity to bring about positive change.” [Otto Newman and Richard de Zoysa, “The Third Way alternative: America’s new political agenda?” Contemporary Politics. Volume 6, number 3, 2000. Pages 231-245.]
          “In May, 2010, President Arroyo of the Republic of the Philippines signed into law the Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Act. The law constituted a major paradigm shift in disaster management from an emphasis on relief and recovery, and domination by military leaders, to a proactive, preventative approach in which civil society groups foster community-based participation for vulnerable populations who historically had been most at risk from disasters. The role of civil society organizations, and especially the advocacy work of the umbrella group, the DRR [Disaster Risk Reduction] Network of the Philippines (DRRNetPhils), is a prominent component of the story.” [Ralph S. Brower and Francisco A. Magno, “A ‘Third Way’ in the Phillipines: Voluntary Organizing for a New Disaster Management Paradigm.” International Review of Public Administration. Volume 16, number 1, 2011. Pages 31-50.]
          “I freely acknowledge what I have argued for a decade: the relationship between civil society and liberal democracy is an empirical rather than philosophical issue. That is precisely why I make such extensive use of empirical evidence in my work.” [William A. Galston, “Civil Society, Civic Virtue, and Liberal Democracy.” Chicago-Kent Law Review. Volume 75, issue 2, article 13, April 2000. Pages 603-612.]
          “There is currently much talk of a ‘global civil society.’ The battle of Seattle and subsequent protests highlighted the reality of transnational protest by global social movements. In a different way, the terrorist attacks on September 11 have led to renewed reference to a ‘global community’ and the need for ‘humanitarian assistance.’ Indeed, some regard this latter approach as a proper manifestation of a progressive global politics, as opposed to the nihilism of much of the anticapitalist left. Advocates of the Third Way have been particularly keen to champion the cause of global justice against the ‘rejectionists’ of the fundamentalist left, be they hardline Marxists or anti-globalization protestors.” [Ray Kiely, “Comment: The global Third Way or progressive globalism?” Contemporary Politics. Volume 8, number 3, September 2002. Pages 167-184.]
          “… [Tony] Blair, influenced by his academic ‘guru’ Anthony Giddens, signed the party up to the philosophy of the ‘third way’ and thereby to cultivating a ‘new politics’ that is consensual, participatory and departs from the confrontational politics of ‘old’ ….” [Stewart Davidson and Stephen Elstub, “Deliberative and Participatory Democracy in the UK.” The British Journal of Politics & International Relations. Volume 16, issue 3, August 2014. Pages 367-385.]
          “The [UK] Labour government’s vision of modernization is identical to that of the New Right: an essentially reactionary project based on a reassertion of the principle of private property. And it is notable that [Anthony] Giddens’s argument for the modernization of welfare is based on criticisms of the welfare state from the Right rather than the Left: ‘recognizing the problematic history of the welfare state, third way politics should accept some of the criticisms the right makes of that state.’” [Mark Neocleous, “Radical conservatism, or, the conservatism of radicals: Giddens, Blair and the politics of reaction.” Radical Philosophy: Philosophical Journal of the Independent Left. Number 93, January/February 1999. Pages 24-34.]
          “The political influence of social theory arguably reached its height in 1997 when [Anthony] Giddens himself proposed the Third Way as the project of New Labour. New Labour, in Giddens’s work, became a neo-Durkheimian project of moral renewal.” [Peter Osborne, “From structure to rhizome: transdisciplinarity in French thought.” Radical Philosophy: Philosophical Journal of the Independent Left. Number 65, January/February 2011. Pages 15-40.]
          “We have seen that moral rules have a particular authority, by virtue of which human wills abide by their prescriptions simply because they so ordain, and independent of the possible outcomes that the acts thus prescribed may have. To do one’s duty because it is a duty—this is to abide by the rule because it is a rule. How does it happen that a rule, humanly contrived, can have such ascendance, that it can so bend the wills of those human beings who themselves make it? Certainly, since the fact itself is incontestable, we could assert the proposition even though we were in no position to offer an explanation, and even, it could be maintained, although we shall not be able to explain it. But we must be careful not to deny the moral reality simply because the present state of knowledge does not allow us to account for it. As a matter of fact, however, what has been established in the preceding chapters will permit us to resolve this mystery without any recourse to hypotheses of a non-empirical order.” [Émile Durkheim. Moral Education. Mineola, New York: Dover Publications, Inc., imprint of Courier Corporation. 2002. Page 85.]
          “Moral activity … is recognizable by the sign that the rules of conduct to which it conforms are open to universalization; it pursues, then, by definition, impersonal ends. Morality begins only with disinterest, with attachment to something other than ourselves.…
          “… We cannot give ourselves over to moral ends without moving away from ourselves, without unsettling the instincts and inclinations that are the most deeply rooted in our body. There is no moral act that does not imply a sacrifice, for, as [Immanuel] Kant has shown, the law of duty cannot compel obedience without humbling our individual or, for him, our ‘empirical’ sensibility. This sacrifice we might well accept without resistance, and even with enthusiasm. But even when carried out with a joyous élan, it is still real; the pain that the ascetic seeks is still pain. And this antinomy is so deep and so radical that in the end it can never be resolved. How can we belong altogether to ourselves and altogether to others, or vice versa? The self cannot be something altogether other than itself, for then it would vanish. This is what happens in ecstasy. To think, one must be, one must have an individuality. But, on the other hand, the self cannot be altogether and exclusively itself, for then it would empty of all content.”
          [Émile Durkheim, “The Dualism of Human Nature and its Social Conditions.” Durkheimian Studies. Volume 11, number 1, winter 2005. Pages 35-45.]
          “The setting for the re-edition of the Third Way is a putatively post-socialist universe in which, according to [Anthony] Giddens, ‘there are no alternatives to capitalism’ of the sort historically projected by reformist (let alone revolutionary) socialists. Post-war Keynesian social democracy, intent upon a fundamental modification of capitalism, is now no more viable than the pre-war Marxist social democracy aspiring to its abolition, and ‘the arguments that remain concern how far, and in what ways, capitalism should be governed and regulated.’” [Gregory Elliott, “Via dollaro$a: On the ‘Third Way’” Radical Philosophy: Philosophical Journal of the Independent Left. Number 94, March/April 1999. Pages 2-5.]
          “The Third Way is … not so much a powerful case for a refashioned social democracy as a rather depressing symptom of [Anthony] Giddens’s own intellectual and political evolution to the right. Theoretically, the decisive phase in this process seems to be his writings on ‘late modernity’ in the early 1990s. These reflect the impact on his thinking of the theory of reflexive modernization advanced by Ulrich Beck in Risk Society (1986). Beck argues, in effect, that, in the late twentieth century, the modernization process increasingly feeds off itself. Structures which were constitutive of industrial society—social class, the nuclear family, bureaucratic organization—are progressively undermined by a process of ‘individualization’ which leaves the individual responsible for the construction of both her personal identity and her position in the labour market. In the resulting ‘capitalism without classes, but with individualized social inequality,’ conflict is displaced from the class structure onto the struggle between women and men continually to renegotiate their personal relationships, and onto the movements seeking to respond to the new forms of risk generated by the unexpected consequences of the systematic application of scientific knowledge to the domination of nature.” [Alex Callinicos, “Social Theory Put to the Test of Politics: Pierre Bourdieu and Anthony Giddens.” New Left Review. Series 1, number 236, July–August 1999. Pages 78-102.]
          “For [Anthony] Giddens, utopian realism is ‘utopian’ in the sense that it reaches out to a future beyond the present, yet is ‘realist’ in the sense that this future ‘corresponds to observable trends’ ….” [Darren Webb, “Where’s the vision? The concept of utopia in contemporary educational theory.” Oxford Review of Education. Volume 35, number 6, 2009. Pages 743-760.]
          “[Anthony] Giddens agrees with [Ulrich] Beck in seeing late industrialism or late modernity as being characterized by transformations in traditional habits and customs, having a radical effect on the conduct and meaning of everyday life. He identifies modern institutions as being central to the nature of modernity. These institutions affect everyday life and selfhood, but in turn are themselves shaped by individuals’ actions.” [Deborah Lupton. Risk. London and New York: Routledge imprint of Taylor & Francis Group, an Informa PLC business. 2005. Page 75.]
       7. New Mutualism (Peter Kellner). It focuses upon mutual responsibility. The mutualist tradition was initiated by the anarchist theorist Pierre-Joseph Proudhon (discussed in an earlier chapter).
          “The Seven Pillars of Mutualism
          1. “For a free society to flourish, the exercise of individual liberty requires the acknowledgement of mutual responsibility.
          2. “Mutualism can thrive only when it is rooted in culture and choice, rather than laws and coercion; it should be encouraged as far as possible, and enforced only when necessary.
          3. “Legitimate economic and political power may derive from a variety of sources; what matters is how it is used, how it is checked and how far it is dispersed.
          4. “Markets are social institutions that should both offer rights to, and demand obligations from, those who seek financial gain.
          5. “Government has a duty to promote responsible market behaviour; to act as an effective umpire it should, as far as possible, avoid being a market competitor.
          6. “Mutualism requires an inclusive society in which all have equal access to the means to participate in it to the full.
          7. “Government has a duty to guarantee basic equality of access, but should, as far as possible, leave delivery to independent institution s exercising their mutual responsibility.”
          [Peter Kellner. New Mutualism: The Third Way. London: Co-operative Press Ltd. imprint of The Co-operative Party. September, 1998. Page 3.]
          “It [this article] suggests a design for the Third Way that gives it a distinct purpose, and does not merely split the difference between the free market principles of the new right and the state socialism of the old left. It also suggests a name: mutualism.…
          “… mutualism is the precise opposite of ‘no-such-thing-as-society’ Thatcherism. Mutualism asserts that we have both rights and responsibilities, and that social, political and economic institutions work best when all of their members respect each other.
          “Mutualism is not an ideology in the Marxist or free market sense. It does not regard ownership of the means of production as the central issue. What matters is the way that power is used.”
          [Peter Kellner, “A new ‘ism’ for our times.” New Statesman. Volume 11, number 505, May (22nd) 1998. Pages 30-32.]
          “One of the aims of a mutualist government should be to use its bully-pulpit and its powers of persuasionto build a set of values that companies (like other institutions) choose to adopt, for fear of a backlash if they fall short of the standards expected of them. This will not happen automatically. It is as demanding as designing new laws but, done effectively, more likely to have lasting, beneficial effects: in their quest for profits, companies would seek not merely to avoid breaching laws and regulations, which is a negative and sometimes devious activity, they would also act positively to improve their reputations.” [Peter Kellner, “A philosophy for a fallible world.” New Statesman. Volume 12, number 547, March (19th) 1999.]
          “… [There is] the Third Way for which Mr [Tony] Blair seems to be striving. Following last week’s seminar, it clearly needs to be developed in more detail. It also needs a name.…
          “… I consulted the full version of the Oxford English Dictionary. It defines ‘mutualism’ as’the doctrine that individual and collective wellbeing is attainable only by mutual dependence.’ If there is a shorter, more accurate description of Tony Blair’s philosophy, I have yet to read it.”
          [Peter Kellner, “Why Blair is doing it a Third Way.” The Evening Standard. London newspaper. May (11th) 1998.]
          “In ‘The Origins of Virtue’ Matt Ridley undertakes a detailed analysis of the biological and evolutionary basis of the tendency of human beings to behave ethically towards each other and to co-operate. Ridley is a unique combination of zoologist, economist and journalist. His work is highly readable and entertaining. Unlike [Richard] Dawkins, who, for rational scientific reasons, rejects, as a false continuum, ‘the nature is nasty, nature is nice debate’ Ridley analyses it in depth before drawing his conclusions, although he too ultimately rejects it as a false dichotomy.…
          “New Mutualism asserts that we have both rights and responsibilities, and that social, political and economic institutions work best when all of their members respect each other. It seeks to rescue the virtues of co-operation, and the principles that gave birth to the Co-operative Movement, from the strangling embrace of ideological socialism.” [David Kellner in David Rodgers. New Mutualism: The Third Estate. London: The Co-operative Party. January, 1999. No pagination.]
          “New Mutualism is not simply about a repositioning of politics to the left or right of the centre of the old left/right continuum. New Mutualism is a radical Third Way of looking at social and economic policy issues. It is founded on the valuable insights evolutionary biology has given us into the origins of human virtue and cooperation. It also permits us to enter into a new political debate, one that seeks to re-define the role of politics and government and to define, in a new way, the appropriate role for, and power of, the state as that which encourages mutual social and economic outcomes.” [David Rodgers. New Mutualism: The Third Estate. London: The Co-operative Party. January, 1999. No pagination.]
          “Man the hunter-gatherer, man the savanna primate, man the social monogamist—and man the exchanger. Exchange for mutual benefit has been part of the human condition for at least as long as Homo sapiens has beena species. It is not a modern invention.” [Matt Ridley. The Origins of Virtue: Human Instincts and the Evolution of Cooperation. New York: Penguin Books imprint of Penguin Putnam Inc. 1998. Page 200.]
       8. collaborative community (Paul S. Adler and Charles Heckscher): It advocates a “horizontal coordination of interdependent work processes.”
          “Broadly speaking, sociological views have been divided into three camps. A first camp develops a pessimistic critique of capitalist growth and of modernization more generally as leading to the progressive erosion of community …. A second camp … seeks hope in a revival of pre-modern community through support for the remnants that have survived the onslaught of the market—traditional family forms such as family, friendship networks, church groups.…
          “A third camp, however, has explored the possibility that a new and possibly higher form of community might emerge, offering a framework for trust in dynamic and diverse relationships, and reconciling greater degrees of both solidarity and autonomy.…
          “The present essay lies within this third camp. We argue that capitalist development does indeed corrode traditional forms of community, but also that the demand for complex, knowledge-based and solutions-oriented oriented production in the modern capitalist economy has stimulated significant progress towards a new form of community. Rather than focusing on institutions like science and the professions, we direct attention to the very center of capitalist society—the structure of large corporations ations and the nature of inter-firm relations. We argue that in the last few decades, a form of community—we call it collaborative community—has emerged that points the way beyond the classic antinomy of individual vs. collective, of tradition vs. freedom, of Gemeinschaft vs. Gesellschaft, and begins to embody the intuition behind [Émile] Durkheim’s notion of ‘organic solidarity.’”
          [Paul S. Adler and Charles Heckscher, “Towards Collaborative Community.” The Firm as a Collaborative Community: The Reconstruction of Trust in the Knowledge Economy. Charles Heckscher and Paul S. Adler, editors. Oxford, England, and New York: Oxford University Press. 2006. Kindle edition.]
          “Collaborative community is distinctive, first, in its social structures that support horizontal coordination of interdependent work processes.… Collaborative community, like hierarchy, supports interdependence with formal procedures. Whereas under the hierarchy principle these procedures are defined by hierarchical superiors and used by them to monitor performance and drive improvement, under collaborative community the procedures are designed collaboratively and used by peers to monitor each other and to work together to improve performance. Compared to other forms of community, collaborative community is distinctive in its reliance on value-rationality—its participants coordinate their activity through a shared commitment to a set of ultimate goals. In short, they form a community of purpose …. Its highest value is therefore interdependent contribution to these shared goals.” [Paul S. Adler, Seok-Woo Kwon, and Charles Heckscher, “Professional Work: The Emergence of Collaborative Community.” Organization Science. Volume 19, number 2, March–April 2008. Pages 359-376.]
          “Contemporary theorists of community like Amatai [sic; Amitai] Etzioni, and Charles Heckscher and Paul Adler advocate less rigid and more democratic forms of community structures, which they refer to as ‘responsive communitarianism’ and ‘collaborative community,’ respectively. These models of community are more amenable to the complexities of the modern world and seek to strike a better balance between the collective welfare of the community and the individual rights and personal fulfillment of its constituent members. According to Heckscher and Adler, collaborative communities are already starting to become normative in large corporations and in inter-firm relations in the global economy.” [Gordon Shepherd and Gary Shepherd, “New Religions and Community.” Nova Religio: The Journal of Alternative and Emergent Religions. Volume 13, number 3, February 2010. Pages 5-13.]
       9. associative democracy (Paul Hirst and Veit Bader as pronounced in this MP3 audio file): They propose a competition among associations for “the good life.”
          “Associative democracy not merely lacks the totalitarian potential of the old ideologies, it is their direct opposite, since it offers room for the projects of the most diverse social and political forces. It is not tied to any given part of the old left-right political spectrum. It can appeal to and be used as a guiding political doctrine by a wide variety of political and social groups subscribing to very different beliefs. The concept of the governance of social affairs through voluntary associations can enable groups to build their own social worlds in civil society; for example, conservative religious groups, radical feminists, those seeking a self-sufficient ecologically sustainable form of life, can all live as they wish, and compete politically by soliciting the voluntary choices of individuals. In this respect associationalism is the one great system of political ideas born in the nineteenth century that is likely to continue into the twenty-first with real intellectual enthusiasm and the energy for social renewal driving it forward.” [Paul Hirst. Associative Democracy: New Forms of Economic and Social Governance. Cambridge, England: Polity Press. 1994. Google Play edition.]
          “Associative democracy is the only political doctrine well adapted to cope with the problems of ensuring democratic accountability in a culturally diverse organisational society. Traditional social democracy has fared badly both in defining new programmes of welfare-state reform and in devising new strategies for economic regulation. Indeed, social democratic parties have tended to retreat before the pressure to defend existing entitlements by citizens, the tax aversion of key social constituencies and pressure from business opinion for welfare cuts and deregulation. Even a moderniser such as Anthony Giddens, who argues in The Third Way … that traditional bureaucratic social democracy needs renewal in response to the major social changes of recent decades, fails either to recognise or to tackle the problem of the organisational society. He emphasises changes leading to individuation and social fluidity, but ignores the prevailing social institutions.” [Paul Hirst, “Can Associationalism Come Back?” Associative Democracy: The Real Third Way. Paul Hirst and Veit Bader, editors. New York: Frank Cass Publishers. 2005. Pages 15-30.]
          “Associative democracy is a political theory, the core proposition of which is that as many social activities as possible should be devolved to self-governing voluntary associations. It has an intellectual pedigree stretching back to the mid-nineteenth century, but it has recently been revived in a new form. Associationalism might be described as the original ‘Third Way’ between free-market individualism and centralised state control. Associationalists argue that laissez-faire leaves large areas of social life ungoverned.…
          “Associationalists argue that there are different versions of the good life in society and that different contents and styles of provision of public services go along with them. Services should be public and publicly funded, open to all, but non-state. Associations should be free to compete with one another for members for the services they provide, and members would bring public funds with them according to a common per capita formula.…
          “In such a system, associations, rather than the state or corporations, would control most welfare provision and a good deal of economic activity. The state and the market would both continue to exist, but they would be paralleled by an associative system of governance.”
          [Veit Bader, “Introduction to Associative democracy: the real third way? special volume.” Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy. Volume 4, number 1, 2001. Pages 1-14.]
          “… associative democracy makes productive use of the idea of differentiated morality, i.e., that standards of minimal morality have to protect the basic needs, interests and rights of all, including vulnerable minorities within minorities, such as minors and women. Their basic interests require external supervision, control and sanctions (by the liberal state) without riding roughshod over meaningful associational autonomy in caring for their best interests, as evangelists of liberal autonomy and liberal-democratic congruence propose.” [Veit Bader, “Introduction to Secularism or Democracy?: Associational Governance of Religious Diversity.” Krisis: Journal for contemporary philosophy. Issue 1, 2008. Creative Commons. Pages 16-24.]
          “… democratic citizenship ought to be disentangled from citizenship as state membership. Historically, some version of this type of disentanglement is at the root of all versions of economic, industrial, or social (associational) democracy and of all forms of local, town hall, provincial political democracy as well.” [Veit Bader, “Citizenship and Exclusion: Radical Democracy, Community, and Justice. Or, What Is Wrong with Communitarianism?” Political Theory. Volume 23, number 2, May 1995. Pages 211-246.]
          “What we advocate is a form of associative democracy in which the strengths of both individual and associational freedoms are combined and in which religious associations, among others, play a more crucial societal and institutionalized political role. This also might help prevent the development of religious fundamentalism.” [Veit Bader, “Religious Diversity and Democratic Institutional Pluralism.” Political Theory. Volume 31, number 2, April 2003. Pages 265-294.]
       10. politics of continual complex choice (Robert Geyer): He advocates an alternative to Anthony Giddens’ Third Way grounded in complex theory.
           “… we see the fundamental contradiction at the heart of [Anthony] Giddens’ Third Way. On the one hand, he wants to break with the ‘providentialism’ … of the left which argued that capitalism led to socialism, proletarians were humanity’s saviours and history had a clear direction. A complexity perspective would certainly agree with this position. On the other hand, his desire to find a radical ‘new way’ that gives the left back its position at the forefront of historical development has clear overtones of earlier 20ᵗʰ-century attempts to create a linear order. Hence, by not recognising the full implications of complexity he opens up the Third Way to criticisms that it is both amorphous (disorderly from a linear perspective) and authoritarian (orderly from a nonlinear perspective) at the same time.…
           “… what it [complexity theory] does is put the Third Way in a larger scientific perspective. It goes beyond it by recognising that the Third Way is only a small indication of a much more fundamental shift in the natural and social sciences and society, a complexity shift. This recognition implies a revolution in our understanding of society and politics. In essence, the future is not a search for a Third Way, but for any number of ‘third ways.’ It is not a politics of the search for a new order or disorder, but a politics of continual complex choice.…
           “… In essence, the future is not a search for a Third Way, but for any number of ‘third ways.’ It is not a politics of the search for a new order or disorder, but a politics of continual complex choice.”
           [Robert Geyer, “Beyond the Third Way: the science of complexity and the politics of choice.” British Journal of Politics and International Relations. Volume 5, number 2, May 2003. Pages 237-257.]
           “… [The type-2-diabetic] Mark’s life exhibited all of the main complexity concepts.… As choices were made, regularities emerged. For example, he stayed married and faithful to his wife, thereby limiting his sexual partners. He remained a fireman, limiting his experience of other jobs, but overall his life exhibited all of the main aspects of change and stability that typify punctuated equilibrium.” [Robert Geyer, “Can Complexity Move UK Policy beyond ‘Evidence-Based Policy Making’ and the ‘Audit Culture’? Applying a ‘Complexity Cascade’ to Education and Health Policy.” Political Studies. Volume 60, number 1, March 2012. Pages 20-43.]
           “Confederalism did not have a special interest in social policy. Overall, it was expected to follow general integration developments. The interesting points that confederalist thinking raised for EC [European Community] social policy were fourfold: there could be waves and troughs of social policy development, changes in the international system could influence the success or failure of social policy, and appropriate EC institutional structures and policies would affect social policy outcomes. Finally, and perhaps most important, the recognition of uncertainty and complexity of social policy development was a substantial shift from earlier thinking.” [Robert Geyer, “The State of European Union Social Policy.” Policy Studies, Volume 21, number 3, September 2000. Pages 245-261.]
           “In summary …, for a system to exist in a state of self-organized complexity, it must have internal elements capable of interacting at an appropriate level of connectivity and in accordance with suitable local rules. Complex adaptive systems exhibit an ability to evolve over time through small but effective modifications, but their evolution is an uncertain and lengthy process that does not lead to an optimal end-state. Finally, average complexity increases over time, and systems with the highest complexity stand to gain the most.” [Samir Rihani and Robert Geyer, “Complexity: an appropriate framework for development?” Progress in Development Studies. Volume 1, number 3, 2001. Pages 237–245.]
       11. Hizmet Hareket (Muhammed Fethullah Gülen as pronounced in this MP3 audio file): “Hizmet Hareket” (MP3 audio file), Turkish for “service movement,” has been described as a Turkish Islamic third-way or communitarian approach. In the English languguage, Hizmet Hareket is commonly referred to as the Gülen movement. Turkish–born Gülen now lives in the village of Saylorsburg—in the Poconos of eastern Pennsylvania.
           “After highlighting the salience of social networks in the field of collective mobilization, it [this chapter] introduces the reader to Anthony Giddens’ notion of ‘third way’ politics in the contemporary era of post-Cold War globalization. In so doing, the GM [Gülen movement] is posited as exemplifying a Turkish–Islamic variant ‘third way’ theory as it is expressed in Islamic terms.…
           “… I conclude that GM loyalists frame their political engagement as ‘non-political’ in line with Anthony Giddens’ notion of ‘third way’, ‘dialogic’ politics, or, better still, with the politics of ‘reflexive modernization’. ‘The third way’ is Giddens’ prescription for Europe’s social democratic parties (specifically Britain’s New Labour Party) to acknowledge that the old Left–Right dichotomies have given way to the transformative processes of neo-liberal restructuring.…
           “The GM’s collective effort to distance itself from politics needs to be understood within the context of global neo-liberalism, a hegemonic narrative that presupposes the inevitable collapse of political antagonism under ‘third way’ democratic institutions. Consciously or unconsciously, the GM’s claim to offer a ‘middle way’ between militant secularism and radical Islamism is a local variant of Giddens’ notion of dialogic politics, and is illustrative of little more than the localization of neo-liberal normativity.”
           [Joshua D. Hendrick, “Neo-liberalism and ‘Third Way’ Islamic Activism: Fethullah Gülen and Turkey’s New Elite.” The Sociology of Islam: Secularism, Economy and Politics. Tugrul Keskin, editor. Reading, England: Ithaca Press imprint of Garnet Publishing Limited. 2011. Pages 61-89.]
           “… the [Gülen] Movement operates apart from the state. Indeed, the movement is very much the apolitical heir of its reformist forebears. It expresses very much the same views as the modernist catalyst Jamal al-Din al-Afghani [Arabic/ʿArabiyyaẗ, جَمَال الدِّين الأَفْغَانِيّ, Ǧamāl ʾal-Ddīn ʾal-ꞌAfġāniyy] (1838-1897), in that Muslims need to borrow and learn from the West and that science is the key, as all revelation stems from the one truth, God. However, gone are al-Afghani’s appeal to rulers, which ranged from the Ottoman Sultan to the Shah of Iran, to implement needed political reforms. Rather, the movement has shifted to a grassroots organizational approach that seeks to institute the reforms within Islamic thinking advocated by al-Afghani from below, via its schools. In this regard, the Movement is very much a civically minded activist group. It seeks to help its fellow Muslims to find a middle ground or a ‘third way’ between religious tradition and modernity that will enable them to build social capital and better engage with the world around them.” [David Tittensor. The House of Service: The Gülen Movement and Islam’s Third Way. Oxford, England, and New York: Oxford University Press. 2014. Page 169.]
           “This ethnographic book analyzes the Gülen movement, drawing on the latter’s self-given name, Hizmet (service), for the title. It is not an easy text to review due to its paradoxical aspects. On the one hand, those with limited information on Hizmet and Turkey would appreciate the book’s detailed background information on Ottoman and modern Turkish history, but they may be disappointed that the book does not provide a comprehensive analysis of the movement’s various aspects, particularly its recently increasing political engagements. On the other hand, those already knowledgeable about the movement and Turkey will find the book’s narrowfocus on specific items refreshing; however, they may regard the historical background tedious—readers must wait until page seventy for discussion of the movement.” [Ahmet T. Kuru, “The House of Service: The Gülen Movement and Islam’s Third Way.” Review article. International Journal of Middle East Studies. Volume 37, number 2, May 2015. Pages 402-403.]
           “As a result of our qualitative research, we observed that the members of the [M. Fethullah] Gülen community acts in two different trajectories. On the one hand, as a neo-communitarian religious community, they strive to have a larger share—more members—within the religious market of Turkish Diaspora by producing a new religious discourse and new organisational strategies, as they did in Turkey. The followers of Gülen inculcate Islamic values and norms in society through sohbets (religious study circles). So, the clientelist perspective and the search for an ethnoreligious reference of the community members are not neglected by the Gülen movement. On the other hand, by interiorising the modern-secular codes and by organising around the non-religious, cultural and non-profit associations, they seek to gain legitimacy in the public space in Germany and France in order to build an educational network in these countries, as they did in Central Asia or in Balkan region. In these two different trajectories, the Turkish population appears both as a backing population and as an obstacle.… As a result of the synthesis of these trajectories; a reinvented and reorganised community took place in Europe. Therefore, the ‘fine balance,’ is procured by a reciprocal compromise between the ethno-religious attachment of the Turkish Diaspora and integrationist stance of the movement. This is why the Gülen community became a neo-communitarian movement in Europe.” [Emre Demir, “The Emergence of a NeoCommunitarian Movement in the Turkish Diaspora in Europe: The Strategies of Settlement and Competition of Gülen Movement in France and Germany.” Muslim World in Transition: Contributions of the Gülen Movement. International Gülen Conference Proceedings. October 25rd–27th, 2007. London, England. Pages 214-229. Retrieved on May 1st, 2016.]
           “[M. Fethullah] Gülen is a major figure in defining the contemporary global Islamic experience. He is a spiritual leader, philosopher, poet, and a thinker, not solely a preacher. His interpretation of Islam has attracted many religious leaders, intellectuals, and politicians in Turkey …. Although he is not as well known as some Muslim leaders or intellectuals in the West, his community is one of the most influential, revivalist Islamic groups in modern Turkey …. His influence is not limited to religion. Indeed, he has had an impact on diverse fields including education, the media, business, and the financial sector.” [Salih Yucel, “Fethullah Gülen: Spiritual Leader in a Global Islamic Context.” Journal of Religion & Society. Volume 12, 2010. Pages 1-19.]
           “According to [Anthony] Giddens, globalization is a process that transforms existing everyday routines and local rhythms (time) as well as the cultural locations, institutional and social structures, and political forms (space) in which such everyday routines and rhythms are situated. Globalization is thus a socioculturally transformative force in the sense that it de-situates or ‘distanciates’ – de-temporalizes and dislocates – everyday life from the temporal–spatial contexts in which it was pre-globally embedded and couples it instead to ‘the global.’ Such disembedding of the local and coupling of the global means, for Giddens, that ‘globalization has something to do with the thesis that we now all live in one world’ [Joseph D. Lewandowski, “Disembedded Democracy?: Globalization and the ‘Third Way.’” European Journal of Social Theory. Volume 6, number 1, 2003. Pages 115–131.]
           “The Prophets dealt with people and life in a holistic manner, appealing to each person’s intellect, reason, spirit, and all outer and inner senses and feelings. They never ignored or neglected any human faculties.
           “The position of a Prophet in relation to Divine Revelation is similar to that of a corpse in the hands of a mortician: The individual can do nothing of his own volition. God directs and guides a Prophet as necessary so that he can lead his people. Without this Divine direction, he would be unable to guide anyone. If he neglected their intellects, the end result would be a community of poor, docile mystics. If he neglected their hearts or spirits, a crude rationalism devoid of any spiritual dimension would be produced. As each individual is comprised of intellect, spirit, and body, each must be assigned its due part of the Message.
           “Human beings are active. Therefore, they should be led to those activities that form the real purpose of their lives, as determined by God and communicated by the Prophet. God did not create people only to have them to become passive recluses, activists without reason and spirit, or rationalists without spiritual reflection and activism.”
           [M. Fethullah Gülen. The Messenger of God – Muhammad – An Analysis of the Prophet’s Life. Paris, France: Feedbooks. 2009. Pages 76-77.]
       12. Buddhist third way (Thich Nhat Hanh [Vietnamese, Thích Nhất Hạnh as pronounced in this MP3 audio file]): He has developed a Buddhist third-way approach.
           “Thich Nhat Hanh was already familiar with Western society, having studied and taught at Princeton and Columbia Universities in the early 1960s. He befriended Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. and was a frequent writer and speaker in the West on the Vietnam War. Hanh and his monastic colleagues pioneered a Buddhist ‘third way’ that sought to distinguish itself from either the Communist or capitalist opposing sides in the war.… In his teachings, Hanh emphasized the practice of mindfulness paired with a dedicated engagement with the world. This struck a chord with many people in the West, especially the United States, and became the basis of one of the largest networks of practitioners.” [Jeff Wilson. Mindful America: The Mutual Transformation of Buddhist Meditation and American Culture. Oxford, England, and New York: Oxford University Press. 2015. Pages 33-34.]
           “… the Buddhist ‘Struggle Movement’ during the war in Vietnam was called the ‘Third Way’ for their refusal to side with either the North or the South, with either the Communists or the American-backed regime.” [Sallie B. King. Socially Engaged Buddhism: Dimensions of Asian Spirituality. Honolulu, Hawaiʿi: University of Hawaiʿi Press. 2009. Page 31.]
           “One of the best-known – and most inspiring – exponents of a Buddhist approach to conflict resolution and peacemaking is the Vietnamese Buddhist master Thich Nhat Hanh …. As a champion of the Buddhist ‘third way’ in the Vietnam War, Nhat Hanh developed a non-violent approach to the conflict that rejected both communist and capitalist doctrines and took an active part in the anti-war movement. Since those days he has practised and taught in the West, expounding ‘engaged Buddhism’ as a response to conflict and injustice.” [Oliver Ramsbotham, Tom Woodhouse, and Hugh Miall. Contemporary Conflict Resolution: The prevention, management and transformation of deadly conflicts. Third edition. Malden, Massachusetts: Polity Press. 2011. Page 343.]
           “Regardless of the reason for the lack of community among western nurses, if nursing is to flourish as a profession, something needs to be done to change the hostile culture that waters the seeds of professional unsatisfactoriness. In its guiding ideal, western communitarian ethics has similarities to the concept of a Buddhist Sangha [Sanskrit/Saṃskṛtam, संघा, saṃghā, ‘community’]. According to the Zen monk, Thich Nhat Hanh, a Sangha is a ‘community that lives in harmony and awareness’ …. If nurses really want to advance nursing as a caring and moral profession, the concept of a Buddhist community of practice and its underlying philosophy may provide a noteworthy model for cultivating communitarian behavior.” [Karen L. Rich, “Using a Buddhist Sangha as a model of communitarianism in nursing.” Nursing Ethics. Volume 14, number 4, 2007. Pages 466-477.]
           “Sangha is the Sanskrit word for community. I love the work of Sangha building. Building our community can bring us a lot of happiness. Sangha is our refuge. By taking refuge in the Sangha, we take refuge in the Buddha and the Dharma. We feel safe. We know that with awakening, things are going to change very quickly.…
           “The solution is a Sangha. A true Sangha always carries within it the true Dharma and the true Buddha. The Buddha is someone inhabited by the energy of mindfulness, concentration, insight, compassion, and understanding, and we know that every one of us has these seeds in us.…
           “The Buddha was an excellent Sangha builder. He knew that he could not do much alone, so after enlightenment he immediately created a Sangha. He found his five co-practitioners in Benares and started to practice together in the Deer Park. In just one year, the community grew to 1,250 members! At first, his community was made up of monks. Later nuns, and laypeople also joined the Sangha.”
           [Thich Nhat Hanh. Together We Are One: Honoring Our Diversity, Celebrating Our Connection. Berkeley, California: Parallax Press. 2005. Pages 212-213.]
           “This concept, what we call ‘interbeing,’ applies to everything. Look into your body. Your body cannot exist alone, by itself. It has to ‘inter-be’ with the earth, the air, the rain, the plants, your parents, and your ancestors. There is nothing in the universe that is not present in your body. When you touch your body deeply, you touch the whole universe.…
           “… Day and night we have to water the seed of understanding in our store consciousness so that it will grow and help us see the nature of interbeing in everything we see and touch, allowing us to make peace with ourselves. We have to bring this understanding into our daily life so that, with mindfulness, we are more aware of our feelings, recognize them, and prevent them from becoming knots in the first place.”
           [Thich Nhat Hanh and Lilian Cheung D.Sc., R.D. Savor: Mindful Eating, Mindful Life. New York: HarperCollins e-books imprint of HarperCollins Publishers. 2010. Ebook edition.]
       13. Empowered Deliberative Democracy (Archon Fung and Erik Olin Wright): They propose a third way based upon participatory democracy.
           “… we call … [the] reform family Empowered Deliberative Democracy (EDD). They have the potential to be radically democratic in their reliance on the participation and capacities of ordinary people, deliberative because they institute reason-based decision making, and empowered since they attempt to tie action to discussion.
           “… Conceptually, EDD presses the values of participation, deliberation, and empowerment to the apparent limits of prudence and feasibility. Taking participatory democracy seriously in this way throws both its vulnerabilities and advantages into sharp relief.…
           “These experiments’ [i.e., ‘real-world experiments in the redesign of democratic institutions’] deliberative procedures offer a third way to advance equity and fairness. Unlike strategic bargaining (in which outcomes are determined by the powers that parties bring to negotiations), hierarchical command (in which outcomes are determined according to the judgment of the highly placed), markets (in which money mediates outcomes), or aggregative voting (in which outcomes are determined according to the quantity of mobilized supporters), they establish groups that ostensibly make decisions according to the rules of deliberation. Parties make proposals and then justify them with reasons that the other parties in the group can support. A procedural norm of these groups is that they generate and adopt proposals that enjoy broad consensus support, although strict consensus is never a requirement. Groups select measures that upon reflection win the deepest and widest appeal. In the ideal, such procedures are regulated according to the lights of reason rather than money, power, numbers, or status. Since the idea of fairness is infused in the practice of reasonable discussion, truly deliberative decision making should tend toward more equitable outcomes than those regulated by power, status, money, or numbers. There will no doubt be some distance between this lofty deliberative ideal and the actual practices of these experiments.”
           [Archon Fung and Erik Olin Wright, “Deepening Democracy: Innovations in Empowered Participatory Governance.” Politics & Society. Volume 29, number 1, March 2001. Pages 5-41.]
           “For participatory democrats, the advance is the direct engagement of citizens in producing a range of public goods and acting for themselves.” [Archon Fung, Hollie Russon Gilman, and Jennifer Shkabatur, “Six Models for the Internet + Politics.” International Studies Review. Volume 15, number 1, March 2014. Pages 30-47.]
           “Compared to some of the proposals in the Real Utopias series—for example, the notion of a universal basic income or for wideranging participatory democracy—Infotopia enjoys greater support in the current political discourse across much of the world. Whereas there are many skeptics of participatory democracy (who favor traditional representative government) and many more opponents of income and asset redistribution, the basic notion of transparency finds widespread support and few, perhaps too few, critics. Among governments, this support is manifest in the dramatic expansion of freedom of information laws, the Obama Administration’s early commitment to open government, and the international Open Government Partnership. In global civil society, organizations such as Transparency International and the International Budget Partnership represent the leading edge of transparency.” [Archon Fung, “Infotopia: Unleashing the Democratic Power of Transparency.” Politics & Society. Volume 41, number 2, June 2013. Pages 183-212.]
       14. postfeminist politics (Stéphanie Genz as pronounced in this MP3 audio file): She develops an ecologically feminist third-way approach.
           “… [A] double movement is apparent in Third Way politics and its search for the New Middle, a mid-point between left and right, between social justice and the free market. Postfeminist politics adopts a similar Third Way perspective to reconcile feminist concerns with female equality, theoretical debates on anti-essentialism, media-friendly depictions of feminine empowerment and consumerist demands of capitalist culture. This results in an ultimately unstable political position where there are no fixed rules for subversion or resistance, no guarantees of political efficacy. The implications for postfeminist politics are that backlash and innovation, complicity and critique can never fully be separated but they are always ambiguously entwined.” [Stéphanie Genz, “Third Way/ve: The politics of postfeminism.” Feminist Theory. Volume 7, number 3, 2006. Pages 333-353.]
           “The postfeminist landscape generates complex and ambiguous portrayals of femaleness, femininity, and feminism, exploring the contingent and unresolvable tension between these subject positions. In particular, the PFW [postfeminist woman] navigates the conflicts between her feminist values and her feminine body, between individual and collective achievement, between professional career and personal relationship. She inhabits a nondualistic space that holds together these varied and often oppositional stances and thus, she provides multiple opportunities for female identification.” [Stéphanie Genz, “Singled out: postfeminism’s ‘New Woman’ and the dilemma of having it all.” Journal of Popular Culture. Volume 43, issue 1, 2010. Pages 97-119.]
           “The following essays illustrate postfeminism’s multiple layers of signification that encompass misogyny and anti-feminism as well as resilience and pro-feminism. We are concerned from the outset not to pre-empt any characterisation of postfeminism but to accept its flexibility and doubleness. In particular, we want to complexify the rhetoric of backlash that has oversimplified the postfeminist phenomenon and led the debate into a cul-de-sac that offers no potential for critical analysis and progression. The postfeminist landscape expands in divergent directions, forging encounters between competing discourses and theories.” [Benjamin Brabon and Stéphanie Genz, “Introduction: Postfeminist Gothic.” Gothic Studies. Volume 9, number 2, November 2007. Pages 1-6.]
           “Stephanie Genz … posits a postfeminist third wave as an arbiter between feminist-inspired women’s empowerment and that given by the pro-capitalist market much like the way in which a neoliberal Third Way presents itself as a mean between left and right political positions. She attributes to postfeminism the same mediatory or even reconciliatory qualities that can be posited of moderation given the former’s capacity to bring together a number of conflicting positions around gender transformation and capitalist consumption (much like the Third Way, she says).” [Srila Roy, “Feminist ‘radicality’ and ‘moderation’ in times of crises and change.” The Sociological Review. Volume 61, issue S2, December 2013. Pages 100-118.]
       15. new culture of populist producerism (Christopher Lasch): He advocates a third-way alternative to “the culture of narcissism.”
           “… in Minimal Self he [Christopher Lasch] tried to show how a third way was the morally necessary response to the bipolar tendencies of modern politics. At one pole the ‘conservatives’ (particularly the stream of conservatism sourced in the thinking of the eighteenth-century statesman Edmund Burke) allowed veneration of tradition and communal unity to confine them to an ossified world of custom, habit, ritual, and tradition.… [C]onservatives – including contemporary ‘communitarians,’ who grounded their hopes on this fantasy of stability and unity – actually invented the erosion of their own communities.
           “At the other pole were the progressives, examples par excellence, in Lasch’s thinking, of what Reinhold Niebuhr in his Gifford lectures had described as ‘the unwillingness of man to acknowledge his creatureliness and dependence upon God and his efford to make his own life independent and secure.’ The ancient sense of inescapable limits they saw as something to conquer rather than as that to which they must submit, and the fruit of their vision was the modern world itself, with its medical advances, its remarkable conveniences, its liberal political order – and its nihilism.…
           “Between these two polar tendencies, ‘progressivism’ and ‘conservatism,’ lay the radical option. Recognizing humans’ perennial need for the renewal of life, radicals did not give in to the life-denying forms of political and intellectual dependence – whether ‘traditional’ or ‘progressive’ – that characterized both right and left.”
           [Eric Miller. Hope in a Scattering Time: A Life of Christopher Lasch. Grand Rapids, Michigan: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company. 2010. Page 335-337.]
           “The old culture rests on an ‘arrogant assumption about the importance of the single individual in society and the importance of humanity in the universe.’ The new culture, on the other hand, values the ‘humble virtues’ that have taken on ‘higher survival value’ in a world endangered by runaway technology, ecological disaster, and nuclear holocaust. ‘The conditions that gave competitiveness survival value have long since evaporated.’” [Christopher Lasch. The Minimal Self: Psychic Survival in Troubled Times. New York: W. W. Norton & Company. 1985. Page 55.]
           “Careful study of the consequences of our attempts to master nature leads only to a renewed appreciation of our dependence on nature. In the face of this evidence, the persistence of fantasies that envision technological self-sufficiency for the human race indicates that our culture is a culture of narcissism in a much deeper sense than is conveyed by journalistic slogans like ‘me-ism.’ No doubt there is too much selfish individualism in American life; but such diagnoses barely scratch the surface.” [Christopher Lasch. The Culture of Narcissism: American Life in an Age of Diminishing Expectations. New York: W. W. Norton & Company. 1979. Kindle edition.]
           “The justification for reading [Ralph Waldo] Emerson’s work as a kind of theology of producerism does not lie in ‘Compensation’ alone. In that seminal essay, and in many others besides, Emerson addresses himself to concerns shared by the Calvinist, republican, and even some early liberal traditions—fate, moral corruption, and virtue. In effect, he transposes the political economy of populism (which derived, as we have seen, both from liberal and from republican antecedents) into the higher register of moral and ontological speculation. But he does not always live on these heights. He also talks about more mundane affairs; his consistent preoccupation is to show how ordinary concerns intersect with ultimate concerns—to consider the everyday in the light of the eternal, but also to draw on everyday experience in order to enrich our understanding of last things.” [Christopher Lasch. The True and Only Heaven: Progress and Its Critics. New York: W. W. Norton & Company. 1991. Kindle edition.]
           “Populism, as I understand it, is unambiguously committed to the principle of respect. It is for this reason, among others, that populism is to be preferred to communitarianism, which is too quick to compromise with the welfare state and to endorse its ideology of compassion. Populism has always rejected both the politics of deference and the politics of pity. It stands for plain manners and plain, straightforward speech. It is unimpressed by titles and other symbols of exalted social rank, but it is equally unimpressed by claims of moral superiority advanced in the name of the oppressed.” [Christopher Lasch. The Revolt of the Elites and the Betrayal of Democracy. New York: W. W. Norton & Company. 1996. Page 106.]
           “Communitarians share with the right an opposition to bureaucracy, but they do not stop with an attack on governmental bureaucracy; they are equally sensitive to the dangers of corporate bureaucracy in the misnamed private sector. Indeed they tend to reject the conventional distinction between the public and the private realm, which figures so prominently both in the liberal tradition and in the tradition of economic individualism that has grown up side by side with it.” [Christopher Lasch, “The Communitarian Critique of Liberalism” Soundings: An Interdisciplinary Journal. Volume 69, number 1/2, spring/summer 1986. Pages 60-76.]
           “Throughout his last work [The Revolt of the Elites and the Betrayal of Democracy], [Christopher] Lasch is careful to distance himself from Amitai Etzioni and his small but voluble band of disciples. ‘Communitarianism,’ he argues, is a counterfeit populism that studiedly avoids criticism of economic orthodoxy. Etzioni’s ersatz political philosophy not only ignores the impoverishment and environmental despoliation that market ideology has caused, but also passes responsibility for social disintegration from politicians, banks and corporations to ordinary people themselves. Communitarians speak of neighbourhood, family and school with quasi-religious enthusiasm, not realising—one hopes—that their slogan has ironic echoes of the Vichy regime’s old warcry, ‘Work, Family, Fatherland.’ They provide no coherent policies for the regeneration of community life, such as the creation of real jobs or the abolition of low pay. Instead, they offer us nostalgic images of life before the welfare state, when the working-class were poor but honest, when children believed their teachers and trusted the police, when homosexuals were invisible and single mothers shunned by polite society or institutionalised as ‘moral defectives.’” [Aidan Rankin, “Christopher Lasch and the Moral Agony of the Left.” New Left Review. Series I, number 215, January–February 1996. Pages 149-155.]
       16. global third way (William H. Thornton and Songok Han Thornton): They advocate “People Power without borders.”
           “… the American financial establishment was saved, even as its authority eroded worldwide. The big question is what will take its place on the world stage. The China model is staking its claim to that power vacuum, and if a global Third Way is not made available as an egalitarian alternative, the Washington Consensus will give way to the Beijing Consensus or its authoritarian equivalent.…
           “… Authoritarian capitalism cannot be blamed for suppressing what globalization had already destroyed. To revitalize democratization as a global force, a radically different mode of globalization will have to be fostered. We call this the Global Third Way, but what it amounts to is People Power without borders.”
           [William H. Thornton and Songok Han Thornton, “The Contest of Rival Capitalisms: Mandate for a Global Third Way.” Journal of Developing Societies. Volume 28, number 1, 2012. Pages 115–128.]
       17. PROUT (Shri Prabhat Ranjan Sarkar [Bengali/Bāṅāli, শ্রী প্রভাত রঞ্জন সরকার, Śrī Prabhāta Rañjana Sarakāra as pronounced in this MP3 audio file]): “PROUT” is an acronym for “Progressive Utilization Theory.” It is historically, but indirectly, associated with Ananda Marga (Bengali/Bāṅāli, আনন্দ মার্গ, Ānanda Mārga as pronounced in this MP3 audio file; or Hindī आनन्द मार्ग, Ānanda Mārga as pronounced in this MP3 audio file). The term translates into the English language as path of bliss or, literally, bliss path. Ananda Marga is “a global spiritual and social service organization.”
           “PROUT organizes production in three tiers or economic sectors;
           1. “Key industry; whose products provide essential resources for economic nativity (eg minerals and energy, large scale transport and communications) are managed as public utilities. Board of directors is elected democratically by the region concerned. These industries work on a ‘no profit no loss’ basis and workers should participate in management.
           2. “Cooperatives; constitute the largest sector of a PROUT economy. They include most manufacturing industries and agriculture. Cooperatives are owned and managed by their workers with scope for private investment but not control.
           3. “Private enterprise; includes remaining small scale manufacturing, retailing, service industries. This is the free enterprise private sector where prices are determined by supply and demand.
           • “Banking must be taken out of the private sector. The central bank is a key industry while trading and commercial banks operate as cooperatives.…
           • “PROUT believes that today’s global crises are largely the making of egotistical leaders who think only for their selfish interest. At a time when weapons permit the destruction of Che world, we allow politicians with the moral discipline and equal respect to all, regardless of race, sex, or religion. Simply by virtue of being human, everybody adds colour and variety to human existence.…
           • “Neohumanism is the philosophy which takes human society beyond humanism and into the 21ˢᵗ century. It has a future vision – the integrated evolution of all species and the full flowering of their physical, psychic and spiritual potentialities.”
           [PROUT: Progressive Utilization Theory—the third way. Official pamphlet. No author provided. Undated. Pages 1-8.]
           “PROUT has five fundamental principles from which all policies concerning human society are to be derived. Policies of utilization will go on changing progressively but not these fundamentals:
           1. “No individual should be allowed to accumulate any physical wealth without the clear permission or approval of the collective body.
           2. “There should be maximum utilization and rational distribution of all mundane, supra-mundane and spiritual potentialities of human society.
           3. “There should be maximum utilization of physical, metaphysical and spiritual potentialities of unit and collective bodies of human society.
           4. “There should be proper adjustment amongst those physical, metaphysical, mundane, supra-mundane and spiritual utilizations.
           5. “The method of utilization should vary in accordance with the changes in time, space and person and the utilization should be of progressive nature.”
           [Ac. Raghunath Prasad. The PROUT Companion. Edited, updated, and illustrated. New Delhi, India: Proutist Universal. 1978. Pages 18-19.]
           “In 1959, four years after starting Ananda Marga, [Shri Prabhat Ranjan] Sarkar launched PROUTist Universal (a.k.a. PROUT) as a separate organization. The latter was meant to propagate PROUT, Sarkar’s socio-economic and political philosophy. PROUTist Universal has its international headquarters in Copenhagen, Denmark. Ananda Marga’s international headquarters is at Ananda Nagar in the Purulia District of West Bengal, with a de facto headquarters in the Kolkata suburb of Tiljala.” [Helen Crovetto, “Ananda Marga and the Use of Force.” Nova Religio: The Journal of Alternative and Emergent Religions. Volume 12, number 1, August 2008. Pages 26-56.]
           “Prout proposes the maximum utilization and rational distribution of all natural and human resources, emphasizing the value of both individual and collective well-being. It is a holistic model of economic, social and spiritual concepts that include guaranteeing minimum necessities to all, the right to jobs, a three-tiered economy, including small-scale private enterprises, cooperatives, and large-scale publicly owned key industries, food sovereignty, sustainable agriculture, and economic democracy.” [Dada and Mariah Branch Maheshvarananda, “The Progressive Utilization Theory (PROUT): Alternative Economic and Spiritual Model for the Welfare of All.” Working USA. Volume 13, number 1, 2010. Pages 31-40.]
           “… [There is] a comprehensive third world based movement called PROUT (the Progressive Utilization Theory). This is a new vision developed by Indian philosopher, [Shri Prabhat Ranjan] Sarkar. He envisions a world federation consisting of diverse cultures, where people are technologically advanced and spiritually developed. For him, the vision of technological development does not mean a loss of past cultures, rather it can free time for intellectual and spiritual development, that is, for the creation of new cultures and the dialectical synthesis of past and present. This technological development must be, however, in the context of a self-reliant cooperative eocnomy (where workers are owners, where there exist income ceilings and floors, where contradictions between local and export production have been solved; an economy where the goal is equity and balance). PROUT evokes the ancient stories of the mystical, yet it does not fear the technological, the move to space or the genetic engineering creation abilities of humanity. However, sarkar sees the key in the development of a spiritual culture; one that has a respect for nature, devotion to the Infinite; intuitional disciplines, a universal outlook and a desire to selflessly serve the poor and the oppressed. True development from this perspective is individual self-realization and the creation of society wherein individuals have their basic needs met so they can develop their potential.” [Sohail Inayatuilah, “The Futures of Cultures: Present Images, Past Visions, and Future Hopes.” The Futures of Development: Selections from the Tenth World Conference of the World Future Studies Federation. E. Masini, J. Dator, and S. Rodgers, editors. Beijing, China. September 3rd–8th, 1988. Pages 109-122. Retrieved on May 22nd, 2016.]
           “Human civilization has now reached a critical stage of transition. Exploitation of one human being by another has assumed alarming proportions. At critical junctures in the past, when exploitation had reached the zenith point, history witnessed the emergence of mighty personalities who were able to overcome the problems in society. Today also, the guidance of mighty personalities with a comprehensive ideology is required to lead humanity away from the edge of disaster towards a glorious future. The emergence of such personalities is an indispensable necessity of history.” [Shri Prabhat Ranjan Sarkar in Trond Overland. A Look at Progress, Utilization and Theory. Third edition. Copenhagen, Denmark: PROUT Globe. 2011. Page 5.]
           “The cooperative system is fundamental to the organization, structure and culture of a Proutist economy. It is an expression of economic democracy in action – cooperative enterprises give workers the right of capital ownership, collective management and all the associated benefits, such as profit sharing. Sarkar, the propounder of Prout, goes further and argues that an egalitarian society is actually not possible without a commitment to the cooperative system. The commitment is not just to an economic order but also to a cooperative ethic and a cooperative culture. This essay explores cooperation from the ethical, social and cultural perspective. The business enterprise perspective is the subject of another essay in this volume.” [Michael Towsey, “The Biopsychology of Cooperation.” Understanding PROUT: Essays on Sustainability and Transformation—Volume 1. Jake Karlyle and Michael Towsey, editors. Maleny, Queensland, Australia: Proutist Universal, Australia. 2009. Pages 1-76.]
           “If we are to develop a technology of mind (eventually achieving some kind of power comparable to material technology) then we require a substantive theory of mind. Mind certainly exists in close association with matter, but mind is also its own thing. [Shri Prabhat Ranjan] Sarkar’s theory of microvita, introduced in a series of discourses from 1986 to 1990, extends a set of metaphors already well-established in physics (such as wave, particle, and multi-dimensional space) to formulate a substantive theory of mind. Part of the difficulty in embracing a science of mind is the lack of suitable metaphors to describe the apparently intangible. Sarkar’s theory is of interest if only because it emanates from a culture in which mental power is taken seriously.” [Michael Towsey, “After Materialism: Paradigm Struggle in Western Science.” Eternal Dance of Macrocosm: An Encyclopaedia of Matter, Mind and Consciousness. Michael Towsey, editor. Maleny, Queensland, Australia: Proutist Universal, Australia. 2011. Pages 1-64.]
           “It is a must to withdraw the mind from objective physicalities, because a scattered mind has neither the strength nor the capacity to achieve anything. When the mind is withdrawn from the objective physicality, it remains within the limits of the body, but even then it has not been withdrawn totally. It is still scattered throughout all parts of the body. Hence, it first has to be withdrawn from the body by concentrating it in a point. This giving of a point is a most essential factor, because when the mind gets concentrated in a point it gains in strength and power. Secondly, the point must be in that part of the body which is dominated by the sentient force.” [Ácárya Cidghanánanda Avadhúta. Ánanda Márg Meditation: Rájádhirája Yoga – The Most Sublime and Kingly Tantra Yoga. Purulia, India: Ánanda Márga Publications. 2007. No pagination.]
           “Bliss is infinite happiness. It is the fundamental desire of human beings. ‘There is in the living being a thirst for limitlessness.’ We can never be satisfied with limited things. They may give us pleasure for a while, but not long-lasting satisfaction. A limited object can only give a temporary and limited amount of happiness. But only infinite happiness will satisfy us. So how are we to attain it? By expanding our awareness to infinity; by transforming our individual limited experience into the cosmic experience of the unlimited: infinite happiness; perfect peace and contentment – bliss.” [Dada Gunamuktananda (compiler). Ánanda Márga: Path of Bliss. Flushing, New York: Ánanda Márga Publication. 2006. Page 4.]
       18. alterglobalization and glocalization (Geoffrey Pleyers, Roland Robertson, and many others): These third-way approaches promote globalization coupled with social justice, as in alterglobalization, or localism, with glocalization (a neologism). The word “alterglobalization” (alternatively alter-globalization or alternative globalization) is a translation of the French-language term «altermondialisation (MP3 audio file)».
           “Even when globalization is met with little or no resistance, it can usually be described as glocalization (a term coined by Roland Robertson).…
           “Globalization is two-sided and operates through dialectical negation.…
           “Working out these tensions generates a variety of third ways or alternatives. This is, among other things, where the term glocalization comes into its own, but also terms like alter-globalization ….”
           [Thomas Hylland Eriksen, “Globalization.” The Human Economy: A Citizen’s Guide. Keith Hart, Jean-Louis Laville, and Antonio David Cattani, editors. Malden, Massachusetts: Polity Press. 2010. Pages 21-31.]
           “The movement was first called anti-globalization.…
           “Alter-globalization intellectuals often share with their neoliberal adversaries and experts in the international institutions a tendency to reduce complex reality to a few calculable parameters, essentially drawn from economic analysis. From terrorism to cultural homogenization, they tend to perceive a common source for all evil: growing inequalities created by neoliberal globalization. Hence, attacks on the legitimacy of the neoliberal economic model and calls for another economics represent a major thrust of their struggle. Alter-globalization experts seek to demonstrate that the Washington Consensus policies are not only socially unfair but also economically irrational and invalid according to scientific criteria. Their major criticisms hence rest on two central values: rationality and democracy.
           [Geoffrey Pleyers, “Alter-Globalization.” The Human Economy: A Citizen’s Guide. Keith Hart, Jean-Louis Laville, and Antonio David Cattani, editors. Malden, Massachusetts: Polity Press. 2010. Pages 63-74.]
           “… the article posits that justice globalism also provides practical policy alternatives to those currently touted by market globalists. The existence of strong ideological and policy components in justice globalism suggests that, contrary to the assertion of neoliberals, justice globalism is not simply anti-globalization. Instead, it may be described more accurately as alter-globalization, offering a sophisticated alternative vision of global politics at the outset of the twenty-first century.” [Manfred B. Steger and Erin K. Wilson, “Anti-Globalization or Alter-Globalization? Mapping the Political Ideology of the Global Justice Movement.” International Studies Quarterly. Volume 56, 2012. Pages 439–454.]
           “In reflecting on the failure of the ‘human right to water’ campaigns to foreclose the involvement of the private sector in water supply management, we broach a question often raised by ‘alter-globalization’ activists: how can we negotiate resistance to neoliberalization? In raising this question, alter-globalization (as distinct from anti-privatization) activists are often dismissive of human rights, arguing that ‘rights talk’ resuscitates a public/private binary that recognizes only two unequally satisfactory options—state or market control: twinned corporatist models from which communities are equally excluded ….” [Karen Bakker, “The ‘Commons’ versus the ‘Commodity’: Alter-Globalization, Anti-Privatization, and the Human Right to Water in the Global South.” Antipode. Volume 39, issue 3, June 2007. Pages 430-455.]
           “Ever since the alterglobalization movement made itself visible to the world on the streets of Seattle by shutting down the 1999 World Trade Organization meeting, many scholars have tried to understand what holds this highly diverse and divergent movement together. The coalitions and coordination between movement actors who for all intents and purposes held different goals, adversaries, and identities baffled many spectators.” [Marianne Maeckelbergh, “Doing is Believing: Prefiguration as Strategic Practice in the Alterglobalization Movement.” Social Movement Studies. Volume 10, number 1, January 2011. Pages 1-20.]
           “The word glocalization derives from the Japanese term dochakuka [Japanese, 土着化, dochakuka], meaning ‘global localization’ or, in micro-marketing terms, the tailoring of global products and services to suit particular cultural tastes …. Sociological usage of glocalization highlights the simultaneity or co-presence of both universalizing and particularizing tendencies in globalization; that is, the commonly interconnected processes of homogenization and heterogenization ….” [Richard Giulianotti and Roland Robertson, “Forms of Glocalization: Globalization and the Migration Strategies of Scottish Football Fans in North America.” Sociology. Volume 41, number 1, February 2007. Pages 133-152.]
           “The concept of ‘glocalization’ underpins our analysis, and has been applied elsewhere to explain the globalization of football …. Notwithstanding significant divergences, analysts in both fields agree that glocalization encapsulates the quotidian complexity of local–global or universal–particular relations in the context of intensified global compression and transnational change.” [Richard Giulianotti and Roland Robertson, “Recovering the social: globalization, football and transnationalism.” Global Networks. Volume 7, number 2, 2007. Pages 144-186.]
           “‘Glocalization’ is a neologism to speak of the complex interplay of global and local. If one looks it up in Wikipedia, it is mostly about marketing, adapting global brands and products to local preferences in order to be more successful commercially. That is still too close to an export model, in my opinion. The process runs deeper than that; the local dimension, the emphasis on particularity, is not merely instrumental but ought to be considered to be a genuine source of insight.” [Willem B. Drees, “Glocalization: Religion and Science Around the World.” Zygon: Journal of Religion and Science. Volume 50, number 1, March 2015. Pages 151-154.]
           “According to the dictionary meaning, the term ‘glocal’ and the process noun ‘glocalization’ are ‘formed by telescoping global and local to make a blend’ …. If one takes a long-term view of globalization, ‘locality’ or ‘local’ itself is a consequence of globalization. Hardly, any cultures can be seen as isolated or unconnected from the global processes.…
           “… Glocalization (a neologism of globalization and localization) has emerged as the new standard in reinforcing positive aspects of worldwide interaction, be it in textual translations, localized marketing communication, socio-political considerations, etc. Its decorum is to serve a negotiated process whereby local customer considerations are coalesced from the onset into market offerings via bottom-up collaborative efforts. Cultural, lingual, political, religious and ethnic affiliations are simultaneously researched and integrated into a unified holistic solution.”
           [Mohammad Shamsuddoha, “Globalization to Glocalization: A Conceptual Analysis.” SSRN Electronic Journal. December, 2008. Pages 1-11.]
       19. social and solidarity economy (Mariana Curado Malta as pronounced in this MP3 audio file, Ana Alice Baptista as pronounced in this MP3 audio file, Cristina Parente as pronounced in this MP3 audio file, Ethan Miller, and many others): The social economy is the sector of the economy which promotes collective well-being. The solidarity economy—which includes cooperatives, the commons (resources which are shared, jointly, by members of a human population), and not-for-profit organizations—focuses upon eradicating injustice through economic equality.
           “The Social and Solidarity Economy (SSE), reported in the literature as the ‘other economy’ is a third way, distinct from the market economy and the state power …. It boils down in a pragmatic way to the union or association of people with a common purpose for the group and the society around them, where new values are born in opposition to practices of the capitalist world that are considered predatory. The SSE is characterized by solidarity and equality, the collective ownership of the work and its non-alienation ….
           “… The Social Economy was born to solve social problems that the state did not manage to solve.…
           “… Solidarity Economy is characterized by solidarity and equality, by the collective ownership of work. It is based on the idea that those having no capital are not necessarily less able and have therefore the right to perform more complex and less alienating tasks.”
           [Mariana Curado Malta, Ana Alice Baptista, and Cristina Parente, “Social and Solidarity Economy Web Information Systems: State of the Art and an Interoperability Framework.” Journal of Electronic Commerce in Organizations. Volume 12, number 1, January-March 2014. Pages 35-52.]
           “A third way was … proposed, which was the product of the interaction between theory and practice and capable of transforming into legal terms a theoretical model based on open access, diffused use, and disseminated power to defend the integrity of the resource.
           “In the proposed reform, beside the categories of the public goods and of the private goods belonging to the public, the [Rodotà] Commission introduced the category of the commons, which was then applied to goods belonging to the natural and cultural patrimony of the country such as rivers, streams, lakes, air, forests, flora, and fauna, but also to all those goods considered of archaeological, cultural, and environmental relevant.”
           [Alessandra Quarta and Tomaso Ferrando, “Italian Property Outlaws: From the Theory of the Commons to the Praxis of Occupation.” Global Jurist. Volume 15, number 3, 2015. Pages 261-290.]
           “The concept of SSE [solidarity/social economies] has a long theoretical pedigree, and has been developed by academics in concert with a set of social movements, which span the globe …. In the United Kingdom, this research has focused on the development of a ‘social’ economy, with particular attention paid to the role that progressive financial institutions and enterprises directed by social missions might play in producing a different kind of economic development …. In contrast, the Brazilian conception of the solidarity economy places heavy emphasis upon worker cooperatives and reflects the country’s long history with landless worker movements …. In the United States, theoretical examination of the solidarity economy has been comparatively limited, as is the development of a concomitant social movement ….” [Maliha Safri, “Mapping noncapitalist supply chains: Toward an alternate conception of value creation and distribution.” Organization. Volume 22, number 6, 2015. Pages 924-941.]
           “A … way to establish a commons is to organize important institutions and resources as nonprofit, nongovernmental associations, or networks of associations.
           “The characteristic features of associations are: voluntary membership; considerable autonomy from other institutions; internal deliberation; rules or norms to govern membership and conduct; and common ownership. They differ from corporations because they do not sell shares, and they differ from states because they do not compel membership or claim sovereign powers.”
           [Peter Levine, “Building the Electronic Commons.” The Good Society. Volume 11, number 3, 2002. Pages 1 and 4-9.]
           “Father Arizmendi (as he [the Basque priest, Jose Maria Arizmendiarrieta] is often referred) envisioned the cooperative system as a ‘“third way” between the options of unbridled capitalism and centralized socialism that preserved individual economic incentive while emphasizing collective commitment and goals’ … Father Arizmendi’s philosophy [was that] of [a] solidarity economy ….” [Nathalia E. Jaramillo and Michelle E. Carreon, “Pedagogies of resistance and solidarity: towards revolutionary and decolonial praxis.” Interface: a journal for and about social movements. Volume 6, number 1, May 2014. Pages 392-411.]
           “… Solidarity Economy involves thinking beyond the neoliberal logic, in a framework of economic pluralism, aiming ultimately at producing socioeconomic innovation and social transformation, in a third way that departs from both the neoliberalism governed by free markets and the omnipresence of the state.” [Heloisa Primavera, “Social Currencies and Solidarity Economy: An Enduring Bond of Common Good.” WorkingUSA: The Journal of Labor and Society. Volume 13, March 2010. Pages 41-59.]
           “Solidarity economics is fundamentally different than both capitalist and state socialist economics. Instead of starting with a grand theory, it starts with our practices. Instead of demanding a single plan or vision for the economy, it seeks to connect many diverse initiatives together in ways that respect their differences and independence. Instead of putting forward a single vision of economic organization (how the economy should be structured); solidarity economics provides us with a model for economic organizing—a process by which we can democratically strengthen and create new kinds of economic relations in our communities.” [Ethan Miller, “Solidarity Economics: Strategies for Building New Economies From the Bottom-Up and the Inside-Out.” Grassroots Economic Organizing (GEO) Collective. June, 2005. Pages 1-14.]
           “The idea and practice of ‘solidarity economics’ emerged in Latin America in the mid-1980s and blossomed in the mid to late [19]90s, as a convergence of at least three social trends. First, the economic exclusion experienced by growing segments of society, generated by deepening debt and the ensuing structural adjustment programs imposed by the International Monetary Fund, forced many communities to develop and strengthen creative, autonomous and locally-rooted ways of meeting basic needs. These included initiatives such as worker and producer cooperatives, neighborhood and community associations, savings and credit associations, collective kitchens, and unemployed or landless worker mutual-aid organizations.” [Ethan Miller, “Other Economies Are Possible: Building a Solidarity Economy,” in Ethan Miller and Michael Albert. Post-Capitalist Alternatives: New Perspectives on Economic Democracy. London, Ontario: Socialist Renewal Publishing Project. 2009. Creative Commons. Pages 16-22.]
           “Our country’s emerging solidarity economy embodies wisdom earned through countless manifestos, meetings, demonstrations, and experiments with change. It is led by our country’s vibrant social movements – worker and anti-class, civil rights and anti-racist, feminist, welfare rights and anti-poverty, ecology, lesbian and gay liberation, disability, and peace movements – in connection and interaction with movements abroad. These movements have engaged millions of Americans in processes of individual and social transformation. They have taught us to recognize and overcome our prejudices; to become more whole and balanced; and to honor our bodies and the Earth. They have taught us to question the competitive consumerist ‘American dream’ which denies us the well-being it promises, while destroying our planet. They have pointed out, each from their own lens, the many ways in which our economic practices and institutions must change if they are to truly embody the American ideals of equality, democracy, and freedom. In this way, our social movements have laid the groundwork for an epochal shift in our country, out of a paradigm based on polarization, hierarchy, competition, and domination, to one based instead on equality, democracy, freedom, and solidarity.” [Jenna Allard and Julie Matthaei, “Introduction.” Solidarity Economy: Building Alternatives for People and Planet – Papers and Reports from the U.S. Social Forum, 2007. Jenna Allard, Carl Davidson, and Julie Matthaei, editors. Chicago, Illinois: ChangeMaker Publications. 2008. Page 1.]
           “Solidarity economy is an open process, an invitation. The concept does not arise from a single political tradition or body of ideas. Its very nature and definition are in continual development, discussed and debated among its advocates. Seeking to ‘make the road by walking’ rather than to push a closed or finalized ideology, solidarity economy is a ‘movement of movements’ continually seeking connections and possibilities while holding on to the transformative commitment of shared values. In such a spirit, this chapter will present neither a complete nor an ‘objective’ view of solidarity economy. Writing as an activist and a scholar in the U.S. context, I seek to contribute towards a concept and practice of solidarity economy that might be useful and appropriate to making change here in the ‘belly of the beast.’ While I draw on some writing—and much inspiration—from the work of those in other parts of the world, I also recognize and honor the responsibility that we have to forge our own ideas about solidarity economy.” [Ethan Miller, “Solidarity Economy: Key Concepts and Issues.” Solidarity Economy I: Building Alternatives for People and Planet. Emily Kawano, Tom Masterson, and Jonathan Teller-Ellsberg, editors. Amherst, Massachusetts: Center for Popular Economics. 2010.]
           “Linda Hartling suggests inclusionism. I suggest dignism (or dignitism, this is a term that starts with dignity, then becomes dignity-ism, then dignitism, and in its shortest form dignism).
           “Both terms, inclusionism, and dignism, could also be expressed as ethical economy, or plural economy, or solidarity economy.
           “Unity in diversity and the subsidiarity principle are central to inclusionism and dignism. We, as humankind, should not allow unity to degrade into uniformity as in oppressive communism, for example, and global consumerism. And we should not allow diversity to degrade into the division of everybody-against-everybody, as it happens in the extreme individualism we see in disintegrating capitalist contexts.”
           [Evelin Lindner. A Dignity Economy: Creating an Economy that Serves Human Dignity and Preserves Our Planet. Lake Oswego, Oregon: Dignity Press. 2011. Creative Commons. Page 38.]
           SolidarityNYC: “We’re a collective of organizers and academics who promote, connect, and support New York City’s solidarity economy. Solidarity economy practices utilize values of justice, democracy, cooperation, and mutualism to meet community needs. Our collective renders these practices visible, through mapping and filmmaking, and brings the sectors of the solidarity economy into greater cooperation with each other for enhanced economic and political power through education, organizing, and research.” [“SolidarityNYC connects, supports, and promotes New York City’s solidarity economy.” SolidarityNYC. Undated. Retrieved on September 11th, 2015.]
           Solidarity Economy St. Louis: “Intentionally organizing with low-income communities, many of which have a rich history of engaging in the solidarity economy, partially because they have no choice and have been marginalized, disenfranchised, and excluded from the current economy.” [Our Mission. Solidarity Economy St. Louis. Undated. Retrieved on September 11th, 2015.]
           The U.S. Solidarity Economy Network (SEN): “SEN members organized or are participated in a number of workshops that relate to different aspects of the solidarity economy.” [“SEN Updates.” The U.S. Solidarity Economy Network (SEN). April 12th, 2012. Retrieved on September 11th, 2015.]
           Brazilian Forum of Solidarity Economy (FBES): “Solidarity Economy is fruit of the organization of workers in the construction of new economical and social practices based on relations of solidary partnership, and inspired on cultural values where men and women are protagonists and the purpose of the economic activity, and not the private accumulation of wealth in general and capital in particular.” [“The Management and Organization Experience of the Solidarity Economy Movement in Brazil.” Brasília, Brazil. January, 2006. Retrieved on September 17th, 2015.]
           Institute for Solidarity Economics: “We are a small organisation dedicated to providing infrastructural and financial support for research and popular education projects that further the grassroots movement for a just and sustainable economic system.” [“What We Do.” Institute for Solidarity Economics. Undated. Retrieved on September 17th, 2015.]
           U.S. Solidarity Economy Mapping Platform: “In the U.S. and all throughout the world there is a growing solidarity economy (SE) where people and communities are working together to put people and planet over blind profit maximization and reckless growth. The solidarity economy is grounded in principles of solidarity, equity, sustainability, participatory democracy and pluralism (meaning it’s not a one-size-fits-all model). Practices that the solidarity economy embraces include worker, consumer, producer, and housing cooperatives; fair trade, community land trusts; credit unions; social currencies; participatory budgeting; collective childcare, community gardening, community supported agriculture/seafood, and the commons movement, to name a few. There is a substantial foundation that already exists upon which to build a solidarity economy.” [About the Solidarity Economy Mapping Project. U.S. Solidarity Economy Mapping Platform. Undated. Retrieved on September 18th, 2015.]
           Solidarius – Soluções para Redes Solidarias (MP3 audio file) [in English, Solidarius – Solutions for Solidarity Networks]: “From our perspective, Solidarity Economy is a strategy of economic liberation for the popular classes and for human societies as a whole, which uses the concept of ‘well living’ as a reference for the ethical exercise of public and private freedoms. This perspective understands Solidarity Economy as a way of living, as an economic system in construction, as an axis of struggle for the overcoming of exploitation and economic domination and for the construction of a new society, ecologically sustainable, economically fair, politically democratic and recreated, day by day, on the basis of intercultural dialogue.” [Euclides Mance, “Solidarity Economy.” Solidarius – Soluções para Redes Solidarias. December, 2011. Retrieved on September 17th, 2015.]
           RIPESS – Intercontinental Network for the Promotion of Social Solidarity Economy: “RIPESS’ mission is to build and promote the social solidarity economy (SSE), which takes into account the social and ethical dimension in all its economic activities. Thus the SSE aims to produce, exchange and consume goods and services that answer the economic and social needs of the local and international communities.” [“About Us.” RIPESS – Intercontinental Network for the Promotion of Social Solidarity Economy. 2014. Retrieved on September 17th, 2015.]
           “The social economy (SE) exists at the nexus between civil society, the economy, and the state. It is comprised of a variety of public, private and non-profit entities that provide goods, services, and information to the public with the aim of generating both economic productivity and social solidarity ….” [“What is the Social Economy?” Social Economy in Arizona. Undated. Retrieved on September 17th, 2015.]
           “… the historical roots of the social economy lie within the thought and work of the utopian socialists and the early attempts to create alternative communitarian responses to the mainstream capitalist economy through the use of the co-operative model. This early history framed later definitions that retained the emphasis on an alternative paradigm that challenged the classical understanding of capitalist economics, including the control of capital.
           “Very quickly the concept came to be used to refer to collective enterprises and associations guided by ethical and moral considerations, not just material gain.”
           [John Restakis. Defining the Social Economy – The BC Context. British Columbia Cooperative Association. January, 2006. Page 8. Retrieved on October 1st, 2015.]
           “Undoubtedly, the social economy is a sector which makes a significant contribution to employment creation, sustainable growth and to a fairer income and wealth distribution. It is a sector which is able to combine profitability with social inclusion and democratic systems of governance, working alongside the public and private sectors in matching services to needs. Crucially, it is a sector which has weathered the economic crisis much better that others and is increasingly gaining recognition at the European level.” [José Luis Monzón and Rafael Chaves. The Social Economy in the European Union. International Centre of Research and Information on the Public, Social and Cooperative Economy (CIRIEC). Undated. Retrieved on October 1st, 2015. Page 6.]
           “A wide number of new strategies exist for assuring that the commons, in its many forms, is protected and enhanced over time. Some involve government and law, others depend on informal governance and social sanctions, while still others work with market mechanisms and other hybrid models.” [“Commons Strategies.” On the Commons. Undated. Retrieved on September 18th, 2015.]
           “The idea of universal access to research, education, and culture is made possible by the Internet, but our legal and social systems don’t always allow that idea to be realized. Copyright was created long before the emergence of the Internet, and can make it hard to legally perform actions we take for granted on the network: copy, paste, edit source, and post to the Web. The default setting of copyright law requires all of these actions to have explicit permission, granted in advance, whether you’re an artist, teacher, scientist, librarian, policymaker, or just a regular user. To achieve the vision of universal access, someone needed to provide a free, public, and standardized infrastructure that creates a balance between the reality of the Internet and the reality of copyright laws. That someone is Creative Commons.” [“About.” Creative Commons. Undated. Retrieved on October 1st, 2015.]
           “The most important aspect of necessity that we must now recognize, is the necessity of abandoning the commons in breeding. No technical solution can rescue us from the misery of overpopulation. Freedom to breed will bring ruin to all. At the moment, to avoid hard decisions many of us are tempted to propagandize for conscience and responsible parenthood. The temptation must be resisted, because an appeal to independently acting consciences selects for the disappearance of all conscience in the long run, and an increase in anxiety in the short.
           “The only way we can preserve and nurture other and more precious freedoms is by relinquishing the freedom to breed, and that very soon. ‘Freedom is the recognition of necessity’—and it is the role of education to reveal to all the necessity of abandoning the freedom to breed. Only so, can we put an end to this aspect of the tragedy of the commons.”
           [Garrett Hardin, “The Tragedy of the Commons.” Science. Volume 162, number 3859, December 1968. Pages 1243-1248.]
           “Garrett Hardin’s ‘The Tragedy of the Commons’ was one of the most frequently cited articles of the twentieth century. Hardin argued that a valuable resource must be owned. If it was left unowned, it would be consumed and not replenished. There appeared to be two kinds of owners: (1) private individuals or corporations, and (2) governments. A heated debate followed about the relative advantages and dangers of each, but the consensus held that one or the other type of owner ought to own everything that mattered. If you favored the government, you leaned toward the socialist side of the political spectrum; if you preferred private ownership, you were more of a libertarian. There was not much of a third way in the theoretical literature, although there were important, overlooked alternatives in practice.” [Peter Levine, “Seeing Like a Citizen: The Contributions of Elinor Ostrom to ‘Civic Studies’” The Good Society. Volume 20, number 1, 2011. Pages 3-14.]
           “A cooperative is a group of individuals acting together and pooling their resources for mutual benefit. By forming a cooperative, members and patrons are able to obtain services which they could not receive economically as individuals.
           “Ownership and control of a cooperative are vested in the member. In a cooperative organized with capital stock, membership is evidenced by ownership of one or more shares of voting (or ‘common’) stock. Some State laws limit the amount of common stock held by individuals to a percentage of the total amount issued.”
           [Raymond Williams and Richard Douglas. Financing New Cooperatives. Washington, D.C.: United States Department of Agriculture. April, 1979. Page 1.]
           “Sojourners was founded in 1971—35 years ago—by a little group of seminarians at Trinity Evangelical Divinity School near Chicago.…
           “Eleven years ago, we founded Call to Renewal, with many other partners and organizations, to specifically focus on poverty by uniting churches and faith-based organizations across the theological and political spectrum to lift up those whom Jesus called ‘the least of these.’ While disagreeing on many other issues, we all agreed on the biblical priority of the poor and wanted to come together around a common mission to overcome poverty. But to do that, we needed a new organization for that specific purpose, one that didn’t have the history of any existing group.”
           [Jim Wallis, “Sojourners/call to renewal.” Sojourners Magazine. Volume 35, number 9, September–October 2006. Pages 5+.]
           “To restrict faith to only a few issues of mostly personal morality leaves wealth, power, and violence unchallenged. Religion becomes a political support for injustice and for those who defend the status quo. After I was a guest on The Daily Show with John Stewart for the first time, many young people emailed me to say, ‘I didn’t know that you could be a Christian and care about poverty, the environment, or the war in Iraq.’ The success of my book God’s Politics revealed hundreds of thousands of people who didn’t feel represented by a narrow Religious Right, nor a secular Left, and were seeking a biblical, theological, and spiritual foundation for social justice.” [Jim Wallis, “From a Shoebox to a Movement.” Sojourners Magazine. Volume 40, number 10, November 2011. Pages 14-16.]
           “The strength of the American Right is its willingness to stick by its own ideas rather than compromising them for the sake of momentary victories.…
           “Imagine how much impact it would have if there were a Left with similar clarity and commitment to its principles, combined with a genuine openness to building an alliance among secular, spiritual, and religious progressives.
           “Well, that is precisely what we propose to do with the Tikkun Community’s newest project—the creation of a Network of Spiritual Progressives. Building on the Core Vision of The Tikkun Community, we are taking the first steps to create an interfaith network that will link together on a grassroots level anyone who might want to be part of a Spiritual/Religious Left.”
           [(Rabbi) Michael Lerner, “What is a Network of Spiritual Progressives?” Tikkun: to heal, repair, and transform the world. Volume 20, number 4, July–August 2005. Pages 7-10.]
           “The Next System Project is an ambitious multi-year initiative aimed at thinking boldly about what is required to deal with the systemic challenges the United States faces now and in coming decades. Responding to real hunger for a new way forward, and building on innovative thinking and practical experience with new economic institutions and approaches being developed in communities across the country and around the world, the goal is to put the central idea of system change, and that there can be a ‘next system,’ on the map. Working with a broad group of researchers, theorists, and activists, we seek to launch a national debate on the nature of ‘the next system’ using the best research, understanding, and strategic thinking, on the one hand, and on-the-ground organizing and development experience, on the other, to refine and publicize comprehensive alternative political-economic system models that are different in fundamental ways from the failed systems of the past and capable of delivering superior social, economic, and ecological outcomes.” [Gar Alperovitz, James Gustave Speth, and Joe Guinan. The Next System Project: New Political-Economic Possibilities for the Twenty-First Century. Washington, D.C.: The Next System Project. March, 2015. Page 2.]
           “‘Social economy’ and ‘solidarity economy’ are two frameworks for understanding the economic alternatives springing up around the globe. In parts of western Europe, Latin America, and Africa, these terms are commonly applied to a range of socio-economic-cultural development strategies, activities, and structures, ranging from the small and local to the large and global. They are less familiar in North America, outside Québec. To some their meaning is uncertain. To others, it is unimportant. Are they not just two more additions to our ‘alphabet soup’ of terminology?
           “We don’t think so. Both frameworks deserve close consideration, especially by those working in the field.”
           [Michael Lewis and Dan Swinney, “Social Economy & Solidarity Economy: Transformative Concepts for Unprecedented Times?” Solidarity Economy: Building Alternatives for People and Planet—Papers and Reports from the U.S. Social Forum 2007. Jenna Allard, Carl Davidson, and Julie Matthaei, editors. Chicago, Illinois: ChangeMaker Publications. 2008. Pages 28-41.]
           “Unlike other economies meant to counter capitalism’s hegemony, the ‘how’ of the solidarity economy is purposefully left open to interpretation. Instead of a blueprint or action plan, the solidarity economy is an ideological framework. How one community’s version of a solidarity economy looks as compared with another depends upon its particular political, industrial, and cultural past, as well as social and physical geography, indigenous knowledge and collective shared experience. In other words, place matters: cultural specificities, as well as the particular demographics, assets, and resources of region, city, or neighborhood influence how different communities approach building community wealth and expressions of solidarity.” [Susan Sakash. A Mutual Aid and Pleasure Society: New Orleans and the Solidarity Economy. M.A. thesis. Goddard College. Plainfield, Vermont. Spring, 2015. Page 26.]
           “This paper aims to contribute to the debate on alternatives to capitalism, first, by reviewing recent literature on the alternatives to capitalism (and neoliberalism) thesis. It will then look into how various forms of peoples’ solidarity economies and state-initiated democratic participatory schemes become spaces or provide spaces for the development of counter-consciousness (outside the capitalist common sense) and concomitantly build capacities for the development of projects, initiatives and economies beyond the capitalist logic. Finally, it establishes a ‘dialogue’ between theoretical debates on the subject and existing meso and micro social experiments and initiatives. Through this ‘dialogue,’ we aim to address the apparent disconnect between macro level theoretical discourses and micro level practices and struggles. We argue that although the meso and micro initiatives occur and are rooted in distinct places, they share common elements which link them across space and time.” [Melisa R. Serrano and Edlira Xhafa, “The Quest for Alternatives beyond (Neoliberal) Capitalism.” Working paper number 14. The Global Labour University. Kassel, Germany. September, 2011. Pages I-VI and 1-79.]
           “… the creation of democratic worker cooperatives (DWCs) in a capitalist context proved exceedingly difficult. Capitalists attacked union coops, sometimes violently, but most often denied investment capital and limited access to markets. Repeated coop failures, conservative labor leaders’ acceptance of capitalist control over production and the Marxist-Leninist emphasis on state control as the means to power led labor to drop worker cooperative development as an organizing strategy.” [John W. Lawrence, “Democratic Worker Cooperatives: An Organizational Strategy Reconsidered for the 21ˢᵗ Century.” New Politics. Volume 9, number 1, summer 2002. Pages 116-122.]
       20. human economy (Malak Zaalouk [Arabic/ʿArabiyyaẗ, مَلَاك زَعْلُوك, Malāk Zaʿlūk] and many others): He specifically focuses on a third “co-operative way.”
           “The author argues that, instead of continuing with profit-oriented capitalism or relying on the informal sector, the co-operative way represents a third alternative to existing economic sectors within the dominant contemporary economic system. The article analyses the many benefits of this path for the realisation of a humane economy. In so doing, it touches on issues of equity and social protection. Finally, the article outlines what needs to be done if this is to be a viable solution for a human economy.…
           “What this paper is suggesting is to develop the ‘third way,’ namely the co-operative way as a strategy of fulfilling the exigencies of a humane economy.…
           “Co-operatives are economic organisations or enterprises owned and run by an association of members according to co-operative principles for the purpose of satisfying shared economic and social needs ….
           “They are enterprises that put people rather than capital at the centre of their business. Because of this, they follow a broader set of values than those associated purely with making a profit – namely self-help, self-responsibility, democracy, equality, equity and solidarity.”
           [Malak Zaalouk, “A human economy: A ‘third way’ for the future of young people in the Middle East and North Africa.” International Review of Education. Volume 60, issue 3, June 2014. Pages 339-359.]
       21. liberal collectivism (Sungmoon Kim [Korean, 성문 김, Sŏngmun Kim as pronounced in this MP3 audio file]): He explores the development of a distinctively Korean third way.
           “The … normative question … is Should Koreans enthusiastically embrace them to have a true (i.e. ‘liberal’) democracy? Can’t there be any way that Koreans’ collective, if not collectivistic, culture can empower their own form of democracy—a democracy pivoted not so much on liberal individualism, but on, say, ‘liberal collectivism’? …
           “… In the face of the psycho-cultural and political predicament generated by a ‘clash of civilizations,’ the alternative that Koreans came up with was a special ethos of collective responsibility that complements, rather than nullifies, the individual’s sense of responsibility (or guilt).…
           “… This new civil ethos therefore is neither individualistic nor collectivistic, neither purely Confucian nor unqualifiedly liberal, and neither sentimentalist nor legalist; rather, in each instance, it is both.…
           “… one should be cautioned that the distinction of the two groups [those advocating for traditional Korean familial relations and those advocating for justice] is by no means exhaustive. More accurately, they are not categorically two but one that includes the other, and vice versa. The difference is only relative and it is through this ambivalence that Koreans searched for a third way.”
           [Sungmoon Kim, “Liberal Collectivism: The Korean Challenge to Liberal Individualism.” The Good Society. Volume 16, number 1, 2007. Pages 54-59.]
       22. Third Way urbanism (Roger Keil): He adopts the third-way notion as an approach to urbanism.
           “At the turn of the millennium, the Western world talks about a Third Way. Yet the ascendance of New Left/New Labour and talk about various ‘third ways’ in national governments in Western countries present us with a dilemma.…
           “For the purposes of this article, I call … [the] three pathways [of urbanism] neo-liberal urbanism, progressive urbanism, and Third Way urbanism. These three fields are potentially overlapping and sometimes interdependent in their discursive construction in the political arena.…
           “Although the Third Way is not as conservative as the neoliberal project on social issues, its proponents still use identity to draw a mostly traditional urban society. The difference is that the Third Way will accept social difference and integrate it into the vision of social engineering through urban design. Ecological modernization, sustainability, and new urbanism are the fields of dreams of boomer middle classes. This comes with an acceptance of the suburbanization of the city both in the burbs and in the inner city (gentrification, spectacularization); it also comes with the market as the sole ruler of urban affairs and with a shift from the collectivity of earlier projects of Stadtbürgertum [urban bourgeoisie] to the individuality and self-centeredness of market-based activity of the suburban consumer middle classes.”
           [Roger Keil, “Third Way Urbanism: Opportunity or Dead End?” Alternatives: Global, Local, Political. Volume 25, number 2, April-June 2000. Pages 247-267.]
       23. community organizing (Saul D. Alinsky and others): This approach to community-based empowerment, originated by Alinsky, incorporated some political Marxian tactics but not Marxist theory. It is sometimes understood as a third-way approach. As an illustration, see the ICA International (Institute of Cultural Affairs) website.
           “Through community organizing, which builds ‘bridging’ social capital, community members establish relationships of trust with school and elected officials. Through these relationships, they become aware of each other’s concerns and agendas and make commitments for follow-through. Secondly, powerful communities can counter competing economic and political interests, ultimately compelling officials to act in the interests of low-income communities. Making discussions public is a third way that education organizing creates the political will that can bring bureaucracies to take action. When these discussions are public, everyone’s interests are on the table. Without back door deals, it is more difficult to dodge responsibility for taking action.” [Eva Gold, Elaine Simon, and Chris Brown. Strong Neighborhoods Strong Schools: The Indicators Project on Education Organizing. Chicago, Illinois: Cross City Campaign for Urban School Reform. March, 2002. Page 34.]
           “In ‘Rule for Radicals,’ Saul Alinsky advises organizers to ‘personify problems’ and ‘identify an enemy’ against whom action can be mobilized. ICA’s [Institute of Cultural Affairs’s] approach is to transcend polarization by finding a third way forward.” [Terry Bergdall. An Introduction to the Organizational Wisdom of ICA: Principles, Values, and Perspectives. Toronto, Canada: ICA International. 2015. Page 2.]
           “Few of us [the radicals of my generation] survived the Joe McCarthy holocaust of the early 1950s and of those there were even fewer whose understanding and insights had developed beyond the dialectical materialism of orthodox Marxism.” [Saul D. Alinsky. Rules for Radicals: A Practical Primer for Realistic Radicals. New York: Random House. 1971. Page xii.]
           “… a Marxist begins with his prime truth that all evils are caused by the exploitation of the proletariat by the capitalists. From this he logically proceeds to the revolution to end capitalism, then into the third stage of reorganization into a new social order or the dictatorship of the proletariat, and finally the last stage—the political paradise of communism….
           “An organizer working in and for an open society is in an ideological dilemma. To begin with, he does not have a fixed truth—truth to him is relative and changing; everything to him is relative and changing. He is a political relativist.”
           [Saul D. Alinsky. Rules for Radicals: A Practical Primer for Realistic Radicals. New York: Random House. 1971. Pages 10-11.]
           “What follows is for those who want to change the world from what it is to what they believe it should be. The Prince was written by [Niccolò] Machiavelli for the Haves on how to hold power. Rules for Radicals is written for the Have-Nots on how to take it away.” [Saul D. Alinsky. Rules for Radicals: A Practical Primer for Realistic Radicals. New York: Random House. 1971. Page 3.]
           “I’ve never joined any organization – not even the ones I’ve organized myself. I prize my own independence too much. And philosophically, I could never accept any rigid dogma or ideology, whether it’s Christianity or Marxism. [Saul D. Alinsky. Interview. 1967.]
           “The position taken by organized labor is consistent with their role in a monopolistic capitalist economy. They must be opposed to Socialism, Communism or any other philosophy which would destroy private ownership of industry or private employment. From their point of view, the introduction of a Socialistic society would mean the death knell of the present organized labor movement. If the working classes were to assume political control of the economy and society, there would be little point in the continuation of the present type of labor unions. The function of a labor union is first of all to bargain collectively between employers and employees. Under Socialism, which would involve public ownership of the means of production, the collective bargaining would have to take place between the government (the employer) and the unions. If the government is a people’s government, from the Socialist or Communist point of view, representing the working classes, the question could well be raised as to what sense there would be for the people to establish labor unions in order to protect themselves against their own government or themselves.” [Saul D. Alinsky. Reveille for Radicals. Chicago, Illinois: University of Chicago Press. 1946. Page 50.]
           “[Saul] Alinsky adapted the Marxist approach to conflict as an organizing tool, but without using the explicit Marxist approach to class struggle. This was accomplished by crystallizing support in minority and low-income communities by attacking the local community power structure and making demands on them for things such as jobs. Not only was this considered impertinent, but it was also usually done by explicitly making it clear who the individuals in the local power structure were. For example, instead of just picketing an important local company at its factory gates, Alinsky would organize pickets at the boss’s home, embarrassing the person in his own neighborhood. Tactics such as these were considered outrageous but usually helped define a ‘we’ (of the minority and low-income population) versus a ‘they’ (of the local power structure). During the civil rights movements of the 1960s, Alinsky’s approach to organizing was popular in Chicago; in Buffalo, Syracuse, and Rochester in New York State; in St. Louis, Missouri; and in various places in California….
           “The Alinsky approach had its most dramatic manifestation when the organizer Cesar Chavez (1927-1993) adopted it in organizing the United Farm Workers (UFW) union.”
           [William H. Friedland and Michael Rotkin, “Community Organizing.” Encyclopedia of Community. Karen Christensen and David Levinson, editors. Thousand Oaks, California. SAGE Publications, Inc. 2003. Pages 288-291.
           “The Alinsky method of community organizing learned its tactics and approach from the Communist Party and the Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO). The Alinsky method encouraged organizers to get community people in touch with their anger, to ‘rub raw people’s resentments,’ to use any and all nonviolent tactics in order to publicize issues and win victories, and thereby see the power of collective direct action. [Saul D.] Alinsky believed that almost any and all tactics were justifiable to protect democracy and advance the interests of working people. He understood that power concedes nothing without struggle, and the more creative and unpredictable a community’s strategies and tactics the more effective their efforts. Of course, Alinsky’s theory and practice did not only use conflict. His efforts used a wide variety of tactics to achieve their goals. But it was Alinsky’s use of militant tactics for which he is best known. In the late 1930s, with so much at stake due to both economic depression and the rise of fascists, militant protest fit well with the turmoil in society.
           “Alinsky explicitly rejected ideological organizing, and later on he emphasized in response to the New Left that organizing must be ‘nonideological.’ He saw ideological organizing as fundamentally undemocratic, as contrary to community organizing.”
           [Robert Fisher, James DeFilippis, and Eric Shragge, “History Matters: Canons, Anti-Canons, and Critical Lessons from the Past.” The Community Development Reader. Second edition. James DeFilippis and Susan Saegert, editors. London and New York: Routledge imprint of Taylor & Francis Group, an Informa PLC business. 2012. Google Play edition.]
           “In regard to the extent of ‘white collar’ crimes, it is apparent that the Jews have been proportionally greater offenders than the non-Jews. The size of the differences between the two groups is rapidly narrowing, however, and by the end of the [19]20’s was only one third or one fourth as large as it had been. Like the prevalence of the factor of ‘crimes against the person,’ ‘white collar’ crimes also appear to be disappearing as a differentiating characteristic of the Jewish ‘minority.’” [A. J. Jaffe and Saul D. Alinsky, “A Comparison of Jewish and Non-Jewish Convicts.” Jewish Social Studies. Volume 1, number 3, July 1939. Pages 359-366.]
           “The March Against Corruption is an international grassroots campaign dedicated to fighting corruption and promoting democracy and human dignity using tactics of nonviolent resistance. It began on social media in 2013 and the first global day of action occurred on November 2, 2013 when thousands of people in dozens of cities across the world took to the streets protesting corruption.
           “The March Against Corruption is a non-partisan effort to build an anti-corruption movement to put pressure on our political system from the outside and raise awareness of, challenge, and eventually defeat the systemic corruption of the governments that are supposed to represent, and defend the rights and interests of, The People….
           “The first and most important thing to realize about organizing protests is that The People are always what matter the most. The political power of people in sheer numbers is what is needed to overpower all the money and all the power and all the organization of those countless entities that corrupt our government with money and favors and cronyism. There is no substitute for People Power, and almost every tactic taken to battle corruption must ultimately be aimed at the public consciousness….
           “As we organize to exercise our right to free expression we must dedicate ourselves to promoting democracy and human dignity alike. The March Against Corruption is an international march that utilizes the tactic of direct action to raise awareness about the corruption within governance and public policy making. March Against Corruption is proud to be a part of the continuous global revolution. As we individually commit to organizing actions we offer new and experienced organizers alike both tools and knowledge.
           “While we welcome all individuals to participate with respect to our commitment toward nonviolent action on the streets, we also encourage the utilization of other non-violent direct action tactics. The desired tactic we aspire to inspire is self-actualization. Self-actualization is the realization and fulfillment of one’s own talents and potentialities. Our goal is to allow for innovation within our current paradigm shift so that corruption is not allowed to manifest itself, or will be exposed throughout its manifestation.” [An Organizer’s Strategy Guide for Peaceful Revolution. Version 1.0. March Against Corruption: Uniting for Democracy & Human Dignity. September, 2014.]
           “A tribune of the people is a leader who fights against self-interested or even group-interested organizing among her own people and replaces it with a transformative view of social change. Examples of tribunes of the people include a Latina community organizer who fights for affirmative action for Blacks instead of insisting that ‘only Latinos are hard working and deserve the jobs,’ a white radical feminist who fights for the interests of Third World women inside and outside the United States, a Black worker who supports unconditional amnesty for Latino immigrants and gets his union to support the legal rights of gays to marry.” [Eric Mann. Playbook for Progressives: 16 Qualities of the Successful Organizer. Boston, Massachusetts: Beacon Press. 2011. Page 109.]
           “Our Policy Directions are our Principles applied to Politics. We believe that we need to carry on our heritage of expanding rights and opportunities. We owe most of our freedoms to those who worked before us. It is our responsibility to build a better future for following generations.” [“Our Policy Directions.” La Raza Unida Organizing Committee: Caring. Responsibility. Strength. Albuquerque, New Mexico. Undated. Retrieved on September 19th, 2015.]
           “As a caring family we have the responsibility to act for our mutual benefit, and to develop the strength to carry this out. This extends to our future generations as well. This warmth is for us today and our future generations tomorrow. It is the warmth of human caring and affection.” [“Our Principles.” La Raza Unida Organizing Committee: Caring. Responsibility. Strength. Albuquerque, New Mexico. Undated. Retrieved on September 19th, 2015.]
           “Founded originally by Saul Alinsky …, the IAF [Industrial Areas Foundation] now represents the nation’s largest faith-based community organizing network. Reconstructed after Alinsky’s death in 1972 by its new director Ed Chambers, the IAF has built more than 60 local affiliates across the country and is rapidly growing. Its potential reach is quite extensive as the IAF claims to incorporate more than 1,000 congregations that, in turn, include more than 1 million member families.” [Mark R. Warren, “Community Building and Political Power: A Community Organizing Approach to Democratic Renewal.” American Behavioral Scientist. Volume 42, number 1, September 1998. Pages 78-92.]
       24. third way of civic populism (Harry C. Boyte): He discusses a third-way movement inspired by Monsignor Geno C. Baroni (MP3 audio file). It is also associated with community organizing.
           “In the late 1960s, key bridging figures translated the freedom movement’s developmental or organizing politics into an explicit populism tied to community organizing.…
           “Among these translators, Monsignor Geno Baroni was arguably the most important. Son of an immigrant coal mining family in Pennsylvania, Baroni became a Catholic priest in 1956, served in working-class parishes in Altoona and Johnstown, Pennsylvania, and then was transferred to an inner-city African American parish in Washington. He became involved in the freedom movement, served as Catholic coordinator for the 1963 March on Washington, and led the Catholic delegation to the 1965 Selma-to-Montgomery March.
           “The enormous ferment among ethnic-minority Americans in the late 1960s inspired many intellectuals to move sharply in a conservative direction, forming the basis for neo-conservatism. But a key group of ethnic leaders and intellectuals forged a third way of populism, neither mass politics liberalism nor neo-conservatism. For these leaders, Baroni was a pivotal figure, a courageous and inspiring organizer of a new ethnic, populist movement with immense democratic potential. [U.S.] Representative Marcy Kaptur (D-OH [Democrat from Ohio]), who, like Barbara Mikulski (D-MD [Democrat from Maryland]) and many others, continues to call herself a disciple of Baroni, described the new democratic ethnic politics clearly as a commemoration of his life.” [Harry C. Boyte, “Introduction: Reclaiming Populism as a Different Kind of Politics.” The Good Society. Volume 21, number 2, 2012. Pages 173-176.]
           “[Geno C.] Baroni became a Catholic priest in 1956, served in white ethnic working class parishes, then transferred to an inner city African American parish in Washington. He was Catholic coordinator for the 1963 March on Washington, and led the Catholic delegation to the 1965 Selma to Montgomery March. In the late sixties, Baroni argued for a third way in politics, which he called the new populism. New populism differed from universalist liberalism focused on rights and redistribution and contemptuous of white ethnics whom liberals saw as bastions of bigotry. It also differed from neo-conservatism with its Burkean, defensive perspective. This is how Baroni described his vision:
           “The organizer has to believe that ordinary people can build bridges across racial and ethnic lines. The organizer has to get ordinary people in touch with their roots, their heritage, their best. The organizer has to give ordinary people hope.”
           [Harry C. Boyte, “Civic Populism: The People’s Politics of Geno Baroni.” Solutons: For a sustainable and desirable future. Volume 6, issue 1, April 2015. Creative Commons. Pages 10-15.]
           “Learning more of populist history …, I came to believe that the ‘new populism’ advocated by the community organizing leader Monsignor Geno Baroni was not a cover for ‘stealth socialism,’ as is charged by today’s conservatives. Rather, populism is best conceived as a democratizing, non-ideological politics.” [Harry C. Boyte, “Populism—Bringing Culture Back In.” The Good Society. Volume 21, number 2, 2012. Pages 300-319.]
           “From the vantage of public work, focusing on what is ‘missing’ in American politics eclipses the alternative based on citizen agency. This approach has been associated with populist themes now caricatured in the mainstream as a politics of grievance. In populism with a democratic cast, by way of contrast, people care about the commons when they help make and sustain it through their public labors, and the development of popular agency is a constituting theme.” [Harry C. Boyte, “Constructive Politics as Public Work: Organizing the Literature.” Political Theory. Volume 39, number 5, October 2011. Pages 630-660.]
           “Broad-based community organizing networks such as the Gamaliel Foundation, the Industrial Areas Foundation, and PICO involve Republicans as well as Democrats. Some include Muslims, Jews, and Christians. Groups contain diverse cultures, sometimes as broad as a mix of African Americans, Latinos, European Americans, Asian Americans, and Native Americans. Though their primary base is working families, they also include very poor people and some upper middle class families. These groups act on practical issues such as immigrant rights, housing, jobs, health, and education.” [Harry C. Boyte, “A Commonwealth of Freedom: Response to Beltrá.” Political Theory. Volume 38, number 6, 2010. Pages 870-876.]
           “The freedom movement functioned as a vast citizenship school in which people developed civic agency—the capacity to act wisely and effectively together for democratic change in the nation.” [Harry C. Boyte, “A Challenging Patriotism.” Change: The Magazine of Higher Learning. Volume 44, issue 4, June 2012. Pages 22-26.]
           “We live in a complicated society, with big corporations and big government, and the individual has a hard time dealing with them.
           “So, in terms of looking for a policy framework, federal initiatives are needed, but they must be conceived by people at the local level, and the people must be involved. The involvement of families and neighborhoods is essential. Otherwise, I think big government could destroy the civility of a society.
           “Finally, I think America has to recognize its diversity and learn to deal with that diversity.”
           [Geno C. Baroni in Geno C. Baroni, Richard G. Hatcher, Mark O. Hatfield, and Richard G. Lugar. The Future of Urban Centers: What are the Policy Options? John Charles Daly, moderator. Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute. 1978. Page 5.]
       25. distributism, distributivism, or distributionism (Pope Leo XIII, Gilbert K. Chesterton, and others): This third-way economic proposal is rooted in nineteenth- and early twentieth-century Roman Catholic teachings. The Distributist Review features articles on the subject.
           “Many claim that there is no ‘third way,’ that only capitalism or socialism can be chosen. We find this particularly among the most radical of both factions, whose ideology is inextricably entwined in the false principles of these systems. The communists, of course, claim that the inevitable evolution of society will draw men to communism; if one seeks to resist communism, one can only end up with capitalism. The Austrian economists see things likewise; they hold that any system not based on their principles of free-market economics must inevitably become, if it is not by its very nature already, a socialist state. Some of these thinkers have been very open about their opinions on these subject.” [Donald P. Goodman. Distributism: A Catholic System of Economics. Martinsville, Virginia: Goretti Publications. 2006. Creative Commons. Page 39.]
           “The papal encyclicals give us the principles; distributism means to give us the means, the methods by which the principles of the encyclicals can be put into action. Our purpose has been, first and foremost, to explain what distributism can offer to the economic milieu in the early twenty-first century, particularly in America.” [Donald P. Goodman. Distributism: A Catholic System of Economics. Martinsville, Virginia: Goretti Publications. 2006. Creative Commons. Page xi.]
           “Assaulted for nearly a century with charges of socialism, even Trotskyism, distributism stands alone as an economic system specifically designed around the papal encyclicals and the traditional social teaching of the Church. It is certainly the most conforming system yet devised. If, then, its principles can be examined, corrected where necessary, and thus brought more in line with the teachings of the Church and the social reign of Christ the King, then a truly Catholic system of economics will have been conceived, and Catholics in the West will have something to work for in their attempts to reform the economic order in the image of God and His Mother. To this cause the next two chapters are dedicated, and we beseech the blessing of Christ the King and the prayers of His Mother as we embark upon this noble task.” [Donald P. Goodman. Distributism: A Catholic System of Economics. Martinsville, Virginia: Goretti Publications. 2006. Creative Commons. Page 43.]
           “… [A] universal commitment to the common good is a feature distinctive to distributism, which no other proposed or existing system shares; it is a dedication to the good of the whole community, rather than to that of individuals or even private groups. This commitment has been called by many different names; in the modern day, however, it is most often called by the name of solidarity.” [Donald P. Goodman. Distributism: A Catholic System of Economics. Martinsville, Virginia: Goretti Publications. 2006. Creative Commons. Pages 64-65.]
           “… [Here] is distributism’s primary emphasis in economic doctrine: that the normal member of the state ought to be an owner, as opposed to capitalism, in which only a few are owners, and socialism, in which the state is the only owner. Productive property must be restored to the poor, or distributism, no matter how much good it might do with the above measures and others, has not really fulfilled its true mission.” [Donald P. Goodman. Distributism: A Catholic System of Economics. Martinsville, Virginia: Goretti Publications. 2006. Creative Commons. Page 86.]
           “Distributism naturally supports local and family-owned business. This is simply required by its principles. The wider distribution of productive property requires, of course, the wider distribution of businesses which deal in the products of that property. Ideally, of course, the business will sell the same items that it produces; often, however, businesses will sell the produce of others, particularly farmers, who for one reason or another decide to sell through a businessman rather than directly. However, in either case ownership by a single family of a single store, rather than by a multinational corporation of many stores, is preferable because of the greater distribution of productive property (property, that is, which is productive of wealth) which it requires. The distributist, then, should support such businesses as often and as greatly as possible.” [Donald P. Goodman. Distributism: A Catholic System of Economics. Martinsville, Virginia: Goretti Publications. 2006. Creative Commons. Page 97.]
           “Implicit in the notion of distributionist justice is the idea that to evaluate the justice of a given distribution it is enough to know what the alternative possible distributions are. This point is highlighted when (with respect to those distributionist principles which allow inequalities in the size of the packets of benefits) we notice that specific assignments to individuals are a matter of indifference.” [Eric Mack, “Distributionism Versus Justice.” Ethics. Volume 86, number 2, January 1976. Pages 145-153.]
           “… Ordo Liberals proposed a political-economic order in which the state would play a positive though limited role in maintaining the social framework of the free market—those social, political, and economic arrangements which work in tandem with competition to preserve a ‘free, happy, prosperous, just, and well-ordered society.’ It was a position not unlike that taken by Henry Simons, William Orton, and even the British and American decentralist writers of the 1930s known as distributists and the Southern Agrarians.” [Andrew W. Foshee and William F. Campbell, “Catholic Social Encyclicals and Wilhelm Roepke’s Political Economy of the ‘Third Way.’” Catholic Social Science Review. 1997. Pages 117-144.]
           “About fifteen years ago a few of us began to preach, in the old New Age and New Witness, a policy of small distributed property (which has since assumed the awkward but accurate name of Distributism), as we should have said then, against the two extremes of Capitalism and Communism. The first criticism we received was from the most brilliant Fabians, especially Mr. Bernard Shaw. And the form which that first criticism took was simply to tell us that our ideal was impossible. It was only a case of Catholic credulity about fairy–tales. The Law of Rent, and other economic laws, made it inevitable that the little rivulets of property should run down into the pool of plutocracy. In truth, it was the Fabian wit, and not merely the Tory fool, who confronted our vision with that venerable verbal opening, ‘If it were all divided up to–morrow–’” [G. K. Chesterton. The Outline of Sanity. London, England: Aeterna Press. 2015. Google Play edition.]
           “… though man may sacrifice anything, Everyman must not sacrifice everything. Individual men must sacrifice their own liberties, but only to restore liberty. And it is a grand irony that, while the cultured Communist (with all respect to him) is rending everybody else’s garments and scattering ashes on other people’s heads, away in many quiet places, on the hills of Lanark or deep in my own Buckingham beech-woods, priests and friars who have themselves renounced private property are rebuilding the farms and families of Distributism.…
           “… What is totally intolerable is the idea that everybody must pretend, for the sake of peace and decorum, that moral inspiration only comes from secular things like Distributism, and cannot possibly come from spiritual things like Catholicism.”
           [G. K. Chesterton. The Well and the Shadows. Cookhill, Alcester, Warwickshire, England: Read Books Ltd. 2013. Google Play edition.]
           “Property is a point of honour. The true contrary of the word ‘property’ is the word ‘prostitution.’ And it is not true that a human being will always sell what is sacred to that sense of self-ownership, whether it be the body or the boundary. A few do it in both cases; and by doing it they always become outcasts. But it is not true that a majority must do it; and anybody who says it is, is ignorant, not of our plans and proposals, not of anybody’s visions and ideals, not of distributism or division of capital by this or that process, but of the facts of history and the substance of humanity. He is a barbarian who has never seen an arch.…
           “There is such a thing as what we should call ideal Distributism; though we should not, in this vale of tears, expect Distributism to be ideal. In the same sense there certainly is such a thing as ideal Communism. But there is no such thing as ideal Capitalism; and there is no such thing as a Capitalist ideal. As we have already noticed (though it has not been noticed often enough), whenever the capitalist does become an idealist, and specially when he does become a sentimentalist, he always talks like a Socialist.

           [Gilbert K. Chesterton in The Third Way: Foundations of Distributism as Contained in the Writings of Pope Leo XIII and Gilbert K. Chesterton. Paul A. Böer, Sr., compiler and editor. New York: Veritatis Splendor Publications. Kindle edition.]

           “To cite the wise words of St. Thomas Aquinas: ‘As the part and the whole are in a certain sense identical, so that which belongs to the whole in a sense belongs to the part.’ Among the many and grave duties of rulers who would do their best for the people, the first and chief is to act with strict justice—with that justice which is called distributive—toward each and every class alike.” [Pope Leo XIII in The Third Way: Foundations of Distributism as Contained in the Writings of Pope Leo XIII and Gilbert K. Chesterton. Paul A. Böer, Sr., compiler and editor. New York: Veritatis Splendor Publications. Kindle edition.]

           “Distributism offers another way, an economic system which will place fewer obstacles for fallen humanity to put first things first, to put material goods in their own proper place and value other things more. Capitalism as it has always operated has produced a commercial society that distracts men from what is important and fosters the greed and love of money that St. Paul called the ‘root of all evils.’ Genuine socialism likewise turns men away from what is important toward this-worldly manner of existence that in the end is as materialistic as the commercial capitalism that it critiques. Distributism is the best and easiest method of avoiding the errors of each. Distributism by itself will not, of course, banish greed from the hearts of men, but it does not provide artificial incentives to greed and the amassing of goods beyond the reasonable needs of one’s self and family. Distributism points fallen human nature toward its true good, and although individuals are always free to sin, a just social order will aid and support us in our struggle for virtue.” [Thomas Storck, “A Distributist Looks at Capitalism and Socialism.” The Distributist Review. November 8th, 2010. Retrieved on May 25th, 2016.]

           “The evolution of British Catholic studies found, instead, a conservative application in the ‘distributionism’ of Lord [Gilbert K.] Chesterton ….” [Stefano Solari, “The corporative third way in Social Catholicism (1830 to 1918).” The European Journal of the History of Economic Thought. Volume 17, issue 1, February 2010. Pages 87-113.]
       26. Just Third Way and binary economics (Louis O. Kelso, Mortimer J. Adler, Norman G. Kurland, Dawn K. Brohawn, Michael D. Greaney, Rodney Shakespeare, Robert Ashford, and others): This approach—associated with the Center for Economic and Social Justice, Arco Carib, The Kelso Institute, the Global Justice Movement, and Binary Economics—was initiated through the work of Kelso and Adler. The perspective has close ties with distributism. Although Adler himself was a Jewish convert to Roman Catholicism (and a Thomist), not all proponents of the Just Third Way and binary economics are Roman Catholics.
           “Mortimer Adler co-wrote a book with Louis Kelso, which, though it is called The Capitalist Manifesto, is an attempt to apply distributist principles to a financialized economy.” [Peter Blair, “Distributism is not Agrarianism.” First Things: America’s Most Influential Journal of Religion and Public Life. May 30th, 2014. Online publication. No pagination.]
           “What is needed to bring about a truly free and just market system is a truly moral or ‘Just Third Way,’ which transcends and transforms both capitalism and socialism, providing mechanisms to accomplish what the two discredited systems have only promised.…
           “The four pillars of a ‘Just Third Way’ consist of:
           • “Universal Access to Capital Ownership
           • “Limited Economic Power of the State
           • “Free And Open Markets
           • “The Restoration of Private Property”
           [Norman G. Kurland, Dawn K. Brohawn, and Michael D. Greaney. Capital Homesteading for Every Citizen: A Just Free Market Solution for Saving Social Security. Washington, D.C.: Center for Economic and Social Justice. 2004. Page 22.]
           “A socialist … may think that capitalism is being advocated. A capitalist may find himself thinking that this fellow [Father William J.] Ferree must have been a socialist. Both would be wrong. Father Ferree gives us the tools we need to find another way, a third way that leaves behind the greed of capitalism and the envy of socialism, a third way that is socially just and within the reach of everyone through acts of Social Justice carried out in association with others.” [Norman G. Kurland’s foreward to Father William J. Ferree, S.M. Introduction to Social Justice. Washington, D.C.: Center for Economic and Social Justice. 1997. Page xii.]
           “… we can … [consider] the shortcomings of any theory of Social Justice which makes it a mere ‘intention for the Common Good.’ The Holy Father [Pope Pius XI] is categorical in his statement that Social Justice must enter into the practical order before it can be said to exist. He says that all institutions, both those ‘of peoples’ (governmental) and those ‘of all social life’ (semi-public and private) must be penetrated with this justice. He insists further that ‘it is necessary that it be truly effective.’” [Father William J. Ferree, S.M. Introduction to Social Justice. Washington, D.C.: Center for Economic and Social Justice. 1997. Page 15.]
           “The most obvious, and certainly the most distressing, consequence of a system which rigidly links the formation and ownership of new capital to the ownership of existing capital is the progressive concentration of the ownership of capital. Once we state the proposition that the ownership of savings (capital) is a condition precedent to becoming the owner of newly formed capital and that the magnitude of one is directly proportionate to that of the other, then it follows that increasing industrialization is synonymous with growing concentration of the ownership of capital. It is this relationship between the ownership of existing capital and the ownership of newly formed capital which explains why, in spite of the ownership of some capital by perhaps 15 percent of the households of the economy, the great bulk of capital is owned by 3 or 4 percent of the households.” [Louis O. Kelso and Mortimer J. Adler. The New Capitalists: A Proposal to Free Economic Growth from the Slavery of Savings. San Francisco, California: Kelso Institute. 2000. Page 19.]
           “Ours is not the manifesto of a revolutionary party dedicated to overthrowing the established order. It is instead a revolutionary manifesto which calls upon the American people as a whole to find in the established order the reasons for its renovation and the seeds of the better society we can develop. The end, at last in view, is that ideal society to which America has always been dedicated and toward which it has made great progress since its beginning.
           “THE CAPITALIST MANIFESTO is intended to replace the Communist Manifesto as a call to action, first of all in our own country, and then, with our country’s leadership, everywhere else in the world. It is our industrial power and capital wealth, together with our institutions of political liberty and justice, that make America the place where the capitalist revolution must first take place to establish economic liberty and justice for all.
           [Louis O. Kelso and Mortimer J. Adler. The Capitalist Manifesto. San Francisco, California: Kelso Institute. 2000. Page 14.]
           “People in developing countries are increasingly rejecting capitalist and socialist models of development as powerconcentrating and exploitative, or outmoded and inefficient. The Just Third Way … is a nation-building model based on the equal opportunity of every citizen to acquire and possess productive capital assets within an economy that decentralizes economic power. The new model provides a stable foundation for an effective and religiously pluralistic democracy. It offers a viable and politically unifying framework for all Iraqi citizens to work and prosper together, regardless of their religious, ethnic, cultural and other differences.” [Norman Kurland, “A new model of nation-building for citizens of Iraq.” Futures. Volume 40, issue 9, November 2008. Pages 841–843.]
           “Higher wages are not the focus of the real Third Way. The Third Way is a systematic approach, balancing the demands of participative and distributive justice by lifting institutional barriers which have historically separated owners from nonowners. This involves removing the roadblocks preventing people from participating fully in the economic process as both workers and owners. More people can then begin earning incomes from both labor and capital.
           “The emphasis of the Third Way is not on redistribution of income, but on providing people with social means and a legal system which will encourage them to create their own new wealth and share in profits broadly and equitably.”
           [Norman G. Kurland and Michael D. Greaney, “The Third Way: America’s True Legacy to the New Republics.” Curing World Poverty: The New Role of Property. Saint Louis, Missouri: Social Justice Review. 1994. Pages 269-280.]
           “So there’s the vision of society — that we can live together because we have built up common expectations of habitual actions, of actions that are always the same. They always have the same significance and people count on that like we count on it. Because we can count on these common expectations we can live. You can see then why society becomes important for human perfection.” [William Ferree, S.M. Social Charity. Washington, D.C.: Center for Economic and Social Justice. 2003. Page 23.]
           “We walked the 89 kilometers track in fifty days, each day reflecting on one year of the Cuban Revolution. Each day we wrote an article analyzing both socialism and capitalism as though there were freedom of speech in Cuba. Into these reflections we wove a general overview of what we prefer to call Solidarism, generally referred to as the Just Third Way. The reflections were posted daily on our website at www.arcocarib.com and sent to approx. 300 people worldwide (including Cuban opposition groups), who forwarded them to their networks.” [Michiel Bijkerk. Cuba, a New Beginning: March from Santa Fé to Nueva Paz. Bonaire, the Netherlands: Golden Mean Society imprint of Arco Carib. December, 2009. Pages 2-3.]
           “This story sets the stage for the Bank GMS [Golden Mean Society] will set up. It is connected to the Sun in the sense that the first 3 letters of the words ‘solidarity’ and ‘solidity’ (‘sol’) is Latin for ‘Sun.’ The Bank promotes solidarity and financial solidity. We call it Balancism, i.e. the Just Third Way. That is the solution.” [Michiel Bijkerk. Paradigm Regained: An Untrodden path to Arcadia. Bonaire, the Netherlands: Golden Mean Society imprint of Arco Carib. 2015. Page 31.]
           “Binary economics is a theory of economic growth that places emphasis upon the distribution of capital, rather than the quantity of capital or the productivity of labor. Its roots are found in the late 1950s, in the work of Louis Kelso, originator of the Employee Stock Option Plan. Regarded as a paradigm shift by its proponents, binary economics maintains that capital is productive independent of the labor input, and that most economic growth occurs as a result of capital accumulation, exclusive of increases in the knowledge or skills of humans.” [Timothy D. Terrell, “Binary Economics: Paradigm Shift or Cluster of Errors.” The Quarterly Journal of Austrian Economics. Volume 8, number 1, spring 2005. Pages 31-50.]
           “While social justice is generally associated with progressives and those further to the Left, it is also a central concept of the Third Way/Communitarian movement. Both former President Clinton and former Prime Minister Blair declared themselves to be adherents of the Third Way.
           “For me, the Third Way is an elitist philosophy based on a sense of moral superiority. It is based on the writings of Louis Kelso, the philosophical father of The Just Third Way, and Mortimer Adler, who taught the Philosophy of Law at the University of Chicago Law School.”
           [Jared Silverman, “How to define ‘social justice’: It’s all relative.” New Jersey Jewish News. Online newspaper. June 9st, 2010. Retrieved on May 24th, 2016.]
           “Binary Economics offers a conception of economics that is foundationally distinct from the economic theories presently employed by government, private enterprise, charitable institutions, and individuals to formulate and evaluate economic policy. Because it is foundationally distinct from classical, neoclassical, Keynesian, monetarist, and socialist economics, binary economics specifically offers a distinct explanation for the persistence of poverty, unutilized capacity, and suboptimal growth. First advanced by Louis Kelso, binary economics holds that (1) labor and capital are equally fundamental or ‘binary’ factors of production, (2) technology makes capital much more productive than labor, (3) the more broadly capital is acquired with the earnings of capital the faster the economy will grow.” [Robert Ashford, “Binary Economics – An Overview,” Working paper number 15. College of Law Faculty Scholarship. College of Law, Syracuse University. 2010. Pages 1-16.]
           “Binary Economics: Adam Smith’s free market theory, with its central assumptions modified to reflect that, since the Industrial Revolution, people produce goods and services and earn income both through their labor power and their privately owned capital.” [Louis O. Kelso and Patricia Hetter Kelso. Democracy and Economic Power: Extending the ESOP Revolution through Binary Economics. Lanham, Maryland: University Press of America. 1991. Page 165.]
           “In Binary Economics: The New Paradigm, Robert Ashford and Rodney Shakespeare, an American law professor and an English historian respectively, explain the premises and principles which Louis Kelso first discovered and then developed and refined into a logically coherent model of the free market system during his long career (more than 50 years) as a lawyer and investment banker. Although academic economists have either ignored Kelso or dismissed him as an ‘amateur crank’ (Paul Samuelson’s famous epithet), his binary paradigm explains, as theirs do not, such ‘anomalies’ as the economic decline of the middle class, growing social alienation, and our inability to transfer technology to the emerging nations in ways that do not create bubble economies that inevitably burst.” [Patricia Hetter Kelso, “Binary Economics: The New Paradigm.” Review article. The Kelso Institute. 2014. Online publication. No pagination.]
           “Quick Technical Summary of Binary Economics
           1. “Commercial banks to lend (at interest), as they wish, only their own money and, with permission, that of depositors. Commercial banks not allowed to create new money. NB This creates a limited pool of money enabling reasonable interest rates to be paid to depositors.
           2. “Central (or National or European) Bank to create interest-free loan money for productive capacity and, in particular, for the spreading of productive capacity (and thus the associated consuming capacity), over time, to every person in society. This is counter-inflationary because new, widespread productive (and consuming) capacity comes into existence while the money which created it is cancelled.
           3. “The Central Bank interest-free loan money to be administered by the commercial banks only allowed to make a reasonable administration charge.
           4. “The Central Bank need only make periodic checks on a commercial bank to ensure that the interest-free loan supply is being used specifically for the spreading of productive capacity.
           [Rodney Shakespeare, “Introduction.” Binary Economics. Undated web page. Retrieved on May 25th, 2016.]
           “In the binary economy, as capital is increasingly acquired over time by people of the poor or middle classes that capital will (after returning its acquisition costs) begin to pay a capital income to its new owners thus supplementing their labor income and reducing their welfare dependence. Each year, with growing participation in capital acquisition among people of the poor and middle classes, capital will increasingly distribute to its new owners the earnings necessary to buy what capital increasingly produces. Thus all people will increasingly be able to afford to buy with their capital earnings what is increasingly produced by capital. In open binary capital markets, supply (in the form of incremental capital investment) can increasingly be financed by way of voluntary market transactions to provide the capital foundation (in the form of capital dividends) for growing poor and middle class consumer demand.” [Robert Ashford and Rodney Shakespeare. Binary Economics: The New Paradigm. Lanham, Maryland: University Press of America. 1999. Pages 15-16.]
           “Wide ownership – on the principles of binary economics – uses interest-free money to enable any person in the population, over time on market principles, to have a basket of shares paying out their true, full earnings. In practice it means that not only employees but people not in formal employment (e.g. women carers and children) may have an income because they have been connected to what truly creates wealth – productive capital assets.” [Rodney Shakespeare, “The comparative role of banking in binary and Islamic economy.” Humanomics. Volume 25, issue 2, May 2009. Pages 142-162.]
           “The new way uses Islamic endogenous loans. These are state-issued, repayable, interest-free loans which are generally administered by the banking system on market and private property principles. The loans are counter-inflationary and are always directed at productive capacity.” [Rodney Shakespeare, “Islamic Endogenous Loans.” Humanomics. Volume 21, issue 3/4, March 2005. Pages 85-91.]
           “Binary economics asserts that capital has a potent distributive relationship to growth. If this proposition is true, then the democratization of capital acquisition (by reforming the economic system to extend to everyone the competitive opportunity to acquire capital with the earnings of capital) will enable all people, rich and poor, to become wealthier and an under-capacity producing economy to grow up to its potential level and perhaps beyond ‘full potential’ as that term is generally understood.…
           “According to binary economics, a true democracy requires individual participation in both political power (universal suffrage) and economic power (universal participation in production by way of both labor and capital ownership). By this definition, it is undemocratic that only some individuals are able to acquire capital with the earnings of capital. Believing that the distribution of capital ownership has a potent distributive relationship to growth that is suppressed in under-producing capitalist economies (because institutional barriers prevent and discourage efficient, growth-enhancing ownership-broadening transactions), binary economists propose institutional reforms intended to open capital acquisition more competitively to all people.”
           [Robert Ashford and Demetri Kantarelis, “Capital democratization.” The Journal of Socio-Economics. Volume 37, issue 4, August 2008. Pages 1624–1635.]
           “Milton Friedman’s thesis that a competitive, free market, private enterprise, capitalist system is an essential condition for freedom has been critiqued in published articles from many economic perspectives but not from the perspective of binary economics. This article offers insights regarding deficiencies in Dr. Friedman’s analysis based on binary economics that sheds light on the necessary economic conditions for freedom.” [Robert Ashford, “Milton Friedman’s Capitalism and Freedom: A Binary Economic Critique.” Journal of Economic Issues. Volume 44, number 2, June 2010. Pages 533-541.]
           “The approach described in this article, based on principles of binary economics, calls for an implementation of a voluntary, ownership-broadening system of corporate finance that would require no taxes, redistribution, borrowing, or government command. Corporations would be free to continue to meet their capital requirements as before, but they would have an additional, potentially more profitable, market means to do so.” [Robert Ashford, “Beyond austerity and stimulus: democratizing capital acquisition with the earnings of capital as a means to sustainable growth.” Journal of Post Keynesian Economics. Volume 36, number 2, winter 2013–14. Pages 179-205.]
           “The neglected role of capital in the production of wealth and economic growth, and the importance of the fair distribution its ownership for a just and democratic society, was written about by corporate finance attorney and investment banker Louis Kelso beginning in the late 1950s. Using a rather inelegant term, binary economics, to emphasize the equal importance of capital and labor in the productive process, Kelso and his followers demonstrated that since the beginning of the industrial revolution, the productive capacity of technology, or capital, has increased greatly in excess of that of labor.” [Sidney M. Greenfield, “Making Another World Possible: The Torah, Louis Kelso, and the Problem of Poverty.” Explore: The Journal of Science and Healing. Volume 3, issue 5, 2007. Pages 492-501.]
       27. radical–democratic program (Roberto Mangabeira Unger as pronounced in this MP3 audio file): He characterizes this third-way approach as committed to “democratic experimentalism.”
           “Let me call this … program the radical-democratic program. It represents the commitment to democratic experimentalism as we might hope to realize it in the domain of industrial organization. If democratic experimentalism for society as a whole advances by combining the generalization of experimentalist opportunities with the enhancement of individual capacities and securities, we should expect to find a similar union in a program of business reform responsive to the ambitions of the democratic experimentalist.
           “Two insights animate this radical-democratic alternative, connecting the practical problems it solves to the democratizing and experimentalist spirit it expresses. The first insight is that the inherited regime of property, contract, and corporate law imposes unnecessary and unwarranted restraints upon access to productive resources and opportunities.…
           “The second insight informing the radical-democratic alternative is that workers can best be defended by arrangements that enhance their capabilities rather than entrench their positions. The aim is to help them thrive in the midst of innovation rather than to shield them, and their customary ways of life, from the destabilizing consequences of invention. This idea exemplifies the general commitment to develop those cooperative arrangements that are friendliest to innovation. It also makes the assumption that only such a form of social defense can be inclusive, avoiding the contrasts between insiders and outsiders with which the standard social-democratic program remains complicit.”
           [Roberto Mangabeira Unger. Democracy Realized: The Progressive Alternative. London and New York: Verso imprint of New Left Books. 1998. Pages 48-50.]
           “The failure of the ‘second way’ has been so unequivocal that it has brought with it the repudiation of all ‘third ways.’ There is nothing these ‘third ways‘ or ‘market socialisms’ promise, according to this dominant view, that has not been been better accomplished by the first and only way: the route taken by the existing democratic market societies.…
           “The countries that took the road of the command economy must now return to the fork at which they took the wrong turn.”
           [Roberto Mangabeira Unger. Democracy Realized: The Progressive Alternative. London and New York: Verso imprint of New Left Books. 1998. Page 89.]
           “A particular feature of Democracy Realized is its combination of core and periphery agendas. It proceeds via a discussion of the economic and social ‘vanguards’ and ‘rearguards’ in the current world division of labour, which clearly draws on the Brazilian experience of polarization between a highly unionized, minoritarian industrial proletariat and a far larger, informal working-class sector, yet remains universal in its application. The question posed is whether the defence of group interests here must necessarily remain ‘conservative and exclusive,’ preserving established privilege; or whether it could become what [Roberto Mangabeira] Unger calls ‘transformative and solidaristic’—unionized workers finding common cause with casual labourers in supporting schemes for decentralized access to venture capital, for example.” [Michael Rustin, “A Practical Utopianism?” New Left Review. Series II, number 26, March–April 2004. Pages 136-147.]
       28. associationism (John Milbank, Kojin Karatani [Japanese, からたに こうじん, Karatani Koujin as pronounced in this MP3 audio file; カラタニ コウジン, Karatani Koujin as pronounced in this MP3 audio file; or 柄谷行人, Karatani Kōjin as pronounced in this MP3 audio file], and others): Milbank advocates a Roman Catholic, and an Anglican (Episcopal), third-way perspective. Karatani is a major figure in the New Associationist Movement. In grand historical fashion, he makes a case for a new stateless economic system. The website, affiliated with the New Associationist Movement, is in Japanese. The term “associationism” has generally been connected with the views of French philosopher and utopian socialist Charles Fourier (MP3 audio file), 1772–1837. He is directly referenced by Milbank.
           “More power must be given to the space of powerlessness if there is to be peace and justice. So the fictional powers must be resisted and overcome, and state and market (coercion and contractual consent) reduced to their more modest and properly secular roles of serving the good of society which is the good of association. For there is no secular without the sacred contrast: a purely self-referring secular has to sacralize itself according to the merely democratic fictions of immanent justification.
           “The implications of such ‘associationism,’ which is … necessarily ‘religious,’ for political economy is the subject …
           “It can therefore be argued that the alternative to social democratic cynicism and pathos is an associationist advocacy of a ‘moral market.’ The arrival of the latter alone would free us from the political Manicheanism of cynical reason, which, needless to add, is theologically as well humanly unacceptable. Once we have identified and genealogically accounted for the ontological cynicism of the current left, it becomes clear that the real source of radical change today would be (and perhaps already is) ‘religious’ repentance, and not yet more materialist ‘analysis,’ however searching and sophisticated.…
           “My argument will be that, first, Anglicans have been at the forefront of the recovery of Augustinian notions of charity as reciprocal gift exchange and the associationist application of such ideas to the social and economic sphere; and secondly, that, despite some recent evidence to the contrary, Anglicanism has particular ecclesiologico-political reasons to be sympathetic to this integralist social agenda and indeed may have some of its own resources to offer in understanding this position in the modern world.”
           [John Milbank, “The Real Third Way: For a New Metanarrative of Capital and the Associationist Alternative.” The Crisis of Global Capitalism: Pope Benedict XVI’s Social Encyclical and the Future of Political Economy. Adrian Pabst, editor. Eugene, Oregon: Cascade Books imprint of Wipf and Stock Publishers. 2011. Pages 27-70.]
           “… in France, the sanguinary course of the 1789 revolution engendered a disgust with politics, and both [Henri de] St. Simon and [Charles] Fourier, in very different ways, advocated ‘social’ action as an alternative to political action, which was held to have revealed its limitations. Fourier wished to concentrate on the creation of local, ideal communities, while St. Simon believed that the development of industrial organization would produce a new, more scientific, more harmonious mode of polity, which would eventually replace the existing state apparatus. The English Christian socialists had, of course, no sympathy with this aspect of St. Simonianism, but, on the other hand, they promoted cooperative programs which had something in common with those of [Robert] Owen and Fourier, though much more with those of another French socialist, Philippe Buchez.” [John Milbank. The Future of Love: Essays in Political Theology. Eugene, Oregon: Cascade Books imprint of Wipf and Stock Publishers. 2009. Google Play edition.]
           “… peculiar open-yet-bound practice of giving did arise within the Christian epoch. In the Middle Ages, charity was a reciprocal ‘state,’ not just an ‘action’: its purpose was to effect real reconciliation with a visible neighbour, not to ensure oneness or ‘generosity’ to a stranger. Even the beggar who received your alms could return your love by praying for your soul, and all charity was a public exchange binding one within a ‘fraternity.’ Thus there were founded work and trade guilds, monasteries and universities, which were both free and associative, and therefore, I am arguing, the most genuine kind of community. Let us free ourselves here once and for all from all taint of Marxist Whiggery. The Christian Socialist account of history has been vindicated, not the Marxist one.” [John Milbank, “Socialism of the Gift, Socialism by Grace.” New Blackfriars. Volume 77, number 910, December 1996. Pages 532-548.]
           “[Gerald A.] Cohen’s suggestion that, aside from this exception [a ‘tolerance … of emergent inequalities according to relative skill or the vagaries of fortune’], all should be equal in terms of resources of capability, but free to spend them how they like (again an individualism of random desire), must be rejected as actually not equitable, because it denies the greater social scope that should be given to virtuously exercised skill of all kinds to the benefit of all, given that virtue is inherently transferable. The suggestion is equally impracticable because, in the face of the admitted scelerosis of the command economy, he is unable to put forward a plan for implementing his non-associative and non-cooperative socialism. The latter model is rejected because Cohen’s individualism means that, just like the neoliberals, he is unable to conceive of the economic market as other than entirely agonistic in character, and so as likely to produce renewed unjustifiable inequalities between competing associative firms.” [John Milbank, “Culture and Justice.” Theory, Culture & Society. Volume 27, number 6, 2010. Pages 107-124.]
           “… he [Slavoj Žižek] scarcely moves very far beyond the precise homology between late capitalism and postmodern philosophy which he correctly diagnoses. In what sense for him can capitalism be any more than refused in an empty subjective gesture? The alternative would indeed appear to be an austere socialist dictatorship in which the forbidding of futile desire by law benignly releases us for the privacy of chastened love according to the dictates of the autonomous law of morality. This really does reek of nostalgia for life within the tenements of communist Eastern Europe.” [John Milbank, “The Double Glory, or Paradox versus Dialectics: On Not Quite Agreeing with Slavoj Žižek.” The Monstrosity of Christ: Paradox or Dialectic? Creston Davis, editor. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press. 2009. Pages 110-223.]
           “… it is not the exact content of punishment but the marking of the seriousness of the offence in various grades of contradiction to the ideality of law. This sphere of sheer contingency remains permanently comprehensible in terms of analytic understanding (chance association and ‘externality’ of particulars) – it remains, as it were ‘left behind’ by synthetic reason.” [John Milbank, “An Essay Against Secular Order.” The Journal of Religious Ethics. Volume 15, number 2, fall 1987. Pages 199-224.]
           “We can broadly differentiate socialism into two types. The first is socialism by means of the state, and the other is socialism that rejects the state (i.e., associationism). Strictly speaking, only the latter should be called socialism. The former should properly be called state socialism or welfare statism. It is often said that the socialist movement pursued the egalitarianism that the French Revolution was never able to realize. But socialism in the strict sense (associationism) is not a continuation of the French Revolution: this socialism was actually born as a rejection of that revolution.” [Kojin Karatani. The Structure of World History: From Modes of Production to Modes of Exchange. Durham, North Carolina: Duke University Press. 2014. Page 236.]
           “Previously, I pointed out how universal religion arose in the form of an unconscious, compulsory ‘return of the repressed,’ rather than a conscious, nostalgic restoration of the past. We can draw the same distinction with regard to nationalism and socialism. Nationalism is nostalgic, a proactive attempt to restore past ways of life. By contrast, even as associationism seeks to restore the past form of mode of exchange A, it is not about restoring the past. Associationism is about creating the future anew. This is why associationism seeks to transform the status quo, while nationalism generally ends up affirming it.” [Kojin Karatani. The Structure of World History: From Modes of Production to Modes of Exchange. Michael K. Bourdaghs, translator. Durham, North Carolina: Duke University Press. 2014. Page 260.]
           “… it becomes necessary to consider a realm that [Immanuel] Kant did not scrutinize—a place where all differences are unconditionally bracketed: the monetary economy. This is where manifold use values and the practical labor that produces them are reduced to exchange value, or, in [Karl] Marx’s terms, ‘social and abstract labor.’ In the beginning of Capital, Marx wrote: ‘The commodity is, first of all, an external object, a thing which through its qualities satisfies human needs of whatever kind. The nature of these needs, whether they arise, for example, from the stomach, or the imagination, makes no difference. Nor does it matter here how the thing satisfies man’s need, whether directly as a means of subsistence, i.e., an object of consumption, or indirectly as a means of production.’ In other words, it is in the world of the commodity economy where we find an attitude that is totally indifferent to the difference of things—the use value—and concerned only with one thing: interest.” [Kojin Karatani and Sabu Kohso, “Uses of Aesthetics: After Orientalism.” boundary 2. Volume 25, number 2, summer 1998. Pages 145-160.]
           “Drawing its name from the lexicon of the early socialist movement, associationism was a utopian programme that sought to transcend capital, nation and state—seen as three mutually-reinforcing moments of a ‘Borromean knot’—through the creation of federated worker and consumer cooperatives, boycotts, and local currency schemes, which were supposed to sow the seeds of a post-capitalist mode of production in the midst of capitalist society. Justification for this orientation had come from [Kojin] Karatani’s reading of Marxian political economy, which viewed the moment of consumption as one of greater leverage for workers than that of production, since capital has no direct power to enforce the purchase of its products.” [Rob Lucas, “Socialism as a Regulative Idea?” Review article. New Left Review. Series II, number 94, July–August 2015. Pages 105-125.]
           “The New Associationist Movement (hereafter NAM) is the work of Karatani Kojin, Japan’s most gifted critic, and a number of associates including the economist Nishibe Makoto, the lawyer Kuchiki Sui, the critic and economist Asada Akira and others, even though there is no formal organization as such, and no leader since its members are all equal representatives.… The purpose of NAM is to ‘achieve a clear perspective on the abolition of capitalism and the state’ and to combine a number of dispersed movements into a new association pledged to realizing the goal with methods that no longer belong to either socialism or anarchism but plainly originate from both.” [Harry Harootunian, “Out of Japan: The New Associationist Movement.” Radical Philosophy: Philosophical Journal of the Independent Left. Number 108, July/August 2001. Pages 2-6.]
           “They [the intellectual faculties] are the source of political Laws and Institutions of a general nature, and hence of Administration or Government. Their function in this sphere is to regulate on one plan the general interests of States and Nations. In future ages, they will lead to the Administrative Unity of the Globe, or to a uniform system of government throughout the Earth. The result will be UNIVERSAL ASSOCIATION—that is to say, the harmonious combination of the labors, operations, and interests of Mankind, and universal cooperation and concert of action in executing the great Works of which this Earth is to be the theatre. The Administrative Unity of the Globe is nothing more nor less than the Serialization of the general interests, operations, and relations of the Human Race. The Intellectual Faculties in their more universal action, perform this function of Serialization as they perform the same function in the most restricted spheres.” [Charles Fourier. The Social Destiny of Man or Theory of the Four Movements. Henry Clapp, Jr., translator. New York: Robert M. Dewitt and Calvin Blanchard. 1857. Page 37.]
           “… before the discovery of the compass, which only dates six centuries back, if a man had reasoned about the attraction of iron and the magnet, suspected some great mystery in this affinity, and proposed researches, and experiments, the encyclopaedist would have answered him: Take care not to penetrate this mystery, no use can come of it! What dost know about it, apostle of darkness? Thou wilt, perhaps, deny that by experimenting on this mystery, men have made a discovery of immense utility? Is it not a notice to intellect to experiment on all mysteries? O dear no, our obscurants will say, for if people went and found out the secret of certain problems, among others that of the social scale, and of the periods superior to civilization; the books of philosophy would cut a sorry figure, and would go in a mass to the grocer; whence it is clear that you must take care not to penetrate great mysteries, like that of the social destiny, that of the analytical and synthetical calculus of attraction, and that of the practical usage of truth, which would establish the mechanism of graduated association.” [Charles Fourier. The Passions of the Human Soul and Their Influence on Society and Civilization. Hugh Doherty, translator. London and New York: Hippolyte Bailliere. 1851. Page 114.]
           “In its early twentieth century formulations—which were often linked with the syndicalist political tradition—associationism was posited as kind of third way between the radical individualism of industrial capitalism and the state-enforced collectivation of socialism. Unlike those models and communities of fate and coerced groupings in general, associationism sought to create and proliferate the formation of social groupings based upon a logic of affinity.” [Michael Menser, “Transnational Participatory Democracy in Action: The Case of La Via Campesina.” Journal of Social Philosophy. Volume 39, number 1, spring 2008. Pages 20-41.]
           “It is common knowledge that associationism had a tremendous influence in France at the time that [Karl] Marx was living in Paris (1843–45). Virtually every type of plan for social reform, no matter what their other differences, was built around the concept association, and that is why I believe that it is necessary to view Marx as an associationist and to reassess his position within the trends current at that time. Rather than viewing the problem as one of direct influence, what we need to do is to construct tools of historical analysis that may be used to analyse Marx, together with the other thinkers of his time.
           “My objective here is to provide a general overview of the concept association as it existed in the 1840s, as a preliminary step towards analysing Marx’s interpretation of it.”
           [Koichi Takakusagi, “Louis Blanc, associationism in France, and Marx.” Marx for the 21ˢᵗ Century. Hiroshi Uchida, editor. London and New York: Routledge imprint of Taylor & Francis Group, an Informa PLC business. 2006. Pages 180-192.]
       29. integral politics (Gregory Wilpert): He proposes a “spiritual third way” based upon Ken Wilber’s integral theory.
           “In this time of ideological upheaval, when the old ideologies of left and right, of socialism, liberalism, and conservatism, no longer capture the political imagination the way they once did, new political visions are required. Some have tried to formulate a ‘Third Way’ between social democracy and conservatism.… I would like to present another vision, that of Integral Politics, which is very compatible with the approach of Michael Lerner but is based on the work of Ken Wilber.…
           “While the Integral Politics outlined here does not constitute a concrete political platform, it is possible to generate concrete policies out of these principles. Integral Politics can help move politics beyond the typical left-right stalemate and present a true ‘third way,’ one that brings politics to a new level and finds solutions that are not just compromises, but are solutions that emerge from a higher understanding, from the unforced unification of opposites. And, Integral Politics can answer our basic human desire for spirit, by recognizing the validity of spirituality and by giving spirituality an important role in formulating a politics for the third millennium.”
           [Gregory Wilpert, “Integral Politics: A Spiritual Third Way.” Tikkun: to heal, repair, and transform the world. Volume 16, number 4, July/August 2001. Pages 44-49.]
       30. abundant community (Peter Block, John McKnight, and Walter Brueggemann): This perspective—which is associated with Abundant Community, Asset-Based Community Development Institute (ABCD Institute), and ABCD in Action—focuses on community development and community organizing.
           “You know that community is the point; … and we’ve forgotten that community mattered. The last hundred years has been to say, ‘Let’s put the common good aside, and let’s care about the privatization of almost everything.’ And so, we’ve privatized our schools. We’ve privatized our highways. We’ve privatized our government. And the general conversation has been that we have too much government. Government is that institution who cares for the common good. And we say, ‘Let’s shrink it. Let’s get rid of it.…
           “And so, really, the task is to say, ‘ How do we reclaim the common?’ What kind of leadership allows us to do that? And we do that in the face of a very patriarchal world.… And so what we have is kind of a leadership model, vision, role model: ‘You lead. We will follow.’ Well, that model is part of what gets us in trouble.… We come to together to heal the woundedness in the breakdown in community. And even faith communities have a hard time coming together.… Most of our models are parent-child.… You say, ‘Why don’t we come together in partnership? Why don’t we come together as peers?’ … Membership in this modern era is the model of dependency—the model of, well, we’re here to follow.… How do we, in small groups, come together so that everyone’s voice is heard? … Transformation is to engage people in conversations they haven’t had before.
           “And, well, if you say, ‘What is the Third Way?’ … There’s truth in both sides. Now, what kind of future do we want to create together? … How do we face each other and say, ‘Is there is a Third Way? Is there some way that we can create a future that’s distinct from the past?’ … We’ve lost the notion of free will.… In this world of corporatization—with a business perspective which is ‘speed is good, costs should be low—alright, this is a business perspective, but it’s not the kind of world I want to live in.…
           “I can’t watch the news anymore. It’s too painful, because all it tells us is that there is something wrong with us. And all it’s designed to do is make me afraid. People who are afraid are easier to control. So there’s an agenda in the dominant conversation— that say that you should be afraid.… There’s been a marketing of fear.… Our work is to have a different conversation, which is one of possibility instead of problem.… The conversation of problems doesn’t take us anywhere.… I want to have a conversation about prosperity with you.… I would say that the leadership role is to convene people ino small groups.”
           [Peter Block, “The Third Way of Leadership.” Personal transcript of an excerpt from a lecture presented to the Anabaptist Leadership Conference. Eastern Mennonite University. Harrisonburg, Virginia. April 7th–9th, 2016. Retrieved on May 26th, 2016.]
           “It is evident on the face of it, is it not, that the world is not yet at God’s shalom [Hebrew/ʿIḇəriyṯ, שָׁלוֹם, šālōm]? We are not agreed on how to think about that undeniable reality. One way is to focus upon original sin and imagine that it is long-term human sin that has brought the world to its present sorry state, and there can be no doubt of human implicatedness in that condition. Another way to think about our condition … toward which I am inclined … is to notice the resilient power of chaos (and the devil) in the world that is not yet subdued or governed by God. Or a third way is to conclude that God’s own self is not finally reliable but is sometimes abusive and so contributes in huge ways to the trouble so massive among us.” [Walter Brueggemann, “Together in the Spirit, Beyond Seductive Quarrels.” Theology Today. Volume 56, number 2, July 1999. Pages 152-163.]
           “Health, safety, environment, economy, food, children, and care are the seven responsibilities of an abundant community and its citizens. They are the necessities that only we can fulfill. And when we fail, no institution or government can succeed. Because we are the veritable foundation of the society.…
           “At the heart of our movement are three universal properties. A community becomes powerful and competent when it awakens these properties. They become the source of power in families and neighborhoods. Here are the three basics of our calling:
           • “The Giving of Gifts—The gifts of the people in our neighborhood are boundless. Our movement calls forth those gifts.
           • “The Presence of Association—In association we join our gifts together, and they become amplified, magnified, productive, and celebrated.
           • “The Compassion of Hospitality—We welcome strangers because we value their gifts and need to share our own. Our doors are open. There are no strangers here, just friends we haven’t met.”
           [John McKnight and Peter Block. The Abundant Community: Awakening the Power of Families and Neighborhoods San Francisco, California: Berrett-Koehler Publishers, Inc. 2010. Pages 4-6.]
           “We see an inherent longing and readiness for community all around us. It is the bottomless combination of fidelity and freedom that funds our yearning. In other words, our yearning for community is not something we invented; it is innate, a given. This means that mystery is more than just unknown space; it is also an active agency. Mystery has work to do. An example is that famous scene the night after Martin Luther King, Jr.’s house was bombed in Montgomery. MLK was sitting at the kitchen table when he heard a voice say, ‘Martin, don’t be afraid.’ Dr. King said he was never afraid again. Was that an act of daring imagination on his part, or a mystery? We say it was an active mystery that came to him and he chose to receive it.” [Peter Block, Walter Brueggemann, and John McKnight. An Other Kingdom: Departing the Consumer Culture. Hoboken, New Jersey: John Wiley & Sons, Inc. 2016. Kindle edition.]
           “To achieve an enterprising economy, hold Six Conversations that Matter:
           1. “Invitation conversation. Transformation occurs through choice, not mandate. Invitation is the call to create an alternative future. What is the invitation we can make to support people to participate and own the relationships, tasks, and process that lead to success?
           2. “Possibility conversation. This focuses on what we want our future to be as opposed to problem solving the past. It frees people to innovate, challenge the status quo, break new ground, and create new futures that make a difference.
           3. “Ownership conversation. This conversation focuses on whose organization or task is this? It asks, ‘How have I contributed to creating current reality?’ Confusion, blame and waiting for someone else to change are a defense against ownership and personal power.
           4. “Dissent conversation. This gives people the space to say no. If you can’t say no, your yes has no meaning. Give people a chance to express their doubts and reservations, as a way of clarifying their roles, needs, and yearnings within the vision and mission. Genuine commitment begins with doubt, and no is an expression of people finding their space and role in the strategy.
           5. “Commitment conversation. This conversation is about making promises to peers about your contribution to the success. It asks: What promise am I willing to make to this enterprise? And, what price am I willing to pay for success? It is a promise for the sake of a larger purpose, not for personal return.
           6. “Gifts conversation. Rather than focus on deficiencies and weaknesses, we focus on the gifts and assets we bring and capitalize on those to make the best and highest contribution. Confront people with their core gifts that can make the difference and change lives.”
           [Peter Block and John McKnight, “Enterprising Economy: It is based in competent community.” Leadership Excellence. Volume 28, number 1, January 2011. Pages 16-17.]
           “Seven elements of satisfaction grow out of an abundant community:
           1. “Our communities are the primary source of our Health.…
           2. “Whether we are Safe and Secure is largely within our domain.…
           3. “The future of our earth—the Environment—is first a local responsibility.…
           4. “In our communities, we have the power to build a resilient Economy—one less dependent on the unreliable mega-systems of finance and production.…
           5. “We have a local responsibility for the Food we eat.…
           6. “We are local people who must raise our Children.…
           7. “Locally we are the site of Care.”
           [John McKnight and Peter Block, “Abundant Community: Awakening our personal powers.” Leadership Excellence. Volume 27, number 4, April 2010. Pages 5-6.]
           “The way to the good life is the way of a competent community recognizing its abundance. We see that if we are to be citizens, together we must be the creators of our future—we must become citizens, not consumers. Consumers are dependent on the creations of the market; and in the end, they produce nothing much but waste.” [John McKnight and Peter Block, “Limits of Consumption: Satisfaction can’t be purchased.” Leadership Excellence. Volume 27, number 6, June 2010. Page 18.]
           “We can accept systems for what they are good at and move our attention to helping neighborhoods and families find satisfaction created by their own gifts and capacities. We need to rebuild the capacity of a neighborhood to raise a child, maintain our health, keep the street safe and provide local work. This means turning some of our attention away from a consumer culture and towards more of a citizen culture.” [John McKnight and Peter Block, “The Limits of Systems: Their growth threatens our welfare.” Leadership Excellence. Volume 27, number 12, December 2010. Page 17.]
           “The lens for assessing our common interests and institutional well-being is the business lens. It now defines the conversation. This is not an argument against business, for businesses are the stabilizing institutions in most communities. They contribute to communities in many more ways than creating jobs. They are the institutions most open to change and adaptation to the new world. They also bring to the community talented and committed people. The point is not to paint business as a villain. The point is to recognize its power to frame the culture, to frame the context for how we choose to be together.” [Peter Block, “Technology, Culture, and Stewardship.” Organizational Development Journal. Volume 32, number 4, winter 2014. Pages 9-13.]
           “Care is, indeed, the manifestation of a community. The community is the site for the relationships of citizens. And it is at this site that the primary work of a caring society must occur. If that site is invaded, co-opted, overwhelmed, and dominated by service-producing institutions, then the work of the community will fail. And that failure is manifest in families collapsing, schools failing, violence spreading, medical cal systems spinning out of control, justice systems becoming ing overwhelmed, prisons burgeoning, and human services degenerating.” [John McKnight. The Careless Society: Community And Its Counterfeits. New York: Basic Books imprint of the Perseus Books Group. 1995. Kindle edition.]
           “Every community creates its own culture – the way the community members learn, through time, how to survive and prosper in a particular place. Displaced people lose their culture. But it is also possible to lose a community culture even though you stay in a place. Many people have lost their culture, even though they live in a neighborhood. They occupy an apartment and don’t know the people who live around them. Or they may live in a house but their neighbors are strangers to whom they give a smiling nod. These people are not really neighbors in a neighborhood. They are merely residents occupying a building. They have lost their way. They are lonely people depending on malls, schools and cars for survival and the tenuous appearance of prosperity.” [John McKnight, “A Basic Guide to ABCD Community Organizing.” The Asset-Based Community Development Institute. Northwestern University. Evanston, Illinois. 2013. Pages 1-20. Retrieved on May 26th, 2016.]
           “[John] McKnight provides a graphic illustration of this argument by arguing that profesional bereavement counselors have infiltrated local communities to provide professional assistance at a time when the bereaved previously turned to relatives and friends for support. Through their intervention, there has been a decline in the support offered by traditional carers.… The author contends that unless the process of medicalization and professionalization is reversed, the very moral basis of American society will be subverted creating serious problems in the future.
           “McKnight’s book will have resonance with many Americans. This is, after all, a culture where communitarian and populist beliefs are deeply ingrained.”
           [Editor, “The Careless Society: Community and its Counterfeits.” Review article. The Journal of Sociology & Social Welfare. Volume 23, issue 1, article 25. Pages 210-211.]
       31. Jewish third way (Eli Lederhendler [Hebrew/ʿIḇəriyṯ, אֵלִי לֶדֶּרְהֶנְדְּלֶר, ʾĒliy Lẹdẹrəhẹnədəlẹr]): He examines a third-way, neocommunitarian approach grounded in “Jewishness.”
           “I want to address the possibility of a third Jewish approach, one that fostered a dissenting attitude toward capitalism and eschewed cultural integration, yet also maintained a preoccupation with social justice and equityᾰbut not from within the universalistic discourse of the left. Rather, I suggest that it could have drawn on a religiously conservative (small ‘c’) and neocommunitarian discourse which, in its own way, challenged regnant American social and economic values.
           “In that sense, ‘Jewishness’—not other-regarding universalism—could have fueled a critique of capitalist individualism. Thus, where the secular-leftist genesis of Jewish liberalism would point to Jewish labor union activism in the immigrant generation and to liberal Democratic voting patterns in succeeding American Jewish generations, a communitarian theory would have to take account of mutual-assistance fraternalism at the grassroots level of urban Jewish life.…
           “This Jewish third way might be thought of as resembling in certain respects other critiques of capitalism that emerged from socially and religiously or culturally conservative circles in Europe and the United States.”
           [Eli Lederhendler, “A Jewish ‘Third Way’ to American Capitalism: Isaac Rivkind and the Conservative-Communitarian Ideal.” Chosen Capital: The Jewish Encounter with American Capitalism. Rebecca Kobrin, editor. New Brunswick, New Jersey: Rutgers University Press. 2012. Kindle edition.]
       32. communitarian liberalism and morality (Philip Selznick): This third-way perspective, which includes an approach to moral realism, is referred to as consequentialist in the first quotation by Jingjing Huo (Chinese, 霍晶晶, Huò-Jīng-jīng as pronounced in this MP3 audio file). Huo’s discussion of the Third Way will also apply, following the current listing, to other perspectives (the views of Michael J. Sandel, Henry Tam, William A. Galston, and Alasdair MacIntyre).
           “[Tony] Blair’s work-centered third way ideology utilized two distinctive schools of thought: communitarianism and theories of postmodernity, the latter by [Anthony] Giddens, who himself became closely associated with Blair’s third way project by serving as his advisor.… [C]ompared with social theorist communitarians, such as Alasdair MacIntyre and Michael Sandel, it was the consequentialists (who espouse communitarianism for its purportedly beneficial economic and social consequences), such as Amitai Etzioni, Philip Selznick, Henry Tam, and William Galston, who had more direct influence on ideological transformation, primarily for the [Bill] Clinton Democrats in the United States, but also for [British] New Labour under Blair.…
           “The common feature from all these variants of communitarian thoughts is a relatively strong prescriptive emphasis.”
           [Jingjing Huo. Third Way Reforms: Social Democracy after the Golden Age. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press. 2009. Pages 77-78.]
           “I did not begin with any concern for ideology. As my work proceeded, however, I found myself in sympathy with the communitarian turn in contemporary moral, social, and political theory. Therefore, as part of the larger project, I have tried to help formulate the intellectual foundations of what we may call ‘communitarian liberalism.’…
           “My defense of moral realism is, however, a beginning not an end. Baseline moralities are properly understood as underpin nings or foundations, not as completions. Once a baseline morality is established, we can respond to opportunities for extending responsibility and enhancing fellowship. The conditions of survival are easier to meet that those of flourishing, which are more complex and fragile.”
           [Philip Selznick, “Introducing: The Moral Commonwealth: Social Theory and the Promise of Community.” The Newsletter of PEGS. Volume 3, number 3, winter 1993. Pages 9-10.]
           “In sociology at its best, and in a communitarian morality as well, the person is a vividly realized organic unity; the premise is that only when we respond to the concreteness of persons do we vindicate their humanity. To treat persons as ends, and not as means only, requires that they be appreciated directly, in their uniqueness, warts and all. (For people who are interested in moral philosophy I would say, as a brief aside, that we should be more careful to distinguish what it means to be a moral actor from what it means to be an object of moral concern.)…
           “A communitarian morality, as I have thus far described it, is not at its core a philosophy of liberation. The central value is not freedom or independence but belonging. (This is where it most sharply departs from the liberal tradition.) At the same time, what it means to belong must encompass respect for the integrity of the person. The claim is that personhood is best served in and through social participation. But what kind of participation? That is the crux.”
           [Philip Selznick, “The Idea of a Communitarian Morality.” California Law Review. Volume 75, number 1, January 1987. Pages 445-463.]
           “Communitarians accept elements of conservative and progressive points of view. Part of this position means tolerating ambiguity and accepting that the best system of government cannot be embodied by a single idea, and partly to use lessons from the past to reconstruct a future.…
           “The main thrust of the communitarian perspective is to suggest that what a country like the United States needs – and it really spills over into other countries as well in the West – is a greater sense of solidarity, a greater enhancement of responsibility at all levels of society. This is not a utopian idea, or an idea which is nostalgic and looks to the past; it is an idea that says that there are a great many forces that are fragmenting the 1 modern world, forces that are undermining the capacities of individuals and groups to behave responsibly.”
           [Philip Selznick, “The Communitarian Journey.” Quadrant. Volume 43, issue 1-2, January/February 1999. Pages 19-22.]
           “Moral realism presumes a tough-minded conception of evil. It is not enough to recognize that corruption and oppression are pervasive. Nor is it enough to think of specific evils as problems to be solved or obstacles to be overcome. Rather, the perspective of moral realism treats some transgressions as dynamic and inescapable. They can be depended on to arise, in one form or another, despite our best efforts to put them down.” [Philip Selznick. The Moral Commonwealth: Social Theory and the Promise of Community. Berkeley, California: University of California Press. 1992. Page 175.]
           “The promise of community is not a pledge of easy intimacy or innocent harmony. A communitarian ethos calls for integration, but also demands protection of diversity and reconciliation of interests. To meet this demand is the office of civility …. The most important expression of civility is the virtue we call justice. Justice speaks civilly to the inevitable diversity of passions and interests. Differences are adjudicated, not erased; and discord is channeled into self-preserving paths. At the same time, justice takes account of the claims of piety. The commitments generated by a shared history and fate lend form and texture to the quest for justice.” [Philip Selznick. The Moral Commonwealth: Social Theory and the Promise of Community. Berkeley, California: University of California Press. 1992. Page 438.]
           “Communitarianism remains somewhere between the extremes of total liberty and total community conformity. Maybe it is for this reason that [Amitai] Etzioni is telling scholars that [Philip] Selznick’s book is ‘masterful’ and the publisher calls it ‘magisterial.’ (Is this a bow toward an enlightened monarchy as the preferred political system of communitarians?) It shows that Etzioni’s armchair philosophizing takes one to the same exact spot as Selznick’s learned analysis—somewhere between the extremes. Matters corrupted by too much individualism require more community conformity, while matters corrupted by too much community conformity require more individualism. Maybe, as an Aristotelian mean state, communitarianism is an art, not a science.” [Denis Collins, “The Moral Commonwealth: Social Theory and the Promise of Community.” The International Journal of Organizational Analysis. Volume 3, number 3, July 1995. Pages 320-323.]
       33. republicanism (Michael J. Sandel): He argues for republicanism over utilitarianism and some interpretations of liberalism.
           “The publication in 1996 of [Michael J.] Sandel’s Democracy’s Discontent: America in Search of a Public Philosophy … [illustrated] his critical wrestling with liberalism by taking up against it the cause of republicanism, or civic republicanism, a creed associated in the United States with Thomas Jefferson and with [Alexis] de Tocqueville’s view of America, emphasizing political participation, civic virtues generally, and the primacy of the public good.” [Hilliard Aronovitch, “Review: From Communitarianism to Republicanism: On Sandel and His Critics.” Canadian Journal of Philosophy. Volume 30, number 4, December 2000. Pages 621-647.]
           “In contrast to the liberal claim that the right is prior to the good, republicanism … affirms a politics of the common good. But the common good it affirms does not correspond to the utilitarian notion of exaggerating individual preferences. Unlike utilitarianism, republicanism does not people’s existing preferences, whatever they may be, and try to satify them. It seeks instead to cultivate in citizens the qualities of character necessary to the common good of self-government. Insofar as certain dispositions, attachments, and commitments are essential to the realization of self-government, republican politics regards moral character as a public, not merely private, concern. In this sense, it attends to the identity, not just the interests, of its citizens.” [Michael J. Sandel. Democracy’s Discontent: America in Search of a Public Philosophy. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Belknap Press imprint of Harvard University Press. 1998. Page 25.]
           “From [Thomas] Jefferson’s agrarian republicanism to [Abraham] Lincoln’s celebration of free labor to [Louis D.] Brandeis’ call for industrial democracy, the emphasis on producer identities reflected the attempt to form in citizens the qualities necessary to self-government.” [Michael J. Sandel. Democracy’s Discontent: America in Search of a Public Philosophy. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Belknap Press imprint of Harvard University Press. 1998. Page 224.]
           “Whether liberalism and republicanism are compatible doctrines depends on how they are conceived. At a certain level of generality, there is no necessary conflict: the liberal tradition stands for toleration and individual rights, while the republican tradition stands for government by the people. Liberal rights support republican self rule by preventing the majority from oppressing the minority, while the republican emphasis on civic virtue restrains individuals from abusing their rights and ignoring the common good.” [Michael J. Sandel, “Liberalism and Republicanism: Friends or Foes? A Reply to Richard Dagger.” The Review of Politics. Volume 61, number 2, spring 1999. Pages 209-214.]
           “The procedural republic represents the triumph of a liberal public philosophy over a republican one, with adverse consequences for democratic politics and the legitimacy of the regime. It reverses the terms of relation between liberty and democracy, transforms the relation of the individual and nation-state, and tends to undercut the kind of community on which it nonetheless depends. Liberty in the procedural republic is defined, not as a function of democracy but in opposition to democracy, as an individual’s guarantee against what the majority might will.” [Michael J. Sandel, “The Political Theory of the Procedural Republic.” Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale. Volume 93, number 1, January-March 1988. Pages 57-68.]
           “According to the republican conception of citizenship, to be free is to share in self-rule. This is more than a matter of voting in elections and registering my preferences or interests. On the republican conception of citizenship, to be free is to participate in shaping the forces that govern the collective destiny. But in order to do that, and to do it well, it is necessary that citizens possess or come to acquire certain qualities of character, or civic virtues.…
           “… The republican conception of citizenship … seeks to cultivate a fuller range of virtues, including a moral bond with the community whose fate is at stake, a sense of obligation for one’s fellow citizens, a willingness to sacrifice individual interests for the sake of the common good, and the ability to deliberate well about common purposes and ends.”
           [Michael J. Sandel, “What Money Shouldn’t Buy.” The Hedgehog Review. Volume 5, number 2, summer 2003. Pages 77-97.]
           “A more robust public engagement with our moral disagreements could provide a stronger, not a weaker, basis for mutual respect. Rather than avoid the moral and religious convictions that our fellow citizens bring to public life, we should attend to them more directly—sometimes by challenging and contesting them, sometimes by listening to and learning from them. There is no guarantee that public deliberation about hard moral questions will lead in any given situation to agreement—or even to appreciation for the moral and religious views of others. It’s always possible that learning more about a moral or religious doctrine will lead us to like it less. But we cannot know until we try.
           “A politics of moral engagement is not only a more inspiring ideal than a politics of avoidance. It is also a more promising basis for a just society.”
           [Michael J. Sandel. Justice: What’s the Right Thing to Do? New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux. 2009. Page 268.]
           “Except for extraordinary moments, such as war, the nation proved too vast a scale across which to cultivate the shared self-understandings necessary to community in the formative, or constitutive sense. And so the gradual shift, in our practices and institutions, from a public philosophy of common purposes to one of fair procedures, from a politics of good to a politics of right, from the national republic to the procedural republic.” [Michael J. Sandel, “The Procedural Republic and the Unencumbered Self.” Political Theory. Volume 12, number 1, February 1984. Pages 81-96.]
           “According to the republican conception of citizenship, to be free is to share in self-rule. This is more than a matter of voting in elections and registering my preferences or interests. On the republican conception of citizenship, to be free is to participate in shaping the forces that govern the collective destiny. But in order to do that, and to do it well, it is necessary that citizens possess or come to acquire certain qualities of character, or civic virtues.” [Michael J. Sandel, “What Money Can’t Buy: The Moral Limits of Markets.” The Tanner Lectures on Human Values. May 11th and 12th, 1998. Brasenose College, Oxford, England. Pages 87-122.]
           “Part of the appeal of market reasoning is that it seems to offer a nonjudgmental way of allocating goods. Each party to a deal decides what value to place on the goods being exchanged. If someone is willing to pay for sex or a kidney, and a consenting adult is willing to sell, the economist does not ask whether the parties have valued the goods appropriately. Asking such questions would entangle economics in controversies about virtue and the common good and thus violate the strictures of a purportedly value-neutral science. And yet it is difficult to decide where markets are appropriate without addressing these normative questions.” [Michael J. Sandel, “Market Reasoning as Moral Reasoning: Why Economists Should Re-engage with Political Philosophy.” The Journal of Economic Perspectives. Volume 27, number 4, fall 2013. Pages 121-140.]
           “Whereas liberalism approaches difference in terms of cultural diversity and pluralism, neorepublicanism sides with a politics of difference. It entertains a principled political view of culture that remains alert to those processes in which difference is ‘privatised’ in undesirable ways. It has, moreover, little patience with mere identity politics as the translation of a politics of difference. It instead takes cultural politics to signify a broad societal critique of dominance ….
           “A neorepublican view of cultural citizenship differs from a theory of multiculturalism in that it avoids merely buoying cultural identity. It takes culture to refer to the symbolic forces that co-constitute social and civic life. Culture here denotes the symbolic dimensions of civil society, which, next to configuring experiences and expressions of cultural identities, also inscribe and inaugurate power relations, economic positionings, and the violence that may inhabit cultural ascriptions and introjections. On the symbolic level, political desire itself is configured and articulated.”
           [Judith Vega, “A neorepublican cultural citizenship: beyond Marxism and liberalism.” Citizenship Studies. Volume 14, issue 3, 2010. Pages 259-274.]
       34. liberal path (Henry Tam): He argues against a “market-obsessed individualism.”
           “Instead of assuming that a thick dossier of common values and beliefs is essential in keeping people together, we would see that what actually holds people together is when people are prepared to be open, refer to objective evidence, refrain from seeking to exploit or coerce others, and respect others’ differences so long as they do not directly inflict harm on them – a not unfamiliar liberal approach to human interactions.…
           “… a liberal, non culture-based approach would not attempt to measure the inherent importance of these values but consider the impact of different degrees of their adoption on the people affected. This will include factors such as security implications when people’s identity in sensitive areas could be allowed to be regularly concealed, or the exclusion of facial expressions in such contexts as teacher-pupil communications.…
           “… it is the liberal path that offers the best hope for human cooperation ….”
           [Henry Tam, “Through thick and thin: What does it really take for us to live together?” Ethnicities. Volume 11, number 3, September 2011. Pages 355-359.]
           “In the United States, Democrats have been on the back foot for much of the time since [Ronald] Reagan’s neo-con [neoconservative] onslaught on the ‘liberal’ state. Many have urged them to challenge the right’s strategy in framing public policy debates in anti-progressive terms – projecting Democrats’ preferences as ‘unpatriotic,’ ‘elitist,’ ‘weak,’ or ‘overbearing.’ In the UK today, there is just as urgent a need to reframe debates about state and society to ensure the ‘Big Con’ does not take hold.” [Henry Tam, “The Big Con: Reframing the state/society debate.” Public Policy Research. Volume 18, issue 1, March-May 2011. Pages 30-40.]
           “No market-obsessed individualism can ever escape from a flawed view of citizens as consumers—entailing the deficient conception of public service as parasitic on the private pursuit of wealth and self-gratification. In reality, services which bind and sustain the public domain are the core elements of any civilised society. Those who dedicate themselves to serving the public good—be they elected or appointed, part-time or full-time, paid or volunteers—they are the ones who provide the foundations for citizenship, making it possible for ‘less public-spirited’ individuals, so to speak, to pursue their own ends.” [Henry Tam, “The Community Roots of Citizenship.” Political Quarterly. Supplement 1, volume 72, issue s1. Pages 123-131.]
           “One innovation of the present paper is that we adopt a social contract approach to understand the formation of national borders and stress property rights as the underlying motivation for the formation of a nation. According to the present paper, the difference between a nation and the international arena is that the international arena consists of nations among which there is no property rights enforcement, while property rights issues are resolved and enforced by the national government within each nation. The driving force behind forming a nation is that in the Hobbesian-Lockean state of nature, people’s consumption is uncertain in the absence of property rights.” [Henry Tam, “A social contract approach to the formation of national borders.” Public Choice. Volume 118, issue 1/2, January 2004. Pages 183-209.]
       35. liberal pluralism (William A. Galston): He explores various forms of pluralism, including value pluralism, pluralist constitutionalism, political pluralism, and perspectival pluralism.
           “The constitutional politics of liberal pluralism will seek to restrict enforceable forceable general norms to the essentials.…
           “But how much farther should the state go in enforcing specific conceptions ceptions of justice, authority, or the good life? What kinds of differences should the state permit? What kinds of differences may the state encourage age or support? I want to suggest that an understanding of liberal pluralism ism guided by principles of expressive liberty, moral pluralism, and the political pluralism of divided sovereignty yields clear and challenging answers in specific cases.…
           “In short, while liberal pluralism rejects state promotion of individual ual autonomy as an intrinsic good, there is a form of liberty that is a higher-order liberal pluralist political good: namely, individuals’ right of exit from groups and associations that make up civil society. Securing this liberty will require affirmative state protections against oppression carried out by groups against their members.”
           [William A. Galston. Liberal Pluralism: The Implications of Value Pluralism for Political Theory and Practice. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press. 2002. Kindle edition.]
           “In a recent book, Liberal Pluralism, argue that we must develop a more complex theory of the limits to government. In this endeav or, three concepts are of special importance. The first is political pluralism, an understanding of social life that comprises multiple sources of authority—individuals, parents, civil associations, faith based institutions, and the state, among others—no one of which is dominant in all spheres, for all purposes, on all occasions. Because so many types of human association possess an identity not wholly derived from the state, pluralist politics does not presume that the inner structure and principles of every sphere must mirror those of basic political institutions.” [William A. Galston, “The Idea of Political Pluralism.” Nomos. Volume 49, 2009. Pages 95-124.]
           “… if value pluralism means anything, it is that there is more than one way of life meriting respect as choiceworthy for (at least some) human beings.” [William A. Galston, “Between Logic and Psychology: The Links between Value Pluralism and Liberal Theory.” The Review of Politics. Volume 75, number 1, winter 2013. Pages 97-101.]
           “One of the strengths of the U.S. Constitution is that its preambular purposes closely track, and do not move much beyond, these conditions of public order. The Constitution mirrors, on the secular plane, a deservedly famous theological proposition, ‘In necessary things, unity; in uncertain things, liberty; in all things, charity,’ which might well serve as the motto of pluralist constitutionalism.” [William A. Galston, “Pluralist Constitutionalism.” Social Philosophy & Policy. Volume 28, number 1, January 2011. Pages 228-241.]
           “Political pluralism is a politics of recognition rather than construction. It respects the diverse spheres of human association; it does not understand itself as creating or constituting those activities. For example, families are shaped by public law, but this does not mean that they are ‘socially constructed.’ There are complex relations between public law and faith communities, but it is preposterous to claim that the public sphere constructs those communities, any more than environmental laws create air and water. Because so many types of human association possess an identity not derived from the state, pluralist politics does not presume that the inner structure and principles of every sphere must mirror those of basic political institutions.” [William A. Galston, “Expressive Liberty and Constitutional Democracy: The Case of Freedom of Conscience.” The American Journal of Jurisprudence. Volume 48, issue 1, January 2003. Pages 149-177.]
           “We often characterize modern societies as pluralistic because they encompass multiple interest groups or diverse ethnicities and cultures. But these societies are pluralist in another sense as well: they contain diverse spheres of human activity—families, voluntary associations, religious communities, commerce, and politics, among others—whose animating principles and corresponding virtues differ fundamentally. To act in one sphere in accordance with the principles and virtues of another yields comedy in some cases, tragedy in others.” [William A. Galston, “Pluralism and Civic Virtue.” Social Theory and Practice. Volume 33, number 4, October 2007. Pages 625-635.]
           “… because the perspectives of the powerful had dominated politics for so long, it was high time to listen to those of the subordinated. The point was not whether doing so would serve the public interest, the cogency of which perspectival pluralism called into question, but whether the voiceless would at long last be heard.” [William A. Galston, “An old debate renewed: the politics of the public interest.” Daedalus. Volume 136, number 4, fall 2007. Pages 10-19.]
           “Value pluralists are prepared to acknowledge that the relationships among values may be structured in specific ways by the content of those values, but they reject the idea of a once-and-for-all priority of some values over others regardless of circumstances and regardless of the sacrifices of value required by such strict priority rules. They also are not comfortable with the idea of a single summum bonum [highest good] toward which all other goods are somehow directed.” [William A. Galston, “Value Pluralism and Liberal Political Theory.” The American Political Science Review. Volume 93, number 4, December 1999. Pages 769-778.]
           “The pluralist movement began to take shape in the nineteenth century as a reaction to the growing tendency to see state institutions as all-powerful or total, a tendency that took various practical forms in different countries: French anticlerical republicanism, British parliamentary supremacy, and the drive for national unification in Germany and Italy against subordinate political and social powers.” [William A. Galston, “On the Reemergence of Political Pluralism.” Daedalus. Volume 135, number 3, summer 2006. Pages 118-122.]
           “… value pluralism offers the most secure foundation for a politics of liberty. Value pluralism is an alternative to both monism and relativism: the distinction between good and bad is objective, but goods are heterogeneous, there is no single dominant good for all purposes, and there is no way of life that is preferable to all others for all individuals. Applied to the conditions of human life, value pluralism yields a threshold of basic goods common to all decent lives, with a wide range of legitimate ways of life being above the baseline of common decency.” [William A. Galston, “After Socialism: Mutualism and a Progressive Market Strategy.” Social Philosophy & Policy. Volume 20, number 1, January 2003. Pages 204-222.]
           “Alongside the ‘fact of pluralism’ is a kind of rough agreement on certain basics: the treatment of all individuals as free and equal; the understanding of society as a system of uncoerced cooperation; the right of each individual to claim a fair share of the fruits of that cooperation; and the duty of all citizens to support and uphold institutions that embody a shared conception of fair principles.” [William A. Galston, “Pluralism and Social Unity.” Ethics. Volume 99, number 4, July 1989. Pages 711-726.]
       36. Thomistic Aristotelianism (Alasdair MacIntyre): MacIntyre, as a convert to Roman Catholicism, develops a moral philosophy informed by the views of Aristotle and St. Thomas Aquinas. MacIntyre also refers to his position as the “Aristotelian and Thomistic tradition of the virtues.”
           “An external observer might … have expected that, challenged … on the nature and use of moral concepts in formally and informally institutionalized social practice, the practitioners of academic moral philosophy would have had to include the study of actual social practice in their deliberations. That external observer would once again have been disappointed. Why? Before I turn to sketch the outline of a possible answer to this question, it will be worthwhile to examine another case against recent academic moral philosophy, one framed from the very different standpoint of a Thomistic Aristotelianism.” [Alasdair MacIntyre. The Tasks of Philosophy: Selected Essays, Volume I. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press. 2006. Page 111.]
           “I wrote these essays and I write now with the intentions and commitments of a Thomistic Aristotelian.” [Alasdair MacIntyre. The Tasks of Philosophy: Selected Essays, Volume I. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press. 2006. Page xi.]
           “The Aristotelian and Thomistic tradition of the virtues is, like some, although not all other moral traditions, a tradition of enquiry. It is characteristic of traditions of enquiry that they claim truth for their central theses and soundness for their central arguments. Were it otherwise, they would find it difficult either to characterize the aim and object of their enquiries or to give reasons for their conclusions. But, since they are and have been at odds with one another in their standards of rational justification – indeed the question of what those standards should be is among the matters that principally divide them – and since each has its own standards internal to itself, disputes between them seem to be systematically unsettlable, even although the contending parties may share both respect for the requirements of logic and a core, but minimal conception of truth.” [Alasdair MacIntyre. After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory. Third edition. Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press. 2007. Page xii.]
           “When I wrote After Virtue, I was already an Aristotelian, but not yet a Thomist ….” [Alasdair MacIntyre. After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory. Third edition. Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press. 2007. Page x.]
           “Let me turn now to a … criticism, that of those defenders of liberal and individualist modernity who frame their objections in terms of the liberalism versus communitarian debate, supposing me to be a communitarian, something that I have never been. I see no value in community as such – many types of community are nastily oppressive – and the values of community, as understood by the American spokespersons of contemporary communitarianism, such as Amitai Etzioni, are compatible with and supportive of the values of the liberalism that I reject. My own critique of liberalism derives from a judgment that the best type of human life, that in which the tradition of the virtues is most adequately embodied, is lived by those engaged in constructing and sustaining forms of community directed towards the shared achievement of those common goods without which the ultimate human good cannot be achieved.” [Alasdair MacIntyre. After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory. Third edition. Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press. 2007. Page xiv.]
           “… Aristotle’s scheme of thought was developed by [St. Thomas] Aquinas in a which which enabled him to accommodate Augustinian claims and insights alongside Aristotelian theorizing in a single dialectically constructed enterprise.…
           “… resources [of the Aristotelian tradition] suggest that prima facie at least a case has been made for concluding first that those who have thought their ways through the topics of justice and practical rationality, from the standpoint constructed by and in the direction pointed out first by Aristle and then by Aquinas, have every reason at least so far to hold that the rationality of their tradition has been confirmed in its encounters with other traditions and, second, that the task of characterizing and accounting for the achievements and successes, as well as the frustrations and failures, of the Thomistic tradition in the terms afforded by rival traditions of enquiry, may, even from the point of view of the adherents of those traditions, be a more demanding task than has sometimes been supposed.”
           [Alasdair MacIntyre. Whose Justice? Which Rationality? Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press. 1988. Pages 402-403.]
           “[St. Thomas] Aquinas considers as one objection to the view that liberality is a part of the virtue of justice that justice is a matter of what is owed, and that therefore, when we give to another only what is owed to that other, we do not act with liberality. It is on this view the mark of the liberal, that is, the generous individual to give more than justice requires.… In discussing beneficence Aquinas emphasizes how in a single action these different virtues may be exemplified by different aspects of that action.” [Alasdair MacIntyre. Dependent Rational Animals: Why Human Beings Need the Virtues. Chicago, Illinois: Open Court Publishing Company imprint of Carus Publishing Company. 1999. Page 121.]
           “We are now in a position to summarize some of the difficulties that stand in the way of the protagonists of any theory purporting to assimilate moral utterances to imperatives. First of all, since it was made clear that the imperatival form does not of itself segregate any well-defined class of utterances, it is clear that some better defined class of utterances that can be expressed by means of imperatives would have to be picked out to provide a comparison with moral utterances. Secondly, it was also made clear that, where the class of utterances that can be characterized as instances of ‘telling to’ rather than of ‘telling that’ or of ‘telling how’ are concerned, we must ask for some further characterization beyond that of ‘telling to.’” [Alasdair MacIntyre, “Imperatives, Reasons for Action, and Morals.” The Journal of Philosophy. Volume 62, number 19, October 1965. Pages 513-524.]
           “The idea of a set of rules adequate to secure cooperation as such, independently of what it is cooperation towards or for and neutral between rival conceptions of human good is a chimera. The claim that moral rules in actual societies are such rules encounters additional difficulties. Moreover, the conception of the good defended in After Virtue does in fact warrant a kind of community and a conception of justice incompatible with liberal conceptions of moral rules.” [Alasdair MacIntyre, “Intelligibility, Goods, and Rules.” The Journal of Philosophy. Volume 79, number 11, November 1982. Pages 663-665.]
           “… a devotion to revolution must appear a harmless eccentricity in lives whose social identification is in quite other terms. We may note in passing that the satisfaction of this condition is more easily combined with revolutionary activity than might be suspected at one level: the successful revolutionary cannot afford not to have conservative moral habits. Lack of punctuality, disorganization, a too tangled sexual life, and a bohemian existence not only affront the social order more openly than is safe for the revolu- tionary; they also menace systematic revolutionary work, as they do work of any kind.” [Alasdair MacIntyre, “Ideology, Social Science, and Revolution.” Comparative Politics. Volume 5, number 3, April 1973. Pages 321-342.]
           “Homer, Sophocles, Aristotle, the New Testament and medieval thinkers differ from each other in too many ways. They offer us different and incompatible lists of the virtues; they give a different rank order of importance to different virtues; and they have different and incompatible theories of the virtues.” [Alasdair MacIntyre, “The Nature of the Virtues.” The Hastings Center Report. Volume 11, number 2, April 1981. Pages 27-34.]
           “All moral actions, … including those moral actions which are acts of moral judgment, can be only more or less complex expressions of desire and the social system of morality in which ‘we’ agree can be nothing but a set of coincident desires and expressions of desire.” [Alasdair MacIntyre, “How Moral Agents Became Ghosts or Why the History of Ethics Diverged from That of the Philosophy of Mind.” Synthese. Volume 53, number 2, November 1982. Pages 295-312.]
           “… ethics requires a systematic connection with the philosophy of causality, mind and action.” [Alasdair MacIntyre, “Why Is the Search for the Foundations of Ethics So Frustrating?” The Hastings Center Report. Volume 9, number 4, August 1979. Pages 16-22.]
           “Applied ethics derives its conclusions from sets of premises in which conclusions drawn from ethics are conjoined to factual finding about some specific social and intellectual area. Its rational claims upon our attention depend first then upon the justifiability of the account of morality which it presupposes; secondly, upon the warranted character of its account of the structures of medical or legal or political or military or business institutional and social relationships; and thirdly, upon its ability to derive its conclusions rationally from its premises.” [Alasdair MacIntyre, “Does Applied Ethics Rest on a Mistake?” The Monist. Volume 67, number 4, October 1984. Pages 498-513.]
           “I want to suggest that the kind of regulation which is concerned with the safety or the quality of goods and services is not itself an expression of any particular moral standpoint, but is rather a substitute for morality at just those points in our social fabric where we no longer possess adequate moral resources. I take it to be a very important substitute and the only substitute which we have. Therefore in the end my argument will conclude in favor of certain kinds of regulation.” [Alasdair MacIntyre, “Regulation: A Substitute for Morality.” The Hastings Center Report. Volume 10, number 1, February 1980. Pages 31-33.]
           “Philosophy is today inhibited to some degree by inheriting conventional boundary lines between parts of the discipline—epistemology, theory of meaning, ethics, philosophy of science, political philosophy—which themselves presuppose philosophical views and attitudes that we now ought to be putting in question.” [Alasdair MacIntyre, “A Perspective on Philosophy.” Social Research. Volume 51, number 1/2, spring/summer 1984. Pages 477-491.]
           “It is an oddity in recent philosophical discussions of moral dilemmas that some of the examples from an older past recurrently cited in the literature are of persons confronting daunting alternatives, who nonetheless themselves found no apparently insuperable difficulty in deciding between those alternatives, that is of persons who did not experience their own situation as dilemmatic.” [Alasdair MacIntyre, “Moral Dilemmas.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. Vol. 50, supplement, autumn 1990. Pages 367-382.]
           “Aristotle carries forward Plato’s project, even in the course of revising and sometimes abandoning Plato’s own theses and arguments in order to remedy a range of incoherences and resourcelessnesses, recognizable as such by Plato’s own standards. And even when Aristotle revises those standards he does so in the light of considerations to which Plato too would have had to attach weight.” [Alasdair MacIntyre, “Précis of Whose Justice? Which Rationality?” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. Volume 51, number 1, March 1991. Pages 149-152.]
           “Moral agents … have to understand themselves as accountable, not only in their roles, but also as rational individuals. The responsibilities that are socially assigned to roles are defined in part by the types of accountability that attach to each of them. For each role there is a range of particular others, to whom, if they fail in their responsibilities, they owe an account that either excuses or admits to the offence and accepts the consequences.” [Alasdair MacIntyre, “Social Structures and Their Threats to Moral Agency.” Philosophy. Volume 74, number 289, July 1999. Pages 311-329.]
           “We have to ask not how do Japanese differ from Americans in respect of the social and individual aspects or components of morality, but rather how does a Japanese view of the difference between Americans and Japanese differ from an American view of that same difference, and in what ways do the concepts in terms of which the Japanese approach this question differ from the concepts which Americans employ. And if we ask this latter question, we shall perhaps discover that the most relevant Japanese distinction cannot be rendered adequately into English as a distinction between the social and the individual.” [Alasdair MacIntyre, “Individual and Social Morality in Japan and the United States: Rival Conceptions of the Self.” Philosophy East and West. Volume 40, number 4, October 1990. Pages 489-497.]
           “I would have to find some way of studying philosophy systematically, if I was to situate myself as a rational agent in the moral, political, religious, and scientific conflicts of my time. What might happen if I failed so to situate myself? One dread possibility was that I might be reduced to leading a drab conformist existence as the member of some profession, an accountant, say, or a librarian, or even a lawyer. It never occurred to me that philosophers might be thought of as members of a profession any more than, say, poets might.” [Alasdair MacIntyre, “On Not Knowing Where You Are Going.” Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association. Volume 84, number 2, November 2010. Pages 61-74.]
           “Modern governments in advanced economies, for example, now justify themselves in equally piecemeal fashion, trading this or that particular object of desire in return for allegiance in the form of compliant opinion. They neither need nor want philosophical justification in the way that they once did.” [Alasdair MacIntyre, “Philosophy: Past Conflict and Future Direction.” Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association. Volume 61, number 1, supplement, September 1987. Pages 81-87.]
           “Philosophy and the history of philosophy stand in a not quite Hegelian relationship: not quite, because the claim to have reached that absolute standpoint from which the development of the subject can be at last viewed with the eyes of God is a claim unlikely to be repeated. But Hegelian certainly to some degree, because of the intimate relationship that necessarily holds between the way in which we understand the present state of philosophical issues and problems and the perspective in which we view that history of philosophy which has made the present what it is.” [Alasdair MacIntyre, “Praxis and Action.” The Review of Metaphysics. Volume 25, number 4, June 1972. Pages 737-744.]
           “That the theoretical standpoint of Galileo or [Isaac] Newton may have been incommensurable with that of the scholastics is not inconsistent with this recognition of how the later physical tradition transcended the limitations of the earlier. And it is of course not only within the history of natural philosophy that this kind of claim can be identified and sometimes vindicated. Such a claim is implicit in the relationship of some of the medieval theistic Aristotelians to Aristotle in respect of theology and of Dante’s Commedia to the Aeneid in respect of poetic imagination.” [Alasdair MacIntyre, “Relativism, Power and Philosophy.” Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association. Volume 59, number 1, September 1985. Pages 5-22.]
           “From the fact that some social concepts are noncontestable it does not follow that any area of social life is rescued from contestability. For a given economic system, with its corresponding bodies of theory, always involves a delimitation of ‘the economic’ as contrasted with, say, the political or the moral. But the concept of what belongs to the economic is indeed essentially contestable. This is why the argument between bourgeois economies and Marxist economies is only secondarily about the content of economic theory, although both parties often contend as though it was primarily about such content.” [Alasdair MacIntyre, “The Essential Contestability of Some Social Concepts.” Ethics. Volume 84, number 1, October 1973. Pages 1-9.]
           “What is it that we need to understand, if on some occasion the outcome of our practical deliberations has been perhaps disastrous, or at least very different from what we had expected? What are the different ways in which we may have gone astray? If our conception of practical reasoning is in general Aristotelian, there are several ways in which our deliberations may have been defective.” [Alasdair MacIntyre, “The Very Idea of a University: Aristotle, Newman and Us.” New Blackfriars. Volume 91, number 1031, January 2010. Pages 4-19.]
           “It is a sign of a great thinker, but also, perhaps, an intellectual injustice, for one’s name to become synonymous with a single work. A sign of greatness, because proof that one has intervened decisively in the philosophical problems of one’s age and steered the conversation in a direction it might not otherwise have gone. Injustice, because all of one’s work prior to and after the magnum opus tends to be downplayed, with the consequence that one’s lifework is reduced to a caricature, its full range and complexity ignored. Such is the fate of Alasdair MacIntyre and After Virtue.” [Jeff Noonan, “MacIntyre, Virtue and the Critique of Capitalist Modernity.” Journal of Critical Realism. Volume 13, issue 2, April 2014. Pages 189-203.]
           “… it has been argued that [Alasdair] MacIntyre can be understood as a critical realist …. Critical realism can be characterized as an approach which maintains the existence of an objective reality (and hence exhibits a realist ontology) while being sceptical toward our ability to understand it (and hence a critical epistemology). In contrast to the incommensurable paradigms of much organization studies, MacIntyre’s critical realism offers not relativism but a tradition-constituted pursuit of truth that supervenes on the perspectivist-relativist position ….” [Geoff Moore, “Virtue in Business: Alliance Boots and an Empirical Exploration of MacIntyre’s Conceptual Framework.” Organization Studies. Volume 33, number 3, March 2012. Pages 363-387.]
           “There is … a fundamental difference between the interpretations of Aristotle by [Hans-Georg] Gadamer and by [Alasdair] MacIntyre. MacIntyre does not take his understanding of Aristotle from Heidegger. Rather, his interpretation is traditional. The indirect sources of his interpretation are the representations of Aristotle’s philosophy by mediaeval scholastics and by [Georg Wilhelm Friedrich] Hegel and his successors. For the mediaevals, Aristotle’s practical philosophy was grounded in his theoretical philosophy.… This said, Gadamer’s Heideggerian understanding of Aristotle was important to MacIntyre at least in suggesting to him the possibility of calling a moral theory ‘Aristotelian’ whilst repudiating that ‘metaphysical biology’ which was the traditional ‘presupposition’ of Aristotelianism’s ethics and politics.” [Kelvin Knight, “Aristotelianism versus Communitarianism.” Analyse & Kritik. Volume 27, number 2, 2005. Pages 259-273.]
       37. qualified consequentialism (Richard Mullender): He develops a theoretical approach to the third way. The focus is on “distributive justice.”
           “The third way is identified as being informed by a form of moral philosophy to which the name qualified consequentialism is given.…
           “… qualified consequentialism can be seen to be oriented towards pursuit of the ideal of distributive justice.…
           “… in so far as qualified consequentialism gives priority not to such interests but, rather, to the pursuit of generally beneficial outcomes, it is open to the criticism that it is somewhat out of kilter with its context.…
           “… it [qualified consequentialism] supports the pursuit of only those outcomes that can reasonably be expected to redound to the advantage of all those whose interests are implicated in their pursuit. But, at this point, it must be remembered that, on a qualified consequentialist view, interests that countervail against the pursuit of generally beneficial outcomes can be overridden or compromised.”
           [Richard Mullender, “Theorizing the Third Way: Qualified Consequentialism, the Proportionality Principle, and the New Social Democracy.” Journal of Law and Society. Volume 27, number 4, December 2000. Pages 493-516.]
       38. compassionate conservatism (George W. Bush): Bush’s campaign slogan, or philosophy, is critiqued, from the right, as a “third way” by David Boaz.
           “Conservatives used to believe that the US Constitution set up a government of strictly limited powers. It was supposed to protect us from foreign threats and deliver the mail, leaving other matters to the several states or to the private sector – individuals, families, churches, charities and businesses.
           “[George W.] Bush has rejected the clarity of that vision, seeking a sort of Third Way between [Ronald] Reagan and [Bill] Clinton.”
           [David Boaz, “Bush’s Third Way Betrays True Conservatism.” The Australian. Newspaper. January 31st, 2003. Friday All-round Country Edition.]
           “… the mere fact of conservatives avowing compassion is not what is truly significant about the theory; nor is the fundamental problem with compassionate conservatism the inability of conservatives to live up to its demands in practice. What requires understanding is that there is a world of difference between what compassion means in everyday use and when conservatives deploy the term; ‘concern’ for the poor or underprivileged can take many forms, not all of which would be recognized by nonconservatives as ‘compassionate.’ Conservatives use an understanding of compassion as a ‘tough-minded,’ rather than a ‘soft-hearted,’ moral virtue to challenge the fundamental precepts of competing social philosophies.…
           “… some observers explain compassionate conservatism as representing conservatives’ own version of a ‘third way,’ a philosophy that steers a course between the ‘extremes’ of left and right, to mimic and counter the strategy of Bill Clinton and the New Democrats in seeking to claim the political centre ground. The third-way interpretation is offered by libertarian critic David Boaz, executive vice president of the free-market Cato Institute.”
           [Bruce Pilbeam, “The Tragedy of Compassionate Conservatism.” Journal of American Studies. Volume 44, number 2, May 2010. Pages 251-268.]
           “Upon assuming the presidency in January 2001, George W. Bush, despite his Christian-conservative image, picked up where his dissolute liberal predecessor had left off. White House adviser Don Eberly told the February 1, 2001, Washington Post that Mr. Bush’s ‘compassionate conservatism’ represents ‘the ultimate third way. The debate in this town the last eight years was how to forge a compromise on the role of the state and the market. This is a new way to rethink social policy—a major re-igniting of interest in the social sector.’ For ‘social,’ read ‘government.’…
           “It’s useful to consider communitarianism as less an ideology than a tendency toward favoring collective ‘obligations’ over individual ‘rights,’ and government-designated objectives over private preferences. As Amitai Etzioni explains in his new book From Empire to Community the communitarian worldview ‘assumes that collective decision making often entails imposing on various participants sacrifices for the common good.’ To legitimize those sacrifices, a ‘consensus’ must be defined and either accepted by the masses through consent or imposed on them by force.”
           [William Norman Grigg, “‘Community’ by Coercion: Behind the Bush administration’s ‘compassionate conservatism’ and revolutionary foreign policy is a dangerous collectivist ideology called ‘Communitarianism.’” The New American. Volume 20, number 11, May 2004. Pages 28-32.]
           “Ours is a solid record of accomplishment. And that’s why I’ve come to talk about compassionate conservatism and what I envision for the future.…
           “Does blocking the Faith-Based Initiative help communities where the only social service provider could be a church? Does the status quo in education really, really help the children of this country? Does class warfare—has class warfare or higher taxes ever created decent jobs in the inner city? Are you satisfied with the same answers on crime, excuses for drugs, and blindness to the problem of the family? …
           “… if you believe in the power of faith and compassion to defeat violence and despair and hopelessness, I hope you will take a look at where I stand.”
           [George W. Bush. Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: George W. Bush, 2004, Book II—July 1 to September 30, 2004. Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office. 2007. Pages 1414-1415.]
           “When President [George W.] Bush entered office, many nonprofits in communities across America had the desire to help their fellow citizens but lacked the capacity and resources to successfully compete for Federal funds. And because many of these organizations were faith-based, they were often unable to receive support from the Federal Government.
           “The President set about to change this based on his philosophy of compassionate conservatism. This approach was compassionate because it was rooted in a timeless truth – that we ought to love our neighbors as we would like to be loved ourselves. And this approach was conservative because it recognized that bureaucracies can put money in people’s hands, but they cannot put hope in people’s hearts.
           “To implement this new approach, the President used his first Executive Order to establish the Office of Faith Based and Community Initiatives at the White House. During his Administration, he created Faith-Based and Community offices at 11 Federal agencies. The Administration tasked these offices with lowering the legal and institutional barriers that prevented government and faith-based groups from working as partners.”
           [A Charge Kept: The Record of the Bush Presidency, 2001-2009. Marc A. Thiessen, editor. (No author identified.) New York: Morgan James Publishing. 2009. Page 61.]
           “Compassionate conservatism has a genuine intellectual history. It was touted for years in universities and think-tanks by two sponsors, Marvin Olasky, a former Marxist and now born-again Christian at the University of Texas in Austin, and Myron Magnet, a Dickens scholar and mutton-chop-whiskered member of the Manhattan Institute in New York. But it broke through only in the late 1990s, when the Republican Party was running out of ideas and the definition of conservatism was up for grabs.” [Editor, “Preparing America for compassionate conservatism: Does George W. Bush have any core values? He does. And many people may find them unexpectedly provocative.” The Economist. July 27th, 2000.]
       39. Stuart Hall’s framework of Marxism without guarantees (Owen Worth): Worth argues for a new third way based upon Stuart Hall’s article, “The problem of ideology: Marxism without guarantees.”
           “The main reason the third way failed as a political strategy … was that it had served its purpose. While still relevant as a counterfoil to import-substitution strategies in the semi-periphery …, in Europe it largely took the form of a useful sound bite. This was partly because, despite [Anthony] Gidden’s continued insistence that the third way did constitute a radical alternative to the status quo …. The question for the left in Europe remains that of how to develop a strategy in response that doesn’t merely return to the traditional domains of national social democracy, but which uses European integration as a force for potential unity rather than as a barrier to social equality.…
           “… this article has argued that there remains another avenue for the left-an alternative third way, if you wish-that aims to re-establish the main aims of democratic socialism within the context of historical change. It is here that Stuart Hall’s framework of ‘Marxism without guarantees’ remains relevant. Written from a post-Fordist, post-nationalist perspective, Hall’s work provides us with a way in which the left can identify the meaning of change, and rebuild accordingly. Unlike the modernisation programmes of [Anthony] Giddens and [Ulrich] Beck, Hall’s is rooted both in a Marxist interpretation of dialectical materialism, and in a Gramscian understanding of civil society. In order for the European left to rebuild itself as a force capable of challenging the supremacy of neoliberalism, it requires a recognition of regional and global change, the restatement-rather than the reassessment-of socialist principles, and the re-evaluation of the concept of transnational civil society.”
           [Owen Worth, “Re-engaging the third way? Regionalism, the European left and ‘Marxism without guarantees.’” Capital & Class. Volume 31, number 3, autumn 2007. Pages 93-109.]
           “The same process—capitalist production and exchange—can be expressed within a different ideological framework, by the use of different ‘systems of representation.’ There is the discourse of ‘the market,’ the discourse of ‘production,’ the discourse of ‘the circuits’: each produces a different definition of the system. Each also locates us differently— as worker, capitalist, wage worker, wage slave, producer, consumer, etc. Each thus situates us as social actors or as a member of a social group in a particular relation to the process and prescribes certain social identities for us. The ideological categories in use, in other words, position us in relation to the account of the process as depicted in the discourse. The worker who relates to his or her condition of existence in the capitalist process as ‘consumer’—who enters the system, so to speak, through that gateway— participates in the process by way of a different practice from those who are inscribed in the system as ‘skilled labourer’—or not inscribed in it at all, as ‘housewife.’ All these inscriptions have effects which are real. They make a material difference, since how we act in certain situations depends on what our definitions of the situation are.” [Stuart Hall, “The problem of ideology: Marxism without guarantees.” Stuart Hall: Critical Dialogues in Cultural Studies. David Morley and Kuan-Hsing Chen, editors. London and New York: Routledge imprint of Taylor & Francis Group, an Informa PLC business. 2005. Pages 24-45.]
       40. New Liberal philosophy (Richard D. Kahlenberg and Ruy Teixeira as pronounced in this MP3 audio file): They advocate for a liberal third way position.
           “It is time for a New Liberal philosophy to supersede not only Old Liberal approaches but those of New Democrats as well. This New Liberal approach would share the orthodox Third Way premise—that traditional liberal and conservative approaches are wanting—but would offer a dramatically different program aimed at seriously addressing fundamental problems of social justice and economic inequality. Such is the payoff, after all, that the Third Way movement was meant to make possible.…
           “… New Liberals would … advocate a substantial expansion of federal investment in education, including: (1) a major teacher pay increase, to address the need to attract talented men and women; (2) the support necessary to open schools early, keep them open into the evening and make them available during the summer; (3) universal access to preschool, including fully funding Head Start; and (4) a generous income-contingent college loan program, where students’ repayments are pegged to their actual earnings after they leave school, to make college education a reasonable option for many who now see the associated debt burden as too high.”
           [Richard D. Kahlenberg and Ruy Teixeira, “A Better Third Way: It’s time for a liberal philosophy focusing on social justice and inequality.” The Nation. Volume 272, number 9, March 2001. Pages 15-18.]
       41. global third way (Ethan B. Kapstein): Kapstein develops a third way informed by John Rawls’ theory of justice.
           “… if we wish to create a third way, redressing the balance between mobile capital and immobile labor, it must be done on the basis of international cooperation, rather than by states acting on their own.…
           “… the problem of increasing efficiency, as Harvard philosopher John Rawls taught us in A Theory of Justice (1971), represents only one societal concern among others. Equality and justice are of even greater consequence, and they must be taken into account by poli- cymakers, since an economic system that is widely viewed as unjust cannot, should not, endure.
           “The starting point for this discussion of the third way draws on that insight and begins with the premise that the purpose of economic policy is to provide an environment in which every individual is able to realize his or her talents to the fullest extent possible, compatible with similar liberties for all other individuals,”
           [Ethan B. Kapstein, “A Global Third Way: Social Justice and the World Economy.” World Policy Journal. Volume 15, number 4, winter 1998/1999. Pages 23-35.]
           “Justice as fairness is an example of what I have called a contract theory.…
           “The theory of justice is a part, perhaps the most significant part, of the theory of rational choice. Furthermore, principles of justice deal with conflicting claims upon the advantages won by social cooperation; they apply to the relations among several persons or groups.…
           “… Justice as fairness is not a complete contract theory. For it is clear that the contractarian idea can be extended to the choice of more or less an entire ethical system, that is, to a system including principles for all the virtues and not only for justice.… We must recognize the limited scope of justice as fairness and of the general type of view that it exemplifies. How far its conclusions must be revised once these other matters are understood cannot be decided in advance.”
           [John Rawls. A Theory of Justice. Revised edition. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The Belknapp Press imprint of Harvard University Press. 1999. Pages 14-15.]
           “So far as possible one assumes only a knowledge of the thin theory of the good, a theory founded on the facts of psychology and setting out the general structure of human desires and ends. On the basis of this theory we can define the primary goods. Of course, the thin theory must be sound; but at the moment this is not at issue. For the point of the original position is to understand our conception of justice (and our notion of the good, too, in so far as it extends beyond the thin theory) by seeing how this conception is limited by and can be constructed from other notions that it is natural to think of as more basic and abstract. This is the reason for bracketing conceptions of the right and it applies equally to conceptions of the good (other than the thin theory).” [John Rawls, “Fairness to Goodness.” The Philosophical Review. Volume 84, number 4, October 1975. Pages 536-554.]
           “In recent years, traditional rights-based liberalism has come under attack from a group of critics known as communitarians.… According to [John] Rawls’s theory of justice, certain traditional rights, or ‘basic equal liberties,’ can be derived from a hypothetical social contract made by individuals in what he calls the ‘original position.’ In the original position people operate under a ‘veil of ignorance,’ whereby the contracting individuals are not aware of their particular endowments, character traits, and allegiances.” [Joel Feinberg, “Liberalism, Community, and Tradition.” Tikkun: to heal, repair, and transform the world. Volume 3, number 3, May/June 1988. Pages 38-41 and 116-120.]
           “[John] Rawls’ political conception of justice is built on a view of the proper justification of public institutions and policies in societies characterized by the fact of pluralism, that is, in societies in which citizens do not agree about the ultimate values that define the good life. A conception of justice consists of a set of principles for assigning basic rights and responsibilities and for determining the distribution of the benefits and burdens of social cooperation.” [M. Victoria Costa, “Rawlsian Civic Education: Political not Minimal.” Journal of Applied Philosophy. Volume 21, number 1, 2004. Pages 1-14.]
       42. Islamic conscious capitalism (Samir H. K. Safar-Aly [Arabic/ʿArabiyyaẗ, سَمِير ه. ك. صَفَر ـ عَلِيّ, Samīr H. K. Ṣafar-ʿAliyy]): He proposes a third way based upon classical Islamic sacred texts.
           “… what we appear to witness within Islamic economic jurisprudence is a spiritual marriage between the medieval Christian division of Caritas [Christian love and charity] and commerce, arguably offering the potential for salvation through ethical and spiritual consciousness in both profit procurement and the profit incentive. In understanding what is spiritually prohibited within Islamic finance transactions and Islamic business, we may get a better picture of what an Islamic ‘Third Way’ may look like.…
           “… Perhaps we can … be inspired by Islamic theological economic teachings, despite the current onslaught of Islamophobia throughout Western Europe and the USA. Given the research above, and considering the great shared teachings between both the Islamo-Christian and Judeo-Islamic traditions, there may in fact be a great potential for an Islamic ‘Third Way’ based on virtue, inserting consciousness and ethics into capitalism.”
           [Samir H. K. Safar-Aly, “Islamic conscious capitalism: a ‘Third Way’ in light of classical scripture.” International Review of Economics. Volume 63, issue 1, March 2016. Pages 77-91.]
       43. Žižek’s third way (Slavoj Žižek as pronounced in this MP3 audio file, Rex Butler, and Scott Stephens): Butler and Stephens propose a third way based upon the work of Slavoj Žižek.
           “… [There is the] ‘Third Way’ alternative [which Slavoj] Žižek so vehemently rejects throughout his work. However, are the reasons for this rejection – and let us even suggest, as he does with regard to [Tony] Blair and [Jörg] Haider, a certain clinching of Žižek and Blair – not to be explained as arising out of Žižek’s own uncomfortable proximity to Blair, as indeed is hinted at by [Ernesto] Laclau’s suggestion that what is implicit in Žižek is some kind of impossible ‘third way’? But let us be more exact here. At stake in Žižek’s ‘third way’ is a necessary distinction between form and content. With regard to content, he is absolutely in agreement with the Third Way and its desire to institute progressive social programmes in the face of conservative opposition. There is simply no alternative to capitalism (at this moment). But with regard to form, Žižek absolutely rejects the Third Way’s concession to this fact in advance. For Žižek, the conclusion that there is no alternative to capitalism can only be reached via the thinking of the alternative that, precisely through its exclusion (this again is [Georg Wilhelm Friedrich] Hegel’s point concerning the distinction between concrete and abstract universalities), ensures that there is only capitalism. In other words, as opposed to the Third Way in which we always begin with capitalism, for Žižek capitalism is only the result of a more abstract universality (capitalism and its other).” [Rex Butler and Scott Stephens, “Editors’ introduction: Slavoj Žižek’s ‘third way.’” The Universal Exception. Rex Butler and Scott Stephens, editors. London and New York: Continuum Books. 2006. Pages 1-11.]
           “What is effectively at stake in the present crisis of post-socialist states is the struggle for one’s place, now that the illusion of this ‘third way’ has evaporated: who will be admitted ‘inside,’ integrated into the developed capitalist order, and who will remain excluded from it?” [Slavoj Žižek, “The absent ‘second way’: Eastern European liberalism and its discontents.” The Universal Exception. Rex Butler and Scott Stephens, editors. London and New York: Continuum Books. 2006. Pages 13-32.]
           “In [Jörg] Haider’s clinching to [Tony] Blair—we use the term in the precise sense, of the boxing-ring—the Third Way gets its own message back in inverted form. Participation by the far Right in government is not punishment for ‘sectarianism’ or a failure to ‘come to terms with postmodern conditions.’ It is the price the Left pays for renouncing any radical political project, and accepting market capitalism as ‘the only game in town.’” [Slavoj Žižek, “Why We All Love to Hate Haider.” New Left Review. Series II, number 2, March-April 2000. Pages 37-45.]
           “… what, concretely, would … [a] new leftist vision be, with regard to its content? Is not the decline of the traditional Left, its retreat into the moral rationalist discourse that no longer enters the hegemonic game, conditioned by big changes in the global economy in the last decades? So where is a better leftist global solution to our present predicament? Whatever one holds against the ‘third way,’ it at least tried to propose a vision that does take into account these changes.” [Slavoj Žižek, “Against the Populist Temptation.” Critical Inquiry. Volume 32, spring 2006. Pages 551-574.]
           “… in those confused months of the passage of ‘really existing socialism’ [in the former East Germany] into capitalism [in the newly reunited Germany], the fiction of a ‘third way’ was the only point at which social antagonism was not obliterated. Herein lies one of the tasks of the ‘postmodern’ critique of ideology: to designate the elements within an existing social order which – in the guise of ‘fiction,’ that is, of ‘Utopian’ narratives of possible but failed alternative histories – point towards the system’s antagonistic character, and thus ‘estrange‘ us to the self-evidence of its established identity.” [Slavoj Žižek, “The Spectre of Ideology.” Mapping Ideology. Slavoj Žižek, editor. London and New York: Verso imprint of New Left Books. 2012. Pages 1-33.]
       44. ethopolitics (Nikolas Rose): He refers to a regeneration and reactivation of ethical values.
           “I term … [the] new politics of behavior ethopolitics. [Michel] Foucault, of course, identified the rise of disciplinary power, focusing on maximizing the utility and docility of individuals, and biopower, focusing on maximizing the health and welfare of the population. If discipline individualizes and normalizes and biopower aggregates and socializes, ethopower works through the values, beliefs, and sentiments thought to underpin the techniques of responsible self government and the management of one’s obligations to others. In ethopolitics, life itself, in its everyday manifestations, is the object of adjudication.…
           “In what other politics would elected politicians seek to use the apparatus of the law to require parents to read to their children for a fixed period each day? Ethopolitics here can incite and justify a will to govern that imposes no limits on itself. Here one can identify the threat of governing too much, which haunts the current administrations of Bill Clinton and Tony Blair: This is a Third Way that would seek to govern a polity through the micromanagement of the self-steering practices of its citizens. Beyond such examples, what conclusions can we draw from this provisional inventory of some of the presuppositions and practices of the Third Way?”
           [Nikolas Rose, “Community, Citizenship, and the Third Way.” American Behavioral Scientist. Volume 43, number 9, June/July 2000. Pages 1395-1411.]
           “… in the recent interest in the politics of communitarianism, associationalism and the ‘Third Way,’ ones sees an accentuation of the strategies that I term ‘ethopolitics’ …. These seek to regenerate and reactivate the ethical values that are now believed to regulate individual conduct and that help maintain order and obedience to law by binding individuals into shared moral norms and values: governing through the self-steering forces of honour and shame, of propriety, obligation, trust, fidelity, and commitment to others.” [Nikolas Rose, “Government and Control.” The British Journal of Criminology. Volume 40, number 2, spring 2000. Pages 321-339.]
           “As biopolitics becomes entangled with bioeconomics, as biocapital becomes open to ethical evaluation, and as ethopolitics becomes central to our way of life, new spaces are emerging for the politics of life in the twenty-first century.” [Nikolas Rose. Nikolas Rose: The Politics of Life Itself. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press. 2006. Page 8.]
           “Risk here denotes a family of ways of thinking and acting, involving calculations about probable futures in the present followed by interventions into the present in order to control that potential future. Mortality and morbidity were key sites for the development of conceptions of the future as calculable, predictable, and as dependent upon identifiable factors some of which were manageable ….” [Nikolas Rose, “The Politics of Life Itself.” Theory, Culture & Society. Volume 18, number 6, 2001. Pages 1-30.]
           “The language of political philosophy: state and civil society, freedom and constraint, sovereignty and democracy, public and private plays a key role in the organization of modern political power. However, it cannot provide the intellectual tools for analyzing the problematics of government in the present. Unless we adopt different ways of thinking about the exercise of political power, we will find contemporary forms of rule hard to understand. It will thus be difficult to make proper judgment of the alternatives on offer.” [Nikolas Rose, “Political Power beyond the State: Problematics of Government.” The British Journal of Sociology. Volume 43, number 2, June 1992. Pages 173-205.]
       45. libertarian third way (Peter Foster and—as interpreted by W. James Antle, III—David Boaz): They develop proposals on right libertatianism.
           “On the surface, American politics often seems so tribally divided between Democrat and Republican, Liberal and Conservative, that there is little point even bothering with the shades of grey in between.
           “But while it is true third-party candidates don’t succeed in US general elections, the failures of first the [George W.] Bush and now the [Barack] Obama administrations have seen the emergence not of a third party in US politics but a libertarian ‘third force’ that could yet influence the outcome in 2016.
           “Listen carefully and libertarian ideas – with a small ‘l’ – can be heard shaping many of the big issues of the day, from marijuana legalisation to penal reform, from digital privacy issues in the wake of the Edward Snowden revelations to whether the US bombs Syria.”
           [Peter Foster, “The libertarian third way between red and blue that could fire up the 2016 election.” Sunday Telegraph. Newspaper. October 5th, 2015.]
           “The long struggle against communism kept libertarians and traditionalist conservatives allied despite their often significant philosophical differences. Since the demise of the Soviet Union, many commentators have speculated on the likelihood of growing strains in the libertarian-conservative relationship. Usually the speculation has centered on splits between libertarians and the religious right over such moral or “social” issues as abortion, gay rights, school prayer, and the drug war. Lately, however, a lot of mainstream conservatives have decided to challenge libertarians on the basic issue of, well, liberty.…
           “… ‘Free individuals require a community, which backs them up against encroachment by the state and sustains morality by drawing on the gentle prodding of kin, friends, neighbors, and other community members rather than building on government controls,’ writes Amitai Etzioni in The Spirit of Community. And again, ‘Much of what Communitarians favor has little to do with laws and regulations, which ultimately draw on the coercive powers of the state.’ Yet they call for more and more new laws. They should take their libertarian rhetoric more seriously.”
           [David Boaz. The Politics of Freedom: Taking on The Left, The Right and Threats to Our Liberties. Washington, D.C.: Cato Institute, 2008. Kindle edition.]
           “… [David] Boaz advocates a libertarian third way that transcends the conventional Left-Right spectrum [in the book, The Politics of Freedom: Taking on the Left, the Right, and Threats to Our Liberties].” [W. James Antle, III, “Agenda for anti-statists.” The American Conservative. Volume 7, number 11, June (2nd) 2008. Pages 32-34.]
       46. God’s radical third way (Tom Sine): He develops a Christian third-way approach.
           “I am also discovering growing numbers of Christians from all backgrounds who are bone weary of the inflamed speech and polarizing ideologies of both the left and the right. They have no desire to side with either of the extremes or to get caught up in the unholy name-calling and mayhem that is terrorizing the public square. These self-directed Christians, from a broad spectrum of Christian traditions, choose to read their newspapers and their Bibles for themselves and to do their own thinking.
           “They are seeking a third way, looking for another place to stand and a new reason for being that more authentically reflect a biblical faith instead of a political ideology, right or left. Unfortunately, there is currently little available in print that enables people either to make sense of America’s culture wars or to find an alternative to its polar extremes.”
           [Tom Sine. Cease Fire: Searching for Sanity in America’s Culture Wars. Grand Rapids, Michigan: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company. 1995. Page 4.]
           “You see, the first call of the gospel of Jesus Christ is not to doing, but to being. It is a call not to progressive or conservative political action but to a new way to be in the world. The foundation of God’s radical third way lies in the family of God, in the eucharist, in worship, and in Scripture.” [Tom Sine. Cease Fire: Searching for Sanity in America’s Culture Wars. Grand Rapids, Michigan: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company. 1995. Page 262.]
           “As we race toward the 2004 presidential election, the United States is a deeply divided country. At the very center of this divide is a seriously polarized church—polarized by politics more than theology. The American church is not only split by contentious issues such as abortion and the sanctioning of gay unions, but also by issues of domestic and foreign policy.…
           “Simon Jones, editor of the Third Way magazine, a Christian publication in Britain, said, ‘I’ve found Christian comment here in the UK to be almost unanimously anti-war…. In fact, I have found it difficult to find people who could write in favor of military intervention. Generally speaking, Christians here are determined to remind non-Christians that the theology that drives George Bush … is not something that the UK church identifies with.’”
           [Tom Sine, “‘Divided by a Common Faith’; Evangelicals in the United States are increasingly estranged from their counterparts almost everywhere else.” Sojourners Magazine. Volume 33, number 10, October 2004. Pages 28-31.]
       47. Chinese third way (Li He [Chinese, 李贺, Lǐ-Hè as pronounced in this MP3 audio file] and Jeffery R. Webber): They each examine the path taken by Mainland China following the end of the Cultural Revolution.
           “China’s reform strategy recently has been touted by economists, including those from the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, as both economically and socially successful. The Chinese gradualist approach has produced winners but not losers. The Chinese ‘third way’—a mixture of market reform and continuation of significant state influence over the economy—is acquiring normative and policy significance and has been used to challenge the intellectual pillars of the Washington Consensus—often seen synonymous with neoliberalism and globalization—by such influential figures as Joseph Stiglitz. Joshua Ramo argues that there is a new ‘Beijing consensus’ emerging with distinct attitudes about politics, development, and the global balance of power.” [Li He, “The Chinese Path of Economic Reform and Its Implications.” Asian Affairs: an American Review. Volume 31, number 4, winter 2005. Pages 195-211.]
           “Post-1989 developments [in Mainland China] were also the starting point for some progressives’ embrace of China as a model. Many leftists were thrown into disarray after the collapse of the supposedly socialist economies of the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, and China stood out as an alternative: ‘China’s government continued to proclaim its commitment to building socialism. Moreover, its more gradualist reform policies were producing rapid and sustained economic growth.’ Many leftists rooted themselves in the conceptualization of the new China as a market-socialist ‘third way’ situated between the extremes of capitalism and centralized state socialism.” [Jeffery R. Webber, “Marxism and Development Theory: Recent Scholarship on the Third World.” Rethinking Marxism. Volume 20, number 1, January 2008. Pages 164-178.]
       48. Arab third way (Daoud Kuttab [Arabic/ʿArabiyyaẗ, دَاوُد كُتَّاب, Dāwud Kuttāb]): He discusses the possibility of political alternatives following the Arab spring of 2011.
           “Throughout the post-colonial period, Arab countries have consistently failed to produce an efficient – let alone democratic – system of government. Now, after a half-century of competition between military or royal dictatorships and militant Islamist regimes, many Arabs are again seeking a ‘third way’ ….
           “In order to make progress, the youth-led movements that drove the Arab Spring must translate their shared principles into effective political structures, and choose leaders who are capable of placing the search for consensus ahead of personal ambition. If they succeed, the Arab world may finally have an alternative to rule by generals or mullahs. Even if they fail to gain power, the emergence of such an alternative would surely influence the Arab world’s agenda for years to come.”
           [Daoud Kuttab, “An Arab ‘Third Way.’” Today’s Zaman. Newspaper. Istanbul, Turkey. September 5th, 2013.]
       49. Third Wave (Alvin Toffler): Toffler, the well-known futurist, elected to refer to his perspective as a Third Wave—rather than a Third Way. Nevertheless, at least in this writer’s view, the Third Wave merits inclusion in the section.
           “… the forces of the Third Wave favor a democracy of shared minority power; they are prepared to experiment with more direct democracy; they favor both transnationalism and a fundamental devolution of power. They call for a crack-up of the giant bureaucracies. They demand a renewable and less centralized energy system. They want to legitimate options to the nuclear family. They fight for less standardization, more individualization in the schools. They place a high priority on environmental problems. They recognize the necessity to restructure the world economy on a more balanced and just basis.…
           “… advocates of the Third Wave are … difficult to characterize. Some head up major corporations while others are zealous anticorporate consumerists. Some are worried environmentalists; others are more concerned with the issues of sexual roles, family life, or personal growth. Some focus almost exclusively on the development of alternative energy forms; others are mainly excited by the democratic promise of the communications revolution.”
           [Alvin Toffler. The Third Wave. New York: William Morrow and Company, Inc. 1980. Page 454.]
           “Right now, the conflicts within the US are relatively minor. At the lowest level – in business, say – we still have accounting systems and taxation systems that favor companies with hardware over knowledge-based firms. We still depreciate technology over many years, while, in the Third Wave sector of the economy, the equipment can be obsolete within months.…
           “… look at the global level, and you see a struggle by the USA to impose intellectual property protection on First and Second Wave countries, some of whose leaders hardly understand why that should be all that important. After all, it isn’t in agrarian or industrial countries. It is important, however, in Third Wave knowledge economies.…
           “Now with the emergence of the Third Wave, knowledge-based economies and societies, global power is increasingly tri-sected: Countries with primarily peasant economies on the bottom; countries with cheap labor, manufacturing economies in the middle; and countries with emergent, knowledge-based economies on top. The transition to this new system is the single greatest change in the distribution of power on the planet. If we’re not careful, some serious conflicts could erupt that could make those we’ve known recently look small by comparison.”
           [Alvin Toffler in Alvin Toffler, Tom Johnson, and Larry Bennigson, “Riding the Third Wave: A Conversation with Alvin Toffler, Tom Johnson and Lawrence Bennigson.” Strategy & Leadership. Volume 27, number 4/5, July/August/September 1999. Pages 4-10.]
           “As the Third Wave emerges the nation state—the key political unit of the Second Wave era—is being pressured from above and below. Moreover pressure arise due to the Transnational companies (TNC) which have taken on some of the features of the nation-state itself—including their own corps of quasi-diplomats and their own highly effective intelligence agencies. All these alter the position of the nation-state on the planet as the power that once belonged exclusively to it when it was the only major force operating on the world scene is sharply reduced. But the transnational corporations are not the only forces on the global stage there are also the nongovernmental transnational associations and the supranational agency. As a consequence we create a new multilayered global game in which not nations but corporations and trade unions, political, ethnic, and cultural groupings, transnational associations and supranational agencies are all players.” [Alvin Toffler, “The Third Wave: The corporate identity crisis.” Management Review. Volume 69, issue 5, May 1980. Pages 8-17.]
       50. market-socialist third way (Thomas E. Weisskopf): He proposes a third way, for Eastern Europe, based upon market socialism—a synthesis of capitalism and socialism.
           “Economists and policy-makers in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, discouraged by the experience of market-oriented reforms in command-administrative economies, have tended to dismiss the possibility of a successful market-socialist third way involving social property rights and/or worker self-management. From the 1960s through the 1980s, when communist regimes still dominated policy-making in the East, the idea of a «third way» was popular in certain circles – especially among market-oriented economic reformers who wished to liberalize the administrative-command system. Now that the alternative of a completely capitalist market economy appears within reach, only a few committed democratic socialists are still advocating a third way. Yet there are good reasons to think that a democratic-enterprise-based market socialism may well offer the best approach to a market economy in the East.” [Thomas E. Weisskopf, “Is There Really No Third Way in Eastern Europe? The Case for a Democratic-Enterprise-Based Market Socialism.” Revue européenne des sciences sociales. Volume 31, number 96, 1993. Pages 217-239.]
       51. stakeholder capitalism (Ian Clark): He develops a third way based upon an analysis of the Volkswagen Group.
           “In the contemporary period, the question raised by the VW [Volkswagen] crisis is threefold. First, if VW can negotiate a way through, does this suggest that the stakeholder approach to business and the Rhineland model of industrial relations are more resilient than advocates of Anglo-American approaches suggest? Second, does the change package at VW illustrate that codetermination and stakeholder approaches can incorporate the requirements of shareholder capitalism to usher in an enlightened model of shareholder capitalism into the German economy? Third, and related, will this preclude the arrival of and necessity for Anglo-American management techniques in German-based firms? In short, does the VW case suggest change, continuity or pathway adjustment?” [Ian Clark, “Another third way? VW and the trials of stakeholder capitalism.” Industrial Relations Journal. Volume 37, issue 6, November 2006. Pages 593-606.]
       52. revised Third Way (Paul Stubbs): He suggests a third way focused upon human needs.
           “There is clearly a need … for consultancy models to be based on a study of social welfare in which any prescriptions are based on rigorous, thick, ethnographic description; favouring policies where universal entitlements coexist with a recognition of diversity, and a commitment to a plurality of provision; in which material needs and the non-material need for voice – ‘enabling … people to develop their own … social scripts’ – are both treated as important; and in which due weight is placed on both the content and the process of reform measures and policy advice. This suggests a revised ‘Third Way,’ not between capitalism and socialism, but between absolutist and relativist approaches to human needs in which outcomes matter – ‘poverty’ may well be a discourse, but people still die from it – but in which these outcomes are seen as always more complex, contradictory, and contested than the mere imposition, in local fields, of ‘global scripts.’” [Paul Stubbs, “Globalisation, Memory and Consultancy: Towards a new ethnography of policy advice and welfare reform.” Occassional Papers in International Development Studies. Number 24, 2004. Pages 175-197.]
       53. evidence-based policy making (Ian Sanderson): He examines the implementation of economic and social policies by New Labour in the UK.
           “The UK Government’s renewed emphasis on evidence-based policy making (EBP) is held to reflect a less ideological, more pragmatic ‘third way’ to developing and implementing economic and social policies. The new mantra – ‘what matters is what works’ – signals a resurgence of traditional notions of rationality in policy making. It implies a central role for social research and evaluation in developing robust evidence of how and why policies do, or do not, ‘work’ and policy-making processes that prioritize the influence of such evidence.” [Ian Sanderson, “Getting Evidence into Practice: Perspectives on Rationality.” Evaluation. Volume 10, number 3, 2004. Pages 366–379.]
           “The notion of evidence-based policy making (EBP) has gained renewed currency in the UK in the context of the current Labour Government’s commitment to modernise government.…
           “… a key component of New Labour’s ‘pragmatic’ Third Way position is the shift of focus onto ‘delivering results that matter’ through ‘modern policy making’ ….”
           [Ian Sanderson, “Making Sense of ‘What Works’: Evidence Based Policy Making as Instrumental Rationality?” Public Policy and Administration. Volume 17, number 3, autumn 2002. Pages 61-75.]
       54. pragmatic, third-way approach to environmental governance (Andrea K. Gerlak): The article examines U.S. water policy.
           “… [Some] tell of the new pragmatic, third-way approach to environmental governance ….
           “New regionally based restoration efforts, along with cooperative programs and agreements, indicate movement toward greater coordination. In recent years, we have witnessed a shift toward bioregional ecosystem-scale approaches with an emphasis on collaborative governance. Such institutional arrangements are place based and multiobjective, typically embracing goals of economic efficiency, environmental protection and social equity.”
           [Andrea K. Gerlak, “Federalism and U.S. Water Policy: Lessons for the Twenty-First Century.” Publius. Volume 36, number 2, spring 2006. Pages 231-257.]
       55. self-consciously pragmatic Third Way (Peter Scourfield): He examines UK New Labour’s approach to residential care.
           “New Labour’s apparent comfort with the progressive marketization and privatization of the residential care sector, which is still regarded as part of the ‘public sector’ because much of it is state commissioned, might be construed as revealing a greater degree of neo-liberal influence than the government would care to admit. New Labour’s self-consciously pragmatic ‘Third Way’ heritage, with its concerns for social inclusion and democratic renewal, means that any suggestion that it is simply enacting a neo-liberalist agenda becomes both contestable and obscured.” [Peter Scourfield, “Are there reasons to be worried about the ‘caretelization’ of residential care?” Critical Social Policy. Volume 27, number 2, 2007. Pages 155-180.]
       56. third way parenting (Stuart Waiton): The article discusses the impact of UK New Labour on parenting in Scotland.
           “The aim of the article is to understand the emergence of the Named Person in Scotland and to explain the significant distance between legislators and policy makers and those who have opposed the Named Person initiative. We propose that the key to understanding these divergent views is predicated upon profoundly different views of the family, the collapse of the ideal of family autonomy, and its replacement with what can be described as ‘third way parenting.’ …
           “Through the prism of ‘risk,’ objectives, ideas, and services targeted at children and families have increasingly developed around the need for ‘prevention.’ … This shift emerged with the wider trend toward a more managerial, ‘less political’ approach to social policy—an evidence-based approach that ‘came to the fore in the UK with the advent of the New Labour government, who saw it as a pragmatic “third way” approach that transcended ideologies of Left and Right’ ….”
           [Stuart Waiton, “Third Way Parenting and the Creation of the ‘Named Person’ in Scotland: The End of Family Privacy and Autonomy?” SAGE Open. January–March, 2016. Pages 1-13.]
       57. third way on network neutrality (Robert D. Atkinson and Philip J. Weiser): They propose a third way, or a centrist approach, for assuring the neutrality of the Internet.
           “To its supporters, net neutrality is a way of protecting innovation by ensuring that all Internet traffic is treated equally. To its opponents, it is a threat to innovation because it inhibits network providers who believe that the capital raised by charging for ‘tiered service’ would enable major improvements in broadband infrastructure. In reality, both sides are partially right, even as they portray one another as misguided or pernicious. But there is another position—a ‘third way,’ so to speak—that will enable the development of enhanced networks while at the same time ensuring a robust, open, best-efforts Internet.…
           “What is missing from this debate is a sensible, centrist solution, one that would allow broadband providers to offer and charge for enhanced network services while providing for some form of regulatory oversight to ensure that the current broadband providers do not abuse their market power. Such an approach would also assure that a reasonably sized, open, and best-efforts Internet pipe is available for innovators. This ‘third way’ should have three prongs: effective consumer protection measures, sound competition policy oversight, and conditioned tax incentives.”
           [Robert D. Atkinson and Philip J. Weiser, “A Third Way on Network Neutrality.” The New Atlantis. Number 13, summer 2006. Pages 47-60.]
       58. mutual obligation (Jennifer Doyle): Focusing on Australia, she reconsiders the welfare state.
           “… [The] idea of mutual obligation is seen as a central pillar of third way politics. To avoid welfare recipients falling into the dependency ‘black hole,’ such people must be compelled by governments, through various behavioural modification strategies, to take up opportunities that facilitate greater self-reliance.
           “Mutual obligation in the Australian context is being implemented under the current Coalition Govern ment, however, the seeds of mutual obligation started under the previous two Labour Governments, when public sympathy for the unemployed declined.”
           [Jennifer Doyle, “The ‘Third Way’ and Mutual Obligation: Rethinking the Welfare State.” AQ: Australian Quarterly. Volume 75, number 3, May–June 2003. Pages 23-26 and 40.]
       59. good international citizenship (Nicholas J. Wheeler and Tim Dunne): They discuss an alternative to “the traditional realist approach to foreign policy.”
           “… there are clear parallels between the social democratic values pursued by our Labour government and those of the Australian Labor governments under Bob Hawke and Paul Keating. Second, Australia’s foreign minister from 1988 to 1996, Gareth Evans, came into office at a time when the constraints of the Cold War which had so inhibited [U.S. President Jimmy] Carter were loosening. This opened a space for leadership and innovative thinking which Evans supplied in the form of his concept of ‘good international citizenship’ which was subjected to a critical analysis by academics, policy-makers and activists.
           “For Evans, good international citizenship departs from the traditional realist approach to foreign policy because it rejects the assumption that the national interest always pulls in the opposite direction to the promotion of human rights. Moreover, in contrast to idealism, which sees an underlying harmony of moral principles, advocates of good international citizenship recognize that ‘terrible moral choices have sometimes to be made.’”
           [Nicholas J. Wheeler and Tim Dunne, “Good International Citizenship: A Third Way for British Foreign Policy.” International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-). Volume 74, number 4, October 1998. Pages 847-870.]
       60. non-weaponized deterrence (George Perkovich): He proposes a nuclear third way for South Asia.
           “Non-weaponized deterrence does not preclude progress further down the de-nuclearization road. In fact, all concerned should aim to improve South Asia’s security environment to the point where those countries can sign binding, universal non-proliferation commitments. For that, the relationship between China and India is pivotal; if India can be reassured by Chinese accession to nuclear constraints and redeployment of Chinese missiles northward, away from India, India’s steps toward de-nuclearization will in all likelihood be followed by Pakistan. Unlike the NPT-centered policy, though, the non-weaponized deterrence approach does not sacrifice attainable progress for remote perfection.
           “It will take inspired technical and diplomatic feats to structure and verify a non-weaponized deterrence relationship between India and Pakistan. Yet that task is much easier than verifying an agreement to abandon nuclear weapons completely.”
           [George Perkovich, “A Nuclear Third Way in South Asia.” Foreign Policy. Number 91, summer 1993. Pages 85-104.]
       61. self-governing schools (Lesley Anderson): The article examines an application of Anthony Giddens’s approach to education in the UK.
           “… [New Labour’s Third Way in politics] is discussed in terms of general and educational policies with specific regard to the characteristics of self-governing schools.…
           “… it can be argued that the actual concept of self-governance as represented by GM [grant–maintained] schools as well as the approach taken by New Labour in dealing with them may be viewed as one of the ‘experiments with democracy’ proposed by [Anthony] Giddens … as being crucial to his conception of the Third Way.”
           [Lesley Anderson, “A ‘Third Way’ Towards Self-Governing Schools?: New Labour and Opting out.” British Journal of Educational Studies. Volume 49, number 1, March 2001. Pages 56-70.]
       62. Sustainable Intensification (Niamh Mahon, Ian Crute, Eunice Simmons, and Muhammad Mofakkarul Islam): They propose a third-way approach to agriculture.
           “… the concept of “Sustainable Intensification” (SI) has been expounded and promoted. The term was first coined in thelate 1990s in the context of smallholder, African agriculture …. Since then, the concept has gained traction and become per-vasive through governments …, research institutes …, International development institutions, … and even transnational agribusinesses …. It may be that the concept of SI has become so appealing because it is perceived to representa third way, between the contrasting paradigms of HEIA [High External Input Agriculture] and AA [Alternative Agriculture] ….” [Niamh Mahon, Ian Crute, Eunice Simmons, and Md. Mofakkarul Islam, “Sustainable intensification – ‘oxymoron’ or ‘third-way’? A systematic review.” Ecological Indicators. Volume 74, March 2017. Pages 73-97.]
       63. liberal socialism (Tony Wright): Focusing upon the UK, Wright proposes a new third way of democratic socialism.
           “In many respects the loosening and eventual disappearance of the rival socialist blocs in recent decades has widened the constituency for this kind of democratic socialism, as part of a more general opening towards neglected and minority traditions, notwithstanding the fact that it has occurred in the immediate context of neo-liberal triumphalism. While this is much to be welcomed, it has in some respects made it more difficult to construct a viable and coherent democratic socialist political practice. In Britain, in particular, this was conspicuously the case for a period, when the Labour Party was immobilized by the combined effects of a vulgar labourism and a vulgar Marxism and unable to develop a democratic socialism that was both theoretically and practically credible in the face of the resurgent market liberalism with which it was confronted. This kind of democratic socialism or social democracy would represent a genuine third way between state socialism and irresponsible capitalism. It would also demand a considerable amount of political skill and practical imagination, from both its leaders and its supporters. It would involve a long haul, with many failures and mistakes on the way, and without any assurance of eventual success or lasting victory.” [Tony Wright. Socialisms: Old and new. London and New York: Routledge imprint of Taylor & Francis Group, an Informa PLC business. 2006. Page 100.]
           “If a liberal socialism requires an old collectivism to become a new collectivism (the failure to meet this requirement has played no small part in the recent problems of social democratic politics), an even more pressing precondition is that the contemporary tyranny of market individualism should be ended. Until this is accomplished, the basis for a new intellectual and political consensus simply will not exist. Already there are indications that this may be happening. A new language of community speaks to the times more convincingly than the abrasive othodoxies of possessive individualism. The fractured and fragmented condition of western societies cries out for a new politics of security and solidarity. Societies that are coming apart at the seams demand a principled reconstruction around common purposes, not a celebration of their disintegration at the hands of the careless gods of the market.” [Tony Wright. Socialisms: Old and new. London and New York: Routledge imprint of Taylor & Francis Group, an Informa PLC business. 2006. Page 116.]
       64. learning society (Kenneth Wain): He develops an approach to education in the European Union.
           “In short, the idea of the state creating the learning society as a’welfare provision’ means that the public is encouraged to surrender the initiative to the providers; namely the state and its experts, hence, today’s predicament, where the rapid transformations of the times fail to be addressed by an active public domain ….
           “… There is … clearly a clash here with the strong self-responsible individualism promoted by the EU [European Union] in its discourse on lifelong learning and the learning society that was evolving at the same time that he was making his arguments and that he does not consider. Nor does he describe how the role of the market and the employers, strong as we have seen under the neoliberal regime, would be redefined in a learning social democracy.”
           [Kenneth Wain, “The Learning Society and the Third Way.” Counterpoints. Volume 260, 2004. Pages 183-227.]
       65. tough love (Bill Jordan): He describes policies of “fiscal prudence” by the UK’s New Labour.
           “As part of its mobilization of a mainstream political coalition, New Labour was committed both to fiscal prudence and a hard line on a whole range of issues that had inflamed popular opinion …. Hence its programme had to balance measures for inclusion, equality and empowerment with ones for enforcement. The phrase ‘tough love’ has caught on as a way of capturing the spirit of its culture shift …. It borrowed from the [Bill] Clinton administration in the USA an approach to criminal justice and drugs policy (as in ‘zero tolerance’ and ‘three strikes and you’re out’) which spilt over into other aspects of the social programme ….” [Bill Jordan, “Tough Love: Social Work, Social Exclusion and the Third Way.” The British Journal of Social Work. Volume 31, number 4, August 2001. Pages 527-546.]
       66. Dutch model (Anton Hemerijck as pronounced in this MP3 audio file and Jelle Visser as pronounced in this MP3 audio file): They propose the economy of the Netherlands as a progressive European third way.
           “The ‘Dutch model’ has become a catchphrase for progressive European politicians pondering the possibilities of a ‘third way’ between Anglo-American deregulation of labour markets and the bloated stagnation of European dirigiste [state-regulated] economies. Foreign politicians, central bankers and union leaders alike praise the combination of fiscal conservatism, wage moderation, consensual welfare reform, job creation and the maintainance of overall social security. They highlight the extraordinary proportion of Dutch people, male and female, in part-time jobs; the sustained policy of wage moderation by the trade unions; the success in holding the course for EMU and the absence of social unrest.” [Anton Hemerijck and Jelle Visser, “The Dutch Model: An Obvious Candidate for the ‘Third Way’?” European Journal of Sociology / Archives Européennes de Sociologie / Europäisches Archiv für Soziologie. Volume 40, number 1, 1999. Pages 103-121.]
       67. third way reconfigured (Hans-Gerd Ridder as pronounced in this MP3 audio file, Erk P. Piening as pronounced in this MP3 audio file, and Alina McCandless Baluch): They consider a third way for human resource management of non-profit (not-for-profit) organizations.
           “Many of the cases with a high strategic orientation tend to have a lower HR [human resource] orientation. Confirming studies that indicate HRM [human resource management] supports relations between the organization, its clients and funders …, this emergent cluster suggests that NPOs [non-profit organizations] are configuring their HR practices by adopting a proactive approach in dealing with external constraints and having a strong financial orientation toward performance.… Considering the dichotomy between a strategic orientation and an HR orientation, there seems to be a third way of configuring HRM that represents a specific combination of these two orientations.” [Hans-Gerd Ridder, Erk P. Piening, and Alina McCandless Baluch, “The Third Way Reconfigured: How and Why Nonprofit Organizations are Shifting Their Human Resource Management.” Voluntas: International Journal of Voluntary and Nonprofit Organizations. Volume 23, number 3, September 2012. Pages 605-635.]
       68. third way in political knowledge estimation (Melissa K. Miller and Shannon K. Orr): They examine a modification to the forced-choice survey methodology.
           “With web surveys now used … for national random sample data collection, it seems an opportune time to test a third way in political knowledge estimation: omitting the DK [‘don’t know’] option altogether.
           “A comparison of the DK-encouraged and DK-discouraged strategies to the DK-omitted strategy produced consistent results. Eliminating the DK option yielded higher estimates of knowledge, both on a per-item and aggregate basis for political and general knowledge.”
           [Melissa K. Miller and Shannon K. Orr, “Experimenting with a ‘Third Way’ in Political Knowledge Estimation.” The Public Opinion Quarterly. Volume 72, number 4, winter 2008. Pages 768-780.]
       69. third way in biomedical research (Kenneth H. Buetow): He considers the “reinvention of biomedicine.”
           “The call for big science recognizes that many of the technology approaches required in biology and medicine are expensive, beyond the reach of individual investigators, and increasingly challenging the resource reserves of all but a few institutions. New paradigms are required onto support these investigations.… Big science contributes large-scale, raw material that feeds the virtual communities. Cyberinfrastructure empowers a reinvention of biomedicine without having to fundamentally change its basic culture or operational characteristics—a third way.” [Kenneth H. Buetow, “Cyberinfrastructure: Empowering a ‘Third Way’ in Biomedical Research.” Science. Volume 308, number 5723, May 2005. Pages 821-824.]
       70. third way in mental health (Philip Fennell): He proposes a third way between self-reliance and institutionalization.
           “In July 1998 the [UK] Secretary of State for Health, Frank Dobson, declared that community care had failed. He wanted ‘a third way’ in mental health. The third way would steer a path between reliance on putting all mentally ill people in institutions – ‘out of sight – out of mind’ – and community care where people with mental health problems could be ‘left off the books’ thereby putting themselves and other people at risk. The third way is not greatly different from the policy proclaimed by Stephen Dorrell in the last years of [UK Prime Minister] John Major’s Conservative government, replacing community care by ‘spectrum of care.’ Like spectrum of care, the third way involves developing a range of services, ranging from the top-security special hospitals, which provide care for patients with dangerous or violent proclivities, through to community provision.” [Philip Fennell, “The Third Way in Mental Health Policy: Negative Rights, Positive Rights, and the Convention.” Journal of Law and Society. Volume 26, number 1, March 1999. Pages 103-127.]
       71. third way of nonviolent resistance (Jamal Hader [Arabic/ʿArabiyyaẗ, جَمَال خَضِر, Ǧamāl H̱aḍir]): He develops a third way for Palestine. Perhaps, in relation to the present–day U.S., nonviolent resistance would be Americans of all religions walking, hand in hand, to add their names to a Muslim registry. Undermine its value. Make it worthless.
           “Beginning in 2009, the Palestinian government put out a plan to prepare the institutions and infra-structure of the Palestinian state. Kairos [Ancient Greek/Archaía Hellēniká, καιρός, kairós, “time”] reflects a common attitude among Palestinians: that between negotiations and violence, there is a third way of nonviolent resistance to the military occupation. How will the international community respond to this nonviolent approach of the Palestinians and recognize a Palestinian state? …
           “As church, we witness the continued Israeli military occupation of Palestinian lands. Together with all men and women of peace and goodwill, including many Israeli and Palestinian Muslims, Christians and Jews, we are called to be both a voice of truth and justice and a healing presence.”
           [Jamal Hader, “The Context of Kairos Palestine.” The Ecumenical Review. Volume 64, number 1, March 2012. Pages 3-6.]
       72. third way of civil disobedience (Zahbia Yousuf [Arabic/ʿArabiyyaẗ, ذَهَبِيَّة يُوسُف, Ḏahabiyyaẗ Yūsuf]): The article advocates a third way between joining one of the armed groups, in the Micoahumado (MP3 audio file) area of Colombia, or opposing both of them. Notably, civil disobedience should, in Foster’s view, be properly appreciated as a subset of nonviolent resistance. That is to say, one can engage in nonviolent resistance without breaking the law (civil disobedience). The opposite is not, however, true. Demonstrably, one cannot practice civil disobedience without also participating in acts of nonviolent resistance.
           “Impartiality is important for people working in areas controlled by armed groups. While community peace actors featured in this publication were not necessarily neutral, as they were part of the conflict context and may have had links with an armed group, they strived to act impartially so that they could operate as effective brokers between two sides and avoid perceptions of collusion.
           “The need to maintain impartiality sometimes required the renegotiation of pre-existing relationships. In Micoahumado [in Colombia], the community rejected either joining one or other of the armed actors, or opposing both of them, as each of these options risked provoking their own displacement. Instead they chose a ‘third way’ of civil disobedience, which meant refusing to support any of the armed actors and maintaining a clear stance of nonviolence.”
           [Zahbia Yousuf, “Accord Insight—In the midst of violence: local engagement with armed groups.” Accord: An International Review of Peace Initiatives. Volume 2, May 2015. Pages 6-9.]
       73. subaltern nationalism (Jennifer Ruth Hosek): She discusses a third way for German anti-authoritarians.
           “The anti-authoritarians sought to define an identity for themselves based on notions of nationalism professed by Third-World liberation movements in the global South. By nationalism here, I mean both a shared sentiment of caring about an imagined community and the desire to act in the cause of this community. Yet, an important distinc tion must be made here. These Germans rejected what Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri have recently called ‘bourgeois’ nationalism associated with the global North in favor of ‘subaltern’ nationalism associated with the global South.…
           “… Taking the global perspectives of the anti-authoritarians’ local activism seriously reveals the significance of transnational affinities for gaining national leverage and for internationalist attempts at a ‘third way.’”
           [Jennifer Ruth Hosek, “‘Subaltern Nationalism’ and the West Berlin Anti-Authoritarians.” German Politics & Society. Volume 26, number 1, spring 2008. Pages 57-81.]
       74. social investment state (Deena White): She explains the “radical centrism” of the third way as a supposed replacement for the welfare state.
           “The Third Way does not represent a coherent ideology. Indeed, it steers away from ideology, seeking instead a pragmatic political orientation that borrows from both left and right, claiming to form a ‘radical centre.’ For some, its core values can be expressed in the acronym, CORA: community, opportunity, responsibility and accountability …. In the place of the welfare state, the Third Way posits a ‘social investment state’ which does not simply redistribute the wealth, but invests in human and social capital, such as education, health, communities and the voluntary sector, to encourage the development of autonomous, responsible and active citizens.” [Deena White, “Social Policy and Solidarity, Orphans of the New Model of Social Cohesion.” The Canadian Journal of Sociology / Cahiers canadiens de sociologie. Volume 28, number 1, winter 2003. Pages 51-76.]
       75. Frankfurt School (Martin Jay): He explains that the Frankfurt School—the historical bedrock of a major branch of the critical theoretical tradition in Europe, Canada, the United States, and so forth—was critiqued, by some Marxist–Leninists, as a third way.
           “Amidst the faded splendor of … [an] ancient Czech spa, philosophers from the Soviet Union, the German Democratic Republic, and Czechoslovakia met to denounce the so-called ‘third way’ between capitalism and communism represented by the Frankfurt School’s Critical Theory. Many of their arguments echoed the charges made in 1970 at a similar, although less international, conference in Frankfurt itself, which took place at the Institut für Marxistische Studien und Forschungen [Institute for Marxist Studies and Research] led by the Communist Josef Schleifstein.” [Martin Jay, “Some Recent Developments in Critical Theory.” Berkeley Journal of Sociology. Volume 18, 1973–1974. Pages 27-44.]
       76. third way of organizational learning (Bente Elkjaer as pronounced in this MP3 audio file): She discusses learning as both participatory and processual.
           “It is with a point of departure in a pragmatic theory of learning I suggest a ‘third way’ of OL [organizational learning]. The ‘third way’ is an attempt to make a synthesis of the ‘second way’ of OL with its understanding of learning as participation in communities of practice by including elements of the ‘first way’ of OL, learning as acquisition of knowledge as well as analytical and communicative skills. The basic idea behind this synthesis of what is here called the ‘first’ and ‘second way’ of OL is to acknowledge that thinking is instrumental in learning as participation and that learning takes place as a social process.” [Bente Elkjaer, “Organizational Learning: The ‘Third Way.’” Management Learning. Volume 35, number 4, 2004. Pages 419-434.]
       77. institutional isomorphism (Tomi J. Kallio as pronounced in this MP3 audio file and Päivikki Kuoppakangas as pronounced in this MP3 audio file): They talk about a third-way approach which tripled Finnish municipal enterprises.
           “While statistical generalisations are not possible due to the case study approach, in the case of the recent mushrooming of municipal enterprises in Finland, this study suggests that institutional isomorphism might play an essential role. Moreover, the analyses suggest that as a consequence of their search for a Third Way, some local politicians … might have triggered the development which has further led to the bandwagon effect. Due to this bandwagon effect, the number of municipal enterprises in Finland has nearly tripled in a decade.” [Tomi J. Kallio and Päivikki Kuoppakangas, “Bandwagoning municipal enterprises: institutional isomorphism and the search for the Third Way.” Policy Studies. Volume 34, number 1, January 2013. Pages 19-35.]
       78. integrated farming systems (Carol Morris and Michael Winter): They propose this approach as a third way between conventional and organic farming.
           “The potential contribution of integrated farming systems (IFS) to the development of a more sustainable agriculture has been largely ignored within social science and by policy analysts. The goals of IFS are to sustain agricultural production, maintain farm incomes, safeguard the environment and respond to consumer concerns about food quality issues. IFS can be conceptualised as a ‘third way’l or middle course for agriculture between conventional and organic farming.…
           “… Just as the origins of IFS are distinct from those of the organic movement, IFS do not go as far as organic agriculture in the production practices they propound (although IFS production techniques may represent a radical change for many farmers, requiring new skills and knowledge). The emphasis within IFS is on reduced input use to achieve environmental benefits and cost savings but not the complete withdrawal of chemicals.”
           [Carol Morris and Michael Winter, “Integrated farming systems: the third way for European agriculture?” Land Use Policy. Volume 16, issue 4, October 1999. Pages 193-205.]
       79. ecological modernization (Giorel Curran as pronounced in this MP3 audio file): The article explores the implications of this environmentally-focused approach for the Third Way.
           “This article … asks: what concerns does ecological modernization raise about the Third Way? Four key areas will be explored. First, the broad contours of the Third Way discourse are sketched, especially in the light of its interpretation of globalization. Second, the EM [ecological modernization] discourse is explored and parallels with the TW [Third Way] are drawn. Third, some key implications are raised and key critiques of the intersection of the two discourses developed. Finally, these critiques are underscored by a brief overview of recent Australian environmental policy experience.” [Giorel Curran, “The Third Way and ecological modernization.” Contemporary Politics. Volume 7, number 1, March 2001. Pages 41-55.]
       80. green third way (Volkert Beekman as pronounced in this MP3 audio file): He proposes an ecologically conscious third-way approach.
           “The narrative approach spells out a green third way of government intervention in non-sustainable lifestyles that should be applicable in western affluent liberal-democracies. It does not claim that this green third way is also applicable in other, non-western and probably not altogether liberal-democratic, contexts of action. Moreover, it primarily reflects on interventions by national governments, although some of the arguments may also hold true in a sub-national or supra-national context. One final restriction: the book limits itself to government intervention in people’s lifestyles and patterns of consumption, and leaves aside possible interventions in the sphere of production.
           “However, the spatio-temporally-contingent narrative approach of this book does not imply that it merely tells another narrative about government intervention in non-sustainable lifestyles. The narrative it spells out hopes to stand a better chance than other competing narratives in articulating and addressing the intricacies of environmental policy-making in contemporary affluent liberal-democracies. Therefore, this narrative should be able to gain adherents over time.”
           [Volkert Beekman. A Green Third Way? Philosophical Reflections on Government Intervention in Non-Sustainable Lifestyles. Ph.D. thesis (U.S. English, dissertation). Wageningen University. Wageningen, the Netherlands. 2001. Page 7.]
       81. model of transition management (René Kemp, Derk Loorbach as pronounced in this MP3 audio file, and Jan Rotmans as pronounced in this MP3 audio file): They present a third-way approach to sustainable development.
           “Sustainable development requires changes in socio-technical systems and wider societal change – in beliefs, values and governance. In this article we present a model for managing processes of co-evolution: transition management.… Perhaps transition management constitutes the third way that policy scientists have been looking for all the time, combining the advantages of incrementalism (based on mutual adaptation) with the advantages of planning (based on long-term objectives).…
           “The model of transition management tries to utilize innovative bottom-up developments in a more strategic way by coordinating different levels of governance and fostering self-organization through new types of interaction and cycles of learning and action for radical innovations offering sustainability benefits. Transition management views societal change as a result of the interaction between all relevant actors on different societal levels within the context of a changing societal landscape. It is thus concerned with the use and coordination of interaction and co-evolutionary processes.”
           [René Kemp, Derk Loorbach, and Jan Rotmans, “Transition management as a model for managing processes of co-evolution towards sustainable development.” The International Journal of Sustainable Development and World Ecology. Volume 14, issue 1, February 2007. Pages 1-15.]
       82. sharing economy (Chris Opfer, Darcy Allen, and Lizzie Richardson): It is a proposed thir way based upon “new business models.”
           “The rise of the sharing economy has some lawmakers considering a new employment and tax classification category aimed at workers operating in new business models, but which could extend into a variety of more traditional workplaces.…
           “Training, benefits push talk of ‘third way.’ Gig employers such as transportation suppliers Uber and Lyft ultimately may be forced by courts to reclassify their drivers from contractors to employees.”
           [Chris Opfer, “Uber economy could spawn new worker classification.” HR Focus. January 2016. Pages 6+.]
           “The rise of the sharing economy has some lawmakers considering a new employment and tax classification category aimed at workers operating in new business models, but which could extend into a variety of more traditional workplaces.…
           “Training, Benefits Push Talk of ‘Third Way’
           “Gig employers such as transportation suppliers Uber and Lyft may be forced by courts to reclassify their drivers from contractors to employees.”
           [Chris Opfer, “Sharing economy may spawn new worker classification.” Payroll Manager’s Report. December 2015. Pages 11+.]
           “The sharing economy is a suite of emerging software platforms acting as an intermediary between private buyers and private sellers, allowing them to share their existing resources—hence, a ‘sharing’ economy. The sharing economy is a market catalysed by disruptive technologies. Communication technologies have drastically reduced the costs of coordinating resources. It is now marvellously cheap and simple to discover if there’s an idle car or an empty room around the corner.” [Darcy Allen, “The Sharing Economy.” Institute for Public Affairs Review. Volume 6, number 3, September 2015. Pages 25-27.]
           “The sharing economy refers to forms of exchange facilitated through online platforms, encompassing a diversity of for-profit and non-profit activities that all broadly aim to open access to under-utilised resources through what is termed ‘sharing.’ The sharing economy constitutes an apparent paradox. It has been framed both as part of the capitalist economy and as an alternative: simultaneously ‘neoliberalism on steroids’ … and a remedy for a hyper-consumerist culture ….” [Lizzie Richardson, “Performing the sharing economy.” Geoforum. Volume 16, December 2015. Pages 121-129.]
       83. coworking spaces (Alessandro Gandini as pronounced in this MP3 audio file): It is a third way of “working individually in a shared environment.”
           “This literature review addresses one of the most interesting phenomena to recently emerge: the diffusion of coworking spaces.…
           “Coworking spaces are shared workplaces utilised by different sorts of knowledge professionals, mostly freelancers, working in various degrees of specialisation in the vast domain of the knowledge industry. Practically conceived as office-renting facilities where workers hire a desk and a wi-fi connection these are, more importantly, places where independent professionals live their daily routines side-by-side with professional peers, largely working in the same sector – a circumstance which has huge implications on the nature of their job, the relevance of social relations across their own professional networks and – ultimately – their existence as productive workers in the knowledge economy.
           “Contemporary coworking originates in 2005 in San Francisco. It brought the possibility of envisaging a ‘third way’ of working, halfway between a ‘standard’ worklife within a traditional, well-delimited workplace in a community-like environment, and an independent worklife as a freelancer, characteristic of freedom and independence, where the worker is based at home in isolation. This third way was coined ‘coworking’ without the hyphen, to indicate the practice of working individually in a shared environment – and to differentiate it from coworking (with hyphen), which indicates working closely together on a piece of work … – although often these terms are used interchangeably.”
           [Alessandro Gandini, “The rise of coworking spaces: A literature review.” Ephemera: Theory & Politics in Organisation. Volume 15, number 1, February 2015. Creative Commons. Pages 193-205.]
       84. rural reconstruction (Liang Shuming, Shuming Liang, or Shu Ming Liang [Chinese, 梁漱溟, Liáng-Shù-míng as pronounced in this MP3 audio file]): Rural reconstruction (Chinese 農村建設, Nóng-Cūn-Jiàn-Shè as pronounced in this MP3 audio file) was proposed as a Chinese third way. The Chinese-language term literally translates as “establishing the construction of a farming village.”
           “Liang [Shuming] saw his project of “rural reconstruction” (農村建設) as a third way between capitalism and communism.” [Ady Van den Stock. The Horizon of Modernity: Observations on New Confucian Philosophy in History and Thought. Doctor of Oriental Languages and Cultures dissertation (Dutch, „proefschrift”). Ghent University. Ghent, Belgium. 2014. Page 87.]
           “… in my own case, I admit to being a follower of Buddhism; I would not deny being a follower of Confucius either. Why? Why don’t I deny it? Because this way of the Mahayana Bodhisattva—I want to follow the way of the Bodhisattva—is ‘not to abandon sentient beings’ and ‘not to reside in Nirvana.’ So I want to go into the world. Because of this, all through my life, for example, everyone knows that I worked in rural reconstruction, rural movement, and that I worked in politics as a mediator between the two Parties (that is, national affairs), especially when Japan invaded China, so would this be considered ‘leaving the mundane world’ or not? This [activity] does not in the slightest go against ‘leaving the mundane world.’ Because this is what? It is the way of the Bodhisattva. This is not Hinayana. Hinayana wants to go into the mountains, to some monastery and not emerge. Mahayana is ‘non-abandonment of sentient beings’ and ‘nonresidence in Nirvana.’ You can say that I am a Confucian, a follower of Confucius, and you can say that I am a follower of Siddhartha, because there is no conflict or contradiction [between the two].” [Shu Ming Liang in Shu Ming Liang and Guy S. Alitto. Has Man a Future?: Dialogues with the Last Confucian. New York: Springer Science+Business Media. 2013. Pages 20-21.]
           “What is thought? Actually thought is knowledge taken one step further. Thought includes the views and attitudes one holds towards both important and trivial questions concerning the universe and human fife. Now, no thought is lacking in an attitude, and what is more, attitude can be found at the center of all thought. But what we now want to look at are opinions or views and not attitudes. Attitude involves emotion and will. What we want to observe now is a facet of reason. Thought follows knowledge, and in fight of what we said earlier, the West appears to have been extremely successful in the pursuit of knowledge. What the two sides have known is quite different; hence, the thought of the two sides is also very different.” [Shuming Liang, “The Cultures of the East and West and Their Philosophies.” Andrew Covlin and Jinmei Yuan, translators. Dao: A Journal of Comparative Philosophy. Volume I, number 1, December 2001. Pages 107-127.]
       85. resource-based economy (Jacque Fresco, Peter Joseph, and others): It is associated with The Venus Project and The Zeitgeist Movement. These two organizations once cooperated with one another. In 2012, they divided, over procedural or administrative issues, into two independent “technotopian” social movements. See also The Institute for a Resource-based Economy and Kadagaya.
           “The Zeitgeist Movement tells of the need for a third way – beyond left and right; a new direction in which we need to move in order to ensure the sustainability of our earth. It has been shown that various political and economic paradigms attempted thus far have failed to address society’s needs in a way that ensures equality and sustainability. It is all too clear that we are damaging the very thing that is most necessary to our survival – our earth – all in the name of profit and unequal distribution of resources that leaves wealth and power in the hands of only a few who perpetuate the cycle of destruction and the upward flow of the monetary system.
           “It is for this reason that a different economic paradigm is needed. Various economic models must be examined and compared in terms of their respective merit, and weighed up against the sustainable economic system of a resource-based economy, as advocated by the Zeitgeist Movement. It is important, when examining a new model, that we explore ways in which such a system could be implemented and maintained, and acknowledge that the first steps have already been taken.”
           [Kari McGregor, “Building a Creative Economy: Transition to a Sustainable Economy.” Spirit of the Times: The Zeitgeist Movement Australia Magazine. Issue 3, January 2012. Creative Commons. Pages 14-17.]
           “To put it simply, a resource-based economy uses resources rather than money, and people have access to whatever they need without the use of money, credits, barter, or any other form of debt or servitude. All of the world’s resources are held as the common heritage of all of Earth’s people.
           “The real wealth of any nation is not its money, but the developed and potential resources and the people who work toward the elimination of scarcity for a more humane society.
           “If this is still confusing to you consider this: If a group of people were stranded on an island with money, gold, and diamonds, but the island had no arable land, fish or clean water, their wealth would be irrelevant to their survival.”
           [Jacque Fresco. Designing the Future. Venus, Florida: The Venus Project, Inc. 2007. Page 21.]
           “Along with a new orientation toward human and environmental concerns, there must be a methodology for making this a reality. If these ends are to be achieved, the monetary system must evolve into a world resource-based economy. To effectively and economically utilize resources, cybernated and computerized technology must be applied in order to ensure a higher standard of living for everyone. With intelligent and humane applications of science and technology, we will be able to guide and shape our future for the preservation of the environment and ourselves for the generations to come.” [Jacque Fresco. The Best that Money Can’t Buy: Beyond Politics, Poverty, & War. Venus, Florida: Global Cyber-Visions imprint of The Venus Project, Inc. 2002. Page 27.]
           “As … technologies give humans ever greater power to collect the earth’s vast resources and distribute them to all, we may see a new social structure in which ‘the age-old failures of war, poverty, hunger, debt, nationalism, and unnecessary human suffering are viewed not only as fully avoidable, but also totally unacceptable,’ says Fresco. He refers to this as a ‘global resource-based economy where all of the earth’s resources are declared the common heritage of all the world’s people.’” [Jacque Fresco and Roxanne Meadows, “Engineering a New Vision of Tomorrow.” The Futurist. Volume 36, number 1, January–February 2002. Pages 33-36.]
           “Today, various terms exists to express the general logical basis for a more scientifically oriented social system in different circles, including the titles ‘Resource-Based Economy’ or ‘Natural Law Economy.’ While these titles are historically referential and somewhat arbitrary overall, the title ‘Natural Law/Resource-Based Economy’ (NLRBE) will be utilized here since it has the most concrete semantic basis.” [The Zeitgeist Movement’s linguistics team. The Zeitgeist Movement Defined: Realizing a New Train of Thought. 1st edition. The Zeitgeist Movement Global (no location given). January, 2014. Creative Commons. Page 9.]
           “In a resource-based economy, where production is streamlined to maximize quality and minimize waste and duplication the idea of property becomes obsolete and, in fact, detrimental. People do not need to hoard and protect anything. They simply need access to what they need at the time they need it. The best example is the automobile. We’ve been finding in science now there have been tests done of cars that can drive themselves. It’s been tested: satellite-driven automobiles that can navigate very well.” [Peter Joseph, “Social Pathology.” Talk presented on March 13th, 2010, in New York City. Retrieved on July 7th, 2016.]
           “In order to interrogate the masculine discourse that pervades even social movement organizations such as The Zeitgeist Movement, it is essential to include a discussion of the overarching system of patriarchy that it works to support.… Acknowledging both the institutional and discursive oppression that results from patriarchy provides a more complete analysis of the ways that social movements can perpetuate inequality.
           “Of course, women undoubtedly participate in the system of patriarchy and oppression as well.… Oppressed and oppressor may share the same gender, cultural background and both may participate in what [Bell] Hooks refers to as the ‘politics of domination’ …. In other words, the ‘Other’ can and does participate in systems of inequality and oppression.”
           [Tiffany Ann Dykstra. (Cyber)activism in an Online Social Movement: Exploring Dialectics and Discourse in the Zeitgeist Movement. M.A. thesis. Texas Tech University. Lubbock, Texas. May, 2012. Pages 19-20.]
           “‘Zeitgeist’ has all but replaced the fringegroups discussing September 11ᵗʰ being an inside-job and other irrelevant ‘conspiracies’ (of course the conspiracy industry is reluctant to acknowledge the two greatest public conspiracies: capital and the State). In other words, the anti-political fiction du-jour has had quite the metamorphosis. Alex Jones, one of the entrepreneurs of the conspiracy industry and proponents of ‘New World Order’ ‘theory’ (if ever a word was so bastardized), has been dethroned by Peter Joseph and his hypothetical technological utopia.” [Anonymous, “The Problem with ‘Zeitgeist.’” Anarchist News (location unknown). 2009. Pages 1-9.]
           “There is no question that technological growth trends in science and industry are increasing exponentially. There is, however, a growing debate about what this runaway acceleration of ingenuity may bring. A number of respected scientists and futurists now are predicting that technological progress is driving the world toward a ‘Singularity’ – a point at which technology and nature will have become one. At this juncture, the world as we have known it will have gone extinct and new definitions of ‘life,’ ‘nature’ and ‘human’ will take hold.” [James Bell, “Technotopia and the Death of Nature.” Earth Island Journal. Volume 17, number 2, summer 2002. Pages 36-38.]
       86. participatory planning (Fikret Adaman as pronounced in this MP3 audio file, Pat Devine, Damon Y. Smith, Michael Albert, Robin Hahnel, Michael Murray, and John Greer): They develop a third-way approach to socialism.
           “[Pat] Devine states repeatedly that his model represents a third way, ‘an alternative to state coercion and the coercion of market forces.’” [David Laibman, “Participatory Planning Through Negotiated Coordination: Comment.” Science & Society. Volume 66, number 1, spring 2002. Pages 86-88.]
           “The present authors have advocated a system of participatory planning, … in discussion of the economic theory of socialism, arguing that what is needed is a paradigm shift in the way in which economic interactions are conceptualized in order to overcome the two sources of imperfection of knowledge identified in the evaluation of the socialist economic calculation debate. The system of participatory planning advocated is one in which the values of individuals and collectives interact and shape one another through a process of cooperation and negotiation. Such a process, it is claimed, would enable tacit knowledge to be articulated and economic life to be consciously controlled and coordinated in a context that dispenses with coercion, whether by the state or by market forces.” [Fikret Adaman and Pat Devine, “On the Economic Theory of Socialism.” New Left Review. Series I, number 221, January–February 1997. Pages 54-80.]
           “Models of participatory planning are based on the principle that decisions should be taken, directly or indirectly, by those affected by them. The fact that all affected by a decision are involved in taking it enables the all-pervasive interdependencies of economic life to be taken into account. Models of participatory planning differ according to how they conceive of: the different interests affected by a decision; the sort of information needed for decision-making at different levels, and the way in which the information is generated; and the process through which decisions are taken.” [Pat Devine, “Market Socialism or Participatory Planning?” Review of Radical Political Economics. Volume 24, number 3 and 4, 1992. Pages 67-89.]
           “Our major purpose in this article is to rebut the claim that there is no alternative to markets and authoritarian planning. In the main body we describe our model of participatory planning and explain why there is every reason to believe it is both feasible and desirable.…
           “… what distinguishes our model of a participatory economy from earlier contributions is the careful elaboration of a planning procedure that allows the various councils and federations to propose and revise their own activities efficiently and fairly.”
           [Michael Albert and Robin Hahnel, “Participatory Planning.” Science & Society. Volume 56, number 1, spring 1992. Pages 39-59.]
           “It is within this brief theoretical and policy review that the empirical discussion of participatory planning processes associated with the preparation of the Northern Ireland RSF [Regional Strategic Framework] can be located. In this society, which is emerging out of conditions associated with a long-standing democratic de. cit and bureaucratic hegemony, the challenges facing public policy formation include shifting political debate more fully towards environmental, social and economic priorities, capturing the involvement of an active citizenry, and harnessing the collaborative energy of multiple interests in setting down an agreed vision of the future. The narrative below provides a timely examination of process innovation designed to meet these challenges within the sphere of regional land use planning over the period since 1997.” [Michael Murray and John Greer, “Participatory Planning as Dialogue: The Northern Ireland Regional Strategic Framework and its Public Examination Process.” Policy Studies. Volume 23, number 3/4, 2002. Pages 191-209.]
           “The central thesis of this article is that deeper participatory planning procedures, as defined below, should be included in state redevelopment laws in recognition that the planning process serves a number of important functions. These functions include: 1) legitimizing economic redevelopment decisions in the eyes of the public and the judiciary; 2) providing important procedural legal protections for residents who live in distressed communities; and 3) providing an opportunity for low-income residents to share in the benefits of redevelopment. Although the legal literature often describes public participation in economic development planning as exemplary of purely direct democracy and empowerment principles, this article is animated by the belief that a rhetorical shift to emphasize how participatory planning adds value to the decisions ultimately made by elected legislative bodies, and provides a more legally coherent rhetorical and theoretical framework to justify such participation.” [Damon Y. Smith, “Participatory Planning and Procedural Protections: The Case for Deeper Public Participation in Urban Redevelopment.” Saint Louis University Public Law Review. Volume XXIX, number 243, June 2009. Pages 243-272.]
       87. academic mobility (Florence Lojacono): She proposes an online third way, based upon Web 2.0, for higher educational institutions.
           “To be efficient and credible, you need to walk your talk, in social justice as in any other field. Cross-border initiatives are encouraged all over the world as part of a necessary internalization of higher education institutions. But cross-border teaching is not single-focused on email exchange between classes oceans apart anymore. Cross-border teaching, as a part of a true effort towards internalization, signifies much more than this. To foster social justice we need to show our students that we walk our talk, and this could mean for higher education institutions, giving full access to “invited” students to all educational resources, for example. Sharing resources as well as fostering mobility is the core of the OECD [Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development] programme …. Beyond the explicit-implicit dichotomy, academic mobility is the third way to promote mutual understanding and equal access to knowledge, two requirements of any social justice outcome.” [Florence Lojacono, “Foreign Language Acquisition: Fostering Social Justice and Internalization within Web 2.0 Environments.” Journal of Arts and Humanities (JAH). Volume 2, number 10, November 2013. Pages 45-55.]
       88. alternative medicine (Leslie Pleass): Pleass, an osteopath, presents alternative medicine as a third way.
           “So I had a dream. I dreamt I was observing an old fashioned chicken run and a passageway between two chicken coops, a primitive first take on what is now a horrendous industry of battery chicken facilities.…
           “… In many indigenous cultures, when a person goes through a major healing and or initiation, they change their name to their medicine name. A new name for a new person. Later on, when I was back home, I had another dream where a women touched and held me in a totally present way to such an extent I almost lost consciousness, and she said, ‘this is the Third Way, the way you must work.’
           “So the chicken coop dream with the passage between two enclosed ways felt like it was the confirmation of a Third Way; the middle way. Rather than being cooped up in one school of thought or an opposing other, there is a middle way, a Third Way.”
           [Leslie Pleass, “The third way?” Journal of Alternative Medicine Research. Volume 4, number 1, 2012. Pages 109-114.]
       89. roaming reactions (Joel M. Bowman and Arthur G. Suits): They present a third way in which molecules can break apart.
           “Chemists have long assumed that unimolecular dissociation follows one of two decomposition modalifies. The first is dissociation over a potential energy barrier into a pair of smaller molecules …. The second dissociation modality involves simply stretching a bond until it breaks ….
           “… Excited molecules with energies well above the dissociation threshold may therefore persist for nanoseconds or microseconds—countiess oscillations of the bond that ultimately breaks—before dissociation occurs. It is somewhat less rare for almost enough energy to accumulate in that bond—and for roaming to long range to occur. As the bond is stretched, it can become floppier—the bond angles are no longer so tightly constrained—and the system may explore large regions of configuration space, which may lead to alternative reactive sites. Rather than ‘Why roaming?’ the question really should be ‘Why not roaming?’ How has the ubiquitous third way been overlooked for so long? The oversight reflects on the limitations of our experimental methods, our impatience with computing long trajectories, and even perhaps the inadequacy of our imagination. It is a lesson in humility.”
           [Joel M. Bowman and Arthur G. Suits, “Roaming reactions: The third way.” Physics Today. Volume 64, issue 11, November 2011. Pages 33-37.]
       90. ubuntu theory (Desmond Tutu as pronounced in this MP3 audio file and others): As developed by Anglican Archbishop Tutu and others, this term for “humanness,” ubuntu (MP3 audio file), refers to a distinctively southern African third-way perspective.
           “… [The] third way of amnesty was consistent with a central feature of the African Weltsanschauung—what we know in our languages as ubuntu, in the Nguni group of languages, or botho, in the Sotho languages. What is it that constrained so many to choose to forgive rather than to demand retribution, to be so magnanimous and ready to forgive rather than wreak revenge?
           “Ubuntu is very difficult to render into a Western language. It speaks of the very essence of being human. When we want to give high praise to someone we say, ‘Yu, u nobuntu’; ‘Hey, so-and-so has ubuntu.’ Then you are generous, you are hospitable, you are friendly and caring and compassionate. You share what you have. It is to say, ‘My humanity is caught up, is inextricably bound up, in yours.’ We belong in a bundle of life. We say, ‘A person is a person through other persons.’ It is not, ‘I think therefore I am.’ It says rather: ‘I am human because I belong. I participate, I share.’ A person with ubuntu is open and available to others, affirming of others, does not feel threatened that others are able and good, for he or she has a proper self-assurance that comes from knowing that he or she belongs in a greater whole and is diminished when others are humiliated or diminished, when others are tortured or oppressed, or treated as if they were less than who they are.”
           [Desmond Tutu. No Future Without Forgiveness. New York: An Image Book imprint of Doubleday, a division of Random House, Inc. 2000. Page 31.]
           “Because the emphasis of the study is on the existence, and/or the absence of ubuntu amongst the members of the community of Zama Zama, the ubuntu discourse must be introduced and discussed. Ubuntu is an African concept that gained a lot of interest and attention in the last few years. There are many books and journal articles available on the topic, and many definitions on and perceptions about it. Ubuntu is a prominent notion in the public sphere of the democratic South Africa and in the post-apartheid context a trademark of the ‘new’ South Africa.…
           “Desmund Tutu … speaks about a ‘third way.’ What is it that constrained so many to choose to forgive, rather than to demand retribution? According to Tutu …, it lies in ubuntu. It speaks of the very essence of being human. People with ubuntu are generous, hospitable, friendly, caring and compassionate ….”
           [Retha Kruidenier, “Trying for better circumstances (Zama Zama): Exploring ubuntu amongst marginalised women in an informal settlement.” Verbum et Ecclesia. Volume 36, number 2, July 2015. Pages 1-7.]
           “This article offers a historical analysis of the various ways that ubuntu has been defined in written sources. Such an analysis has not been conducted before. The analysis indicates that many of the present ideas about the nature of ubuntu, for instance, that ubuntu is African humanism, a philosophy, an ethic, or a worldview, first emerged in written sources during the second half of the 1900s. Furthermore, the analysis shows that ubuntu became an object of particular interest and consideration during the political periods of transition from white minority rule to black majority rule in Zimbabwe and South Africa.” [Christian B. N. Gade, “The Historical Development of the Written Discourses on Ubuntu.” South African Journal of Philosophy. Volume 30, number 3, 2011. Pages 303-329.]
           “Ubuntugogy has been defined as the ‘art and science of teaching and learning undergirded by humanity towards others’ …. Ubuntu is broader because others could include both adults and children. [Abdul Karim] Bangura … noted further that ubuntugogy, as practiced in traditional African society, transcends pedagogy (the art and science of teaching children), andragogy (the art and science of helping adults to learn), ergonagy (the art and science of helping people to learn to work), and heutagogy (the study of self-determined learning).” [Fredrick Muyia Nafukho, “Ubuntu Worldview: A Traditional African View of Adult Learning in the Workplace.” Advances in Developing Human Resources. Volume 8, number 3, August 2006. Pages 408-415.]
           “After almost three centuries of employing Western educational approaches, many African societies are still characterized by low Western literacy rates, civil conflicts and underdevelopment. It is obvious that these Western educational paradigms, which are not indigenous to Africans, have done relatively little good for Africans. Thus, I argue in this paper that the salvation for Africans hinges upon employing indigenous African educational paradigms which can be subsumed under the rubric of ubuntugogy, which I define as the art and science of teaching and learning undergirded by humanity towards others. Therefore, ubuntugogy transcends pedagogy (the art and science of teaching), andragogy (the art and science of helping adults learn), ergonagy (the art and science of helping people learn to work), and heutagogy (the study of self-determined learning).” [Adbul Karim Bangura, “Ubuntugogy: An African Educational Paradigm that Transcends Pedagogy Andragogy Ergonagy and Heutagogy.” Journal of Third World Studies. Volume 22, number 2, fall 2005. Pages 13-52.]
           “… the data indicate persistent attempts at inclusiveness in the discourse of both female and male teachers. This may well relate to teachers’ use of the concept of ubuntu (literally translated as human-ness from Nguni languages used in Southern Africa).… The ubuntu concept centres around the fundamental idea of maintenance of harmonious relationships within the community and with nature …. Philosophers using the ubuntu worldview to interpret society suggest that the concept of an autonomous individual, a basis for Western thought, is absent from African thought, as Self can not be separated from the community and from nature ….” [Zena Scholtz, Martin Braund, Merle Hodges, Robert Koopman, and Fred Lubben, “South African teachers’ ability to argue: The emergence of inclusive argumentation.” International Journal of Educational Development. Volume 28, issue 1, January 2008. Pages 21-34.]
           “Ubuntu worldview is shared among many Africans across the continent and even the Diasporas. Ubuntu reflects African people’s understanding of the essence of being human, a humanity that is reflected in collective personhood and collective morality …. [It is] best captured in the phrase I am because we are, and because we are, I am.” [Faith Wambura Ngunjiri, “‘I Am Because We Are’: Exploring Women’s Leadership Under Ubuntu Worldview.” Advances in Developing Human Resources. Volume 18, number 2, 2016. Pages 223-242.]
           “I could focus on the humanity of my hosts, and how well we bonded as friends, it could help me overlook that my privileged status was somehow tied to their underprivileged status. If I could focus on history, and the enormous strides South Africa had made, I could forget that my status had likely diminished my host community’s at some point. Now I must acknowledge that ubuntu theory may have resonated so deeply, partly because it answered questions that I held about community development, but more, because it was an immediate answer to my personal struggle of being a wealthy white woman in a poor black community. I could walk away from real struggles of privilege, such as questioning why I was embarrassed to show our relative wealth, by focusing on having a really nice conversation and bonding as individuals. This is a danger in using ubuntu blindly, and not treating it as the building block for systemic change that it is.” [Angela R. Crist. South African Ubuntu Theory in Cross Cultural Community Development Practice: An Autoethnographic Exploration. M.A. thesis. Bowling Green State University. Bowling Green, Ohio. August, 2009. Pages 41-42.]
       91. demoicracy (Kalypso Nicolaïdis [Greek/Hellēniká, Καλυψώ Νικολαΐδη, Kalypsṓ Nikolaḯdē as pronounced in this MP3 audio file]): She uses this clever neologism to describe a third way for the European Union. The Greek spelling would be something like dē̂moikratía (Greek/Hellēniká, δῆμοικρατία).
           “This article offers an overview and reconsideration of the idea of European demoicracy in the context of the current crisis. It defines ‘demoicracy’ as ‘a Union of peoples, understood both as states and as citizens, who govern together but not as one,’ and argues that the concept is best understood as a third way, distinct from both national and supranational versions of single demos polities.…
           “The idea of European demoicracy is seductively simple: a Union of peoples who govern together, but not as one. However much shared κράτος [krátos, power] or power to govern, we must contend with the plurality of δῆμοι [dē̂moi, peoples]; but also crucially, however many demoi, we need a common kratos to define and deliver, through mutually agreed disciplines, the responsibilities we owe to one another. This simple ideal is, however, potentially under threat as proposed solutions to the crisis proliferate which fail to rely on enhancing the health of national democracies in Europe.…
           “I start with the assertion that a demoicracy is what the EU [European Union] has become over time, and with the argument that its peoples should aspire to nurture its demoicratic features in the context of the euro crisis.”
           [Kalypso Nicolaïdis, “European Demoicracy and Its Crisis.” Journal of Common Market Studies. Volume 51, number 2, March 2013. Pages 351-369.]
       92. emancipatory discourse (Chamsy el-Ojeili as pronounced in this MP3 audio file): He proposes a third way based upon left communism.
           “I … want to suggest that a post-modern socialism, an emancipatory discourse today, would be best achieved by a negotiation between marginalised libertarian strands of socialism, left communism, and post-modernist leftism. In the following chapters, I identify the co-ordinates, internal disparities, and advances and failures of left communism, a current of socialism that is historically, politically, and philosophically separate from (though hardly unscathed by the failures of) social democracy and Leninism. Left communism offers a distinct alternative to the two dominant modes of socialism, and, moreover, it addresses itself to a consciousness that is still extant. This distinct alternative, a version of the progressive idea of a third way ‘running between two increasingly anachronistic poles of development – the capitalist world order and a disintegrating socialist tradition,’ means a break from ‘traditional party-centered, hierarchical, and productivist models of change.’” [Chamsy el-Ojeili. From Left Communism to Post-modernism: Reconsidering Emancipatory Discourse. Wellington, New Zealand: Society for Philosophy & Culture. 2013. Kindle edition.]
           “… what I call ‘left communism,’ has its recent origins in the socialist sub-traditions of syndicalism, anarcho-communism, council communism, and Western Marxism.” [Chamsy el-Ojeili. From Left Communism to Post-modernism: Reconsidering Emancipatory Discourse. Wellington, New Zealand: Society for Philosophy & Culture. 2013. Kindle edition.]
           “… [The] Left communist current contains a wealth of sometimes contradictory emphases – a group of thinkers whose ranks include anarcho-communists and anarcho-syndicalists, council communists and Bordigists, situationists and impossibilists. To indicate the variety and complexity, here, I would refer the reader to Chris Wright’s … worthy but inescapably rather tortured and partial effort to represent the Marxist side of this family tree. In his ‘Libertarian Marxist Tendency Map,’ Wright begins with Marx and Engels, followed by major groups, Operaismo, the Situationist International, Open Marxism and so on. Adding in the numerous anarchist sub-currents – such as anarchist communism, anarcho-syndicalism, individualist anarchism, eco-anarchism, communalist anarchism, post-anarchism, anarcho-feminism – their internal variations, and some representative groups and thinkers, we would make such a map infinitely more illegible.” [Chamsy el-Ojeili. Beyond Post-Socialistm: Dialogues with the Far Left. New York: Palgrave Macmillan imprint of St. Martin’s Press LLC. 2015. Page 13.]
           “First mentioned in the mid-1870s by Francois Dumarthray, and adopted by the Jura Federation in 1880, anarcho-communism could be viewed as an evolutionary development out of [Mikhail] Bakunin’s later collectivist work and that of his close collaborator James Guillaume, the resemblance especially clear in the latter’s ‘On Building the New Social Order,’ for example ….
           “Concurrent with anarcho-communism is a second tendency – the notorious period and tactic of ‘propaganda by the deed.’ …
           “The third tendency, anarcho-syndicalism, begins to take hold as the period of propaganda by the deed of the 1880s and 1890s recedes …, emerging and peaking in different places between the 1890s and 1940, a mass, more organized, movement …
           [Chamsy el-Ojeili, “Anarchism as the Contemporary Spirit of Anti-Capitalism? A Critical Survey of Recent Debates.” Critical Sociology. Volume 40, number 3, May 2014. Pages 451-468.]
           “It’s always refreshing to read a book of political theory that makes no qualms about the practical purposes for which it has been written. As this text’s final sentence makes clear, [Chamsy] el-Ojeili has chosen to address the legacy of what he calls ‘left communism’ precisely because he believes that it can offer some important pointers as to how ‘to leave the old world and to create a freer and more democratic society.’ In the process of making his case, el-Ojeili provides a wide-ranging survey of anti-statist outlooks of the 20ᵗʰ century. These are organized around thematic chapters that address in turn the following questions: the apparent demise of socialist politics; the political engagement of intellectuals; anti-statist critiques of socialist societies past and present; the nature of revolutionary processes; and finally, the significance of culture for radical political change.” [Steve Wright, “From Left Communism to Post-modernism: Reconsidering Emancipatory Discourse.” Review article. Thesis Eleven. Volume 81, number 1, May 2005. Pages 109-115.]
       93. participatory socialism (Michael Walzer, Robert Michels as pronounced in this MP3 audio file, and others): They propose a third-way tendency grounded in democracy and participation.
           “… theorists who have historically put forward third way doctrines have typically been original minds pursuing idiosyncratic goals. What ends up being selected from the different currents within liberalism, socialism, populism, and ambient cultural or political trends is always unique to the individual third-way theorist.…
           “… Does China qualify as an example of market socialism? It meets neither the definition of socialism favoured by old-guard Marxists nor does it have much to do with the sort of democratic participatory socialism that western advocates of market socialism favor.”
           [Laurent Dobuzinskis, “If Not Left-Libertarianism, then What? A Fourth Way out of the Dilemma Facing Libertarianism.” Cosmos+Taxis. Volume 2, issue 1, 2014. Pages 31-47.]
           “Ours is a ‘participatory’ socialism, and so the story we have to tell is about parties, unions, movements, associations, and nongovernmental organizations of many different sorts and about their activists and militants, who are politically engaged on the Left. But the full impact of that story requires another—about the political world that we actually inhabit. I argued that democracy, regulation, and welfare are now conventional in the West. But that also means that they are subject to a certain kind of adverse pressure, which is not so much conventional as it is ‘natural.’ In every political organization and in every state and society, there is a steady tendency toward authoritarianism and hierarchy. Robert Michels wrote about this tendency long ago, at roughly the same time as Bernstein was writing and with reference to the same historical events and political experience.” [Michael Walzer, “Which Socialism?” Dissent. Online magazine. Summer, 2010.]
           “As the party bureaucracy increases, two elements which constitute the essential pillars of every socialist conception undergo an inevitable weakening: an understanding of the wider and more ideal cultural aims of socialism, and an understanding of the international multiplicity of its manifestations. Mechanism becomes an end in itself. The capacity for an accurate grasp of the peculiarities and the conditions of existence of the labour movement in other countries diminishes in proportion as the individual national organizations are fully developed. This is plain from a study of the mutual international criticisms of the socialist press.” [Robert Michels. Political Parties. Eden and Ceder Paul, translators. New York: Hearst’s International Library Co. 1915. Page 187.]
           “As long as the struggle on behalf of the oppressed brings to those engaged in it nothing more than a crown of thorns, those members of the bourgeoisie who adhere to socialism must fulfil functions in the party exacting great personal disinterestedness. Bourgeois adherents do not become a danger to socialism until the labour movement, abandoning its principles, enters the slippery paths of a policy of compromise.” [Robert Michels. Political Parties. Eden and Ceder Paul, translators. New York: Hearst’s International Library Co. 1915. Page 213.]
           “The problem of socialism is not merely a problem in economics. In other words, socialism does not seek merely to determine to what extent it is possible to realize a distribution of wealth which shall be at once just and economically productive. Socialism is also an administrative problem, a problem of democracy, and this not in the technical and administrative sphere alone, but also in the sphere of psychology.” [Robert Michels. Political Parties. Eden and Ceder Paul, translators. New York: Hearst’s International Library Co. 1915. Page 386.]
           “The refusal of the worker to participate in the collective life of his class cannot fail to entail disastrous consequences. In respect of culture and of economic, physical, and physiological conditions, the proletarian is the weakest element of our society. In fact, the isolated member of the working classes is defenceless in the hands of those who are economically stronger. It is only by combination to form a structural aggregate that the proletarians can acquire the faculty of political resistance and attain to a social dignity.” [Robert Michels. Political Parties. Eden and Ceder Paul, translators. New York: Hearst’s International Library Co. 1915. Page 22.]
           “In certain country districts of Germany no blame attaches to the young couple if a child is born while they are living together. We see the same thing in Italy, where, in certain parts, prematrimonial relationships are regarded by the peasantry as a kind of socialist demonstration against the prejudices of capitalist society. In other districts, again, the free union is simply the outcome of poverty; the young people do not marry, because they wish to avoid the expenses attached to the ceremony, or they wish to obtain from the public funds a support for their children on the ground that they are illegitimate.” [Robert Michels. Sexual Ethics: A Study of Borderland Questions. Eden and Ceder Paul, translators. New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons. 1914. Page 58.]
           “In participatory socialism, the state’s role is more pervasive than in the pure social economy. The state does not simply provide funding and set the parameters; it is also, in various ways, directly involved in the organization and production of economic activity. On the other hand, participatory socialism is also different from statist socialism, for here social power plays a role not simply through the ordinary channels of democratic control of state policies, but directly inside the productive activities themselves. A good example is the participatory budget in urban government. Because these budgets constitute allocations of resources to produce infrastructure to meet human needs, they should be treated as an aspect of economic activity; participatory budgets are thus not simply a form of democratic participation in the state, but are part of a participatory socialist economy.” [Erik Olin Wright, “2012 Presidential Address: Transforming Capitalism through Real Utopias.” American Sociological Review. Volume 78, number 1, February 2013. Pages 1-25.]
       94. perspective of the state (Christina Boswell): She proposes a third way for migration policy.
           “I shall … suggest the core elements of a theory in which societal interests and institutional constraints are incorporated only in accordance with the functional imperatives of the state. I contend that this ‘third way’ can do a better job of explaining why states continue to permit substantial levels of immigration, even in the face of strong political pressures for restriction.…
           “… what explains the inclusionary thrust of migration policies in liberal states? I have argued that we can best understand migration policy by adopting the perspective of the state, and considering how it defines its choices and constraints through the prism of its functional imperatives. This influences which interests and norms the state feels compelled to take into account in formulating policy. If we assume that the state’s core imperative is to secure legitimacy, four preconditions appear to be particularly important in the area of migration policy: security, accumulation, fairness, and institutional legitimacy.”
           [Christina Boswell, “Theorizing Migration Policy: Is There a Third Way?” The International Migration Review. Volume 41, number 1 spring 2007. Pages 75-100.]
       95. synergy (Freya Mathews): She considers a third way for development.
           “… in a post-materialist society, the conativity of the cosmos is acknowledged, and we adapt ourselves, at every level of our lives, to that larger unfolding. It is possible for us to do this while still pursuing a path of social ‘development,’ provided development is understood in terms of synergistic engagement with reality rather than mastery and makeover. As a social modality then, synergy allows for change—and thereby departs from the stasis of tradition—but it does so without resorting to domination and control, the modality of modernity. It thereby offers a ‘third way’ for development.” [Freya Mathews, “Beyond Modernity and Tradition: A Third Way for Development.” Ethics and the Environment. Volume 11, number 2, fall–winter 2006. Pages 85-113.]
       96. marketless socialism (Ernest Mandel): Referring to a “third solution,” Mandel argues for “a way out between the Scylla of blind market forces and the Charybdis of huge centralized bureaucracies.”
           “[Ernest] Mandel tries to demonstrate that ‘market socialism’ can only lead to the restoration of capitalism. On the other hand, he argues that a democratically centralised marketless socialism is both practicable and necessary. Ultimately the debate centres upon the role of the market in social development rather than upon the need for a market as such. Mandel follows the majority socialist tradition in arguing that the market must eventually wither away.” [Roland Lew, “A Feasible Socialism.” The Socialist Register. Volume 22, 1985/1986. Pages 414-435.]
           “… [There is] the ‘market-less socialism’ of Ernest Mandel ….” [David Gorman, “Critical Unrealism.” Radical Chains. Number 4, November 1993. Original pagination unknown.]
           “Socialists should view neo-capitalism as an essentially organic development of monopoly capitalism. This means that they can neither see their task as the hastening of neo-capitalist reforms, nor in defending more backward capitalists, who try to obstruct neo-capitalist reforms because they cannot keep up with the pace of investment and competition. The approach must be the same as the one socialists took traditionally towards capitalist concentration and monopolies, neither ‘promoting’ concentration in the name of efficiency, nor ‘defending’ technically backward firms in the name of economic freedom, but of considering concentration as inevitable within the framework of capitalism, while using the progress of concentration as a most powerful argument in favour of introducing socialism.” [Ernest Mandel, “The Economics of Neo-Capitalism.” The Socialist Register. Volume 1, 1964. Pages 56-67.]
           “It is the partisans of the alleged ‘eternal’ advantages of market economy, including of ‘market socialism’, who show an obstinate dogmatism, a growing blindness to empirical data, in the unfolding of the debate about the ‘feasibility’ of socialism, opposing less and less relevant trends (either of the past or of more backward economies) to what really has been going on in the advanced economies during the last forty to fifty years.…
           “… If they [producers/consumers] want to forego the second television set in exchange for more leisure or less strenuous and less monotonous work, they have the perfect right to do so. Nobody should dictate these preferences to them, neither markets nor experts, nor scientists/philosophers, nor charismatic leaders, nor parties, all of whom history has proven to be anything but omniscient. But they should have the right to make these decisions freely, by the light of their own consciousness and sensibility. That is what human freedom is all about. That is what socialist planning is all about.”
           [Ernest Mandel, “The Myth of Market Socialism.” New Left Review. Series I, number 169, May–June 1988. Pages 108-120.]
           “… precisely the trend towards wider and wider de facto cooperation between ordinary people, which has developed side by side with the objective socialization of labour, shows that there is a way out between the Scylla of blind market forces and the Charybdis of huge centralized bureaucracies: democratically centralized—that is, articulated—self-management, based on deliberate and free cooperation.…
           “But would this ‘third solution’ not lead to an idealization of routine and custom—that is, to economic stagnation? Certainly not in the field of production, where the producers’ interests in reducing their workload and ameliorating human ecology would generate a built-in incentive to cost-cutting.”
           [Ernest Mandel, “In Defence of Socialist Planning.” New Left Review. Series I, number 159, September–October 1986. Pages 5-37.]
           “We say to the radical pacifists: humanity will not be freed from the nightmare of the nuclear threat unless it takes into its own hands the right and the power to decide what is produced and what cannot be produced. This implies the elimination of private property, of competition between individuals and between states, and of the market economy. If you are not ready to pay this price, it is because you prefer to run the risk of seeing the human race disappear, rather than change the social system that is leading to collective suicide.” [Ernest Mandel, “The Threat of War and the Struggle for Socialism.” New Left Review. Series I, number 141, September–October 1983. Pages 23-50.]
           “As long as socialism or revolution are only ideals preached by militants because of their own convictions and consciousness, their social impact is inevitably limited. But when the ideas of revolutionary socialism are able to unite faith, confidence and consciousness with the immediate material interest of a social class in revolt—the working class, then their potential becomes literally explosive.” [Ernest Mandel, “Where is America Going?” New Left Review. Series I, number 54, March–April 1969. Pages 3-15.]

Return to the table of contents.

Copyright © 2014- Mark A. Foster, Ph.D. All rights reserved.
Marxisms and Neo-Marxisms is a MarkFoster.NETwork™ publication.